Finish up conclusion

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@ -252,31 +252,27 @@ choices resulting from conflicting constraints and lack of awareness. In Chapter
results of a survey across approximately 30 real world tamper sensing mesh implementations, analyzing common design results of a survey across approximately 30 real world tamper sensing mesh implementations, analyzing common design
features. features.
The latter half of our survey in Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey} answers our second research question. From our analysis of The second half of our survey in Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey} answers our second research question. From our analysis of
this large corpus of devices, we deduce a list of design criteria that can be applied to increase the security of any a large corpus of devices, we deduce a list of design criteria that can be applied to increase the security of any
tamper sensing mesh implementation. tamper sensing mesh implementation. To answer our third research question, in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm} we propose the
Inertial Hardware Security Module (IHSM), a new type of HSM that extends the high level of protection offered by the
To answer our third research question, in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm} we propose the Inertial Hardware Security Module modern cryptographic software stack down to the hardware level, enabling secure computation in insecure places. IHSMs
(IHSM), a new type of HSM that extends the high level of protection offered by the modern cryptographic software stack can be built from basic, off-the-shelf components and do not require bespoke manufacturing processes. To answer our
down to the hardware level, enabling secure computation in insecure places. IHSMs can be built from basic, off-the-shelf fourth research question, in Chapter~\ref{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon} we propose improvements to the state of the art in
components and do not require bespoke manufacturing processes. HSM tamper sensors based on the use of low-cost, embeddable Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR). Our improvements can be
applied to both IHSMs and to conventional HSMs. IHSMs come with unique power supply constraints since their rotating
To answer our fourth research question, in Chapter~\ref{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon} we propose improvements to the state mesh must be continuously powered. A straightforward solution utilizes Wireless Power Transfer using planar inductors,
of the art in HSM tamper sensors based on the use of low-cost, embeddable Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR). Our but existing WPT designs exhbit a ripple voltage due to an asymmetry of conventional planar inductors. This leads to our
improvements can be applied to both IHSMs and conventional HSMs. fifth research question, which we solve in Chapter~\ref{chapter-nice-coils} with the design and experimental evaluation
of a new, generalized class of \emph{twisted} planar inductors that reduces voltage ripple in rotating shaft setups.
IHSMs come with unique power supply constraints since their rotating mesh must be continuously powered. A A finding of independent interest is that compared to conventional two-layer planar inductors, in our experiments our
straightforward solution utilizes Wireless Power Transfer using planar inductors, but existing WPT designs exhbit a proposed inductor design improved self-resonant frequency by up to \qty{50}{\percent} and increased inductance by up to
ripple voltage due to an asymmetry of conventional planar inductors. This leads to our fifth research question, which \qty{6.5}{\percent}. Finally, we answer our last research question by showing in two case studies how an end-to-end
we solve in Chapter~\ref{chapter-nice-coils} with the design and experimental evaluation of a new, generalized class of design of an IHSM-secured data processing system could look like. Both case studies concern scenarios that IHSMs unlock
\emph{twisted} planar inductors that reduces voltage ripple in rotating shaft setups. that were previously infeasible using conventional HSMs: In Chapter~\ref{chapter-qkd}, we explore how IHSMs enable
long-range Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) networks using trustable physically secured relay nodes and in
Finally, we answer our last research question by showing in two case studies how an end-to-end design of an IHSM-secured Chapter~\ref{chapter-smpc} we elaborate how datacenter-scale Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) clusters can be
data processing system could look like. Both case studies concern scenarios that IHSMs unlock that were previously created using IHSM enclosures with commercial server hardware.
infeasible using conventional HSMs: In Chapter~\ref{chapter-qkd}, we explore how IHSMs enable long-range Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) networks using trustable physically secured relay nodes and in Chapter~\ref{chapter-smpc} we
elaborate how datacenter-scale Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) clusters can be created using IHSM enclosures with
commercial server hardware.
\section{Contributions} \section{Contributions}