237 lines
19 KiB
TeX
237 lines
19 KiB
TeX
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\chapterquote{attributed to Grace Hopper\cite{
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WikiQuoteGraceHopper,
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QuoteOriginMost2014,
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}}{
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The most dangerous phrase in the language is ``We've always done it this way!''.
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}
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\chaptertitle{The German ePA: A Motivating Counter-Example}
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\todo{FIXME: Proper citation here}
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\sourceattrib{This part is based on a short paper written by me and presented by me at the HS3 workshop at ESORICS
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2025.}
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Looking at the landscape of computer security solutions, we are presented with a wide variety of vendors and products
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that may give the impression that hardware security is a solved problem. Vendors sell various claims rangning from
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\emph{You don't need hardware security, just do it in the cloud!} to \emph{Buy our HSM and you will be secure!}. In
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practice, things are not as easy and even well-intentioned projects still often go awry on the hardware security
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dimension. Concluding this chapter, we will now have a look at one such project that was done by capable people with the
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best intentions, yet it resulted in a hardware security design that is dangerously inadequate for the purpose.
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Beginning May 2025, after several delays, Germany has started the nation-scale rollout of its new electronic medical
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record system. The system aims to create a national database accessible to all healthcare providers that holds the
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complete electronic medical records of all publically insured people living in Germany. The system aims to replace
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paper-based workflows that are error-prone and lead to healthcare providers often only having access to a subset of
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patient's medical records. Data in scope for the system includes medical letters, laboratory results, and medical
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imaging files.
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Due to Germany's mandatory health insurance laws, the system's user base encompasses the majority of all German
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residents. People who have replaced their public health insurance with private insurance as of now are not subject to
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the system. In Germany, by law private health insurance is only available to people from the top 10th percentile of
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household income. This means that the system disproportionally affects people who have low income, creating an equity
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issue. While it is possible to opt out from the use of the system, the process of opting out is difficult. Additionally,
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the government and health insurance providers have publically depicted the system in a one-sidedly positive way, meaning
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that it is unlikely the majority of people subject to the system have a comprehensive understanding of the system's
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benefits and risks that would be necessary for an informed decision.
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While there has been loud criticism of the system's security from civil society organizations such as digital rights
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nonprofit organization Chaos Computer Club (CCC) \cite{kochMoreMoreExperts2025} and several severe security flaws have
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been demonstrated practically, this criticism has largely been ignored by the political structures in charge. We observe
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that despite this civil society outrage and the system's large scale, it has received little attention from the academic
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cryptography and information security community.
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In this chapter, we aim to point out some perplexing cryptographic engineering decisions in the system. In particular,
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we point out that the system's core per-user secrets are kept in a rudimentary key escrow system whose security is based
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on engineering assumptions, not on cryptographic principles. Furthermore, we observe that by specification, the
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individual user keys of the system are derived from a per-user cleartext salt based on a system-wide long-term secret
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with only 256 bits of entropy\footnote{
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In previous versions of the standard \cite{
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gematikSpezifikationSchluesselgenerierungsdienstEPA2023,
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gematikUebergreifendeSpezifikationVerwendung2025,
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}, there were two escrow services, with both keys used in layers to reduce the risk of a compromise of either one.
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The current standard only requires one escrow service, and drops the entropy requirement of the root keys from 512
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bits to 256 bits. The apparent reason for the long-term nature of these keys is that they are updated manually.
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}. Finally, we note that according to specification, the only physical security requirement for the protection of this
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highly sensitive secret is a ``hard, opaque potting material'', with no tamper detection and response required. We
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belive that Inertial HSMs provide a path forward for systems like this, enabling physical security in applications that
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currently rely on insecure, legacy systems. Even if for regulatory reasons a poorly secured conventional HSM without
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active tamper sensing is chosen, it would be conceivable to construct an IHSM enclosure \emph{around} this conventional
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HSM, in effect retrofitting the missing active tamper-sensing envelope.
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We base our analysis of the ePA on the system's publicly available standards in their latest version as of the writing
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of the paper underlying this chapter in April 2025, describing version 3.0 of the healthcare record system \cite{
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gematikSpezifikationAktensystemEPA2025,
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gematikUbergreifendeSpezifikationVerwendung2024,
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}. We note that the implementation might well deviate from these standards and be more secure--however, with the
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system's history of flaws, we believe this is unlikely to be the case. The reference implementation provided by the
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specification authority \cite{GithubRepositoryERPFD} follows the specified minimum requirements closely. As of now,
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there is no meaningful way for either the public or for researchers such as us to ascertain the concrete implementation
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security of the system.
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\section{The Design of ePA}
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ePA (short for \emph{elektronische Patientenakte}, ``electronic patient record''), is embedded into Germany's national
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public healthcare backend system ``Telematikinfrastruktur'' (TI). TI is a highly complex system, and a detailed
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description would exceed the limits of this analysis. Briefly put, TI consists of a shared DMZ that parties like
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insurance providers and healthcare providers connect to through a VPN. At the client location, usually an individual
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doctor's office or a hospital, this VPN connection is terminated by a specialized VPN appliance named ``Konnektor'' that
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simultaneously acts as a trusted component inside the client network hosting some software for purposes such as
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authentication. The Konnektor contains several smart cards that store keys used for authentication. Konnektor devices
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are offered by several vendors and healthcare providers like doctor's offices are indivudally responsible for purchasing
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and maintaining a Konnektor.
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% FIXME: Is there a threat/trust model of the system that you could summarise in a few sentences?
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Every person enrolled in the system as well as every healthcare professional providing services under it is issued an ID
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card that contains a smart card that contains keys used to authenticate towards the central infrastructure. The primary
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use of these smart cards up to now is that when someone visits a healthcare provider, they will insert their ID card
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into a terminal so the healthcare provider can automatically fetch their personal information such as name, birth date,
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address and enrollment status from their insurance provider.
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ePA is implemented inside the TI system. Its centralized services are accessed by healthcare providers through the TI's
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VPN. Patient records are encrypted and decrypted inside TI's backend systems. Smart cards authenticate parties and
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hardware devices to each other. Each insurance provider picks one of several implementations of ePA's server-side
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infrastructure to run for its clients. Currently, there are two approved implementations of this server-side
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infrastructure.
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With the current version of the specificatoin, the overall architecture of ePA heavily relies on Trusted Execution
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Environments (TEEs). Data processing on the server side is done in plaintext inside TEEs, with some cryptographic key
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management delegated to a Hardware Security Module. While attacks on the TEEs are considered in the system, the HSMs are
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assumed to be perfectly secure, and the system does not include mitigations for a compromised HSM. The primary
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motivation for plaintext processing seems to be to enable large-scale data analysis for research purposes without
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requiring consent or cooperation of the people whose records are being processed.
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The primary services offered by the server side are authentication services, key escrow, and a database storing the
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encrypted records themselves. Records are symmetrically encrypted with keys that are derived from system-wide secrets
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inside an HSM. The primary motivation behind the use of a key escrow service seems to be to enable the creation of a
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duplicate patient ID smartcard in case a person looses theirs. While the current version of the standard is unclear on
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the exact mechanism of key derivation, in previous versions of the standard, the escrow service's root key, a random
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salt, and the healthcare ID number of the person owning the record was used in SHA256-HKDF. The specification requires
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that a new root key is generated once a year, but as far as we can tell, record key rollover is not done automatically
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but is only meant to be done when the \emph{user} requests it, and old root keys must be retained forever to ensure old
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records can be accessed.
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\section{Related Work}
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The state-owned company specifying the system commissioned several security assessments of the system relating to the
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key escrow service. \textcite{fischlinKryptographischeAnalyseSpezifikation2021} focuses on the cryptographic
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dimension of the key escrow service used in an older version of the standard, and is now obsolete.
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\textcite{slanySicherheitsanalyseZurSicherheit2020} approaches the system at a higher level, and focuses on the
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cryptography of the inner protocol layers spoken between the system's components. Industry research organization
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Fraunhofer SIT was comissioned for a structured, theoretical assessment of attack paths to the system
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\cite{fraunhofersitAbschlussberichtSicherheitsanalyseGesamtsystems2024}. We are not currently aware of
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independent academic security research on the system.
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The design and operation of the system have been independently described in detail by civil society activists, who have
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demonstrated several successful attacks on the system. \textcite{tschirsichHackerHinOder0100} demonstrated how they
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could trivially acquire each of the smartcards as well as the Konnektor necessary for accessing the system.
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\textcite{tschirsichKonnteBisherNoch0100} summarize the history of attacks demonstrated on the system and show multiple
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practical attacks on various parts of the system's implementation.
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\section{Concerning Cryptographic Engineering Choices}
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We wish to highlight some of the design choices in the system that we believe stray from current best practice. This is
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by no means an exhaustive list, and is only meant to underscore why we believe the system deserves more scrutiny.
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\subsection{Use of Key Escrow}
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First, the system's general approach of using a key escrow service instead of securely storing the keys inside the
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system's already existing smart card infrastructure is concerning, given that this key escrow service poses a
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centralized security risk. The system's designers made this decision since it was deemed important that access to an
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encrypted record can be restored quickly after an insurance ID card is lost, without requiring the cooperation of the
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healthcare providers holding the primary copies of the person's medical records.
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While key escrow services have been a topic of political debate in decades past, in the cryptographic community,
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consensus generally is that they are a bad idea since they pose a centralized target for attack, and increase attack
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surface \cite{
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abelsonRisksKeyRecovery1997,
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abelsonKeysDoormats2015,
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andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020,
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}.
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\subsection{Cryptographic Design}
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The system's overall cryptographic design is intentionally kept simple. The standard explicitly mentions that symmetric
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primitives have been preferred over asymmetric primitives in the core key escrow functions due to the risk of an attack
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on asymmetric primitives in the long term. Notably, other advanced cryptographic techniques such as secret sharing
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schemes, oblivious pseudo-random functions, or multiparty computation that could help with the security and privacy of
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the key escrow service by reducing trust placed in any single component of the service are also absent while the system
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relies extensively on the engineering-based security guarantees of TEEs and HSMs. Given that the ePA system trusts its
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HSMs as unconditionally secure, it is unclear what purpose the manual yearly root key renewal serves, especially absent
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an automatic way to roll over the wrapped record keys.
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A consequence of the systems' simple cryptographic design is that the system trusts its components to a large degree.
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For instance, the system leaks a person's insurance ID number to the key escrow HSM every time record keys are
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requested. Along with the timing and frequency of these requests, this leaks information on the person's condition to
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the key escrow service in an identifiable way.
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% TODO I feel that this section is a mix-up of critique on the cryptographic design and the approach to privacy
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% protection and data minimisation. How are they linked? I'm missing some discussion here.
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\subsection{A Realistic Attacker Model}
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We observe that the system as a whole does not appear to be designed to defend against well-resourced adversaries. The
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series of practical attacks that have been demonstrated on the system confirm this impression. In
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\textcite{tschirsichKonnteBisherNoch0100} summarize a series of successful attacks. Attacks include social engineering
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resulting in access to copies of smartcards enabling accessing patient records, using misconfigured Konnektor VPN
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appliances with their LAN DMZ and authentication interface exposed on the public internet, circumventing video-based
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authentication processes resulting in duplicate file keys being provided, classis SQL injection on a backend service
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maintaining an authentication database, accessing all national patient records through brute-force enumeration of weak
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identifiers, and several more.
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We believe that a system like this must be designed to withstand well-resourced adversaries such as enemy secret
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services, since the medical data stored in such as information on chronic illness, sexually transmittable disease or
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severe food allergies has intelligence value. Repeated breaches of national digital infrastructure such as the 2015
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breach of the US Office of Personnel Management \cite{barrettUSSuspectsHackers2015} or the 2024 compromise of US
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telecommunications wiretapping systems \cite{mennChineseGovernmentHackers2024} demonstrate that such state-sponsored
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attacks on national digital infrastructure are a realistic concern. A possible scenario in the ePA system would be an
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enemy secret service gaining access to one of the HSMs storing the systems' root secrets, extracting the root secret by
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an advanced physical attack, then being able to decrypt captured encrypted health records at will. Similarly, a
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nation-state adversary might have access to an exploit allowing the compromise of the system's TEEs, which would enable
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the extraction of any patient records being processed in plaintext inside these TEEs.
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\subsection{Physical Security}
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Physical security has received some consideration in the system's specification. First, smart cards are used extensively
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for authentication. Second, Hardware Security Modules are used in key locations of the system to process some
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cryptographic secrets. The core of the system's key escrow service is implemented inside an HSM. However, it is notable
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that the actual security level required for this HSM is only FIPS 140-2 level
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3 \cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002}. Not only has FIPS 140-2
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been superseded by FIPS 140-3 since
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2019 \cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019}, its security level 3
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mostly provides logical separation of cryptographic functions from other logic and is not very meaningful in the context
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of physical attacks. The only physical requirement of FIPS 140-2 level 3 is that the HSM has a hard, opaque coating.
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This coating is specified to be tamper-evident, but notably no active tamper detection or response features are required
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by this standard. In contrast to the newer FIPS 140-3 standard and the related ISO/IEC 19790 \cite{ISOIEC19790} as well
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as ISO/IEC 24759 \cite{ISOIEC24759} standards, FIPS 140-2 does not make any particular requirements regarding resistance
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to side-channel attacks. The lack of tamper response, unspecified resistance to side-channel attacks and the fact that
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the ePA specification only requires the long-lived key escrow root key inside the HSM to have 256 bits of entropy lead
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to an unsatisfactory overall constellation.
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\section{Conclusion}
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In conclusion, we observe that in Germany's ePA national medical record database, despite the decade-long
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standardization and implementation process, several cryptographic compromises ended up in the system's final deployment.
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Even assuming that nation-scale key escrow is a good idea, the implementation of this key escrow system seems to stray
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from current best practice. The system uses a secret key with only 256 bits of entropy to derive highly sensitive secret
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keys for potentially tens of millions of people sharing an insurance provider. The cryptographic design of this escrow
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system is unsophisticated, ignoring the past three decades in cryptographic developments particularly in multiparty
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computation (MPC) and other secret sharing techniques in favor of an engineering approach. In the engineering dimension,
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the system's physical security is only held to the basic level 3 of the obsolete FIPS 140-2 standard, which is
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considerably less secure than an average credit card payment terminal. The system's root keys are only protected by a
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``hard, opaque potting material'' and no tamper detection and response is required. We estimate that the system poses an
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attractive and soft target to nation-state adversaries. The system's shortcomings are made more severe by the fact that
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the system disproportionally affects the lives of people with low income.
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From an academic perspective, it is interesting to see how the ePA ended up in its current state, and the gaps in
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cryptographic solutions left by academic research that contributed. A fundamental truth in cryptographic engineering is
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that in the absence of technical checks, political promises are no guarantees of restraint. As such, the degree of trust
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the ePA system places on organizational measures leads to a concerning overall picture. In particular, the system's
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strong reliance on conventional HSMs built to long obsolete security standards as well as on trusted execution
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environment technology that has been broken multiple times highlights the need for new approaches to hardware security
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that better accomodate real-world use cases.
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We believe that Inertial HSMs can address this use case by cleanly separating the physical security primitive into a
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retargetable design that can be applied to entire servers if needed, and augment or replace technology like conventional
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HSMs or trusted execution environments to provide high-level hardware security.
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