Include some of Benny's feedback

ai-llm-use-disclosure.tex

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ wrong output. Thus, I used the following list of observations to guide my LLM us
 
 \begin{enumerate}
     \item Passing text through an LLM is an imprecise operation. Especially when large amounts of text are passed
-        through an LLM, despite clear instructions such as ``only fix spelling errors'', the LLM output might deviate
+        through an LLM, despite clear instructions such as ``only fix spelling errors,'' the LLM output might deviate
         from the source text. Therefore, the document text should never be passed through the LLM, and the LLM should be
         prompted to point out problems, or to produce a list of suggestions for improvements instead.
     \item LLMs are really bad at summarizing text that contains novel concepts. LLM summaries of text often converge to

chapter-introduction/chapter.tex

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ All Cops Are Bastards, or ACAB is a slogan popular in far left and anarchist cir
 that expresses a rejection of state authority~\cite{constantinouAppliedResearchPolicing2021}. While politically, this
 blanket rejection is a fringe viewpoint with no mainstream acceptance, there exists a parallel between this and modern
 cryptographic best practice. In modern cryptography, it is generally seen as best practice to have the least amount of
-keys possible involved in any computation. and cryptographers have time and time again strongly rejected attempts by
+keys possible involved in any computation and cryptographers have time and time again strongly rejected attempts by
 states and other authorities to insert backdoor access mechanisms into cryptographic systems~\cite{
     abelsonRisksKeyRecovery1997,
     abelsonKeysDoormats2015,
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ the system design, its possibility is considered a vulnerability.
 % required to comply with so-called \emph{Lawful Interception} orders on particular customers or traffic types, and
 % datacenter operators commonly provide hardware access to state authorities. The design decisions in cryptographic
 % protocols generally hold, and the gold standard for backdoor access to modern systems is either exploiting a
-% \emph{zero-day} flaw that is not yet publically known, or acquiring physical access to the target system.
+% \emph{zero-day} flaw that is not yet publicly known, or acquiring physical access to the target system.
 
 In this thesis, we aim to extend the level of protection afforded by cryptographic protocol design down the technology
 stack. While cryptographic protocols and modern software from the operating system up make it possible to secure the