From 132a6cc5ee1d2cd6ca4f49380ebb8bd4d16b50a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jaseg Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2025 21:39:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Add some todos based on Benny's feedback --- chapter-introduction/chapter.tex | 66 ++++++++++++++++------- chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex | 1 + 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex b/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex index fc10acd..71e7f8a 100644 --- a/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex @@ -8,6 +8,53 @@ \chaptertitle{Introduction} \label{chapter-intro} +% New draft: +% +% Passionate statement about democracy and academic freedom +% +% We live in times of rising fascist and authoritarian sentiment worldwide. While computer science and cryptography are +% often portrayed as politically neutral technologies, their practice is a political act and can have grave real-world +% consequences. +% maybe: Within mathematics and computer science, the field of cryptography is unique in that it smainstream views +% link to cypherpunks, hackers +% Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are an example of such a political technology. The core function of HSMs is to +% protect cryptographic secrets against \emph{any} physical attack. Even though they are widely used in finance and +% business applications, in their design, they curiously embody the radical idiology of the cypherpunk and hacker +% movements. +% +% We believe physically secure devices like HSMs can be a keystone technology in the creation of secure systems for +% communication and computation in a free, democratic society. However, while current state-of-the art commercial +% devices can be expected to resist a fascist police force or even some authoritarian states' secret services, their +% physical security is still lacking due to misaligned ecosystem incentices. As Anderson put it, +% todo cite: betrusted +% +% FIXME: quote from anderson: Security economics remains a big soft spot, with security chips being in many +% ways a market for lemons. A banker buying HSMs probably won’t be aware of +% the huge gap between FIPS [US national HSM security standard] level 3 and level 4, and understand that level 3 can +% sometimes be defeated with a Swiss army knife. The buying incentive there is +% compliance, and where real security clashes with operations it’s not surprising +% to see weaker standards designed to make compliance easier. API security is +% too hard, and the difference between HSMs’ internal and external APIs makes +% it too confusing. The near-abdication of FIPS in favour of ISO 19790 and vari- +% ous protection profiles touted under the Common Criteria will confuse things +% further, as will the UK’s move away from the Criteria. Confusion marketing +% and liability games appear set to continue. +% +% Meanwhile in academia, +% In this thesis, we aim to significantly advance the field of hardware security module construction. We publish all +% designs, code and data as open source to create the groundwork for future research, and sow the seeds for a new +% generation of secure hardware that will be able to resist a rising tide of fascist and authoritarian movements. +% +% +% +% Research questions: +% 1. can hsm w/o proprietary mesh? +% 2. how do meshes look like in practice? +% 3. can we improve monitoring? +% 4. can we solve power transfer issue +% 5. applications +% + All Cops Are Bastards, or ACAB is a slogan popular in far left and anarchist circles since the mid-twentieth century that expresses a rejection of state authority~\cite{constantinouAppliedResearchPolicing2021}. While politically, this blanket rejection is a fringe viewpoint with no mainstream acceptance, there exists a parallel between this and modern @@ -77,25 +124,6 @@ thesis that progress from theory to practical deployment. guarantee? \end{enumerate} -% FIXME: quote from anderson: Security economics remains a big soft spot, with security chips being in many -% ways a market for lemons. A banker buying HSMs probably won’t be aware of -% the huge gap between FIPS level 3 and level 4, and understand that level 3 can -% sometimes be defeated with a Swiss army knife. The buying incentive there is -% compliance, and where real security clashes with operations it’s not surprising -% to see weaker standards designed to make compliance easier. API security is -% too hard, and the difference between HSMs’ internal and external APIs makes -% it too confusing. The near-abdication of FIPS in favour of ISO 19790 and vari- -% ous protection profiles touted under the Common Criteria will confuse things -% further, as will the UK’s move away from the Criteria. Confusion marketing -% and liability games appear set to continue. But does this matter? -% First, most of the HSM business is moving to the cloud, with Azure and AWS -% each having of the order of 2,000 HSMs, and Google playing catchup. Instead of -% having a few thousand banks each running a few, or a few dozen, HSMs we’ll -% have three companies running a few thousand. As the prices are driven down, -% the HSM vendor engineers’ expertise will be lost; and as the cloud service -% providers guard their datacentres, HSMs are likely to be replaced by crypto -% chips. - To answer our first research question, we propose the Inertial Hardware Security Module (IHSM), a new type of HSM that extends the high level of protection offered by the modern cryptographic software stack down to the hardware level, enabling secure computation in insecure places. diff --git a/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex index 6d9915d..4f9fae6 100644 --- a/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ manufacturing processes are difficult to replicate and that the resulting cost o lower-security applications such as card payment terminals, simpler approaches are still commonly used for their ease of implementation. Often, standard copper/polyimide Flexible Printed Circuits (FPCs) or even standard Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) are used because of the wide availability of manufacturing services. +\todo{Integrate new scope plots!} Inertial HSMs are one approach that enables the use of less expensive, commodity materials in high-security applications. Several other academic approaches exist that target low-cost~\cite{