fix up intro and conclusion
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5 changed files with 40 additions and 33 deletions
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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ all: thesis.pdf
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echo "Undefined biblatex references:"
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grep -A2 'Package biblatex Warning: The following entry could not be found' thesis.log | sed -n '3~4{s/(biblatex) *//;p}' || echo "<None>"
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%-final.pdf: %.tex common-packages.tex common-defs.tex main.bib version.tex
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%-final.pdf: %.tex common-packages.tex common-defs.tex main.bib version.tex abstract.tex abstract-de.tex
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pdflatex -jobname $*-final -shell-escape $<
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biber $*-final
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pdflatex -jobname $*-final -shell-escape $<
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@ -16,8 +16,8 @@
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Nischenanwendungen wie z.B.\ der Zertifikatsausstellung im Transport Layer Security (TLS)-System sowie der
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Zahlungsdatenverarbeitung eingesetzt.
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In dieser Dissertation wird das Inertiale Hardware-Sicherheitsmodul (IHSM), eine neue Architektur für
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Hardware-Sicherheitsmodule vorgestellt. IHSMs stellen einen hoch sicheren, aktiven Manipulationsschutz bereit.
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In dieser Dissertation wird das Inertiale Hardware-Sicherheitsmodul (IHSM) vorgestellt, eine neue Architektur für
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Hardware-Sicherheitsmodule. IHSMs stellen einen hoch sicheren, aktiven Manipulationsschutz bereit.
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Gleichzeitig können mithilfe der IHSM-Technologie kryptographische Rechnersysteme von wesentlich größeren
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Abmessungen, Gewicht und elektrischer Leistungsaufnahme geschützt werden, als es in konventionellen HSMs möglich
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ist. IHSMs ersetzen die kostenintensiven und in der Herstellung aufwendigen Meshes
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@ -3,22 +3,29 @@
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political tool, and it confers on the field an intrinsically moral dimension.}
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\chapter{Conclusion}
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In this thesis, we propose Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs), a new approach to physical security that combines
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conventional tamper-sensing meshes with physical movement to bootstrap a highly secure system from low-security,
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off-the-shelf parts, solving our first research question introduced in Chapter~\ref{chapter-intro}. To motivate our
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research, we use the German national digital health record system as an example demonstrating the difficulties in
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achieving useful hardware security in practice. Besides some minor cryptographic oddities, our analysis reveals at least
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one essential specification mistake that negates the hardware security of the system by unnecessarily introducing a
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poorly protected HSM. With this motivation in mind, we support the construction of concretely secure IHSMs by providing
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deep analyses of two key engineering challenges in IHSM construction, mesh monitoring and power transfer. Solving our
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second research question, we propose a low-cost TDR-based mesh monitoring system that exceeds the capabilities of
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previous systems from academic or from patent literature. Our system is capable of monitoring large meshes while
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simultaneously providing detailed results. Our TDR-based mesh monitoring system is of independent interest, since it can
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also be integrated into traditional HSM designs. We additionally propose a new, generalized design for high-frequency
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PCB inductors with low parasitic capacitance. Our design provides better bandwidth and lower parasitic capacitance
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compared to the state of the art without increasing implementation cost. We conclude this thesis with two chapters
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elaborating on two new use cases that are made possible by IHSM technology due to its ability to protect large payloads
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that have high power consumption. Together, these results answer our third and final research question.
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In this thesis, we provided an examination of the field of Hardware Security Modules both from an academic perspective
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and with regards to their practical implementation. We answered our first research question introduced in
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Chapter~\ref{chapter-intro} on the current state of the art in Chapters~\ref{chapter-epa} and \ref{chapter-survey},
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providing a comprehensive view of practical implementations. Chapter~\ref{chapter-epa} motivates our research using the
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German national digital health record system as an example that demonstrates the difficulties in achieving practical
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hardware security. Besides some minor cryptographic oddities, our analysis reveals at least one essential specification
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mistake that negates the hardware security of the system by unnecessarily introducing a poorly protected HSM. In
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Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}, we answer our second research question in a detailed survey of a wide range of devices
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that utilize tamper-sensing meshes, distilling a set of criteria for the design of secure tamper-sensing meshes. In
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Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}, we propose Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs), a new approach to physical security
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that combines conventional tamper-sensing meshes with physical movement. IHSMs enable bootstrapping a highly secure
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system from low-security, off-the-shelf parts, thereby solving our third research question on achieving physical
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security without bespoke components. We support the construction of concretely secure IHSMs by providing deep analyses
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of two key engineering challenges in IHSM construction, mesh monitoring and power transfer. Solving our fourth research
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question on mesh monitoring fidelity, we propose a low-cost TDR-based mesh monitoring system that exceeds the
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capabilities of previous systems from academic or from patent literature. Our system is capable of monitoring large
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meshes while simultaneously providing detailed results. Our TDR-based mesh monitoring system is of independent interest,
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since it can also be integrated into traditional HSM designs. Solving our fifth research question on ripple reduction
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for rotating Wireless Power Transfer for IHSMs, we propose a new, generalized design for high-frequency PCB inductors
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with low parasitic capacitance. Beyond our IHSM application, our design provides better bandwidth and lower parasitic
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capacitance compared to the state of the art without increasing implementation cost. We conclude this thesis with two
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chapters elaborating on two new use cases that are made possible by IHSM technology due to its ability to protect large
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payloads that have high power consumption. Together, these results answer our sixth and final research question.
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The research presented in this thesis is aimed at advancing both academic research and applied engineering in hardware
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security. We believe that by publishing our research including its artifacts under open source licenses, we provide the
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@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ and even general computation~\cite{
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aumannSecurityCovertAdversaries2010,
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chorPrivateInformationRetrieval}
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in a decentralized way that avoids trusted authorities.
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While politically, this blanket rejection of authority represents a fringe viewpoint, in cryptography it has a long
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tradition originating with the Cypherpunk and Hacker movements~\cite{
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While politically, the anarchist blanket rejection of authority represents a fringe viewpoint, in cryptography it has a
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long tradition originating with the Cypherpunk and Hacker movements~\cite{
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andersonCypherpunkEthicsRadical2022,
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hughesCypherpunksManifesto,
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jarvisCryptoWarsFight2020,
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@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ providing strict physical security guarantees, but these systems are expensive,
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and their physical security is often questionable~\cite{
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obermaier2018,
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andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020},
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which we wi elaborate further in Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}. \textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} writes on
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HSMs and their security standards:
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which we will elaborate further in Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}. \textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} writes
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on HSM security:
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\begin{quote}
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Security economics remains a big soft spot, with security chips being in many ways a market for lemons. A banker
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@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ HSMs and their security standards:
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understand that level 3 can sometimes be defeated with a Swiss army knife. The buying incentive there is compliance,
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and where real security clashes with operations it’s not surprising to see weaker standards designed to make
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compliance easier.
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\begin{flushright}
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\textit{\textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} p. 629}
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\end{flushright}
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@ -231,7 +230,7 @@ computing power by increasing feasible payload power dissipation by orders of ma
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\section{Research Questions and Contributions}
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Based on the current state of the field of hardware security, we deduce three overarching research questions for this
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Based on the current state of the field of hardware security, we deduce six overarching research questions for this
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thesis that progress from theory to practical deployment.
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\begin{enumerate}
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@ -253,7 +252,7 @@ choices resulting from conflicting constraints and lack of awareness. In Chapter
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results of a survey across approximately 30 real world tamper sensing mesh implementations, analyzing common design
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features.
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The latter half of our survey in Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey} answers our second research quesion. From our analysis of
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The latter half of our survey in Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey} answers our second research question. From our analysis of
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this large corpus of devices, we deduce a list of design criteria that can be applied to increase the security of any
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tamper sensing mesh implementation.
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@ -262,16 +261,16 @@ To answer our third research question, in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm} we propose
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down to the hardware level, enabling secure computation in insecure places. IHSMs can be built from basic, off-the-shelf
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components and do not require bespoke manufacturing processes.
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IHSMs come with unique power supply constraints since their rotating mesh must be continuously powered. A
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straightforward solution utilizes Wireless Power Transfer using planar inductors, but existing WPT designs exhbit a
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ripple voltage due to an asymmetry of conventional planar inductors. This leads to our fourth research question, which
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we solve in Chapter~\ref{chapter-nice-coils} with the design and experimental evaluation of a new, generalized class of
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\emph{twisted} planar inductors that reduces voltage ripple in rotating shaft setups.
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To answer our fifth research question, in Chapter~\ref{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon} we propose improvements to the state
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To answer our fourth research question, in Chapter~\ref{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon} we propose improvements to the state
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of the art in HSM tamper sensors based on the use of low-cost, embeddable Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR). Our
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improvements can be applied to both IHSMs and conventional HSMs.
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IHSMs come with unique power supply constraints since their rotating mesh must be continuously powered. A
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straightforward solution utilizes Wireless Power Transfer using planar inductors, but existing WPT designs exhbit a
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ripple voltage due to an asymmetry of conventional planar inductors. This leads to our fifth research question, which
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we solve in Chapter~\ref{chapter-nice-coils} with the design and experimental evaluation of a new, generalized class of
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\emph{twisted} planar inductors that reduces voltage ripple in rotating shaft setups.
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Finally, we answer our last research question by showing in two case studies how an end-to-end design of an IHSM-secured
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data processing system could look like. Both case studies concern scenarios that IHSMs unlock that were previously
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infeasible using conventional HSMs: In Chapter~\ref{chapter-qkd}, we explore how IHSMs enable long-range Quantum Key
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@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
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\hyphenation{da-ta-cen-ter}
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\hyphenation{Si-cher-heits-mo-du-l}
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\hyphenation{Si-cher-heits-mo-du-le}
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\babelhyphenation[ngerman]{Si-cher-heits-mo-dul}
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\setstretch{1.3}
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