Add some todos based on Benny's feedback

chapter-introduction/chapter.tex

@@ -8,6 +8,53 @@
 \chaptertitle{Introduction}
 \label{chapter-intro}
 
+% New draft:
+%
+% Passionate statement about democracy and academic freedom
+% 
+% We live in times of rising fascist and authoritarian sentiment worldwide. While computer science and cryptography are
+% often portrayed as politically neutral technologies, their practice is a political act and can have grave real-world
+% consequences.
+% maybe: Within mathematics and computer science, the field of cryptography is unique in that it smainstream views
+% link to cypherpunks, hackers
+% Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are an example of such a political technology. The core function of HSMs is to
+% protect cryptographic secrets against \emph{any} physical attack. Even though they are widely used in finance and
+% business applications, in their design, they curiously embody the radical idiology of the cypherpunk and hacker
+% movements.
+%
+% We believe physically secure devices like HSMs can be a keystone technology in the creation of secure systems for
+% communication and computation in a free, democratic society. However, while current state-of-the art commercial
+% devices can be expected to resist a fascist police force or even some authoritarian states' secret services, their
+% physical security is still lacking due to misaligned ecosystem incentices. As Anderson put it,
+% todo cite: betrusted
+% 
+% FIXME: quote from anderson: Security economics remains a big soft spot, with security chips being in many
+% ways a market for lemons. A banker buying HSMs probably won’t be aware of
+% the huge gap between FIPS [US national HSM security standard] level 3 and level 4, and understand that level 3 can
+% sometimes be defeated with a Swiss army knife. The buying incentive there is
+% compliance, and where real security clashes with operations it’s not surprising
+% to see weaker standards designed to make compliance easier. API security is
+% too hard, and the difference between HSMs’ internal and external APIs makes
+% it too confusing. The near-abdication of FIPS in favour of ISO 19790 and vari-
+% ous protection profiles touted under the Common Criteria will confuse things
+% further, as will the UK’s move away from the Criteria. Confusion marketing
+% and liability games appear set to continue.
+%
+% Meanwhile in academia, 
+% In this thesis, we aim to significantly advance the field of hardware security module construction. We publish all
+% designs, code and data as open source to create the groundwork for future research, and sow the seeds for a new
+% generation of secure hardware that will be able to resist a rising tide of fascist and authoritarian movements.
+%
+% 
+% 
+% Research questions:
+% 1. can hsm w/o proprietary mesh?
+% 2. how do meshes look like in practice?
+% 3. can we improve monitoring?
+% 4. can we solve power transfer issue 
+% 5. applications
+%
+
 All Cops Are Bastards, or ACAB is a slogan popular in far left and anarchist circles since the mid-twentieth century
 that expresses a rejection of state authority~\cite{constantinouAppliedResearchPolicing2021}. While politically, this
 blanket rejection is a fringe viewpoint with no mainstream acceptance, there exists a parallel between this and modern
@@ -77,25 +124,6 @@ thesis that progress from theory to practical deployment.
         guarantee?
 \end{enumerate}
 
-% FIXME: quote from anderson: Security economics remains a big soft spot, with security chips being in many
-% ways a market for lemons. A banker buying HSMs probably won’t be aware of
-% the huge gap between FIPS level 3 and level 4, and understand that level 3 can
-% sometimes be defeated with a Swiss army knife. The buying incentive there is
-% compliance, and where real security clashes with operations it’s not surprising
-% to see weaker standards designed to make compliance easier. API security is
-% too hard, and the difference between HSMs’ internal and external APIs makes
-% it too confusing. The near-abdication of FIPS in favour of ISO 19790 and vari-
-% ous protection profiles touted under the Common Criteria will confuse things
-% further, as will the UK’s move away from the Criteria. Confusion marketing
-% and liability games appear set to continue. But does this matter?
-% First, most of the HSM business is moving to the cloud, with Azure and AWS
-% each having of the order of 2,000 HSMs, and Google playing catchup. Instead of
-% having a few thousand banks each running a few, or a few dozen, HSMs we’ll
-% have three companies running a few thousand. As the prices are driven down,
-% the HSM vendor engineers’ expertise will be lost; and as the cloud service
-% providers guard their datacentres, HSMs are likely to be replaced by crypto
-% chips.
-
 To answer our first research question, we propose the Inertial Hardware Security Module (IHSM), a new type of HSM that
 extends the high level of protection offered by the modern cryptographic software stack down to the hardware level,
 enabling secure computation in insecure places.

chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ manufacturing processes are difficult to replicate and that the resulting cost o
 lower-security applications such as card payment terminals, simpler approaches are still commonly used for their ease of
 implementation. Often, standard copper/polyimide Flexible Printed Circuits (FPCs) or even standard Printed Circuit
 Boards (PCBs) are used because of the wide availability of manufacturing services.
+\todo{Integrate new scope plots!}
 
 Inertial HSMs are one approach that enables the use of less expensive, commodity materials in high-security
 applications. Several other academic approaches exist that target low-cost~\cite{