Intro WIP
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@ -51,12 +51,62 @@ We conclude this thesis with an overview of two concrete use cases IHSMs unlock
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conventional HSMs: Datacenter-scale Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) and long-range Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
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networks.
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\section{Building Inertial HSMs}
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In a system with a secure software stack, the role of a HSM is to secure the hardware part of the stack. The basic
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approach of a HSM is to combine a secure software stack with a fast self-destruct mechanism and tamper sensors. The
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self-destruct mechanism can be hardware or software that quickly, securely wipes all cryptographic secrets, rendering
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the device worthless to an attacker. The tamper sensors are tasked with detecting any physical attack an attacker could
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mount on the device. Common classes of such sensors include \emph{tamper-sensing meshes}, i.e.\ flexible foils attached
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to the HSM's enclosure that detect attempts at penetrating the shell of the device with probes, and environmental
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sensors such as temperature or radiation sensors that detect attempts at causing controllable faults in the HSM by
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heating, cooling or irradiating it. Out of these sensors, the tamper-sensing meshes are the core line of defense against
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most physical attacks. Such meshes are very effective at mitigating almost all physical attacks, but they are difficult
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to construct securely as they usually require bespoke manufacturing processes. As a result, they are currently only used
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in niche applications, and even there not every realization is equally secure.
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%In cryptography, Kerckhoffs' principle, named after Dutch military cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs, expresses that the
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%security of a cryptographic system should only depend on the secrecy of its keys, not on the secrecy of its design. In
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%this way, Kerckhoff's principle states the opposite of the common industry practice of \emph{Security by Obscurity},
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%which aims to achieve security by making it sufficiently annoying to cryptoanalyze a system that nobody bothers.
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Inertial HSMs solve the issue of creating an impenetrable tamper-sensing envelope by replacing the bespoke
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tamper-sensing mesh foil with a set of simple, rigid meshes made from commodity Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) that are
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rotating at high speed. In motion, these simple PCB tamper-sensing meshes are as secure as the much more sophisticated
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bespoke foils used in conventional HSMs, yet they are simpler and less expensive to manufacture. To verify that the mesh
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is rotating correctly, an accelerometer is placed on the rotating mesh, and its centrifugal force reading is used to
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validate its path of motion.
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\section{Cryptographic Principles and Physical Reality}
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Cryptographers' aversion to backdoor access derives from a combination of two fundamental computing principles:
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Kerckhoffs' principle, and the principle of least authority. In cryptography, Kerckhoffs' principle, named after Dutch
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military cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs, expresses that the security of a cryptographic system should only depend on
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the secrecy of its keys, not on the secrecy of its design. In this way, Kerckhoff's principle states the opposite of the
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common industry practice of \emph{Security by Obscurity}, which aims to achieve security by making it sufficiently
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annoying to cryptoanalyze a system that nobody bothers. Complementary to Kerckhoff's is the principle of least
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authority, which describes that in a secure system each component should only have access to the smallest set of
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capabilities necessary to fulfill its purpose. Applying both to a cryptographic system means that the system's design
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should be transparent and not include any hiddent components or opaque parts that cannot be inspected, and that the
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system's keys should be scoped to place the least amount of trust possible in each participating party.
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Let's take a basic videoconferencing system as an example. In our example system's deployment, users logen to a central
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conference server, which receives and distributes the users' video streams. Allowing backdoor access to the video
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streams to some third party like a datacenter operator or a state would violate Kerckhoffs' principle since it would
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have to be hidden from the systems' participants, who would therefore not have a complete view of the systems' deployed
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architecture. The principle of least authority would also be violated since in almost all cases, such a backdoor access
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system would not see legitimate use. As a result, it would possess capabilities that almost never would be essential to
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the proper function of the videoconference system.
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In their design, almost all modern software -- especially open source -- cleanly applies these principles. However, the
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practical reality after deployment almost always deviates from them. While backdoors are vanishingly rare in modern
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open-source software, practical depoloyments usually are vulnerable to physical attacks. Modern hardware generally is
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not designed with a local attacker with advanced physical attack capabilities in mind since no mitigation can fully
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prevent them, they can only be detected, or at best slowed down. As a result, commonplace attacks against modern
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software often involve taking over the hardware at some point in the chain. Even End-to-End-Encrypted (E2EE)
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communication systems can be compromised if one of the encrypted channel's endpoints can be physically compromised.
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Corresponding \emph{digital forensics} capabilities are commonplace among state actors, and are available as a turnkey
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solution on the market.
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A consequence of the difficulty of defending against physical attacks along with the wide availability of attack tools
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and services is that
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\section{Inertial HSM Applications}
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%In the early days of mass-market computing, the expectations towards this new tool were high. Even before people
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@ -90,8 +140,6 @@ networks.
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% Cypherpunks
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\section{Centralized Authority}
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% ACAB is a anti-authoritarian sentiment
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% In anarchist discourse, "cops" are not just policemen and -women, but also other means of centralized control.
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% Anarchism rejects centralized authority in favor of the freedom of individuals because it recognizes the dangers
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