diff --git a/paper.tex b/paper.tex
index e4f9455..8b88008 100644
--- a/paper.tex
+++ b/paper.tex
@@ -46,10 +46,10 @@
 
 \begin{document}
 
-\author{Anonymous Author(s)}
-\institute{}
-%\author{Jan Sebastian Götte\inst{1}}
-%\institute{Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany, \email{research@jaseg.de}}
+%\author{Anonymous Author(s)}
+%\institute{}
+\author{Jan Sebastian Götte\inst{1}}
+\institute{Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany, \email{research@jaseg.de}}
 \title{Germany Is Rolling Out Nation-Scale Key Escrow And Nobody Is Talking About It}
 \maketitle
 \keywords{Physical Security\and Tamper Resistance\and Hardware Security Module
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ This coating is specified to be tamper-evident, but notably no active tamper det
 by this standard. In contrast to the newer FIPS 140-3 standard and the related ISO/IEC 19790 \cite{ISOIEC19790} as well
 as ISO/IEC 24759 \cite{ISOIEC24759} standards, FIPS 140-2 does not make any particular requirements regarding resistance
 to side-channel attacks. The lack of tamper response, unspecified resistance to side-channel attacks and the fact that
-the ePA specification only requires the long-lived key escrow root key inside the HSM to have 256 bits of security lead
+the ePA specification only requires the long-lived key escrow root key inside the HSM to have 256 bits of entropy lead
 to an unsatisfactory overall constellation.
 
 \section{Conclusion}