From 70daf2b35b75152ab89c7fee322f197b685624bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jaseg Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 10:30:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Camera-ready changes --- paper.tex | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/paper.tex b/paper.tex index e4f9455..8b88008 100644 --- a/paper.tex +++ b/paper.tex @@ -46,10 +46,10 @@ \begin{document} -\author{Anonymous Author(s)} -\institute{} -%\author{Jan Sebastian Götte\inst{1}} -%\institute{Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany, \email{research@jaseg.de}} +%\author{Anonymous Author(s)} +%\institute{} +\author{Jan Sebastian Götte\inst{1}} +\institute{Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany, \email{research@jaseg.de}} \title{Germany Is Rolling Out Nation-Scale Key Escrow And Nobody Is Talking About It} \maketitle \keywords{Physical Security\and Tamper Resistance\and Hardware Security Module @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ This coating is specified to be tamper-evident, but notably no active tamper det by this standard. In contrast to the newer FIPS 140-3 standard and the related ISO/IEC 19790 \cite{ISOIEC19790} as well as ISO/IEC 24759 \cite{ISOIEC24759} standards, FIPS 140-2 does not make any particular requirements regarding resistance to side-channel attacks. The lack of tamper response, unspecified resistance to side-channel attacks and the fact that -the ePA specification only requires the long-lived key escrow root key inside the HSM to have 256 bits of security lead +the ePA specification only requires the long-lived key escrow root key inside the HSM to have 256 bits of entropy lead to an unsatisfactory overall constellation. \section{Conclusion}