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@ -46,10 +46,10 @@
\begin{document}
\author{Anonymous Author(s)}
\institute{}
%\author{Jan Sebastian Götte\inst{1}}
%\institute{Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany, \email{research@jaseg.de}}
%\author{Anonymous Author(s)}
%\institute{}
\author{Jan Sebastian Götte\inst{1}}
\institute{Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany, \email{research@jaseg.de}}
\title{Germany Is Rolling Out Nation-Scale Key Escrow And Nobody Is Talking About It}
\maketitle
\keywords{Physical Security\and Tamper Resistance\and Hardware Security Module
@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ This coating is specified to be tamper-evident, but notably no active tamper det
by this standard. In contrast to the newer FIPS 140-3 standard and the related ISO/IEC 19790 \cite{ISOIEC19790} as well
as ISO/IEC 24759 \cite{ISOIEC24759} standards, FIPS 140-2 does not make any particular requirements regarding resistance
to side-channel attacks. The lack of tamper response, unspecified resistance to side-channel attacks and the fact that
the ePA specification only requires the long-lived key escrow root key inside the HSM to have 256 bits of security lead
the ePA specification only requires the long-lived key escrow root key inside the HSM to have 256 bits of entropy lead
to an unsatisfactory overall constellation.
\section{Conclusion}