phd-thesis/main.bib

@book{2019ConferenceInformation2019,
  title = {2019 {{Conference}} on {{Information Communications Technology}} and {{Society}} ({{ICTAS}}): {{Durban}}, {{South Africa}}, 6, 7 and 8 {{March}} 2019},
  shorttitle = {2019 {{Conference}} on {{Information Communications Technology}} and {{Society}} ({{ICTAS}})},
  date = {2019},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {Piscataway, NJ},
  eventtitle = {Conference on {{Information Communications Technology}} and {{Society}}},
  isbn = {978-1-5386-7365-2},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {1}
}

@article{abelsonKeysDoormats2015,
  title = {Keys under Doormats},
  author = {Abelson, Harold and Anderson, Ross and Bellovin, Steven M. and Benaloh, Josh and Blaze, Matt and Diffie, Whitfield "Whit" and Gilmore, John and Green, Matthew and Landau, Susan and Neumann, Peter G. and Rivest, Ronald L. and Schiller, Jeffrey I. and Schneier, Bruce and Specter, Michael A. and Weitzner, Daniel J.},
  date = {2015-09-28},
  journaltitle = {Commun. ACM},
  volume = {58},
  number = {10},
  pages = {24--26},
  issn = {0001-0782},
  doi = {10.1145/2814825},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2814825},
  urldate = {2025-05-26},
  abstract = {Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications.}
}

@article{abelsonRisksKeyRecovery1997,
  title = {The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-Party Encryption},
  author = {Abelson, Hal and Anderson, Ross and Bellovin, Steven M. and Benalob, Josh and Blaze, Matt and Diffie, Whitfield and Gilmore, John and Neumann, Peter G. and Rivest, Ronald L. and Schiller, Jeffrey I. and Schneier, Bruce},
  date = {1997-06-01},
  journaltitle = {World Wide Web J.},
  volume = {2},
  number = {3},
  pages = {241--257},
  issn = {1085-2301}
}

@online{adc2019,
  title = {Choose the Right Accelerometer for Predictive Maintenance},
  author = {Campagnie, Bertrand},
  date = {2019},
  url = {https://www.analog.com/media/en/technical-documentation/tech-articles/Choose-the-Right-Accelerometer-for-Predictive-Maintenance.pdf},
  urldate = {2021-04-01},
  organization = {Analog Devices}
}

@online{adhikariDontLookUbiquitous2022,
  title = {Don't {{Look Up}}: {{Ubiquitous Data Exfiltration Pathways}} in {{Commercial Spaces}}},
  shorttitle = {Don't {{Look Up}}},
  author = {Adhikari, Anku and Guo, Samuel and Smaragdis, Paris and Winslett, Marianne},
  date = {2022-06-26},
  eprint = {2206.12944},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2206.12944},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {We show that as a side effect of building code requirements, almost all commercial buildings today are vulnerable to a novel data exfiltration attack, even if they are air-gapped and secured against traditional attacks. The new attack uses vibrations from an inconspicuous transmitter to send data across the building’s physical infrastructure to a receiver. Our analysis and experiments with several large realworld buildings show a single-frequency bit rate of 300K bps, which is sufficient to transmit ordinary files, real-time MP3-quality audio, or periodic highquality still photos. The attacker can use multiple channels to transmit, for example, real-time MP4quality video. We discuss the difficulty of detecting the attack and the viability of various potential countermeasures.},
  langid = {english},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}
}

@article{agnesiAllfiberSelfcompensatingPolarization2019,
  title = {All-Fiber Self-Compensating Polarization Encoder for Quantum Key Distribution},
  author = {Agnesi, Costantino and Avesani, Marco and Stanco, Andrea and Villoresi, Paolo and Vallone, Giuseppe},
  date = {2019-05-15},
  journaltitle = {Optics Letters},
  shortjournal = {Opt. Lett., OL},
  volume = {44},
  number = {10},
  pages = {2398--2401},
  publisher = {Optica Publishing Group},
  issn = {1539-4794},
  doi = {10.1364/OL.44.002398},
  url = {https://opg.optica.org/ol/abstract.cfm?uri=ol-44-10-2398},
  urldate = {2024-09-04},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows distant parties to exchange cryptographic keys with unconditional security by encoding information on the degrees of freedom of photons. Polarization encoding has been extensively used for QKD along free-space, optical fiber, and satellite links. However, the polarization encoders used in such implementations are unstable, expensive, and complex and can even exhibit side channels that undermine the security of the protocol. Here we propose a self-compensating polarization encoder based on a lithium niobate phase modulator inside a Sagnac interferometer and implement it using only commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. Our polarization encoder combines a simple design and high stability reaching an intrinsic quantum bit error rate as low as 0.2\%. Since realization is possible from the 800 to the 1550\&\#x00A0;nm band using COTS devices, our polarization modulator is a promising solution for free-space, fiber, and satellite-based QKD.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Lithium niobate,Optical delay lines,Optical fibers,Polarization mode dispersion,Quantum key distribution,Single-photon avalanche diodes}
}

@article{aguilar-melchorXPIRPrivateInformation2016,
  title = {{{XPIR}} : {{Private Information Retrieval}} for {{Everyone}}},
  shorttitle = {{{XPIR}}},
  author = {Aguilar-Melchor, Carlos and Barrier, Joris and Fousse, Laurent and Killijian, Marc-Olivier},
  date = {2016-04-01},
  journaltitle = {Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies},
  volume = {2016},
  number = {2},
  pages = {155--174},
  issn = {2299-0984},
  doi = {10.1515/popets-2016-0010},
  url = {https://petsymposium.org/popets/2016/popets-2016-0010.php},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme is a protocol in which a user retrieves a record from a database while hiding which from the database administrators. PIR can be achieved using mutuallydistrustful replicated databases, trusted hardware, or cryptography. In this paper we focus on the later setting which is known as single-database computationallyPrivate Information Retrieval (cPIR). Classic cPIR protocols require that the database server executes an algorithm over all the database content at very low speeds which impairs their usage. In [1], given certain assumptions, realistic at the time, Sion and Carbunar showed that cPIR schemes were not practical and most likely would never be. To this day, this conclusion is widely accepted by researchers and practitioners. Using the paradigm shift introduced by lattice-based cryptography, we show that the conclusion of Sion and Carbunar is not valid anymore: cPIR is of practical value. This is achieved without compromising security, using standard crytosystems, and conservative parameter choices.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{albartus2020,
  title = {{{DANA}} Universal Dataflow Analysis for Gate-Level Netlist Reverse Engineering},
  author = {Albartus, Nils and Hoffmann, Max and Temme, Sebastian and Azriel, Leonid and Paar, Christof},
  date = {2020},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  volume = {2020},
  number = {4},
  pages = {309--336},
  doi = {10.13154/tches.v2020.i4.309-336},
  bibsource = {dblp computer science bibliography, https://dblp.org}
}

@article{albertiniHowAbuseFix,
  title = {How to {{Abuse}} and {{Fix Authenticated Encryption Without Key Commitment}}},
  author = {Albertini, Ange and Duong, Thai and Gueron, Shay and Kölbl, Stefan and Luykx, Atul and Schmieg, Sophie},
  abstract = {Authenticated encryption (AE) is used in a wide variety of applications, potentially in settings for which it was not originally designed. Recent research tries to understand what happens when AE is not used as prescribed by its designers. A question given relatively little attention is whether an AE scheme guarantees “key commitment”: ciphertext should only decrypt to a valid plaintext under the key used to generate the ciphertext. Generally, AE schemes do not guarantee key commitment as it is not part of AE’s design goal. Nevertheless, one would not expect this seemingly obscure property to have much impact on the security of actual products. In reality, however, products do rely on key commitment. We discuss three recent applications where missing key commitment is exploitable in practice. We provide proof-of-concept attacks via a tool that constructs AES-GCM ciphertext which can be decrypted to two plaintexts valid under a wide variety of file formats, such as PDF, Windows executables, and DICOM. Finally we discuss two solutions to add key commitment to AE schemes which have not been analyzed in the literature: a generic approach that adds an explicit key commitment scheme to the AE scheme, and a simple fix which works for AE schemes like AES-GCM and ChaCha20Poly1305, but requires separate analysis for each scheme.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{alendalChipChopSmashing2021,
  title = {Chip Chop — Smashing the Mobile Phone Secure Chip for Fun and Digital Forensics},
  author = {Alendal, Gunnar and Axelsson, Stefan and Dyrkolbotn, Geir Olav},
  date = {2021-07},
  journaltitle = {Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation},
  shortjournal = {Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation},
  volume = {37},
  pages = {301191},
  issn = {26662817},
  doi = {10.1016/j.fsidi.2021.301191},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2666281721000998},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {sampling-mesh}
}

@online{algorithmicsabotageresearchgroupTechFascism2025,
  title = {Against {{Tech Fascism}}},
  author = {{Algorithmic Sabotage Research Group}},
  date = {2025-07-27T00:00:00+00:00},
  url = {https://algorithmic-sabotage.gitlab.io/asrg/against-tech-fascism/},
  urldate = {2025-12-04},
  abstract = {This draft debate piece examines technofascism and its domineering configurations of power, while advancing resistance through the proposed strategic intervention of “algorithmic sabotage”.},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {ASRG}
}

@online{alievExperimentalDemonstrationScalable2023,
  title = {Experimental Demonstration of Scalable Quantum Key Distribution over a Thousand Kilometers},
  author = {Aliev, A. and Statiev, V. and Zarubin, I. and Kirsanov, N. and Strizhak, D. and Bezruchenko, A. and Osicheva, A. and Smirnov, A. and Yarovikov, M. and Kodukhov, A. and Pastushenko, V. and Pflitsch, M. and Vinokur, V.},
  date = {2023-11-01},
  eprint = {2306.04599},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {quant-ph},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.04599},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  abstract = {Secure communication over long distances is one of the major problems of modern informatics. Classical transmissions are recognized to be vulnerable to quantum computer attacks. Remarkably, the same quantum mechanics that engenders quantum computers offers guaranteed protection against such attacks via quantum key distribution (QKD). Yet, long-distance transmission is problematic since the essential signal decay in optical channels occurs at a distance of about a hundred kilometers. We propose to resolve this problem by a QKD protocol, further referred to as the Terra Quantum QKD protocol (TQ-QKD protocol). In our protocol, we use semiclassical pulses containing enough photons for random bit encoding and exploiting erbium amplifiers to retranslate photon pulses and, at the same time, ensuring that at the chosen pulse intensity only a few photons could go outside the channel even at distances of about a hundred meters. As a result, an eavesdropper will not be able to efficiently utilize the lost part of the signal. The central component of the TQ-QKD protocol is the end-to-end loss control of the fiber-optic communication line since optical losses can in principle be used by the eavesdropper to obtain the transmitted information. However, our control precision is such that if the degree of the leak is below the detectable level, then the leaking states are quantum since they contain only a few photons. Therefore, available to the eavesdropper parts of the bit encoding states representing ‘0’ and ‘1’ are nearly indistinguishable. Our work presents the experimental demonstration of the TQ-QKD protocol allowing quantum key distribution over 1079 kilometers. Further refining the quality of the scheme’s components will expand the attainable transmission distances. This paves the way for creating a secure global QKD network in the upcoming years.},
  langid = {english},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {Quantum Physics}
}

@article{alomairInformationTheoreticallySecure,
  title = {Information {{Theoretically Secure Encryption}} with {{Almost Free Authentication}}},
  author = {Alomair, Basel},
  abstract = {In cryptology, secure channels enable the exchange of messages in a confidential and authenticated manner. The literature of cryptology is rich with proposals and analysis that address the secure communication over public (insecure) channels. In this work, we propose an information theoretically secure direction for the construction of secure channels. First, we propose a method of achieving unconditionally secure authentication with half the amount of key material required by traditional unconditionally secure message authentication codes (MACs). Key reduction is achieved by utilizing the special structure of the authenticated encryption system. That is, authentication exploits the secrecy of the message to reduce the key material required for authentication. After the description of our method, since key material is the most important concern in unconditionally secure authentication, given the message is encrypted with a perfectly secret one-time pad cipher, we extend our method to achieve unconditionally secure authentication with almost free key material. That is, we propose a method for unconditionally authenticating arbitrarily long messages with much shorter keys. Finally, we will show how the special structure of the authenticated encryption systems can be exploited to achieve provably secure authentication that is very efficient for the authentication of short messages.},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{alwenDoubleRatchetSecurity2019,
  title = {The {{Double Ratchet}}: {{Security Notions}}, {{Proofs}}, and {{Modularization}} for the {{Signal Protocol}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Double Ratchet}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2019},
  author = {Alwen, Joël and Coretti, Sandro and Dodis, Yevgeniy},
  editor = {Ishai, Yuval and Rijmen, Vincent},
  date = {2019},
  volume = {11476},
  pages = {129--158},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-17653-2_5},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-17653-2_5},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {Signal is a famous secure messaging protocol used by billions of people, by virtue of many secure text messaging applications including Signal itself, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Skype, and Google Allo. At its core it uses the concept of “double ratcheting,” where every message is encrypted and authenticated using a fresh symmetric key; it has many attractive properties, such as forward security, post-compromise security, and “immediate (no-delay) decryption,” which had never been achieved in combination by prior messaging protocols.},
  isbn = {978-3-030-17652-5 978-3-030-17653-2},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{amazonAWSCloudHSM,
  title = {{{AWS CloudHSM}}},
  author = {{Amazon}},
  url = {https://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  abstract = {AWS CloudHSM provides total access management control and protection for your encryption keys with secure and compliant hardware security modules (HSMs).},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {Amazon Web Services, Inc.}
}

@inproceedings{amhenriorDesignImplementationAutomatic2017,
  title = {Design and Implementation of an Automatic Tamper Detection and Reporting Capability for a Single Phase Energy Meter},
  booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE}} 3rd {{International Conference}} on {{Electro-Technology}} for {{National Development}} ({{NIGERCON}})},
  author = {Amhenrior, H. E. and Edeko, F. O. and Ogujor, E. A. and Emagbetere, J. O.},
  date = {2017-11},
  pages = {1--9},
  issn = {2377-2697},
  doi = {10.1109/NIGERCON.2017.8281947},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8281947/?arnumber=8281947&tag=1},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  abstract = {In this paper, the design and implementation of automatic tamper detection and reporting capability of Energy meter was carried out. The system has the capability to detect bypass internally on the meter and externally on the service cables from the electric pole. It also incorporates wireless disconnection and connection of load capabilities. This becomes imperative as a result of high rate of energy theft that arises from meter tampering. The system comprises of a developed Single Phase Prepayment Energy Meter and the supply authority Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) capable device platform. The meter is made of the energy meter IC, two microcontrollers which are suitably programmed in C++, one for Energy measurement and the other for monitoring of meter activities especially terminal tamper and communications. It also has the tamper switch, the circuit breaker and the GSM modem (SIM900) which is interfaced to the monitoring microcontroller. The modem is used for communication particularly in Short Message Service (SMS) form with the supply authority. The server and the Application Platform communicates with the meter using developed commands available to only the supply authority. The use of Wireless Current Transducers (WCT) for the detection of energy theft through external bypass of the Prepaid Meter was also proposed to be incorporated in the system. The results obtained show satisfactory tamper detection and reporting as well as wireless connection with 100\% success rate recorded as implemented.},
  eventtitle = {2017 {{IEEE}} 3rd {{International Conference}} on {{Electro-Technology}} for {{National Development}} ({{NIGERCON}})},
  keywords = {Automatic Tamper Reporting,Companies,Developed Commands,GSM,Meters,Microcontroller,Microcontrollers,Monitoring,Pins,SMS,Wireless Connection}
}

@incollection{amiriEfficientUnconditionallySecure2018,
  title = {Efficient {{Unconditionally Secure Signatures Using Universal Hashing}}},
  booktitle = {Applied {{Cryptography}} and {{Network Security}}},
  author = {Amiri, Ryan and Abidin, Aysajan and Wallden, Petros and Andersson, Erika},
  editor = {Preneel, Bart and Vercauteren, Frederik},
  date = {2018},
  volume = {10892},
  pages = {143--162},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_8},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_8},
  urldate = {2024-06-19},
  abstract = {Digital signatures are one of the most important cryptographic primitives. In this work we construct an information-theoretically secure signature scheme which, unlike prior schemes, enjoys a number of advantageous properties such as short signature length and high generation efficiency, to name two. In particular, we extend symmetric-key message authentication codes (MACs) based on universal hashing to make them transferable, a property absent from traditional MAC schemes. Our main results are summarised as follows.},
  isbn = {978-3-319-93386-3 978-3-319-93387-0},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{amitonovaQuantumKeyEstablishment2020,
  title = {Quantum Key Establishment via a Multimode Fiber},
  author = {Amitonova, Lyubov V. and Tentrup, Tristan B. H. and Vellekoop, Ivo M. and Pinkse, Pepijn W. H.},
  date = {2020-03-02},
  journaltitle = {Optics Express},
  shortjournal = {Opt. Express, OE},
  volume = {28},
  number = {5},
  pages = {5965--5981},
  publisher = {Optica Publishing Group},
  issn = {1094-4087},
  doi = {10.1364/OE.380791},
  url = {https://opg.optica.org/oe/abstract.cfm?uri=oe-28-5-5965},
  urldate = {2024-09-04},
  abstract = {Quantum communication aims to provide absolutely secure transmission of secret information. State-of-the-art methods encode symbols into single photons or coherent light with much less than one photon on average. For long-distance communication, typically a single-mode fiber is used and significant effort has been devoted already to increase the data carrying capacity of a single optical line. Here we propose and demonstrate a fundamentally new concept for remote key establishment. Our method allows high-dimensional alphabets using spatial degrees of freedom by transmitting information through a light-scrambling multimode fiber and exploiting the no-cloning theorem. Eavesdropper attacks can be detected without using randomly switched mutually unbiased bases. We prove the security against a common class of intercept-resend and beam-splitting attacks with single-photon Fock states and with weak coherent light. Since it is optical fiber based, our method allows to naturally extend secure communication to larger distances. We experimentally demonstrate this new type of key exchange method by encoding information into a few-photon light pulse decomposed over guided modes of an easily available multimode fiber.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Multicore fibers,Multimode fibers,Quantum communications,Quantum key distribution,Single mode fibers,Space division multiplexing}
}

@www{anandtech2015,
  title = {Top Tier {{CPU}} Air Coolers {{Q3}} 2015: 9-Way Roundup Review},
  author = {Fylladitakis, Emmanouil D.},
  publisher = {AnandTech},
  url = {https://www.anandtech.com/show/9415/top-tier-cpu-air-coolers-9way-roundup-review/12},
  urldate = {2021-07-08}
}

@inproceedings{anderson1996tamper,
  title = {Tamper Resistance-a Cautionary Note},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Second {{Usenix}} Workshop on Electronic Commerce},
  author = {Anderson, Ross and Kuhn, Markus},
  date = {1996},
  volume = {2},
  pages = {1--11}
}

@book{anderson2020,
  title = {Security Engineering},
  author = {Anderson, Ross},
  date = {2020-09-16},
  isbn = {978-1-119-64281-7}
}

@article{andersonCryptographicProcessorsASurvey2006,
  title = {Cryptographic {{Processors-A Survey}}},
  author = {Anderson, R. and Bond, M. and Clulow, J. and Skorobogatov, S.},
  date = {2006-02},
  journaltitle = {Proceedings of the IEEE},
  volume = {94},
  number = {2},
  pages = {357--369},
  issn = {1558-2256},
  doi = {10.1109/JPROC.2005.862423},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1580505/?arnumber=1580505},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  abstract = {Tamper-resistant cryptographic processors are becoming the standard way to enforce data-usage policies. Their origins lie with military cipher machines and PIN processing in banking payment networks, expanding in the 1990s into embedded applications: token vending machines for prepayment electricity and mobile phone credit. Major applications such as GSM mobile phone identification and pay TV set-top boxes have pushed low-cost cryptoprocessors toward ubiquity. In the last five years, dedicated crypto chips have been embedded in devices such as game console accessories and printer ink cartridges, to control product and accessory after markets. The "Trusted Computing" initiative will soon embed cryptoprocessors in PCs so they can identify each other remotely. This paper surveys the range of applications of tamper-resistant hardware and the array of attack and defense mechanisms which have evolved in the tamper-resistance arms race.},
  eventtitle = {Proceedings of the {{IEEE}}},
  keywords = {Banking,Cryptography,Cryptoprocessor,Embedded computing,fault analysis,GSM,Hardware,HSM,Ink,Mobile handsets,Personal communication networks,power analysis,Printers,security API,semi-invasive attack,survey,TV}
}

@book{andersonCypherpunkEthicsRadical2022,
  title = {Cypherpunk {{Ethics}}: {{Radical Ethics}} for the {{Digital Age}}},
  shorttitle = {Cypherpunk {{Ethics}}},
  author = {Anderson, Patrick D.},
  date = {2022-04-24},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  location = {London},
  doi = {10.4324/9781003220534},
  abstract = {Cypherpunk Ethics explores the moral worldview of the cypherpunks, a movement that advocates the use of strong digital cryptography—or crypto, for short—to defend individual privacy and promote institutional transparency in the digital age.  Focusing on the writings of Timothy May and Julian Assange, two of the most prolific and influential cypherpunks, the book examines two competing paradigms of cypherpunk philosophy—crypto anarchy and crypto justice—and examines the implications of cypherpunk ethics for a range of contemporary moral issues, including surveillance, privacy, whistleblowing, cryptocurrencies, journalism, democracy, censorship, intellectual property, and power.  Rooted in theory but with very real applications, this volume will appeal not only to students and scholars of digital media, communication, journalism, philosophy, political science, critical data studies, sociology, and the history of technology but also to technologists and activists around the world.},
  isbn = {978-1-003-22053-4},
  pagetotal = {142}
}

@book{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020,
  title = {Security {{Engineering}}: {{A Guide}} to {{Building Dependable Distributed Systems}}},
  shorttitle = {Security {{Engineering}}},
  author = {Anderson, Ross},
  date = {2020-12-22},
  edition = {3},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  doi = {10.1002/9781119644682},
  url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119644682},
  urldate = {2024-12-03},
  isbn = {978-1-119-64278-7},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{andreaElectronicConnectorBook2022,
  title = {The {{Electronic Connector Book}}},
  author = {Andrea, Davide},
  date = {2022},
  edition = {1},
  url = {https://connectorbook.com/},
  isbn = {978-1-300-09248-3}
}

@online{AntimatterAlgorithmThat,
  title = {Antimatter: An Algorithm That Prunes {{CRDT}}/{{OT}} History},
  url = {https://braid.org/antimatter},
  urldate = {2024-08-28}
}

@inproceedings{arakiHighThroughputSemiHonestSecure2016,
  title = {High-{{Throughput Semi-Honest Secure Three-Party Computation}} with an {{Honest Majority}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2016 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Araki, Toshinori and Furukawa, Jun and Lindell, Yehuda and Nof, Ariel and Ohara, Kazuma},
  date = {2016-10-24},
  series = {{{CCS}} '16},
  pages = {805--817},
  publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  location = {New York, NY, USA},
  doi = {10.1145/2976749.2978331},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978331},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {In this paper, we describe a new information-theoretic protocol (and a computationally-secure variant) for secure three-party computation with an honest majority. The protocol has very minimal computation and communication; for Boolean circuits, each party sends only a single bit for every AND gate (and nothing is sent for XOR gates). Our protocol is (simulation-based) secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and achieves privacy in the client/server model in the presence of malicious adversaries. On a cluster of three 20-core servers with a 10Gbps connection, the implementation of our protocol carries out over 1.3 million AES computations per second, which involves processing over 7 billion gates per second. In addition, we developed a Kerberos extension that replaces the ticket-granting-ticket encryption on the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT-Kerberos with our protocol, using keys/ passwords that are shared between the servers. This enables the use of Kerberos while protecting passwords. Our implementation is able to support a login storm of over 35,000 logins per second, which suffices even for very large organizations. Our work demonstrates that high-throughput secure computation is possible on standard hardware.},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-4139-4}
}

@inproceedings{arpPrivacyThreatsUltrasonic2017,
  title = {Privacy {{Threats}} through {{Ultrasonic Side Channels}} on {{Mobile Devices}}},
  booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})},
  author = {Arp, Daniel and Quiring, Erwin and Wressnegger, Christian and Rieck, Konrad},
  date = {2017-04},
  pages = {35--47},
  doi = {10.1109/EuroSP.2017.33},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7961950/?arnumber=7961950},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Device tracking is a serious threat to the privacy of users, as it enables spying on their habits and activities. A recent practice embeds ultrasonic beacons in audio and tracks them using the microphone of mobile devices. This side channel allows an adversary to identify a user's current location, spy on her TV viewing habits or link together her different mobile devices. In this paper, we explore the capabilities, the current prevalence and technical limitations of this new tracking technique based on three commercial tracking solutions. To this end, we develop detection approaches for ultrasonic beacons and Android applications capable of processing these. Our findings confirm our privacy concerns: We spot ultrasonic beacons in various web media content and detect signals in 4 of 35 stores in two European cities that are used for location tracking. While we do not find ultrasonic beacons in TV streams from 7 countries, we spot 234 Android applications that are constantly listening for ultrasonic beacons in the background without the user's knowledge.},
  eventtitle = {2017 {{IEEE European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})},
  keywords = {Acoustics,Frequency shift keying,Media,Mobile applications,Mobile handsets,privacy,Privacy,side channels,TV,ultrasound}
}

@article{asharovMoreEfficientOblivious2017,
  title = {More {{Efficient Oblivious Transfer Extensions}}},
  author = {Asharov, Gilad and Lindell, Yehuda and Schneider, Thomas and Zohner, Michael},
  date = {2017-07},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Cryptology},
  shortjournal = {J Cryptol},
  volume = {30},
  number = {3},
  pages = {805--858},
  issn = {0933-2790, 1432-1378},
  doi = {10.1007/s00145-016-9236-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00145-016-9236-6},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{ashleyAshleyBookKnots1993,
  title = {The {{Ashley}} Book of Knots: With Amendments},
  shorttitle = {The {{Ashley}} Book of Knots},
  author = {Ashley, Clifford W. and Budworth, Geoffrey},
  date = {1993},
  edition = {Reprint},
  publisher = {Doubleday},
  location = {New York},
  isbn = {978-0-385-04025-9},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {620}
}

@article{athalyeVerifyingHardwareSecurity,
  title = {Verifying {{Hardware Security Modules}} with {{Information-Preserving Refinement}}},
  author = {Athalye, Anish and Kaashoek, M Frans and Zeldovich, Nickolai},
  abstract = {Knox is a new framework that enables developers to build hardware security modules (HSMs) with high assurance through formal verification. The goal is to rule out all hardware bugs, software bugs, and timing side channels. Knox’s approach is to relate an implementation’s wirelevel behavior to a functional specification stated in terms of method calls and return values with a new definition called information-preserving refinement (IPR). This definition captures the notion that the HSM implements its functional specification, and that it leaks no additional information through its wire-level behavior. The Knox framework provides support for writing specifications, importing HSM implementations written in Verilog and C code, and proving IPR using a combination of lightweight annotations and interactive proofs. To evaluate the IPR definition and the Knox framework, we verified three simple HSMs, including an RFC 6238compliant TOTP token. The TOTP token is written in 2950 lines of Verilog and 360 lines of C and assembly. Its behavior is captured in a succinct specification: aside from the definition of the TOTP algorithm, the spec is only 10 lines of code. In all three case studies, verification covers entire hardware and software stacks and rules out hardware/software bugs and timing side channels.},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{attemaEfficientCompilerCovert2022,
  title = {Efficient {{Compiler}} to {{Covert Security}} with {{Public Verifiability}} for {{Honest Majority MPC}}},
  booktitle = {Applied {{Cryptography}} and {{Network Security}}},
  author = {Attema, Thomas and Dunning, Vincent and Everts, Maarten and Langenkamp, Peter},
  editor = {Ateniese, Giuseppe and Venturi, Daniele},
  date = {2022},
  volume = {13269},
  pages = {663--683},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_33},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_33},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {We present a novel compiler for transforming arbitrary, passively secure MPC protocols into efficient protocols with covert security and public verifiability in the honest majority setting. Our compiler works for protocols with any number of parties {$>$} 2 and treats the passively secure protocol in a black-box manner.},
  isbn = {978-3-031-09233-6 978-3-031-09234-3},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{aumannSecurityCovertAdversaries2010,
  title = {Security {{Against Covert Adversaries}}: {{Efficient Protocols}} for {{Realistic Adversaries}}},
  shorttitle = {Security {{Against Covert Adversaries}}},
  author = {Aumann, Yonatan and Lindell, Yehuda},
  date = {2010-04},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Cryptology},
  shortjournal = {J Cryptol},
  volume = {23},
  number = {2},
  pages = {281--343},
  issn = {0933-2790, 1432-1378},
  doi = {10.1007/s00145-009-9040-7},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00145-009-9040-7},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  abstract = {In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of mutually distrustful parties wish to securely compute some joint function of their private inputs. The computation should be carried out in a secure way, meaning that no coalition of corrupted parties should be able to learn more than specified or somehow cause the result to be “incorrect.” Typically, corrupted parties are either assumed to be semi-honest (meaning that they follow the protocol specification) or malicious (meaning that they may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol). However, in many settings, the assumption regarding semi-honest behavior does not suffice and security in the presence of malicious adversaries is excessive and expensive to achieve.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{awuahNovelCoilDesign2023,
  title = {Novel Coil Design and Analysis for High-Power Wireless Power Transfer with Enhanced {{Q-factor}}},
  author = {Awuah, Charles Marfo and Danuor, Patrick and Moon, Jung-Ick and Jung, Young-Bae},
  date = {2023-03-14},
  journaltitle = {Scientific Reports},
  shortjournal = {Sci Rep},
  volume = {13},
  number = {1},
  pages = {4187},
  publisher = {Nature Publishing Group},
  issn = {2045-2322},
  doi = {10.1038/s41598-023-31389-y},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-023-31389-y},
  urldate = {2024-06-21},
  abstract = {The power transfer efficiency (PTE) is a crucial aspect for effective wireless power transfer (WPT) applications. The quality factor (Q) of the WPT coil plays a critical role in ensuring higher PTE. In this paper, a novel method of improving the Q of a WPT coil is proposed. Resistance reduction techniques are presented which involves variation of the trace pitch, width, and thickness. This approach targets the high AC losses centered in the inner turns, which subsequently results in an increased Q. Numerical analysis with respect to the inductance and resistance models are presented, analyzed, and compared to that of the EM simulation results. To verify the efficacy of the proposed coil structure, a prototype is fabricated where good agreement is achieved between the measured and simulated results. The proposed coil attained a quality factor increment of about 19.24\% at 85~kHz in comparison to the conventional one. The proposed technique can be used to optimize planar spiral coils to attain higher Q.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Electrical and electronic engineering,Power stations}
}

@article{azumaAllphotonicQuantumRepeaters2015,
  title = {All-Photonic Quantum Repeaters},
  author = {Azuma, Koji and Tamaki, Kiyoshi and Lo, Hoi-Kwong},
  date = {2015-04-15},
  journaltitle = {Nature Communications},
  shortjournal = {Nat Commun},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {6787},
  issn = {2041-1723},
  doi = {10.1038/ncomms7787},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms7787},
  urldate = {2024-05-15},
  abstract = {Abstract             Quantum communication holds promise for unconditionally secure transmission of secret messages and faithful transfer of unknown quantum states. Photons appear to be the medium of choice for quantum communication. Owing to photon losses, robust quantum communication over long lossy channels requires quantum repeaters. It is widely believed that a necessary and highly demanding requirement for quantum repeaters is the existence of matter quantum memories. Here we show that such a requirement is, in fact, unnecessary by introducing the concept of all-photonic quantum repeaters based on flying qubits. In particular, we present a protocol based on photonic cluster-state machine guns and a loss-tolerant measurement equipped with local high-speed active feedforwards. We show that, with such all-photonic quantum repeaters, the communication efficiency scales polynomially with the channel distance. Our result paves a new route towards quantum repeaters with efficient single-photon sources rather than matter quantum memories.},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{bahmaniSecureMultipartyComputation2017,
  title = {Secure {{Multiparty Computation}} from {{SGX}}},
  booktitle = {Financial {{Cryptography}} and {{Data Security}}},
  author = {Bahmani, Raad and Barbosa, Manuel and Brasser, Ferdinand and Portela, Bernardo and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Scerri, Guillaume and Warinschi, Bogdan},
  editor = {Kiayias, Aggelos},
  date = {2017},
  volume = {10322},
  pages = {477--497},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_27},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_27},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  abstract = {Isolated Execution Environments (IEE) offered by novel commodity hardware such as Intel’s SGX deployed in Skylake processors permit executing software in a protected environment that shields it from a malicious operating system; it also permits a remote user to obtain strong interactive attestation guarantees on both the code running in an IEE and its input/output behaviour. In this paper we show how IEEs provide a new path to constructing general secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols. Our protocol is intuitive and elegant: it uses code within an IEE to play the role of a trusted third party (TTP), and the attestation guarantees of SGX to bootstrap secure communications between participants and the TTP. In our protocol the load of communications and computations on participants only depends on the size of each party’s inputs and outputs and is thus small and independent from the intricacy of the functionality to be computed. The remaining computational load– essentially that of computing the functionality – is moved to an untrusted party running an IEE-enabled machine, an appealing feature for Cloud-based scenarios. However, as often the case even with the simplest cryptographic protocols, we found that there is a large gap between this intuitively appealing solution and a protocol with rigorous security guarantees. We bridge this gap through a comprehensive set of results that include: i. a detailed construction of a protocol for secure computation for arbitrary functionalities; ii. formal security definitions for the security of the overall protocol and that of its components; and iii. a modular security analysis of our protocol that relies on a novel notion of labeled attested computation. We implemented and extensively evaluated our solution on SGX-enabled hardware, providing detailed measurements of our protocol as well as comparisons with software-only MPC solutions. Furthermore, we show the cost induced by using constant-time, i.e., timing side channel resilient, code in our implementation.},
  isbn = {978-3-319-70971-0 978-3-319-70972-7},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{baiBatCommEnablingInaudible2020,
  title = {{{BatComm}}: Enabling Inaudible Acoustic Communication with High-Throughput for Mobile Devices},
  shorttitle = {{{BatComm}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 18th {{Conference}} on {{Embedded Networked Sensor Systems}}},
  author = {Bai, Yang and Liu, Jian and Lu, Li and Yang, Yilin and Chen, Yingying and Yu, Jiadi},
  date = {2020-11-16},
  series = {{{SenSys}} '20},
  pages = {205--217},
  publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  location = {New York, NY, USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3384419.3430773},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3384419.3430773},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Acoustic communication is an increasingly popular alternative to existing short-range wireless communication technologies for mobile devices, such as NFC and QR codes. Unlike the current standards, there are no requirements for extra hardware, lighting conditions, or Internet connection. However, the audibility and limited throughput of existing studies hinder their deployment on a wide range of applications. In this paper, we aim to redesign acoustic communication mechanism to push the boundary of potential throughput while keeping the inaudibility. Specifically, we propose BatComm, a high-throughput and inaudible acoustic communication system for mobile devices capable of throughput rates 12X higher than contemporary state-of-the-art acoustic communication for mobile devices. We theoretically model the non-linearity of microphone and use orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) to transmit data bits over multiple orthogonal channels with an ultrasound frequency carrier. We also design a series of techniques to mitigate interference caused by sources such as the signal's unbalanced frequency response, ambient noise, and unrelated residual signals created through OFDM, amplitude modulation (AM), and related processes. Extensive evaluations under multiple realistic settings demonstrate that our inaudible acoustic communication system can achieve over 47kbps within a 10cm communication range. We also show the possibility of increasing the communication range to room scale (i.e., around 2m) while maintaining high-throughput and inaudibility. Our findings offer a new direction for future inaudible acoustic communication techniques to pursue in emerging mobile and IoT applications.},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-7590-0}
}

@online{banquecentraleduluxembourgInkstainedBanknotes,
  title = {Ink-Stained Banknotes},
  author = {{Banque centrale du Luxembourg}},
  url = {https://www.bcl.lu/en/Banknotes-and-Coins/remboursement/billets-macules1/index.html},
  urldate = {2025-11-21}
}

@book{barakIntensiveIntroductionCryptography,
  title = {An Intensive Introduction to Cryptography: {{Computational}} Security},
  shorttitle = {An Intensive Introduction to Cryptography},
  author = {Barak, Boaz},
  url = {https://intensecrypto.org/},
  urldate = {2024-07-31},
  abstract = {Lecture notes on Cryptography by Boaz Barak},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{barnettSecuringQuantumKey2011,
  title = {Securing a Quantum Key Distribution Relay Network Using Secret Sharing},
  booktitle = {2011 {{IEEE GCC Conference}} and {{Exhibition}} ({{GCC}})},
  author = {Barnett, S. M. and Phoenix, S. J. D.},
  date = {2011-02},
  pages = {143--145},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {Dubai, United Arab Emirates},
  doi = {10.1109/IEEEGCC.2011.5752491},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5752491/},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  abstract = {We present a simple new technique to secure quantum key distribution relay networks using secret sharing. Previous techniques have relied on creating distinct physical paths in order to create the shares. We show, however, how this can be achieved on a single physical path by creating distinct logical channels. The technique utilizes a random ‘drop-out’ scheme to ensure that an attacker must compromise all of the relays on the channel in order to access the key.},
  eventtitle = {2011 {{IEEE GCC Conference}} and {{Exhibition}} ({{GCC}})},
  isbn = {978-1-61284-118-2},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{barootiPublicKeyEncryptionQuantum2023,
  title = {Public-{{Key Encryption}} with~{{Quantum Keys}}},
  booktitle = {Theory of {{Cryptography}}},
  author = {Barooti, Khashayar and Grilo, Alex B. and Huguenin-Dumittan, Loïs and Malavolta, Giulio and Sattath, Or and Vu, Quoc-Huy and Walter, Michael},
  editor = {Rothblum, Guy and Wee, Hoeteck},
  date = {2023},
  pages = {198--227},
  publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-48624-1_8},
  abstract = {In the framework of Impagliazzo’s five worlds, a distinction is often made between two worlds, one where public-key encryption exists (Cryptomania), and one in which only one-way functions exist (MiniCrypt). However, the boundaries between these worlds can change when quantum information is taken into account. Recent work has shown that quantum variants of oblivious transfer and multi-party computation, both primitives that are classically in Cryptomania, can be constructed from one-way functions, placing them in the realm of quantum MiniCrypt (the so-called MiniQCrypt). This naturally raises the following question: Is it possible to construct a quantum variant of public-key encryption, which is at the heart of Cryptomania, from one-way functions or potentially weaker assumptions?},
  isbn = {978-3-031-48624-1},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{barrettUSSuspectsHackers2015,
  title = {U.{{S}}. {{Suspects Hackers}} in {{China Breached About}} 4 {{Million People}}’s {{Records}}, {{Officials Say}}},
  author = {Barrett, Devlin and Yadron, Danny and Paletta, Damian},
  date = {2015-06-04T21:04:00Z},
  url = {http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-suspects-hackers-in-china-behind-government-data-breach-sources-say-1433451888},
  urldate = {2025-05-15},
  abstract = {The Federal Bureau of Investigation is probing an apparently far-reaching penetration of data held by the Office of Personnel Management, in which the records of approximately four million individuals were compromised.},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {Wall Street Journal},
  keywords = {Asia,Asia Pacific,BRICS Countries,C&E Executive News Filter,China,Content Types,courts,crime,Crime/Courts,cybercrime,Cybercrime/Hacking,Developing Economies,Eastern Asia,Emerging Market Countries,Factiva Filters,general news,Greater China,hacking,North America,OASN,OCHN,political,Political/General News,SYND,United States,US News}
}

@online{bartusekCryptographyCertifiedDeletion2023,
  title = {Cryptography with {{Certified Deletion}}},
  author = {Bartusek, James and Khurana, Dakshita},
  date = {2023-04-20},
  eprint = {2207.01754},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {quant-ph},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2207.01754},
  urldate = {2024-05-23},
  abstract = {We propose a unifying framework that yields an array of cryptographic primitives with certified deletion. These primitives enable a party in possession of a quantum ciphertext to generate a classical certificate that the encrypted plaintext has been information-theoretically deleted, and cannot be recovered even given unbounded computational resources.},
  langid = {english},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,Quantum Physics}
}

@article{batraEffectFerriteAddition2015,
  title = {Effect of Ferrite Addition above the Base Ferrite on the Coupling Factor of Wireless Power Transfer for Vehicle Applications},
  author = {Batra, T. and Schaltz, E. and Ahn, S.},
  date = {2015-05-07},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Applied Physics},
  volume = {117},
  number = {17},
  pages = {17D517},
  issn = {0021-8979, 1089-7550},
  doi = {10.1063/1.4919039},
  url = {https://pubs.aip.org/jap/article/117/17/17D517/387226/Effect-of-ferrite-addition-above-the-base-ferrite},
  urldate = {2024-10-30},
  abstract = {Power transfer capability of wireless power transfer systems is highly dependent on the magnetic design of the primary and secondary inductors and is measured quantitatively by the coupling factor. The inductors are designed by placing the coil over a ferrite base to increase the coupling factor and reduce magnetic emissions to the surroundings. Effect of adding extra ferrite above the base ferrite at different physical locations on the self-inductance, mutual inductance, and coupling factor is under investigation in this paper. The addition can increase or decrease the mutual inductance depending on the placement of ferrite. Also, the addition of ferrite increases the self-inductance of the coils, and there is a probability for an overall decrease in the coupling factor. Correct placement of ferrite, on the other hand, can increase the coupling factor relatively higher than the base ferrite as it is closer to the other inductor. Ferrite being a heavy compound of iron increases the inductor weight significantly and needs to be added judiciously. Four zones have been identified in the paper, which shows different sensitivity to addition of ferrite in terms of the two inductances and coupling factor. Simulation and measurement results are presented for different air gaps between the coils and at different gap distances between the ferrite base and added ferrite. This paper is beneficial in improving the coupling factor while adding minimum weight to wireless power transfer system.},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{baumMoz$$mathbbZ_2^k$$arellaEfficient2022,
  title = {Moz\$\$\textbackslash mathbb \{{{Z}}\}\_\{2\textasciicircum k\}\$\$arella: {{Efficient Vector-OLE}} and {{Zero-Knowledge Proofs}} over \$\$\textbackslash mathbb \{{{Z}}\}\_\{2\textasciicircum k\}\$\$},
  shorttitle = {Moz\$\$\textbackslash mathbb \{{{Z}}\}\_\{2\textasciicircum k\}\$\$arella},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2022},
  author = {Baum, Carsten and Braun, Lennart and Munch-Hansen, Alexander and Scholl, Peter},
  editor = {Dodis, Yevgeniy and Shrimpton, Thomas},
  date = {2022},
  volume = {13510},
  pages = {329--358},
  publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-15985-5_12},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-15985-5_12},
  urldate = {2023-02-28},
  abstract = {Zero-knowledge proof systems are usually designed to support computations for circuits over F2 or Fp for large p, but not for computations over Z2k , which all modern CPUs operate on. Although Z2k -arithmetic can be emulated using prime moduli, this comes with an unavoidable overhead. Recently, Baum et al. (CCS 2021) suggested a candidate construction for a designated-verifier zero-knowledge proof system that natively runs over Z2k . Unfortunately, their construction requires preprocessed random vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE) to be instantiated over Z2k . Currently, it is not known how to efficiently generate such random VOLE in large quantities.},
  isbn = {978-3-031-15984-8 978-3-031-15985-5},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{beards1996,
  title = {Structural Vibration: {{Analysis}} and Damping},
  author = {Beards, C. F.},
  date = {1996},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  isbn = {0-340-64580-6}
}

@inproceedings{beaverComplexitySecureProtocols1990,
  title = {The Round Complexity of Secure Protocols},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual {{ACM}} Symposium on {{Theory}} of Computing  - {{STOC}} '90},
  author = {Beaver, D. and Micali, S. and Rogaway, P.},
  date = {1990},
  pages = {503--513},
  publisher = {ACM Press},
  location = {Baltimore, Maryland, United States},
  doi = {10.1145/100216.100287},
  url = {http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=100216.100287},
  urldate = {2025-08-14},
  abstract = {In a network of n players, each player i having private input zi, we show how the players can collaboratively evaluate a function f(zl, ..., zn) in a way that does not compromise the privacy of the players' inputs, and yet requires only a constant number of rounds of interaction.},
  eventtitle = {The Twenty-Second Annual {{ACM}} Symposium},
  isbn = {978-0-89791-361-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{beckFuzzyMessageDetection2021,
  title = {Fuzzy {{Message Detection}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2021 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Beck, Gabrielle and Len, Julia and Miers, Ian and Green, Matthew},
  date = {2021-11-12},
  pages = {1507--1528},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Virtual Event Republic of Korea},
  doi = {10.1145/3460120.3484545},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3460120.3484545},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {Many privacy-preserving protocols employ a primitive that allows a sender to “flag” a message to a recipient’s public key, such that only the recipient (who possesses the corresponding secret key) can detect that the message is intended for their use. Examples of such protocols include anonymous messaging, privacy-preserving payments, and anonymous tracing. A limitation of the existing techniques is that recipients cannot easily outsource the detection of messages to a remote server, without revealing to the server the exact set of matching messages. In this work we propose a new class of cryptographic primitives called fuzzy message detection schemes. These schemes allow a recipient to derive a specialized message detection key that can identify correct messages, while also incorrectly identifying non-matching messages with a specific and chosen false positive rate p. This allows recipients to outsource detection work to an untrustworthy server, without revealing precisely which messages belong to the receiver. We show how to construct these schemes under a variety of assumptions; describe several applications of the new technique; and show that our schemes are efficient enough to use in real applications.},
  eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '21: 2021 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-8454-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{bellareEfficientGarblingFixedKey2013,
  title = {Efficient {{Garbling}} from a {{Fixed-Key Blockcipher}}},
  booktitle = {2013 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}},
  author = {Bellare, Mihir and Hoang, Viet Tung and Keelveedhi, Sriram and Rogaway, Phillip},
  date = {2013-05},
  pages = {478--492},
  issn = {1081-6011},
  doi = {10.1109/SP.2013.39},
  abstract = {We advocate schemes based on fixed-key AES as the best route to highly efficient circuit-garbling. We provide such schemes making only one AES call per garbled-gate evaluation. On the theoretical side, we justify the security of these methods in the random-permutation model, where parties have access to a public random permutation. On the practical side, we provide the Just Garble system, which implements our schemes. Just Garble evaluates moderate-sized garbled-circuits at an amortized cost of 23.2 cycles per gate (7.25 nsec), far faster than any prior reported results.},
  eventtitle = {2013 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}},
  keywords = {Cryptography,Games,Garbled circuits,garbling schemes,Logic gates,multiparty computation,Protocols,random-permutation model,Semantics,timing study,Wires,Yao's protocol}
}

@online{bellovinPermissiveActionLinks,
  title = {Permissive {{Action Links}}},
  author = {Bellovin, Steven M.},
  url = {https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html#CZ89},
  urldate = {2024-09-05}
}

@article{bencivenniTimeDomainReflectometer2013,
  title = {A {{Time Domain Reflectometer}} with 100ps Precision Implemented in a Cost-Effective {{FPGA}} for the Test of the {{KLOE-2 Inner Tracker}} Readout Anodes},
  author = {Bencivenni, G. and Czerwinski, E. and De Lucia, E. and De Robertis, G. and Domenici, D. and Erriquez, O. and Fanizzi, G. and Felici, G. and Liuzzi, R. and Loddo, F. and Mongelli, M. and Morello, G. and Ranieri, A. and Valentino, V.},
  date = {2013-01-11},
  journaltitle = {Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment},
  shortjournal = {Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment},
  volume = {698},
  pages = {185--191},
  issn = {0168-9002},
  doi = {10.1016/j.nima.2012.10.023},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168900212011552},
  urldate = {2025-03-11},
  abstract = {A Time Domain Reflectometer implemented in a single cost-effective Field Programmable Gate Array device is shown to achieve a precision around 100ps. The Time to Digital Converter section of the device is based on a tapped delay line followed by an encoder and shows both Differential and Integral Non-Linearity below one least significant bit. The same Field Programmable Gate Array houses an 8051 8-bits microprocessor, for the control of the pulse signals generation, the acquisition and the first treatment of raw data. Principles of operation, architecture, performance and preliminary trials on the prototype are presented in this paper. As an example of possible application, the proposed circuit has been usefully used to perform the quality control of the micro-strip anodic planes of the Gas Electron Multiplier Inner Tracker of the KLOE-2 experiment.},
  keywords = {Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA),Micro-strip,Statistical Code Method,Tapped delay line,Time Domain Reflectometer (TDR)}
}

@inproceedings{benderDangersStochasticParrots2021,
  title = {On the {{Dangers}} of {{Stochastic Parrots}}: {{Can Language Models Be Too Big}}? 🦜},
  shorttitle = {On the {{Dangers}} of {{Stochastic Parrots}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2021 {{ACM Conference}} on {{Fairness}}, {{Accountability}}, and {{Transparency}}},
  author = {Bender, Emily M. and Gebru, Timnit and McMillan-Major, Angelina and Shmitchell, Shmargaret},
  date = {2021-03-03},
  pages = {610--623},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Virtual Event Canada},
  doi = {10.1145/3442188.3445922},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3442188.3445922},
  urldate = {2023-03-06},
  abstract = {The past 3 years of work in NLP have been characterized by the development and deployment of ever larger language models, especially for English. BERT, its variants, GPT-2/3, and others, most recently Switch-C, have pushed the boundaries of the possible both through architectural innovations and through sheer size. Using these pretrained models and the methodology of fine-tuning them for specific tasks, researchers have extended the state of the art on a wide array of tasks as measured by leaderboards on specific benchmarks for English. In this paper, we take a step back and ask: How big is too big? What are the possible risks associated with this technology and what paths are available for mitigating those risks? We provide recommendations including weighing the environmental and financial costs first, investing resources into curating and carefully documenting datasets rather than ingesting everything on the web, carrying out pre-development exercises evaluating how the planned approach fits into research and development goals and supports stakeholder values, and encouraging research directions beyond ever larger language models.},
  eventtitle = {{{FAccT}} '21: 2021 {{ACM Conference}} on {{Fairness}}, {{Accountability}}, and {{Transparency}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-8309-7},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{bennettGeneralizedPrivacyAmplification1995,
  title = {Generalized Privacy Amplification},
  author = {Bennett, C.H. and Brassard, G. and Crepeau, C. and Maurer, U.M.},
  date = {1995-11},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory},
  volume = {41},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1915--1923},
  issn = {00189448},
  doi = {10.1109/18.476316},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/476316/},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {This paper provides a general treatment of privacy amplification by public discussion, a concept introduced by Bennett, Brassard, and Robert for a special scenario. Privacy amplification is a process that allows two parties to distill a secret key from a common random variable about which an eavesdropper has partial information. The two parties generally know nothing about the eavesdropper’s information except that it satisfies a certain constraint. The results have applications to unconditionally secure secret-key agreement protocols and quantum cryptography, and they yield results on wiretap and broadcast channels for a considerably strengthened definition of secrecy capacity.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{berriosHighFidelityQuantum2012,
  title = {High {{Fidelity Quantum Gates}} with {{Vibrational Qubits}}},
  author = {Berrios, Eduardo and Gruebele, Martin and Shyshlov, Dmytro and Wang, Lei and Babikov, Dmitri},
  date = {2012-11-26},
  journaltitle = {The Journal of Physical Chemistry A},
  shortjournal = {J. Phys. Chem. A},
  volume = {116},
  number = {46},
  pages = {11347--11354},
  issn = {1089-5639, 1520-5215},
  doi = {10.1021/jp3055729},
  url = {https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/jp3055729},
  urldate = {2024-06-27},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{bhargavanPracticalInSecurity64bit2016,
  title = {On the {{Practical}} ({{In-}}){{Security}} of 64-Bit {{Block Ciphers}}: {{Collision Attacks}} on {{HTTP}} over {{TLS}} and {{OpenVPN}}},
  shorttitle = {On the {{Practical}} ({{In-}}){{Security}} of 64-Bit {{Block Ciphers}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2016 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Bhargavan, Karthikeyan and Leurent, Gaëtan},
  date = {2016-10-24},
  pages = {456--467},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Vienna Austria},
  doi = {10.1145/2976749.2978423},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2976749.2978423},
  urldate = {2024-07-31},
  abstract = {While modern block ciphers, such as AES, have a block size of at least 128 bits, there are many 64-bit block ciphers, such as 3DES and Blowfish, that are still widely supported in Internet security protocols such as TLS, SSH, and IPsec. When used in CBC mode, these ciphers are known to be susceptible to collision attacks when they are used to encrypt around 232 blocks of data (the so-called birthday bound). This threat has traditionally been dismissed as impractical since it requires some prior knowledge of the plaintext and even then, it only leaks a few secret bits per gigabyte. Indeed, practical collision attacks have never been demonstrated against any mainstream security protocol, leading to the continued use of 64-bit ciphers on the Internet.},
  eventtitle = {{{CCS}}'16: 2016 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-4139-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{bibakQuantumKeyDistribution2021,
  title = {Quantum Key Distribution with {{PRF}}({{Hash}}, {{Nonce}}) Achieves Everlasting Security},
  author = {Bibak, Khodakhast and Ritchie, Robert},
  date = {2021-07},
  journaltitle = {Quantum Information Processing},
  shortjournal = {Quantum Inf Process},
  volume = {20},
  number = {7},
  pages = {228},
  issn = {1570-0755, 1573-1332},
  doi = {10.1007/s11128-021-03164-3},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11128-021-03164-3},
  urldate = {2024-07-29},
  abstract = {Peev et al. (Int J Quantum Inf 03:225–231, 2005) introduced a key-efficient two-step hash function for authentication in quantum key distribution (QKD). They suggested using a publicly known hash function as part of this scheme. Improving on this, Pacher et al. (Quantum Inf Process 15:327–362, 2016) suggested a method to restore information-theoretic security (ITS) by using almost universal hash functions instead of publicly known hash functions. While their scheme is a key-efficient almost-strongly universal (ASU) family, like any other ASU family, it only provides a one-time MAC. Here, we propose the use of a MAC paradigm called PRF(Hash, Nonce) for authentication in QKD. This MAC has several advantages which make it suited for QKD. In particular, unlike the above constructions, it is a many-time MAC and is also more key-efficient. In fact, PRF(Hash, Nonce) is even more key-efficient than the Wegman–Carter paradigm, the most widely used MAC scheme for authentication in QKD. Furthermore, it provides everlasting security, which means that if authentication remains unbroken during the execution of QKD, then the resulting keys retain ITS, which guarantees that the adversary cannot gain any new information on the keys even with unlimited computational power.},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{blanquiNiDieuNi2009,
  title = {Ni dieu ni maître},
  author = {Blanqui, Auguste and Dommanget, Maurice},
  date = {2009},
  series = {Opium du peuple},
  publisher = {Éd. Aden [diff. Belles lettres]},
  location = {Bruxelles [Le Kremlin-Bicêtre]},
  isbn = {978-2-930402-77-2},
  langid = {fre}
}

@inproceedings{blantonPrivateObliviousSet2012,
  title = {Private and Oblivious Set and Multiset Operations},
  author = {Blanton, Marina and Aguiar, Everaldo},
  date = {2012-05-02},
  pages = {40--41},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Seoul Korea},
  doi = {10.1145/2414456.2414479},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2414456.2414479},
  urldate = {2024-06-06},
  eventtitle = {{{ASIA CCS}} '12: 7th {{ACM Symposium}} on {{Information}}, {{Compuer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-1648-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{blechmanTechnologyLimitationInternational1989,
  title = {Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict},
  editor = {Blechman, Barry M.},
  date = {1989},
  series = {{{FPI}} Papers in International Affairs},
  publisher = {Foreign Policy Inst. [u.a.]},
  location = {Washington, DC},
  isbn = {978-0-941700-42-9 978-0-941700-43-6},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {185}
}

@inproceedings{blockAutonomicPermissionlessAndroid2017,
  title = {An Autonomic and Permissionless {{Android}} Covert Channel},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th {{ACM Conference}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} in {{Wireless}} and {{Mobile Networks}}},
  author = {Block, Kenneth and Narain, Sashank and Noubir, Guevara},
  date = {2017-07-18},
  series = {{{WiSec}} '17},
  pages = {184--194},
  publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  location = {New York, NY, USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3098243.3098250},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3098243.3098250},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Demand for mobile devices continues to experience worldwide growth. Within the U.S., there is a significant shift away from broadband usage towards Smartphones as the primary Internet entry point for consumers. Although technological advancements have helped fuel demand for greater features and functionality to enhance the user experience, they have also drawn attention from malicious actors seeking to access and exfiltrate increasingly available sensitive and content rich personalized information.In traditional Android based exfiltration channels, the application engaged in information acquisition is granted permission to execute off-board communications. This tactic increases the possibility of detection by applications designed to identify this form of behavior. In this paper, we sever the acquisition / exfiltration bundling by assigning independent responsibilities to two apps communicating via a stealthy, permissionless, self-configuring and self-optimizing ultrasonic bridge. We present a framework for analyzing channel feasibility and performance, and apply it to 28 popular mobile devices. We demonstrate basic channel capability on 13 devices, achieving in certain cases, Bit Error Rates lower than 10−4 and Shannon capacity approaching 14 bps. We further demonstrate two performance boosting solutions that build on these results: a multichannel implementation which improves performance by nearly 80\% and; a single channel Amplitude Shift Keying solution that increases capacity three-fold.},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-5084-6}
}

@incollection{blomNoGodsNo2025,
  title = {No {{Gods No Masters}}: {{Anarchist}} Mots de Mémoire from {{Titles}} to {{T-Shirts}}},
  booktitle = {Memory and the {{Language}} of {{Contention}}},
  author = {Blom, Tashina},
  editor = {Van Den Elzen, Sophie and Rigney, Ann},
  date = {2025-03-10},
  pages = {231--247},
  publisher = {BRILL},
  doi = {10.1163/9789004692978},
  url = {https://brill.com/view/title/69864},
  urldate = {2025-11-24},
  isbn = {978-90-04-69297-8}
}

@misc{boak1973,
  title = {A History of {{U}}.{{S}}. Communications Security, Volumes {{I}} and {{II}}},
  author = {Boak, David G.},
  date = {1973},
  url = {https://www.governmentattic.org/18docs/Hist_US_COMSEC_Boak_NSA_1973u.pdf},
  urldate = {2021-09-24},
  howpublished = {Lecture Notes},
  organization = {US National Security Agency (NSA)}
}

@book{boakHistoryUSCommunications1973,
  title = {A {{History}} of {{U}}.{{S}}. {{Communications Security}} ({{The David G}}. {{Boak Lectures}}), {{Volume I}}},
  author = {Boak, David G.},
  date = {1973},
  publisher = {(US) National Security Agency},
  url = {http://archive.org/details/history_comsec-nsa},
  urldate = {2025-02-18},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {NSA},
  annotation = {2015 re-declassified version contains more material}
}

@book{boakHistoryUSCommunications1981,
  title = {A {{History}} of {{U}}.{{S}}. {{Communications Security}} ({{The David G}}. {{Boak Lectures}}), {{Volume II}}},
  author = {Boak, David G.},
  date = {1981},
  publisher = {(US) National Security Agency},
  url = {http://archive.org/details/history_comsec_ii-nsa},
  urldate = {2025-02-18},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {NSA},
  annotation = {2015 re-declassified version contains more material}
}

@book{bogatinSignalPowerIntegrity2018,
  title = {Signal and Power Integrity, Simplified},
  author = {Bogatin, Eric},
  date = {2018},
  edition = {Third edition},
  publisher = {Prentice Hall},
  location = {Boston},
  isbn = {978-0-13-451341-6},
  pagetotal = {958},
  keywords = {Digital signalbehandling,Digital techniques,Impedance (Electricity),Signal integrity (Electronics),Signal processing}
}

@inproceedings{boyarNewCombinationalLogic2010,
  title = {A {{New Combinational Logic Minimization Technique}} with {{Applications}} to {{Cryptology}}},
  booktitle = {Experimental {{Algorithms}}},
  author = {Boyar, Joan and Peralta, René},
  editor = {Festa, Paola},
  date = {2010},
  pages = {178--189},
  publisher = {Springer},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-13193-6_16},
  abstract = {A new technique for combinational logic optimization is described. The technique is a two-step process. In the first step, the non-linearity of a circuit – as measured by the number of non-linear gates it contains – is reduced. The second step reduces the number of gates in the linear components of the already reduced circuit. The technique can be applied to arbitrary combinational logic problems, and often yields improvements even after optimization by standard methods has been performed. In this paper we show the results of our technique when applied to the S-box of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES [6]). This is an experimental proof of concept, as opposed to a full-fledged circuit optimization effort. Nevertheless the result is, as far as we know, the circuit with the smallest gate count yet constructed for this function. We have also used the technique to improve the performance (in software) of several candidates to the Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition. Finally, we have experimentally verified that the second step of our technique yields significant improvements over conventional methods when applied to randomly chosen linear transformations.},
  isbn = {978-3-642-13193-6},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {AES,Circuit complexity,linear component minimization,multiplicative complexity,S-box}
}

@incollection{boyleEfficientPseudorandomCorrelation2019,
  title = {Efficient {{Pseudorandom Correlation Generators}}: {{Silent OT Extension}} and {{More}}},
  shorttitle = {Efficient {{Pseudorandom Correlation Generators}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2019},
  author = {Boyle, Elette and Couteau, Geoffroy and Gilboa, Niv and Ishai, Yuval and Kohl, Lisa and Scholl, Peter},
  editor = {Boldyreva, Alexandra and Micciancio, Daniele},
  date = {2019},
  volume = {11694},
  pages = {489--518},
  publisher = {Springer},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8_16},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8_16},
  urldate = {2024-02-26},
  abstract = {Secure multiparty computation (MPC) often relies on sources of correlated randomness for better efficiency and simplicity. This is particularly useful for MPC with no honest majority, where input-independent correlated randomness enables a lightweight “non-cryptographic” online phase once the inputs are known. However, since the amount of correlated randomness typically scales with the circuit size of the function being computed, securely generating correlated randomness forms an efficiency bottleneck, involving a large amount of communication and storage.},
  isbn = {978-3-030-26953-1 978-3-030-26954-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{boyleFunctionalSignaturesPseudorandom2014,
  title = {Functional {{Signatures}} and {{Pseudorandom Functions}}},
  booktitle = {Public-{{Key Cryptography}} – {{PKC}} 2014},
  author = {Boyle, Elette and Goldwasser, Shafi and Ivan, Ioana},
  editor = {Krawczyk, Hugo},
  date = {2014},
  volume = {8383},
  pages = {501--519},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-54631-0_29},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-54631-0_29},
  urldate = {2023-03-02},
  abstract = {In this paper, we introduce two new cryptographic primitives: functional digital signatures and functional pseudorandom functions. In a functional signature scheme, in addition to a master signing key that can be used to sign any message, there are signing keys for a function f , which allow one to sign any message in the range of f . As a special case, this implies the ability to generate keys for predicates P , which allow one to sign any message m, for which P (m) = 1.},
  isbn = {978-3-642-54630-3 978-3-642-54631-0},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{boyleObliviousTransferConstant2023,
  title = {Oblivious {{Transfer}} with~{{Constant Computational Overhead}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2023},
  author = {Boyle, Elette and Couteau, Geoffroy and Gilboa, Niv and Ishai, Yuval and Kohl, Lisa and Resch, Nicolas and Scholl, Peter},
  editor = {Hazay, Carmit and Stam, Martijn},
  date = {2023},
  pages = {271--302},
  publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30545-0_10},
  abstract = {The computational overhead of a cryptographic task is the asymptotic ratio between the computational cost of securely realizing the task and that of realizing the task with no security at all.},
  isbn = {978-3-031-30545-0},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{boyleSecureMultipartyComputation2022,
  title = {Secure {{Multiparty Computation}} with {{Sublinear Preprocessing}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2022},
  author = {Boyle, Elette and Gilboa, Niv and Ishai, Yuval and Nof, Ariel},
  editor = {Dunkelman, Orr and Dziembowski, Stefan},
  date = {2022},
  volume = {13275},
  pages = {427--457},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-06944-4_15},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-06944-4_15},
  urldate = {2024-06-06},
  isbn = {978-3-031-06943-7 978-3-031-06944-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{boyleSublinearGMWStyleCompiler2021,
  title = {Sublinear {{GMW-Style Compiler}} for {{MPC}} with {{Preprocessing}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2021},
  author = {Boyle, Elette and Gilboa, Niv and Ishai, Yuval and Nof, Ariel},
  editor = {Malkin, Tal and Peikert, Chris},
  date = {2021},
  volume = {12826},
  pages = {457--485},
  publisher = {Springer},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_16},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_16},
  urldate = {2023-02-28},
  abstract = {We consider the efficiency of protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) with a dishonest majority. A popular approach for the design of such protocols is to employ preprocessing. Before the inputs are known, the parties generate correlated secret randomness, which is consumed by a fast and possibly “information-theoretic” online protocol.},
  isbn = {978-3-030-84244-4 978-3-030-84245-1},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{BraidSynchronizationHTTP,
  title = {Braid: {{Synchronization}} for {{HTTP}}},
  url = {https://braid.org/},
  urldate = {2024-08-28}
}

@book{brattonStackSoftwareSovereignty2016,
  title = {The {{Stack}}: {{On Software}} and {{Sovereignty}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Stack}}},
  author = {Bratton, Benjamin H.},
  date = {2016-02-19},
  publisher = {The MIT Press},
  doi = {10.7551/mitpress/9780262029575.001.0001},
  url = {https://direct.mit.edu/books/book/3504/The-StackOn-Software-and-Sovereignty},
  urldate = {2024-06-21},
  abstract = {A comprehensive political and design theory of planetary-scale computation proposing that The Stack—an accidental megastructure—is both a technological apparatus and a model for a new geopolitical architecture.             What has planetary-scale computation done to our geopolitical realities?~It takes different forms at different scales—from energy and mineral sourcing and subterranean cloud infrastructure to urban software and massive universal addressing systems; from interfaces drawn by the augmentation of the hand and eye to users identified by self—quantification and the arrival of legions of sensors, algorithms, and robots. Together, how do these distort and deform modern political geographies and produce new territories in their own image?             In The Stack, Benjamin Bratton proposes that these different genres of computation—smart grids, cloud platforms, mobile apps, smart cities, the Internet of Things, automation—can be seen not as so many species evolving on their own, but as forming a coherent whole: an accidental megastructure called The Stack that is both a computational apparatus and a new governing architecture. We are inside The Stack and it is inside of us.~             In an account that is both theoretical and technical, drawing on political philosophy, architectural theory, and software studies, Bratton explores six layers of The Stack: Earth, Cloud, City, Address, Interface, User. Each is mapped on its own terms and understood as a component within the larger whole built from hard and soft systems intermingling—not only computational forms but also social, human, and physical forces. This model, informed by the logic of the multilayered structure of protocol “stacks,” in which network technologies operate within a modular and vertical order, offers a comprehensive image of our emerging infrastructure and a platform for its ongoing reinvention.~             The Stack is an interdisciplinary design brief for a new geopolitics that works with and for planetary-scale computation. Interweaving the continental, urban, and perceptual scales, it shows how we can better build, dwell within, communicate with, and govern our worlds.             thestack.org},
  isbn = {978-0-262-33018-3},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{braunMOTIONFrameworkMixedProtocol2022,
  title = {{{MOTION}} – {{A Framework}} for {{Mixed-Protocol Multi-Party Computation}}},
  author = {Braun, Lennart and Demmler, Daniel and Schneider, Thomas and Tkachenko, Oleksandr},
  date = {2022-03-04},
  journaltitle = {ACM Trans. Priv. Secur.},
  volume = {25},
  number = {2},
  pages = {8:1--8:35},
  issn = {2471-2566},
  doi = {10.1145/3490390},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3490390},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {We present MOTION, an efficient and generic open-source framework for mixed-protocol secure multi-party computation\ (MPC). MOTION is built in a user-friendly, modular, and extensible way, intended to be used as a tool in MPC research and to increase adoption of MPC protocols in practice. Our framework incorporates several important engineering decisions such as full communication serialization, which enables MPC over arbitrary messaging interfaces and removes the need of owning network sockets. MOTION also incorporates several performance optimizations that improve the communication complexity and latency, e.g.,  \textbackslash ( 2\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) \ better online round complexity of precomputed correlated\ Oblivious Transfer\ (OT).We instantiate our framework with protocols for N\ parties and security against up to  \textbackslash ( N-1 \textbackslash )  passive corruptions: the MPC protocols of Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson\ (GMW) in its arithmetic and Boolean version and OT-based BMR\ (Ben-Efraim et\ al., CCS’16), as well as novel and highly efficient conversions between them, including a non-interactive conversion from BMR to arithmetic GMW.MOTION is highly efficient, which we demonstrate in our experiments. Compared to secure evaluation of AES-128 with  \textbackslash ( N=3 \textbackslash )  parties in a high-latency network with OT-based BMR, we achieve a 16 \textbackslash ( \textbackslash times \textbackslash )  better throughput of 16\ AES evaluations per second using BMR. With this, we show that BMR is much more competitive than previously assumed. For  \textbackslash ( N=3 \textbackslash )  parties and full-threshold protocols in a LAN, MOTION is  \textbackslash ( 10\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) – \textbackslash ( 18\textbackslash times \textbackslash )  faster than the previous best passively secure implementation from the MP-SPDZ framework, and  \textbackslash ( 190\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) – \textbackslash ( 586\textbackslash times \textbackslash )  faster than the actively secure SCALE-MAMBA framework. Finally, we show that our framework is highly efficient for privacy-preserving neural network inference.}
}

@patent{brodskyCircuitLayoutsTamperrespondent2018,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Circuit Layouts of Tamper-Respondent Sensors},
  author = {Brodsky, William L. and Busby, James A. and Cohen, Edward N. and Isaacs, Phillip Duane},
  holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}},
  date = {2018-11-20},
  number = {10136519B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10136519B2/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {conductive lines,respondent,respondent sensor,sensor,tamper}
}

@article{brodskyPolarizationModeDispersion2006,
  title = {Polarization {{Mode Dispersion}} of {{Installed Fibers}}},
  author = {Brodsky, Misha and Frigo, Nicholas J. and Boroditsky, Misha and Tur, Moshe},
  date = {2006-12},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Lightwave Technology},
  volume = {24},
  number = {12},
  pages = {4584--4599},
  issn = {1558-2213},
  doi = {10.1109/JLT.2006.885781},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4063384/?arnumber=4063384&tag=1},
  urldate = {2024-09-04},
  abstract = {Polarization mode dispersion (PMD), a potentially limiting impairment in high-speed long-distance fiber-optic communication systems, refers to the distortion of propagating optical pulses due to random birefringences in an optical system. Because these perturbations (which can be introduced through manufacturing imperfections, cabling stresses, installation procedures, and environmental sensitivities of fiber and other in-line components) are unknowable and continually changing, PMD is unique among optical impairments. This makes PMD both a fascinating research subject and potentially one of the most challenging technical obstacles for future optoelectronic transmission. Mitigation and compensation techniques, proper emulation, and accurate prediction of PMD-induced outage probabilities critically depend on the understanding and modeling of the statistics of PMD in installed links. Using extensive data on buried fibers used in long-haul high-speed links, the authors discuss the proposition that most of the temporal PMD changes that are observed in installed routes arise primarily from a relatively small number of "hot spots" along the route that are exposed to the ambient environment, whereas the buried shielded sections remain largely stable for month-long time periods. It follows that the temporal variations of the differential group delay for any given channel constitute a distinct statistical distribution with its own channel-specific mean value. The impact of these observations on outage statistics is analyzed, and the implications for future optoelectronic fiber-based transmission are discussed},
  eventtitle = {Journal of {{Lightwave Technology}}},
  keywords = {Communication systems,High speed optical techniques,Optical distortion,Optical fiber cables,optical fiber communication,Optical fiber communication,optical fiber dispersion,optical fiber polarization,Optical fiber polarization,Optical propagation,Optical pulses,Optical sensors,Polarization mode dispersion,Statistical distributions}
}

@patent{brodskyTamperRespondentAssemblyFlexible2019,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper-{{Respondent Assembly With Flexible Tamper-Detect Sensor}}(s) {{Overlying In-Situ-Formed Tamper-Detect Sensor}}},
  author = {Brodsky, William L. and Busby, James A. and Dangler, John R. and Dragone, Silvio and Fisher, Michael J. and Long, David C.},
  holder = {{Internationnal Business Machines Corporation}},
  date = {2019-06-18},
  number = {10,327,329 B2},
  abstract = {Tamper-respondent assemblies and methods of fabrication are provided which include an enclosure, an in -situ -formed tamper-detect sensor, and one ormore flexible tamper-detect sensors. The enclosure encloses, at least in part, one ormore electronic components to be protected , and the in -situ formed tamper-detect sensor is formed in place over an inner surface of the enclosure. The flexible tamper-detect sensor(s ) is disposed over the in -situ -formed tamper-detect sensor, such that the in -situ -formed tamper-detect sensor is between the inner surface of the enclosure and the flexible tamper-detect sensor(s). Together the in -situ -formed tamper detect sensor and flexible tamper-detect sensor(s) facilitate defining, at least in part, a secure volume about the one or more electronic components.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{broussaisOriginesDeviseAnarchiste2022,
  title = {Les Origines de La Devise Anarchiste « {{Ni Dieu}} Ni Maître » : Une Généalogie Discutable},
  shorttitle = {Les Origines de La Devise Anarchiste « {{Ni Dieu}} Ni Maître »},
  author = {Broussais, Romain},
  date = {2022-02-01},
  journaltitle = {Histoire Politique},
  shortjournal = {histoirepolitique},
  number = {46},
  issn = {1954-3670},
  doi = {10.4000/histoirepolitique.2452},
  url = {http://journals.openedition.org/histoirepolitique/2452},
  urldate = {2025-11-24}
}

@patent{busbyTamperDetectionEnclosuretoboard2020,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Detection at Enclosure-to-Board Interface},
  author = {Busby, James A. and HIGBY, Arthur J. and Long, David C. and Fisher, Michael J. and Budd, Russell A. and Turgeon, Michel and Tetreault, Sylvain},
  holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}},
  date = {2020-03-17},
  number = {10595401B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10595401B1/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  keywords = {circuit board,enclosure,respondent,respondent sensor,tamper}
}

@online{BypassingGlitterNail,
  title = {Bypassing the {{Glitter Nail Polish Tamper Evident Seal}}},
  url = {https://hoodiepony.medium.com/bypassing-the-glitter-nail-polish-tamper-evident-seal-25d6973d617d},
  organization = {Bypassing the Glitter Nail Polish Tamper Evident Seal}
}

@online{byPCBsLinearMotors2018,
  title = {{{PCBs As Linear Motors}}},
  author = {By},
  date = {2018-06-11T18:30:54+00:00},
  url = {https://hackaday.com/2018/06/11/pcbs-as-linear-motors/},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {PCBs are exceptionally cheap now, and that means everyone gets to experiment with the careful application of copper traces on a fiberglass substrate. For his Hackaday Prize entry, [Carl] is putting…},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {Hackaday}
}

@article{caldwell1989reducing,
  title = {Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War with Permissive Action Links},
  author = {Caldwell, Dan and Zimmerman, Peter},
  date = {1989},
  journaltitle = {Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict},
  pages = {137--150},
  publisher = {Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute}
}

@inproceedings{cannonProtectionPhysicalAttacks2023,
  title = {Protection {{Against Physical Attacks Through Self-Destructive Polymorphic Latch}}},
  booktitle = {2023 {{IEEE}}/{{ACM International Conference}} on {{Computer Aided Design}} ({{ICCAD}})},
  author = {Cannon, Andrew and Farheen, Tasnuva and Roy, Sourav and Tajik, Shahin and Forte, Domenic},
  date = {2023-10},
  pages = {1--9},
  issn = {1558-2434},
  doi = {10.1109/ICCAD57390.2023.10323716},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10323716/?arnumber=10323716},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {On-chip assets, such as cryptographic keys, intermediate cipher computations, obfuscation keys, and hardware security primitive outputs, are usually stored in volatile memories, e.g., registers and SRAMs. Such volatile memories could be read out using active physical attacks, such laser-assisted side-channels. One way to protect assets stored in volatile memories can be the employment of sensors that detect active physical attacks and trigger complete zeroization of sensitive data. However, hundreds or thousands of clock cycles are often needed to accomplish this. Further, the sensing and self-destruction mechanisms are decoupled from the sensitive circuitry and can be disabled separately by an adversary. Moreover, defensive actions (e.g., zeroization) may be disabled by bringing the CPU/SoC into an inoperable condition, while registers may still hold their data, making them susceptible. This paper proposes a self-destructive latch to protect sensitive data from active side-channel attacks, which require supply voltage manipulations. Our proposed latch senses supply voltage interference required during such attacks, and reacts instantaneously by entering a forbidden data state, erasing its stored data. The design uses a NULL convention logic (NCL)-based polymorphic NOR/NAND gate, which changes its functionality with supply voltage. Our results show that the latch is stable across temperature and process variation reacting to attacks with 91\% confidence. Even for the 9\% where data is not destroyed, in 3.33 \% of cases data flips its state which makes reliable extraction difficult for an attacker. The polymorphic latch is straightforward to implement due to its NCL implementation and the voltage for the self-destructive behavior is easily altered by resizing only two transistors. Further, this self-destructive behavior extends to registers which are built out of latches.},
  eventtitle = {2023 {{IEEE}}/{{ACM International Conference}} on {{Computer Aided Design}} ({{ICCAD}})},
  keywords = {active side-channel attacks,hardware security,Latches,Logic gates,polymorphic latch,polymorphism,Registers,self-destructive countermeasure,Sensors,Side-channel attacks,Temperature sensors,Voltage,voltage modulation}
}

@article{caoEvolutionQuantumKey2022,
  title = {The {{Evolution}} of {{Quantum Key Distribution Networks}}: {{On}} the {{Road}} to the {{Qinternet}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Evolution}} of {{Quantum Key Distribution Networks}}},
  author = {Cao, Yuan and Zhao, Yongli and Wang, Qin and Zhang, Jie and Ng, Soon Xin and Hanzo, Lajos},
  date = {2022-22},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Communications Surveys \& Tutorials},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials},
  volume = {24},
  number = {2},
  pages = {839--894},
  issn = {1553-877X, 2373-745X},
  doi = {10.1109/COMST.2022.3144219},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9684555/},
  urldate = {2024-05-15}
}

@article{caoHybridTrustedUntrusted2021,
  title = {Hybrid {{Trusted}}/{{Untrusted Relay-Based Quantum Key Distribution Over Optical Backbone Networks}}},
  author = {Cao, Yuan and Zhao, Yongli and Li, Jun and Lin, Rui and Zhang, Jie and Chen, Jiajia},
  date = {2021-09},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications},
  shortjournal = {IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.},
  volume = {39},
  number = {9},
  pages = {2701--2718},
  issn = {0733-8716, 1558-0008},
  doi = {10.1109/JSAC.2021.3064662},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9373434/},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) has demonstrated a great potential to provide future-proofed security, especially for 5G and beyond communications. As the critical infrastructure for 5G and beyond communications, optical networks can offer a cost-effective solution to QKD deployment utilizing the existing fiber resources. In particular, measurement-device-independent QKD shows its ability to extend the secure distance with the aid of an untrusted relay. Compared to the trusted relay, the untrusted relay has obviously better security, since it does not rely on any assumption on measurement and even allows to be accessed by an eavesdropper. However, it cannot extend QKD to an arbitrary distance like the trusted relay, such that it is expected to be combined with the trusted relay for large-scale QKD deployment. In this work, we study the hybrid trusted/untrusted relay based QKD deployment over optical backbone networks and focus on cost optimization during the deployment phase. A new network architecture of hybrid trusted/untrusted relay based QKD over optical backbone networks is described, where the node structures of the trusted relay and untrusted relay are elaborated. The corresponding network, cost, and security models are formulated. To optimize the deployment cost, an integer linear programming model and a heuristic algorithm are designed. Numerical simulations verify that the cost-optimized design can significantly outperform the benchmark algorithm in terms of deployment cost and security level. Up to 25\% cost saving can be achieved by deploying QKD with the hybrid trusted/untrusted relay scheme while keeping much higher security level relative to the conventional point-to-point QKD protocols that are only with the trusted relays.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{carpovManticoreEfficientFramework,
  title = {Manticore: {{Efficient Framework}} for {{Scalable Secure Multiparty Computation Protocols}}},
  author = {Carpov, S and Deforth, K and Gama, N and Georgieva, M and Jetchev, D and Katz, J and Mohammadi, M and Sae-Tang, A and Vuille, M},
  abstract = {We propose a novel MPC framework, Manticore, in the multiparty setting, with full threshold and semi-honest security model, supporting a combination of real number arithmetic (arithmetic shares), Boolean arithmetic (Boolean shares) and garbled circuits (Yao shares). In contrast to prior work [34,32], Manticore never overflows, an important feature for machine learning applications. It achieves this without compromising efficiency or security. Compared to other overflow-free recent techniques such as MP-SPDZ [17] that convert arithmetic to Boolean shares, we introduce a novel highly efficient modular lifting/truncation method that stays in the arithmetic domain. We revisit some of the basic MPC operations such as real-valued polynomial evaluation, division, logarithms, exponentials and comparisons by employing our modular lift in combination with existing efficient conversions between arithmetic, Boolean and Yao shares. Furthermore, we provide a highly efficient and scalable implementation supporting logistic regression models with realworld training data sizes and high numerical precision through PCA and blockwise variants (for memory and runtime optimizations). On a dataset of 50 million rows and 50 columns distributed among two players, it completes in one day with at least 10 decimal digits of precision. Our logistic regression solution placed first at Track 3 of the annual iDASH’2020 Competition. Finally, we mention a novel oblivious sorting algorithm built using Manticore.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{carraraAcousticCovertChannels2015,
  title = {On {{Acoustic Covert Channels Between Air-Gapped Systems}}},
  booktitle = {Foundations and {{Practice}} of {{Security}}},
  author = {Carrara, Brent and Adams, Carlisle},
  editor = {Cuppens, Frédéric and Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin and Zincir Heywood, Nur and Fong, Philip W. L.},
  date = {2015},
  pages = {3--16},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-17040-4_1},
  abstract = {In this work, we study the ability for malware to leak sensitive information from an air-gapped high-security system to systems on a low-security network, using ultrasonic and audible audio covert channels in two different environments: an open-concept office and a closed-door office. Our results show that malware installed on unmodified commodity hardware can leak data from an air-gapped system using the ultrasonic frequency range from 20~kHz to 20.5~kHz at a rate of 140~bps and at a rate of 6.7~kbps using the audible spectrum from 500~Hz to 18~kHz. Additionally, we show that data can be communicated using ultrasonic communication at distances up~to 11~m with bit rates over 230~bps and a bit error rate of 2~\%. Given our results, our attacks are able to leak captured keystrokes in real-time using ultrasonic signals and, using audible signals when nobody is present in the environment - the overnight attack, both keystrokes and recorded audio.},
  isbn = {978-3-319-17040-4},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Audio communication,Jumping air-gaps,Malware communication,Out-of-band covert channels,Ultrasonic}
}

@article{carraraOutofBandCovertChannels2016,
  title = {Out-of-{{Band Covert Channels}}—{{A Survey}}},
  author = {Carrara, Brent and Adams, Carlisle},
  date = {2016-06-30},
  journaltitle = {ACM Comput. Surv.},
  volume = {49},
  number = {2},
  pages = {23:1--23:36},
  issn = {0360-0300},
  doi = {10.1145/2938370},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/2938370},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {A novel class of covert channel, out-of-band covert channels, is presented by extending Simmons’ prisoners’ problem. This new class of covert channel is established by surveying the existing covert channel, device-pairing, and side-channel research. Terminology as well as a taxonomy for out-of-band covert channels is also given. Additionally, a more comprehensive adversarial model based on a knowledgeable passive adversary and a capable active adversary is proposed in place of the current adversarial model, which relies on an oblivious passive adversary. Last, general protection mechanisms are presented, and an argument for a general measure of “covertness” to effectively compare covert channels is given.}
}

@book{carterManagingNuclearOperations1987,
  title = {Managing Nuclear Operations},
  editor = {Carter, Ashton and Steinbruner, John D. and Zraket, Charles A. and {Brookings Institution} and {Harvard University}},
  date = {1987},
  publisher = {Brookings Institution},
  location = {Washington, D.C},
  isbn = {978-0-8157-1313-5 978-0-8157-1314-2},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {751}
}

@incollection{castryckEfficientKeyRecovery2023,
  title = {An {{Efficient Key Recovery Attack}} on {{SIDH}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2023},
  author = {Castryck, Wouter and Decru, Thomas},
  editor = {Hazay, Carmit and Stam, Martijn},
  date = {2023},
  volume = {14008},
  pages = {423--447},
  publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_15},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_15},
  urldate = {2024-06-27},
  abstract = {We present an efficient key recovery attack on the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman protocol (SIDH). The attack is based on Kani’s “reducibility criterion” for isogenies from products of elliptic curves and strongly relies on the torsion point images that Alice and Bob exchange during the protocol. If we assume knowledge of the endomorphism ring of the starting curve then the classical running time is polynomial in the input size (heuristically), apart from the factorization of a small number of integers that only depend on the system parameters. The attack is particularly fast and easy to implement if one of the parties uses 2-isogenies and the starting curve comes equipped with a non-scalar endomorphism of very small degree; this is the case for SIKE, the instantiation of SIDH that recently advanced to the fourth round of NIST’s standardization effort for post-quantum cryptography. Our Magma implementation breaks SIKEp434, which aims at security level 1, in about ten minutes on a single core.},
  isbn = {978-3-031-30588-7 978-3-031-30589-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{cesanaSecurityClothDesign2006,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Security Cloth Design and Assembly},
  author = {Cesana, Mario L. and Farquhar, Donald S. and Taddei, Martino},
  holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}},
  date = {2006-01-03},
  number = {6982642B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US6982642B1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {assembly,bonding pad,cloth,extension,wrap}
}

@patent{cesanaTamperResistantCard2001,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Resistant Card Enclosure with Improved Intrusion Detection Circuit},
  author = {Cesana, Mario and Zavatti, Roberto},
  holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}},
  date = {2001-12-27},
  number = {20010056542A1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20010056542A1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {circuit traces,intrusion,resistant enclosure,tamper resistant,traces}
}

@article{chafiDesignMethodPCB2021,
  title = {Design {{Method}} of {{PCB Inductors}} for {{High-Frequency GaN Converters}}},
  author = {Chafi, Ammar and Idir, Nadir and Videt, Arnaud and Maher, Hassan},
  date = {2021-01},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {36},
  number = {1},
  pages = {805--814},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2020.3000438},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9110799/?arnumber=9110799&tag=1},
  urldate = {2024-11-14},
  abstract = {The new power Gallium Nitride transistors allow to increase the operating frequency of converters to megahertz range, thanks to their low switching time that is of a few nanoseconds or less. This permits to reduce the values and the volume of the passive components, and enhance the power density of power converters. However, inductors needed for energy storage still take a large volume in converters compared with the others components, because of their weak energy density. Furthermore, high-frequency operation require low-losses magnetic materials. In this article, a design method of PCB inductors is proposed. A flexible ferrite sheet is used to enhance the inductance value and ease the realization of custom-shape devices. The design method of the inductor is based on the optimization of the inductor volume taking into account thermal issues of the magnetic sheets. Also a simulation method is proposed to calculate the equivalent stray capacitance of the inductors. The proposed method provides a losses volume tradeoff that helps designers to optimize the inductor for their application.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Copper,Flexible magnetic sheets,Gallium nitride,GaN converters,Inductance,Inductors,Magnetic resonance imaging,optimization of volume,PCB inductor,Saturation magnetization,thermal issues,Toroidal magnetic fields}
}

@book{chanceWaveforms1949,
  title = {Waveforms},
  editor = {Chance, Britton and Hughes, Vernon and MacNichol, Edward F. and Sayre, David and Williams, Frederic C.},
  date = {1949},
  series = {{{MIT Radiation Laboratory}}},
  volume = {19},
  publisher = {McGraw-Hill},
  location = {New York}
}

@incollection{chanCommittingAuthenticatedEncryption2022,
  title = {On {{Committing Authenticated-Encryption}}},
  booktitle = {Computer {{Security}} – {{ESORICS}} 2022},
  author = {Chan, John and Rogaway, Phillip},
  editor = {Atluri, Vijayalakshmi and Di Pietro, Roberto and Jensen, Christian D. and Meng, Weizhi},
  date = {2022},
  volume = {13555},
  pages = {275--294},
  publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-17146-8_14},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-17146-8_14},
  urldate = {2024-08-26},
  abstract = {We provide a strong definition for committing authenticatedencryption (cAE), as well as a framework that encompasses earlier and weaker definitions. The framework attends not only to what is committed but also the extent to which the adversary knows or controls keys. We slot into our framework strengthened cAE-attacks on GCM and OCB. Our main result is a simple and efficient construction, CTX, that makes a nonce-based AE (nAE) scheme committing. The transformed scheme achieves the strongest security notion in our framework. Just the same, the added computational cost (on top of the nAE scheme’s cost) is a single hash over a short string, a cost independent of the plaintext’s length. And there is no increase in ciphertext length compared to the base nAE scheme. That such a thing is possible, let alone easy, upends the (incorrect) intuition that you can’t commit to a plaintext or ciphertext without hashing one or the other. And it motivates a simple and practical tweak to AE-schemes to make them committing.},
  isbn = {978-3-031-17145-1 978-3-031-17146-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{chatterjeeARDWAugmentedReality2022,
  title = {{{ARDW}}: {{An Augmented Reality Workbench}} for {{Printed Circuit Board Debugging}}},
  shorttitle = {{{ARDW}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 35th {{Annual ACM Symposium}} on {{User Interface Software}} and {{Technology}}},
  author = {Chatterjee, Ishan and Pforte, Tadeusz and Tng, Aspen and Salemi Parizi, Farshid and Chen, Chaoran and Patel, Shwetak},
  date = {2022-10-29},
  pages = {1--16},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Bend OR USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3526113.3545684},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3526113.3545684},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  eventtitle = {{{UIST}} '22: {{The}} 35th {{Annual ACM Symposium}} on {{User Interface Software}} and {{Technology}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-9320-1},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{chesnoyUnderseaFiberCommunication2015,
  title = {Undersea Fiber Communication Systems},
  author = {Chesnoy, José},
  date = {2015},
  edition = {Second edition},
  publisher = {Academic Press},
  location = {Amsterdam},
  abstract = {Since publication of the 1st edition in 2002, there has been a deep evolution of the global communication network with the entry of submarine cables in the Terabit era. Thanks to optical technologies, the transmission on a single fiber can achieve 1 billion simultaneous phone calls across the ocean! Modern submarine optical cables are fueling the global internet backbone, surpassing by far all alternative techniques. This new edition of Undersea Fiber Communication Systems provides a detailed explanation of all technical aspects of undersea communications systems, with an emphasis on the most recent breakthroughs of optical submarine cable technologies. This fully updated new edition is the best resource for demystifying enabling optical technologies, equipment, operations, up to marine installations, and is an essential reference for those in contact with this field. Each chapter of the book is written by key experts of their domain. The book assembles in a complementary way the contributions of authors from key suppliers acting in the domain, such as Alcatel-Lucent, Ciena, NEC, TE-Subcom, Xtera, from consultant and operators such as Axiom, OSI, Orange, and from University and organization references such as TelecomParisTech, and Suboptic. This has ensured that the overall topics of submarine telecommunications is treated in a quite ecumenical, complete and un-biased approach},
  isbn = {978-0-12-804269-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{chituAlgorithmDesignConductive2020,
  title = {Algorithm to {{Design Conductive Mesh}} for {{Tamperproof Envelope}}},
  booktitle = {2020 {{IEEE}} 26th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
  author = {Chiţu, Sorin and Vasile, Daniel Ciprian and Honceriu, Tudor Ioan and Svasta, Paul},
  date = {2020-10},
  pages = {106--108},
  issn = {2642-7036},
  doi = {10.1109/SIITME50350.2020.9292275},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9292275/?arnumber=9292275},
  urldate = {2024-10-31},
  abstract = {Protection of the Critical Security Parameters is a permanent concern for the designers, but also for the users of cryptographic equipment. The usage of a conductive mesh is a sensitive and efficient solution in order to protect the firmware, keys or any other sensitive data that could be contained in a cryptographic module. In order to improve the security provided by this principle, based on the flexibility of common technology that can be used to produce PCBs, an algorithm to produce particular designs of conductive mesh on PCBs starting from random bit strings is present in this article. Random design of conductive mesh is useful in order to increase the unpredictability of its electrical characteristics so, in addition to the sensitivity of this conductive mesh which will detect and react even to any attempt of measuring it by probes, an attacker will not have any information which can be exploited. The proposed innovative algorithm provides filling of the full area of envelope which cover the cryptographic module, even if its perimeter is irregular, according to necessary dimensions and profile, keeping traces on a dense grid, without any uncovered areas. The main advantage of the proposed solution consists of the possibility to implement a fully automated production flux, without human participation, and with an increased level of security due to unpredictable electrical characteristics of conductive mesh generated from a true random bit string.},
  eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE}} 26th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
  keywords = {algorithm,Cryptography,Electric variables,Electronics packaging,Generators,mesh,Probes,Production,random,sampling-mesh,security,Sensitivity,tamperproof}
}

@patent{chockPointSaleTerminal2009,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Point of Sale Terminal Having Pulsed Current Tamper Control Sensing},
  author = {Chock, Raymond O. and Hess, Mark},
  holder = {{Zilog Inc}},
  date = {2009-06-23},
  number = {7551098B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US7551098B1/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  keywords = {tamper,tamper detect,terminal,time,voltage}
}

@article{choiHalbachMagneticCircuit2010,
  title = {Halbach {{Magnetic Circuit}} for {{Voice Coil Motor}} in {{Hard Disk Drives}}},
  author = {Choi, Young-Man and Ahn, Da-Hoon and Gweon, Dae-Gab and Jeong, Jae-Hwa},
  date = {2010-09-30},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Magnetics},
  shortjournal = {Journal of Magnetics},
  volume = {15},
  number = {3},
  pages = {143--147},
  issn = {1226-1750},
  doi = {10.4283/JMAG.2010.15.3.143},
  url = {http://koreascience.or.kr/journal/view.jsp?kj=E1MGAB&py=2010&vnc=v15n3&sp=143},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Rotary-type voice coil motors are widely used as actuators in hard disk drives. The recent trend toward higher density and smaller form factors in data storage devices requires performance improvement of the voice coil motor. In this study, we introduce a Halbach magnet array to the voice coil motor in order to increase the force generation. The Halbach magnetic circuit outperforms the conventional magnetic circuit due to the confined magnetic flux. To investigate the performance of the Halbach magnetic circuit, we analyze air gap flux density with the various shapes and thickness of the magnets using 3-dimensional finite element analysis. Consequently the optimum shape of the Halbach magnetic circuit is proposed. Simulations and experimental results proved effectiveness of the proposed magnet array in the voice coil motor for a commercial hard disk drive.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{choiQuantumKeyDistribution2010,
  title = {Quantum Key Distribution on a {{10Gb}}/s {{WDM-PON}}},
  author = {Choi, Iris and Young, Robert J. and Townsend, Paul D.},
  date = {2010-04-26},
  journaltitle = {Optics Express},
  shortjournal = {Opt. Express, OE},
  volume = {18},
  number = {9},
  pages = {9600--9612},
  publisher = {Optica Publishing Group},
  issn = {1094-4087},
  doi = {10.1364/OE.18.009600},
  url = {https://opg.optica.org/oe/abstract.cfm?uri=oe-18-9-9600},
  urldate = {2024-09-04},
  abstract = {We present the first demonstration of quantum key distribution (QKD) on a multi-user wavelength division multiplexed passive optical network (WDM-PON) with simultaneous, bidirectional 10Gb/s classical channel transmission. The C-Band QKD system operates at a clock rate of 10GHz and employs differential phase shift keying (DPSK). A dual feeder fiber and band filtering scheme is used to suppress classical to quantum channel cross-talk generated by spontaneous Raman scattering, which would otherwise prevent secure key distribution. Quantum keys were distributed to 4 users with negligible Raman cross-talk penalties. The mean QBER value for 4 users was 3.5\% with a mean raw key distribution rate of 1.3Mb/s, which decreased to 696kb/s after temporal windowing to reduce inter-symbol interference due to single photon detector timing jitter.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Passive optical networks,Quantum cryptography,Quantum key distribution,Raman scattering,Stimulated Raman scattering,Wavelength division multiplexing}
}

@article{choiSecureMultipartyComputation2019,
  title = {Secure {{Multiparty Computation}} and {{Trusted Hardware}}: {{Examining Adoption Challenges}} and {{Opportunities}}},
  shorttitle = {Secure {{Multiparty Computation}} and {{Trusted Hardware}}},
  author = {Choi, Joseph I. and Butler, Kevin R. B.},
  date = {2019},
  journaltitle = {Security and Communication Networks},
  volume = {2019},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1368905},
  issn = {1939-0122},
  doi = {10.1155/2019/1368905},
  url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1155/2019/1368905},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  abstract = {When two or more parties need to compute a common result while safeguarding their sensitive inputs, they use secure multiparty computation (SMC) techniques such as garbled circuits. The traditional enabler of SMC is cryptography, but the significant number of cryptographic operations required results in these techniques being impractical for most real-time, online computations. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation of code and data in use, making them promising candidates for making SMC more tractable. This paper revisits the history of improvements to SMC over the years and considers the possibility of coupling trusted hardware with SMC. This paper also addresses three open challenges: (1) defeating malicious adversaries, (2) mobile-friendly TEE-supported SMC, and (3) a more general coupling of trusted hardware and privacy-preserving computation.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{chorPrivateInformationRetrieval,
  title = {Private Information Retrieval},
  author = {Chor, Benny and Goldreich, Oded and Kushilevitz, Eyal},
  date = {1998-11-01},
  journaltitle = {Journal of the ACM},
  shortjournal = {JACM},
  volume = {45},
  number = {6},
  pages = {965--981},
  doi = {10.1145/293347.293350},
  abstract = {Publicly accessible databases are an indispensable resource for retrieving up-to-date information. But they also pose a significant risk to the privacy of the user, since a curious database operator can follow the user’s queries and infer what the user is after. Indeed, in cases where the users’ intentions are to be kept secret, users are often cautious about accessing the database. It can be shown that when accessing a single database, to completely guarantee the privacy of the user, the whole database should be down-loaded; namely n bits should be communicated (where n is the number of bits in the database).},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{choudhuriComplexitySecureComputation2020,
  title = {The {{Round Complexity}} of {{Secure Computation Against Covert Adversaries}}},
  booktitle = {Security and {{Cryptography}} for {{Networks}}},
  author = {Choudhuri, Arka Rai and Goyal, Vipul and Jain, Abhishek},
  editor = {Galdi, Clemente and Kolesnikov, Vladimir},
  date = {2020},
  volume = {12238},
  pages = {600--620},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_30},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_30},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {We investigate the exact round complexity of secure multiparty computation (MPC) against covert adversaries who may attempt to cheat, but do not wish to be caught doing so. Covert adversaries lie in between semi-honest adversaries who follow protocol specification and malicious adversaries who may deviate arbitrarily.},
  isbn = {978-3-030-57989-0 978-3-030-57990-6},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{choudhuriFluidMPCSecure2021,
  title = {Fluid {{MPC}}: {{Secure Multiparty Computation}} with {{Dynamic Participants}}},
  shorttitle = {Fluid {{MPC}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2021},
  author = {Choudhuri, Arka Rai and Goel, Aarushi and Green, Matthew and Jain, Abhishek and Kaptchuk, Gabriel},
  editor = {Malkin, Tal and Peikert, Chris},
  date = {2021},
  volume = {12826},
  pages = {94--123},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_4},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_4},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {Existing approaches to secure multiparty computation (MPC) require all participants to commit to the entire duration of the protocol. As interest in MPC continues to grow, it is inevitable that there will be a desire to use it to evaluate increasingly complex functionalities, resulting in computations spanning several hours or days.},
  isbn = {978-3-030-84244-4 978-3-030-84245-1},
  langid = {english}
}

@inreference{ChubbDetectorLock2025,
  title = {Chubb Detector Lock},
  booktitle = {Wikipedia},
  date = {2025-01-05T23:12:12Z},
  url = {https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Chubb_detector_lock&oldid=1267621709},
  urldate = {2025-04-17},
  abstract = {A Chubb detector lock is a lever tumbler lock with an integral security feature, a re-locking device, which frustrates unauthorised access attempts and indicates to the lock's owner that it has been interfered with. When someone tries to pick the lock or to open it using the wrong key, the lock is designed to jam in a locked state until (depending on the lock) either a special regulator key or the original key is inserted and turned in a different direction. This alerts the owner to the fact that the lock has been tampered with. Any person who attempts to pick a detector lock must avoid triggering the automatic jamming mechanism. If the automatic jamming mechanism is accidentally triggered (which happens when any one of the levers is lifted too high) the lock-picker has the additional problem of resetting the detector mechanism before the next attempt to open the lock. This introduces additional complexity into the task, increasing the degree of lock-picking skill required to a level which few people have. The first detector lock was produced in 1818 by Jeremiah Chubb of Portsmouth, England, as the result of a government competition to create an unpickable lock. It remained unpicked until the Great Exhibition of 1851.},
  langid = {english},
  annotation = {Page Version ID: 1267621709}
}

@inproceedings{cifuentesPoorMansHardware2016,
  title = {Poor {{Man}}'s {{Hardware Security Module}} ({{pmHSM}}): {{A Threshold Cryptographic Backend}} for {{DNSSEC}}},
  shorttitle = {Poor {{Man}}'s {{Hardware Security Module}} ({{pmHSM}})},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 9th {{Latin America Networking Conference}}},
  author = {Cifuentes, Francisco and Hevia, Alejandro and Montoto, Francisco and Barros, Tomás and Ramiro, Victor and Bustos-Jiménez, Javier},
  date = {2016-10-13},
  pages = {59--64},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Valparaiso Chile},
  doi = {10.1145/2998373.2998452},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2998373.2998452},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  eventtitle = {{{LANC}} '16: {{Latin America Networking Conference}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-4591-0},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {sampling-mesh}
}

@patent{clarkTamperDetectionSystem2005,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Detection System for Securing Data},
  author = {Clark, Douglas A.},
  holder = {{Pitney Bowes Inc}},
  date = {2005-05-17},
  number = {6895509B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US6895509B1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {node,power source,resistor,transistor,wire loop}
}

@online{ClavisXGQKD2024,
  title = {Clavis {{XG QKD System Brochure}}},
  date = {2024-07},
  url = {https://www.idquantique.com/quantum-safe-security/products/clavis-xg-qkd-system/},
  urldate = {2024-09-04},
  abstract = {Introducing the Clavis XG: IDQ’s long distance and backbone Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) solution, the ultimate in Quantum-Safe Security.},
  langid = {british},
  organization = {ID Quantique}
}

@article{clementiComparisonTaggingTechnologies2018,
  title = {Comparison of {{Tagging Technologies}} for {{Safeguards}} of {{Copper Canisters}} for {{Nuclear Spent Fuel}}},
  author = {Clementi, Chiara and Littmann, François and Capineri, Lorenzo},
  date = {2018-04},
  journaltitle = {Sensors},
  volume = {18},
  number = {4},
  pages = {929},
  publisher = {Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute},
  issn = {1424-8220},
  doi = {10.3390/s18040929},
  url = {https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/4/929},
  urldate = {2024-09-04},
  abstract = {Several countries are planning to store nuclear spent fuel in long term geological repositories, preserved by copper canisters with an iron insert. This new approach involves many challenging problems and one is to satisfy safeguards requirements: the Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of the fuel must be kept from the encapsulation plant up to the final repository. To date, no measurement system has been suggested for a unique identification and authentication. Following the list of the most important safeguards, safety and security requirements for copper canisters identification and authentication, a review of conventional tagging technologies and measurement systems for nuclear items is reported in this paper. The aim of this study is to verify to what extent each technology could be potentially used for keeping the CoK of copper canisters. Several tagging methods are briefly described and compared, discussing advantages and disadvantages.},
  issue = {4},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {copper canisters,identification tags,nuclear spent fuel}
}

@patent{cobianuLargeAreaDistributed2008,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Large Area Distributed Sensor},
  author = {Cobianu, Cornel P. and Georgescu, Ion and Dumitru, Viorel-Georgel},
  holder = {{Honeywell International Inc}},
  date = {2008-01-03},
  number = {20080001741A1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20080001741A1/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&oq=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&sort=old},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {dielectric film,distributed,distributed electrical,electrical circuit,printed}
}

@inproceedings{cominelliEvenBlackCats2020,
  title = {Even {{Black Cats Cannot Stay Hidden}} in the {{Dark}}: {{Full-band De-anonymization}} of {{Bluetooth Classic Devices}}},
  shorttitle = {Even {{Black Cats Cannot Stay Hidden}} in the {{Dark}}},
  booktitle = {2020 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  author = {Cominelli, Marco and Gringoli, Francesco and Patras, Paul and Lind, Margus and Noubir, Guevara},
  date = {2020-05},
  pages = {534--548},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {San Francisco, CA, USA},
  doi = {10.1109/SP40000.2020.00091},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9152700/},
  urldate = {2023-01-19},
  eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  isbn = {978-1-7281-3497-0}
}

@book{constantinouAppliedResearchPolicing2021,
  title = {Applied {{Research}} on {{Policing}} for {{Police}}: {{The}} Case of {{Cyprus}}},
  shorttitle = {Applied {{Research}} on {{Policing}} for {{Police}}},
  author = {Constantinou, Angelo G.},
  date = {2021},
  series = {{{SpringerBriefs}} in {{Criminology}}},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-76377-0},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-76377-0},
  urldate = {2025-08-15},
  isbn = {978-3-030-76376-3 978-3-030-76377-0},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{cookTamperDetectionCircuit2020,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Detection Circuit Assemblies and Related Manufacturing Processes},
  author = {Cook, Timothy E. and Jr, Gerald Thomas Wardrop},
  holder = {{Thales eSecurity Inc}},
  date = {2020-03-03},
  number = {10579833B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10579833B1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {conductive lines,group,lid,security processor,signal}
}

@online{CorningSMF28Ultra2024,
  title = {Corning {{SMF-28 Ultra Optical Fiber Product Information Sheet}}},
  date = {2024-02},
  url = {https://www.corning.com/media/worldwide/coc/documents/Fiber/product-information-sheets/PI-1424-AEN.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-09-05}
}

@misc{coroamaPossibleFutureTrends2025,
  title = {Past and {{Possible Future Trends}}},
  author = {Coroamă, Vlad C and Dumbrav, Oana and Hinterholzer, Simon and Progni, Kejsi and Hintemann, Ralph},
  date = {2025-04},
  url = {https://www.borderstep.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/EDNA-EE-of-servers-FINAL.pdf},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {International Energy Agency}
}

@incollection{couteauSilverSilentVOLE2021,
  title = {Silver: {{Silent VOLE}} and {{Oblivious Transfer}} from {{Hardness}} of {{Decoding Structured LDPC Codes}}},
  shorttitle = {Silver},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2021},
  author = {Couteau, Geoffroy and Rindal, Peter and Raghuraman, Srinivasan},
  editor = {Malkin, Tal and Peikert, Chris},
  date = {2021},
  volume = {12827},
  pages = {502--534},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_17},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_17},
  urldate = {2023-02-28},
  abstract = {We put forth new protocols for oblivious transfer extension and vector OLE, called Silver, for SILent Vole and oblivious transfER. Silver offers extremely high performances: generating 10 million random OTs on one core of a standard laptop requires only 300ms of computation and 122KB of communication. This represents 37\% less computation and ∼ 1300× less communication than the standard IKNP protocol, as well as ∼ 4× less computation and ∼ 14× less communication than the recent protocol of Yang et al. (CCS 2020). Silver is silent: after a one-time cheap interaction, two parties can store small seeds, from which they can later locally generate a large number of OTs while remaining offline. Neither IKNP nor Yang et al. enjoys this feature; compared to the best known silent OT extension protocol of Boyle et al. (CCS 2019), upon which we build up, Silver has 19× less computation, and the same communication. Due to its attractive efficiency features, Silver yields major efficiency improvements in numerous MPC protocols.},
  isbn = {978-3-030-84251-2 978-3-030-84252-9},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{crawfordDungeonsDragonsPlayers2024,
  title = {Dungeons \& Dragons - Player's Handbook},
  author = {Crawford, Jeremy},
  date = {2024},
  publisher = {Wizards of the Coast LLC},
  location = {Renton},
  abstract = {"This revised and expanded Player's Handbook® is the essential reference for every fifth edition Dungeons \& Dragons player. It contains rules for character creation and advancement, exploration, combat, equipment, spells, and much more. Create fantastic D\&D® heroes from the wide selection of character origins, classes, and subclasses provided. Explore ancient ruins and deadly dungeons. Battle monsters while searching for legendary treasures. Gain experience and power as you trek across uncharted lands with your companions."-- Back cover},
  isbn = {978-0-7869-6951-7},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {384}
}

@article{cuellarStaticFatigueLifetime1987,
  title = {Static Fatigue Lifetime of Optical Fibers in Bending},
  author = {Cuellar, E. and Roberts, D. and Middleman, L.},
  date = {1987-01-01},
  journaltitle = {Fiber and Integrated Optics},
  volume = {6},
  number = {3},
  pages = {203--213},
  publisher = {Taylor \& Francis},
  issn = {0146-8030},
  doi = {10.1080/01468038708223680},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/01468038708223680},
  urldate = {2024-08-28},
  abstract = {An experimental program aimed at defining the effects of applied stress, temperature, humidity, and buffer coating on the static fatigue behavior of optical fibers in bending configurations is in progress. Data are presented below which demonstrate that the static fatigue behavior of fiber is strongly dependent on the polymeric buffer coating. Furthermore, the effect of humidity is readily evident by the comparison of times to failure at 30\% RH and in water immersion. The ultimate objective of this research is to determine an allowable bend radius for fiber optic cable which is based on measurements of both static fatigue and strength in bending and which will assure reliable performance of the fiber over the design lifetime.}
}

@patent{curetHardwareSecurityModule2025,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Hardware Security Module Adapter System, Method and Device},
  author = {Curet, Jon Cameron Grant and Wong, Daniel},
  holder = {{Marvell Asia Pte Ltd}},
  date = {2025-05-20},
  number = {12309267B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US12309267B1/en?q=(hardware+security+module+heatsink)&oq=hardware+security+module+heatsink},
  urldate = {2025-12-03},
  keywords = {circuit board,contact pads,encryption,mesh,printed circuit}
}

@article{curranModelingCharacterizationPCB2015,
  title = {Modeling and Characterization of {{PCB}} Coils for Inductive Wireless Charging},
  author = {Curran, Brian and Maaß, Uwe and Fotheringham, Gerhard and Stevens, Nobby and Ndip, Ivan and Lang, Klaus-Dieter},
  date = {2015-09},
  journaltitle = {Wireless Power Transfer},
  shortjournal = {Wirel Pow Transfer},
  volume = {2},
  number = {2},
  pages = {127--133},
  issn = {2052-8418},
  doi = {10.1017/wpt.2015.14},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2052841815000147/type/journal_article},
  urldate = {2023-10-31},
  abstract = {Wireless charging is emerging as a viable technology in many industries, including consumer, medical, and sensor electronics. An investigation of design principles is conducted for a wireless charging platform that is designed to charge devices of different sizes and technologies, using only through vias. It is shown that at a 5 mm separation distance, a coupling coefficient can be achieved which varies from 0.12 to 0.37 when staggered hexagonal transmitter coils (approximately 5 cm across) are used with an unstaggered square receiver coil, which declines to 0.06–0.11 at 2 cm separation. Without design measures, the coupling coefficient will approach zero at certain positions. The quality factors of the coils can be improved by stacking the coils in parallel, enabling the use of only through-vias, while the inductance can be controlled horizontally by increasing the number of turns in the inductor.},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{dalphinEnceinteProtegeeAvec1987,
  type = {patenteu},
  title = {Enceinte Protégée Avec Interrupteur Électrique et Son Application},
  author = {Dalphin, Claude Société Civile S. P. I. D.},
  holder = {{Telecommunications Radioelectriques et Telephoniques SA TRT, Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken NV, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV}},
  date = {1987-08-12},
  number = {0231549A1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/EP0231549A1/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&oq=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&sort=old},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  abstract = {Une enceinte protégée L comporte au moins un élément de paroi E muni d'un interrupteur électrique C1, C2 lui-même protégé par une sonde mince et souple S, B qui d'une part transmet la commande mécanique externe P et d'autre part permet la détection d'une intrusion à ce point faible de l'en­ceinte protégée.     Application : Enceinte de sécurité avec clavier de saisie du code d'accès notamment pour système de paiement électronique.},
  keywords = {flexible,layer,probe,protected enclosure,thickness}
}

@article{dalskovFantasticFourHonestMajority,
  title = {Fantastic {{Four}}: {{Honest-Majority Four-Party Secure Computation With Malicious Security}}},
  author = {Dalskov, Anders and Escudero, Daniel and Keller, Marcel},
  abstract = {This work introduces a novel four-party honest-majority MPC protocol with active security that achieves comparable efficiency to equivalent protocols in the same setting, while having a much simpler design and not relying on functiondependent preprocessing. Our initial protocol satisfies security with abort, but we present some extensions to achieve guaranteed output delivery. Unlike previous works, we do not achieve this by delegating the computation to one single party that is identified to be honest, which is likely to hinder the adoption of these technologies as it centralizes sensitive data. Instead, our novel approach guarantees termination of the protocol while ensuring that no single party (honest or corrupt) learns anything beyond the output.},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{damgardUnconditionallySecureUniversally2013,
  title = {Unconditionally {{Secure}} and {{Universally Composable Commitments}} from {{Physical Assumptions}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} - {{ASIACRYPT}} 2013},
  author = {Damgård, Ivan and Scafuro, Alessandra},
  editor = {Sako, Kazue and Sarkar, Palash},
  editora = {Hutchison, David and Kanade, Takeo and Kittler, Josef and Kleinberg, Jon M. and Mattern, Friedemann and Mitchell, John C. and Naor, Moni and Nierstrasz, Oscar and Pandu Rangan, C. and Steffen, Bernhard and Sudan, Madhu and Terzopoulos, Demetri and Tygar, Doug and Vardi, Moshe Y. and Weikum, Gerhard},
  editoratype = {redactor},
  date = {2013},
  volume = {8270},
  pages = {100--119},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-42045-0_6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-42045-0_6},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {We present a constant-round unconditional black-box compiler that transforms any ideal (i.e., statistically-hiding and statistically-binding) straight-line extractable commitment scheme, into an extractable and equivocal commitment scheme, therefore yielding to UC-security [9]. We exemplify the usefulness of our compiler by providing two (constant-round) instantiations of ideal straight-line extractable commitment based on (malicious) PUFs [37] and stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens [27], therefore achieving the  rst unconditionally UC-secure commitment with malicious PUFs and stateless tokens, respectively. Our constructions are secure for adversaries creating arbitrarily malicious stateful PUFs/tokens.},
  isbn = {978-3-642-42044-3 978-3-642-42045-0},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{daneshDifferentiallyDrivenSymmetric2002,
  title = {Differentially Driven Symmetric Microstrip Inductors},
  author = {Danesh, M. and Long, J.R.},
  date = {2002-01},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques},
  volume = {50},
  number = {1},
  pages = {332--341},
  issn = {1557-9670},
  doi = {10.1109/22.981285},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/981285/?arnumber=981285},
  urldate = {2024-10-31},
  abstract = {A differentially excited symmetric inductor that enhances inductor quality (Q) factor on silicon RFICs is presented. Compared with an equivalent single-ended configuration, experimental data demonstrate that the differential inductor offers a 50\% greater Q factor and a broader range of operating frequencies. Predictions from full-wave simulations and a physics-based SPICE-compatible model are validated by experimental measurements on an inductor fabricated in a triple-level metal silicon technology. Application of the symmetric inductor to a cross-coupled oscillator improves output voltage swing and phase noise by 75\% and 1.8 dB, respectively (for a given power consumption), while chip area is reduced by 35\% compared to conventional inductor equivalents.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Microwave Theory}} and {{Techniques}}},
  keywords = {Frequency,Inductors,Microstrip,Phase noise,Predictive models,Q factor,Radiofrequency integrated circuits,Semiconductor device measurement,Silicon,Voltage-controlled oscillators}
}

@patent{danglerMethodManufacturingVenting2015,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Method of {{Manufacturing}} a {{Venting Device}} for {{Tamper Resistant Electronic Modules}}},
  author = {Dangler, John Richard and Isaacs, Phillip Duane and Sinha, Arvind Kumar},
  holder = {{International Business Machines Corporation}},
  date = {2015-02-24},
  number = {8,961,280 B2},
  abstract = {Atamper resistant enclosure for an electronic circuit includes an inner copper case, a tamper sensing mesh wrapped around the inner case, an outer copper case enclosing the inner case and the tamper sensing mesh, and a venting device forming a vent channel from inside the inner case to outside the outer case, the vent channel passing between overlapping layers of the tamper sensing mesh and having at least one right angle bend along its length. The venting device consists of two strips of a thin polyamide coverlay material laminated together along their length, and a length of wool yarn sand wiched between the two thin strips and extending from one end of the strips to the other end of the strips to form the vent channel. The length of yarn follows a Zig-Zag path between the first and second strips, the Zig-Zag path including at least one right angle bend.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{darcoSecureComputationComputers2016,
  title = {Secure Computation without Computers},
  author = {D'Arco, Paolo and De Prisco, Roberto},
  date = {2016-10-25},
  journaltitle = {Theoretical Computer Science},
  shortjournal = {Theoretical Computer Science},
  volume = {651},
  pages = {11--36},
  issn = {0304-3975},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tcs.2016.08.003},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304397516303905},
  urldate = {2024-03-07},
  abstract = {The design of secure protocols which can be used without the aid of a computer and without cryptographic knowledge is an interesting and challenging research task. Indeed, protocols enjoying these features could be useful in a variety of settings where computers cannot be used or where people feel uncomfortable to interact with or trust a computer. In this paper we make a step in such a direction: we propose a novel method for performing secure two-party computations that, apart from the setup phase, requires neither a computing machinery nor cryptographic knowledge. By merging together in a suitable way two beautiful ideas of the 80's and the 90's, Yao's garbled circuit construction and Naor and Shamir's visual cryptography, respectively, we enable Alice and Bob to securely evaluate a function f(⋅,⋅) of their inputs, x and y, through a pure physical process. Indeed, once Alice has prepared a set of properly constructed transparencies (for this activity a computer is useful), Bob computes the function value f(x,y) by applying a sequence of simple steps which require the use of a pair of scissors, superposing transparencies, and the human visual system. Our construction builds on Kolesnikov's gate evaluation secret sharing schemes.},
  keywords = {Secure computation,Visual cryptography,Yao's construction}
}

@incollection{dejeanRFDNARadioFrequencyCertificates2007,
  title = {{{RF-DNA}}: {{Radio-Frequency Certificates}} of {{Authenticity}}},
  shorttitle = {{{RF-DNA}}},
  booktitle = {Cryptographic {{Hardware}} and {{Embedded Systems}} - {{CHES}} 2007},
  author = {DeJean, Gerald and Kirovski, Darko},
  editor = {Paillier, Pascal and Verbauwhede, Ingrid},
  date = {2007},
  volume = {4727},
  pages = {346--363},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  issn = {0302-9743, 1611-3349},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_24},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_24},
  urldate = {2023-12-19},
  abstract = {A certificate of authenticity (COA) is an inexpensive physical object that has a random and unique multidimensional structure S which is hard to near-exactly replicate. An inexpensive device should be able to scan object’s physical “fingerprint,” i.e., obtain a set of features in the form of a multidimensional signal x that pseudo-uniquely represents S. For a given “fingerprint” x and without access to S, it should be computationally difficult to construct an object of fixed dimensions with a “fingerprint” y which is at a bounded proximity from x according to a standardized distance metric. We introduce objects that behave as COAs in the electromagnetic field. The objective is to complement RFIDs so that they are physically, not only digitally, unique and hard to replicate. By enabling this feature, we introduce a tag whose information about the product can be read within a relative far-field, and also whose authenticity can be reliably verified within its near-field. In order to counterfeit a tag, the adversary faces two difficulties – a computational and a manufacturing one. The computational difficulty stems from the hardness of solving linear inverse problems in the electromagnetic field. In order to create an actual tag, the adversary must also manufacture a multidimensional object with a specific three-dimensional topology, dielectric properties, and conductivity.},
  isbn = {978-3-540-74734-5 978-3-540-74735-2},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{deshotelsInaudibleSoundCovert,
  title = {Inaudible {{Sound}} as a {{Covert Channel}} in {{Mobile Devices}}},
  author = {Deshotels, Luke},
  abstract = {Mobile devices can be protected by a variety of information flow control systems. These systems can prevent Trojans from leaking secrets over network connections. As mobile devices become more secure, attackers will begin to use unconventional methods for exfiltrating data.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{desouzaAuditBackupProcedures2008,
  title = {Audit and Backup Procedures for Hardware Security Modules},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th Symposium on {{Identity}} and Trust on the {{Internet}}},
  author = {family=Souza, given=Túlio Cicero Salvaro, prefix=de, useprefix=true and Martina, Jean Everson and Custódio, Ricardo Felipe},
  date = {2008-03-04},
  pages = {89--97},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Gaithersburg Maryland USA},
  doi = {10.1145/1373290.1373302},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1373290.1373302},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  abstract = {Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are an useful tool to deploy public key infrastructure (PKI) and its applications. This paper presents necessary procedures and protocols to perform backup and audit in such devices when deployed in PKIs. These protocols were evaluated in an implementation of a real HSM, enabling it to perform secure backups and to provide an audit trail, two important considerations for a safe PKI operation. It also introduces a ceremony procedure to support the operation of such HSMs in a PKI environment.},
  eventtitle = {{{IDtrust}} 2008: 7th {{Symposium}} on {{Identity}} and {{Trust}} on the {{Internet}}},
  isbn = {978-1-60558-066-1},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {sampling-mesh}
}

@www{dexter2015,
  title = {Shopshifting: {{The}} Potential for Payment System Abuse},
  author = {Nohl, Karsten and Bräunlein, Fabian and {dexter}},
  date = {2015-12-27},
  publisher = {32C3 Chaos Communication Congress},
  url = {https://media.ccc.de/v/32c3-7368-shopshifting#t=2452}
}

@article{diamantiPracticalChallengesQuantum2016,
  title = {Practical Challenges in Quantum Key Distribution},
  author = {Diamanti, Eleni and Lo, Hoi-Kwong and Qi, Bing and Yuan, Zhiliang},
  date = {2016-11-08},
  journaltitle = {npj Quantum Information},
  shortjournal = {npj Quantum Inf},
  volume = {2},
  number = {1},
  pages = {16025},
  issn = {2056-6387},
  doi = {10.1038/npjqi.2016.25},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/npjqi201625},
  urldate = {2024-09-02},
  abstract = {Abstract             Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditional security in data communication and is currently being deployed in commercial applications. Nonetheless, before QKD can be widely adopted, it faces a number of important challenges such as secret key rate, distance, size, cost and practical security. Here, we survey those key challenges and the approaches that are currently being taken to address them.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{disserBreakingSizeBarrier2023,
  title = {Breaking the~{{Size Barrier}}: {{Universal Circuits Meet Lookup Tables}}},
  shorttitle = {Breaking the~{{Size Barrier}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{ASIACRYPT}} 2023},
  author = {Disser, Yann and Günther, Daniel and Schneider, Thomas and Stillger, Maximilian and Wigandt, Arthur and Yalame, Hossein},
  editor = {Guo, Jian and Steinfeld, Ron},
  date = {2023},
  pages = {3--37},
  publisher = {Springer Nature},
  location = {Singapore},
  doi = {10.1007/978-981-99-8721-4_1},
  abstract = {A Universal Circuit~(UC) is a Boolean circuit of size~\$\$\textbackslash varTheta (n \textbackslash log n)\$\$Θ(nlogn)that can simulate any Boolean function up to a certain size~n. Valiant (STOC’76) provided the first two UC constructions of asymptotic sizes \$\$\textbackslash sim 5 n\textbackslash log n\$\$∼5nlognand \$\$\textbackslash sim 4.75 n\textbackslash log n\$\$∼4.75nlogn, and today’s most efficient construction of Liu et al.~(CRYPTO’21) has size~\$\$\textbackslash sim 3n\textbackslash log n\$\$∼3nlogn. Evaluating a public UC with a secure Multi-Party Computation~(MPC) protocol allows efficient Private Function Evaluation~(PFE), where a private function is evaluated on private data.},
  isbn = {978-981-99-8721-4},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {multi-party computation,private function evaluation,universal circuit}
}

@incollection{dittmerAuthenticatedGarblingSimple2022,
  title = {Authenticated {{Garbling}} from {{Simple Correlations}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2022},
  author = {Dittmer, Samuel and Ishai, Yuval and Lu, Steve and Ostrovsky, Rafail},
  editor = {Dodis, Yevgeniy and Shrimpton, Thomas},
  date = {2022},
  volume = {13510},
  pages = {57--87},
  publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-15985-5_3},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-15985-5_3},
  urldate = {2023-02-28},
  abstract = {We revisit the problem of constant-round malicious secure two-party computation by considering the use of simple correlations, namely sources of correlated randomness that can be securely generated with sublinear communication complexity and good concrete efficiency.},
  isbn = {978-3-031-15984-8 978-3-031-15985-5},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{dixon2007,
  title = {The Shock Absorber Handbook},
  author = {Dixon, John C.},
  date = {2007},
  publisher = {Wiley},
  isbn = {978-0-470-51020-9}
}

@misc{dorseyHighSpeedDataTransmission2010,
  title = {High-{{Speed Data Transmission}} and {{Rotary Platforms}}: {{Slip Rings}}, {{Fiber Optic Rotary Joints}}, and {{Multiplexers}}},
  author = {Dorsey, Glenn},
  date = {2010},
  url = {https://www.globalspec.com/MoogComponents/REF/Note_204_HSDataTrans_RotaryPlatRev1.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-06-26},
  organization = {Moog, Inc.}
}

@incollection{dowlingFlexibleAuthenticatedConfidential2020,
  title = {Flexible {{Authenticated}} and {{Confidential Channel Establishment}} ({{fACCE}}): {{Analyzing}} the {{Noise Protocol Framework}}},
  shorttitle = {Flexible {{Authenticated}} and {{Confidential Channel Establishment}} ({{fACCE}})},
  booktitle = {Public-{{Key Cryptography}} – {{PKC}} 2020},
  author = {Dowling, Benjamin and Rösler, Paul and Schwenk, Jörg},
  editor = {Kiayias, Aggelos and Kohlweiss, Markulf and Wallden, Petros and Zikas, Vassilis},
  date = {2020},
  volume = {12110},
  pages = {341--373},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-45374-9_12},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-45374-9_12},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {The Noise protocol framework is a suite of channel establishment protocols, of which each individual protocol ensures various security properties of the transmitted messages, but keeps specification, implementation, and configuration relatively simple. Implementations of the Noise protocols are themselves, due to the employed primitives, very performant. Thus, despite its relative youth, Noise is already used by large-scale deployed applications such as WhatsApp and Slack. Though the Noise specification describes and claims the security properties of the protocol patterns very precisely, there has been no computational proof yet. We close this gap.},
  isbn = {978-3-030-45373-2 978-3-030-45374-9},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{dragoneVentedTamperrespondentAssemblies2020,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Vented Tamper-Respondent Assemblies},
  author = {Dragone, Silvio and Oggioni, Stefano S. and Santiago-Fernandez, William},
  holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}},
  date = {2020-05-26},
  number = {10667389B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10667389B2/en?q=(hardware+security+module+heatsink)&assignee=International+Business+Machines+Corporation},
  urldate = {2025-12-03},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {circuit board,multilayer circuit,secure volume,tamper,vent}
}

@inproceedings{drimer2008,
  title = {Thinking inside the Box: System-Level Failures of Tamper Proofing},
  booktitle = {2008 {{IEEE}} Symposium on Security and Privacy (Sp 2008)},
  author = {Drimer, Saar and Murdoch, Steven J and Anderson, Ross},
  date = {2008},
  pages = {281--295},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  x-fetchedfrom = {Google Scholar}
}

@patent{droegeSicherheitsmodulMitEinteiliger1997,
  type = {patentde},
  title = {Sicherheitsmodul Mit Einteiliger {{Sicherheitsfolie}}},
  author = {Droege, Hartmut and Fischer, Ludwig and Scheibel, Markus and Sonnentag, Dieter},
  holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}},
  date = {1997-07-17},
  number = {19600769A1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/DE19600769A1/en?q=(H01L23%2f576)&oq=(H01L23%2f576)&sort=old&page=2},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {area,film,module,security,security module}
}

@incollection{dulekSecureMultipartyQuantum2020,
  title = {Secure {{Multi-party Quantum Computation}} with a {{Dishonest Majority}}},
  author = {Dulek, Yfke and Grilo, Alex B. and Jeffery, Stacey and Majenz, Christian and Schaffner, Christian},
  date = {2020},
  volume = {12107},
  eprint = {1909.13770},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {quant-ph},
  pages = {729--758},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-45727-3_25},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1909.13770},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  abstract = {The cryptographic task of secure multi-party (classical) computation has received a lot of attention in the last decades. Even in the extreme case where a computation is performed between \$k\$ mutually distrustful players, and security is required even for the single honest player if all other players are colluding adversaries, secure protocols are known. For quantum computation, on the other hand, protocols allowing arbitrary dishonest majority have only been proven for \$k=2\$. In this work, we generalize the approach taken by Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail (CRYPTO 2012) in the two-party setting to devise a secure, efficient protocol for multi-party quantum computation for any number of players \$k\$, and prove security against up to \$k-1\$ colluding adversaries. The quantum round complexity of the protocol for computing a quantum circuit of \$\textbackslash\{\textbackslash mathsf\{CNOT, T\}\textbackslash\}\$ depth \$d\$ is \$O(k \textbackslash cdot (d + \textbackslash log n))\$, where \$n\$ is the security parameter. To achieve efficiency, we develop a novel public verification protocol for the Clifford authentication code, and a testing protocol for magic-state inputs, both using classical multi-party computation.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,Quantum Physics}
}

@article{dumitruImpostorUSBOffPath,
  title = {The {{Impostor Among US}}({{B}}): {{Off-Path Injection Attacks}} on {{USB Communications}}},
  author = {Dumitru, Robert and Genkin, Daniel and Wabnitz, Andrew and Yarom, Yuval},
  abstract = {USB is the most prevalent peripheral interface in modern computer systems and its inherent insecurities make it an appealing attack vector. A well-known limitation of USB is that traffic is not encrypted. This allows on-path adversaries to trivially perform man-in-the-middle attacks. Off-path attacks that compromise the confidentiality of communications have also been shown to be possible. However, so far no off-path attacks that breach USB communications integrity have been demonstrated.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{duncanFLATSFillingLogic2019,
  title = {{{FLATS}}: {{Filling Logic}} and {{Testing Spatially}} for {{FPGA Authentication}} and {{Tamper Detection}}},
  shorttitle = {{{FLATS}}},
  booktitle = {2019 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Hardware Oriented Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{HOST}})},
  author = {Duncan, Adam and Skipper, Grant and Stern, Andrew and Nahiyan, Adib and Rahman, Fahim and Lukefahr, Andrew and Tehranipoor, Mark and Swany, Martin},
  date = {2019-05},
  pages = {81--90},
  doi = {10.1109/HST.2019.8741025},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8741025/?arnumber=8741025},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  abstract = {Security-critical field programmable gate array (FPGA) designs traditionally rely on bitstream encryption and hashing to prevent bitstream modifications and provide design authentication. Recent attacks to extract bitstream encryption keys, and research in automated bitstream manipulation tools, have created a class of vulnerabilities involving post-synthesis low-level FPGA editing. Current authentication and tamper (e.g., malicious modification) detection approaches dependent upon hash-based comparison mechanisms and register transfer level safeguards are vulnerable to these post-synthesis exploits. In this paper, we propose FLATS, which provides filling logic and testing spatially to combat such vulnerability. FLATS fills unused lookup tables (LUTs) within the FPGA design and inserts infrared-emitting spatial watermarks into the partially used LUTs at the post-synthesis stage for physical authentication and tamper detection using backside infrared imaging. FLATS takes an existing synthesized design and re-purposes a portion of its LUT initialization to function as a watermark allowing for the detection of changes to the post-synthesis placement and initialization. Experimental results validate the FLATS architecture on a 28nm Xilinx FPGA with less than 12\% look-up table utilization overhead and negligible compromises in power and speed.},
  eventtitle = {2019 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Hardware Oriented Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{HOST}})},
  keywords = {3PIPs,Authentication,Encryption,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,infrared,Table lookup,watermark,Watermarking}
}

@article{dupontMiniaturizedUltraLowPowerTamper2022,
  title = {A {{Miniaturized}} and {{Ultra-Low-Power Tamper Detection Sensor}} for {{Portable Applications}}},
  author = {Dupont, François and Laurent, Philippe and Montfort, Francis and Pierre, Hervé and Jeanne, Léo and Stoukatch, Serguei and Dricot, Samuel and Redouté, Jean-Michel},
  date = {2022-03},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Sensors Journal},
  volume = {22},
  number = {5},
  pages = {4524--4533},
  issn = {1558-1748},
  doi = {10.1109/JSEN.2022.3143656},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9682743/?arnumber=9682743},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {This article presents a tamper detection sensor complementing cryptographic techniques in order to protect data from unauthorized access and/or from data falsification. Both the mechanical and electronic parts of the systems are described. The proposed architecture targets portable devices and can be realized using commercially available components, widely available materials and known manufacturing and assembly techniques. The tamper detection circuit is based on a capacitive sensing principle and uses ultra-low-power electronic components, leading to an overall consumed current below 10 \textbackslash mu \textbackslash textA . Autonomy is a crucial reported drawback of miniaturized battery backed-up anti-tampering hardware systems: the presented architecture and implementation ensures a lifetime of at least 3 years when powered by one CR2032 coin cell battery. The paper also assesses the sensitivity of the tamper detection: measurements show that the system is able to detect a variation of at least one percent of the capacitance of the tamper layer, resulting from an attempt to breach the outer shell surrounding the circuit for accessing the sensitive data.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Sensors Journal}}},
  keywords = {Batteries,Capacitive sensor,Computer architecture,data security,Encryption,FIPS 140-2,Hardware,sampling-mesh,Security,Sensors,tamper detection,Temperature sensors,ultra-low-power electronics}
}

@article{durQuantumInternet2017,
  title = {Towards a Quantum Internet},
  author = {Dür, Wolfgang and Lamprecht, Raphael and Heusler, Stefan},
  date = {2017-07-01},
  journaltitle = {European Journal of Physics},
  shortjournal = {Eur. J. Phys.},
  volume = {38},
  number = {4},
  pages = {043001},
  issn = {0143-0807, 1361-6404},
  doi = {10.1088/1361-6404/aa6df7},
  url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1361-6404/aa6df7},
  urldate = {2024-05-15}
}

@thesis{e2013,
  type = {phdthesis},
  title = {On-Shaft Vibration Measurement Using a {{MEMS}} Accelerometer for Faults Diagnosis in Rotating Machines},
  author = {Elnady, Maged Elsaid},
  date = {2013},
  institution = {University of Manchester},
  url = {https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/54530535/FULL_TEXT.PDF},
  urldate = {2021-04-01}
}

@online{ednAchieveTamperproofCapacitive2015,
  title = {Achieve Tamper-Proof Capacitive Sensing},
  author = {EDN},
  date = {2015-01-12T14:24:00+00:00},
  url = {https://www.edn.com/achieve-tamper-proof-capacitive-sensing/},
  urldate = {2025-09-03},
  abstract = {Applications such as Point Of Sale (POS) devices and keypads for secure door locks are required to be tamper resistant. If these devices are tampered},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {EDN}
}

@patent{elbertSecureCircuitAssembly2006,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Secure Circuit Assembly},
  author = {Elbert, Arcadi and Diep, Alvin},
  holder = {{Individual}},
  date = {2006-11-16},
  number = {20060259788A1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20060259788A1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {boundary area,circuit,circuit board,printed circuit,secure}
}

@patent{ElektrischeSicherheitseinrichtungSchutze1932,
  type = {patentde},
  title = {Elektrische {{Sicherheitseinrichtung}} Zum {{Schutze}} von {{Geldschraenken}} u. Dgl},
  holder = {{Individual}},
  date = {1932-09-26},
  number = {559905C},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/DE559905C/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&oq=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&sort=old},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {contacts,covering,door,rugs,safe}
}

@book{elzenMemoryLanguageContention2025,
  title = {Memory and the Language of Contention},
  editor = {family=Elzen, given=Sophie, prefix=van den, useprefix=false and Rigney, Ann},
  date = {2025},
  series = {Mobilizing Memories},
  number = {volume 1},
  publisher = {Brill},
  location = {Leiden Boston},
  abstract = {This edited volume shows how memories of activism live in the medium of language and, conversely, how working with the historical resonance of words is a central feature of political contention},
  isbn = {978-90-04-69297-8},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {1}
}

@incollection{eppenAnforderungenEinzelteileRundfunkempfanger1927,
  title = {Anforderungen an Die {{Einzelteile}} Der {{Rundfunkempfänger}}; {{Gesichtspunkte}} Für Den {{Bau}} Der {{Geräte}}},
  booktitle = {Die Wissenschaftlichen {{Grundlagen}} Des {{Rundfunkempfangs}}},
  author = {Eppen, F.},
  editor = {Wagner, K. W.},
  date = {1927},
  publisher = {Verlag von Julius Springer},
  location = {Berlin},
  keywords = {twisted-inductors}
}

@inproceedings{erenFringeEffectCapacitiveProximity2005,
  title = {Fringe-{{Effect Capacitive Proximity Sensors}} for {{Tamper Proof Enclosures}}},
  author = {Eren, Halit and Sandor, L.D.},
  date = {2005-03-10},
  pages = {22--26},
  doi = {10.1109/SICON.2005.257863},
  abstract = {Capacitive sensors can be constructed for tamper resistant enclosures to prevent unauthorized intrusions. The use printed circuit can provide serpentine geometric patterns of conductors. Any penetration of this envelope interferes with the conductive serpentine, producing a detectable warning of intrusion. Capacitive sensors discussed in this paper are suitable for implementing in the area of physical security cryptographic modules. These sensors conform to Levels 3 and 4 of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2}
}

@inproceedings{erenFringeEffectCapacitiveProximity2005a,
  title = {Fringe-{{Effect Capacitive Proximity Sensors}} for {{Tamper Proof Enclosures}}},
  booktitle = {2005 {{Sensors}} for {{Industry Conference}}},
  author = {Eren, Halit and Sandor, Lucas D},
  date = {2005-02},
  pages = {22--26},
  doi = {10.1109/SICON.2005.257863},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/4027448},
  urldate = {2025-12-24},
  abstract = {Capacitive sensors can be constructed for tamper resistant enclosures to prevent unauthorized intrusions. The use printed circuit can provide serpentine geometric patterns of conductors. Any penetration of this envelope interferes with the conductive serpentine, producing a detectable warning of intrusion. Capacitive sensors discussed in this paper are suitable for implementing in the area of physical security cryptographic modules. These sensors conform to Levels 3 and 4 of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2},
  eventtitle = {2005 {{Sensors}} for {{Industry Conference}}},
  keywords = {Capacitance,Capacitive sensors,Computer industry,Cryptography,Electrodes,Hardware,Information security,Magnetic sensors,Printed circuits,Protection}
}

@inproceedings{essexObliviousPrintingSecret2012,
  title = {Oblivious {{Printing}} of {{Secret Messages}} in a {{Multi-party Setting}}},
  booktitle = {Financial {{Cryptography}} and {{Data Security}}},
  author = {Essex, Aleksander and Hengartner, Urs},
  editor = {Keromytis, Angelos D.},
  date = {2012},
  series = {Lecture {{Notes}} in {{Computer Science}}},
  pages = {359--373},
  publisher = {Springer},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-32946-3_26},
  abstract = {We propose oblivious printing, a novel approach to document printing in which a set of printers can cooperate to print a secret message—in human or machine readable form—without learning the message. We present multi-party protocols for obliviously printing a secret in three settings: obliviously printing the contents of a ciphertext, obliviously printing a randomized message, and generating and obliviously printing a DSA/Elgamal keypair. We propose an approach to improving the legibility of messages in the presence of numerous participants. Finally we propose some potential applications of oblivious printing in the context of electronic voting and digital cash.},
  isbn = {978-3-642-32946-3},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Electronic Vote,Encrypt Image,Secret Message,Translation Table,Visual Cryptography}
}

@online{europeancentralbankDamagedInkstainedBanknotes2023,
  title = {Damaged and Ink-Stained Banknotes},
  author = {{European Central Bank}},
  date = {2023-07-10},
  url = {https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/banknotes/damaged/html/index.en.html},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  abstract = {The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank of the European Union countries which have adopted the euro. Our main task is to maintain price stability in the euro area and so preserve the purchasing power of the single currency.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{evansPragmaticIntroductionSecure,
  title = {A {{Pragmatic Introduction}} to {{Secure Multi-Party Computation}}},
  author = {Evans, David and Kolesnikov, Vladimir and Rosulek, Mike},
  abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) has evolved from a theoretical curiosity in the 1980s to a tool for building real systems today. Over the past decade, MPC has been one of the most active research areas in both theoretical and applied cryptography. This book introduces several important MPC protocols, and surveys methods for improving the efficiency of privacy-preserving applications built using MPC. Besides giving a broad overview of the field and the insights of the main constructions, we overview the most currently active areas of MPC research and aim to give readers insights into what problems are practically solvable using MPC today and how different threat models and assumptions impact the practicality of different approaches.},
  langid = {english}
}

@www{faa2018,
  title = {Pack Safe: {{Batteries}}, Lithium},
  author = {Administration, US Federal Aviation},
  date = {2018-05-31},
  publisher = {US Federal Aviation Administration},
  url = {https://www.faa.gov/hazmat/packsafe/more_info/?hazmat=7},
  urldate = {2021-07-12}
}

@article{fanSimultaneousWirelessPower2024,
  title = {A {{Simultaneous Wireless Power}} and {{Coil Inductance Insensitive Data Transfer System}} for {{Rotary Structures}}},
  author = {Fan, Yuanshuang and Hu, Hongsheng and Sun, Yue and Hu, Han and Wu, Sihan},
  date = {2024-05},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Power Electron.},
  volume = {39},
  number = {5},
  pages = {6526--6536},
  issn = {0885-8993, 1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2024.3367295},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10440478/},
  urldate = {2024-06-21},
  abstract = {This article proposes a simultaneous wireless power and coil inductance-insensitive data transfer system for rotary structures. Power and data are transferred simultaneously via a pair of coupled coils, adopting frequency division multiplexing technology. The data carrier is injected into and extracted from the power transfer channel by inductors connected serially with the coupled coils and by multiplexing the compensation networks of the power transfer channel. The transfer gain of the data transfer channel is insensitive to the inductances of the coupled coils within a certain interval. LCLC compensation topology is proposed to realize constant voltage output and to filter the high-order harmonics out of the power transfer channel, reducing the total harmonic distortion and creating a favorable condition for simultaneous data transfer. The circuit model is built to analyze the power and data transfer performance, and the complex-frequency-domain model of the system is established to analyze the responses of power interference. Finally, the feasibility of the technology proposed is verified by a 300 W prototype with a data rate of 40 kbps.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{fengConcretelyEfficientSecure2022,
  title = {Concretely Efficient Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocols: Survey and More},
  shorttitle = {Concretely Efficient Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocols},
  author = {Feng, Dengguo and Yang, Kang},
  date = {2022},
  journaltitle = {Security and Safety},
  shortjournal = {Security and Safety},
  volume = {1},
  pages = {2021001},
  issn = {2826-1275},
  doi = {10.1051/sands/2021001},
  url = {https://sands.edpsciences.org/10.1051/sands/2021001},
  urldate = {2025-08-15},
  abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to jointly compute a function on their private inputs, and reveals nothing but the output of the function. In the last decade, MPC has rapidly moved from a purely theoretical study to an object of practical interest, with a growing interest in practical applications such as privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML). In this paper, we comprehensively survey existing work on concretely efficient MPC protocols with both semi-honest and malicious security, in both dishonestmajority and honest-majority settings. We focus on considering the notion of security with abort, meaning that corrupted parties could prevent honest parties from receiving output after they receive output. We present high-level ideas of the basic and key approaches for designing different styles of MPC protocols and the crucial building blocks of MPC. For MPC applications, we compare the known PPML protocols built on MPC, and describe the efficiency of private inference and training for the state-of-the-art PPML protocols. Furthermore, we summarize several challenges and open problems to break though the efficiency of MPC protocols as well as some interesting future work that is worth being addressed. This survey aims to provide the recent development and key approaches of MPC to researchers, who are interested in knowing, improving, and applying concretely efficient MPC protocols.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{fernandez-hernandezNavigationMessageAuthentication2016,
  title = {A {{Navigation Message Authentication Proposal}} for the {{Galileo Open Service}}},
  author = {Fernández-Hernández, Ignacio and Rijmen, Vincent and Seco-Granados, Gonzalo and Simon, Javier and Rodríguez, Irma and Calle, J. David},
  date = {2016},
  journaltitle = {NAVIGATION},
  volume = {63},
  number = {1},
  pages = {85--102},
  issn = {2161-4296},
  doi = {10.1002/navi.125},
  url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/navi.125},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {GNSS vulnerabilities have become evident in the last decade. Authentication of the GNSS signals and data can be an important building block contributing to mitigating these vulnerabilities. This paper presents a Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) scheme based on the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol and a novel concept based on a single one-way chain for all senders and cross-authentication. The paper presents an NMA implementation in the Galileo Open Service (OS) navigation message that should provide similar navigation performance to data-authenticated users and standard non-authenticated users in terms of time to first fix, accuracy, and availability even in difficult reception conditions. The proposal also maintains a high level of signal unpredictability to help receivers protect against replay attacks. The scheme and implementation proposed yield significant improvements compared to the state of the art, offering the opportunity for Galileo to become the reference GNSS in civil navigation authentication. Copyright © 2016 Institute of Navigation},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{FewNotesAWS2024,
  title = {A Few Notes on {{AWS Nitro Enclaves}}: {{Attack}} Surface},
  shorttitle = {A Few Notes on {{AWS Nitro Enclaves}}},
  date = {2024-09-24T13:00:36+00:00},
  url = {https://blog.trailofbits.com/2024/09/24/notes-on-aws-nitro-enclaves-attack-surface/},
  urldate = {2024-09-26},
  abstract = {By Paweł Płatek In the race to secure cloud applications, AWS Nitro Enclaves have emerged as a powerful tool for isolating sensitive workloads. But with great power comes great responsibility—and p…},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {Trail of Bits Blog}
}

@book{filbigLehrbuchHochfrequenztechnik1942,
  title = {Lehrbuch Der {{Hochfrequenztechnik}}},
  author = {Filbig, Fritz},
  date = {1942},
  volume = {1},
  publisher = {Akad. Verlag Becker \& Erler},
  keywords = {twisted-inductors}
}

@report{fischlinKryptographischeAnalyseSpezifikation2021,
  title = {Kryptographische Analyse Spezifikation Schlüsselgenerierungsdienst ePA},
  author = {Fischlin, Marc},
  date = {2021-12},
  institution = {Technische Universität Darmstadt},
  url = {https://www.gematik.de/media/erezept/SGD_Analyse_2021.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-05-15},
  langid = {german}
}

@book{flemingPrinciplesElectricWave1910,
  title = {The {{Principles}} of {{Electric Wave Telegraphy}} and {{Telephony}}},
  author = {Fleming, J. A.},
  date = {1910},
  edition = {2},
  publisher = {{Longmans, Green, and Co.}},
  keywords = {twisted-inductor}
}

@report{fowlerInvestigationFlowProcesses1966,
  title = {An Investigation of the Flow Processes in a Centrifugal Compressor Impeller},
  author = {Fowler, H. S.},
  date = {1966},
  journaltitle = {Mechanical Engineering Report (National Research Council Canada. Division of Mechanical Engineering. Engine Laboratory)},
  volume = {ME-220},
  institution = {National Research Council Canada},
  issn = {0077-555X},
  doi = {10.4224/40003753},
  url = {https://nrc-publications.canada.ca/eng/view/object/?id=fd41e817-48ff-4d37-a5af-aede36a9a9cb},
  urldate = {2025-12-02},
  abstract = {The flow in the impeller of a centrifugal flow compressor is complex, and is not yet fully understood. A theoretical model of this flow is proposed, from first principles, and an experimental method of investigating the validity of this model is described. An observer is placed in the centre of a large model of the impeller, and by rotating with it is enabled to examine the flow in the impeller passages in great detail . Experimental results obtained by this method are analysed, and some tentative conclusions on the accuracy of parts of the model are put forward.},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{fraunhofersitAbschlussberichtSicherheitsanalyseGesamtsystems2024,
  title = {Abschlussbericht {{Sicherheitsanalyse}} Des {{Gesamtsystems ePA}} Für Alle},
  author = {{Fraunhofer SIT}},
  date = {2024-08-09},
  url = {https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/fileadmin/dokumente/studien_und_technical_reports/Abschlussbericht_Sicherheitsanalyse_ePA_fuer_alle_Fraunhofer_SIT.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-05-16}
}

@article{frazelle2019,
  title = {Securing the {{Boot Process}}: {{The}} Hardware Root of Trust},
  author = {Frazelle, Jessie},
  date = {2019-12-01},
  journaltitle = {ACM queue : tomorrow's computing today},
  shortjournal = {ACM Queue},
  doi = {10.1145/3380774.3382016},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/fullHtml/10.1145/3380774.3382016},
  urldate = {2020-10-22}
}

@online{fs1M12FSC,
  title = {1M 12F SC/APC Singlemode Farbcodiertes LWL-Pigtail - FS.com Deutschland},
  author = {FS},
  url = {https://www.fs.com/de/products/42416.html},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  abstract = {Kaufen Sie LWL-Pigtail, 1M 12 Fasern SC Singlemode Fasernarbcodiertes LWL-Pigtail, SC/APC Stecker beim Lichtwellenleiter(LWL) Pigtail Hersteller mit besten Preis},
  langid = {german},
  organization = {FS.com}
}

@article{fujimotoDemonstrationHTDetectionMethod2018,
  title = {A {{Demonstration}} of a {{HT-Detection Method Based}} on {{Impedance Measurements}} of the {{Wiring Around ICs}}},
  author = {Fujimoto, Daisuke and Nin, Shota and Hayashi, Yu-Ichi and Miura, Noriyuki and Nagata, Makoto and Matsumoto, Tsutomu},
  date = {2018-10},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. II},
  volume = {65},
  number = {10},
  pages = {1320--1324},
  issn = {1549-7747, 1558-3791},
  doi = {10.1109/TCSII.2018.2858798},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8418748/},
  urldate = {2025-09-30}
}

@online{FunLCDsVisual,
  title = {Fun with {{LCDs}} and {{Visual Cryptography}}},
  url = {https://justi.cz/security/2020/07/30/lcd-crypto.html},
  urldate = {2025-11-18}
}

@article{ganjiHighPerformancePlanar2017,
  title = {High Performance Planar Micro-Transformer Using Novel Crossover Connection},
  author = {Ganji, Bahram Azizollah and Molanzadeh, Mohammad},
  date = {2017-10-01},
  journaltitle = {Microsystem Technologies},
  shortjournal = {Microsyst Technol},
  volume = {23},
  number = {10},
  pages = {4413--4418},
  issn = {1432-1858},
  doi = {10.1007/s00542-017-3494-6},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00542-017-3494-6},
  urldate = {2024-09-23},
  abstract = {In this paper a novel planar micro-transformer with high performance is presented. Non-uniform current density distribution, especially in inner turn, increases the effective metal resistance due to skin and proximity effect. In order to overcome this problem, a novel crossover connection between turns has been used to make equal current paths in the turns and uniform the current distribution. By reducing the current crowding effects, the effective resistance is minimized, thereby the transformer performance characteristics can be increased. Simulation has been taken using ADS Momentum and HFSS software. The results show that the quality factor, self-inductance, mutual inductance and coupling factor are about 42.6, 4.9, 3.3 nH, 0.747 respectively, at 3.5~GHz frequency. The footprint of proposed structure is 860~μm~×~860~μm. Compare with conventional micro-transformer, 17\% in quality factor, 5\% in coupling coefficient and more than 20\% in self and mutual inductance improvement has been achieved.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{gaoOptimalDesignPCB2024,
  title = {Optimal {{Design}} of {{PCB Coreless Axial Flux Permanent Magnet Synchronous Motor With Arc Windings}}},
  author = {Gao, Bo and Cheng, Yuan and Wang, Yao and Zhao, Tianxu and Ding, Ling and Cui, Shumei and Liu, Xinhua and Shi, Yu},
  date = {2024-03},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Energy Conversion},
  volume = {39},
  number = {1},
  pages = {567--577},
  issn = {1558-0059},
  doi = {10.1109/TEC.2023.3315413},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10251645},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The coreless axial flux permanent magnet synchronous motor with printed circuit board stator (PCB motor for short) has attracted research interests for many advantages, such as flexible and precise winding design, low toque ripple, noiseless operation and simple manufacturing process. The motor performance, however, highly depends on its wiring design, which should be carefully optimized. In this article, an arc-shaped distributed winding is adopted due to its higher efficiency. The PCB motor has a 3D magnetic field distribution, which makes its optimal design very difficult since the 3D finite element analysis is usually required. In this article, an analytical model of PCB motor including 3D magnetic field, arc-shaped winding flux linkage and eddy current loss is firstly deduced. On this basis, a multi-objective optimal design is then carried out to design a PCB motor for a vacuum cleaner. Compared with the concentrated winding, the arc winding can achieve a 3\% efficiency improvement. Finally, a 130 W prototype and testbench were built and the presented analytical model is verified by experiments. The results show that there is little difference between calculation and experiment. The presented method effectively simplifies the design process of this kind of motor and shortens the design time.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Energy Conversion}}},
  keywords = {3-D magnetic field calculation,Analytical models,arc-shaped winding,Axial flux motor,Magnetic cores,Magnetostatics,optimization,PCB motor,Permanent magnet motors,Solid modeling,Three-dimensional displays,Windings}
}

@inproceedings{garbFORTRESSFORtifiedTamperResistant2021,
  title = {{{FORTRESS}}: {{FORtified Tamper-Resistant Envelope}} with {{Embedded Security Sensor}}},
  shorttitle = {{{FORTRESS}}},
  author = {Garb, Kathrin and Obermaier, Johannes and Ferres, Elischa and Künig, Martin},
  date = {2021-12},
  pages = {1--12},
  doi = {10.1109/PST52912.2021.9647783},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9647783/?arnumber=9647783},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  abstract = {Protecting security modules from attacks on the hardware level presents a very challenging endeavor since the attacker can manipulate the device directly through physical access. To address this issue, different physical security enclosures have been developed with the goal to cover entire hardware modules and, hence, protect them from external manipulation.Novel concepts are battery-less and based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), aiming at overcoming the most severe drawbacks of past devices; the need for active monitoring and, thus, limited battery life-time. Although some progress has already been made for certain aspects of PUF-based enclosures, the combination and integration of all required components and the creation of a corresponding architecture for Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) is still an open issue. In this paper, we present FORTRESS, a PUF-based HSM that integrates the tamper-sensitive capacitive PUF-based envelope and its embedded security sensor IC into a secure architecture. Our concept proposes a secure life cycle concept including shipment aspects, a full key generation scheme with re-enrollment capabilities, and ourthe next generation Embedded Key Management System. With FORTRESS, we take the next step towards the productive operation of PUF-based HSMs.},
  eventtitle = {18th {{International Conference}} on {{Privacy}}, {{Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{PST}})},
  keywords = {capacitive enclosure,Hardware,hardware security module,Integrated circuits,physical unclonable function,Physical unclonable function,Privacy,secure life cycle,Security,Solids,Supply chains,tamper-sensitive}
}

@thesis{garbTamperSensitiveDesignPUFBased,
  type = {phdthesis},
  title = {Tamper-Sensitive Design of PUF-Based Security Enclosures},
  author = {Garb, Kathrin A},
  langid = {ngerman}
}

@article{garbWiretapChannelCapacitive2022,
  title = {The {{Wiretap Channel}} for {{Capacitive PUF-Based Security Enclosures}}},
  author = {Garb, Kathrin and Xhemrishi, Marvin and Kürzinger, Ludwig and Frisch, Christoph},
  date = {2022-06-08},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  shortjournal = {TCHES},
  eprint = {2202.01508},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  pages = {165--191},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2022.i3.165-191},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.01508},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {In order to protect devices from physical manipulations, protective security enclosures were developed. However, these battery-backed solutions come with a reduced lifetime, and have to be actively and continuously monitored.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}
}

@online{gctwnlWhenChatGPTSummarises2024,
  title = {When {{ChatGPT}} Summarises, It Actually Does Nothing of the Kind.},
  author = {{GCTWNL}},
  date = {2024-05-27T21:58:15+00:00},
  url = {https://ea.rna.nl/2024/05/27/when-chatgpt-summarises-it-actually-does-nothing-of-the-kind/},
  urldate = {2025-11-02},
  abstract = {One of the use cases I thought was reasonable to expect from ChatGPT and Friends (LLMs) was summarising. It turns out I was wrong. What ChatGPT isn’t summarising at all, it only looks like it…},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {R\&A IT Strategy \& Architecture}
}

@article{gellmanNSAInfiltratesLinks2013,
  entrysubtype = {newspaper},
  title = {{{NSA}} Infiltrates Links to {{Yahoo}}, {{Google}} Data Centers Worldwide, {{Snowden}} Documents Say},
  author = {Gellman, Barton and Soltani, Ashkan},
  date = {2013-10-30},
  journaltitle = {The Washington Post},
  issn = {0190-8286},
  url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {Agency positioned itself to collect from among millions of accounts, many of them belonging to Americans},
  langid = {american}
}

@online{gematikSpezifikationAktensystemEPA2025,
  title = {Spezifikation Aktensystem ePA für alle v1.4.1},
  author = {{gematik}},
  date = {2025-05-09},
  url = {https://gemspec.gematik.de/docs/gemSpec/gemSpec_Aktensystem_ePAfueralle/latest/},
  urldate = {2025-05-16},
  langid = {ngerman}
}

@online{gematikSpezifikationSchluesselgenerierungsdienstEPA2023,
  title = {Spezifikation Schlüsselgenerierungsdienst ePA v1.6.0},
  author = {{gematik}},
  date = {2023-03-31},
  url = {https://gemspec.gematik.de/downloads/gemSpec/gemSpec_SGD_ePA/gemSpec_SGD_ePA_V1.6.0.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-05-26},
  langid = {ngerman}
}

@online{gematikUbergreifendeSpezifikationVerwendung2024,
  title = {Übergreifende {{Spezifikation Verwendung}} Kryptographischer {{Algorithmen}} in Der {{Telematikinfrastruktur}} v2.28.1},
  author = {{gematik}},
  date = {2024-02-23},
  url = {https://gemspec.gematik.de/downloads/gemSpec/gemSpec_Krypt/gemSpec_Krypt_V2.28.1.html},
  urldate = {2025-05-16}
}

@online{gematikUebergreifendeSpezifikationVerwendung2025,
  title = {Übergreifende Spezifikation Verwendung kryptographischer Algorithmen in der Telematikinfrastruktur v2.40.0},
  author = {{gematik}},
  date = {2025-03-28},
  url = {https://gemspec.gematik.de/downloads/gemSpec/gemSpec_Krypt/gemSpec_Krypt_V2.40.0.pdf},
  langid = {ngerman}
}

@online{gematikWhitepaperDatenschutzUnd2025,
  title = {Whitepaper Datenschutz und Informationssicherheit in der Telematikinfrastruktur},
  author = {{gematik}},
  date = {2025-07},
  url = {https://www.gematik.de/media/gematik/Medien/Newsroom/Publikationen/Informationsmaterialien/gematik_Whitepaper_Datenschutz_web_20250707.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  langid = {german}
}

@software{GerbonaraToolsHandle,
  title = {Gerbonara: {{Tools}} to Handle {{Gerber}} and {{Excellon}} Files in {{Python}}},
  shorttitle = {Gerbonara},
  url = {https://gitlab.com/gerbolyze/gerbonara},
  urldate = {2024-12-03},
  version = {1.4.0},
  keywords = {Artistic Software,excellon,gerber,Multimedia - Graphics,pcb,Printing,Scientific/Engineering,Scientific/Engineering - Electronic Design Automation (EDA),Scientific/Engineering - Image Processing,Utilities}
}

@inproceedings{german2007,
  title = {Event Data Recorders in the Analysis of Frontal Impacts},
  booktitle = {Annual Proceedings of the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine},
  author = {German, A. and Comeau, J-L. and K.J. McClafferty, M.J. Shkrum and Tiessen, P.F.},
  date = {2007},
  number = {51},
  pages = {225--243},
  url = {https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3217513/},
  urldate = {2021-07-12}
}

@article{geuzaineGmsh3DFinite2009,
  title = {Gmsh: {{A}} 3‐{{D}} Finite Element Mesh Generator with Built‐in Pre‐ and Post‐processing Facilities},
  shorttitle = {Gmsh},
  author = {Geuzaine, Christophe and Remacle, Jean‐François},
  date = {2009-09-10},
  journaltitle = {International Journal for Numerical Methods in Engineering},
  shortjournal = {Numerical Meth Engineering},
  volume = {79},
  number = {11},
  pages = {1309--1331},
  issn = {0029-5981, 1097-0207},
  doi = {10.1002/nme.2579},
  url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/nme.2579},
  urldate = {2024-12-03},
  abstract = {Abstract             Gmsh is an open‐source 3‐D finite element grid generator with a build‐in CAD engine and post‐processor. Its design goal is to provide a fast, light and user‐friendly meshing tool with parametric input and advanced visualization capabilities. This paper presents the overall philosophy, the main design choices and some of the original algorithms implemented in Gmsh. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{gevorgianLineCapacitanceImpedance2001,
  title = {Line {{Capacitance}} and {{Impedance}} of {{Coplanar-Strip Waveguides}} on {{Substrates}} with {{Multiple Dielectric Layers}}},
  booktitle = {31st {{European Microwave Conference}}, 2001},
  author = {Gevorgian, S. and Berg, H.},
  date = {2001-10},
  pages = {1--4},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {London, England},
  doi = {10.1109/EUMA.2001.339161},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4140229/},
  urldate = {2024-04-16},
  abstract = {Closed form formulas for the basic parameters of Coplanar-Strip line on a finite thickness substrate are reviewed. New, improved formulas are derived using conformal mapping technique.},
  eventtitle = {31st {{European Microwave Conference}}, 2001},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{ghaleehDurabilitySolderJoints,
  title = {The Durability of Solder Joints under Thermo- Mechanical Loading; Application to {{Sn-37Pb}} and {{Sn-3}}.{{8Ag-0}}.{{7Cu}} Lead-Free Replacement Alloy},
  author = {Ghaleeh, Mohammad},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{ghasemzadehAudioSteganalysisBased2016,
  title = {Audio Steganalysis Based on Reversed Psychoacoustic Model of Human Hearing},
  author = {Ghasemzadeh, Hamzeh and Tajik Khass, Mehdi and Khalil Arjmandi, Meisam},
  date = {2016-04-01},
  journaltitle = {Digital Signal Processing},
  shortjournal = {Digital Signal Processing},
  volume = {51},
  pages = {133--141},
  issn = {1051-2004},
  doi = {10.1016/j.dsp.2015.12.015},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1051200416000026},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {During the last decade, audio information hiding has attracted lots of attention due to its ability to provide a covert communication channel. On the other hand, various audio steganalysis schemes have been developed to detect the presence of any secret messages. Basically, audio steganography methods attempt to hide their messages in areas of time or frequency domains where human auditory system (HAS) does not perceive. Considering this fact, we propose a reliable audio steganalysis system based on the reversed Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (R-MFCC) which aims to provide a model with maximum deviation from HAS model. Genetic algorithm is deployed to optimize dimension of the R-MFCC-based features. This will both speed up feature extraction and reduce the complexity of classification. The final decision is made by a trained support vector machine (SVM) to detect suspicious audio files. The proposed method achieves detection rates of 97.8\% and 94.4\% in the targeted (Steghide@1.563\%) and universal scenarios. These results are respectively 17.3\% and 20.8\% higher than previous D2-MFCC based method.},
  keywords = {Audio steganalysis,Audio steganography,Human auditory system,Mel frequency cepstrum coefficients,Universal steganalysis}
}

@article{gibneyCanResearchersStop2025,
  title = {Can Researchers Stop {{AI}} Making up Citations?},
  author = {Gibney, Elizabeth},
  date = {2025-09-08},
  journaltitle = {Nature},
  volume = {645},
  number = {8081},
  pages = {569--570},
  publisher = {Nature Publishing Group},
  issn = {1476-4687},
  doi = {10.1038/d41586-025-02853-8},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-02853-8},
  urldate = {2025-12-04},
  abstract = {OpenAI’s GPT-5 hallucinates less than previous models do, but cutting hallucination completely might prove impossible.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer science},
  annotation = {Bandiera\_abtest: a\\
Cg\_type: News\\
Subject\_term: Computer science}
}

@incollection{giraultGeneralizedBirthdayAttack1988,
  title = {A {{Generalized Birthday Attack}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} — {{EUROCRYPT}} ’88},
  author = {Girault, Marc and Cohen, Robert and Campana, 2)Mireille},
  editor = {Barstow, D. and Brauer, W. and Brinch Hansen, P. and Gries, D. and Luckham, D. and Moler, C. and Pnueli, A. and Seegmüller, G. and Stoer, J. and Wirth, N. and Günther, Christoph G.},
  date = {1988},
  volume = {330},
  pages = {129--156},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/3-540-45961-8_12},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/3-540-45961-8_12},
  urldate = {2024-07-31},
  abstract = {We generalize the birthday attack presented by Coppersmith at Crypto'8S which defrauded a Davies-Price message authentication scheme. We first study the birthday paradox and a variant f o r which some convergence results and related bounds are provided. Secondly, we generalize the Davies-Price scheme and show how the Coppersmith attack can be extended to this case. AS a consequence, the case p=4 with DES (important when RSA with a 512-bit modulus is used €or signature) appears not to be secure enough.},
  isbn = {978-3-540-50251-7},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{GithubRepositoryERPFD,
  title = {Github Repository: {{eRP-FD}}/Vau-Hsm},
  url = {https://github.com/eRP-FD/vau-hsm/tree/master},
  urldate = {2025-05-16}
}

@inproceedings{goldbergPlanarFabricationMesoscale2014,
  title = {Planar Fabrication of a Mesoscale Voice Coil Actuator},
  booktitle = {2014 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})},
  author = {Goldberg, Benjamin and Karpelson, Michael and Ozcan, Onur and Wood, Robert J.},
  date = {2014-05},
  pages = {6319--6325},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {Hong Kong, China},
  doi = {10.1109/ICRA.2014.6907791},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6907791/},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Mesoscale robots are devices with characteristic dimensions in the centimeter to millimeter scale, with feature sizes ranging from millimeters to micrometers. Due to the physics involved in scaling down conventional motors, such robots frequently require novel approaches to actuation. Actuation can have a very significant effect on robot performance, particularly at small scales where locomotion becomes energetically expensive; however, existing options for small-scale actuation are quite limited. We present a mesoscale voice coil actuator (VCA) with favorable scaling characteristics and a design that minimizes costly frictional effects at small scales while allowing fast, linear, high-displacement motion. The VCA is fabricated using planar manufacturing techniques, making it well-suited for integration into a number of mesoscale robotic platforms and for mass production. The designed VCA has a mass of 310mg, maximum force of 11.8mN, bandwidth of 51Hz, and a stroke of 4mm.},
  eventtitle = {2014 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})},
  isbn = {978-1-4799-3685-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{goldmanUnrestrainedChineseCyberattackers2025,
  entrysubtype = {newspaper},
  title = {‘{{Unrestrained}}’ {{Chinese Cyberattackers May Have Stolen Data From Almost Every American}}},
  author = {Goldman, Adam},
  date = {2025-09-04},
  journaltitle = {The New York Times},
  issn = {0362-4331},
  url = {https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/04/world/asia/china-hack-salt-typhoon.html},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {Information collected during the yearslong  Salt Typhoon attack could allow Beijing’s intelligence services to track targets from the United States and dozens of other countries.},
  langid = {american},
  keywords = {China,Cyberattacks and Hackers,Cyberwarfare and Defense,Defense and Military Forces,Espionage and Intelligence Services,International Relations,Surveillance of Citizens by Government,United States Politics and Government}
}

@book{golumbiaCulturalLogicComputation2009,
  title = {The Cultural Logic of Computation},
  author = {Golumbia, David},
  date = {2009},
  publisher = {Harvard University Press},
  location = {Cambridge, Mass},
  isbn = {978-0-674-03292-7},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{gonzalezInformationTheoreticallySecure2013,
  title = {Information {{Theoretically Secure}}, {{Enhanced Johnson Noise Based Key Distribution}} over the {{Smart Grid}} with {{Switched Filters}}},
  author = {Gonzalez, Elias and Kish, Laszlo B. and Balog, Robert S. and Enjeti, Prasad},
  editor = {Abbott, Derek},
  date = {2013-07-25},
  journaltitle = {PLoS ONE},
  shortjournal = {PLoS ONE},
  volume = {8},
  number = {7},
  pages = {e70206},
  issn = {1932-6203},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0070206},
  url = {https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0070206},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {We introduce a protocol with a reconfigurable filter system to create non-overlapping single loops in the smart power grid for the realization of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise secure key distribution system. The protocol is valid for onedimensional radial networks (chain-like power line) which are typical of the electricity distribution network between the utility and the customer. The speed of the protocol (the number of steps needed) versus grid size is analyzed. When properly generalized, such a system has the potential to achieve unconditionally secure key distribution over the smart power grid of arbitrary geometrical dimensions.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{gonzalezLayerLayerPatterned2022,
  title = {Layer by {{Layer}}, {{Patterned Valves Enable Programmable Soft Surfaces}}},
  author = {Gonzalez, Jesse T. and Hudson, Scott E.},
  date = {2022-03-29},
  journaltitle = {Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies},
  shortjournal = {Proc. ACM Interact. Mob. Wearable Ubiquitous Technol.},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--25},
  issn = {2474-9567},
  doi = {10.1145/3517251},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3517251},
  urldate = {2024-08-02},
  abstract = {Programmable surfaces, which can be instructed to alter their shape or texture, may one day serve as a platform for tangible interfaces and adaptive environments. But so far, these structures have been constrained in scale by a challenging fabrication process, as the numerous constituent actuators must be built and assembled individually. We look towards emerging trends in mechanical engineering and consider an alternate framework — layer-driven design, which enables the production of dynamic, discretely-actuated surfaces at multiple scales. By centering the construction around patterning and stacking, forgoing individual assembly in favor of bulk processes such as photo-etching and laser cutting, we avoid the need for multiple manufacturing steps that are repeated for each of the many actuators that compose the surface. As an instance of this layer-driven model, we build an array of electrostatic valves, and use this composite material (which we refer to as Stoma-Board) to drive four types of pneumatic transducers. We also show how this technique may be readily industrialized, through integration with the highly mature and automated manufacturing processes of modern electronics. CCS Concepts: • Hardware → PCB design and layout; • Human-centered computing → Haptic devices; Interface design prototyping; • Computer systems organization → Robotics.},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{googleCloudHSMCloud2025,
  title = {Cloud {{HSM}} | {{Cloud Key Management Service}}},
  author = {{Google}},
  date = {2025-11-13},
  url = {https://docs.cloud.google.com/kms/docs/hsm},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  abstract = {Allows you to host encryption keys and perform cryptographic operations in a Hardware Security Module (HSM) cluster.},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {Google Cloud Documentation}
}

@incollection{goosInformationTheoreticallySecure1999,
  title = {Information {{Theoretically Secure Communication}} in the {{Limited Storage Space Model}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} — {{CRYPTO}}’ 99},
  author = {Goos, Gerhard and Hartmanis, Juris and family=Leeuwen, given=Jan, prefix=van, useprefix=true and Aumann, Yonatan and Rabin, Michael O.},
  editor = {Wiener, Michael},
  date = {1999},
  volume = {1666},
  pages = {65--79},
  publisher = {Springer},
  doi = {10.1007/3-540-48405-1_5},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/3-540-48405-1_5},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {We provide a simple secret-key two-party secure communication scheme, which is provably information-theoretically secure in the limited-storage-space model. The limited-storage-space model postulates an eavesdropper who can execute arbitrarily complex computations, and is only limited in the total amount of storage space (not computation space) available to him. The bound on the storage space can be arbitrarily large (e.g. terabytes), as long as it is fixed. Given this bound, the protocol guarantees that the probability of the eavesdropper of gaining any information on the message is exponentially small. The proof of our main results utilizes a novel combination of linear algebra and Kolmogorov complexity considerations.},
  isbn = {978-3-540-66347-8 978-3-540-48405-9},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{gotteCantTouchThis2022,
  title = {Can’t {{Touch This}}: {{Inertial HSMs Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks}}},
  shorttitle = {Can’t {{Touch This}}},
  author = {Götte, Jan Sebastian and Scheuermann, Björn},
  date = {2022},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  pages = {69--93},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2022.i1.69-93},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9290},
  urldate = {2024-11-08},
  abstract = {In this paper, we introduce a novel countermeasure against physical attacks: Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs). Conventional systems have in common that their security requires the crafting of fine sensor structures that respond to minute manipulations of the monitored security boundary or volume. Our approach is novel in that we reduce the sensitivity requirement of security meshes and other sensors and increase the complexity of any manipulations by rotating the security mesh or sensor at high speed—thereby presenting a moving target to an attacker. Attempts to stop the rotation are easily monitored with commercial MEMS accelerometers and gyroscopes. Our approach leads to an HSM that can easily be built from off-the-shelf parts by any university electronics lab, yet offers a level of security that is comparable to commercial HSMs. We have built a proof-of-concept hardware prototype that demonstrates solutions to the concept’s main engineering challenges. As part of this proof-of-concept, we have found that a system using a coarse security mesh made from commercial printed circuit boards and an automotive high-g-force accelerometer already provides a useful level of security.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {electronic commerce,hardware security,implementation,smart cards}
}

@inproceedings{gotteGermanyRollingOut2026,
  title = {Germany Is {{Rolling Out Nation-Scale Key Escrow}} and {{Nobody}} Is {{Talking About}} It},
  booktitle = {Computer {{Security}}. {{ESORICS}} 2025 {{International Workshops}}},
  author = {Götte, Jan Sebastian},
  editor = {Laborde, Romain and Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin and Yazdinejad, Abbas and Epiphaniou, Gregory and Abie, Habtamu and Ranise, Silvio and Choraś, Michał and Woźniak, Michał and Hara, Yuko and Mühlberg, Jan Tobias and Greco, Claudia and Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond},
  date = {2026},
  pages = {370--377},
  publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
  location = {Cham},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-032-16165-9_22},
  abstract = {Germany is currently rolling out an opt-out, nation-scale database of the medical records of the majority of~its population, with low-income people being disproportionally represented among its users. While there has~been considerable criticism of the system coming from civil society, independent academic analysis of the system by~the cryptography and information security community has been largely absent. In this paper, we aim to raise awareness~of the system’s existence and, based on the system’s public specifications, highlight several concerning cryptographic engineering decisions. Our core observations is that the system’s most sensitive long-term user keys are derived~by a rudimentary, home-grown centralized key escrow mechanism. This mechanism relies on a per-use salt and only 256~bit of entropy, shared globally across millions of users. Furthermore, the system’s specification mandates only level~3 compliance with the obsolete FIPS 140-2 security standard, which requires “hard, opaque potting”, but lacks active tamper sensing. As a result, the system remains vulnerable to attacks by nation states and other well-funded adversaries.},
  isbn = {978-3-032-16165-9},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Cryptography,Governance,Hardware Security Module (HSM),Healthcare,Physical Security,Tamper Resistance}
}

@inproceedings{gotteHighFidelitySecurity2026,
  title = {High {{Fidelity Security Mesh Monitoring}} Using {{Low-Cost}}, {{Embedded Time Domain Reflectometry}}},
  booktitle = {Transactions on {{Cryptographic Hardware}} and {{Embedded Systems}}},
  author = {Götte, Jan Sebastian and Scheuermann, Björn},
  date = {2026-01},
  volume = {2026/1},
  pages = {533--558},
  publisher = {IACR},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2026.i1.533-558},
  url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1962},
  urldate = {2025-11-04},
  abstract = {Security Meshes are patterns of sensing traces covering an area that are used in Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) and other systems to detect attempts to physically intrude into the device's protective shell. State-of-the-art solutions manufacture meshes in bespoke processes from carefully chosen materials, which is expensive and makes replication challenging. Additionally, state-of-the-art monitoring circuits sacrifice either monitoring precision or cost efficiency. In this paper, we present an embeddable security mesh monitoring circuit constructed from low-cost, standard components that utilizes Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) to create a unique fingerprint of a mesh. Our approach is both low-cost and precise, and enables the use of inexpensive standard Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) as security mesh material. We demonstrate a working prototype of our TDR circuit costing less than 10 € in components that achieves both time resolution and rise time better than 200 ps—a 25 × improvement over previous work. We demonstrate a simple classifier that detects several types of advanced attacks such as probing using an oscilloscope probe or micro-soldering attacks with no false negatives.},
  eventtitle = {Conference on {{Cryptographic Hardware}} and {{Embedded Systems}} 2026}
}

@inproceedings{gotzfriedCacheAttacksIntel2017,
  title = {Cache {{Attacks}} on {{Intel SGX}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th {{European Workshop}} on {{Systems Security}}},
  author = {Götzfried, Johannes and Eckert, Moritz and Schinzel, Sebastian and Müller, Tilo},
  date = {2017-04-23},
  series = {{{EuroSec}}'17},
  pages = {1--6},
  publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  doi = {10.1145/3065913.3065915},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3065913.3065915},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {For the first time, we practically demonstrate that Intel SGX enclaves are vulnerable against cache-timing attacks. As a case study, we present an access-driven cache-timing attack on AES when running inside an Intel SGX enclave. Using Neve and Seifert's elimination method, as well as a cache probing mechanism relying on Intel PMC, we are able to extract the AES secret key in less than 10 seconds by investigating 480 encrypted blocks on average. The AES implementation we attack is based on a Gladman AES implementation taken from an older version of OpenSSL, which is known to be vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. In contrast to previous works on cache-timing attacks, our attack is executed with root privileges running on the same host as the vulnerable enclave. Intel SGX, however, was designed to precisely protect applications against such root-level attacks. As a consequence, we show that SGX cannot withstand its designated attacker model when it comes to side-channel vulnerabilities. To the contrary, the attack surface for side-channels increases dramatically in the scenario of SGX due to the power of root-level attackers, for example, by exploiting the accuracy of PMC, which is restricted to kernel code.},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-4935-2}
}

@online{greenbergSignalMoreEncrypted2024,
  title = {Signal {{Is More Than Encrypted Messaging}}. {{Under Meredith Whittaker}}, {{It}}’s {{Out}} to {{Prove Surveillance Capitalism Wrong}}},
  author = {Greenberg, Andy},
  date = {2024-08-28},
  url = {https://www.wired.com/story/meredith-whittaker-signal/},
  urldate = {2025-06-13},
  organization = {WIRED Magazine},
  annotation = {Archive URL: https://archive.is/J1ZlG}
}

@inproceedings{griloObliviousTransferMiniQCrypt2021,
  title = {Oblivious {{Transfer Is}} in {{MiniQCrypt}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2021},
  author = {Grilo, Alex B. and Lin, Huijia and Song, Fang and Vaikuntanathan, Vinod},
  editor = {Canteaut, Anne and Standaert, François-Xavier},
  date = {2021},
  pages = {531--561},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_18},
  abstract = {MiniQCrypt is a world where quantum-secure one-way functions exist, and quantum communication is possible. We construct an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in MiniQCrypt that achieves simulation-security in the plain model against malicious quantum polynomial-time adversaries, building on the foundational work of Crépeau and Killian (FOCS 1988) and Bennett, Brassard, Crépeau and Skubiszewska (CRYPTO 1991). Combining the OT protocol with prior works, we obtain secure two-party and multi-party computation protocols also in MiniQCrypt. This is in contrast to the classical world, where it is widely believed that one-way functions alone do not give us OT.},
  isbn = {978-3-030-77886-6},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{grisafiPISTISTrustedComputing,
  title = {{{PISTIS}}: {{Trusted Computing Architecture}} for {{Low-end Embedded Systems}}},
  author = {Grisafi, Michele and Ammar, Mahmoud and Crispo, Bruno and Roveri, Marco},
  abstract = {Recently, several hardware-assisted security architectures have been proposed to mitigate the ever-growing cyberattacks on Internet-connected devices. However, such proposals are not compatible with a large portion of the already deployed resource-constrained embedded devices due to hardware limitations. To fill this gap, we propose PISTIS, a puresoftware trusted computing architecture for bare-metal lowend embedded devices. PISTIS enables several security services, such as memory isolation, remote attestation and secure code update, while fully supporting critical features such as Direct Memory Access (DMA) and interrupts. PISTIS targets a wide range of embedded devices including those that lack any hardware protection mechanisms, while only requiring a few kilobytes of Flash memory to store its root of trust (RoT) software. The entire architecture of PISTIS is built from the ground up by leveraging memory protectionenabling techniques such as assembly-level code verification and selective software virtualisation. Most importantly, PISTIS achieves strong security guarantees supported by a formally verified design. We implement and evaluate PISTIS on MSP430 architecture, showing a reasonable overhead in terms of runtime, memory footprint, and power consumption.},
  langid = {english}
}

@standard{GrobkonzeptEPAFuer2023,
  title = {Grobkonzept ePA für alle},
  date = {2023-12-13},
  langid = {ngerman},
  version = {1.0.0}
}

@online{groupUsingLaserDirect2012,
  title = {Using {{Laser Direct Structuring}} ({{LDS}}) to {{Create Robust Hardware Security Devices}}},
  author = {Group, SAE Media},
  date = {2012-10-01},
  url = {https://www.mobilityengineeringtech.com/component/content/article/14919-using-laser-direct-structuring-lds-to-create-robust-hardware-security-devices},
  urldate = {2025-09-03},
  abstract = {A wide range of devices are designed to handle, convey and store sensitive information that requires varying degrees of security from protecting low level administrative to classified and top secret information.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{grunenfelderFastSinglephotonDetectors2023,
  title = {Fast Single-Photon Detectors and Real-Time Key Distillation Enable High Secret-Key-Rate Quantum Key Distribution Systems},
  author = {Grünenfelder, Fadri and Boaron, Alberto and Resta, Giovanni V. and Perrenoud, Matthieu and Rusca, Davide and Barreiro, Claudio and Houlmann, Raphaël and Sax, Rebecka and Stasi, Lorenzo and El-Khoury, Sylvain and Hänggi, Esther and Bosshard, Nico and Bussières, Félix and Zbinden, Hugo},
  date = {2023-05},
  journaltitle = {Nature Photonics},
  shortjournal = {Nat. Photon.},
  volume = {17},
  number = {5},
  pages = {422--426},
  issn = {1749-4885, 1749-4893},
  doi = {10.1038/s41566-023-01168-2},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41566-023-01168-2},
  urldate = {2024-09-02},
  abstract = {Abstract             Quantum key distribution has emerged as the most viable scheme to guarantee information security in the presence of large-scale quantum computers and, thanks to the continuous progress made in the past 20 years, it is now commercially available. However, the secret key rates remain limited to just over 10\,Mbps due to several bottlenecks on the receiver side. Here we present a custom multipixel superconducting nanowire single-photon detector that is designed to guarantee high count rates and precise timing discrimination. Leveraging the performance of the detector and coupling it to fast acquisition and real-time key distillation electronics, we remove two major roadblocks and achieve a considerable increase of the secret key rates with respect to the state of the art. In combination with a simple 2.5-GHz clocked time-bin quantum key distribution system, we can generate secret keys at a rate of 64\,Mbps over a distance of 10.0\,km and at a rate of 3.0\,Mbps over a distance of 102.4\,km with real-time key distillation.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{grunenfelderLimitsMultiplexingQuantum2021,
  title = {The Limits of Multiplexing Quantum and Classical Channels: {{Case}} Study of a 2.5 {{GHz}} Discrete Variable Quantum Key Distribution System},
  shorttitle = {The Limits of Multiplexing Quantum and Classical Channels},
  author = {Grünenfelder, Fadri and Sax, Rebecka and Boaron, Alberto and Zbinden, Hugo},
  date = {2021-09-20},
  journaltitle = {Applied Physics Letters},
  shortjournal = {Applied Physics Letters},
  volume = {119},
  number = {12},
  pages = {124001},
  issn = {0003-6951},
  doi = {10.1063/5.0060232},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0060232},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  abstract = {Network integration of quantum key distribution is crucial for its future widespread deployment due to the high cost of using optical fibers dedicated for the quantum channel only. We studied the performance of a system running a simplified BB84 protocol at 2.5\,GHz repetition rate, operating in the original wavelength band, the short O-band, when multiplexed with communication channels in the conventional wavelength band, and the short C-band. Our system could successfully generate secret keys over a single-mode fiber with a length of 95.5\,km and with co-propagating classical signals at a launch power of 8.9\,dBm. Furthermore, we discuss the performance of an ideal system under the same conditions, showing the limits of what is possible with a discrete variable system in the O-band. We also considered a short and lossy link with 51\,km optical fiber resembling a real link in a metropolitan area network. In this scenario, we could exchange a secret key with a launch power up to 16.7\,dBm in the classical channels.}
}

@report{gs21,
  title = {Tech Report: {{Inerial}} Hsms Thwart Advanced Physical Attacks},
  author = {{Jan Sebastian Götte and Björn Scheuermann}},
  date = {2021-01-14},
  institution = {Alexander von Humboldt Institut für Internet und Gesellschaft},
  url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/055},
  urldate = {2021-04-13}
}

@article{guazziNoncontactMeasurementOxygen2015,
  title = {Non-Contact Measurement of Oxygen Saturation with an {{RGB}} Camera},
  author = {Guazzi, Alessandro R. and Villarroel, Mauricio and Jorge, João and Daly, Jonathan and Frise, Matthew C. and Robbins, Peter A. and Tarassenko, Lionel},
  date = {2015-09-01},
  journaltitle = {Biomedical Optics Express},
  shortjournal = {Biomed. Opt. Express},
  volume = {6},
  number = {9},
  pages = {3320},
  issn = {2156-7085, 2156-7085},
  doi = {10.1364/BOE.6.003320},
  url = {https://opg.optica.org/abstract.cfm?URI=boe-6-9-3320},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {A novel method (Sophia) is presented to track oxygen saturation changes in a controlled environment using an RGB camera placed approximately 1.5 m away from the subject. The method is evaluated on five healthy volunteers (Fitzpatrick skin phenotypes II, III, and IV) whose oxygen saturations were varied between 80\% and 100\% in a purpose-built chamber over 40 minutes each. The method carefully selects regions of interest (ROI) in the camera image by calculating signal-to-noise ratios for each ROI. This allows it to track changes in oxygen saturation accurately with respect to a conventional pulse oximeter (median coefficient of determination, 0.85).},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{guerinNoGodsNo2005,
  title = {No {{Gods No Masters}}: {{An Anthology}} of {{Anarchism}}},
  shorttitle = {No Gods, No Masters},
  author = {Guérin, Daniel},
  translator = {Sharkey, Paul},
  date = {2005},
  edition = {Complete unabridged ed},
  publisher = {AK Press},
  abstract = {Vol.1: Max Stirner (1806-1856) -- Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) -- Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) -- Vol.2: Mikhail Bakunin (cont.) -- Direct action and libertarian construction foreshadowed -- James Guillaume (1844-1916) -- Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921) -- Vol. 3: Errico Malatesta (1853-1932) -- Émile Henry (1872-1894) -- The French anarchists in the trade unions -- Fernand Pelloutier (1867-1901) -- Émile Pouget (1860-1931) -- The Spanish collectives -- Voline (1882-1945) -- Vol.4: Nestor Makhno (1889-1935) -- Kronstadt (1921) -- Anarchists behind bars -- Anarchism in the Spanish Civil War -- Durruti (1896-1936) and libertarian warfare -- Anarcho-syndicalism in government},
  isbn = {978-1-904859-25-3},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {699}
}

@inproceedings{guoEfficientSecureMultiparty2020,
  title = {Efficient and {{Secure Multiparty Computation}} from {{Fixed-Key Block Ciphers}}},
  booktitle = {2020 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  author = {Guo, Chun and Katz, Jonathan and Wang, Xiao and Yu, Yu},
  date = {2020-05},
  pages = {825--841},
  issn = {2375-1207},
  doi = {10.1109/SP40000.2020.00016},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9152760/?arnumber=9152760},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Many implementations of secure computation use fixed-key AES (modeled as a random permutation); this results in substantial performance benefits due to existing hardware support for AES and the ability to avoid recomputing the AES key schedule. Surveying these implementations, however, we find that most utilize AES in a heuristic fashion; in the best case this leaves a gap in the security proof, but in many cases we show it allows for explicit attacks.Motivated by this unsatisfactory state of affairs, we initiate a comprehensive study of how to use fixed-key block ciphers for secure computation-in particular for OT extension and circuit garbling-efficiently and securely. Specifically: · Weconsider several notions of pseudorandomness for hash functions (e.g., correlation robustness), and show provably secure schemes for OT extension, garbling, and other applications based on hash functions satisfying these notions. · We provide provably secure constructions, in the (non-programmable) random-permutation model, of hash functions satisfying the different notions of pseudorandomness we consider. Taken together, our results provide end-to-end security proofs for implementations of secure-computation protocols based on fixed-key block ciphers (modeled as random permutations). Perhaps surprisingly, at the same time our work also results in noticeable performance improvements over the state-of-the-art.},
  eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  keywords = {Ciphers,Computational modeling,Correlation,Protocols,Receivers,Robustness}
}

@article{guriFansmitterAcousticData,
  title = {Fansmitter: {{Acoustic Data Exfiltration}} from ({{Speakerless}}) {{Air-Gapped Computers}}},
  author = {Guri, Mordechai and Solewicz, Yosef and Daidakulov, Andrey and Elovici, Yuval},
  abstract = {Because computers may contain or interact with sensitive information, they are often airgapped and in this way kept isolated and disconnected from the Internet. In recent years the ability of malware to communicate over an air-gap by transmitting sonic and ultrasonic signals from a computer speaker to a nearby receiver has been shown. In order to eliminate such acoustic channels, current best practice recommends the elimination of speakers (internal or external) in secure computers, thereby creating a so-called 'audio-gap'.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{guriFansmitterAcousticData2020,
  title = {Fansmitter: {{Acoustic}} Data Exfiltration from Air-{{Gapped}} Computers via Fans Noise},
  shorttitle = {Fansmitter},
  author = {Guri, Mordechai and Solewicz, Yosef and Elovici, Yuval},
  date = {2020-04-01},
  journaltitle = {Computers \& Security},
  shortjournal = {Computers \& Security},
  volume = {91},
  pages = {101721},
  issn = {0167-4048},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cose.2020.101721},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404820300080},
  urldate = {2025-05-27},
  abstract = {Computers that contain sensitive information are often maintained in air-gapped isolation. In this defensive measure, a computer is disconnected from the Internet - logically and physically - preventing accidental or intentional leakage of sensitive information outward. In recent years it has been shown that malware can leak data over an air-gap by transmitting sonic and ultrasonic signals from a computer speaker. In order to eliminate such acoustic covert channels, current best practice recommends the elimination of speakers in secured computers, thereby creating a so-called ‘audio-gapped’ system. In this paper, we present ‘Fansmitter,’ a malware that can acoustically exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers, even when audio hardware and speakers are not present. Our method utilizes the noise emitted from the CPU, GPU, and chassis fans. We show that a software can regulate the internal fans’ rotation speed in order to control their acoustic signal, known as blade pass frequency (BPF). Binary data can be modulated and transmitted over these audio signals to a remote microphone (e.g., a nearby smartphone). We present design considerations, including acoustic waveform analysis, data modulation and demodulation, and data transmission and reception. We evaluate the acoustic covert channel with various fans at different distances and present the results. We also discuss issues such as stealth, interference, and countermeasures. Using our method we successfully transmitted data from audio-less, air-gapped computers, to a mobile phone in the same room. We demonstrated an effective transmission at distances of 1–8~m, with a maximum bit rate of 60 bit/min per fan.},
  keywords = {Air gaps,Computer viruses,Network security}
}

@inproceedings{guriMOSQUITOCovertUltrasonic2018,
  title = {{{MOSQUITO}}: {{Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions Between Two Air-Gapped Computers Using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication}}},
  shorttitle = {{{MOSQUITO}}},
  booktitle = {2018 {{IEEE Conference}} on {{Dependable}} and {{Secure Computing}} ({{DSC}})},
  author = {Guri, Mordechai and Solewicz, Yosef and Elovici, Yuval},
  date = {2018-12},
  pages = {1--8},
  doi = {10.1109/DESEC.2018.8625124},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8625124},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {In this paper we show how two or more air-gapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the capability of a malware to exploit a specific audio chip feature in order to reverse the connected speakers from output devices into input devices - unobtrusively rendering them microphones. We discuss the attack model and provide technical background and implementation details. We show that although the reversed speakers/headphones/earphones were not originally designed to perform as microphones, they still respond well to the near-ultrasonic range (18kHz to 24kHz). We evaluate the communication channel with different equipment, and at various distances and transmission speeds, and also discuss some practical considerations. Our results show that the speaker-to-speaker communication can be used to covertly transmit data between two air-gapped computers positioned a maximum of nine meters away from one another.},
  eventtitle = {2018 {{IEEE Conference}} on {{Dependable}} and {{Secure Computing}} ({{DSC}})},
  keywords = {Acoustics,Computers,Headphones,Lifting equipment,Magnetoacoustic effects,Malware,Microphones}
}

@article{guriSpeakertospeakerCovertUltrasonic2020,
  title = {Speaker-to-Speaker Covert Ultrasonic Communication},
  author = {Guri, Mordechai and Solewicz, Yosef and Elovici, Yuval},
  date = {2020-04-01},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Information Security and Applications},
  shortjournal = {Journal of Information Security and Applications},
  volume = {51},
  pages = {102458},
  issn = {2214-2126},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jisa.2020.102458},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212619304697},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {In this paper we show how two or more air-gapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the capability of a malware to exploit a specific audio chip feature in order to reverse the connected speakers from output devices into input devices - unobtrusively rendering them microphones. We discuss the attack model and provide technical background and implementation details. We show that although the reversed speakers/headphones/earphones were not originally designed to perform as microphones, they still respond well to the near-ultrasonic range (18~kHz to 24~kHz). We evaluate the communication channel with different equipment, and at various distances and transmission speeds, and also discuss some practical considerations. Our results show that the speaker-to-speaker communication can be used to covertly transmit data between two air-gapped computers positioned a maximum of 9~m away from one another. Moreover, we show that two (microphone-less) headphones can exchange data from a distance of 3~m apart. This enables ‘headphones-to-headphones’ covert communication, which is discussed for the first time in this paper.}
}

@article{hagenContactDiscoveryMobile2022,
  title = {Contact {{Discovery}} in {{Mobile Messengers}}: {{Low-cost Attacks}}, {{Quantitative Analyses}}, and {{Efficient Mitigations}}},
  shorttitle = {Contact {{Discovery}} in {{Mobile Messengers}}},
  author = {Hagen, Christoph and Weinert, Christian and Sendner, Christoph and Dmitrienko, Alexandra and Schneider, Thomas},
  date = {2022-11-07},
  journaltitle = {ACM Trans. Priv. Secur.},
  volume = {26},
  number = {1},
  pages = {2:1--2:44},
  issn = {2471-2566},
  doi = {10.1145/3546191},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3546191},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Contact discovery allows users of mobile messengers to conveniently connect with people in their address book. In this work, we demonstrate that severe privacy issues exist in currently deployed contact discovery methods and propose suitable mitigations.Our study of three popular messengers\ (WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram) shows that large-scale crawling attacks are\ (still) possible. Using an accurate database of mobile phone number prefixes and very few resources, we queried\ 10 \% of\ US mobile phone numbers for\ WhatsApp and\ 100 \% for\ Signal. For\ Telegram, we find that its\ API exposes a wide range of sensitive information, even about numbers not registered with the service. We present interesting\ (cross-messenger) usage statistics, which also reveal that very few users change the default privacy settings.Furthermore, we demonstrate that currently deployed hashing-based contact discovery protocols are severely broken by comparing three methods for efficient hash reversal. Most notably, we show that with the password cracking tool\ “JTR,” we can iterate through the entire worldwide mobile phone number space in\ \< 150 s on a consumer-grade\ GPU. We also propose a significantly improved rainbow table construction for non-uniformly distributed input domains that is of independent interest.Regarding mitigations, we most notably propose two novel rate-limiting schemes: our\ incremental contact discovery for services without server-side contact storage strictly improves over\ Signal’s current approach while being compatible with private set intersection, whereas our\ differential scheme allows even stricter rate limits at the overhead for service providers to store a small constant-size state that does not reveal any contact information.}
}

@www{haines2006,
  title = {{{US}} Outfit Patents 'invisible' {{UAV}}: {{Stealth}} through Persistence of Vision},
  author = {Haines, Lester},
  date = {2006-09-25},
  journaltitle = {The Register},
  url = {https://www.theregister.com/2006/09/25/phantom_sentinel/},
  urldate = {2020-09-17}
}

@patent{hamPrintedcircuitTypeSecurity1971,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Printed-Circuit Type Security Apparatus for Protecting Areas},
  author = {Ham, Conrad S. and Horwinski, Elwood R.},
  holder = {{Lewis Engineering Co}},
  date = {1971-07-20},
  number = {3594770A},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US3594770A/en?q=(H01L23%2f576)&oq=(H01L23%2f576)&sort=old&page=2},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  abstract = {A guarding apparatus responsive to violation of the security of an area or space, comprising a printed or similar gridlike circuit configuration of conductors, preferably of resistance characteristic, connected to form one or several continuous trigger circuits. The configuration may be in the nature of printed circuit panels arranged to enclose, preferably completely, the desired area of security, as by constituting part of the walls, floor, junction or connector boxes and the like. The circuitry is connected, as by a cable, to an energized electrical detector which may comprise an instrument movement and a bridge, whereby any shorting or breaking of one or more of the printed or similar conductors will result in a response by the instrument movement.},
  keywords = {bridge,circuit,conductors,grid,printed}
}

@inproceedings{hanScalingHardwareSecurity2019,
  title = {Toward Scaling Hardware Security Module for Emerging Cloud Services},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th {{Workshop}} on {{System Software}} for {{Trusted Execution}}},
  author = {Han, Juhyeng and Kim, Seongmin and Kim, Taesoo and Han, Dongsu},
  date = {2019-10-27},
  pages = {1--6},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Huntsville Ontario Canada},
  doi = {10.1145/3342559.3365335},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3342559.3365335},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  eventtitle = {{{SOSP}} '19: {{ACM SIGOPS}} 27th {{Symposium}} on {{Operating Systems Principles}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-6888-9},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {sampling-mesh}
}

@article{hanspachCovertAcousticalMesh2013,
  title = {On {{Covert Acoustical Mesh Networks}} in {{Air}}},
  author = {Hanspach, Michael and Goetz, Michael},
  date = {2013},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Communications},
  shortjournal = {JCM},
  volume = {8},
  number = {11},
  pages = {758--767},
  issn = {17962021},
  doi = {10.12720/jcm.8.11.758-767},
  url = {http://www.jocm.us/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=124&id=600},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Covert channels can be used to circumvent system and network policies by establishing communications that have not been considered in the design of the computing system. We construct a covert channel between different computing systems that utilizes audio modulation/demodulation to exchange data between the computing systems over the air medium. The underlying network stack is based on a communication system that was originally designed for robust underwater communication. We adapt the communication system to implement covert and stealthy communications by utilizing the near ultrasonic frequency range. We further demonstrate how the scenario of covert acoustical communication over the air medium can be extended to multi-hop communications and even to wireless mesh networks. A covert acoustical mesh network can be conceived as a botnet or malnet that is accessible via near-field audio communications. Different applications of covert acoustical mesh networks are presented, including the use for remote keylogging over multiple hops. It is shown that the concept of a covert acoustical mesh network renders many conventional security concepts useless, as acoustical communications are usually not considered. Finally, countermeasures against covert acoustical mesh networks are discussed, including the use of lowpass filtering in computing systems and a host-based intrusion detection system for analyzing audio input and output in order to detect any irregularities.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{haobijamQualityFactorEnhancement2007,
  title = {Quality Factor Enhancement of {{CMOS}} Inductor with Pyramidal Winding of Metal Turns},
  booktitle = {2007 {{International Workshop}} on {{Physics}} of {{Semiconductor Devices}}},
  author = {Haobijam, Genemala and Paily, Roy},
  date = {2007-12},
  pages = {729--732},
  doi = {10.1109/IWPSD.2007.4472624},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4472624/?arnumber=4472624&tag=1},
  urldate = {2024-10-30},
  abstract = {In order to exploit the available multilevel interconnects and to reduce the parasitic capacitances, the metal can be traced spirally up and/or down in a pyramidal manner. This paper presents two methods to improve the quality factor (Q) of pyramidically wound inductors. The first method utilizes bulk micromachining to improve the Q. Quality factor improvement of 14.7\% and 19.5\% and self resonating frequency improvement of 26.5\% and 30.6\% respectively were observed in 10 nH and 20 nH over conventional micromachined planar inductors. The second method to improve Q is by differential excitation and is illustrated for 8 nH and 23 nH symmetric pyramidal inductors. The performance of the pyramidically wound inductors are characterized using a full wave Electromagnetic simulator for a six metal layer 0.18 mum process.},
  eventtitle = {2007 {{International Workshop}} on {{Physics}} of {{Semiconductor Devices}}},
  keywords = {CMOS inductor,differential excitation,Etching,Inductors,Integrated inductor,micromachining,Micromachining,Parasitic capacitance,Q factor,Radiofrequency integrated circuits,Resonant frequency,Silicon,Spirals,Wounds}
}

@article{harrisonSoKSecurityArchitects,
  title = {{{SoK}}: {{A Security Architect}}’s {{View}} of {{Printed Circuit Board Attacks}}},
  author = {Harrison, Jacob and Jessurun, Nathan and Tehranipoor, Mark},
  abstract = {Many recent papers have proposed novel electrical measurements or physical inspection technologies for defending printed circuit boards (PCBs) and PCB assemblies (PCBAs) against tampering. As motivation, these papers frequently cite Bloomberg News’ “The Big Hack”, video game modchips, and “interdiction attacks” on IT equipment. We find this trend concerning for two reasons. First, implementation errors and security architecture are rarely discussed in recent PCBA security research, even though they were the root causes of these commonly-cited attacks and most other attacks that have occurred or been proposed by researchers. This suggests that the attacks may be poorly understood. Second, if we assume that novel countermeasures and validation methodologies are tailored to these oft-cited attacks, then significant recent work has focused on attacks that can already be mitigated instead of on open problems. We write this SoK to address these concerns. We explain which tampering threats can be mitigated by a PCBA security architecture. Then, we enumerate assumptions that security architecture depends on. We compare and contrast assurances achieved by security architecture vs. by recently-proposed electrical or inspection-based tamper detection. Finally, we review over fifty PCBA attacks to show how most can be prevented by proper architecture and careful implementation.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{harrisonSoKSecurityArchitects2025,
  title = {{{SoK}}: {{A Security Architect}}'s {{View}} of {{Printed Circuit Board Attacks}}},
  shorttitle = {{{SoK}}},
  author = {Harrison, Jacob and Jessurun, Nathan and Tehranipoor, Mark},
  date = {2025},
  pages = {1907--1924},
  url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/harrison},
  urldate = {2025-11-27},
  eventtitle = {34th {{USENIX Security Symposium}} ({{USENIX Security}} 25)},
  isbn = {978-1-939133-52-6},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{hastingsSoKGeneralPurpose2019,
  title = {{{SoK}}: {{General Purpose Compilers}} for {{Secure Multi-Party Computation}}},
  shorttitle = {{{SoK}}},
  booktitle = {2019 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  author = {Hastings, Marcella and Hemenway, Brett and Noble, Daniel and Zdancewic, Steve},
  date = {2019-05},
  pages = {1220--1237},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {San Francisco, CA, USA},
  doi = {10.1109/SP.2019.00028},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8835312/},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a group of mutually distrustful parties to compute a joint function on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the result of the computation. This type of computation is extremely powerful and has wide-ranging applications in academia, industry, and government. Protocols for secure computation have existed for decades, but only recently have general-purpose compilers for executing MPC on arbitrary functions been developed. These projects rapidly improved the state of the art, and began to make MPC accessible to non-expert users. However, the field is changing so rapidly that it is difficult even for experts to keep track of the varied capabilities of modern frameworks. In this work, we survey general-purpose compilers for secure multi-party computation. These tools provide high-level abstractions to describe arbitrary functions and execute secure computation protocols. We consider eleven systems: EMP-toolkit, Obliv-C, ObliVM, TinyGarble, SCALE-MAMBA (formerly SPDZ), Wysteria, Sharemind, PICCO, ABY, Frigate and CBMC-GC. We evaluate these systems on a range of criteria, including language expressibility, capabilities of the cryptographic back-end, and accessibility to developers. We advocate for improved documentation of MPC frameworks, standardization within the community, and make recommendations for future directions in compiler development. Installing and running these systems can be challenging, and for each system, we also provide a complete virtual environment (Docker container) with all the necessary dependencies to run the compiler and our example programs.},
  eventtitle = {2019 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  isbn = {978-1-5386-6660-9},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{HeatedFlashDrive,
  title = {I {{Heated}} a {{Flash Drive}} to {{160C}} and It {{Still Works}}! ({{Ovrdrive Update}})},
  url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LD9e73BYAnI}
}

@article{heathGRAMOlog2Overhead,
  title = {{{GRAM}} with {{O}}(Log2 n) {{Overhead}}},
  author = {Heath, David and Kolesnikov, Vladimir and Ostrovsky, Rafail},
  abstract = {Garbled RAM (GRAM) is a powerful technique introduced by Lu and Ostrovsky that equips Garbled Circuit (GC) with a sublinear cost RAM without adding rounds of interaction. While multiple GRAM constructions are known, none are suitable for practice, due to costs that have high constants and poor scaling.},
  langid = {english}
}

@www{heise2020t2jailbreak,
  title = {Jailbreaker Nehmen {{T2-sicherheitschip}} von Macs Ins Visier},
  author = {Becker, Leo},
  date = {2020-03-11},
  publisher = {Heise Online / Heise Online},
  url = {https://www.heise.de/mac-and-i/meldung/Jailbreaker-nehmen-T2-Sicherheitschip-von-Macs-ins-Visier-4681131.html}
}

@www{heise2021ovh,
  title = {Cloud-{{Dienstleister OVH}}: {{Feuer}} Zerstört {{Rechenzentrum}}, Ein Weiteres Beschädigt},
  author = {Holland, Martin},
  date = {2021-03-10},
  journaltitle = {heise online},
  url = {https://www.heise.de/news/OVH-Feuer-zerstoert-Rechenzentrum-in-Strassburg-ein-weiteres-beschaedigt-5076320.html}
}

@patent{heitmannMethodMakingTamper2009,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Method of Making Tamper Detection Circuit for an Electronic Device},
  author = {Heitmann, Kjell A. and Clark, Douglas A. and Perreault, Paul G.},
  holder = {{Pitney Bowes Inc}},
  date = {2009-01-13},
  number = {7475474B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US7475474B2/en?q=(tamper+monitoring+circuit)&oq=tamper+monitoring+circuit&page=2},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {circuit board,pcb,printed circuit,tamper,traces}
}

@patent{heitmannTamperBarrierElectronic2005,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Barrier for Electronic Device},
  author = {Heitmann, Kjell and Clark, Douglas and Perreault, Paul},
  holder = {{Pitney Bowes Inc}},
  date = {2005-07-28},
  number = {20050161253A1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20050161253A1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {circuit board,electrical contact,layer,printed circuit,traces}
}

@article{helfinstineOpticalFibreStrength1982,
  title = {Optical Fibre Strength/Fatigue Experiments},
  author = {Helfinstine, J. D. and Quan, F.},
  date = {1982-06-01},
  journaltitle = {Optics \& Laser Technology},
  shortjournal = {Optics \& Laser Technology},
  volume = {14},
  number = {3},
  pages = {133--136},
  issn = {0030-3992},
  doi = {10.1016/0030-3992(82)90108-6},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0030399282901086},
  urldate = {2024-08-28},
  abstract = {New techniques for measuring and analysing the strength characteristics of optical waveguide fibres have evolved as the strength of the optical fibres improved. A recent life-fatigue experiment is described and the results analysed in terms of the most commonly used theoretical model which results in the power law V = AKn. Ten m long fibre samples were tensilely stressed in a high humidity environment by both fixed (static fatigue) and constant rate (dynamic fatigue) loads. The respective test values for the power law exponent, the fatigue constant ‘n’, were 38 and 17. The results of the tests indicate the more conservative value, 17, for practical engineering design, and the need for incorporating an ageing term in the model.},
  keywords = {fatigue,optical fibres,tensile strength}
}

@misc{henkelelectronicmaterialsLoctitePrintedElectronics2019,
  title = {Loctite {{Printed Electronics}}: {{Inks}} and {{Coatings}}},
  author = {{Henkel Electronic Materials}},
  date = {2019-02-14},
  url = {https://print-your-electronics-with-loctite.com/mediafiles/Bilder/Brochure_Henkel_Inks_and_Coatings.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-09-03}
}

@patent{hennigApparatusMethodComprising2020,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Apparatus and Method Comprising a Carrier with Circuit Structures},
  author = {Hennig, Maxim and Schimmel, Oliver and Zieris, Philipp and Filipovic, Bartol},
  holder = {{Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Angewandten Forschung eV}},
  date = {2020-03-17},
  number = {14867889},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10592665B2/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {carrier,circuit structures,component,implemented,result}
}

@article{henzingerOneServerPrice,
  title = {One {{Server}} for the {{Price}} of {{Two}}: {{Simple}} and {{Fast Single-Server Private Information Retrieval}}},
  author = {Henzinger, Alexandra and Hong, Matthew M and Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry and Meiklejohn, Sarah and Vaikuntanathan, Vinod},
  abstract = {We present SimplePIR, the fastest single-server private information retrieval scheme known to date. SimplePIR’s security holds under the learning-with-errors assumption. To answer a client’s query, the SimplePIR server performs fewer than one 32-bit multiplication and one 32-bit addition per database byte. SimplePIR achieves 10 GB/s/core server throughput, which approaches the memory bandwidth of the machine and the performance of the fastest two-server privateinformation-retrieval schemes (which require non-colluding servers). SimplePIR has relatively large communication costs: to make queries to a 1 GB database, the client must download a 121 MB “hint” about the database contents; thereafter, the client may make an unbounded number of queries, each requiring 242 KB of communication. We present a second single-server scheme, DoublePIR, that shrinks the hint to 16 MB at the cost of slightly higher per-query communication (345 KB) and slightly lower throughput (7.4 GB/s/core). Finally, we apply our new private-information-retrieval schemes, together with a novel data structure for approximate set membership, to the task of private auditing in Certificate Transparency. We achieve a strictly stronger notion of privacy than Google Chrome’s current approach with 13× more communication: 16 MB of download per week, along with 1.5 KB per TLS connection.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{hestermanAnalysisModelingMagnetic,
  title = {Analysis and {{Modeling}} of {{Magnetic Coupling}}},
  author = {Hesterman, Bryce},
  langid = {english}
}

@thesis{hiemstraDesignMovingMagnet2014,
  title = {Design of {{Moving Magnet Actuators}} for {{Large-range Flexure-based Nanopositioning}}},
  author = {Hiemstra, David},
  date = {2014-07-01},
  doi = {10.13140/RG.2.2.13711.69288},
  abstract = {Moving magnet actuators (MMA) are direct-drive, single-phase electromagnetic linear actuators that provide frictionless and backlash-free motion over a range of several millimeters. This work investigates the use of MMAs to simultaneously achieve large range, high speed, and high motion quality in flexure-based nanopositioning systems. This work impacts technologies such as scanning probe microscopy and lithography, industrial semiconductor wafer quality control processes, and other applications which rely on nanopositioning systems to provide controlled motion with nanoscale precision, resolution and accuracy. Various actuator types are compared to meet system-level requirements and the MMA is chosen as a promising potential candidate. Component and system level design challenges and associated tradeoffs in designing the MMA to meet nanopositioning performance are discussed and derived in this thesis. In particular, it is shown that even as the overall size of an MMA is varied, the actuation force remains directly proportional to the square root of the actuator’s moving magnet mass and the square root of power consumed. This proportionality constant, identified as the dynamic actuator constant, serves as a novel and important figure of merit for MMAs. It describes fundamental performance limits for MMAs and enables the determination of an optimized MMA geometry in a simplified manner. When an MMA is employed in a flexure-based nanopositioning system, this constant directly impacts the system-level positioning performance in terms of range, resolution, speed, and temperature control. This highlights the significance of incorporating a thermal management system for heat dissipation, minimizing noise and harmonic distortion in the current driver, choosing a low ground vibration setting, and improving the force-stroke uniformity of the actuator. Based on this understanding, a single-axis nanopositioning system that simultaneously achieves 10mm range, 4nm resolution, open-loop natural frequency of 25Hz, and temperature rise of less than 0.5°C, is designed, fabricated, and tested. The significance of the dynamic actuator constant is experimentally validated. A novel thermal management system is tested to successfully mitigate heat dissipation. Preliminary controller design and closed-loop operation highlight the potential of MMAs in large range, high speed nanopositioning. These results point to the importance of achieving greater values of the dynamic actuator constant while maintaining low force– stroke non-uniformity. This motivates the development of actuators with a higher dynamic actuator constant. A novel MMA architecture and other MMA and VCA innovations are presented to achieve a significantly higher dynamic actuator constant and improve motion system performance.}
}

@inproceedings{hinagaThermalEffectsPCB2010,
  title = {Thermal {{Effects}} on {{PCB Laminate Material Dielectric Constant}} and {{Dissipation Factor}}},
  author = {Hinaga, Scott and Koledintseva, Marina Y. and Drewniak, James L. and Koul, Amendra and Zhou, Fan},
  date = {2010},
  abstract = {Values for printed circuit board (PCB) laminate dielectric constant (Dk) and dissipation factor (Df) used in circuit design and signal integrity (SI) modeling are typically those presented on laminate maker datasheets. In most cases, these values are derived from measurements on samples which have not been exposed to thermal stresses representative of the printed circuit board (PCB) assembly process. This paper discusses the changes in Dk and Df values for a variety of laminate materials following simulated assembly thermal exposure of test vehicles to six SMT cycles at 260°C (Pb-free) or 225°C (SnPb eutectic). An additional concern arises around an effect of operating temperatures upon the effective Dk and Df of PCB materials. Due to thermal radiation from active IC devices, power supplies, etc., the operating temperature of PCBs within a network equipment chassis is typically higher than the 23-25°C value at which Dk and Df are measured and reported. This paper also describes the changes in Dk and Df observed when the test samples were measured at temperatures of 50°C and 75°C.},
  eventtitle = {{{IPC Apex Expo}}},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{hongDesignCompensationControl2020,
  title = {Design and {{Compensation Control}} of a {{Flexible Instrument}} for {{Endoscopic Surgery}}},
  booktitle = {2020 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})},
  author = {Hong, Wuzhou and Schmitz, Andreas and Bai, Weibang and Berthet-Rayne, Pierre and Xie, Le and Yang, Guang-Zhong},
  date = {2020-05},
  pages = {1860--1866},
  issn = {2577-087X},
  doi = {10.1109/ICRA40945.2020.9196955},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9196955/?arnumber=9196955},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  abstract = {Snake-like robots for endoscopic surgery make it possible to reach deep-seated lesions. With the use of small flexible tendon-driven instruments, it is possible to perform bimanual micro-surgical tasks that are challenging for standard endoscopic surgeries. Existing devices, however, lack articulated wrists and rolling motion of the end-effector. This paper presents a new instrument design with a distal-roll gripper for snake-like robots. The developed 5 DoFs miniaturized instruments with a diameter of 3 mm enable the deployment into narrow endoluminal channels. Issues related to actuation coupling, tendon slack, and backlash are addressed. Experimental results show that the distal-roll gripper can rotate 106°, and the actuated joints can achieve good repeatability and accuracy with the proposed compensation control scheme.},
  eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})},
  keywords = {Gears,Grippers,Instruments,Joints,Robots,Surgery,Tendons}
}

@book{horowitzArtElectronics2024,
  title = {The Art of Electronics},
  author = {Horowitz, Paul and Hill, Winfield},
  date = {2024},
  edition = {Third edition, 21st printing with corrections},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
  location = {Cambridge, New York},
  isbn = {978-0-521-80926-9},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {1230}
}

@article{houtman1GHzSamplingOscilloscope2000,
  title = {1-{{GHz Sampling Oscilloscope Front End}} Is {{Easily Modified}}},
  author = {Houtman, Hubert},
  date = {2000-09-18},
  journaltitle = {Electronic Design},
  volume = {48},
  number = {19},
  pages = {175--176},
  issn = {0013-4872}
}

@book{HP187BDualTrace1962,
  title = {{{HP 187B Dual-Trace Vertical Amplifier Operating}} and {{Service Manual}}},
  date = {1962},
  publisher = {Hewlett-Packard Company},
  url = {http://hparchive.com/Manuals/HP-187B-Manual.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-03-11}
}

@article{hsuAnalyticalDesignAlgorithm2008,
  title = {Analytical {{Design Algorithm}} of {{Planar Inductor Layout}} in {{CMOS Technology}}},
  author = {Hsu, Heng-Ming and Chan, Kai-Yuen and Chien, Hung-Chi and Kuan, Han-Chien},
  date = {2008-11},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices},
  volume = {55},
  number = {11},
  pages = {3208--3213},
  issn = {1557-9646},
  doi = {10.1109/TED.2008.2004248},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4668566/?arnumber=4668566},
  urldate = {2024-11-08},
  abstract = {A layout design algorithm for a variable-width inductor is proposed to minimize metal resistance. For a given chip area, the proposed algorithm can rapidly design metal widths of each coil in a planar inductor due to the analytical form. Two on-chip inductors with identical chip areas and inductance are fabricated to verify the proposed method in foundry 90-nm CMOS technology. Measurement results demonstrate that the improvement of metal resistance in the proposed device is approximately 19\%. The results of this paper provide an effective algorithm to design a high-Q inductor for RFIC applications.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Electron Devices}}},
  keywords = {Analytical algorithm,CMOS integrated circuits,CMOS technology,Inductors,Layout,minimum resistance,on-chip inductor,Radiofrequency integrated circuits,Resistance,variable width}
}

@online{HttpsArxivorgPdf,
  title = {{{https://arxiv.org/pdf/1909.13770}}},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/pdf/1909.13770},
  urldate = {2024-05-21}
}

@online{HttpsWebarchiveorgWeb,
  title = {{{https://web.archive.org/web/20160421023836id\_/http://people.seas.harvard.edu/\textasciitilde bgoldberg/documents/Papers/ICRA14\_Goldberg.pdf}}},
  url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20160421023836id_/http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~bgoldberg/documents/Papers/ICRA14_Goldberg.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-07-25}
}

@online{HttpsWwweuroixnetMedia,
  title = {{{https://www.euro-ix.net/media/filer\_public/1f/74/1f7457be-afd8-471b-b333-2cb7958f9d0b/demystify\_quantum\_key\_distribution\_euro-ix.pdf}}},
  url = {https://www.euro-ix.net/media/filer_public/1f/74/1f7457be-afd8-471b-b333-2cb7958f9d0b/demystify_quantum_key_distribution_euro-ix.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-06-28}
}

@book{huangHardwareHackerAdventures2019,
  title = {The {{Hardware Hacker}}: {{Adventures}} in {{Making}} and {{Breaking Hardware}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Hardware Hacker}}},
  author = {Huang, Andrew ``bunnie''},
  date = {2019},
  publisher = {No Starch Press},
  location = {San Francisco},
  abstract = {Intro -- Praise for The Hardware Hacker -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Acknowledgments -- brief contents -- contents in detail -- preface -- part 1: adventures in manufacturing -- Chapter 1. made in china -- The Ultimate Electronic Component Flea Market -- The Next Technological Revolution -- Touring Factories with Chumby -- Scale in Shenzhen -- Feeding the Factory -- Dedication to Quality -- Building Technology Without Using It -- Skilled Workers -- The Need for Craftspeople -- Automation for Electronics Assembly -- Precision, Injection Molding, and Patience -- The Challenge of Quality -- Closing Thoughts -- Chapter 2. inside three very different factories -- Where Arduinos Are Born -- Starting with a Sheet of Copper -- Applying the PCB Pattern to the Copper -- Etching the PCBs -- Applying Soldermask and Silkscreen -- Testing and Finishing the Boards -- Where USB Memory Sticks Are Born -- The Beginning of a USB Stick -- Hand-Placing Chips on a PCB -- Bonding the Chips to the PCB -- A Close Look at the USB Stick Boards -- A Tale of Two Zippers -- A Fully Automated Process -- A Semiautomated Process -- The Irony of Scarcity and Demand -- Chapter 3. the factory floor -- How to Make a Bill of Materials -- A Simple BOM for a Bicycle Safety Light -- Approved Manufacturers -- Tolerance, Composition, and Voltage Specification -- Electronic Component Form Factor -- Extended Part Numbers -- The Bicycle Safety Light BOM Revisited -- Planning for and Coping with Change -- Process Optimization: Design for Manufacturing -- Why DFM? -- Tolerances to Consider -- Following DFM Helps Your Bottom Line -- The Product Behind Your Product -- Testing vs. Validation -- Finding Balance in Industrial Design -- The chumby One's Trim and Finish -- The Arduino Uno's Silkscreen Art -- My Design Process -- Picking (and Maintaining) a Partner},
  isbn = {978-1-59327-758-1 978-1-59327-813-7},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{hughesCypherpunksManifesto,
  title = {A {{Cypherpunk}}'s {{Manifesto}}},
  author = {Hughes, Eric},
  url = {https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html},
  urldate = {2025-11-18},
  annotation = {Archived: \textbackslash url\{https://web.archive.org/web/20251002111923/https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html\}}
}

@report{hundRadiofrequencyResistanceInductance1925,
  type = {Technologic Papers of the Bureau of Standards},
  title = {Radio-Frequency Resistance and Inductance of Coils Used in Broadcast Reception.},
  author = {Hund, A. and De Groot, H.B.},
  date = {1925},
  series = {Technologic {{Papers}} of the {{Bureau}} of {{Standards}}},
  number = {T 298},
  pages = {T 298},
  institution = {National Bureau of Standards},
  doi = {10.6028/nbst.8267},
  url = {https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/nbstechnologic/nbstechnologicpaperT298.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-09-10},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{hussainTinyGarble2SmartEfficient2020,
  title = {{{TinyGarble2}}: {{Smart}}, {{Efficient}}, and {{Scalable Yao}}'s {{Garble Circuit}}},
  shorttitle = {{{TinyGarble2}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2020 {{Workshop}} on {{Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning}} in {{Practice}}},
  author = {Hussain, Siam and Li, Baiyu and Koushanfar, Farinaz and Cammarota, Rosario},
  date = {2020-11-09},
  pages = {65--67},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Virtual Event USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3411501.3419433},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3411501.3419433},
  urldate = {2024-09-03},
  abstract = {We present TinyGarble2 – a C++ framework for privacy-preserving computation through the Yao’s Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol in both the honest-but-curious and the malicious security models. TinyGarble2 provides a rich library with arithmetic and logic building blocks for developing GC-based secure applications. The framework offers abstractions among three layers: the C++ program, the GC back-end and the Boolean logic representation of the function being computed. TinyGarble2 thus allowing the most optimized versions of all pertinent components. These abstractions, coupled with secure share transfer among the functions make TinyGarble2 the fastest and most memory-efficient GC framework. In addition, the framework provides a library for Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). Our evaluations show that TinyGarble2 is the fastest among the current end-to-end GC frameworks while also being scalable in terms of memory footprint. Moreover, it performs 18× faster on the CNN LeNet-5 compared to the existing scalable frameworks.},
  eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '20: 2020 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-8088-1},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{huttnerLongrangeQKDTrusted2022,
  title = {Long-Range {{QKD}} without Trusted Nodes Is Not Possible with Current Technology},
  author = {Huttner, Bruno and Alléaume, Romain and Diamanti, Eleni and Fröwis, Florian and Grangier, Philippe and Hübel, Hannes and Martin, Vicente and Poppe, Andreas and Slater, Joshua A. and Spiller, Tim and Tittel, Wolfgang and Tranier, Benoit and Wonfor, Adrian and Zbinden, Hugo},
  date = {2022-09-09},
  journaltitle = {npj Quantum Information},
  shortjournal = {npj Quantum Inf},
  volume = {8},
  number = {1},
  pages = {108},
  issn = {2056-6387},
  doi = {10.1038/s41534-022-00613-4},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41534-022-00613-4},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{iaea2011,
  title = {Safeguards, Techniques and Equipment},
  author = {{International Atomic Energy Agency}},
  date = {2011},
  series = {International Nuclear Verification Series},
  volume = {1},
  url = {https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/nvs1_web.pdf},
  urldate = {2021-04-01},
  isbn = {978-92-0-118910-3}
}

@online{iana21,
  title = {Root Zone {{KSK}} Operator Key Management Procedure},
  author = {{Root Zone KSK Operator Policy Management Authority}},
  date = {2021-09-22},
  url = {https://www.iana.org/dnssec/procedures/ksk-operator/KSK_Key_Management_Procedure_v3.4.pdf},
  urldate = {2021-10-07}
}

@online{ibmCloudHSM2016,
  title = {Cloud {{HSM}}},
  author = {{IBM}},
  date = {2016-05-01},
  url = {https://cloud.ibm.com/catalog/infrastructure/cloud.ibm.com/catalog/infrastructure/hardware-security-module},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  abstract = {A hardware security module (HSM) is a dedicated crypto processor designed for the protection of the crypto key life cycle. HSMs act as trust anchors that protect the cryptographic infrastructure of some of the most security-conscious organizations in the world by securely managing, processing, and storing cryptographic keys inside a hardened, tamper-resistant device. Cloud HSM is a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 validated, single-tenant device available around the world where you need it most.},
  langid = {american}
}

@online{IEEEXploreFullText,
  title = {{{IEEE Xplore Full-Text PDF}}:},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=514853},
  urldate = {2024-05-22}
}

@online{IEEEXploreFullTexta,
  title = {{{IEEE Xplore Full-Text PDF}}:},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8558378},
  urldate = {2024-09-10}
}

@online{IEEEXploreFullTextb,
  title = {{{IEEE Xplore Full-Text PDF}}:},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=6520632},
  urldate = {2024-09-10}
}

@www{ika2002,
  title = {A Test Procedure for Airbags},
  author = {{International Motor Vehicle Inspection Commitee}},
  date = {2002},
  series = {{{CITA Research}} Study Programme on {{Electronically}} Controlled Systems on Vehicles},
  url = {https://citainsp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ECS-RSP-Study-2-TP-airbags.pdf},
  urldate = {2026-01-17}
}

@article{immler2019,
  title = {Secure Physical Enclosures from Covers with Tamper-Resistance},
  author = {Immler, Vincent and Obermaier, Johannes and Ng, Kuan Kuan and Ke, Fei Xiang and Lee, Jin Yu and Lim, Yak Peng and Oh, Wei Koon and Wee, Keng Hoong and Sigl, Georg},
  date = {2019},
  journaltitle = {IACR transactions on cryptographic hardware and embedded systems.},
  shortjournal = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  publisher = {IACR},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.13154/tches.v2019.i1.51-96},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7334/6506},
  urldate = {2020-09-16}
}

@inproceedings{immlerBTREPIDBatterylessTamperresistant2018,
  title = {B-{{TREPID}}: {{Batteryless}} Tamper-Resistant Envelope with a {{PUF}} and Integrity Detection},
  shorttitle = {B-{{TREPID}}},
  author = {Immler, Vincent and Obermaier, Johannes and König, Martin and Hiller, Matthias and Sig, Georg},
  date = {2018-04},
  pages = {49--56},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  doi = {10.1109/HST.2018.8383890},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8383890/?arnumber=8383890},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  abstract = {Protecting embedded devices against physical attacks is a challenging task since the attacker has control of the device in a hostile environment. To address this issue, current countermeasures typically use a battery-backed tamper-respondent envelope that encloses the entire device to create a trusted compartment. However, the battery affects the system's robustness and weight, and also leads to difficulties with the security mechanism while shipping the device. In contrast, we present a batteryless tamper-resistant envelope, which contains a fine mesh of electrodes, and its complementary security concept. An evaluation unit checks the integrity of the sensor mesh by detecting short and open circuits. Additionally, it measures the capacitances of the mesh. Once its preliminary integrity is confirmed, a cryptographic key is derived from the capacitive measurements that represent a PUF, to decrypt and authenticate the firmware of the enclosed host system. We demonstrate the feasibility of our concept, provide details on the layout and electrical properties of the batteryless envelope, and explain the underlying security architecture. Practical results from a set of manufactured envelopes facilitate future research.},
  eventtitle = {International {{Symposium}} on {{Hardware Oriented Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{HOST}})},
  keywords = {Batteries,Capacitance,Capacitance measurement,Cryptography,FIPS 140-2,Higher-Order Alphabet PUF (HOA PUF),Monitoring,Physical Unclonable Function (PUF),Runtime,Secure Bootstrap,Security Standards,Tamper-resistance}
}

@article{immlerSecurePhysicalEnclosures2018,
  title = {Secure {{Physical Enclosures}} from {{Covers}} with {{Tamper-Resistance}}},
  author = {Immler, Vincent and Obermaier, Johannes and Ng, Kuan Kuan and Ke, Fei Xiang and Lee, JinYu and Lim, Yak Peng and Oh, Wei Koon and Wee, Keng Hoong and Sigl, Georg},
  date = {2018-11-09},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  shortjournal = {TCHES},
  pages = {51--96},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2019.i1.51-96},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7334},
  urldate = {2025-04-09},
  abstract = {Ensuring physical security of multiple-chip embedded systems on a PCB is challenging, since the attacker can control the device in a hostile environment. To detect physical intruders as part of a layered approach to security, it is common to create a physical security boundary that is difficult to penetrate or remove, e.g., enclosures created from tamper-respondent envelopes or covers. Their physical integrity is usually checked by active sensing, i.e., a battery-backed circuit continuously monitors the enclosure. However, adoption is often hampered by the disadvantages of a battery and due to specialized equipment which is required to create the enclosure. In contrast, we present a batteryless tamper-resistant cover made from standard flexPCB technology, i.e., a commercially widespread, scalable, and proven technology. The cover comprises a fine mesh of electrodes and an evaluation unit underneath the cover checks their integrity by detecting short and open circuits. Additionally, it measures the capacitances between the electrodes of the mesh. Once its preliminary integrity is confirmed, a cryptographic key is derived from the capacitive measurements representing a PUF, to decrypt and authenticate sensitive data of the enclosed system. We demonstrate the feasibility of our concept, provide details on the layout, electrical properties of the cover, and explain the underlying security architecture. Practical results including statistics over a set of 115 flexPCB covers, physical attacks, and environmental testing support our design rationale. Hence, our work opens up a new direction of counteracting physical tampering without the need of batteries, while aiming at a physical security level comparable to FIPS 140-2 level 3.}
}

@online{ImpactPolarizationMode,
  title = {Impact of Polarization Mode Dispersion on Entangled Photon Distribution},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/html/2408.01754v1},
  urldate = {2024-09-04}
}

@inproceedings{impagliazzoPersonalViewAveragecase1995,
  title = {A Personal View of Average-Case Complexity},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of {{Structure}} in {{Complexity Theory}}. {{Tenth Annual IEEE Conference}}},
  author = {Impagliazzo, R.},
  date = {1995},
  pages = {134--147},
  publisher = {IEEE Comput. Soc. Press},
  location = {Minneapolis, MN, USA},
  doi = {10.1109/SCT.1995.514853},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/514853/},
  urldate = {2024-05-22},
  eventtitle = {Structure in {{Complexity Theory}}. {{Tenth Annual IEEE Conference}}},
  isbn = {978-0-8186-7052-7}
}

@report{ImplementationSecurityQuantum,
  title = {Implementation {{Security}} of {{Quantum Cryptography}} - {{Introduction}}, Challenges, Solutions},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{ImprovementElectromagneticEnvelopes1870,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Improvement in Electro-Magnetic Envelopes for Safes, Vaults},
  date = {1870-12-20},
  number = {110362A},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US110362A/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)&oq=(G08B13%2f126)&sort=old},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {electro,envelope,lining,safes,vaults}
}

@patent{ImprovementProtectingSafes1870,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Improvement in Protecting Safes and Vaults from Burglars},
  date = {1870-08-16},
  number = {106324A},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US106324A/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)&oq=(G08B13%2f126)&sort=old},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {burglars,conductor,improvement,safe,vaults}
}

@book{internetarchiveWholeEarthCatalog1969,
  title = {Whole {{Earth Catalog}}  {{Spring}} 1969},
  namea = {{Internet Archive}},
  nameatype = {collaborator},
  date = {1969-21},
  publisher = {Point Foundation},
  url = {http://archive.org/details/sim_whole-earth-catalog_whole-earth-catalog_spring-1969},
  urldate = {2025-10-29},
  abstract = {Whole Earth Catalog Spring 1969.. Digitized from IA1632332-05. Previous issue: sim\_whole-earth-catalog\_whole-earth-catalog\_1969-03\_supplement. Next issue: sim\_whole-earth-catalog\_whole-earth-catalog\_1969-07\_supplement.},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {132},
  keywords = {General Interest}
}

@inproceedings{irikura2012,
  title = {High Acceleration Motions Generated from the 2011 Pacific Coast off Tohoku, Japan Earthquake},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 15th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering},
  author = {Irikura, K and Kurahashi, S},
  date = {2012},
  pages = {24--28}
}

@inproceedings{isaacs2013,
  title = {Tamper Proof, Tamper Evident Encryption Technology},
  booktitle = {Pan Pacific Microelectronics Symposium},
  author = {Isaacs, Phil and Morris Jr, Thomas and Fisher, Michael J and Cuthbert, Keith},
  date = {2013-01-22},
  publisher = {Surface Mount Technology Association},
  doi = {10.37665/ppDGZDE20978},
  eventtitle = {{{SMTA Pan Pacific Symposium}}},
  x-fetchedfrom = {Google Scholar}
}

@incollection{ishaiExtendingObliviousTransfers2003,
  title = {Extending {{Oblivious Transfers Efficiently}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} - {{CRYPTO}} 2003},
  author = {Ishai, Yuval and Kilian, Joe and Nissim, Kobbi and Petrank, Erez},
  editor = {Boneh, Dan},
  editora = {Goos, Gerhard and Hartmanis, Juris and Van Leeuwen, Jan},
  editoratype = {redactor},
  date = {2003},
  volume = {2729},
  pages = {145--161},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_9},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_9},
  urldate = {2025-08-15},
  abstract = {We consider the problem of extending oblivious transfers: Given a small number of oblivious transfers “for free,” can one implement a large number of oblivious transfers? Beaver has shown how to extend oblivious transfers given a one-way function. However, this protocol is inefficient in practice, in part due to its non-black-box use of the underlying one-way function.},
  isbn = {978-3-540-40674-7 978-3-540-45146-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{ISOIEC19790,
  title = {{{ISO}}/{{IEC}} 19790:2025},
  shorttitle = {{{ISO}}/{{IEC}} 19790},
  url = {https://www.iso.org/standard/82423.html},
  urldate = {2025-05-15},
  abstract = {Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Security requirements for cryptographic modules},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {ISO}
}

@online{ISOIEC24759,
  title = {{{ISO}}/{{IEC}} 24759:2025},
  shorttitle = {{{ISO}}/{{IEC}} 24759},
  url = {https://www.iso.org/standard/82424.html},
  urldate = {2025-04-08},
  abstract = {Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Test requirements for cryptographic modules},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {ISO}
}

@article{ivarssonReviewHardwareSecurity,
  title = {A {{Review}} of {{Hardware Security Modules Fall}} 2010},
  author = {Ivarsson, Johan and Nilsson, Andreas},
  abstract = {This report describes a technical review of four leading network based Hardware Security Modules performed during the fall of 2010. When deriving the review point set the focus was primarily on security features and functionality used for DNSSEC applications. However the more interesting findings were in different areas such as usability and management procedures.},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{jarvinenEmbeddedSFEOffloading2010,
  title = {Embedded {{SFE}}: {{Offloading Server}} and {{Network Using Hardware Tokens}}},
  shorttitle = {Embedded {{SFE}}},
  booktitle = {Financial {{Cryptography}} and {{Data Security}}},
  author = {Järvinen, Kimmo and Kolesnikov, Vladimir and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Schneider, Thomas},
  editor = {Sion, Radu},
  editora = {Hutchison, David and Kanade, Takeo and Kittler, Josef and Kleinberg, Jon M. and Mattern, Friedemann and Mitchell, John C. and Naor, Moni and Nierstrasz, Oscar and Pandu Rangan, C. and Steffen, Bernhard and Sudan, Madhu and Terzopoulos, Demetri and Tygar, Doug and Vardi, Moshe Y. and Weikum, Gerhard},
  editoratype = {redactor},
  date = {2010},
  volume = {6052},
  pages = {207--221},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_17},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_17},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {We consider Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) in the clientserver setting where the server issues a secure token to the client. The token is not trusted by the client and is not a trusted third party.},
  isbn = {978-3-642-14576-6 978-3-642-14577-3},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{jarvisCryptoWarsFight2020,
  title = {Crypto {{Wars}}: {{The Fight}} for {{Privacy}} in the {{Digital Age}}: {{A Political History}} of {{Digital Encryption}}},
  author = {Jarvis, Craig},
  date = {2020-12-14},
  edition = {1},
  publisher = {CRC Press},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003123675},
  urldate = {2025-11-18},
  abstract = {The crypto wars have raged for half a century. In the 1970s, digital privacy activists prophesied the emergence of an Orwellian State, made possible by computer-mediated mass surveillance. The antidote: digital encryption. The U.S. government warned encryption would not only prevent surveillance of law-abiding citizens, but of criminals, terrorists, and foreign spies, ushering in a rival dystopian future. Both parties fought to defend the citizenry from what they believed the most perilous threats. The government tried to control encryption to preserve its surveillance capabilities; privacy activists armed citizens with cryptographic tools and challenged encryption regulations in the courts. No clear victor has emerged from the crypto wars. Governments have failed to forge a framework to govern the, at times conflicting, civil liberties of privacy and security in the digital age—an age when such liberties have an outsized influence on the citizen–State power balance. Solving this problem is more urgent than ever. Digital privacy will be one of the most important factors in how we architect twenty-first century societies—its management is paramount to our stewardship of democracy for future generations. We must elevate the quality of debate on cryptography, on how we govern security and privacy in our technology-infused world. Failure to end the crypto wars will result in societies sleepwalking into a future where the citizen–State power balance is determined by a twentieth-century status quo unfit for this century, endangering both our privacy and security. This book provides a history of the crypto wars, with the hope its chronicling sets a foundation for peace.},
  isbn = {978-1-003-12367-5}
}

@inproceedings{jiangGhostTypeLimitsUsing2024,
  title = {{{GhostType}}: {{The Limits}} of {{Using Contactless Electromagnetic Interference}} to {{Inject Phantom Keys}} into {{Analog Circuits}} of {{Keyboards}}},
  shorttitle = {{{GhostType}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  author = {Jiang, Qinhong and Ren, Yanze and Long, Yan and Yan, Chen and Sun, Yumai and Ji, Xiaoyu and Fu, Kevin and Xu, Wenyuan},
  date = {2024},
  publisher = {Internet Society},
  location = {San Diego, CA, USA},
  doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.23015},
  url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-15-paper.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Keyboards are the primary peripheral input devices for various critical computer application scenarios. This paper performs a security analysis of the keyboard sensing mechanisms and uncovers a new class of vulnerabilities that can be exploited to induce phantom keys—fake keystrokes injected into keyboards’ analog circuits in a contactless way using electromagnetic interference (EMI). Besides regular keystrokes, such phantom keys also include keystrokes that human operators cannot achieve, such as rapidly injecting over 10,000 keys per minute and injecting hidden keys that do not exist on the physical keyboard. The underlying principles of phantom key injections consist in inducing false voltages on keyboard sensing GPIO pins through EMI coupled onto matrix circuits. We investigate the voltage and timing requirements of injection signals both theoretically and empirically to establish the theory of phantom key injection. To validate the threat of keyboard sensing vulnerabilities, we design GhostType that can cause denial-of-service of the keyboard and inject random keystrokes as well as certain targeted keystrokes of the adversary’s choice. We have validated GhostType on 48 of 50 off-the-shelf keyboards/keypads from 20 brands, including both membrane/mechanical structures and USB/Bluetooth protocols. Some example consequences of GhostType include completely blocking keyboard operations, crashing and turning off downstream computers, and deleting computer files. Finally, we glean lessons from our investigations and propose countermeasures, including shielding keyboards with metal materials and enhancing the keystroke sensing mechanism.},
  eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{johanssonTamperProtectionCryptographic2020,
  title = {Tamper {{Protection}} for {{Cryptographic Hardware}} : {{A}} Survey and Analysis of State-of-the-Art Tamper Protection for Communication Devices Handling Cryptographic Keys},
  shorttitle = {Tamper {{Protection}} for {{Cryptographic Hardware}}},
  author = {Johansson, Emil},
  date = {2020},
  url = {https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-166083},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {DiVA portal is a finding tool for research publications and student theses written at the following 50 universities and research institutions.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{johnson2018,
  title = {Titan: Enabling a Transparent Silicon Root of Trust for {{Cloud}}},
  booktitle = {Hot Chips: A Symposium on High Performance Chips},
  author = {Johnson, Scott and Rizzo, Dominic and Ranganathan, Parthasarathy and McCune, Jon and Ho, Richard},
  date = {2018},
  url = {https://www.hotchips.org/hc30/1conf/1.14_Google_Titan_GoogleFinalTitanHotChips2018.pdf},
  x-fetchedfrom = {Google Scholar}
}

@patent{joyceMethodDetectPenetration1996,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Method to Detect Penetration of a Surface and Apparatus Implementing Same},
  author = {Joyce, Richard J. and Kramer, Allan R.},
  holder = {{Hughes Aircraft Co}},
  date = {1996-10-22},
  number = {5568124A},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US5568124A/en?oq=US5568124A},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {conduit means,conduits,frangible,protected,substrate}
}

@online{JUNOSubmarineNetworks,
  title = {{{JUNO}} - {{Submarine Networks}}},
  url = {https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/trans-pacific/juno},
  urldate = {2024-09-03}
}

@article{kahrs50YearsRF2003,
  title = {50 Years of {{RF}} and Microwave Sampling},
  author = {Kahrs, M.},
  date = {2003-06},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques},
  volume = {51},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1787--1805},
  issn = {1557-9670},
  doi = {10.1109/TMTT.2002.806934},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1201815?casa_token=VuzEwA0qx64AAAAA:wyySGOSgyLvNaLEjg05oV0MmQNihh4WH-A66_PYtI9IlkUjW6x6YlbAXePITdT68FFKHMN36wA},
  urldate = {2025-03-11},
  abstract = {Measurement of microwave and UHF signals is often done with sampling techniques. In this paper, the techniques and technology of sampling of electrical signals is reviewed from 1950 to the present. It includes both references to the open literature, as well as an extensive review of relevant patents. It also provides an overview of sampling applications and the use of computer technology to compensate and correct for errors in the sampling process.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Microwave Theory}} and {{Techniques}}},
  keywords = {Circuit testing,Distortion measurement,Instruments,Microwave theory and techniques,Oscilloscopes,Probes,Pulse generation,Radio frequency,Sampling methods,Signal sampling}
}

@incollection{kalaiArgumentQuantumComputers2020,
  title = {The {{Argument Against Quantum Computers}}},
  booktitle = {Quantum, {{Probability}}, {{Logic}}},
  author = {Kalai, Gil},
  editor = {Hemmo, Meir and Shenker, Orly},
  date = {2020},
  pages = {399--422},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-34316-3_18},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-34316-3_18},
  urldate = {2024-06-25},
  isbn = {978-3-030-34315-6 978-3-030-34316-3},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{kalaiWhyLanguageModels2025,
  title = {Why Language Models Hallucinate},
  author = {Kalai, Adam and Vempala, Santosh and Nachum, Ofir and Zhang, Eddie and Robinson, David and Jain, Saachi and Mitchell, Eric and Beutel, Alex and Heidecke, Johannes},
  date = {2025-12-03},
  url = {https://openai.com/index/why-language-models-hallucinate/},
  urldate = {2025-12-04},
  abstract = {OpenAI’s new research explains why language models hallucinate. The findings show how improved evaluations can enhance AI reliability, honesty, and safety.},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {OpenAI}
}

@incollection{kamaraScalingPrivateSet2014,
  title = {Scaling {{Private Set Intersection}} to {{Billion-Element Sets}}},
  booktitle = {Financial {{Cryptography}} and {{Data Security}}},
  author = {Kamara, Seny and Mohassel, Payman and Raykova, Mariana and Sadeghian, Saeed},
  editor = {Christin, Nicolas and Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh},
  date = {2014},
  volume = {8437},
  pages = {195--215},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5_13},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-662-45472-5_13},
  urldate = {2023-01-17},
  abstract = {We examine the feasibility of private set intersection (PSI) over massive datasets. PSI, which allows two parties to find the intersection of their sets without revealing them to each other, has numerous applications including to privacy-preserving data mining, location-based services and genomic computations. Unfortunately, the most efficient constructions only scale to sets containing a few thousand elements—even in the semi-honest model and over a LAN.},
  isbn = {978-3-662-45471-8 978-3-662-45472-5},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{karlDevelopingNoninteractiveMPC2022,
  title = {Developing Non-Interactive {{MPC}} with Trusted Hardware for Enhanced Security},
  author = {Karl, Ryan and Burchfield, Hannah and Takeshita, Jonathan and Jung, Taeho},
  date = {2022-08-01},
  journaltitle = {International Journal of Information Security},
  shortjournal = {Int. J. Inf. Secur.},
  volume = {21},
  number = {4},
  pages = {777--797},
  issn = {1615-5270},
  doi = {10.1007/s10207-022-00583-w},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-022-00583-w},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a promising technology for supporting privacy-preserving computation between multiple untrusted parties. Recent work has made progress reducing the number of online messages that must be sent by each participant to one, in an effort to improve communication overhead. These non-interactive protocols (NI-MPC) are efficient but do not offer standard security guarantees. A vital next step in the research is developing NI-MPC protocols that offer traditional security guarantees in the standard model. This is challenging, because protocols that are non-interactive are vulnerable to the residual function attack, and a malicious party can evaluate a function multiple times using different inputs to deduce the inputs provided by honest users. After proving NI-MPC protocols without extra trust assumptions cannot achieve fully malicious security, fairness, or robustness in the standard model, we solve this problem using trusted hardware. We then present two novel NI-MPC protocols that achieve standard privacy and correctness, and also provide guarantees of fairness and robustness (for the latter additional communication is necessary if an attack occurs). We also introduce the first implementation of an NI-MPC protocol with a one-round online phase that is secure in the standard model. In addition, we rigorously analyze the computational and communication complexity of existing protocols that require either two rounds of communication or one round of online communication. We demonstrate that our protocol outperforms or is comparable to their complexity. Furthermore, we provide rigorous proofs of correctness, security, fairness, and robustness in the covert and malicious adversary models.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Communication round complexity,Non-interactive MPC,Trusted execution environment,Trusted hardware}
}

@incollection{kellerFasterSecureMultiparty2017,
  title = {Faster {{Secure Multi-party Computation}} of {{AES}} and {{DES Using Lookup Tables}}},
  booktitle = {Applied {{Cryptography}} and {{Network Security}}},
  author = {Keller, Marcel and Orsini, Emmanuela and Rotaru, Dragos and Scholl, Peter and Soria-Vazquez, Eduardo and Vivek, Srinivas},
  editor = {Gollmann, Dieter and Miyaji, Atsuko and Kikuchi, Hiroaki},
  date = {2017},
  volume = {10355},
  pages = {229--249},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-61204-1_12},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-61204-1_12},
  urldate = {2024-02-26},
  abstract = {We present an actively secure protocol for secure multi-party computation based on lookup tables, by extending the recent, two-party ‘TinyTable’ protocol of Damg˚ard et al. (ePrint 2016). Like TinyTable, an attractive feature of our protocol is a very fast and simple online evaluation phase. We also give a new method for efficiently implementing the preprocessing material required for the online phase using arithmetic circuits over characteristic two fields. This improves over the suggested method from TinyTable by at least a factor of 50.},
  isbn = {978-3-319-61203-4 978-3-319-61204-1},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{kellerMPSPDZVersatileFramework2020,
  title = {{{MP-SPDZ}}: {{A Versatile Framework}} for {{Multi-Party Computation}}},
  shorttitle = {{{MP-SPDZ}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2020 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Keller, Marcel},
  date = {2020-10-30},
  pages = {1575--1590},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Virtual Event USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3372297.3417872},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3372297.3417872},
  urldate = {2025-08-15},
  abstract = {Multi-Protocol SPDZ (MP-SPDZ) is a fork of SPDZ-2 (Keller et al., CCS ’13), an implementation of the multi-party computation (MPC) protocol called SPDZ (Damgård et al., Crypto ’12). MP-SPDZ extends SPDZ-2 to 30 MPC protocol variants, all of which can be used with the same high-level programming interface based on Python. This considerably simplifies comparing the cost of different protocols and security models.},
  eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '20: 2020 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-7089-9},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{kelly1993,
  title = {Fundamentals of Mechanical Vibrations},
  author = {Kelly, S. Graham},
  date = {1993},
  series = {{{McGraw-hill}} Series in Mechanical Engineering},
  edition = {2},
  publisher = {McGraw-Hill},
  isbn = {0-07-230092-2}
}

@online{kennedyDDR4DIMMsSystem2017,
  title = {{{DDR4 DIMMs}} and {{System Power Consumption}} - {{We Tested}}},
  author = {Kennedy, Patrick},
  date = {2017-01-30T13:52:03+00:00},
  url = {https://www.servethehome.com/ddr4-dimms-system-power-consumption-tested/},
  urldate = {2025-10-27},
  abstract = {We tested a low power 1U system with 16x and 4x DDR4 DIMMs to see the power consumption impact of using fewer RDIMMs in a server},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {ServeTheHome}
}

@article{kerckhoffsCryptographieMilitaire1883,
  title = {La Cryptographie Militaire},
  author = {Kerckhoffs, Auguste},
  date = {1883-01},
  series = {Journal Des Sciences Militaires},
  volume = {9},
  pages = {5--38}
}

@online{KiCadEDA,
  title = {{{KiCad EDA}}},
  url = {https://www.kicad.org/},
  urldate = {2024-12-03},
  abstract = {A Cross Platform and Open Source Electronics Design Automation Suite},
  langid = {american}
}

@article{kim2018,
  title = {Intelligent Intrusion Detection System Featuring a Virtual Fence, Active Intruder Detection, Classification, Tracking, and Action Recognition},
  author = {Kim, Seung Hyun and Lim, Su Chang and others},
  date = {2018},
  journaltitle = {Annals of Nuclear Energy},
  volume = {112},
  pages = {845--855},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  x-fetchedfrom = {Google Scholar}
}

@article{kimAdvancementFlexibleRobot2022,
  title = {Advancement of {{Flexible Robot Technologies}} for {{Endoluminal Surgeries}}},
  author = {Kim, Joonhwan and family=Mathelin, given=Michel, prefix=de, useprefix=true and Ikuta, Koji and Kwon, Dong-Soo},
  date = {2022-07},
  journaltitle = {Proceedings of the IEEE},
  volume = {110},
  number = {7},
  pages = {909--931},
  issn = {1558-2256},
  doi = {10.1109/JPROC.2022.3170109},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9779312/?arnumber=9779312},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  abstract = {The trend of achieving minimal invasiveness in surgeries and recent technological advances in robotics have resulted in the emergence of flexible surgical robots. Such flexible robots can reach a surgical site via narrow and tortuous pathways, extending the reach of robotic surgery and potentially reducing the incision size. This review covers the key technical issues associated with flexible surgical robotics and introduces emerging flexible surgical robot systems organized according to their target applications in the endoluminal surgical field. Furthermore, the challenges and recent advancements in manipulator design, modeling, and control as well as the shape and force sensing of flexible robots are presented as key technical issues. Furthermore, the technical features and clinical values of emerging flexible surgical robot systems are introduced with their medical applications.},
  eventtitle = {Proceedings of the {{IEEE}}},
  keywords = {Continuum robot,endoluminal surgery,flexible robot technology,Flexible structures,flexible surgical robot,Hysteresis,hysteresis compensation,interventional endoscopy,intraluminal surgery,Manipulators,Medical robotics,shape measurement,Shape measurement,Surgery,telemanipulation,Telemedicine}
}

@article{kiselevAnalysisChromaticDispersion2020,
  title = {Analysis of the Chromatic Dispersion Effect on the Subcarrier Wave {{QKD}} System},
  author = {Kiselev, F. and Samsonov, E. and Goncharov, R. and Chistyakov, V. and Halturinsky, A. and Egorov, V. and Kozubov, A. and Gaidash, A. and Gleim, A.},
  date = {2020-09-14},
  journaltitle = {Optics Express},
  shortjournal = {Opt. Express, OE},
  volume = {28},
  number = {19},
  pages = {28696--28712},
  publisher = {Optica Publishing Group},
  issn = {1094-4087},
  doi = {10.1364/OE.403293},
  url = {https://opg.optica.org/oe/abstract.cfm?uri=oe-28-19-28696},
  urldate = {2024-06-28},
  abstract = {In this paper we investigate the chromatic dispersion impact on the quantum key distribution system based on multi-mode weak coherent phase-coded states. We provide an asymptotic secure key rate estimation, taking into account error detection probability due to chromatic dispersion. We demonstrate numerically and experimentally that the effect of chromatic dispersion in an optical fiber without any compensation hinders the secret key distribution at a distance more than 53 km. Finally, we propose a modification to the considered quantum communication system in order to mitigate the influence of chromatic dispersion on its performance.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Fiber Bragg gratings,Fiber losses,Phase matching,Quantum communications,Quantum key distribution,Raman scattering}
}

@online{kissaneDarkForest2024,
  title = {Against the Dark Forest},
  author = {Kissane, Erin},
  date = {2024-11-22T15:26:10},
  url = {https://www.wrecka.ge/against-the-dark-forest/},
  urldate = {2024-11-23},
  abstract = {The complex of ideas I’m going to call the Dark Internet Forest emerges from mostly insidery tech thinking, but from multiple directions.},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {wreckage/salvage}
}

@patent{kleijneSecurityDeviceSecure1986,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Security Device for the Secure Storage of Sensitive Data},
  author = {Kleijne, Theodoor A.},
  holder = {{NCR Corp}},
  date = {1986-06-03},
  number = {4593384A},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US4593384A/en?oq=US4593384A},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {housing,memory,responsive,sensitive data,signal}
}

@book{kleinSpulenUndSchwingungskreise1941,
  title = {Spulen Und {{Schwingungskreise}}},
  author = {Klein, Paul-Eduard},
  date = {1941},
  series = {Deutsche {{Radio-Bücherei}}},
  number = {60},
  publisher = {Deutsch-Literarisches Institut J. Schneider},
  keywords = {twisted-inductors}
}

@article{knottCRYPTENSecureMultiParty,
  title = {{{CRYPTEN}}: {{Secure Multi-Party Computation Meets Machine Learning}}},
  author = {Knott, Brian and Venkataraman, Shobha and Hannun, Awni and Sengupta, Shubho and Ibrahim, Mark},
  abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows parties to perform computations on data while keeping that data private. This capability has great potential for machine-learning applications: it facilitates training of machine-learning models on private data sets owned by different parties, evaluation of one party’s private model using another party’s private data, etc. Although a range of studies implement machine-learning models via secure MPC, such implementations are not yet mainstream. Adoption of secure MPC is hampered by the absence of flexible software frameworks that “speak the language” of machine-learning researchers and engineers. To foster adoption of secure MPC in machine learning, we present CRYPTEN: a software framework that exposes popular secure MPC primitives via abstractions that are common in modern machine-learning frameworks, such as tensor computations, automatic differentiation, and modular neural networks. This paper describes the design of CRYPTEN and measure its performance on state-ofthe-art models for text classification, speech recognition, and image classification. Our benchmarks show that CRYPTEN’s GPU support and high-performance communication between (an arbitrary number of) parties allows it to perform efficient private evaluation of modern machine-learning models under a semi-honest threat model. For example, two parties using CRYPTEN can securely predict phonemes in speech recordings using Wav2Letter [17] faster than real-time. We hope that CRYPTEN will spur adoption of secure MPC in the machine-learning community.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{koblahHardwareMovingTarget2022,
  title = {Hardware {{Moving Target Defenses}} against {{Physical Attacks}}: {{Design Challenges}} and {{Opportunities}}},
  shorttitle = {Hardware {{Moving Target Defenses}} against {{Physical Attacks}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 9th {{ACM Workshop}} on {{Moving Target Defense}}},
  author = {Koblah, David S. and Ganji, Fatemeh and Forte, Domenic and Tajik, Shahin},
  date = {2022-11-11},
  pages = {25--36},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Los Angeles CA USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3560828.3564010},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3560828.3564010},
  urldate = {2024-01-08},
  abstract = {The concept of moving target defense (MTD) has entrenched itself as a viable strategy to reverse the typical asymmetries in cyber warfare. MTDs are technologies that seek to make target systems dynamically change in order to limit the time and information available to complete an attack, increase the likelihood of detection, and/or deter attackers from proceeding. The benefits of MTD have been shown for network-, operating system-, and applicationlevel security. Hardware roots-of-trust, however, are static “sitting ducks", especially against physical attacks, and can therefore benefit from the dynamics brought about by MTDs. Although many MTD concepts seem transferable to hardware applications, there has hardly been any work to establish a functioning research pipeline for countermeasures to physical attacks. The aim of this paper is to introduce viable MTD concepts, describe the issues that they can address, and chart a path towards their realization for the community.},
  eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '22: 2022 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-9878-7},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{Kocher2018spectre,
  title = {Spectre Attacks: {{Exploiting}} Speculative Execution},
  author = {Kocher, Paul and Horn, Jann and Fogh, Anders and Genkin, {and} Daniel and Gruss, Daniel and Haas, Werner and Hamburg, Mike and Lipp, Moritz and Mangard, Stefan and Prescher, Thomas and Schwarz, Michael and Yarom, Yuval},
  date = {2020},
  journaltitle = {Communications of the ACM},
  volume = {63},
  number = {7},
  pages = {93--101},
  doi = {10.1145/3399742}
}

@online{kochMoreMoreExperts2025,
  title = {More and More Experts Warn against Electronic Patient Records},
  author = {Koch, Marie-Claire},
  date = {2025-01-10},
  url = {https://www.heise.de/en/news/More-and-more-experts-warn-against-electronic-patient-records-10235907.html},
  urldate = {2025-05-26},
  abstract = {The electronic patient file is due to be launched in a few days, but more and more experts are advising against it or do not consider it advisable.},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {heise online}
}

@online{kochNochVieleUnklarheiten2025,
  title = {Noch viele Unklarheiten bei der elektronischen Patientenakte},
  author = {Koch, Marie-Claire},
  date = {2025-05-08},
  issn = {1037-7344},
  url = {https://www.heise.de/hintergrund/Elektronische-Patientenakte-Welche-Unklarheiten-es-noch-gibt-10377344.html},
  urldate = {2025-11-28},
  abstract = {Rund um die elektronische Patientenakte gibt es noch viele offene (Sicherheits-)Fragen. Dabei ist sie gerade erst bundesweit gestartet, zumindest theoretisch.},
  langid = {ngerman},
  organization = {heise online}
}

@inproceedings{kodwaniSecurityKeyDerivation2021,
  title = {On {{Security}} of {{Key Derivation Functions}} in {{Password-based Cryptography}}},
  booktitle = {2021 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Cyber Security}} and {{Resilience}} ({{CSR}})},
  author = {Kodwani, Gaurav and Arora, Shashank and Atrey, Pradeep K.},
  date = {2021-07-26},
  pages = {109--114},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {Rhodes, Greece},
  doi = {10.1109/CSR51186.2021.9527961},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9527961/},
  urldate = {2024-07-31},
  abstract = {Most common user authentication methods use some form of password or a combination of passwords. However, encryption schemes are generally not directly compatible with user passwords and thus, Password-Based Key Derivation Functions (PBKDFs) are used to convert user passwords into cryptographic keys. In this paper, we analyze the theoretical security of PBKDF2 and present two vulnerabilities, γ-collision and δ-collision. Using AES-128 as our exemplar, we show that due to γ-collision, text encrypted with one user password can be decrypted with γ − 1 different passwords. We also provide a proof that finding a collision in the derived key for AES-128 requires δ lesser calls to PBKDF2 than the known Birthday attack. Due to this, it is possible to break password-based AES-128 in O(264) calls, which is equivalent to brute-forcing DES.},
  eventtitle = {2021 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Cyber Security}} and {{Resilience}} ({{CSR}})},
  isbn = {978-1-6654-0285-9},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{koehler-sidkiSecuritySelfDifferencingAvalanche2020,
  title = {The {{Security}} of {{Self-Differencing Avalanche Photodiodes}} for {{Quantum Key Distribution}}},
  author = {Koehler-Sidki, Alexander Mark},
  date = {2020-07-17},
  doi = {10.17863/CAM.51665},
  url = {https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/304583},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to communicate with information theoretic security by encoding information on single photons. This security is based on the laws of physics and as such can never be broken in theory. However, in practice, components do not always behave according to their theoretical models and these deviations can be exploited by an eavesdropper. In recent years, exposing loopholes in QKD systems, known as quantum hacking, has attracted significant attention. The components most susceptible to being hacked are the single-photon detectors, often avalanche photodiodes (APDs), as they are directly exposed to the optical channel. Whilst measurement-device-independent QKD removes detector vulnerability from the system, secure key rates with this technique can be much lower than point-to-point links. As such, mitigating attacks on QKD systems is a pressing challenge in QKD. In this thesis, the focus is on a special class of detectors, self-differencing APDs (SD-APDs), which have facilitated state-of-the art demonstrations of QKD. The susceptibility of SD-APDs to blinding attacks, the most explored and successful attack to date, was investigated and it was shown that by following best practice for their operation, such an attack would be unsuccessful. We have also proposed and developed a countermeasure such that the onus for appropriate operation could be removed from the user. We have also explored an arguably more dangerous attack, in the form of the after-gate attack. We have shown that delayed detection events, ordinarily considered detrimental in QKD, can provide inherent protection against this attack. Finally, backflashes in GHz-gated APDs were investigated for the first time and it was shown that threat they pose to QKD security is negligible. These results highlight the inherent protection to a number of attacks that self-differencing APDs possess. We stress that the findings presented in this thesis are also applicable to other types of fast-gated InGaAs APDs that don't possess self-differencing circuitry.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{koehler-sidkiSettingBestPractice2017,
  title = {Setting Best Practice Criteria for Self-Differencing Avalanche Photodiodes in Quantum Key Distribution},
  booktitle = {Quantum {{Information Science}} and {{Technology III}}},
  author = {Koehler-Sidki, Alexander and Dynes, James F. and Yuan, Zhiliang L. and Lucamarini, Marco and Roberts, George R. and Savory, Seb J. and Shields, Andrew J. and Sharpe, Andrew W.},
  editor = {Gruneisen, Mark T. and Dusek, Miloslav and Rarity, John G.},
  date = {2017-10-05},
  pages = {19},
  publisher = {SPIE},
  location = {Warsaw, Poland},
  doi = {10.1117/12.2275675},
  url = {https://www.spiedigitallibrary.org/conference-proceedings-of-spie/10442/2275675/Setting-best-practice-criteria-for-self-differencing-avalanche-photodiodes-in/10.1117/12.2275675.full},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {In recent years, the security of avalanche photodiodes as single photon detectors for quantum key distribution has been subjected to much scrutiny. The most prominent example of this surrounds the vulnerability of such devices to blinding under strong illumination. We focus on self-differencing avalanche photodiodes, single photon detectors that have demonstrated count rates exceeding 1 GCounts/s resulting in secure key rates over 1 MBit/s. These detectors use a passive electronic circuit to cancel any periodic signals thereby enhancing detection sensitivity. However this intrinsic feature can be exploited by adversaries to gain control of the devices using illumination of a moderate intensity. Through careful experimental examinations, we define here a set of criteria for these detectors to avoid such attacks.},
  eventtitle = {Quantum {{Technologies}} and {{Quantum Information Science}}},
  isbn = {978-1-5106-1348-5 978-1-5106-1349-2},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{koemmerlingDesignPrinciplesTamperResistant,
  title = {Design {{Principles}} for {{Tamper-Resistant Smartcard Processors}}},
  author = {Koemmerling, Oliver and Kuhn, Markus G},
  abstract = {We describe techniques for extracting protected software and data from smartcard processors. This includes manual microprobing, laser cutting, focused ion-beam manipulation, glitch attacks, and power analysis. Many of these methods have already been used to compromise widely-fielded conditionalaccess systems, and current smartcards offer little protection against them. We give examples of lowcost protection concepts that make such attacks considerably more difficult.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{kohlsVerLocVerifiableLocalization,
  title = {{{VerLoc}}: {{Verifiable Localization}} in {{Decentralized Systems}}},
  author = {Kohls, Katharina and Diaz, Claudia},
  abstract = {We tackle the challenge of reliably determining the geolocation of nodes in decentralized networks, considering adversarial settings and without depending on any trusted landmarks. In particular, we consider active adversaries that control a subset of nodes, announce false locations and strategically manipulate measurements. To address this problem we propose, implement and evaluate VerLoc, a system that allows verifying the claimed geo-locations of network nodes in a fully decentralized manner. VerLoc securely schedules roundtrip time (RTT) measurements between randomly chosen pairs of nodes. Trilateration is then applied to the set of measurements to verify claimed geo-locations. We evaluate VerLoc both with simulations and in the wild using a prototype implementation integrated in the Nym network (currently run by thousands of nodes). We find that VerLoc can localize nodes in the wild with a median error of 60 km, and that in attack simulations it is capable of detecting and filtering out adversarial timing manipulations for network setups with up to 20 \% malicious nodes.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{kohnoAnalysisElectronicVoting2004,
  title = {Analysis of an Electronic Voting System},
  booktitle = {{{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}, 2004. {{Proceedings}}. 2004},
  author = {Kohno, T. and Stubblefield, A. and Rubin, A.D. and Wallach, D.S.},
  date = {2004-05},
  pages = {27--40},
  issn = {1081-6011},
  doi = {10.1109/SECPRI.2004.1301313},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1301313/},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {With significant U.S. federal funds now available to replace outdated punch-card and mechanical voting systems, municipalities and states throughout the U.S. are adopting paperless electronic voting systems from a number of different vendors. We present a security analysis of the source code to one such machine used in a significant share of the market. Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts. We identify several problems including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network threats, and poor software development processes. We show that voters, without any insider privileges, can cast unlimited votes without being detected by any mechanisms within the voting terminal software. Furthermore, we show that even the most serious of our outsider attacks could have been discovered and executed without access to the source code. In the face of such attacks, the usual worries about insider threats are not the only concerns; outsiders can do the damage. That said, we demonstrate that the insider threat is also quite considerable, showing that not only can an insider, such as a poll worker, modify the votes, but that insiders can also violate voter privacy and match votes with the voters who cast them. We conclude that this voting system is unsuitable for use in a general election. Any paperless electronic voting system might suffer similar flaws, despite any certification it could have otherwise received. We suggest that the best solutions are voting systems having a voter-verifiable audit trail, where a computerized voting system might print a paper ballot that can be read and verified by the voter.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}, 2004. 2004},
  keywords = {Computer science,Cryptography,Electronic voting,Electronic voting systems,Face detection,Information security,Nominations and elections,Privacy,Programming,Robustness}
}

@inproceedings{kolesnikovGateEvaluationSecret2005,
  title = {Gate {{Evaluation Secret Sharing}} and {{Secure One-Round Two-Party Computation}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} - {{ASIACRYPT}} 2005},
  author = {Kolesnikov, Vladimir},
  editor = {Roy, Bimal},
  date = {2005},
  series = {Lecture {{Notes}} in {{Computer Science}}},
  pages = {136--155},
  publisher = {Springer},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/11593447_8},
  abstract = {We propose Gate Evaluation Secret Sharing (GESS) – a new kind of secret sharing, designed for use in secure function evaluation (SFE) with minimal interaction. The resulting simple and powerful GESS approach to SFE is a generalization of Yao’s garbled circuit technique.},
  isbn = {978-3-540-32267-2},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Binary Input,Boolean Formula,Oblivious Transfer,Secret Sharing Scheme,Secure Multiparty Computation}
}

@book{kordyban1998,
  title = {Hot Air Rises and Heat Sinks: {{Everything}} You Know about Cooling Electronics Is Wrong},
  author = {Kordyban, Tony},
  date = {1998},
  publisher = {ASME},
  isbn = {978-0-7918-0074-4}
}

@inproceedings{kozlowskiLargeScaleQuantumNetworks2019,
  title = {Towards {{Large-Scale Quantum Networks}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the {{Sixth Annual ACM International Conference}} on {{Nanoscale Computing}} and {{Communication}}},
  author = {Kozlowski, Wojciech and Wehner, Stephanie},
  date = {2019-09-25},
  pages = {1--7},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Dublin Ireland},
  doi = {10.1145/3345312.3345497},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3345312.3345497},
  urldate = {2024-05-15},
  eventtitle = {{{NANOCOM}} '19: {{The Sixth Annual ACM International Conference}} on {{Nanoscale Computing}} and {{Communication}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-6897-1},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{krachenfelsAutomaticExtractionSecrets2021,
  title = {Automatic {{Extraction}} of {{Secrets}} from the {{Transistor Jungle}} Using {{Laser-Assisted Side-Channel Attacks}}},
  author = {Krachenfels, Thilo and Kiyan, Tuba and Tajik, Shahin and Seifert, Jean-Pierre},
  date = {2021-02-23},
  eprint = {2102.11656},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.11656},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The security of modern electronic devices relies on secret keys stored on secure hardware modules as the root-of-trust (RoT). Extracting those keys would break the security of the entire system. As shown before, sophisticated side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, using chip failure analysis (FA) techniques, can extract data from on-chip memory cells. However, since the chip’s layout is unknown to the adversary in practice, secret key localization and reverse engineering are onerous tasks. Consequently, hardware vendors commonly believe that the ever-growing physical complexity of the integrated circuit (IC) designs can be a natural barrier against potential adversaries. In this work, we present a novel approach that can extract the secret key without any knowledge of the IC’s layout, and independent from the employed memory technology as key storage. We automate the – traditionally very laborintensive – reverse engineering and data extraction process. To that end, we demonstrate that black-box measurements captured using laser-assisted SCA techniques from a training device with known key can be used to profile the device for a later key prediction on other victim devices with unknown keys. To showcase the potential of our approach, we target keys on three different hardware platforms, which are utilized as RoT in different products.},
  langid = {english},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}
}

@inproceedings{krachenfelsRealWorldSnapshotsVs2021,
  title = {Real-{{World Snapshots}} vs. {{Theory}}: {{Questioning}} the t-{{Probing Security Model}}},
  shorttitle = {Real-{{World Snapshots}} vs. {{Theory}}},
  booktitle = {2021 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  author = {Krachenfels, Thilo and Ganji, Fatemeh and Moradi, Amir and Tajik, Shahin and Seifert, Jean-Pierre},
  date = {2021-05},
  eprint = {2009.04263},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  pages = {1955--1971},
  doi = {10.1109/SP40001.2021.00029},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2009.04263},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Due to its sound theoretical basis and practical efficiency, masking has become the most prominent countermeasure to protect cryptographic implementations against physical sidechannel attacks (SCAs). The core idea of masking is to randomly split every sensitive intermediate variable during computation into at least t+1 shares, where t denotes the maximum number of shares that are allowed to be observed by an adversary without learning any sensitive information. In other words, it is assumed that the adversary is bounded either by the possessed number of probes (e.g., microprobe needles) or by the order of statistical analyses while conducting higher-order SCA attacks (e.g., differential power analysis). Such bounded models are employed to prove the SCA security of the corresponding implementations. Consequently, it is believed that given a sufficiently large number of shares, the vast majority of known SCA attacks are mitigated. In this work, we present a novel laser-assisted SCA technique, called Laser Logic State Imaging (LLSI), which offers an unlimited number of contactless probes, and therefore, violates the probing security model assumption. This technique enables us to take snapshots of hardware implementations, i.e., extract the logical state of all registers at any arbitrary clock cycle with a single measurement. To validate this, we mount our attack on masked AES hardware implementations and practically demonstrate the extraction of the full-length key in two different scenarios. First, we assume that the location of the registers (key and/or state) is known, and hence, their content can be directly read by a single snapshot. Second, we consider an implementation with unknown register locations, where we make use of multiple snapshots and a SAT solver to reveal the secrets.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}
}

@inproceedings{krachenfelsRealWorldSnapshotsVs2021a,
  title = {Real-{{World Snapshots}} vs. {{Theory}}: {{Questioning}} the t-{{Probing Security Model}}},
  shorttitle = {Real-{{World Snapshots}} vs. {{Theory}}},
  booktitle = {2021 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  author = {Krachenfels, Thilo and Ganji, Fatemeh and Moradi, Amir and Tajik, Shahin and Seifert, Jean-Pierre},
  date = {2021-05},
  eprint = {2009.04263},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  pages = {1955--1971},
  doi = {10.1109/SP40001.2021.00029},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2009.04263},
  urldate = {2024-01-08},
  abstract = {Due to its sound theoretical basis and practical efficiency, masking has become the most prominent countermeasure to protect cryptographic implementations against physical sidechannel attacks (SCAs). The core idea of masking is to randomly split every sensitive intermediate variable during computation into at least t+1 shares, where t denotes the maximum number of shares that are allowed to be observed by an adversary without learning any sensitive information. In other words, it is assumed that the adversary is bounded either by the possessed number of probes (e.g., microprobe needles) or by the order of statistical analyses while conducting higher-order SCA attacks (e.g., differential power analysis). Such bounded models are employed to prove the SCA security of the corresponding implementations. Consequently, it is believed that given a sufficiently large number of shares, the vast majority of known SCA attacks are mitigated. In this work, we present a novel laser-assisted SCA technique, called Laser Logic State Imaging (LLSI), which offers an unlimited number of contactless probes, and therefore, violates the probing security model assumption. This technique enables us to take snapshots of hardware implementations, i.e., extract the logical state of all registers at any arbitrary clock cycle with a single measurement. To validate this, we mount our attack on masked AES hardware implementations and practically demonstrate the extraction of the full-length key in two different scenarios. First, we assume that the location of the registers (key and/or state) is known, and hence, their content can be directly read by a single snapshot. Second, we consider an implementation with unknown register locations, where we make use of multiple snapshots and a SAT solver to reveal the secrets.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}
}

@article{krachenfelsTrojanAwakenerDetecting2023,
  title = {Trojan Awakener: Detecting Dormant Malicious Hardware Using Laser Logic State Imaging (Extended Version)},
  shorttitle = {Trojan Awakener},
  author = {Krachenfels, Thilo and Seifert, Jean-Pierre and Tajik, Shahin},
  date = {2023-11},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Cryptographic Engineering},
  shortjournal = {J Cryptogr Eng},
  volume = {13},
  number = {4},
  pages = {485--499},
  issn = {2190-8508, 2190-8516},
  doi = {10.1007/s13389-023-00323-3},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13389-023-00323-3},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Abstract             The threat of (HTs) and their detection is a widely studied field. While the effort for inserting a Trojan into an (ASIC) can be considered relatively high, especially when trusting the chip manufacturer, programmable hardware is vulnerable to Trojan insertion even after the product has been shipped or during usage. At the same time, detecting dormant HTs with small or zero-overhead triggers and payloads on these platforms is still a challenging task, as the Trojan might not get activated during the chip verification using logical testing or physical measurements. In this work, we present a novel Trojan detection approach based on a technique known from (IC) failure analysis, capable of detecting virtually all classes of dormant Trojans. Using (LLSI), we show how supply voltage modulations can awaken inactive Trojans, making them detectable using laser voltage imaging techniques. Therefore, our technique does not require triggering the Trojan. To support our claims, we present three case studies on 28~nm and 20~nm SRAM- and flash-based (FPGAs). We demonstrate how to detect with high confidence small changes in sequential and combinatorial logic as well as in the routing configuration of FPGAs in a non-invasive manner. Finally, we discuss the practical applicability of our approach on dormant analog Trojans in ASICs.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{kreft2012,
  title = {Cocoon-{{PUF}}, a Novel Mechatronic Secure Element Technology},
  author = {Kreft, Heinz and Adi, Wael},
  date = {2012},
  journaltitle = {2012 NASA/ESA Conference on Adaptive Hardware and Systems (AHS)},
  doi = {10.1109/ahs.2012.6268655}
}

@book{kropotkinWordsRebel2022,
  title = {Words of a {{Rebel}}},
  author = {Kropotkin, Peter},
  namea = {McKay, Iain and Reclus, Elisée},
  nameatype = {collaborator},
  date = {2022},
  publisher = {PM Press},
  location = {Oakland},
  abstract = {Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- Further Reading -- A Bibliographical Sketch -- A Note on the Text -- Preface -- Preface to the 1904 Italian Edition -- Preface to the 1919 Russian Edition -- Words of a Rebel -- I: The Situation -- II: The Breakdown of the State -- III: The Necessity of Revolution -- IV: The Next Revolution -- V: Political Rights -- VI: To the Young -- VII: War -- VIII: Revolutionary Minorities -- IX: Order -- X: The Commune -- XI: The Paris Commune -- XII: The Agrarian Question -- XIII: Representative Government -- XIV: Law and Authority -- XV: Revolutionary Government -- XVI: All Socialists! -- XVII: The Spirit of Revolt -- XVIII: Theory and Practice -- XIX: Expropriation -- Afterword to the 1919 Russian Edition -- Supplementary Material -- International Workers' Association: General Assembly of the Jura Federation -- The Anarchist Idea from the Point of View of Its Practical Realisation -- International Workers' Association: Jura Federation -- Enemies of the People -- The League and the Trade Unions -- The Workers' Movement in Spain -- Workers' Organisation -- Congress of the Jura Federation of the International Workers' Association -- Declaration of the Accused Anarchists before the Lyon Criminal Court -- The Lyon Trial -- A Letter to Georges Herzig -- Glossary -- Notes -- Index -- About the Authors},
  isbn = {978-1-62963-898-0},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {1}
}

@online{krusesicherheitssystemeDatenblattKRUSEFWSchlusseldepot2018,
  title = {Datenblatt {{KRUSE FW-Schlüsseldepot}} Basic},
  author = {{Kruse Sicherheitssysteme}},
  date = {2018-12},
  url = {https://kruse-shop.de/media/pdf/e3/c0/6c/MA-KRUSE-FW-Schluesseldepot-FSD-D-E_Rev1-3-20-12-18.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-10-30}
}

@inproceedings{kryjakFPGAImplementationCamera2012,
  title = {{{FPGA}} Implementation of Camera Tamper Detection in Real-Time},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2012 {{Conference}} on {{Design}} and {{Architectures}} for {{Signal}} and {{Image Processing}}},
  author = {Kryjak, Tomasz and Komorkiewicz, Mateusz and Gorgon, Marek},
  date = {2012-10},
  pages = {1--8},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6385386},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Video surveillance systems are becoming very common nowadays. Cameras installed in many places are exposed to sabotage or tampering. This can be done by covering the camera lens, changing the focus of the camera lens or changing the camera position to prevent proper registration of the surveilled area. This paper describes a hardware implementation of a system that can detect these kind of events. The algorithm is based on background modelling, histograms comparison, edges comparison and analysis of the image's average brightness. In was described in a hardware description language in a pipeline manner and implemented in an FPGA device. Real-time processing of a video stream with a resolution of 640×480@60 frames per second was achieved. Tests performed on several sequences demonstrated the usefulness of the presented solution.},
  eventtitle = {Proceedings of the 2012 {{Conference}} on {{Design}} and {{Architectures}} for {{Signal}} and {{Image Processing}}},
  keywords = {Analytical models,background generation,camera sabotage detection,camera tampering detection,Cameras,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,Histograms,Image edge detection,Mathematical model,real-time video processing}
}

@misc{kumarIBMZ16Performance2025,
  title = {{{IBM}} Z16 {{Performance}} of {{Cryptographic Operations}}: {{Cryptographic Hardware}}: {{CPACF}}, {{CEX8S}} with {{Quantum-Safe CRYSTALS}} Algorithms},
  author = {Kumar, Dinesh},
  date = {2025-03},
  url = {https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/cryptocards?topic=4770-performance},
  urldate = {2025-10-27},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {IBM}
}

@article{kvk2019,
  title = {Internet of Things Based Monitoring of Large Rotor Vibration with a Microelectromechanical Systems Accelerometer},
  author = {Koene, Ivar and Viitala, Raine and Kuosmanen, Petri},
  date = {2019},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Access},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Access},
  doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2927793}
}

@article{kwekChipbasedQuantumKey2021,
  title = {Chip-Based Quantum Key Distribution},
  author = {Kwek, Leong-Chuan and Cao, Lin and Luo, Wei and Wang, Yunxiang and Sun, Shihai and Wang, Xiangbin and Liu, Ai Qun},
  date = {2021-06-14},
  journaltitle = {AAPPS Bulletin},
  shortjournal = {AAPPS Bull.},
  volume = {31},
  number = {1},
  pages = {15},
  issn = {2309-4710},
  doi = {10.1007/s43673-021-00017-0},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s43673-021-00017-0},
  urldate = {2024-09-02},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution is a matured quantum science and technology. Over the last 20 years, there has been substantial research and development in this area. Recently, silicon technology has offered tremendous promise in the field for improved miniaturization of quantum key distribution through integrated photonic chips. We expect further progress in this area both in terms of protocols, photon sources, and photon detectors. This review captures some of the recent advances in this area.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{lamonacaBloodOxygenSaturation2015,
  title = {Blood Oxygen Saturation Measurement by Smartphone Camera},
  booktitle = {2015 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Medical Measurements}} and {{Applications}} ({{MeMeA}}) {{Proceedings}}},
  author = {Lamonaca, Francesco and Carnì, Domenico Luca and Grimaldi, Domenico and Nastro, Alfonso and Riccio, Maria and Spagnolo, Vitaliano},
  date = {2015-05},
  pages = {359--364},
  doi = {10.1109/MeMeA.2015.7145228},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7145228},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {This study investigates the usability of the smartphone camera for the evaluation of arterial blood oxygenation (SpO2\%). The advantage of this solution derives from the pervasiveness of the smartphone that makes available the evaluation of the SpO2\% everywhere. Differently from the pulse oximeter, which uses well-defined wavelength light, the smartphone uses Light Emitting Diodes as a light source to evaluate the SpO2\%. The change of the light intensity in the Red and Green colour channels in the video frames of the patient fingertip are properly processed. Two PPG signals are obtained at the wavelengths 600nm and 940nm, respectively. These two PPGs are used to evaluate the SpO2\% without calibration coefficients and independently of the smartphone hardware and skin characteristics. Experimental tests are performed to compare the proposed procedure with respect to a commercial pulse oximeter and gas chromatograph. The experimental tests assess the effectiveness of the proposal.},
  eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Medical Measurements}} and {{Applications}} ({{MeMeA}}) {{Proceedings}}},
  keywords = {Absorption,Bio-signal Processing,Biomedical measurement,Blood,Cameras,Light emitting diodes,Monitoring,Oxygen saturation measurement,Photoplethysmogram signal,Pulse measurements,Signal feature extraction}
}

@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018,
  title = {Continuous-{{Variable Quantum Key Distribution}} with {{Gaussian Modulation}} -- {{The Theory}} of {{Practical Implementations}}},
  author = {Laudenbach, Fabian and Pacher, Christoph and Fung, Chi-Hang Fred and Poppe, Andreas and Peev, Momtchil and Schrenk, Bernhard and Hentschel, Michael and Walther, Philip and Hübel, Hannes},
  date = {2018-08},
  journaltitle = {Advanced Quantum Technologies},
  shortjournal = {Adv Quantum Tech},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1},
  eprint = {1703.09278},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {quant-ph},
  pages = {1800011},
  issn = {2511-9044, 2511-9044},
  doi = {10.1002/qute.201800011},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09278},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Quantum Physics}
}

@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018a,
  title = {Continuous-{{Variable Quantum Key Distribution}} with {{Gaussian Modulation}} -- {{The Theory}} of {{Practical Implementations}}},
  author = {Laudenbach, Fabian and Pacher, Christoph and Fung, Chi-Hang Fred and Poppe, Andreas and Peev, Momtchil and Schrenk, Bernhard and Hentschel, Michael and Walther, Philip and Hübel, Hannes},
  date = {2018-08},
  journaltitle = {Advanced Quantum Technologies},
  shortjournal = {Adv Quantum Tech},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1},
  eprint = {1703.09278},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {quant-ph},
  pages = {1800011},
  issn = {2511-9044, 2511-9044},
  doi = {10.1002/qute.201800011},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09278},
  urldate = {2024-05-27},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Quantum Physics}
}

@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018b,
  title = {Continuous-{{Variable Quantum Key Distribution}} with {{Gaussian Modulation}} -- {{The Theory}} of {{Practical Implementations}}},
  author = {Laudenbach, Fabian and Pacher, Christoph and Fung, Chi-Hang Fred and Poppe, Andreas and Peev, Momtchil and Schrenk, Bernhard and Hentschel, Michael and Walther, Philip and Hübel, Hannes},
  date = {2018-08},
  journaltitle = {Advanced Quantum Technologies},
  shortjournal = {Adv Quantum Tech},
  volume = {1},
  number = {1},
  eprint = {1703.09278},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {quant-ph},
  pages = {1800011},
  issn = {2511-9044, 2511-9044},
  doi = {10.1002/qute.201800011},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09278},
  urldate = {2024-05-02},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Quantum Physics}
}

@incollection{launchburyApplicationScaleSecureMultiparty2014,
  title = {Application-{{Scale Secure Multiparty Computation}}},
  booktitle = {Programming {{Languages}} and {{Systems}}},
  author = {Launchbury, John and Archer, Dave and DuBuisson, Thomas and Mertens, Eric},
  editor = {Shao, Zhong},
  editora = {Hutchison, David and Kanade, Takeo and Kittler, Josef and Kleinberg, Jon M. and Mattern, Friedemann and Mitchell, John C. and Naor, Moni and Nierstrasz, Oscar and Pandu Rangan, C. and Steffen, Bernhard and Sudan, Madhu and Terzopoulos, Demetri and Tygar, Doug and Vardi, Moshe Y. and Weikum, Gerhard},
  editoratype = {redactor},
  date = {2014},
  volume = {8410},
  pages = {8--26},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-54833-8_2},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-54833-8_2},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Secure multiparty computation (MPC) permits a collection of parties to compute a collaborative result without any of the parties or compute servers gaining any knowledge about the inputs provided by other parties, except what can be determined from the output of the computation. In the form of MPC known as linear (or additive) sharing, computation proceeds on data that appears entirely random. Operations such as addition or logical-XOR can be performed purely locally, but operations such as multiplication or logical-AND require a network communication between the parties. Consequently, the computational overhead of MPC is large, and the cost is still measured in orders of magnitude slowdown with respect to computing in the clear. However, e ciency improvements over the last few years have shifted the potential applicability of MPC from just micro benchmarks to user-level applications.},
  isbn = {978-3-642-54832-1 978-3-642-54833-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{ledger2019,
  title = {Everybody Be Cool, This Is a Robbery!},
  author = {Bédrune, Jean-Baptiste and Campana, Gabriel},
  date = {2019},
  url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UX88bdHT54M},
  urldate = {2021-09-24},
  organization = {Black Hat USA}
}

@inproceedings{lee16psresolutionRandomEquivalent2003,
  title = {A 16ps-Resolution {{Random Equivalent Sampling}} Circuit for {{TDR}} Utilizing a {{Vernier}} Time Delay Generation},
  author = {Lee, Donghwan and Sung, Jinho and Park, Jaehong},
  date = {2003-10},
  volume = {2},
  pages = {1219-1223 Vol.2},
  issn = {1082-3654},
  doi = {10.1109/NSSMIC.2003.1351912},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1351912},
  urldate = {2025-03-11},
  abstract = {A Random Equivalent Sampling (RES) circuit that has 16ps sampling resolution has been developed for a high-resolution Time-Domain Reflectometer (TDR). The high-resolution TDR uses an expensive programmable delay chip or a complex Time-to-Digital Converter (TDC) circuit to capture the waveform with very fine time interval. The Vernier time delay generation technique using two crystal oscillators of slightly different frequency is proposed, which is simpler and more cost-effective and provides subpicosecond time resolution. One of the two clocks is used for the reference time to generate incident periodic pulses, and another clock is used for the sampling, The implemented RES circuit consists of the Vernier clock generator, the pulse generator and the control logic for pulse generation, interface and high-speed memory control. Using the ADC of relatively low sampling rate, the periodic pulse waveform is reconstructed with tens of GSPS high equivalent sampling rate by the repetitive sampling utilizing the incremental Vernier time delay. The performance of RES circuit is measured through the operation of TDR. The resolution of the RES circuit is 16.8ps equal to 59.5GSPS sampling rate, which means that the signal waveform in the 66.7\%VOP RG58C/U cable can be sampled by 1.6mm interval.},
  eventtitle = {2003 {{IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium}}},
  keywords = {Clocks,Delay effects,Frequency,Logic circuits,Oscillators,Propagation delay,Pulse circuits,Pulse generation,Sampling methods,Time domain analysis}
}

@patent{leekTamperDetection2021,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper {{Detection}}},
  author = {Leek, Alan Henry and Hall, Jace Hunter},
  holder = {{Texas Instruments Incorporated}},
  date = {2021-02-16},
  number = {10,925,154 B2},
  abstract = {In described examples, an enclosure for circuitry includes a platform , a charge source, a first capacitive plate, a second capacitive plate, and a capacitive sensor. The circuitry is fixedly coupled to the platform . The first capacitive plate is also fixedly coupled to the platform , and either alone, or together with the platform , surrounds a volume containing the circuitry and the charge source, the charge source electrically coupled to and configured to charge the first capacitive plate. The second capacitive plate is fixedly coupled to the platform without touching the first capacitive plate, and either alone, or together with the platform , sur rounds the first capacitive plate. The second capacitive plate is configured so that there is an electric potential difference between the first capacitive plate and the second capacitive plate. The capacitive sensor is electrically connected to the first capacitive plate and configured to determine when a capacitance between the first and second capacitive plates is changed .},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{leePrintedSpiralWinding2011,
  title = {Printed {{Spiral Winding Inductor With Wide Frequency Bandwidth}}},
  author = {Lee, Chi Kwan and Su, Y. P. and Ron Hui, S. Y.},
  date = {2011-10},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {26},
  number = {10},
  pages = {2936--2945},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2010.2076318},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5580123/?arnumber=5580123},
  urldate = {2024-10-30},
  abstract = {Winding parasitic capacitance is a major factor limiting the bandwidth of an inductor. In this paper, 1) the traditional, 2) the alternating, and 3) the partial alternating winding methods are evaluated for the multilayer printed spiral winding inductors for megahertz operations. The self-capacitances of various winding structures are estimated by the summation of parasitic capacitance among the turns of a winding. The electric field energy distributions in the inductors are derived from the voltage profiles to illustrate the relative magnitudes of winding parasitic capacitances. The results show that parasitic capacitance reduction can be achieved by reducing stored electric field energy. The partial alternating winding method is found to have the widest frequency bandwidth with reduced number of through-hole vias for multilayer printed spiral winding design. The theoretical analysis has been confirmed with practical measurements. The results provide useful information for the optimal design of coreless or core-based high-frequency planar magnetics.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Bandwidth,Electric fields,Inductors,Parasitic capacitance,Planar magnetic device,printed circuit board inductors,spiral winding,Spirals,Windings}
}

@article{leeSimpleWirelessPower2017,
  title = {A {{Simple Wireless Power Charging Antenna System}}: {{Evaluation}} of {{Ferrite Sheet}}},
  shorttitle = {A {{Simple Wireless Power Charging Antenna System}}},
  author = {Lee, Woncheol and Hong, Yang-Ki and Park, Jihoon and Lee, Jaejin and Baek, In-Seung and Hur, Nam-Pal and Seong, Won-Mo and Park, Seong-Ook},
  date = {2017-07},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Magnetics},
  volume = {53},
  number = {7},
  pages = {1--5},
  issn = {1941-0069},
  doi = {10.1109/TMAG.2017.2676099},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7867861/?arnumber=7867861},
  urldate = {2024-10-30},
  abstract = {We report a simple wireless power charging (WPC) antenna system (50 mm \textbackslash times40 mm \textbackslash times0.1 mm) for use in simulating power transfer efficiency ( \textbackslash eta ) with and without ferrite and a metallic object (battery case), thereby identifying suitable magnetic parameters and ferrite sheet thickness. The simulation results suggest that magnetic loss tangent (tan \textbackslash delta \textsubscript{\textbackslash mu } ) and permeability ( \textbackslash mu ' ) need to be less than 0.05 and higher than 125 at 13.56 MHz, respectively, to achieve at least 75\% of the transfer efficiency ( \textbackslash eta \_\textbackslash mathrm max ) of the WPC antenna without ferrite and the metallic object. Accordingly, we have fabricated NixZn0.85–xCu0.15Fe2O4 (x = 0.32 – 0.38) spinel ferrites using a one-step sintering process and obtained relatively high \textbackslash mu ' of 169 and low tan \textbackslash delta \textsubscript{\textbackslash mu } of 0.1 with a nickel (Ni) concentration of 0.38. This magnetic loss is still too high to achieve 75\% of the \textbackslash eta \_\textbackslash mathrm max value. In order to further reduce the magnetic loss, a two-step sintering process was used. The two-step sintered Ni0.38Zn0.47Cu0.15Fe2O4 shows \textbackslash mu ' of 132 and a tan \textbackslash delta \textsubscript{\textbackslash mu } of 0.03 at 13.56 MHz, respectively. Therefore, this ferrite meets criteria identified by the transfer efficiency simulation and is a good candidate for 13.56-MHz wireless power transfer charging antenna system. In addition, our designed WPC system is capable of evaluating other magnetic materials that are suitable for WPC antenna applications.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Magnetics}}},
  keywords = {Antennas,Ferrites,Magnetic losses,Magnetic noise,Ni–Zn–Cu ferrite,Nickel,Permeability,Powders,power transfer efficiency,wireless power charging (WPC) system}
}

@article{lellaSecurityQuantumKey2023,
  title = {On the {{Security}} of {{Quantum Key Distribution Networks}}},
  author = {Lella, Eufemia and Schmid, Giovanni},
  date = {2023-12},
  journaltitle = {Cryptography},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {53},
  publisher = {Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute},
  issn = {2410-387X},
  doi = {10.3390/cryptography7040053},
  url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2410-387X/7/4/53},
  urldate = {2024-05-22},
  abstract = {The main purpose of a quantum key distribution network is to provide secret keys to any users or applications requiring a high level of security, ideally such as to offer the best protection against any computational attack, even of a quantum nature. The keys shared through a point-to-point link between a source and a detector using a quantum key distribution protocol can be proven information-theoretically secure based on the quantum information theory. However, evaluating the security of a quantum key distribution network, especially if it is based on relay nodes, goes far beyond the quantum security of its single quantum links, involving aspects of conventional security for devices and their communication channels. In this contribution, we perform a rigorous threat analysis based on the most recent recommendations and practical network deployment security issues. We show that, at least in the current state of our understanding of quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution networks can only offer computational security and that their security in practical implementations in the shorter term requires resorting to post-quantum cryptography.},
  issue = {4},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {post-quantum cryptography,quantum key distribution,security controls,threat analysis,unconditional secrecy}
}

@article{leviGarbledCircuitsSCA2023,
  title = {Garbled {{Circuits}} from an {{SCA Perspective}}: {{Free XOR}} Can Be {{Quite Expensive}}. . .},
  shorttitle = {Garbled {{Circuits}} from an {{SCA Perspective}}},
  author = {Levi, Itamar and Hazay, Carmit},
  date = {2023-03-06},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  pages = {54--79},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i2.54-79},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/10277},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Garbling schemes, invented in the 80’s by Yao (FOCS’86), have been a versatile and fundamental tool in modern cryptography. A prominent application of garbled circuits is constant round secure two-party computation, which led to a long line of study of this object, where one of the most influential optimizations is Free-XOR (Kolesnikov and Schneider ICALP’08), introducing a global offset Δ for all garbled wire values where XOR gates are computed locally without garbling them. To date, garbling schemes were not studied per their side-channel attacks (SCA) security characteristics, even though SCA pose a significant security threat to cryptographic devices. In this research we, demonstrate that adversaries utilizing advanced SCA tools such as horizontal attacks, mixed with advanced hypothesis building and standard (vertical) SCA tools, can jeopardize garbling implementations.Our main observation is that garbling schemes utilizing a global secret Δ open a door to quite trivial side-channel attacks. We model our side-channel attacks on the garbler’s device and discuss the asymmetric setting where various computations are not performed on the evaluator side. This enables dangerous leakage extraction on the garbler and renders our attack impossible on the evaluator’s side.Theoretically, we first demonstrate on a simulated environment, that such attacks are quite devastating. Concretely, our attack is capable of extracting Δ when the circuit embeds only 8 input non-linear gates with fifth/first-order attack Success-Rates of 0.65/0.7. With as little as 3 such gates, our attack reduces the first-order Guessing Entropy of Δ from 128 to ∼ 48-bits. We further demonstrate our attack via an implementation and power measurements data over an STM 32-bit processor software implementing circuit garbling, and discuss their limitations and mitigation tactics on logical, protocol and implementation layers.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Free-XOR,Garbled Circuits,Horizontal Attacks,Secure Computation,Side-channel analysis,Single Trace}
}

@article{liLearningNormalityEnough,
  title = {Learning {{Normality}} Is {{Enough}}: {{A Software-based Mitigation}} against {{Inaudible Voice Attacks}}},
  author = {Li, Xinfeng and Ji, Xiaoyu and Yan, Chen and Li, Chaohao and Li, Yichen and Zhang, Zhenning and Xu, Wenyuan},
  abstract = {Inaudible voice attacks silently inject malicious voice commands into voice assistants to manipulate voice-controlled devices such as smart speakers. To alleviate such threats for both existing and future devices, this paper proposes NormDetect, a software-based mitigation that can be instantly applied to a wide range of devices without requiring any hardware modification. To overcome the challenge that the attack patterns vary between devices, we design a universal detection model that does not rely on audio features or samples derived from specific devices. Unlike existing studies’ supervised learning approach, we adopt unsupervised learning inspired by anomaly detection. Though the patterns of inaudible voice attacks are diverse, we find that benign audios share similar patterns in the time-frequency domain. Therefore, we can detect the attacks (the anomaly) by learning the patterns of benign audios (the normality). NormDetect maps spectrum features to a low-dimensional space, performs similarity queries, and replaces them with the standard feature embeddings for spectrum reconstruction. This results in a more significant reconstruction error for attacks than normality. Evaluation based on the 383,320 test samples we collected from 24 smart devices shows an average AUC of 99.48\% and EER of 2.23\%, suggesting the effectiveness of NormDetect in detecting inaudible voice attacks.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{lindellSecureMultipartyComputation,
  title = {Secure {{Multiparty Computation}} ({{MPC}})},
  author = {Lindell, Yehuda},
  abstract = {Protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) enable a set of parties to interact and compute a joint function of their private inputs while revealing nothing but the output. The potential applications for MPC are huge: privacy-preserving auctions, private DNA comparisons, private machine learning, threshold cryptography, and more. Due to this, MPC has been an intensive topic of research in academia ever since it was introduced in the 1980s by Yao for the two-party case (FOCS 1986), and by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson for the multiparty case (STOC 1987). Recently, MPC has become efficient enough to be used in practice, and has made the transition from an object of theoretical study to a technology being used in industry. In this article, we will review what MPC is, what problems it solves, and how it is being currently used.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{linINSPIRETorageRivate2022,
  title = {{{INSPIRE}}: In - s Torage p Rivate i Nformation Re Trieval via Protocol and Architecture Co-Design},
  shorttitle = {{{INSPIRE}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 49th {{Annual International Symposium}} on {{Computer Architecture}}},
  author = {Lin, Jilan and Liang, Ling and Qu, Zheng and Ahmad, Ishtiyaque and Liu, Liu and Tu, Fengbin and Gupta, Trinabh and Ding, Yufei and Xie, Yuan},
  date = {2022-06-18},
  pages = {102--115},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {New York New York},
  doi = {10.1145/3470496.3527433},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3470496.3527433},
  urldate = {2023-10-31},
  abstract = {Private Information Retrieval (PIR) plays a vital role in secure, database-centric applications. However, existing PIR protocols explore a massive working space containing hundreds of GiBs of query and database data. As a consequence, PIR performance is severely bounded by storage communication, making it far from practical for real-world deployment.},
  eventtitle = {{{ISCA}} '22: {{The}} 49th {{Annual International Symposium}} on {{Computer Architecture}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-8610-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{Lipp2018meltdown,
  title = {Meltdown: {{Reading}} Kernel Memory from User Space},
  author = {Lipp, Moritz and Schwarz, Michael and Gruss, Daniel and Prescher, Thomas and Haas, Werner and Fogh, Anders and Horn, Jann and Mangard, Stefan and Kocher, Paul and Genkin, Daniel and Yarom, Yuval and Hamburg, Mike},
  date = {2018},
  journaltitle = {Communications of the ACM},
  volume = {63},
  number = {6},
  pages = {46--56},
  doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3357033}
}

@online{litinskiHowCompute256bit2023,
  title = {How to Compute a 256-Bit Elliptic Curve Private Key with Only 50 Million {{Toffoli}} Gates},
  author = {Litinski, Daniel},
  date = {2023-06-14},
  eprint = {2306.08585},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {quant-ph},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.08585},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {We use Shor's algorithm for the computation of elliptic curve private keys as a case study for resource estimates in the silicon-photonics-inspired active-volume architecture. Here, a fault-tolerant surface-code quantum computer consists of modules with a logarithmic number of non-local inter-module connections, modifying the algorithmic cost function compared to 2D-local architectures. We find that the non-local connections reduce the cost per key by a factor of 300-700 depending on the operating regime. At 10\% threshold, assuming a 10-\$\textbackslash mu\$s code cycle and non-local connections, one key can be generated every 10 minutes using 6000 modules with 1152 physical qubits each. By contrast, a device with strict 2D-local connectivity requires more qubits and produces one key every 38 hours. We also find simple architecture-independent algorithmic modifications that reduce the Toffoli count per key by up to a factor of 5. These modifications involve reusing the stored state for multiple keys and spreading the cost of the modular division operation over multiple parallel instances of the algorithm.},
  langid = {english},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {Quantum Physics}
}

@misc{liuImprovedQuantumCircuits2023,
  title = {Improved {{Quantum Circuits}} for {{AES}}: {{Reducing}} the {{Depth}} and the {{Number}} of {{Qubits}}},
  author = {Liu, Qun and Preneel, Bart and Zhao, Zheng and Wang, Meiqin},
  date = {2023},
  url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1417},
  annotation = {Published: Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1417}
}

@article{liWirelessPowerTransfer2015,
  title = {Wireless {{Power Transfer}} for {{Electric Vehicle Applications}}},
  author = {Li, Siqi and Mi, Chunting Chris},
  date = {2015-03},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Journal of Emerging and Selected Topics in Power Electronics},
  volume = {3},
  number = {1},
  pages = {4--17},
  issn = {2168-6785},
  doi = {10.1109/JESTPE.2014.2319453},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6804648/?arnumber=6804648},
  urldate = {2024-11-08},
  abstract = {Wireless power transfer (WPT) using magnetic resonance is the technology which could set human free from the annoying wires. In fact, the WPT adopts the same basic theory which has already been developed for at least 30 years with the term inductive power transfer. WPT technology is developing rapidly in recent years. At kilowatts power level, the transfer distance increases from several millimeters to several hundred millimeters with a grid to load efficiency above 90\%. The advances make the WPT very attractive to the electric vehicle (EV) charging applications in both stationary and dynamic charging scenarios. This paper reviewed the technologies in the WPT area applicable to EV wireless charging. By introducing WPT in EVs, the obstacles of charging time, range, and cost can be easily mitigated. Battery technology is no longer relevant in the mass market penetration of EVs. It is hoped that researchers could be encouraged by the state-of-the-art achievements, and push forward the further development of WPT as well as the expansion of EV.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Journal}} of {{Emerging}} and {{Selected Topics}} in {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Batteries,Coils,Couplers,Couplings,Dynamic charging,electric vehicle (EV),Ferrites,inductive power transfer (IPT),Power electronics,safety guidelines,stationary charging,Wireless communication,wireless power transfer (WPT)}
}

@inproceedings{liWirelessPowerTransfer2021,
  title = {Wireless {{Power Transfer System}} for {{Long-term Sensor}} on {{Rotating Plane}}},
  booktitle = {2021 {{IEEE Industrial Electronics}} and {{Applications Conference}} ({{IEACon}})},
  author = {Li, Tao and Chen, Xiyou and Lang, Zhengying and Jin, Xin and Qi, Chen and Wang, Yijie},
  date = {2021-11},
  pages = {136--140},
  doi = {10.1109/IEACon51066.2021.9654747},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9654747/?arnumber=9654747},
  urldate = {2024-12-10},
  abstract = {This paper presents a wireless power transfer system (WPT) for long-term sensor rotating around an axis on a plane. The system is suitable for powering long-term sensor and does not need to replace the battery periodically. By designing a new type of magnetic coupler, the coupling coefficient between the receiving coil and the transmitting coil can be maintained in a certain range. On the transmitting side, six planar spiral coils are evenly distributed in a circular array, so that the magnetic field on the path of the sensor is always strong. On the receiving side, two planar spiral coils are partially overlapped. The magnetic field generated by the magnetic coupler is analyzed theoretically and simulated by finite element method. The experimental results verify that the WPT system can continuously supply power for 5W load during rotation.},
  eventtitle = {2021 {{IEEE Industrial Electronics}} and {{Applications Conference}} ({{IEACon}})},
  keywords = {Couplers,Finite element analysis,long-term sensor,magnetic coupler,Maintenance engineering,Power supplies,Rectifiers,rotation,Spirals,Wireless power transfer,wireless power transfer (WPT)}
}

@article{loMeasurementDeviceIndependentQuantumKey2012,
  title = {Measurement-{{Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution}}},
  author = {Lo, Hoi-Kwong and Curty, Marcos and Qi, Bing},
  date = {2012-03-30},
  journaltitle = {Physical Review Letters},
  shortjournal = {Phys. Rev. Lett.},
  volume = {108},
  number = {13},
  pages = {130503},
  issn = {0031-9007, 1079-7114},
  doi = {10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.130503},
  url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.130503},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{longEMEyeCharacterizing2024,
  title = {{{EM Eye}}: {{Characterizing Electromagnetic Side-channel Eavesdropping}} on {{Embedded Cameras}}},
  shorttitle = {{{EM Eye}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  author = {Long, Yan and Jiang, Qinhong and Yan, Chen and Alam, Tobias and Ji, Xiaoyu and Xu, Wenyuan and Fu, Kevin},
  date = {2024},
  publisher = {Internet Society},
  location = {San Diego, CA, USA},
  doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.24552},
  url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-552-paper.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {IoT devices and other embedded systems are increasingly equipped with cameras that can sense critical information in private spaces. The data security of these cameras, however, has hardly been scrutinized from the hardware design perspective. Our paper presents the first attempt to analyze the attack surface of physical-channel eavesdropping on embedded cameras. We characterize EM Eye—a vulnerability in the digital image data transmission interface that allows adversaries to reconstruct high-quality image streams from the cameras’ unintentional electromagnetic emissions, even from over 2 meters away in many cases. Our evaluations of 4 popular IoT camera development platforms and 12 commercial off-the-shelf devices with cameras show that EM Eye poses threats to a wide range of devices, from smartphones to dash cams and home security cameras. By exploiting this vulnerability, adversaries may be able to visually spy on private activities in an enclosed room from the other side of a wall. We provide root cause analysis and modeling that enable system defenders to identify and simulate mitigation against this vulnerability, such as improving embedded cameras’ data transmission protocols with minimum costs. We further discuss EM Eye’s relationship with known computer display eavesdropping attacks to reveal the gaps that need to be addressed to protect the data confidentiality of sensing systems.},
  eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{lopeFirstSelfresonantFrequency2021,
  title = {First Self‐resonant Frequency of Power Inductors Based on Approximated Corrected Stray Capacitances},
  author = {Lope, Ignacio and Carretero, Claudio and Acero, Jesus},
  date = {2021-02},
  journaltitle = {IET Power Electronics},
  shortjournal = {IET Power Electronics},
  volume = {14},
  number = {2},
  pages = {257--267},
  issn = {1755-4535, 1755-4543},
  doi = {10.1049/pel2.12030},
  url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1049/pel2.12030},
  urldate = {2024-09-10},
  abstract = {Inductive devices are extensively employed in power electronic systems due to their magnetic energy storage and power transfer capabilities. The current trend is towards increasing the frequency of operation in order to reduce the size of the magnetic components, but the main drawback is that the parasitic capacitance effect can become significant, and degrade the performance of the system. This work analyses the influence of this stray capacitance, and considers how to improve the performance of the device. In general, the impact of the stray capacitance on a magnetic component can be reduced by two methods: reducing the parasitic capacitance between turns of the winding or, alternatively, modifying the arrangement of the connection between turns. To evaluate the last option, an approximated expression of the first self-resonant frequency of the magnetic device is proposed. This gives a rapid assessment of the performance of different devices maintaining the overall equivalent inductance. The proposed expression accounts for the influence of the connection between turns in the bandwidth of the component. Finally, some numerical results are verified with planar coils manufactured on two-layer printed circuit boards.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{lopeFrequencyDependentResistancePlanar2014,
  title = {Frequency-{{Dependent Resistance}} of {{Planar Coils}} in {{Printed Circuit Board With Litz Structure}}},
  author = {Lope, Ignacio and Carretero, Claudio and Acero, Jesus and Alonso, Rafael and Burdio, Jose M.},
  date = {2014-12},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Magnetics},
  volume = {50},
  number = {12},
  pages = {1--9},
  issn = {1941-0069},
  doi = {10.1109/TMAG.2014.2337836},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6851880/?arnumber=6851880},
  urldate = {2024-10-04},
  abstract = {Printed circuit board (PCB) windings are convenient for many applications given their ease of manufacture, high repeatability, and low profile. In many cases, the use of multistranded litz wires is appropriate due to the rated power, frequency range, and efficiency constraints. This paper proposes a manufacturing technique and a semianalytical loss model for PCB windings using planar litz structure to obtain a similar ac loss reduction to that of conventional windings of round wires with litz structure. Different coil prototypes have been tested in several configurations to validate the proposal.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Magnetics}}},
  keywords = {Coils,Conductors,Electromagnetic analysis,frequency-dependent resistance,Magnetic devices,Media,passive components,printed circuit board (PCB) inductor,Resistance,Windings,Wires}
}

@article{lopez-villegasImprovementQualityFactor2000,
  title = {Improvement of the Quality Factor of {{RF}} Integrated Inductors by Layout Optimization},
  author = {Lopez-Villegas, J.M. and Samitier, J. and Cane, C. and Losantos, P. and Bausells, J.},
  date = {2000-01},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques},
  volume = {48},
  number = {1},
  pages = {76--83},
  issn = {1557-9670},
  doi = {10.1109/22.817474},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/817474/?arnumber=817474},
  urldate = {2024-11-08},
  abstract = {A systematic method to improve the quality (Q) factor of RF integrated inductors is presented in this paper. The proposed method is based on the layout optimization to minimize the series resistance of the inductor coil, taking into account both ohmic losses, due to conduction currents, and magnetically induced losses, due to eddy currents. The technique is particularly useful when applied to inductors in which the fabrication process includes integration substrate removal. However, it is also applicable to inductors on low-loss substrates. The method optimizes the width of the metal strip for each turn of the inductor coil, leading to a variable strip-width layout. The optimization procedure has been successfully applied to the design of square spiral inductors in a silicon-based multichip-module technology, complemented with silicon micromachining postprocessing. The obtained experimental results corroborate the validity of the proposed method. A Q factor of about 17 have been obtained for a 35-nH inductor at 1.5 GHz, with Q values higher than 40 predicted for a 20-nH inductor working at 3.5 GHz. The latter is up to a 60\% better than the best results for a single strip-width inductor working at the same frequency.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Microwave Theory}} and {{Techniques}}},
  keywords = {Coils,Design optimization,Eddy currents,Fabrication,Inductors,Magnetic losses,Optimization methods,Q factor,Radio frequency,Strips}
}

@article{loSecureQuantumKey2014,
  title = {Secure Quantum Key Distribution},
  author = {Lo, Hoi-Kwong and Curty, Marcos and Tamaki, Kiyoshi},
  date = {2014-08},
  journaltitle = {Nature Photonics},
  shortjournal = {Nature Photon},
  volume = {8},
  number = {8},
  pages = {595--604},
  issn = {1749-4885, 1749-4893},
  doi = {10.1038/nphoton.2014.149},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/nphoton.2014.149},
  urldate = {2024-05-15},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{lpkflaser&electronicsagLPKFLDSLaser2014,
  title = {{{LPKF LDS}}: {{Laser Direct Structuring}} for {{3D Molded Interconnect Devices}}},
  author = {{LPKF Laser \& Electronics AG}},
  date = {2014},
  url = {https://www.lpkf.com/fileadmin/mediafiles/user_upload/products/pdf/EQ/3D-MID-LDS/brochure_lpkf_laser_direct_structuring_en.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-11-07}
}

@article{lucamariniOvercomingRateDistance2018,
  title = {Overcoming the Rate–Distance Limit of Quantum Key Distribution without Quantum Repeaters},
  author = {Lucamarini, M. and Yuan, Z. L. and Dynes, J. F. and Shields, A. J.},
  date = {2018-05},
  journaltitle = {Nature},
  shortjournal = {Nature},
  volume = {557},
  number = {7705},
  pages = {400--403},
  issn = {0028-0836, 1476-4687},
  doi = {10.1038/s41586-018-0066-6},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0066-6},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{luCorrelatedRandomnessTeleportation2021,
  title = {Correlated {{Randomness Teleportation}} via {{Semi-trusted Hardware}}—{{Enabling Silent Multi-party Computation}}},
  booktitle = {Computer {{Security}} – {{ESORICS}} 2021},
  author = {Lu, Yibiao and Zhang, Bingsheng and Zhou, Hong-Sheng and Liu, Weiran and Zhang, Lei and Ren, Kui},
  editor = {Bertino, Elisa and Shulman, Haya and Waidner, Michael},
  date = {2021},
  volume = {12973},
  pages = {699--720},
  publisher = {Springer},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_34},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_34},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  abstract = {With the advancement of the trusted execution environment (TEE) technologies, hardware-supported secure computing becomes increasingly popular due to its efficiency. During the protocol execution, typically, the players need to contact a third-party server for remote attestation, ensuring the validity of the involved trusted hardware component, such as Intel SGX, as well as the integrity of the computation result. When the hardware manufacturer is not fully trusted, sensitive information may be leaked to the third-party server through backdoors, steganography, and kleptography, etc. In this work, we introduce a new security notion called semi-trusted hardware model, where the adversary is allowed to passively or maliciously corrupt the hardware. Therefore, she can learn the input of the hardware component and might also tamper its output. We then show how to utilize such semi-trusted hardwares for correlated randomness teleportation. When the semi-trusted hardware is instantiated by Intel SGX, to generate 10k random OT’s, our protocol is 24X and 450X faster than the EMP-IKNP-ROT in the LAN and WAN setting, respectively. When SGX is used to teleport Garbled circuits, the resulting two-party computation protocol is 5.3-5.7X and 43-47X faster than the EMP-SH2PC in the LAN and WAN setting, respectively, for the AES-128, SHA-256, and SHA-512 evaluation. We also show how to achieve malicious security with little overhead.},
  isbn = {978-3-030-88427-7 978-3-030-88428-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{LunaNetworkHSM,
  title = {Thales {{Luna Network HSM}} 7 {{Functionality Module Software Development Kit Guide}}},
  author = {{Thales Group}},
  date = {2025-11-26},
  url = {https://thalesdocs.com/gphsm/luna/7/docs/network/Content/PDF_Network/FM%20SDK%20Programming%20Guide.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-12-01},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{macphersonImprovementsSecurityEnclosures1993,
  type = {patenteu},
  title = {Improvements in Security Enclosures},
  author = {Macpherson, Hugh},
  holder = {{WL Gore and Associates UK Ltd}},
  date = {1993-05-05},
  number = {0540139A2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/EP0540139A2/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&oq=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&sort=old},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  abstract = {A security enclosure comprises a flexible sheet (60) of insulating material extending over the whole of the area of the enclosure and carrying lines (62, 64) of electrically - responsive material on each side. The lines on one side of the sheet (60) extend obliquely relative to the lines on the other side of the sheet and are connected thereto at edge portions of the sheet to form a plurality of conductors so divid - ing the sheet into a number of relatively small areas so that attempted opening of the enclosure changes an electrical characteristic of the conductors. Con - nectors (70) are provided at an edge portion of the sheet (60) for individually connecting the conductors to a detector (88) for detecting the changes in the electrical characteristic of the lines (62, 64). The connectors (70) include a switch arrangement which is selectively configured to connect further connec - tors (72) associated with the detector (88) with se - lected conductors. One edge portion of the sheet includes a plurality of line switches (66a - d) which are selectively configured to connect each one of the lines (62a - d) on one side of the sheet with a selected one of a plurality of lines (64a - d) on the other side of the sheet.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {conductors,edges,enclosure,lines,sheet}
}

@patent{macphersonTamperRespondentEnclosure1999,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Respondent Enclosure},
  author = {MacPherson, Hugh},
  holder = {{WL Gore and Associates Inc}},
  date = {1999-01-12},
  number = {5858500A},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US5858500A/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {delamination,enclosure,layer,respondent,sheet}
}

@article{mahmodSRAMHasNo2025,
  title = {{{SRAM Has No Chill}}: {{Exploiting Power Domain Separation}} to {{Steal On-Chip Secrets}}},
  shorttitle = {{{SRAM Has No Chill}}},
  author = {Mahmod, Jubayer and Hicks, Matthew},
  date = {2025-08},
  journaltitle = {Communications of the ACM},
  shortjournal = {Commun. ACM},
  volume = {68},
  number = {8},
  pages = {82--90},
  issn = {0001-0782, 1557-7317},
  doi = {10.1145/3725845},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3725845},
  urldate = {2025-07-29},
  abstract = {The widespread use of embedded systems has increased the risk of physical memory disclosure attacks. A notable example is the               cold boot               attack, where attackers exploit DRAM’s temperature-dependent data retention property. At low temperatures, DRAM cells temporarily retain their state after power loss, allowing sensitive data to be recovered. Cold boot attacks can expose system secrets, bypassing defenses like disk encryption. To counter this threat, developers store sensitive data in on-chip SRAM. Unlike DRAM, on-chip SRAM is isolated from external access and, due to its low capacitance, loses data almost immediately when powered off, making it robust against such attacks.                                         While SRAM protects against traditional cold boot attacks, we show that there is another way to retain information in on-chip SRAM across power cycles. This paper presents               Volt Boot               , an attack that demonstrates a vulnerability of on-chip SRAM due to the physical separation common in modern system-on-chip power distribution networks.               Volt Boot               leverages asymmetrical power states (for example, on vs. off) to force SRAM state retention across power cycles, eliminating the need for traditional cold boot attack enablers, such as low-temperature or intrinsic data retention time. Using three modern ARM Cortex-A SOCs, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack in caches, registers, and iRAMs. Unlike other forms of SRAM data retention attacks,               Volt Boot               retrieves data with               100\%               accuracy—without any complex post-processing.},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{mahungORWLPCMost2016,
  title = {{{ORWL PC}}: {{The}} Most Secure Home Computer Ever},
  shorttitle = {{{ORWL PC}}},
  author = {Mah Ung, Gordon},
  date = {2016-09-14},
  url = {https://www.pcworld.com/article/416372/orwl-pc-the-most-secure-home-computer-ever.html},
  urldate = {2025-09-03},
  abstract = {ORWL's secure PC is hardened against physical attacks, using technology you might find in a bank's ATM.},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {PCWorld}
}

@article{maierContributionSystemDesign2019,
  title = {Contribution to the {{System Design}} of {{Contactless Energy Transfer Systems}}},
  author = {Maier, David and Heinrich, Jörg and Zimmer, Marco and Maier, Marcel and Parspour, Nejila},
  date = {2019-01},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications},
  volume = {55},
  number = {1},
  pages = {316--326},
  issn = {1939-9367},
  doi = {10.1109/TIA.2018.2866247},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8440726/?arnumber=8440726},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {In this contribution, a design procedure that is applicable to many kinds of wireless or contactless energy transfer systems is proposed. The design procedure is limited to near field wireless energy transfer systems in resonant operation. For this purpose, the input impedance and voltage transfer function of different natural frequencies are calculated analytically, and moreover, the behavior of the system is described. Following three issues lead to a readily applicable design procedure. First, the knowledge of the transfer functions. Secondly, the knowledge of basic magnetic properties and lastly, the known influence of harmonics according to rectifier and inverter. This design procedure is demonstrated with two hardware setups.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industry Applications}}},
  keywords = {Capacitors,Equivalent circuits,Impedance,Inductive charging,inductive power transmission,Magnetic circuits,Magnetic separation,power conversion harmonics,Reactive power,resonant inverters transfer functions,Transfer functions}
}

@article{makarFormateAssayBody1975,
  title = {Formate Assay in Body Fluids: Application in Methanol Poisoning},
  shorttitle = {Formate Assay in Body Fluids},
  author = {Makar, A. B. and McMartin, K. E. and Palese, M. and Tephly, T. R.},
  date = {1975-06},
  journaltitle = {Biochemical Medicine},
  shortjournal = {Biochem Med},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  eprint = {1},
  eprinttype = {pubmed},
  pages = {117--126},
  issn = {0006-2944},
  doi = {10.1016/0006-2944(75)90147-7},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Aldehyde Oxidoreductases,Animals,Body Fluids,Carbon Dioxide,Formates,Haplorhini,Humans,Hydrogen-Ion Concentration,Kinetics,Methanol,Methods,Pseudomonas}
}

@online{MakeYourElectronics,
  title = {Make {{Your Electronics Tamper-Evident}}},
  url = {https://www.anarsec.guide/posts/tamper/},
  organization = {Make Your Electronics Tamper-Evident}
}

@online{marczakGraphiteCaughtFirst2025,
  title = {Graphite {{Caught}}: {{First Forensic Confirmation}} of {{Paragon}}’s {{iOS Mercenary Spyware Finds Journalists Targeted}}},
  shorttitle = {Graphite {{Caught}}},
  author = {Marczak, Bill and Scott-Railton, John},
  date = {2025-06-12T07:55:29-04:00},
  url = {https://citizenlab.ca/2025/06/first-forensic-confirmation-of-paragons-ios-mercenary-spyware-finds-journalists-targeted/},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {On April 29, 2025, a select group of iOS users were notified by Apple that they were targeted with advanced spyware. Among the group were two journalists who consented to the technical analysis of their cases. In this report, we discuss key findings from our forensic analyses of their devices.},
  organization = {Citizen Lab, University of Toronto},
  keywords = {Italy,Mercenary Spyware,Paragon Solutions}
}

@article{marhoeferApplicabilityQuantumCryptography,
  title = {Applicability of {{Quantum Cryptography}} for {{Securing Mobile Communication Networks}}},
  author = {Marhoefer, Michael and Wimberger, Ilse and Poppe, Andreas},
  abstract = {After 20 years of basic research, quantum cryptography has meanwhile led to first commercial products. Its progress has triggered high publicity and additional R\&D funding. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the status of quantum cryptography regarding its practical applicability for securing (mobile) communication networks. With that aim in mind, the paper presents a survey of the state-of-the-art, an analysis of its practical constraints and still open R\&D challenges, and some candidate applications for securing mobile communication networks. First industrial applications of quantum cryptography have become reality; more applications may soon reach practical maturity due to recent technological progress.},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{markantonakisSecureSmartEmbedded2014,
  title = {Secure Smart Embedded Devices, Platforms and Applications},
  author = {Markantonakis, Konstantinos and Mayes, Keith},
  date = {2014},
  publisher = {Springer},
  location = {New York, NY Heidelberg},
  isbn = {978-1-4614-7914-7 978-1-4614-7915-4},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {568}
}

@article{markettosActiveElectromagneticAttacks,
  title = {Active Electromagnetic Attacks on Secure Hardware},
  author = {Markettos, A Theodore},
  abstract = {The field of side-channel attacks on cryptographic hardware has been extensively studied. In many cases it is easier to derive the secret key from these attacks than to break the cryptography itself. One such sidechannel attack is the electromagnetic side-channel attack, giving rise to electromagnetic analysis (EMA).},
  langid = {english}
}

@misc{marlinspikeDoubleRatchetAlgorithm2025,
  title = {The {{Double Ratchet Algorithm}}},
  author = {Marlinspike, Moxie and Schmidt, Rolfe},
  editor = {Perrin, Trevor},
  date = {2025-11-04},
  url = {https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/doubleratchet.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{marlinspikeWeShouldAll2013,
  title = {We {{Should All Have Something To Hide}}},
  author = {Marlinspike, Moxie},
  date = {2013-06-12},
  url = {https://moxie.org/2013/06/12/we-should-all-have-something-to-hide.html},
  urldate = {2025-11-18},
  abstract = {Suddenly, it feels like 2000 again.  Back then, surveillance programs like Carnivore, Echelon, and Total Information Awarenesshelped spark a surge in electronic privacy awareness.  Now a decade later, the recent discovery of programs likePRISM, Boundless Informant, and FISA ordersare catalyzing r...},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {Blog of Moxie Marlinspike},
  annotation = {Archived: https://archive.is/upNKT}
}

@incollection{martinaOpenHSMOpenKey2007,
  title = {{{OpenHSM}}: {{An Open Key Life Cycle Protocol}} for {{Public Key Infrastructure}}’s {{Hardware Security Modules}}},
  shorttitle = {{{OpenHSM}}},
  booktitle = {Public {{Key Infrastructure}}},
  author = {Martina, Jean Everson and family=Souza, given=Tulio Cicero Salvaro, prefix=de, useprefix=true and Custodio, Ricardo Felipe},
  editor = {Lopez, Javier and Samarati, Pierangela and Ferrer, Josep L.},
  editora = {Hutchison, David and Kanade, Takeo and Kittler, Josef and Kleinberg, Jon M. and Mattern, Friedemann and Mitchell, John C. and Naor, Moni and Nierstrasz, Oscar and Pandu Rangan, C. and Steffen, Bernhard and Sudan, Madhu and Terzopoulos, Demetri and Tygar, Doug and Vardi, Moshe Y. and Weikum, Gerhard},
  editoratype = {redactor},
  date = {2007},
  volume = {4582},
  pages = {220--235},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-73408-6_16},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-540-73408-6_16},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  isbn = {978-3-540-73407-9 978-3-540-73408-6}
}

@inproceedings{martinMultiturnTwistedInductor2016,
  title = {A Multi-Turn Twisted Inductor for on-Chip Cross-Talk Reduction},
  booktitle = {2016 {{IEEE International Conference}} on the {{Science}} of {{Electrical Engineering}} ({{ICSEE}})},
  author = {Martin, Peter and Horn, Richard and Ben Atar, Kobi},
  date = {2016-11},
  pages = {1--5},
  doi = {10.1109/ICSEE.2016.7806138},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7806138/?arnumber=7806138},
  urldate = {2024-11-08},
  abstract = {A Fully symmetric multi-turn twisted inductor is presented for the suppression of on-chip interference in the transmit chain of a LTE transceiver chip implemented in TSMC 65nm CMOS process. The inductor is ultra-compact, symmetrical and presents up to ×3 inductance density as compared to a standard spiral inductor. Magnetic coupling reduction of more than 12dB was measured and EM simulation results validate the design procedure. A simple and accurate closed form expression for the inductance estimation is introduced for the first time in the context of planar twisted-inductors to simplify the design process.},
  eventtitle = {2016 {{IEEE International Conference}} on the {{Science}} of {{Electrical Engineering}} ({{ICSEE}})},
  keywords = {closed-form inductance expression,Couplings,crosstalk,Figure-8 inductor,Frequency conversion,Inductance,Inductors,Injection-Lock Divider,Q-factor,Resonant frequency,Standards,Twisted-Inductor}
}

@inproceedings{martinSealClubComputeraidedPaper2023,
  title = {{{SealClub}}: {{Computer-aided Paper Document Authentication}}},
  shorttitle = {{{SealClub}}},
  booktitle = {Annual {{Computer Security Applications Conference}}},
  author = {Martín, Ochoa and Hernán, Vanegas and Jorge, Toro-Pozo and David, Basin},
  date = {2023-12-04},
  pages = {163--177},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Austin TX USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3627106.3627176},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3627106.3627176},
  urldate = {2023-12-21},
  abstract = {Paper documents, where digital signatures are not directly applicable, are still widely utilized due to usability and legal reasons. We propose a novel approach to authenticating paper documents by taking short videos of them with smartphones. Our solution combines cryptographic and image comparison techniques to detect and highlight semantic-changing attacks on rich documents, containing text and graphics. We provide geometrical arguments for the security of our novel comparison algorithm, and prove that its combination with a cryptographic protocol is secure against strong adversaries capable of compromising different system components. We also measure its accuracy on a set of 128 videos of paper documents and a set of 960 synthetically generated warped documents, half containing subtle forgeries. Our algorithm finds all forgeries accurately with no false positives. The highlighted regions are large enough to be visible to users, but small enough to precisely locate forgeries.},
  eventtitle = {{{ACSAC}} '23: {{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference}}},
  isbn = {979-8-4007-0886-2},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{matsunoProtectionCircuitSemiconductor2008,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Protection Circuit for Semiconductor Device and Semiconductor Device Including the Same},
  author = {Matsuno, Noriaki},
  holder = {{Matsushita Electric Industrial Co Ltd}},
  date = {2008-03-18},
  number = {7345497B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US7345497B2/en?q=(tamper+monitoring+circuit)&oq=tamper+monitoring+circuit},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {protection circuit,semiconductor device,shielded,shielded line,signal}
}

@inproceedings{maurerAuthenticationAmplificationSynchronization2013,
  title = {Authentication Amplification by Synchronization},
  booktitle = {2013 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Information Theory}}},
  author = {Maurer, Ueli},
  date = {2013-07},
  pages = {2711--2714},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {Istanbul, Turkey},
  doi = {10.1109/ISIT.2013.6620719},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6620719/},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {Information-theoretic message authentication is traditionally defined as the task of authenticating a message, transmitted over an insecure channel, using a secret key shared between sender and receiver. Previous results have investigated the trade-offs between key size, message size, and the adversary’s cheating probability.},
  eventtitle = {2013 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Information Theory}} ({{ISIT}})},
  isbn = {978-1-4799-0446-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{maurerInformationTheoreticallySecureSecretKey1997,
  title = {Information-{{Theoretically Secure Secret-Key Agreement}} by {{NOT Authenticated Public Discussion}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} — {{EUROCRYPT}} ’97},
  author = {Maurer, Ueli},
  editor = {Fumy, Walter},
  editora = {Goos, Gerhard and Hartmanis, Juris and family=Leeuwen, given=Jan, prefix=van, useprefix=true},
  editoratype = {redactor},
  date = {1997},
  volume = {1233},
  pages = {209--225},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/3-540-69053-0_15},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/3-540-69053-0_15},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {All information-theoretically secure key agreement protocols (e.g. based on quantum cryptography or on noisy channels) described in the literature are secure only against passive adversaries in the sense that they assume the existence of an authenticated public channel. The goal of this paper is to investigate information-theoretic security even against active adversaries with complete control over the communication channel connecting the two parties who want to agree on a secret key. Several impossibility results are proved and some scenarios are characterized in which secret-key agreement secure against active adversaries is possible. In particular, when each of the parties, including the adversary, can observe a sequence of random variables that are correlated between the parties, the rate at which key agreement against active adversaries is possible is characterized completely: it is either 0 or equal to the rate achievable against passive adversaries, and the condition for distinguishing between the two cases is given.},
  isbn = {978-3-540-62975-7 978-3-540-69053-5},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{meeekerFiniteElementMethod2015,
  title = {Finite {{Element Method Magnetics}}. {{User}}'s {{Manual}}.},
  author = {Meeeker, David},
  date = {2015-10-25},
  pagetotal = {161}
}

@article{mehicNovelApproachQualityofService2020,
  title = {A {{Novel Approach}} to {{Quality-of-Service Provisioning}} in {{Trusted Relay Quantum Key Distribution Networks}}},
  author = {Mehic, Miralem and Fazio, Peppino and Rass, Stefan and Maurhart, Oliver and Peev, Momtchil and Poppe, Andreas and Rozhon, Jan and Niemiec, Marcin and Voznak, Miroslav},
  date = {2020-02},
  journaltitle = {IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking},
  shortjournal = {IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking},
  volume = {28},
  number = {1},
  pages = {168--181},
  issn = {1063-6692, 1558-2566},
  doi = {10.1109/TNET.2019.2956079},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8935373/},
  urldate = {2024-05-21}
}

@article{mehicQuantumKeyDistribution2021,
  title = {Quantum {{Key Distribution}}: {{A Networking Perspective}}},
  shorttitle = {Quantum {{Key Distribution}}},
  author = {Mehic, Miralem and Niemiec, Marcin and Rass, Stefan and Ma, Jiajun and Peev, Momtchil and Aguado, Alejandro and Martin, Vicente and Schauer, Stefan and Poppe, Andreas and Pacher, Christoph and Voznak, Miroslav},
  date = {2021-09-30},
  journaltitle = {ACM Computing Surveys},
  shortjournal = {ACM Comput. Surv.},
  volume = {53},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1--41},
  issn = {0360-0300, 1557-7341},
  doi = {10.1145/3402192},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3402192},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The convergence of quantum cryptography with applications used in everyday life is a topic drawing attention from the industrial and academic worlds. The development of quantum electronics has led to the practical achievement of quantum devices that are already available on the market and waiting for their first application on a broader scale. A major aspect of quantum cryptography is the methodology of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which is used to generate and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys between two geographically separate users using the principles of quantum physics. In previous years, several successful QKD networks have been created to test the implementation and interoperability of different practical solutions. This article surveys previously applied methods, showing techniques for deploying QKD networks and current challenges of QKD networking. Unlike studies focusing on optical channels and optical equipment, this survey focuses on the network aspect by considering network organization, routing and signaling protocols, simulation techniques, and a software-defined QKD networking approach.},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{meinkeTaschenbuchHochfrequenztechnik1956,
  title = {Taschenbuch Der {{Hochfrequenztechnik}}},
  author = {Meinke, H. and Gundlach, F. W.},
  date = {1956},
  publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
  keywords = {twisted-inductor}
}

@article{melaraCONIKSBringingKey,
  title = {{{CONIKS}}: {{Bringing Key Transparency}} to {{End Users}}},
  author = {Melara, Marcela S and Blankstein, Aaron and Bonneau, Joseph and Felten, Edward W and Freedman, Michael J},
  abstract = {We present CONIKS, an end-user key verification service capable of integration in end-to-end encrypted communication systems. CONIKS builds on transparency log proposals for web server certificates but solves several new challenges specific to key verification for end users. CONIKS obviates the need for global third-party monitors and enables users to efficiently monitor their own key bindings for consistency, downloading less than 20 kB per day to do so even for a provider with billions of users. CONIKS users and providers can collectively audit providers for non-equivocation, and this requires downloading a constant 2.5 kB per provider per day. Additionally, CONIKS preserves the level of privacy offered by today’s major communication services, hiding the list of usernames present and even allowing providers to conceal the total number of users in the system.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{mennChineseGovernmentHackers2024,
  entrysubtype = {newspaper},
  title = {Chinese Government Hackers Penetrate {{U}}.{{S}}. Internet Providers to Spy},
  author = {Menn, Joseph},
  date = {2024-08-27},
  journaltitle = {The Washington Post},
  url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/08/27/chinese-government-hackers-penetrate-us-internet-providers-spy/},
  urldate = {2025-05-15},
  abstract = {Beijing’s hacking effort has “dramatically stepped up from where it used to be,” says former top U.S cybersecurity official.},
  langid = {american}
}

@www{mgchemicals2017,
  title = {{{MG}} Chemicals Specialty Adhesives Catalog},
  author = {{MG Chemicals}},
  date = {2019},
  url = {https://www.mgchemicals.com/downloads/catalogs/Specialty%20Adhesives%20Catalogue%20Web.pdf},
  urldate = {2021-07-08}
}

@online{microsoftOverviewAzureCloud,
  title = {Overview of {{Azure Cloud HSM}}},
  author = {{Microsoft}},
  url = {https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-hsm/overview},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  abstract = {Learn how Azure Cloud HSM offers cryptographic key storage within the Azure environment as a dedicated HSM service.},
  langid = {american}
}

@online{mikeselectricstuffNeopostPostalFranking2023,
  title = {Neopost {{Postal Franking Machines}}},
  author = {{mikeselectricstuff}},
  date = {2023-10-03},
  url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eO7AoHI2Tpk},
  urldate = {2025-02-17},
  abstract = {A look at some machines for printing money... sort of! mikeselectricstuff merch : https://mikeselectricstuff.creator-sp...}
}

@inproceedings{mishraFaultsOurBus2024,
  title = {Faults in {{Our Bus}}: {{Novel Bus Fault Attack}} to {{Break ARM TrustZone}}},
  shorttitle = {Faults in {{Our Bus}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  author = {Mishra, Nimish and Chakraborty, Anirban and Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep},
  date = {2024},
  publisher = {Internet Society},
  location = {San Diego, CA, USA},
  doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.24499},
  url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-499-paper.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The ever-increasing growth of Internet-of-Things (IoT) has led to wide-scale deployment of high-frequency, highly complex Systems-on-a-Chip (SoCs), which are capable of running a full-fledged operating system (OS). The presence of OS and other software countermeasures make SoCs resilient against the traditional fault attacks that are relevant on FPGAs and microprocessors. In this work, we present the first practical implications of targeting an orthogonal aspect of SoC’s architecture: the system bus. We inject electromagnetic pulses onto the system bus during the execution of instructions involving processor-memory interaction. We show how address bus faults compromise software implementations of masked implementations of ciphers, illustrated using implementations of state-of-theart post-quantum cryptography (PQC) schemes, leaking entire secret keys with a single fault. We also demonstrate that data bus faults can be controlled and exploited to launch Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attacks on table-based implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Furthermore, we demonstrate that the impact of such bus faults can be farreaching and mislead the security guarantees of the popular and widely used ARM TrustZone. We use data-bus faults (along with loopholes in the GlobalPlatform API specification) to mislead the signature verification step to load a malicious Trusted Application (TA) inside the TrustZone. We follow this up with address bus faults to steal symmetric encryption keys of other benign TAs in the system, leading to complete breakdown of security on TrustZone. We note that since the attack relies upon loopholes in the GlobalPlatform API specification, it is portable to any TEE following this specification. To emphasize upon this portability of the attack, we demonstrate successful installation of malicious TAs on two TrustZone implementations (OP-TEE and MyTEE) on two different platforms (Raspberry Pi 3 and Raspberry Pi 4). Finally, we propose countermeasures that can be integrated into the SoC environment to defend against these attack vectors.},
  eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{ModulationRescueIdentifying,
  title = {Modulation to the {{Rescue}}: {{Identifying Sub-Circuitry}} in the {{Transistor Morass}} for {{Targeted Analysis}} | {{Proceedings}} of the 2023 {{Workshop}} on {{Attacks}} and {{Solutions}} in {{Hardware Security}}},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3605769.3623999},
  urldate = {2024-07-25}
}

@inproceedings{moghimiTPMFAILTPMMeets2020,
  title = {{{TPM-FAIL}}: {{TPM}} Meets {{Timing}} and {{Lattice Attacks}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 29th {{USENIX Security Symposium}}},
  author = {Moghimi, Daniel and Sunar, Berk and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Heninger, Nadia},
  date = {2020-08},
  pages = {2057--2073},
  publisher = {USENIX Association},
  url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/moghimi-tpm},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {Trusted Platform Module (TPM) serves as a hardwarebased root of trust that protects cryptographic keys from privileged system and physical adversaries. In this work, we perform a black-box timing analysis of TPM 2.0 devices deployed on commodity computers. Our analysis reveals that some of these devices feature secret-dependent execution times during signature generation based on elliptic curves. In particular, we discovered timing leakage on an Intel firmwarebased TPM as well as a hardware TPM. We show how this information allows an attacker to apply lattice techniques to recover 256-bit private keys for ECDSA and ECSchnorr signatures. On Intel fTPM, our key recovery succeeds after about 1,300 observations and in less than two minutes. Similarly, we extract the private ECDSA key from a hardware TPM manufactured by STMicroelectronics, which is certified at Common Criteria (CC) EAL 4+, after fewer than 40,000 observations. We further highlight the impact of these vulnerabilities by demonstrating a remote attack against a StrongSwan IPsec VPN that uses a TPM to generate the digital signatures for authentication. In this attack, the remote client recovers the server’s private authentication key by timing only 45,000 authentication handshakes via a network connection.},
  eventtitle = {{{USENIX Security Symposium}}},
  isbn = {978-1-939133-17-5},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{mohanSimpleAccurateExpressions1999,
  title = {Simple Accurate Expressions for Planar Spiral Inductances},
  author = {Mohan, S.S. and Del Mar Hershenson, M. and Boyd, S.P. and Lee, T.H.},
  date = {1999-10},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits},
  shortjournal = {IEEE J. Solid-State Circuits},
  volume = {34},
  number = {10},
  pages = {1419--1424},
  issn = {00189200},
  doi = {10.1109/4.792620},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/792620/},
  urldate = {2024-10-10},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{molexMolexSilverFlexible,
  title = {Molex {{Silver Flexible Circuit Solutions}}},
  author = {{Molex}},
  url = {https://my.avnet.com/wcm/connect/d5fa4b27-de81-4aac-9bcb-cff3844b9eb3/Silver-Flexible-Circuit-Solutions-Brochure-EN-Brochure.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=oMyo8ki},
  urldate = {2025-05-07}
}

@article{monfaredHardwareMovingTarget,
  title = {Hardware {{Moving Target Defenses}} against {{Post-Silicon Side-Channel Leakages}}},
  author = {Monfared, Saleh Khalaj and Mitard, Kyle and Forte, Domenic and Tajik, Shahin},
  abstract = {Pre-silicon tools for hardening hardware against side-channel and fault injection attacks have become popular recently. However, the security of the system is still threatened by sophisticated physical attacks, which exploit the physical layer characteristics of the computing system beyond the integrated circuits (ICs) and, therefore, bypass the conventional countermeasures. Further, environmental conditions for the hardware can also impact side-channel leakage and fault vulnerability in unexpected ways that are challenging to model in pre-silicon. Thus, attacks cannot be addressed solely by conventional countermeasures at higher layers of the compute stack due to the lack of awareness about the events occurring at the physical layer during runtime. In this paper, we first discuss why the current presilicon security and verification tools might fail to achieve security against physical threats in the post-silicon phase. Afterward, we provide insights from the fields of power/signal integrity (PI/SI), and failure analysis (FA) to understand the fundamental issue with the failed current practices. We argue that hardware-based moving target defenses (MTDs) to randomize the physical fabric’s characteristics of the system can mitigate such unaccounted postsilicon threats. We show the effectiveness of such an approach by presenting the results of two case studies in which we perform powerful attacks, such as impedance analysis and laser voltage probing. Finally, we review the overhead of our proposed approach and show that the imposed overhead by MTD solutions can be addressed by making them active only when a threat is detected.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{monfaredLeakyOhmSecretBits2023,
  title = {{{LeakyOhm}}: {{Secret Bits Extraction}} Using {{Impedance Analysis}}},
  shorttitle = {{{LeakyOhm}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2023 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Monfared, Saleh Khalaj and Mosavirik, Tahoura and Tajik, Shahin},
  date = {2023-11-21},
  series = {{{CCS}} '23},
  pages = {1675--1689},
  publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  location = {New York, NY, USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3576915.3623092},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623092},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a chip. Such data-dependent influence can be exploited by, for instance, power or electromagnetic analysis. In this work, we introduce a novel non-invasive physical side-channel attack, which exploits the data-dependent changes in the impedance of the chip. Our attack relies on the fact that the temporarily stored contents in registers alter the physical characteristics of the circuit, which results in changes in the die's impedance. To sense such impedance variations, we deploy a well-known RF/microwave method called scattering parameter analysis, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies into the system's power distribution network (PDN) and measure the echo of the signals. We demonstrate that according to the content bits and physical location of a register, the reflected signal is modulated differently at various frequency points enabling the simultaneous and independent probing of individual registers. Such side-channel leakage challenges the t-probing security model assumption used in masking, which is a prominent side-channel countermeasure. To validate our claims, we mount non-profiled and profiled impedance analysis attacks on hardware implementations of unprotected and high-order masked AES. We show that in the case of the profiled attack, only a single trace is required to recover the secret key. Finally, we discuss how a specific class of hiding countermeasures might be effective against impedance leakage.},
  isbn = {979-8-4007-0050-7}
}

@article{mooreApplicationsWirelessPower2019,
  title = {Applications of {{Wireless Power Transfer}} in {{Medicine}}: {{State-of-the-Art Reviews}}},
  shorttitle = {Applications of {{Wireless Power Transfer}} in {{Medicine}}},
  author = {Moore, Julian and Castellanos, Sharon and Xu, Sheng and Wood, Bradford and Ren, Hongliang and Tse, Zion Tsz Ho},
  date = {2019-01},
  journaltitle = {Annals of Biomedical Engineering},
  shortjournal = {Ann Biomed Eng},
  volume = {47},
  number = {1},
  pages = {22--38},
  issn = {0090-6964, 1573-9686},
  doi = {10.1007/s10439-018-02142-8},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10439-018-02142-8},
  urldate = {2024-11-08},
  abstract = {Magnetic resonance within the field of wireless power transfer has seen an increase in popularity over the past decades. This rise can be attributed to the technological advances of electronics and the increased efficiency of popular battery technologies. The same principles of electromagnetic theory can be applied to the medical field. Several medical devices intended for use inside the body use batteries and electrical circuits that could be powered wirelessly. Other medical devices limit the mobility or make patients uncomfortable while in use. The fundamental theory of electromagnetics can improve the field by solving some of these problems. This survey paper summarizes the recent uses and discoveries of wireless power in the medical field. A comprehensive search for papers was conducted using engineering search engines and included papers from related conferences. During the initial search, 247 papers were found then nonrelevant papers were eliminated to leave only suitable material. Seventeen relevant journal papers and/or conference papers were found, then separated into defined categories: Implants, Pumps, Ultrasound Imaging, and Gastrointestinal (GI) Endoscopy. The approach and methods for each paper were analyzed and compared yielding a comprehensive review of these state of the art technologies.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{morimotoSimultaneousMeasurementSpecific2006,
  title = {Simultaneous Measurement of Specific Heat, Thermal Conductivity, and Thermal Diffusivity of Modified Barium Titanate Ceramics},
  author = {Morimoto, Kohsuke and Sawai, Shinya and Hisano, Kumao and Yamamoto, Takashi},
  date = {2006-03},
  journaltitle = {Thermochimica Acta},
  shortjournal = {Thermochimica Acta},
  volume = {442},
  number = {1--2},
  pages = {14--17},
  issn = {00406031},
  doi = {10.1016/j.tca.2005.11.020},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0040603105005630},
  urldate = {2024-01-30},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{mosavirikBackMonICBackside2024,
  title = {{{BackMon}}: {{IC Backside Tamper Detection}} Using {{On-Chip Impedance Monitoring}}},
  shorttitle = {{{BackMon}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2024 {{Workshop}} on {{Attacks}} and {{Solutions}} in {{Hardware Security}}},
  author = {Mosavirik, Tahoura and Tajik, Shahin},
  date = {2024-11-19},
  pages = {68--77},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Salt Lake City UT USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3689939.3695784},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3689939.3695784},
  urldate = {2025-09-30},
  eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '24: {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {979-8-4007-1235-7},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{mosavirikImpedanceVerifOnChipImpedance2022,
  title = {{{ImpedanceVerif}}: {{On-Chip Impedance Sensing}} for {{System-Level Tampering Detection}}},
  shorttitle = {{{ImpedanceVerif}}},
  author = {Mosavirik, Tahoura and Schaumont, Patrick and Tajik, Shahin},
  date = {2022-11-29},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  shortjournal = {TCHES},
  pages = {301--325},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i1.301-325},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9954},
  urldate = {2024-07-10},
  abstract = {Physical attacks can compromise the security of cryptographic devices. Depending on the attack’s requirements, adversaries might need to (i) place probes in the proximity of the integrated circuits (ICs) package, (ii) create physical connections between their probes/wires and the system’s PCB, or (iii) physically tamper with the PCB’s components, chip’s package, or substitute the entire PCB to prepare the device for the attack. While tamper-proof enclosures prevent and detect physical access to the system, their high manufacturing cost and incompatibility with legacy systems make them unattractive for many low-cost scenarios. In this paper, inspired by methods known from the field of power integrity analysis, we demonstrate how the impedance characterization of the system’s power distribution network (PDN) using on-chip circuit-based network analyzers can detect various classes of tamper events. We explain how these embedded network analyzers, without any modifications to the system, can be deployed on FPGAs to extract the frequency response of the PDN. The analysis of these frequency responses reveals different classes of tamper events from board to chip level. To validate our claims, we run an embedded network analyzer on FPGAs of a family of commercial development kits and perform extensive measurements for various classes of PCB and IC package tampering required for conducting different side-channel or fault attacks. Using the Wasserstein Distance as a statistical metric, we further show that we can confidently detect tamper events. Our results, interestingly, show that even environment-level tampering activities, such as the proximity of contactless EM probes to the IC package or slightly polished IC package, can be detected using on-chip impedance sensing.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{mosavirikImpedanceVerifOnChipImpedance2023,
  title = {{{ImpedanceVerif}}: {{On-Chip Impedance Sensing}} for {{System-Level Tampering Detection}}},
  shorttitle = {{{ImpedanceVerif}}},
  author = {Mosavirik, Tahoura and Schaumont, Patrick and Tajik, Shahin},
  date = {2023},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  pages = {301--325},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i1.301-325},
  url = {https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9954},
  urldate = {2025-02-17},
  abstract = {Physical attacks can compromise the security of cryptographic devices. Depending on the attack’s requirements, adversaries might need to (i) place probes in the proximity of the integrated circuits (ICs) package, (ii) create physical connections between their probes/wires and the system’s PCB, or (iii) physically tamper with the PCB’s components, chip’s package, or substitute the entire PCB to prepare the device for the attack. While tamper-proof enclosures prevent and detect physical access to the system, their high manufacturing cost and incompatibility with legacy systems make them unattractive for many low-cost scenarios. In this paper, inspired by methods known from the field of power integrity analysis, we demonstrate how the impedance characterization of the system’s power distribution network (PDN) using on-chip circuit-based network analyzers can detect various classes of tamper events. We explain how these embedded network analyzers, without any modifications to the system, can be deployed on FPGAs to extract the frequency response of the PDN. The analysis of these frequency responses reveals different classes of tamper events from board to chip level. To validate our claims, we run an embedded network analyzer on FPGAs of a family of commercial development kits and perform extensive measurements for various classes of PCB and IC package tampering required for conducting different side-channel or fault attacks. Using the Wasserstein Distance as a statistical metric, we further show that we can confidently detect tamper events. Our results, interestingly, show that even environment-level tampering activities, such as the proximity of contactless EM probes to the IC package or slightly polished IC package, can be detected using on-chip impedance sensing.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Anti-Tamper,PCB Verification,Physical Attacks,Physical Layer Security,Power Distribution Network}
}

@article{mosavirikSiliconEchoesNonInvasive2023,
  title = {Silicon {{Echoes}}: {{Non-Invasive Trojan}} and {{Tamper Detection}} Using {{Frequency-Selective Impedance Analysis}}},
  shorttitle = {Silicon {{Echoes}}},
  author = {Mosavirik, Tahoura and Monfared, Saleh Khalaj and Safa, Maryam Saadat and Tajik, Shahin},
  date = {2023-08-31},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  volume = {2023},
  number = {4},
  pages = {238--261},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i4.238-261},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11165},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The threat of chip-level tampering and its detection has been widely researched. Hardware Trojan insertions are prominent examples of such tamper events. Altering the placement and routing of a design or removing a part of a circuit for side-channel leakage/fault sensitivity amplification are other instances of such attacks. While semi- and fully-invasive physical verification methods can confidently detect such stealthy tamper events, they are costly, time-consuming, and destructive. On the other hand, virtually all proposed non-invasive side-channel methods suffer from noise and, therefore, have low confidence. Moreover, they require activating the tampered part of the circuit (e.g., the Trojan trigger) to compare and detect the modifications. In this work, we introduce a non-invasive post-silicon tamper detection technique applicable to different classes of tamper events at the chip level without requiring the activation of the malicious circuit. Our method relies on the fact that physical modifications (regardless of their physical, activation, or action characteristics) alter the impedance of the chip. Hence, characterizing the impedance can lead to the detection of the tamper events. To sense the changes in the impedance, we deploy known RF tools, namely, scattering parameters, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies to the power distribution network (PDN) of the system and measure the “echo” of the signal. The reflected signals in various frequency bands reveal different tamper events based on their impact size on the die. To validate our claims, we performed measurements on several proof-ofconcept tampered hardware implementations realized on FPGAs manufactured with a 28 nm technology. We further show that deploying the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance can distinguish between tamper events and noise resulting from manufacturing process variation of different chips/boards. Based on the acquired results, we demonstrate that stealthy hardware Trojans, as well as sophisticated modifications of P\&R, can be detected.},
  issue = {4},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Backscattered Side-channel,Hardware Trojans,Impedance Characterization,Physical Layer Security,sampling-mesh,Scattering Parameters,Tamper Detection}
}

@article{mouEnergyEfficientAdaptiveDesign2017,
  title = {Energy-{{Efficient}} and {{Adaptive Design}} for {{Wireless Power Transfer}} in {{Electric Vehicles}}},
  author = {Mou, Xiaolin and Groling, Oliver and Sun, Hongjian},
  date = {2017-09},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics},
  volume = {64},
  number = {9},
  pages = {7250--7260},
  issn = {1557-9948},
  doi = {10.1109/TIE.2017.2686299},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7885065/?arnumber=7885065},
  urldate = {2024-11-08},
  abstract = {Wireless power transfer (WPT) could revolutionize global transportation and accelerate growth in the electric vehicle (EV) market, offering an attractive alternative to cabled charging. Coil misalignment is inevitable due to driver parking behavior and has a detrimental effect on power transfer efficiency (PTE). This paper proposes a novel coil design and adaptive hardware to improve PTE in magnetic resonant coupling WPT and mitigate coil misalignment, a crucial roadblock in the acceptance of WPT for EVs. The new design was verified using ADS, providing a good match to theoretical analysis. Custom designed receiver and transmitter circuitry was used to simulate vehicle and parking bay conditions and obtain PTE data in a small-scale setup. Experimental results showed that PTE can be improved by 30\% at the array's center, and an impressive 90\% when misaligned by three-fourths of the array's radius. The proposed novel coil array achieves overall higher PTE compared to the benchmark single coil design.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industrial Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Adaptive hardware,coil design,Couplings,electric vehicle (EV),Hardware,Inductive charging,Magnetic resonance,magnetic resonant coupling (MRC),misalignment,power transfer efficiency (PTE),Receivers,Transmitters,Windings,wireless power transfer (WPT)}
}

@inproceedings{mouWirelessPowerTransfer2015,
  title = {Wireless {{Power Transfer}}: {{Survey}} and {{Roadmap}}},
  shorttitle = {Wireless {{Power Transfer}}},
  booktitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 81st {{Vehicular Technology Conference}} ({{VTC Spring}})},
  author = {Mou, Xiaolin and Sun, Hongjian},
  date = {2015-05},
  pages = {1--5},
  issn = {1550-2252},
  doi = {10.1109/VTCSpring.2015.7146165},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7146165/?arnumber=7146165},
  urldate = {2024-11-07},
  abstract = {Wireless power transfer (WPT) technologies have been widely used in many areas, e.g., the charging of electric toothbrush, mobile phones, and electric vehicles. This paper introduces fundamental principles of three WPT technologies, i.e., inductive coupling-based WPT, magnetic resonant coupling-based WPT, and electromagnetic radiation-based WPT, together with discussions of their strengths and weaknesses. Main research themes are then presented, i.e., improving the transmission efficiency and distance, and designing multiple transmitters/receivers. The state-of-the-art techniques are reviewed and categorised. Several WPT applications are described. Open research challenges are then presented with a brief discussion of potential roadmap.},
  eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 81st {{Vehicular Technology Conference}} ({{VTC Spring}})},
  keywords = {Couplings,Magnetic resonance,Receivers,Transmitters,Wireless communication,Wireless sensor networks}
}

@inproceedings{muehlmannMutualCouplingModeling2012,
  title = {Mutual Coupling Modeling of {{NFC}} Antennas by Using Open-Source {{CAD}}/{{FEM}} Tools},
  booktitle = {2012 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{RFID-Technologies}} and {{Applications}} ({{RFID-TA}})},
  author = {Muehlmann, U. and Gebhart, M. and Wobak, M.},
  date = {2012-11},
  pages = {393--397},
  doi = {10.1109/RFID-TA.2012.6404553},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6404553},
  urldate = {2023-10-31},
  abstract = {Near Field Communication (NFC) antennas are not comparable to standard communication antennas used for traditional transmission services. The geometries are complex, narrow conductor cross-sections and long loops located close to materials sensitive to electromagnetic interaction, when integrated, make the application of analytical coupling formulations inapplicable, even when it comes down to non-linear relations forced by ferrite shielding. Commercial finite element (FEM) solvers are powerful, but they do not serve the needs of NFC applications due to complexity, inadequateness and code obscuration. An intensive open source code investigation has identified one alternative solver which is capable to deal with all NFC RFID related coupling effects one can imagine. Automated scripts, the tool-chain, and geometry macros have been developed for rapid prototyping of such. Amongst other open source tools listed, the ElmerFEM solver is the most promising solver for linear and non-linear quasi-static electro-magnetic (EM) NFC problems. The solver has a powerful interface and delivers results close to reality even when computational complexity is a trade of physical resolution and memory capacity of standard commercial workstations.},
  eventtitle = {2012 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{RFID-Technologies}} and {{Applications}} ({{RFID-TA}})}
}

@article{mullenEffectMisalignmentInductive,
  title = {Effect of {{Misalignment}} of {{Inductive Wireless Power Transfer Coils}}},
  author = {Mullen, Christopher and Lee, Soobum},
  abstract = {As inductive wireless power transfer becomes ubiquitous for charging phones and other portable electronics, consumers are less worried about efficiency and more concerned with high charging rates. For a Soldier in the field, less efficiency means they must carry more batteries or fuel, or forgo wireless charging altogether. To determine changes in wireless power transfer efficiency with respect to inductor misalignment, this research develops the equations used to calculate inductance, mutual inductance, and coupling coefficient depending on inductor geometry and distance. The results show that despite inductive coils that are not well coupled, there are strategies to maintain the same power transfer efficiency as perfectly coupled coils.},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016,
  title = {Wiring the {{World}}: {{The Social}} and {{Cultural Creation}} of {{Global Telegraph Networks}}},
  shorttitle = {Wiring the {{World}}},
  author = {Müller, Simone},
  date = {2016-04-12},
  publisher = {Columbia University Press},
  doi = {10.7312/mlle17432},
  url = {https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7312/mlle17432/html},
  urldate = {2024-07-26},
  abstract = {Wiring the World is a cultural and social history that explores how the large Anglo-American cable companies won out over alternative visions. Through telegram prices, visions for world peace, scientific innovation, and the role of the nation-state, Simone M. Müller traces globalization's diverse paths and close ties to business and politics.},
  isbn = {978-0-231-54026-1},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{mumbyDielectricPropertiesFR41989,
  title = {Dielectric Properties of {{FR-4}} Laminates as a Function of Thickness and the Electrical Frequency of the Measurement},
  author = {Mumby, Stephen J. and Yuan, Jih},
  date = {1989-03},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Electronic Materials},
  shortjournal = {J. Electron. Mater.},
  volume = {18},
  number = {2},
  pages = {287--292},
  issn = {0361-5235, 1543-186X},
  doi = {10.1007/BF02657420},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02657420},
  urldate = {2024-10-30},
  abstract = {The relationship between the dielectric properties (dielectric constant, e\textasciitilde am,and loss factor, e\textasciitilde m) and thickness of FR-4 laminates was investigated. Thickness variations for laminates reinforced by the same style and number of plies of glass cloth were predominantly due to differences in the resin content. At each measurement frequency, values of both el"mand e]'m were found to vary in an approximate linear manner with changes in the volume fraction of resin, Vr\textasciitilde n. An empirical equation was derived that gives the dielectric constant of an FR-4 laminate, el'm, as a function of the volume fraction of resin, Vr\textasciitilde n, and the frequency at which the measurement was performed (between 1 kHz and 1 GHz). An alternative expression was also determined that permits the calculation of e\textasciitilde. in the same frequency range from just the dielectric thickness of the laminate, providing the effective thickness of the reinforcement is known. The effective thickness of one style of glass cloth (2116) was experimentally determined to be 1.6 mils/ply. Effective thicknesses of most other common woven glass reinforcements used in FR-4 laminates were calculated and tabulated. The empirical relationships should be a valuable aid to electrical designers and others who need to know the frequency dependence of the dielectric properties of FR-4 laminates having different glass-to-resin ratios.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{muraliContinuousAuthenticationUsing2023,
  title = {Continuous {{Authentication Using Human-Induced Electric Potential}}},
  booktitle = {Annual {{Computer Security Applications Conference}}},
  author = {Murali, Srinivasan and Jin, Wenqiang and Sivaraman, Vighnesh and Zhu, Huadi and Ji, Tianxi and Li, Pan and Li, Ming},
  date = {2023-12-04},
  pages = {409--423},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Austin TX USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3627106.3627124},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3627106.3627124},
  urldate = {2023-12-21},
  abstract = {Most terminal devices authenticate users only once at the time of initial login, leaving the terminal unprotected during an active session when the original user leaves it unattended. To address this issue, continuous authentication has been proposed by automatically locking the terminal after a period of inactivity. However, it does not fully eliminate the risk of unauthorized access before the session expires. Recent research has also investigated the feasibility of using physiological and behavioral patterns as biometrics. This study presents a novel two-factor continuous authentication that explores a new form of signal called human-induced electric potential captured by wearables in contact with the user’s body. By analyzing this signal, we can determine the time of user-terminal interactions and compare it with information recorded by the terminal’s OS. If the original user remains on the same terminal, the two-source readings would match. Additionally, the proposed scheme includes an extra layer of protection by extracting terminal’s physical fingerprints from the human-induced electric potential to defend against advanced mimicry attacks. To test the effectiveness of our design, a low-cost wearable prototype is developed. Through extensive experiments, it is found that the proposed scheme has a low error rate of 2.3\%, with minimal computational and energy requirements.},
  eventtitle = {{{ACSAC}} '23: {{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference}}},
  isbn = {979-8-4007-0886-2},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{murtazaPortableHardwareSecurity2022,
  title = {A Portable Hardware Security Module and Cryptographic Key Generator},
  author = {Murtaza, Malik Hamza and Tahir, Hasan and Tahir, Shahzaib and Alizai, Zahoor Ahmed and Riaz, Qaiser and Hussain, Mehdi},
  date = {2022-11-01},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Information Security and Applications},
  shortjournal = {Journal of Information Security and Applications},
  volume = {70},
  pages = {103332},
  issn = {2214-2126},
  doi = {10.1016/j.jisa.2022.103332},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212622001776},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  abstract = {It has been noted with concern that the ability of a password to keep an information system secure is diminishing. Increasingly sophisticated attack vectors and low memorability associated with complicated passwords are among the leading reasons limiting security provisioned by passwords. Cryptographic keys suffer from issues including lack of memorability, vulnerable storage mechanisms, key retrieval attacks, lockouts due to key loss and risk of using the same key for multiple services. This study proposes a novel Hardware Security Module (HSM) as a basis for the generation/ re-creation of cryptographic keys. The designed hardware module entirely eliminates the stored cryptographic keys thus eliminating attacks against stored keys. The HSM derives the cryptographic key from sub-components behaving similar to multi-factor authentication, where each factor is an independent authenticator. The proposed scheme enhances security by incorporating physical security into digital security, i.e. as long as either the crypto provider device remains secure or the human component remains secure, the system security remains intact. The scheme proposes a strategy based on defense in depth to secure the HSM, its user, the related service from attacks ranging from simple shoulder surfing to sophisticated Man-in-the-Middle attacks. The proposed HSM is based on commodity hardware components thus having limited cost implications.},
  keywords = {Cryptography,Hardware security module,Key generator,Key-based authentication,Multi factor authentication,Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)}
}

@article{nabilIST2002507932ECRYPTEuropean,
  title = {{{IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT European Network}} of {{Excellence}} in {{Cryptology Network}} of {{Excellence Information Society Technologies D}}.{{VAM}}.5 {{Report}} on {{DPA}} and {{EMA}} Attacks on {{FPGAs}}},
  author = {Nabil, Mohamed},
  url = {https://www.academia.edu/38939774/IST_2002_507932_ECRYPT_European_Network_of_Excellence_in_Cryptology_Network_of_Excellence_Information_Society_Technologies_D_VAM_5_Report_on_DPA_and_EMA_attacks_on_FPGAs},
  urldate = {2025-03-13},
  abstract = {Project co-funded by the European Commission within the 6th Framework Programme Dissemination Level PU Public X PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission services) RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium}
}

@article{naddafMajorAIConference2025,
  title = {Major {{AI}} Conference Flooded with Peer Reviews Written Fully by {{AI}}},
  author = {Naddaf, Miryam},
  date = {2025-11-27},
  journaltitle = {Nature},
  publisher = {Nature Publishing Group},
  issn = {1476-4687},
  doi = {10.1038/d41586-025-03506-6},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-03506-6},
  urldate = {2025-12-04},
  abstract = {Controversy has erupted after 21\% of manuscript reviews for an international AI conference were found to be generated by artificial intelligence.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer science,Conferences and meetings,Peer review},
  annotation = {Bandiera\_abtest: a\\
Cg\_type: News\\
Subject\_term: Conferences and meetings, Computer science, Peer review}
}

@article{nassiLamphonePassiveSound,
  title = {Lamphone: {{Passive Sound Recovery}} from a {{Desk Lamp}}’s {{Light Bulb Vibrations}}},
  author = {Nassi, Ben and Pirutin, Yaron and Swissa, Raz and Shamir, Adi and Elovici, Yuval and Zadov, Boris},
  abstract = {In this paper, we introduce "Lamphone," an optical sidechannel attack used to recover sound from desk lamp light bulbs; such lamps are commonly used in home offices, which became a primary work setting during the COVID-19 pandemic. We show how fluctuations in the air pressure on the surface of a light bulb, which occur in response to sound and cause the bulb to vibrate very slightly (a millidegree vibration), can be exploited by eavesdroppers to recover speech passively, externally, and using equipment that provides no indication regarding its application. We analyze a light bulb’s response to sound via an electro-optical sensor and learn how to isolate the audio signal from the optical signal. We compare Lamphone to related methods presented in other studies and show that Lamphone can recover sound at high quality and lower volume levels that those methods. Finally, we show that eavesdroppers can apply Lamphone in order to recover speech at the sound level of a virtual meeting with fair intelligibility when the victim is sitting/working at a desk that contains a desk lamp with a light bulb from a distance of 35 meters.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{natureeditorsToolsSuchChatGPT2023,
  title = {Tools Such as {{ChatGPT}} Threaten Transparent Science; Here Are Our Ground Rules for Their Use},
  author = {{nature editors}},
  date = {2023-01-24},
  journaltitle = {Nature},
  volume = {613},
  number = {7945},
  pages = {612--612},
  publisher = {Nature Publishing Group},
  doi = {10.1038/d41586-023-00191-1},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-00191-1},
  urldate = {2025-12-04},
  abstract = {As researchers dive into the brave new world of advanced AI chatbots, publishers need to acknowledge their legitimate uses and lay down clear guidelines to avoid abuse.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Ethics,Machine learning,Publishing,Scientific community},
  annotation = {Bandiera\_abtest: a\\
Cg\_type: Editorial\\
Subject\_term: Ethics, Machine learning, Publishing, Scientific community}
}

@article{natureeditorsWhyNatureWill2023,
  title = {Why {{Nature}} Will Not Allow the Use of Generative {{AI}} in Images and Video},
  author = {{nature editors}},
  date = {2023-06-07},
  journaltitle = {Nature},
  volume = {618},
  number = {7964},
  pages = {214--214},
  publisher = {Nature Publishing Group},
  doi = {10.1038/d41586-023-01546-4},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-01546-4},
  urldate = {2025-12-04},
  abstract = {Saying ‘no’ to this kind of visual content is a question of research integrity, consent, privacy and intellectual-property protection.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Authorship,Education,Machine learning,Publishing},
  annotation = {Bandiera\_abtest: a\\
Cg\_type: Editorial\\
Subject\_term: Publishing, Machine learning, Authorship, Education}
}

@article{navasMTDWhereArt2021,
  title = {{{MTD}}, {{Where Art Thou}}? {{A Systematic Review}} of {{Moving Target Defense Techniques}} for {{IoT}}},
  shorttitle = {{{MTD}}, {{Where Art Thou}}?},
  author = {Navas, Renzo E. and Cuppens, Frederic and Boulahia Cuppens, Nora and Toutain, Laurent and Papadopoulos, Georgios Z.},
  date = {2021-05-15},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Internet of Things Journal},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Internet Things J.},
  volume = {8},
  number = {10},
  pages = {7818--7832},
  issn = {2327-4662, 2372-2541},
  doi = {10.1109/JIOT.2020.3040358},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9270287/},
  urldate = {2024-04-04}
}

@inproceedings{nazReviewVariousAttack2020,
  title = {A {{Review}} of {{Various Attack Methods}} on {{Air-Gapped Systems}}},
  booktitle = {2020 {{International Conference}} on {{Innovation}} and {{Intelligence}} for {{Informatics}}, {{Computing}} and {{Technologies}} ({{3ICT}})},
  author = {Naz, Mohammad Tazeem and Zeki, Ahmed M.},
  date = {2020-12},
  pages = {1--6},
  doi = {10.1109/3ICT51146.2020.9311995},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9311995},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {In the past air-gapped systems that are isolated from networks have been considered to be very secure. Yet there have been reports of such systems being breached. These breaches have shown to use unconventional means for communication also known as covert channels such as Acoustic, Electromagnetic, Magnetic, Electric, Optical, and Thermal to transfer data. In this paper, a review of various attack methods that can compromise an air-gapped system is presented along with a summary of how efficient and dangerous a particular method could be. The capabilities of each covert channel are listed to better understand the threat it poses and also some countermeasures to safeguard against such attack methods are mentioned. These attack methods have already been proven to work and awareness of such covert channels for data exfiltration is crucial in various industries.},
  eventtitle = {2020 {{International Conference}} on {{Innovation}} and {{Intelligence}} for {{Informatics}}, {{Computing}} and {{Technologies}} ({{3ICT}})},
  keywords = {Acoustics,air-gapped,attack methods,Cameras,covert channels,data leak,Electromagnetic radiation,exfiltrate,Fans,Magnetoacoustic effects,Malware,security breach,Universal Serial Bus}
}

@online{NECBuildNew,
  title = {{{NEC}} to Build New Trans-{{Pacific}} Cable},
  url = {https://www.nec.com/en/press/202207/global_20220721_01.html},
  urldate = {2024-09-03},
  abstract = {NEC Corporation (NEC; TSE: 6701) today announced that it has been contracted by Seren Juno Network Co., Ltd., a company established by NTT Ltd Japan Corporation, PC Landing Corp.},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {NEC}
}

@inproceedings{negreaSequentialSamplingTime2009,
  title = {Sequential Sampling Time Domain Reflectometer},
  author = {Negrea, Catalin and Rangu, Marius},
  date = {2009-09},
  pages = {367--371},
  doi = {10.1109/SIITME.2009.5407341},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5407341/?arnumber=5407341},
  urldate = {2025-03-11},
  abstract = {Time domain reflectometry (TDR) is a well-known technique used to detect and characterize impedance discontinuities in transmission lines. Usually the application of this technique employs the usage of a step generator to drive one end of the transmission line and a high speed oscilloscope to visualize the signal reflected at various impedance discontinuities points. This paper presents the design and implementation of an USB-based time domain reflectometer which integrates the functions of both equipments and is intended to be a low cost solution for time domain reflectometry. The acquisition technique used is sequential sampling based on integrated delay lines, giving a time step of 250 [ps] at a total acquisition time of about 2.6 [us]. Sequential sampling is successfully used for high speed sampling oscilloscopes and can be implemented using commercially available components. Unlike similar implementations of the method, our proposal uses internal delay calibration to eliminate the ghost effect which limits the minimum measurable cable length. Also, by comparison with random sampling TDRs, our approach allows an improved control over the acquisition parameters.},
  eventtitle = {2009 15th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} of {{Electronics Packages}} ({{SIITME}})},
  keywords = {Cost function,Drives,Impedance,Oscilloscopes,Reflectometry,Sampling methods,Signal generators,Transmission line discontinuities,Transmission lines,Visualization}
}

@online{nelsonLittleHelpMy2022,
  title = {With a {{Little Help}} from {{My Friends}}: {{Transport Deniability}} for {{Instant Messaging}}},
  shorttitle = {With a {{Little Help}} from {{My Friends}}},
  author = {Nelson, Boel and Askarov, Aslan},
  date = {2022-02-04},
  eprint = {2202.02043},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.02043},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Traffic analysis for instant messaging (IM) applications continues to pose an important privacy challenge. In particular, transport-level data can leak unintentional information about IM – such as who communicates with whom. Existing tools for metadata privacy have adoption obstacles, including the risks of being scrutinized for having a particular app installed, and performance overheads incompatible with mobile devices. We posit that resilience to traffic analysis must be directly supported by major IM services themselves, and must be done in a low-cost manner without breaking existing features. As a first step in this direction, we propose a hybrid messaging model that combines regular and deniable messages. We present a novel protocol for deniable instant messaging, which we call DenIM. DenIM is built on the principle that deniable messages can be made indistinguishable from regular messages with a little help from a user’s friends. Deniable messages’ network traffic can then be explained by a plausible cover story. DenIM achieves overhead proportional to the messages sent, as opposed to scaling with time or number of users. To show the effectiveness of DenIM, we implement a trace simulator, and show that DenIM’s deniability guarantees hold against strong adversaries such as internet service providers.},
  langid = {english},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}
}

@mvbook{nesperHandbuchDrahtlosenTelegraphie1921,
  title = {Handbuch Der {{Drahtlosen Telegraphie}} Und {{Telphonie}}},
  author = {Nesper, Eugen},
  date = {1921},
  volume = {2},
  publisher = {Julius Springer},
  volumes = {2},
  keywords = {twisted-inductors}
}

@article{neumannExperimentallyOptimizingQKD2021,
  title = {Experimentally Optimizing {{QKD}} Rates via Nonlocal Dispersion Compensation},
  author = {Neumann, Sebastian Philipp and Ribezzo, Domenico and Bohmann, Martin and Ursin, Rupert},
  date = {2021-04-01},
  journaltitle = {Quantum Science and Technology},
  shortjournal = {Quantum Sci. Technol.},
  volume = {6},
  number = {2},
  pages = {025017},
  issn = {2058-9565},
  doi = {10.1088/2058-9565/abe5ee},
  url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2058-9565/abe5ee},
  urldate = {2024-09-04},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables unconditionally secure communication guaranteed by the laws of physics. The last decades have seen tremendous efforts in making this technology feasible under real-life conditions, with implementations bridging ever longer distances and creating ever higher secure key rates. Readily deployed glass fiber connections are a natural choice for distributing the single photons necessary for QKD both in intra- and intercity links. Any fiber-based implementation however experiences chromatic dispersion which deteriorates temporal detection precision. This ultimately limits maximum distance and achievable key rate of such QKD systems. In this work, we address this limitation to both maximum distance and key rate and present an effective and easy-to-implement method to overcome chromatic dispersion effects. By exploiting entangled photons’ frequency correlations, we make use of nonlocal dispersion compensation to improve the photons’ temporal correlations. Our experiment is the first implementation utilizing the inherently quantum-mechanical effect of nonlocal dispersion compensation for QKD in this way. We experimentally show an increase in key rate from 6.1 to 228.3 bits/s over 6.46 km of telecom fiber. Our approach is extendable to arbitrary fiber lengths and dispersion values, resulting in substantially increased key rates and even enabling QKD in the first place where strong dispersion would otherwise frustrate key extraction at all.},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{NewCompanyBuilds,
  title = {New Company Builds and Operates a Trans-{{Pacific}} Submarine Cable System between the {{US}} and {{Japan}} | {{Press Release}} | {{NTT}}},
  url = {https://group.ntt/en/newsrelease/2022/07/12/220712a.html},
  urldate = {2024-09-03},
  abstract = {NTT Ltd Japan Corporation (},
  langid = {english}
}

@www{newman2020,
  title = {Apple's {{T2}} Security Chip Has an Unfixable Flaw},
  author = {Newman, Lily Hay},
  date = {2020-10-06},
  journaltitle = {WIRED},
  url = {https://www.wired.com/story/apple-t2-chip-unfixable-flaw-jailbreak-mac/}
}

@article{nguyenReviewComparisonSolid2020,
  title = {A {{Review}} and {{Comparison}} of {{Solid}}, {{Multi-Strands}} and {{Litz Style PCB Winding}}},
  author = {Nguyen, Minh Huy and Fortin Blanchette, Handy},
  date = {2020-08-16},
  journaltitle = {Electronics},
  shortjournal = {Electronics},
  volume = {9},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1324},
  issn = {2079-9292},
  doi = {10.3390/electronics9081324},
  url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/9/8/1324},
  urldate = {2024-10-30},
  abstract = {At high frequency, AC resistance of a printed circuit board (PCB) winding becomes important and accounts for a large proportion of planar transformer losses. The winding is then influenced by both skin and proximity phenomenon, which makes the current distribution uneven resulting in an increased resistance. The study of improving AC resistance of a PCB winding has been tackled by many researchers. However, the lack of an overview and comparison among improvements has made it difficult to apply those methods to a specific winding. To overcome the above limitations, this paper investigates the pros and cons of three popular AC resistance optimizing methods: optimizing track width of a solid PCB winding, using multi-strands and using Litz style PCB winding. To verify the theoretical analysis, a total of 12 PCBs are simulated by finite element (FEM) and tested in the laboratory. Five criteria are analyzed, including skin resistance, proximity resistance, AC to DC ratio, total AC resistance and complexity are taken into consideration. The results of this study show that optimizing track width method has a significant improvement on AC resistance while the use of Litz PCB is effective for applications that need stable AC resistance in a wide frequency range. The use of parallel strands winding should be carefully considered as there is not significant benefit in both reducing the AC resistance and AC to DC ratio.},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{nielsenNewApproachPractical2012,
  title = {A {{New Approach}} to {{Practical Active-Secure Two-Party Computation}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2012},
  author = {Nielsen, Jesper Buus and Nordholt, Peter Sebastian and Orlandi, Claudio and Burra, Sai Sheshank},
  editor = {Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh and Canetti, Ran},
  date = {2012},
  volume = {7417},
  pages = {681--700},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_40},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_40},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {We propose a new approach to practical two-party computation secure against an active adversary. All prior practical protocols were based on Yao’s garbled circuits. We use an OT-based approach and get efficiency via OT extension in the random oracle model. To get a practical protocol we introduce a number of novel techniques for relating the outputs and inputs of OTs in a larger construction.},
  isbn = {978-3-642-32008-8 978-3-642-32009-5},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{nikolopoulosOpticalSchemeCryptographic2019,
  title = {Optical Scheme for Cryptographic Commitments with Physical Unclonable Keys},
  author = {Nikolopoulos, Georgios M.},
  date = {2019-09-30},
  journaltitle = {Optics Express},
  shortjournal = {Opt. Express},
  volume = {27},
  number = {20},
  eprint = {1909.13094},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {physics, physics:quant-ph},
  pages = {29367},
  issn = {1094-4087},
  doi = {10.1364/OE.27.029367},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1909.13094},
  urldate = {2024-06-25},
  abstract = {We investigate the possibility of using multiple-scattering optical media, as resources of randomness in cryptographic tasks pertaining to commitments and auctions. The proposed commitment protocol exploits standard wavefront-shaping and heterodyne-detection techniques, and can be implemented with current technology. Its security is discussed in the framework of a tamper-resistant trusted setup.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,Physics - Applied Physics,Physics - Optics,Quantum Physics}
}

@article{nikolopoulosRemoteQuantumSafeAuthentication2021,
  title = {Remote {{Quantum-Safe Authentication}} of {{Entities}} with {{Physical Unclonable Functions}}},
  author = {Nikolopoulos, Georgios M.},
  date = {2021-07},
  journaltitle = {Photonics},
  volume = {8},
  number = {7},
  pages = {289},
  publisher = {Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute},
  issn = {2304-6732},
  doi = {10.3390/photonics8070289},
  url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2304-6732/8/7/289},
  urldate = {2024-06-25},
  abstract = {Physical unclonable functions have been shown to be a useful resource of randomness for implementing various cryptographic tasks including entity authentication. All the related entity authentication protocols that have been discussed in the literature so far, either they are vulnerable to an emulation attack, or they are limited to short distances. Hence, quantum-safe remote entity authentication over large distances remains an open question. In the first part of this work, we discuss the requirements that an entity authentication protocol has to offer, to be useful for remote entity authentication in practice. Subsequently, we propose a protocol, which can operate over large distances, and offers security against both classical and quantum adversaries. The proposed protocol relies on standard techniques, it is fully compatible with the infrastructure of existing and future photonic networks, and it can operate in parallel with other quantum protocols, including QKD protocols.},
  issue = {7},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {entity authentication,physical unclonable functions,quantum cryptography}
}

@online{nilgesCryptographicStrengthTamperProof2015,
  title = {The Cryptographic Strength of Tamper-Proof Hardware},
  author = {Nilges, Tobias},
  date = {2015},
  doi = {10.5445/IR/1000051809},
  url = {https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000051809},
  urldate = {2023-02-28},
  abstract = {Tamper-proof hardware has found its way into our everyday life in various forms, be it SIM cards, credit cards or passports. Usually, a cryptographic key is embedded in these hardware tokens that allows the execution of simple cryptographic operations, such as encryption or digital signing. The inherent security guarantees of tamper-proof hardware, however, allow more complex and diverse applications.},
  langid = {ngerman}
}

@misc{nisargaSystemLevelTamperProtection2016,
  title = {System-{{Level Tamper Protection Using MSP MCUs}}},
  author = {Nisarga, Bhargavi and Peeters, Eric},
  date = {2016},
  abstract = {Security in embedded systems is a topic that is gaining prominence as embedded systems and products are being deployed everywhere to be used in our everyday routines. Security concerns for embedded system developers and its users scales from adversaries having remote to physical access of the system. Increasing security for remote access includes incorporating secure data communication and secure software and firmware updates to the system; for example, leveraging industry-accepted cryptographic algorithms and secure communication protocols. This application report focuses on security concerns with adversaries having physical access to the system or product, understanding the need for system-level tamper protection, and how the security impact can be mitigated using system-level tamper detection and response functions.},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{niuLaserLogicState2014,
  title = {Laser {{Logic State Imaging}} ({{LLSI}})},
  author = {Niu, Baohua and Khoo, Ms and Chapman, Mr and Chen, Mr and Bockelman, Mr},
  date = {2014-11-10},
  volume = {2014},
  doi = {10.31399/asm.cp.istfa2014p0065},
  abstract = {Infrared Emission Microscopy based logic state imaging, since its introduction in early 2000, has been an indispensable tool and technology in the advanced process technology development and design debug applications. Continuous Laser (1064nm and 1319nm lasers) based Signal Imaging and Probing (CW-SIP) Technology, since its introductions about 4 years ago, has been widely used for scan debug and probing work extensively. We report a new technology-LLSI that combines the better resolution (50\% better) and high signal to noise (SnR) of the CW-SIP with the unique capabilities of the IREM based LSI to enable a unique technology that extend LSI to low voltage (}
}

@inproceedings{nomotoSplittingConductorsCoils2024,
  title = {Splitting {{Conductors}} of {{Coils}} on {{PCB}} for {{AC-resistance Reduction}}},
  booktitle = {2024 {{IEEE Applied Power Electronics Conference}} and {{Exposition}} ({{APEC}})},
  author = {Nomoto, Shunsaku and Shimura, Shinjiro and Kusaka, Keisuke and Takada, Takashi},
  date = {2024-02},
  pages = {3204--3209},
  issn = {2470-6647},
  doi = {10.1109/APEC48139.2024.10509283},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10509283/?arnumber=10509283},
  urldate = {2024-10-04},
  abstract = {Coils built on printed circuit boards (PCBs) have been widely used for transformers and inductors because they have the advantages of downsizing and consistency for mounting components on the PCBs. However, copper loss caused by the skin and proximity effect takes a large proportion of the total loss of the inductors at high-frequency regions. Thus, reducing copper loss is one of the significant issues for the inductors to reduce the power loss on the coils. This paper proposes a method to suppress copper loss (AC-resistance) due to the skin and proximity effect by splitting patterns of a coil and swapping them at the corner of the coil. The proposed structure for the coil is characterized as having no via, which results in an increase in cost and copper loss. The simulation results demonstrate that a 12-corner coil shape with a splitting pattern into three sections suppresses the resistance by 16.7\% compared to a spiral coil and improves the quality factor by 10.9\%. Practical experiments have revealed that the optimized 12-corner coil improves resistance by 24.6\% and the quality factor by 18.7\%.},
  eventtitle = {2024 {{IEEE Applied Power Electronics Conference}} and {{Exposition}} ({{APEC}})},
  keywords = {Coils,Printed circuit board (PCB),Printed circuits,Proximity effect,Q-factor,Resistance,Shape,Simulation,Skin effect,Spiral coil,Spirals}
}

@patent{nortonTamperDetectingCases2019,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Detecting Cases},
  author = {Norton, John},
  holder = {{Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP}},
  date = {2019-11-26},
  number = {10489614B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10489614B2/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {mating lid,opposing side,side walls,socket,storage unit}
}

@book{nottebrockSpulen1950,
  title = {Spulen},
  author = {Nottebrock, Heinrich},
  date = {1950},
  series = {Bauelemente Der {{Nachrichtentechnik}}},
  volume = {3},
  publisher = {Schiele \& Schön},
  keywords = {twisted-inductors}
}

@article{obermaier2018,
  title = {The Past, Present, and Future of Physical Security Enclosures: {{From}} Battery-Backed Monitoring to {{PUF-based}} Inherent Security and Beyond},
  author = {Obermaier, Johannes and Immler, Vincent},
  date = {2018},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Hardware and Systems Security},
  volume = {2},
  pages = {289--296},
  issn = {2509-3428},
  doi = {10.1007/s41635-018-0045-2}
}

@www{obermaier2019,
  title = {Physical Unclonable Functions: {{The}} Future Technology for Physical Security Enclosures?},
  author = {Obermaier, Johannes},
  date = {2019-08-24},
  doi = {10.5446/43265},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.5446/43265}
}

@article{obermaierBreakingRestoringEmbedded,
  title = {Breaking and {{Restoring Embedded System Security}} - {{From Practical Attacks}} to {{Novel PUF-Based Physical Security Enclosures}}},
  author = {Obermaier, Johannes}
}

@inproceedings{obermaierMeasurementSystemCapacitive2018,
  title = {A Measurement System for Capacitive {{PUF-based}} Security Enclosures},
  author = {Obermaier, Johannes and Immler, Vincent and Hiller, Matthias and Sigl, Georg},
  date = {2018-06-24},
  pages = {1--6},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {San Francisco California},
  doi = {10.1145/3195970.3195976},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3195970.3195976},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {Battery-backed security enclosures that are permanently monitored for penetration and tampering are common solutions for providing physical integrity to multi-chip embedded systems. This paper presents a well-tailored measurement system for a batteryless PUFbased capacitive enclosure. The key is derived from the PUF and encrypts the underlying system. We present a system concept for combined enclosure integrity verification and PUF evaluation. The system performs differential capacitive measurements inside the enclosure by applying stimulus signals with a 180◦ phase shift that isolate the local variation in the femtofarad range. The analog circuitry and corresponding digital signal processing chain perform precise PUF digitization, using a microcontroller-based digital lockin amplifier. The system’s measurement range is approximately ±73 fF, the conversion time per PUF node is less than 0.6 ms, and the raw data shows a measurement noise of 0.3 fF. This is the base for a high-entropy key generation while enabling a short system startup time. The system is scalable to the enclosure size and has been experimentally verified to extract information from 128 PUF nodes, using a system prototype. The results show that our concept forms a cornerstone of a novel batteryless PUF-based security enclosure.},
  eventtitle = {{{DAC}} '18: {{The}} 55th {{Annual Design Automation Conference}} 2018},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-5700-5},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{obermaierPUFfilmMethodProducing2023,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {{{PUF-film}} and Method for Producing the Same},
  author = {Obermaier, Johannes and Immler, Vincent and Hesselbarth, Robert},
  holder = {{Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Angewandten Forschung eV}},
  date = {2023-02-21},
  number = {11586780B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US11586780B2/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {circuit,conductive traces,film,layer,puf}
}

@online{oberthurcashprotectionIntroductionCashProtection2019,
  title = {Introduction to {{Cash Protection}}: {{Intelligent Banknote Neutralization Systems}}},
  author = {{Oberthur Cash Protection}},
  date = {2019},
  url = {https://www.oberthurcp.com/hubfs/Oberthur_December2020/Pdf/IBNS_Introduction_to_ink_staining_Oberthur_Cash_Protection_2019.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  annotation = {Archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20250822134238/https://www.oberthurcp.com/hubfs/Oberthur\_December2020/Pdf/IBNS\_Introduction\_to\_ink\_staining\_Oberthur\_Cash\_Protection\_2019.pdf}
}

@article{oflynnPhaseModulationSide,
  title = {Phase {{Modulation Side Channels}}: {{Jittery JTAG}} for {{On-Chip Voltage Measurements}}},
  author = {O’Flynn, Colin},
  abstract = {Measuring fluctuations of the clock phase was identified as a source of leakage in early electromagnetic side-channel investigations. Despite this, only recently was measuring the clock phase (or jitter) of digital signals (not electromagnetic signals) from a target used as a source of exploitable leakage. As the phase of a clock output will be related to signal propagation delay through the target, and this propagation delay is related to voltage, this means that most digital devices perform an unintended phase modulation (PM) of their internal voltage onto clock outputs.},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{ogaraHardwareEnabledMechanismsVerifying2025,
  title = {Hardware-{{Enabled Mechanisms}} for {{Verifying Responsible AI Development}}},
  author = {O'Gara, Aidan and Kulp, Gabriel and Hodgkins, Will and Petrie, James and Immler, Vincent and Aysu, Aydin and Basu, Kanad and Bhasin, Shivam and Picek, Stjepan and Srivastava, Ankur},
  date = {2025-04-02},
  eprint = {2505.03742},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2505.03742},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742},
  urldate = {2025-12-24},
  abstract = {Advancements in AI capabilities, driven in large part by scaling up computing resources used for AI training, have created opportunities to address major global challenges but also pose risks of misuse. Hardware-enabled mechanisms (HEMs) can support responsible AI development by enabling verifiable reporting of key properties of AI training activities such as quantity of compute used, training cluster configuration or location, as well as policy enforcement. Such tools can promote transparency and improve security, while addressing privacy and intellectual property concerns. Based on insights from an interdisciplinary workshop, we identify open questions regarding potential implementation approaches, emphasizing the need for further research to ensure robust, scalable solutions.},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}
}

@inproceedings{ohHeySiriAre2018,
  title = {Hey {{Siri}} – {{Are You There}}?: {{Jamming}} of {{Voice Commands Using}} the {{Resonance Effect}} ({{Work-in-Progress}})},
  shorttitle = {Hey {{Siri}} – {{Are You There}}?},
  booktitle = {2018 {{International Conference}} on {{Software Security}} and {{Assurance}} ({{ICSSA}})},
  author = {Oh, Taekkyung and Aiken, William and Kim, Hyoungshick},
  date = {2018-07},
  pages = {73--76},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {Seoul, Korea (South)},
  doi = {10.1109/ICSSA45270.2018.00026},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9092296/},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  eventtitle = {2018 {{International Conference}} on {{Software Security}} and {{Assurance}} ({{ICSSA}})},
  isbn = {978-1-5386-9210-3}
}

@inproceedings{ongaro2019,
  title = {In Search of an Understandable Consensus Algorithm},
  booktitle = {2014 {{USENIX}} Annual Technical Conference ({{USENIX ATC}} 14)},
  author = {Ongaro, Diego and Ousterhout, John},
  date = {2014-06},
  pages = {305--319},
  publisher = {USENIX Association},
  location = {Philadelphia, PA},
  url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc14/technical-sessions/presentation/ongaro},
  isbn = {978-1-931971-10-2}
}

@misc{OpticalBasedSmartStructures,
  title = {Optical-{{Based Smart Structures}} for {{Tamper-Indicating Applications}}}
}

@article{orlandiOptimizationShieldedPCB2011,
  title = {Optimization of {{Shielded PCB Air-Core Toroids}} for {{High-Efficiency DC}}–{{DC Converters}}},
  author = {Orlandi, Stefano and Allongue, Bruno Andre and Blanchot, Georges and Buso, Simone and Faccio, Federico and Fuentes, Cristian Alejandro and Kayal, Maher and Michelis, Stefano and Spiazzi, Giorgio},
  date = {2011-07},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Power Electron.},
  volume = {26},
  number = {7},
  pages = {1837--1846},
  issn = {0885-8993, 1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2010.2090902},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5621918/},
  urldate = {2024-10-25}
}

@online{orosaDataplantEnhancingSystem2019,
  title = {Dataplant: {{Enhancing System Security}} with {{Low-Cost In-DRAM Value Generation Primitives}}},
  shorttitle = {Dataplant},
  author = {Orosa, Lois and Wang, Yaohua and Puddu, Ivan and Sadrosadati, Mohammad and Razavi, Kaveh and Gómez-Luna, Juan and Hassan, Hasan and Mansouri-Ghiasi, Nika and Tavakkol, Arash and Patel, Minesh and Kim, Jeremie and Seshadri, Vivek and Kang, Uksong and Ghose, Saugata and Azevedo, Rodolfo and Mutlu, Onur},
  date = {2019-11-05},
  eprint = {1902.07344},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1902.07344},
  urldate = {2024-07-02},
  abstract = {DRAM manufacturers have been prioritizing memory capacity, yield, and bandwidth for years, while trying to keep the design complexity as simple as possible. DRAM chips do not carry out any computation or other important functions, such as security. Processors implement most of the existing security mechanisms that protect the system against security threats, because 1) executing security mechanisms usually require non-trivial computational capabilities (e.g., encryption), and 2) commodity DRAM chips are not designed to perform computations or tasks other than data storage. In this work, we advocate for DRAM as a key component for providing security mechanisms to the system. To this end, we propose Dataplant, a new class of low-cost, high-performance, and reliable security primitives that can be integrated in commodity DRAM chips with minimal changes. The main idea of Dataplant is to slightly modify the internal DRAM timing signals to expose the inherent process variation found in all DRAM chips for generating unpredictable but reproducible values (e.g., keys) within DRAM. We use Dataplant to build two new security mechanisms. First, a new Dataplant-based physical unclonable function (PUF) with non-destructive read-out, low evaluation latency, robust responses, resiliency to temperature changes, and data-independent responses. Second, a new cold boot attack prevention mechanism that automatically destroys all data within DRAM on every power cycle with zero run-time energy and latency overheads. Using a combination of detailed simulations and experiments with 136 real commodity DRAM chips, we show that our Dataplant-based PUF has 1.8x higher throughput than the best state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs. We also demonstrate that our Dataplant-based cold boot attack protection mechanism is 19.5x faster and consumes 2.54x less energy when compared to existing mechanisms.},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}
}

@online{PakistanMassSurveillance2025,
  title = {Pakistan: {{Mass}} Surveillance and Censorship Machine Is Fueled by {{Chinese}}, {{European}}, {{Emirati}} and {{North American}} Companies},
  shorttitle = {Pakistan},
  date = {2025-09-09T04:00:00+00:00},
  url = {https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2025/09/pakistan-mass-surveillance-and-censorship-machine-is-fueled-by-chinese-european-emirati-and-north-american-companies/},
  urldate = {2025-11-27},
  abstract = {Amnesty International have published a new report, Shadows of Control: Censorship and mass surveillance in Pakistan.},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {Amnesty International Security Lab}
}

@inproceedings{paleyActiveProtectionPCB2016,
  title = {Active Protection against {{PCB}} Physical Tampering},
  booktitle = {2016 17th {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})},
  author = {Paley, Steven and Hoque, Tamzidul and Bhunia, Swarup},
  date = {2016-03},
  pages = {356--361},
  issn = {1948-3295},
  doi = {10.1109/ISQED.2016.7479227},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7479227/?arnumber=7479227},
  urldate = {2024-07-10},
  abstract = {A printed circuit board (PCB) acts as the backbone of any electronic system hardware by providing mechanical support and electrical connections to its active and passive components. Traditionally, the PCB of a system has been considered trusted and robust during field operation. However, there are numerous recent reports on physical tampering of PCB in the field for malicious alteration of its functionality (e.g. adding/replacing a component through soldering, snooping a trace, and bypassing a connection). Through such alteration, an adversary can leak secret information from PCB or bypass security protection implemented in a system. This paper presents a novel approach to detect tampering in a PCB after it is deployed and to actively prevent system operation when tampering is detected. To our knowledge, this is the first report on active protection against PCB tampering in field. The proposed autonomous monitoring and prevention can enable active defense against physical tampering of electronic hardware, thus maintaining the integrity of a system against various security issues arising from such tampering.},
  eventtitle = {2016 17th {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})},
  keywords = {Active Protection,Copper,Electrical resistance measurement,Games,Monitoring,Physical Tampering,Printed Circuit Board,Resistance,Security,Wires}
}

@article{parsonsTamperRadiationResistant1977,
  title = {Tamper and {{Radiation Resistant Instrumentation}} for {{Safeguarding Special Nuclear Material}}},
  author = {Parsons, Barrett B. and Wells, Jerry L.},
  date = {1977-02},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science},
  volume = {24},
  number = {1},
  pages = {616--620},
  issn = {1558-1578},
  doi = {10.1109/TNS.1977.4328751},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4328751/},
  urldate = {2025-04-11},
  abstract = {A tamper-resistant liquid level/accountability instrumentation system for safeguards use has been developed and tested. The tests demonstrate the accuracy of liquid level measurement using TDR (Time Domain Reflectometry) techniques and the accuracy of differential pressure and temperature measurements utilizing a custom designed liquid level sensor probe. The calibrated liquid level, differential pressure, and temperature data provide sufficient information to accurately determine volume, density, and specific gravity. Test solutions used include ordinary tap water, diluted nitric acid in varying concentrations, and diluted uranium trioxide also in varying concentrations. System operations and preliminary test results conducted at the General Electric Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant and the National Bureau of Standards, respectively, suggest that the system will provide the safeguards inspector with an additional tool for real-time independent verification of normal operations and special nuclear materials accountancy data for chemical reprocessing plants. This paper discusses the system design concepts, including a brief description of the tamper and radiation resistant features, the preliminary test results, and the significance of the work.},
  keywords = {Gravity,Instruments,Level control,Level measurement,Materials testing,Probes,Reflectometry,System testing,Temperature measurement,Temperature sensors}
}

@inproceedings{parvinOpticalProbingResistant2022,
  title = {Toward {{Optical Probing Resistant Circuits}}: {{A Comparison}} of {{Logic Styles}} and {{Circuit Design Techniques}}},
  shorttitle = {Toward {{Optical Probing Resistant Circuits}}},
  booktitle = {2022 27th {{Asia}} and {{South Pacific Design Automation Conference}} ({{ASP-DAC}})},
  author = {Parvin, Sajjad and Krachenfels, Thilo and Tajik, Shahin and Seifert, Jean-Pierre and Torres, Frank Sill and Drechsler, Rolf},
  date = {2022-01},
  pages = {429--435},
  issn = {2153-697X},
  doi = {10.1109/ASP-DAC52403.2022.9712518},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9712518/?arnumber=9712518},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Laser-assisted side-channel analysis techniques, such as optical probing (OP), have been shown to pose a severe threat to secure hardware. While several countermeasures have been proposed in the literature, they can either be bypassed by an attacker or require a modification in the transistor's fabrication process, which is costly and complex. In this work, firstly, we propose a formulation for the caliber of reflected light from OP. Secondly, we propose circuit design techniques and logic styles to alleviate OP attacks based on our formulation. Finally, we compare several logic families and circuit design techniques in terms of performance and OP security merits. In this regard, we perform simulations to compare the optical beam interaction between the different logic gates. By utilizing our proposed circuit design techniques and dual-rail logic (DRL), the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the reflected light from OP is reduced significantly.},
  eventtitle = {2022 27th {{Asia}} and {{South Pacific Design Automation Conference}} ({{ASP-DAC}})},
  keywords = {Circuit synthesis,Logic gates,Optical design techniques,Optical device fabrication,Optical reflection,Resistance,Security}
}

@inproceedings{patelArithmeticBooleanSecret2020,
  title = {Arithmetic and {{Boolean Secret Sharing MPC}} on {{FPGAs}} in the {{Data Center}}},
  booktitle = {2020 {{IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference}} ({{HPEC}})},
  author = {Patel, Rushi and Wolfe, Pierre-François and Munafo, Robert and Varia, Mayank and Herbordt, Martin},
  date = {2020-09},
  pages = {1--8},
  issn = {2643-1971},
  doi = {10.1109/HPEC43674.2020.9286159},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9286159/?arnumber=9286159},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is an important technique used to enable computation over confidential data from several sources. The public cloud provides a unique opportunity to enable MPC in a low latency environment. Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) hardware adoption allows for both MPC acceleration and utilization of low latency, high bandwidth communication networks that substantially improve the performance of MPC applications. In this work, we show how designing arithmetic and Boolean Multi-Party Computation gates for FPGAs in a cloud provide improvements to current MPC offerings and ease their use in applications such as machine learning. We focus on the usage of Secret Sharing MPC first designed by Araki et al [1] to design our FPGA MPC while also providing a comparison with those utilizing Garbled Circuits for MPC. We show that Secret Sharing MPC provides a better usage of cloud resources, specifically FPGA acceleration, than Garbled Circuits and is able to use at least a 10 × less computer resources as compared to the original design using CPUs.},
  eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference}} ({{HPEC}})},
  keywords = {Acceleration,Cloud computing,Cloud Service,Cryptography,Data Center,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,Logic gates,Machine learning,Machine Learning,Matrix Multiplication,Multiparty Computation,Secret Sharing,Secure Computation}
}

@article{patraABY20ImprovedMixedProtocol,
  title = {{{ABY2}}.0: {{Improved Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-Party Computation}}},
  author = {Patra, Arpita and Schneider, Thomas and Suresh, Ajith and Yalame, Hossein},
  abstract = {Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) allows a set of mutually distrusting parties to jointly evaluate a function on their private inputs while maintaining input privacy. In this work, we improve semi-honest secure two-party computation (2PC) over rings, with a focus on the efficiency of the online phase.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{PavingWayFull,
  title = {Paving the {{Way}} to {{Full Security}} in {{eHealth}} – {{Ensuring}} Complete Security for Digital Data, Connected Environments and Devices in {{eHealth}}},
  langid = {english}
}

@standard{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2021,
  title = {Payment {{Card Industry PIN Transaction Security Hardware Security Module Modular Derived Test Requirements}}},
  author = {{PCI Security Standards Council}},
  date = {2021-12},
  url = {https://docs-prv.pcisecuritystandards.org/PTS/Derived%20Test%20Requirements/PCI_HSM_DTRs_v4.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-04-09}
}

@standard{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2021a,
  title = {Payment {{Card Industry PIN Transaction Security Hardware Security Module Modular Security Requirements}}},
  author = {{PCI Security Standards Council}},
  date = {2021-12},
  url = {https://docs-prv.pcisecuritystandards.org/PTS/Standard/PCI_HSM_Security_Requirements_v4.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-04-08},
  abstract = {HSMs (Hardware Security Modules) play a critical role in helping to ensure the confidentiality and/or data integrity of financial transactions. Therefore, to help engender trust in the legitimacy of the financial transactions being supported, it is imperative that HSMs are appropriately secure during their entire lifecycle. This includes manufacturing, shipment, use, and decommissioning. The purpose of this document is to provide guidance and direction for appropriately designing HSMs to meet the security needs of the financial payments industry, and for protecting those HSMs up to the point of initial deployment. Other security requirements apply at the point of deployment for the management of HSMs involved with financial payments industry. This document provides vendors with a list of all the security requirements against which their products will be evaluated in order to obtain Payment Card Industry (PCI) PIN Transaction Security (PTS) Hardware Security Module (HSM) device approval. HSMs may support a variety of payment-processing and cardholder-authentication applications and processes. The processes relevant to the full set of requirements outlined in this document are: ▪ PIN processing ▪ 3-D Secure ▪ Card verification ▪ Card production and personalization ▪ EFTPOS ▪ ATM interchange ▪ Cash-card reloading ▪ Data integrity ▪ Chip-card transaction processing ▪ Key generation ▪ Key injection There are many other applications and processes that may utilize general-purpose HSMs, and which may necessitate the adoption of all or a subset of the requirements listed in this document. However, this document does not aim to develop a standard for general-purpose HSMs for use outside of applications such as those listed above that are in support of a variety of payment-processing and cardholder- authentication applications and processes for the financial payments industry.},
  version = {4.0}
}

@standard{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2025,
  title = {Payment {{Card Industry PIN Transaction Security Device Testing}} and {{Approval Program Guide}}},
  author = {{PCI Security Standards Council}},
  date = {2025-06},
  url = {https://docs-prv.pcisecuritystandards.org/PTS/Supporting%20Document/PTS_Program_Guide_v2.2.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-08-22},
  pagetotal = {75},
  version = {2.2}
}

@book{peaseTroubleshootingAnalogCircuits1993,
  title = {Troubleshooting {{Analog Circuits}}},
  author = {Pease, Robert A.},
  date = {1993},
  publisher = {Newnes},
  location = {Boston},
  abstract = {Based on the author's popular series in EDN Magazine, the book contains a wealth of information on debugging and troubleshooting analog circuits. In this book, you'll find advice on using simple equipment to troubleshoot (would you believe an ordinary AM radio?); step-by-step procedures for analog troubleshooting methods; and generous helpings of the author's unique insights, humor, and philosophy on analog circuits.},
  isbn = {978-0-7506-9499-5},
  langid = {english},
  pagetotal = {234}
}

@patent{perreaultSystemMethodInstalling2005,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {System and Method for Installing a Tamper Barrier Wrap in a {{PCB}} Assembly, Including a {{PCB}} Assembly Having Improved Heat Sinking},
  author = {Perreault, Paul and Clark, Douglas and Heitmann, Kjell},
  holder = {{Pitney Bowes Inc}},
  date = {2005-07-28},
  number = {20050160702A1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20050160702A1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {circuit board,installation tool,printed circuit,tamper,wrap}
}

@article{perrigTESLABroadcastAuthentication,
  title = {The {{TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol}}},
  author = {Perrig, Adrian and Canetti, Ran and Tygar, J D and Song, Dawn},
  abstract = {One of the main challenges of securing broadcast communication is source authentication, or enabling receivers of broadcast data to verify that the received data really originates from the claimed source and was not modified en route. This problem is complicated by mutually untrusted receivers and unreliable communication environments where the sender does not retransmit lost packets.},
  langid = {english}
}

@www{perrin2018,
  title = {The Noise Protocol Framework},
  author = {Perrin, Trevor},
  date = {2018-07-11},
  url = {http://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html},
  urldate = {2021-07-13},
  version = {Revision 34}
}

@online{petitcolasKerckhoffsPrinciplesCryptographie,
  type = {Blog},
  title = {Kerckhoffs' Principles from « {{La}} Cryptographie Militaire »},
  author = {Petitcolas, Fabien},
  url = {http://www.petitcolas.net/steganography/},
  urldate = {2025-11-18},
  organization = {The information hiding homepage},
  annotation = {Archived: https://archive.is/cTxF6\\
Website contains OCR'ed original source and a translation}
}

@online{petriePartIITechnical,
  title = {Flexible {{Hardware-Enabled Guarantees Part II}}: {{Technical Options}}},
  author = {Petrie, James and Aarne, Onni},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {(UK) Advanced Research and Innovation Agency}
}

@patent{phamAntitamperMesh2011,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Anti-Tamper Mesh},
  author = {Pham, Cuong V. and Chubin, David E. and Clarke, Robert A. and Kuan, Aaron D.},
  holder = {{Teledyne Technologies Inc}},
  date = {2011-05-24},
  number = {7947911B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US7947911B1/en},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {conductive,conductive pattern,electronic device,mesh,pattern}
}

@incollection{pinkasPSIPaXoSFast2020,
  title = {{{PSI}} from {{PaXoS}}: {{Fast}}, {{Malicious Private Set Intersection}}},
  shorttitle = {{{PSI}} from {{PaXoS}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2020},
  author = {Pinkas, Benny and Rosulek, Mike and Trieu, Ni and Yanai, Avishay},
  editor = {Canteaut, Anne and Ishai, Yuval},
  date = {2020},
  volume = {12106},
  pages = {739--767},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25},
  urldate = {2023-01-17},
  abstract = {We present a 2-party private set intersection (PSI) protocol which provides security against malicious participants, yet is almost as fast as the fastest known semi-honest PSI protocol of Kolesnikov et al. (CCS 2016).},
  isbn = {978-3-030-45723-5 978-3-030-45724-2},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{piotrowskaLoopixAnonymitySystem,
  title = {The {{Loopix Anonymity System}}},
  author = {Piotrowska, Ania M and Hayes, Jamie and Elahi, Tariq and Meiser, Sebastian and Danezis, George},
  abstract = {We present Loopix, a low-latency anonymous communication system that provides bi-directional ‘third-party’ sender and receiver anonymity and unobservability. Loopix leverages cover traffic and Poisson mixing—brief independent message delays—to provide anonymity and to achieve traffic analysis resistance against, including but not limited to, a global network adversary. Mixes and clients self-monitor and protect against active attacks via self-injected loops of traffic. The traffic loops also serve as cover traffic to provide stronger anonymity and a measure of sender and receiver unobservability. Loopix is instantiated as a network of Poisson mix nodes in a stratified topology with a low number of links, which serve to further concentrate cover traffic. Service providers mediate access in and out of the network to facilitate accounting and off-line message reception.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{pirandolaFundamentalLimitsRepeaterless2017,
  title = {Fundamental Limits of Repeaterless Quantum Communications},
  author = {Pirandola, Stefano and Laurenza, Riccardo and Ottaviani, Carlo and Banchi, Leonardo},
  date = {2017-04-26},
  journaltitle = {Nature Communications},
  shortjournal = {Nat Commun},
  volume = {8},
  number = {1},
  pages = {15043},
  issn = {2041-1723},
  doi = {10.1038/ncomms15043},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms15043},
  urldate = {2024-05-15},
  abstract = {Abstract             Quantum communications promises reliable transmission of quantum information, efficient distribution of entanglement and generation of completely secure keys. For all these tasks, we need to determine the optimal point-to-point rates that are achievable by two remote parties at the ends of a quantum channel, without restrictions on their local operations and classical communication, which can be unlimited and two-way. These two-way assisted capacities represent the ultimate rates that are reachable without quantum repeaters. Here, by constructing an upper bound based on the relative entropy of entanglement and devising a dimension-independent technique dubbed ‘teleportation stretching’, we establish these capacities for many fundamental channels, namely bosonic lossy channels, quantum-limited amplifiers, dephasing and erasure channels in arbitrary dimension. In particular, we exactly determine the fundamental rate-loss tradeoff affecting any protocol of quantum key distribution. Our findings set the limits of point-to-point quantum communications and provide precise and general benchmarks for quantum repeaters.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{pirandolaTheoryChannelSimulation2018,
  title = {Theory of Channel Simulation and Bounds for Private Communication},
  author = {Pirandola, Stefano and Braunstein, Samuel L and Laurenza, Riccardo and Ottaviani, Carlo and Cope, Thomas P W and Spedalieri, Gaetana and Banchi, Leonardo},
  date = {2018-07},
  journaltitle = {Quantum Science and Technology},
  shortjournal = {Quantum Sci. Technol.},
  volume = {3},
  number = {3},
  pages = {035009},
  issn = {2058-9565},
  doi = {10.1088/2058-9565/aac394},
  url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2058-9565/aac394},
  urldate = {2024-05-03},
  abstract = {We review recent results on the simulation of quantum channels, the reduction of adaptive protocols (teleportation stretching), and the derivation of converse bounds for quantum and private communication, as established in PLOB (Pirandola et al 2017 Nat. Commun. 8 15043). We startby introducing a general weak converse bound for private communication based on the relative entropy of entanglement. We discuss how combining this bound with channel simulation and teleportation stretching, PLOB established the two-way quantum and private capacities of several fundamental channels, including the bosonic lossy channel. We then provide a rigorous proof of the strong converse property of these bounds by adopting a correct use of the Braunstein–Kimble teleportation protocol for the simulation of bosonic Gaussian channels. This analysis provides a full justification of claims presented in the follow-up paper WTB (Wilde et al 2017 IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 63 1792–817) whose upper bounds for Gaussian channels would be otherwise infinitely large. Besides clarifying contributions in the area of channel simulation and protocol reduction, we also present some generalizations of the tools to other entanglement measures and novel results on the maximum excess noise which is tolerable in quantum key distribution.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{pirnayLearningClassicalReadout2022,
  title = {Learning Classical Readout Quantum {{PUFs}} Based on Single-Qubit Gates},
  author = {Pirnay, Niklas and Pappa, Anna and Seifert, Jean-Pierre},
  date = {2022-06-22},
  journaltitle = {Quantum Machine Intelligence},
  shortjournal = {Quantum Mach. Intell.},
  volume = {4},
  number = {2},
  pages = {14},
  issn = {2524-4914},
  doi = {10.1007/s42484-022-00073-1},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s42484-022-00073-1},
  urldate = {2024-06-25},
  abstract = {Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a way to identify and authenticate electronic devices. Recently, several ideas have been presented to that aim to achieve the same for quantum devices. Some of these constructions apply single-qubit gates in order to provide a secure fingerprint of the quantum device. In this work, we formalize the class of classical readout quantum PUFs (CR-QPUFs) using the statistical query (SQ) model and explicitly show insufficient security for CR-QPUFs based on single-qubit rotation gates, when the adversary has SQ access to the CR-QPUF. We demonstrate how a malicious party can learn the CR-QPUF characteristics and forge the signature of a quantum device through a modelling attack using a simple regression of low-degree polynomials. The proposed modelling attack was successfully implemented in a real-world scenario on real IBM Q quantum machines. We thoroughly discuss the prospects and problems of CR-QPUFs where quantum device imperfections are used as a secure fingerprint.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer security,Machine learning,Modelling attack,Quantum physical unclonable function}
}

@inproceedings{plummerHistoryNuclearWeapon1998,
  title = {The {{History}} of {{Nuclear Weapon Safety Devices}}},
  author = {Plummer, David W. and Greenwood, William H.},
  date = {1998},
  publisher = {Sandia National Laboratories},
  url = {https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/671923},
  urldate = {2025-04-16},
  eventtitle = {34th {{AIAA}}/{{ASME}}/{{SAE}}/{{ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference}}}
}

@thesis{polasekReflektometrCasoveOblasti2020,
  type = {mathesis},
  title = {Reflektometr v Časové Oblasti},
  author = {Polášek, Petr},
  date = {2020-01-30},
  url = {https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Reflektometr-v-%C4%8Dasov%C3%A9-oblasti-Pol%C3%A1%C5%A1ek/5c634a66e7c6230548b7f65c9cd4c8966a10d77e},
  urldate = {2025-04-07}
}

@article{portmannKeyRecyclingAuthentication2014,
  title = {Key {{Recycling}} in {{Authentication}}},
  author = {Portmann, Christopher},
  date = {2014-07},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Information Theory},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory},
  volume = {60},
  number = {7},
  pages = {4383--4396},
  issn = {0018-9448, 1557-9654},
  doi = {10.1109/TIT.2014.2317312},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6797875/},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {In their seminal work on authentication, Wegman and Carter propose that to authenticate multiple messages, it is sufficient to reuse the same hash function as long as each tag is encrypted with a one-time pad. They argue that because the one-time pad is perfectly hiding, the hash function used remains completely unknown to the adversary. Since their proof is not composable, we revisit it using a composable security framework. It turns out that the above argument is insufficient: if the adversary learns whether a corrupted message was accepted or rejected, information about the hash function is leaked, and after a bounded finite amount of rounds it is completely known. We show however that this leak is very small: Wegman and Carter’s protocol is still ε-secure, if ε-almost strongly universal2 hash functions are used. This implies that the secret key corresponding to the choice of hash function can be reused in the next round of authentication without any additional error than this ε. We also show that if the players have a mild form of synchronization, namely that the receiver knows when a message should be received, the key can be recycled for any arbitrary task, not only new rounds of authentication.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{PositionPaperQuantum,
  title = {Position {{Paper}} on {{Quantum Key Distribution}}},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{PredatorFilesTechnical2023,
  title = {Predator {{Files}}: {{Technical}} Deep-Dive into {{Intellexa Alliance}}'s Surveillance Products},
  shorttitle = {Predator {{Files}}},
  date = {2023-10-06T06:00:52+00:00},
  url = {https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2023/10/technical-deep-dive-into-intellexa-alliance-surveillance-products/},
  urldate = {2025-11-27},
  abstract = {An expose the Intellexa Alliance's surveillance capabilities including advanced spyware, mass surveillance platforms, and tactical systems for targeting and intercepting nearby devices.},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {Amnesty International Security Lab}
}

@online{ProductPageFiber,
  title = {Product Page: {{Fiber Pigtail LC}}/{{APC OS2 G652D-Yellow}} 2m - 1 Piece | {{Unique}} | {{O0485}}.2},
  url = {https://www.efb-elektronik.de/en/fiber-pigtail-lc-apc-os2-g652d-yellow-2m-1-piece/o0485.2},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  abstract = {The LC fiber pigtail has a primary coating (900µ) in the colour of the respective category (see table). The colour of the primary coating is equal to the colour of the secondary coating. A numeric connector coding 1 .. 12 simplifies the allocation of the…},
  langid = {british},
  organization = {EFB-Elektronik GmbH}
}

@article{purserAIDestroyingUniversity2025,
  entrysubtype = {magazine},
  title = {{{AI}} Is {{Destroying}} the {{University}} and {{Learning Itself}}},
  author = {Purser, Ronald},
  date = {2025-12-01},
  journaltitle = {Current Affairs},
  issn = {2471-2647},
  url = {https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/ai-is-destroying-the-university-and-learning-itself},
  urldate = {2025-12-04},
  abstract = {Students use AI to write papers, professors use AI to grade them, degrees become meaningless, and tech companies make fortunes. Welcome to the death of higher education.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{putzAcousticIntegrityCodes2020,
  title = {Acoustic Integrity Codes: Secure Device Pairing Using Short-Range Acoustic Communication},
  shorttitle = {Acoustic Integrity Codes},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 13th {{ACM Conference}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} in {{Wireless}} and {{Mobile Networks}}},
  author = {Putz, Florentin and Álvarez, Flor and Classen, Jiska},
  date = {2020-07-21},
  series = {{{WiSec}} '20},
  pages = {31--41},
  publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  location = {New York, NY, USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3395351.3399420},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3395351.3399420},
  urldate = {2025-05-28},
  abstract = {Secure Device Pairing (SDP) relies on an out-of-band channel to authenticate devices. This requires a common hardware interface, which limits the use of existing SDP systems. We propose to use short-range acoustic communication for the initial pairing. Audio hardware is commonly available on existing off-the-shelf devices and can be accessed from user space without requiring firmware or hardware modifications.We improve upon previous approaches by designing Acoustic Integrity Codes (AICs): a modulation scheme that provides message authentication on the acoustic physical layer. We analyze their security and demonstrate that we can defend against signal cancellation attacks by designing signals with low autocorrelation. Our system can detect overshadowing attacks using a ternary decision function with a threshold. In our evaluation of this SDP scheme's security and robustness, we achieve a bit error ratio below 0.1\% for a net bit rate of 100 bps with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 14 dB. Using our open-source proof-of-concept implementation on Android smartphones, we demonstrate pairing between different smartphone models.},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-8006-5}
}

@book{querfurthCoilWindingDescription1954,
  title = {Coil {{Winding}}: {{A Description}} of {{Coil Winding Procedures}}, {{Winding Machines}} and {{Associated Equipment}}},
  author = {Querfurth, William},
  date = {1954},
  publisher = {G. Stevens Mfg. Company},
  url = {https://vintagewindings.com/gen%20pop/8299543VW8335/TransDesign%201/Coil%20Winding.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-10-30}
}

@online{quintinSomethingRememberUs2024,
  title = {Something to {{Remember Us By}}: {{Device Confiscated}} by {{Russian Authorities Returned}} with {{Monokle-Type Spyware Installed}}},
  shorttitle = {Something to {{Remember Us By}}},
  author = {Quintin, Cooper and Brown, Rebekah and Scott-Railton, John},
  date = {2024-12-05T05:57:38-05:00},
  url = {https://citizenlab.ca/2024/12/device-confiscated-by-russian-authorities-returned-with-monokle-type-spyware-installed/},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {In a joint investigation with The First Department, The Citizen Lab uncovered spyware covertly implanted on the phone of a Russian programmer following his release from Russian custody. The Monokle-like spyware allows an operator to track the device’s location, record phone calls, keystrokes, and read messages from encrypted messaging apps.},
  organization = {Citizen Lab, University of Toronto},
  keywords = {Russia,spyware}
}

@inproceedings{quisquaterElectroMagneticAnalysisEMA2001,
  title = {{{ElectroMagnetic Analysis}} ({{EMA}}): {{Measures}} and {{Counter-measures}} for {{Smart Cards}}},
  shorttitle = {{{ElectroMagnetic Analysis}} ({{EMA}})},
  booktitle = {Smart {{Card Programming}} and {{Security}}},
  author = {Quisquater, Jean-Jacques and Samyde, David},
  editor = {Attali, Isabelle and Jensen, Thomas},
  date = {2001},
  pages = {200--210},
  publisher = {Springer},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/3-540-45418-7_17},
  abstract = {A processor can leak information by different ways [1], electromagnetic radiations could be one of them. This idea, was first introduced by Kocher, with timing and power measurements. Here we developed the continuation of his ideas by measuring the field radiated by the processor. Therefore we show that the electromagnetic attack obtains at least the same result as power consumption and consequently must be carefuly taken into account. Finally we enumerate countermeasures to be implemented.},
  isbn = {978-3-540-45418-2},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {DEMA,DPA,electromagnetic and power analysis,SEMA,smartcard,SPA,tamper resistance}
}

@online{QuoteOriginMost2014,
  title = {Quote {{Origin}}: {{The Most Dangerous Phrase Is}}: “{{We}}’ve {{Always Done It That Way}}” – {{Quote Investigator}}},
  shorttitle = {Quote {{Origin}}},
  date = {2014-11-27},
  url = {https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/11/27/always-done/},
  urldate = {2025-10-22},
  langid = {american}
}

@patent{rahman1988,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Optical Fiber Cable with Tampering Detecting Means},
  author = {Rahman, Mujib},
  holder = {{Pirelli Cable Corp}},
  date = {1988-03-10},
  number = {Patent US4859024A}
}

@article{rahmanComprehensiveSurveyHardwareSoftware,
  title = {A {{Comprehensive Survey}} on {{Hardware-Software}} Co-{{Protection}} against {{Invasive}}, {{Non-Invasive}} and {{Interactive Security Threats}}},
  author = {Rahman, Habibur},
  abstract = {In the face of escalating security threats in modern computing systems, there is an urgent need for comprehensive defense mechanisms that can effectively mitigate invasive, noninvasive and interactive security vulnerabilities in hardware and software domains. Individually, hardware and software weaknesses and probable remedies have been practiced but protecting a combined system has not yet been discussed in detail. This survey paper provides a comprehensive overview of the emerging field of Hardware-Software co-Protection against Invasive and Non-Invasive Security Threats. We systematically review state-of-the-art research and developments in hardware and software security techniques, focusing on their integration to create synergistic defense mechanisms. The survey covers a wide range of security threats, including physical attacks, side-channel attacks, and malware exploits, and explores the diverse strategies employed to counter them. Our survey meticulously examines the landscape of security vulnerabilities, encompassing both physical and software-based attack vectors, and explores the intricate interplay between hardware and software defenses in mitigating these threats.Furthermore, we discuss the challenges and opportunities associated with Hardware-Software co-Protection and identify future research directions to advance the field. Through this survey, we aim to provide researchers, practitioners, and policymakers with valuable insights into the latest advancements and best practices for defending against complex security threats in modern computing environments.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {sampling-mesh}
}

@patent{razaghiCircuitBoardHold2019,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Circuit Board to Hold Connector Pieces for Tamper Detection Circuit},
  author = {Razaghi, Mani},
  holder = {{Square Inc}},
  date = {2019-04-02},
  number = {10251260B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10251260B1/en?q=(H01L23%2f576)&oq=(H01L23%2f576)&sort=old},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  keywords = {board,conductive,detection circuit,tamper,tamper detection}
}

@patent{razaghiTamperDetectionSystem2020,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Detection System},
  author = {Razaghi, Mani and Hill, Jesse},
  holder = {{Square Inc}},
  date = {2020-03-17},
  number = {10595400B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10595400B1/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  keywords = {detection circuit,housing,sensor element,tamper,tamper detection}
}

@online{RecommendationsUniversityState2025,
  title = {Recommendations of the {{University}} and {{State Library Darmstadt}} for {{Labelling}} and {{Documenting AI-generated Content}}},
  date = {2025-09-22},
  url = {https://www.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/ki-doku},
  urldate = {2025-10-24}
}

@online{RefusingTechFascism,
  title = {Refusing {{Tech Fascism}} — {{Error}} 406 {{Tech Fascism Not Acceptable}}},
  url = {https://error417.expectation.fail/406/tech-fascism-not-acceptable/essay-refusing-tech-fascism-by-tante},
  urldate = {2025-05-16},
  abstract = {An essay on Refusing Tech Fascism by Jürgen Geuter aka @tante},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {Error 417 Expectation Failed}
}

@inproceedings{reichertMenhirObliviousDatabase2024,
  title = {Menhir: {{An Oblivious Database}} with {{Protection}} against {{Access}} and {{Volume Pattern Leakage}}},
  shorttitle = {Menhir},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 19th {{ACM Asia Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Reichert, Leonie and Chandran, Gowri R and Schoppmann, Phillipp and Schneider, Thomas and Scheuermann, Björn},
  date = {2024-07-01},
  series = {{{ASIA CCS}} '24},
  pages = {1675--1690},
  publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  location = {New York, NY, USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3634737.3657005},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3634737.3657005},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {Analyzing user data while protecting the privacy of individuals remains a big challenge. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are a possible solution as they protect processes and Virtual Machines (VMs) against malicious hosts. However, TEEs can leak access patterns to code and to the data being processed. Furthermore, when data is stored in a TEE database, the data volume required to answer a query is another unwanted side channel that contains sensitive information. Both types of information leaks, access patterns and volume patterns, allow for database reconstruction attacks.In this paper, we present Menhir, an oblivious TEE database that hides access patterns with ORAM guarantees and volume patterns through differential privacy. The database allows range and point queries with SQL-like WHERE-clauses. It builds on the state-of-the-art oblivious AVL tree construction Oblix (S\&P'18), which by itself does not protect against volume leakage. We show how volume leakage can be exploited in range queries and improve the construction to mitigate this type of attack. We prove the correctness and obliviousness of Menhir. Our evaluation shows that our approach is feasible and scales well with the number of rows and columns in the database.},
  isbn = {979-8-4007-0482-6}
}

@online{renesaselectronicscorporationApplicationNoteAN2242019,
  title = {Application {{Note AN-224}}: {{ALVC}}/{{LVC Logic Characteristics}} and {{Applications}}},
  author = {{Renesas Electronics Corporation}},
  date = {2019},
  url = {https://www.renesas.com/en/document/apn/224-alvclvc-logic-characteristics-and-apps},
  urldate = {2025-04-09}
}

@article{renHybridQuantumKey2022,
  title = {Hybrid Quantum Key Distribution Network},
  author = {Ren, Siyu and Wang, Yu and Su, Xiaolong},
  date = {2022-10},
  journaltitle = {Science China Information Sciences},
  shortjournal = {Sci. China Inf. Sci.},
  volume = {65},
  number = {10},
  pages = {200502},
  issn = {1674-733X, 1869-1919},
  doi = {10.1007/s11432-022-3509-6},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11432-022-3509-6},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) is now moving toward a scalable and secure QKD network, which establishes secret keys among network users. The continuous-variable (CV) and discrete-variable (DV) QKD systems are currently being developed in parallel and are all used in QKD networks. We propose here a hybrid QKD network, in which the CV QKD system is used to build metropolitan QKD networks, and the DV QKD system is used to connect metropolitan QKD networks. The hybrid QKD network takes advantage of high secret key rates for CV QKD systems and long distance for DV QKD systems. We also present a feasible hybrid measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD network, which combines both CV and DV MDI QKD systems. The presented hybrid QKD networks meet the low cost and compact requirement of a realistic QKD network and provide a feasible solution for future real QKD networks by combining the advantages of both CV and DV QKD systems.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{restelliQuantumKeyDistribution2009,
  title = {Quantum Key Distribution at {{GHz}} Transmission Rates},
  author = {Restelli, Alessandro and Bienfang, Joshua C. and Mink, Alan and Clark, Charles W.},
  editor = {Arakawa, Yasuhiko and Sasaki, Masahide and Sotobayashi, Hideyuki},
  date = {2009-01-24},
  pages = {72360L},
  location = {San Jose, CA},
  doi = {10.1117/12.809461},
  url = {http://proceedings.spiedigitallibrary.org/proceeding.aspx?doi=10.1117/12.809461},
  urldate = {2024-05-22},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) channels are typically realized by transmitting and detecting single photons, and therefore suffer from dramatic reductions in throughput due to both channel loss and noise. These shortcomings can be mitigated by applying telecommunications clock-recovery techniques to maximize the bandwidth of the single-photon channel and minimize the system’s exposure to noise. We demonstrate a QKD system operating continuously at a quantum-channel transmission rate of 1.25 GHz, with dedicated data-handling hardware and error-correction/privacy amplification. We discuss the design and performance of our system and highlight issues which limit our maximum transmission and key production rates.},
  eventtitle = {{{SPIE OPTO}}: {{Integrated Optoelectronic Devices}}},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{rezmeritaSelfMutualInductance2017,
  title = {A Self and Mutual Inductance Calculation Resonators with Finite Element Analysis},
  booktitle = {2017 {{International Conference}} on {{Modern Power Systems}} ({{MPS}})},
  author = {Rezmerita, Georgiana and Bobaru, Lavinia and Stanculescu, Marinela and Iordache, Mihai and Niculae, Dragos},
  date = {2017-06},
  pages = {1--4},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {Cluj-Napoca, Romania},
  doi = {10.1109/MPS.2017.7974422},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7974422/},
  urldate = {2023-10-31},
  abstract = {This paper presents how to implement the finite element method (FEM) to determine the magnetically coupled coils parameters. The method is applied for computing the parameters of the two resonators used in wireless power transfer (WPT). To compute the parameters corresponding to the resistance, self inductance, capacity and mutual inductance (R, L, C and M), we used CEDRAT Flux 2D software. The results of the 2D analyses are used to calculate the circuit’s parameters in order to compute the wireless power transferred to a load. Using FEM we realized two models: the first one in order to determine the values corresponding to L1, R1, L2, R2 and M and the second model to test its functioning in steady state. The two models differs by an electric circuit used to realize the coupling and the numerical models are modeled using the magnetic quasistationary state. The wireless power transfer efficiency depends on the coil’s shape which can play an important role in the operation of such devices.},
  eventtitle = {2017 {{International Conference}} on {{Modern Power Systems}} ({{MPS}})},
  isbn = {978-1-5090-6565-3},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{roettelerQuantumResourceEstimates2017,
  title = {Quantum {{Resource Estimates}} for {{Computing Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithms}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{ASIACRYPT}} 2017},
  author = {Roetteler, Martin and Naehrig, Michael and Svore, Krysta M. and Lauter, Kristin},
  editor = {Takagi, Tsuyoshi and Peyrin, Thomas},
  date = {2017},
  volume = {10625},
  pages = {241--270},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_9},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_9},
  urldate = {2024-09-02},
  abstract = {We give precise quantum resource estimates for Shor’s algorithm to compute discrete logarithms on elliptic curves over prime fields. The estimates are derived from a simulation of a Toffoli gate network for controlled elliptic curve point addition, implemented within the framework of the quantum computing software tool suite LIQU i| . We determine circuit implementations for reversible modular arithmetic, including modular addition, multiplication and inversion, as well as reversible elliptic curve point addition. We conclude that elliptic curve discrete logarithms on an elliptic curve defined over an n-bit prime field can be computed on a quantum computer with at most 9n + 2 log2(n) + 10 qubits using a quantum circuit of at most 448n3 log2(n) + 4090n3 Toffoli gates. We are able to classically simulate the Toffoli networks corresponding to the controlled elliptic curve point addition as the core piece of Shor’s algorithm for the NIST standard curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521. Our approach allows gate-level comparisons to recent resource estimates for Shor’s factoring algorithm. The results also support estimates given earlier by Proos and Zalka and indicate that, for current parameters at comparable classical security levels, the number of qubits required to tackle elliptic curves is less than for attacking RSA, suggesting that indeed ECC is an easier target than RSA.},
  isbn = {978-3-319-70696-2 978-3-319-70697-9},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic2015,
  title = {The {{Moral Character}} of {{Cryptographic Work}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}}},
  author = {Rogaway, Phillip},
  date = {2015},
  series = {{{LNCS}}},
  volume = {9452 \& 9453},
  pages = {XVIII},
  publisher = {Springer},
  location = {Auckland, New Zealand},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3},
  url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1162.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-11-18},
  abstract = {Cryptography rearranges power: it configures who can do what, from what. This makes cryptography an inherently political tool, and it confers on the field an intrinsically moral dimension. The Snowden revelations motivate a reassessment of the political and moral positioning of cryptography. They lead one to ask if our inability to effectively address mass surveillance constitutes a failure of our field. I believe that it does. I call for a community-wide effort to develop more effective means to resist mass surveillance. I plead for a reinvention of our disciplinary culture to attend not only to puzzles and math, but, also, to the societal implications of our work.},
  eventtitle = {{{ASIACRYPT}} 2015},
  isbn = {978-3-662-48800-3},
  langid = {english},
  annotation = {Paper on an Invited Talk, full version on eprint, one-page abstract in proceedings}
}

@article{rosaCalculationSelfinductanceSinglelayer1906,
  title = {Calculation of the Self-Inductance of Single-Layer Coils},
  author = {Rosa, E. B.},
  date = {1906-08},
  journaltitle = {Bulletin of the Bureau of Standards},
  shortjournal = {BULL. NATL. BUR. STAND.},
  volume = {2},
  number = {2},
  pages = {161},
  issn = {0096-8579},
  doi = {10.6028/bulletin.034},
  url = {https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/bulletin/02/nbsbulletinv2n2p161_A2b.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-10-10},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{roySelftimedSensorsDetecting2022,
  title = {Self-Timed {{Sensors}} for {{Detecting Static Optical Side Channel Attacks}}},
  booktitle = {2022 23rd {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})},
  author = {Roy, Sourav and Farheen, Tasnuva and Tajik, Shahin and Forte, Domenic},
  date = {2022-04},
  pages = {1--6},
  issn = {1948-3295},
  doi = {10.1109/ISQED54688.2022.9806217},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9806217/?arnumber=9806217},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Sophisticated optical side-channel attacks such as Laser Logic State Imaging (LLSI) can destroy an entire system’s security by extracting static signals. LLSI is based on chip failure analysis (FA) techniques and is conducted from the backside of an IC. It provides unlimited number of probes to observe static signals in the hands of an attacker. Several countermeasures have been proposed to prevent optical probing techniques like LLSI, but they have limitations such as complex fabrication steps, large area, etc. which makes them difficult to verify and implement. In this paper, we propose self-timed, CMOS-compatible sensors for easy-to-implement countermeasures to thwart LLSI attack. To conduct LLSI attack, the attacker needs to freeze the clock at a point of interest and modulate the voltage supply line at a known frequency. With these two attack surfaces in mind, we design and simulate clock freeze and voltage modulation detection sensors that can detect LLSI attacks with very high confidence.1},
  eventtitle = {2022 23rd {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})},
  keywords = {Integrated optics,Optical device fabrication,Optical imaging,Optical sensors,Security,Side-channel attacks,Voltage}
}

@article{ruchtiWhenDecoderHas2022,
  title = {When the {{Decoder Has}} to {{Look Twice}}: {{Glitching}} a {{PUF Error Correction}}},
  shorttitle = {When the {{Decoder Has}} to {{Look Twice}}},
  author = {Ruchti, Jonas and Gruber, Michael and Pehl, Michael},
  date = {2022-06-08},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  pages = {26--70},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2022.i3.26-70},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9694},
  urldate = {2023-02-24},
  abstract = {Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been increasingly used as an alternative to non-volatile memory for the storage of cryptographic secrets. Research on side channel and fault attacks with the goal of extracting these secrets has begun to gain interest but no fault injection attack targeting the necessary error correction within a PUF device has been shown so far. This work demonstrates one such attack on a hardware fuzzy commitment scheme implementation and thus shows a new potential attack threat existing in current PUF key storage systems. After presenting evidence for the overall viability of the profiled attack by performing it on an FPGA implementation, countermeasures are analysed: we discuss the efficacy of hashing helper data with the PUF-derived key to prevent the attack as well as codeword masking, a countermeasure effective against a side channel attack. The analysis shows the limits of these approaches. First, we demonstrate the criticality of timing in codeword masking by confirming the attack’s effectiveness on ostensibly protected hardware. Second, our work shows a successful attack without helper data manipulation and thus the potential for sidestepping helper data hashing countermeasures.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {clock glitch,fault attack,fuzzy commitment scheme,masking,physical unclonable function,safe error attack}
}

@inproceedings{ruhrmairVirtualProofsReality2015,
  title = {Virtual {{Proofs}} of {{Reality}} and Their {{Physical Implementation}}},
  booktitle = {2015 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}},
  author = {Ruhrmair, Ulrich and Martinez-Hurtado, J.L. and Xu, Xiaolin and Kraeh, Christian and Hilgers, Christian and Kononchuk, Dima and Finley, Jonathan J. and Burleson, Wayne P.},
  date = {2015-05},
  pages = {70--85},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {San Jose, CA},
  doi = {10.1109/SP.2015.12},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7163019/},
  urldate = {2023-12-19},
  abstract = {We discuss the question of how physical statements can be proven over digital communication channels between two parties (a “prover” and a “verifier”) residing in two separate local systems. Examples include: (i) “a certain object in the prover’s system has temperature X◦C”, (ii) “two certain objects in the prover’s system are positioned at distance X”, or (iii) “a certain object in the prover’s system has been irreversibly altered or destroyed”. As illustrated by these examples, our treatment goes beyond classical security sensors in considering more general physical statements. Another distinctive aspect is the underlying security model: We neither assume secret keys in the prover’s system, nor do we suppose classical sensor hardware in his system which is tamperresistant and trusted by the verifier. Without an established name, we call this new type of security protocol a ”virtual proof of reality” or simply a “virtual proof” (VP).},
  eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  isbn = {978-1-4673-6949-7},
  langid = {english}
}

@software{ruokolainenElmerCSCElmerfemElmer2023,
  title = {{{ElmerCSC}}/Elmerfem: {{Elmer}} 9.0},
  shorttitle = {{{ElmerCSC}}/Elmerfem},
  author = {Ruokolainen, Juha and Malinen, Mika and Råback, Peter and Zwinger, Thomas and Takala, Eelis and Kataja, Juhani and Gillet-Chaulet, Fabien and Ilvonen, Sami and Gladstone, Rupert and Byckling, Mikko and {Mondher Chekki} and Gong, Cheng and Ponomarev, Pavel and Van Dongen, Eef and Robertsen, Fredrik and Wheel, Iain and Cook, Samuel and {T7saeki} and {Luzpaz} and {Rich\_B}},
  date = {2023-05-03},
  doi = {10.5281/ZENODO.7892181},
  url = {https://zenodo.org/record/7892181},
  urldate = {2024-12-03},
  abstract = {Elmer Release Notes for version 9.0 Previous release: {$<$}strong{$>$}8.4{$<$}/strong{$><$}br{$>$} Period covered: {$<$}strong{$>$}Dec 18 2018 - Nov 10 2020{$<$}/strong{$><$}br{$>$} Number of commits: {$<$}strong{$>$}\textasciitilde 1340{$<$}/strong{$>$} (excluding merges) These release notes provide information on the most essential changes. You can get a complete listing of commit messages, for example, with:{$<$}br{$>$} git log --since="2018-12-18" \&gt; log.txt Apart from the core Elmer team at CSC (Juhani K., Mika M., Juha R., Peter R., Thomas Z.) git log shows contributions from Daniel B., Denis C., Eef v. D., Eelis T., Fabien G-C, Foad S. F., Fredrik R., Olivier G., Joe T., Luz P., Mondher C., Rupert G., Sami I., Sami R., Samuel C., and Saeki T. to this release. Additionally there are many ongoing developments in several branches that have not been merged to this release and are not therefore covered here. Also sometimes the code has been passed on by the original author by other means than the git, and in such cases the names may have been accidentally omitted. The contributions of all developers are gratefully acknowledged! New Solver Modules IncompressibleNSVec Incompressible Navier-Stokes solver utilizing vectorized and threaded assembly Includes built-in support for block preconditioning (Schur complement approximation included) Includes non-Newtonian material laws Intended for Elmer/Ice community but also other may find it useful. BeamSolver3D Solver for the Timoshenko equations of elastic beams embedded in 3-D space (see Elmer Models Manual for documentation) GmshReader Reads the mesh and results from simple Gmsh file format (that can be written by ElmerSolver as well) Solver includes interpolation of the fields to the current mesh May be used for hierarchical simulations where results are inherited from previous simulations ModelMixedPoisson A general-purpose mixed FEM solver for the Poisson equation (see Elmer Models Manual for documentation) Employs a div-conforming (face) finite element approximation SpringAssembly A generic utility to add node-wise springs and masses to structural models (see Elmer Models Manual for documentation) MarchingODESolver A solver that can compute ordinary differential equations on a moving mesh. It is assumed that the mesh is structured and there is a known draw speed. This makes it possible to relate timestep and mesh parameter directly with each other. Enhanced Solver Modules ElasticSolve Adding a new UMAT material model is simplified: compilation with an elmerf90 command is sufficient The state variables of UMAT material model can be written to a result file and visualized UMAT implementation updated to support axial symmetry EMWaveSolver The solver updated to support the basis functions of second order and simulation in 2D The solver is now documented in Elmer Models Manual MagnetoDynamics Fixes and generalization to the source projection (the determination of Jfix). A surface impedance condition for the time-harmonic AV model Thin region formulation for 1D wires in transient analysis Magnetic anisotropy (a complex-valued reluctivity tensor) enabled for the time-harmonic AV model MagnetoDynamics2D A velocity field can be given to add a Lorentz term to the equations Coreloss a posteriori formulas (Bertotti + extended Bertotti) MagnetoDynamicsCalcFields Enabled postprocessing in the case of a complex-valued reluctivity tensor Enabled the computation of magnetic co-energy ResultOutputSolver Vtu format: Enable saving of pieces, i.e. bodies and boundaries Improved saving of elemental, DG and IP fields Gmsh format: Improved use of masking features in output ShellSolver Eigenanalysis with the shell solver enabled Spring, resultant force and couple BCs added Combined analysis of 2-D shells and 1-D beams enabled Fully coupled analysis of 2-D shells and 3-D solids enabled (still subject to some geometric constraints on the mesh) Partial support for using an alternate formulation with drilling degrees of freedom StructuredMeshMapper Enable arbitrary number of layers, before limited to three. HeatSolver A new tentative vectorized version: HeatSolverVec Enable symmetric 3D cases for view factor computation to obtain significant timesavings Make Gebhart factors linear system symmetric, if possible "ViewFactor Symmetry" StressSolver Added a Maxwell visco-elastic model to linear elasticity solver Possible also to be run as incompressible (introducing pressure variable) Optional pre-stress advection term for layered Earth-deformation model WaveSolver The solver can be used to model harmonic and eigenmode cases as well. ParticleAdvector Allow particles to be sent from Gaussian integration points as well. This is beneficial for robustness since they are not located at surface. Local integration time based on local Courant number. ElmerSolver library functionality Treatment of block systems The block matrix approach for solving complicated problems has been enhanced. Currently the block approach can be used in several ways during some stage of the solution. Split up monolithic equations into subproblems that are easier to solve (e.g. IncompressibleNS) Combine linear multiphysical (coupled) problems into a block matrix (e.g. FSI problems) For problems belonging to class 1) we may perform recreation of a monolithic matrix. This will allow better use of standard linear algebra to utilize direct solvers, or change the system to be harmonic or eigenvalue problem. For the documentation of utilizing block-matrix construct in connection with the fully coupled simulation of multiphysical problems see the new chapter "Block-matrix construct to build tightly coupled solvers" in ElmerSolver Manual. More economical integration rules A collection of economical Gauss quadrature rules for prismatic elements are introduced to replace tensor product rules for quadrilateral p-elements when 1 \&lt; p \&lt;= 8. The tensor product rule with n = (p+1)**2 points is now replaced by more economical ones. Dirichlet BCs for div-conforming vector finite elements (face elements) A sif command of the form Q \{f\} j = Real ... can be used to specify vector-valued data whose normal component is then used to integrate the values of DOFs for vector-valued interpolation of the data. Here Q is an Elmer variable which is approximated with face finite elements. Conforming BCs by elimination System can identify conforming boundaries such that dofs related to nodes or edges on opposing sides may be assembled into one degree of freedom. This decreases the size of the linear system and is numerically favourable. Antiperiodicity may be included. For vector-valued problems all components must be treated alike. Conforming BCs for edge dofs may consider the direction of edge. See test cases with "Apply Conforming BCs" and "Conforming BC" defined. Improved internal partitioning with Zoltan Enable internal partitioning with Zoltan to honor connected boundaries. Enable primary solver to call other solvers For documentation see the section "Solver execution by a master solver" in ElmerSolver Manual. Enables calling before and after solving the primary problem. Also possible to call before and after each nonlinear iteration. Anderson Acceleration for nonlinear systems Implemented a version of Anderson Acceleration where previous solutions and residuals are used to accelerate the nonlinear convergence. May increase nonlinear convergence to quadratic, quadratic convergence (Newton's method) is not improved. Swapping meshes on-the-fly Implemented library functionality to swap meshes during the simulation. Currently no history data is interpolated. ListGetElemental routines More flexible routines for obtaining material parameters for the Gaussian integration points. Detects automatically what kind of fields the dependency depends on (nodal, DG, elemental, IP points) Vectorized versions to be used with vectorized finite element assembly View factors Allow computation of view factors in 3D cases with symmetry. Speed-up computation for cases where emissivity not equal to one. Enable view factors to be used in conjunction with DG (in HeatSolveVec) Run Control Enable external loop control over the simulation. May be used in optimization and parametric scanning etc. Applicable also to transient systems as the variable "time" is not used for the control level. Inline parameters Enable inline keywords -rpar and -ipar They are followed by the number of argument + values of the arguments. Generic source control We may tune a r.h.s. load vector such that the solution (or reaction force) at given node is the desired one. Mimics the old Smart Control operation of HeatSolve but on a library level. ElmerGrid Fixes for UNV, mptxt and Gmsh file format import. Tentative reader for FVCOM format Add possibility to define seed for Metis partitioning (-metisseed). Maintain entity names in extrusion ElmerGrid and its plugin under ElmerGUI were harmonized such that they use the same codebase. ElmerGUI Huge number of improvements by Saeki! Highlights include: Object browser to view the case at a glance and to easily access the most windows. Removed sif auto-generation functionality to avoid unintended overwriting of sif file. "Generate, save and run" button to quickly run the case modifed via GUI. "Save and run" button on sif window to quickly run the case modifed via sif window. Postprocessor button selectable from ElmerVTK, ElmerPost or ParaView. "New project..." menu as an alternative way to start a new project. Seperated "Save project as..." menu from "Save project" menu to save the project in a different directory. Improved and more robust project loading "Preference" menu on sif window and on solver log window for syntax highlighting and font selection. "Recent projects" in File menu for quick loading of recently used projects. Improved ElmerVTK postprocessor (reading simple .vtu file, bottom toolbar including time-step control and displace button, etc) Configuration \&amp; Compilation New Windows installer utilizing msys2 either with or without ElmerGUI + with or without MPI installers Elmer/Ice New features in Elmer/Ice are documented in elmerfem/elmerice/ReleaseNotes/release\_elmerice\_9.0.md Other FreeCADBatchFEMTools improvements and added tests New Contributors @frroberts made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/176 @mmcker made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/118 @Foadsf made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/207 @dremerb made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/210 @Kezii made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/234 @kinnala made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/243 {$<$}strong{$>$}Full Changelog{$<$}/strong{$>$}: https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/compare/release-8.4...release-9.0},
  version = {release-9.0}
}

@book{saackeRadiotechnikIIIEmpfanger1926,
  title = {Radiotechnik {{III}}: {{Die Empfänger}}},
  author = {Saacke, Hermann},
  date = {1926},
  series = {Sammlung {{Göschen}}},
  volume = {3},
  publisher = {Walter de Gruyter \& Co.}
}

@article{saadatsafaNearFieldMicrowaveSensing2025,
  title = {Near-{{Field Microwave Sensing}} for {{Chip-Level Tamper Detection}}},
  author = {Saadat Safa, Maryam and Tajik, Shahin},
  date = {2025-07-05},
  journaltitle = {Sensors},
  shortjournal = {Sensors},
  volume = {25},
  number = {13},
  pages = {4188},
  issn = {1424-8220},
  doi = {10.3390/s25134188},
  url = {https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/25/13/4188},
  urldate = {2025-09-30},
  abstract = {Stealthy chip-level tamper attacks, such as hardware Trojan insertions or security-critical circuit modifications, can threaten modern microelectronic systems’ security. While traditional inspection and side-channel methods offer potential for tamper detection, they may not reliably detect all forms of attacks and often face practical limitations in terms of scalability, accuracy, or applicability. This work introduces a non-invasive, contactless tamper detection method employing a complementary split-ring resonator (CSRR). CSRRs, which are typically deployed for non-destructive material characterization, can be placed on the surface of the chip’s package to detect subtle variations in the impedance of the chip’s power delivery network (PDN) caused by tampering. The changes in the PDN’s impedance profile perturb the local electric near field and consequently affect the sensor’s impedance. These changes manifest as measurable variations in the sensor’s scattering parameters. By monitoring these variations, our approach enables robust and cost-effective physical integrity verification requiring neither physical contact with the chips or printed circuit board (PCB) nor activation of the underlying malicious circuits. To validate our claims, we demonstrate the detection of various chip-level tamper events on an FPGA manufactured with 28 nm technology.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{sadeqPrivacyBreachAndroid2022,
  title = {Privacy {{Breach}} in {{Android Smartphone Through Inaudible Sound}}},
  booktitle = {2022 {{IEEE Wireless Communications}} and {{Networking Conference}} ({{WCNC}})},
  author = {Sadeq, Nafis and Hossain, Md. Shohrab},
  date = {2022-04},
  pages = {2441--2446},
  issn = {1558-2612},
  doi = {10.1109/WCNC51071.2022.9771721},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9771721},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The security and privacy of the Android system is an important research area due to the widespread use of Android devices. Most of the existing researches on this area focus on the mobile and wireless networks. Security breach through the speaker remains relatively less explored. In this work, we focus on potential security breaches in the Android system using ultrasonic channel in the speaker. We have proposed a dynamic vocabulary selection strategy to facilitate faster data transmission in ultrasonic side-channel attacks. We also propose a novel piecewise linear amplitude reduction technique that helps the system to achieve a higher bit-rate and higher amplitude for a long time. Our proposed system improves the bit-rate of the modulated audio by 27.5\% and maximum attack distance by 20\%. The improvement for the data transfer rate is 155\% for numeric data, 70\% for alpha-numeric data and 27.5\% for any ASCII character. We also propose a detection mechanism for similar attacks using Android log analysis.},
  eventtitle = {2022 {{IEEE Wireless Communications}} and {{Networking Conference}} ({{WCNC}})},
  keywords = {Android,Bandwidth,Conferences,Inaudible sound,malware,Privacy breach,Side-channel attacks,Transmitters,Ultrasonic security,Vocabulary,Wireless networks}
}

@inproceedings{saeifDayAfterTomorrowPerformanceRadio2023,
  title = {The {{Day-After-Tomorrow}}: {{On}} the {{Performance}} of {{Radio Fingerprinting}} over {{Time}}},
  shorttitle = {The {{Day-After-Tomorrow}}},
  booktitle = {Annual {{Computer Security Applications Conference}}},
  author = {Saeif, Alhazbi and Savio, Sciancalepore and Gabriele, Oligeri},
  date = {2023-12-04},
  pages = {439--450},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Austin TX USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3627106.3627192},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3627106.3627192},
  urldate = {2023-12-21},
  eventtitle = {{{ACSAC}} '23: {{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference}}},
  isbn = {979-8-4007-0886-2},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{safaCounterfeitChipDetection2023,
  title = {Counterfeit {{Chip Detection}} Using {{Scattering Parameter Analysis}}},
  booktitle = {2023 26th {{International Symposium}} on {{Design}} and {{Diagnostics}} of {{Electronic Circuits}} and {{Systems}} ({{DDECS}})},
  author = {Safa, Maryam Saadat and Mosavirik, Tahoura and Tajik, Shahin},
  date = {2023-05-03},
  pages = {99--104},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {Tallinn, Estonia},
  doi = {10.1109/DDECS57882.2023.10139623},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10139623/},
  urldate = {2025-09-30},
  eventtitle = {2023 26th {{International Symposium}} on {{Design}} and {{Diagnostics}} of {{Electronic Circuits}} and {{Systems}} ({{DDECS}})},
  isbn = {979-8-3503-3277-3}
}

@article{sagarStudiesTemperatureDependent2024,
  title = {Studies on Temperature Dependent Dielectric Properties of Some Insulators down to Liquid Helium Temperatures},
  author = {Sagar, Pankaj and Akber, Kashif},
  date = {2024-07-01},
  journaltitle = {Cryogenics},
  shortjournal = {Cryogenics},
  volume = {141},
  pages = {103865},
  issn = {0011-2275},
  doi = {10.1016/j.cryogenics.2024.103865},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0011227524000857},
  urldate = {2025-07-14},
  abstract = {The work discusses on the behavior of dielectric properties of various commercially available insulators with respect to temperature (4.2 K to 300 K) and operating frequency range of 2.52 KHz to 500 KHz. A conventional parallel plate-based capacitor setup was designed and developed considering various conditions. The dielectric constant was found to be very dependent on the pre-breakdown partial discharges at low temperatures. At 4.2 K the discharges move far away from the electrodes and exert high electric stress on the sample under test, which results in the breakdown or the decrease in the dielectric strength. The relative permittivity (ϵr) also decreased rapidly with the increase in frequency in most of the samples, this decrease is due to the reduction of space charge polarization effect. The correlation between the dielectric properties, operating frequencies and temperature have been studied in detailed.},
  keywords = {Capacitor,Cold electronics,Insulators,Relative permittivity}
}

@patent{salleMultilayerSecurityWrap2015,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Multilayer Security Wrap},
  author = {Salle, Vincent Daniel Jean and WARD, Dominic John and EDMONDS, Martin Wallace and Zhang, Libing},
  holder = {{Johnson Electric SA}},
  date = {2015-12-08},
  number = {9209139B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9209139B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {conductive,screen,security,security screen,terminals}
}

@patent{salleSecurityWrap2015,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Security Wrap},
  author = {Salle, Vincent Daniel Jean and WARD, Dominic John and EDMONDS, Martin Wallace and Zhang, Libing},
  holder = {{Johnson Electric SA}},
  date = {2015-12-29},
  number = {9224280B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9224280B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {conductive,pattern,security,security wrap,substrate}
}

@patent{salleSecurityWrapBreakable2017,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Security Wrap with Breakable Conductors},
  author = {Salle, Vincent Daniel Jean and WARD, Dominic John and EDMONDS, Martin Wallace and Zhang, Libing},
  holder = {{Johnson Electric SA}},
  date = {2017-02-21},
  number = {9576450B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9576450B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {layer,screen,security,substrate,wrap}
}

@patent{salleSecurityWrapTearable2017,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Security Wrap with Tearable Substrate},
  author = {Salle, Vincent Daniel Jean and EDMONDS, Martin Wallace},
  holder = {{Johnson Electric SA}},
  date = {2017-08-01},
  number = {9721199B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9721199B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {conductor,point,screen,security,substrate}
}

@patent{salleStackableSecurityWraps2017,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Stackable Security Wraps},
  author = {Salle, Vincent Daniel Jean},
  holder = {{Johnson Electric SA}},
  date = {2017-08-08},
  number = {9730314B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9730314B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {conductive,screen,security,terminals,wrap}
}

@article{samiAdvancingTrustworthinessSysteminPackage2024,
  title = {Advancing {{Trustworthiness}} in {{System-in-Package}}: {{A Novel Root-of-Trust Hardware Security Module}} for {{Heterogeneous Integration}}},
  shorttitle = {Advancing {{Trustworthiness}} in {{System-in-Package}}},
  author = {Sami, Md Sami Ul Islam and Zhang, Tao and Shuvo, Amit Mazumder and Haque, Md Saad Ul and Calzada, Paul E. and Azar, Kimia Zamiri and Kamali, Hadi Mardani and Rahman, Fahim and Farahmandi, Farimah and Tehranipoor, Mark},
  date = {2024},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Access},
  volume = {12},
  pages = {48081--48107},
  issn = {2169-3536},
  doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3375874},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10466542/?arnumber=10466542},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  abstract = {The semiconductor industry has adopted heterogeneous integration (HI), incorporating modular intellectual property (IP) blocks (chiplets) into a unified system-in-package (SiP) to overcome the slowdown in Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling and to respond to the increasing demand for advanced integrated circuits (ICs). Despite the manifold benefits of HI, such as enhanced performance, reduced area overhead, and improved yield, this transformation has also led to security vulnerabilities in the SiP supply chain and in-field operations, ranging from chiplet piracy and SiP reverse engineering (RE) to information leakage. Although conventional countermeasures provide the desired robustness for monolithic ICs, they are insufficient for addressing these challenges in the context of HI. To address these concerns, this paper presents a novel root-of-trust architecture, augmenting the process of integration using a centralized chiplet hardware security module (CHSM), aiming to provide comprehensive and robust protection throughout the SiP supply chain and in-field operations. Also, the proposed architecture equipped with the CHSM effectively addresses potential security breaches while providing robust protection against zero-day attacks through its reconfigurable capabilities. Throughout five detailed case studies, this paper performs a comprehensive security analysis to illustrate the resilience of CHSM against contemporary attack scenarios in the HI domain.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Access}}},
  keywords = {chiplet,Hardware security,hardware security module,Heterogeneous integration,Information leakage,Intellectual property,Multichip modules,Packaging,packaging technology,Reverse engineering,Security management,Semiconductor device manufacture,SiP security,Supply chain management,supply chain security,system-in-package,System-in-package,Trust management,vulnerability mitigation}
}

@article{sasakiQuantumNetworksWhere2017,
  title = {Quantum Networks: Where Should We Be Heading?},
  shorttitle = {Quantum Networks},
  author = {Sasaki, Masahide},
  date = {2017-06-01},
  journaltitle = {Quantum Science and Technology},
  shortjournal = {Quantum Sci. Technol.},
  volume = {2},
  number = {2},
  pages = {020501},
  issn = {2058-9565},
  doi = {10.1088/2058-9565/aa6994},
  url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2058-9565/aa6994},
  urldate = {2024-05-15}
}

@article{sasySoKMetadataProtectingCommunication2024,
  title = {{{SoK}}: {{Metadata-Protecting Communication Systems}}},
  shorttitle = {{{SoK}}},
  author = {Sasy, Sajin and Goldberg, Ian},
  date = {2024-01},
  journaltitle = {Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies},
  shortjournal = {PoPETs},
  volume = {2024},
  number = {1},
  pages = {509--524},
  issn = {2299-0984},
  doi = {10.56553/popets-2024-0030},
  url = {https://petsymposium.org/popets/2024/popets-2024-0030.php},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {Protecting metadata of communications has been an area of active research since the dining cryptographers problem was introduced by David Chaum in 1988.  The Snowden revelations from 2013 resparked research in this direction.  Consequently over the last decade we have witnessed a flurry of novel systems designed to protect metadata of users' communications online.  However, such systems leverage different assumptions and design choices to achieve their goal; resulting in a scattered view of the desirable properties, potential vulnerabilities, and limitations of existing metadata-protecting communication systems (MPCS). In this work we survey 31 systems targeting metadata-protected communications, and present a unified view of the current state of affairs.  We provide two different taxonomies for existing MPCS, first into four different categories by the precise type of metadata protections they offer, and next into six families based on the core techniques that underlie them.  By contrasting these systems we identify potential vulnerabilities, as well as subtle privacy implications of design choices of existing MPCS.  Furthermore, we identify promising avenues for future research for MPCS, and desirable properties that merit more attention.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{satoToucheEnhancingTouch2012,
  title = {Touché: Enhancing Touch Interaction on Humans, Screens, Liquids, and Everyday Objects},
  shorttitle = {Touché},
  author = {Sato, Munehiko and Poupyrev, Ivan and Harrison, Chris},
  date = {2012-05-05},
  pages = {483--492},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Austin Texas USA},
  doi = {10.1145/2207676.2207743},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2207676.2207743},
  urldate = {2025-03-10},
  abstract = {Touché proposes a novel Swept Frequency Capacitive Sensing technique that can not only detect a touch event, but also recognize complex configurations of the human hands and body. Such contextual information significantly enhances touch interaction in a broad range of applications, from conventional touchscreens to unique contexts and materials. For example, in our explorations we add touch and gesture sensitivity to the human body and liquids. We demonstrate the rich capabilities of Touché with five example setups from different application domains and conduct experimental studies that show gesture classification accuracies of 99\% are achievable with our technology.},
  eventtitle = {{{CHI}} '12: {{CHI Conference}} on {{Human Factors}} in {{Computing Systems}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-1015-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{schermerImprovedBendLoss2007,
  title = {Improved {{Bend Loss Formula Verified}} for {{Optical Fiber}} by {{Simulation}} and {{Experiment}}},
  author = {Schermer, Ross T. and Cole, James H.},
  date = {2007-10},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics},
  volume = {43},
  number = {10},
  pages = {899--909},
  issn = {1558-1713},
  doi = {10.1109/JQE.2007.903364},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4300920/?arnumber=4300920},
  urldate = {2024-08-30},
  abstract = {This paper presents an improved curvature loss formula for optical waveguides, which is shown to accurately predict the bend loss of both single-mode and multimode fibers. The formula expands upon a previous formula derived by Marcuse, greatly improving its accuracy for the case of multimode fiber. Also presented are the results of bent fiber simulations using the beam propagation method (BPM), and experimental measurements of bend loss. Agreement among simulation, formula and measurement support the validity of both theoretical methods. BPM simulations showed that the lowest order modes of the bent fiber were reduced to their linearly polarized constituents prior to the onset of significant bend loss. This implies that certain LP mode orientations should propagate with much lower loss than previously expected, and should impact the mode stripping ability of bent large mode area fibers, as employed in fiber lasers and amplifiers.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Journal}} of {{Quantum Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Dielectric waveguides,Fiber lasers,laser amplifiers,Laser modes,Loss measurement,optical fiber amplifiers,Optical fiber amplifiers,optical fiber lasers,Optical fiber losses,Optical fiber polarization,Optical fibers,Optical propagation,optical waveguide theory,Optical waveguides,Propagation losses,waveguide bends}
}

@online{schmiegGooglesThreatModel2024,
  type = {Blog Article},
  title = {Google's {{Threat}} Model for {{Post-Quantum Cryptography}}},
  author = {Schmieg, Sophie and Kölbl, Stefan and Endignoux, Guillaume},
  date = {2024-11-03},
  url = {https://bughunters.google.com/blog/5108747984306176/google-s-threat-model-for-post-quantum-cryptography},
  urldate = {2024-06-27},
  abstract = {Read on to understand how Google currently evaluates the threat landscape related to post-quantum cryptography, and what implications this has for migrating from classical cryptographic algorithms to PQC.},
  langid = {american},
  organization = {Google's Threat model for Post-Quantum Cryptography}
}

@inproceedings{schmitzRollingTipFlexibleInstrument2019,
  title = {A {{Rolling-Tip Flexible Instrument}} for {{Minimally Invasive Surgery}}},
  booktitle = {2019 {{International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})},
  author = {Schmitz, Andreas and Treratanakulchai, Shen and Berthet-Rayne, Pierre and Yang, Guang-Zhong},
  date = {2019-05},
  pages = {379--385},
  issn = {2577-087X},
  doi = {10.1109/ICRA.2019.8793480},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8793480/?arnumber=8793480},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  abstract = {Snake-like robots are commonly used in Minimally Invasive Surgery as they are able to reach areas deep inside the human body. These robots have instruments that are deployed out of the robot's head and controlled via tendons, which connect the instrument to motors at the proximal end. In most currently available systems the instruments are lacking a rolling motion of the end-effector.In this paper, we present a new instrument prototype for a snake-like robot that can perform a stable in-place rolling motion. The prototype has a diameter of 4mm, uses 13 tendons and has 6 degrees of freedom. The robot can bend and roll to high angles, and strongly improves the dexterity compared to an instrument without rolling capabilities. In the evaluation we show that the rolling-tip gripper can rotate about 165° and is capable of applying forces up to 6.5N.},
  eventtitle = {2019 {{International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})},
  keywords = {End effectors,Fasteners,Grippers,Instruments,Surgery,Tendons}
}

@article{schoosJitSCAJitterbasedSideChannel2023,
  title = {{{JitSCA}}: {{Jitter-based Side-Channel Analysis}} in {{Picoscale Resolution}}},
  shorttitle = {{{JitSCA}}},
  author = {Schoos, Kai and Meschkov, Sergej and Tahoori, Mehdi B. and Gnad, Dennis R. E.},
  date = {2023-06-09},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  volume = {2023},
  number = {3},
  pages = {294--320},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i3.294-320},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/10965},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {In safety and security conscious environments, isolated communication channels are often deemed necessary. Galvanically isolated communication channels are typically expected not to allow physical side-channel attacks through that channel. However, in this paper, we show that they can inadvertently leak side channel information in the form of minuscule jitter on the communication signal. We observe worst-case signal jitter within 54 ± 45 ps using an FPGA-based receiver employing a time-to-digital converter (TDC), which is a higher time resolution than a typical oscilloscope can measure, while in many other systems such measurements are also possible. A transmitter device runs a cryptographic accelerator, while we connect an FPGA on the receiver side and measure the signal jitter using a TDC. We can indeed show sufficient side-channel leakage in the jitter of the signal by performing a key recovery of an AES accelerator running on the transmitter. Furthermore, we compare this leakage to a power side channel also measured with a TDC and prove that the timing jitter alone contains sufficient side-channel information. While for an on-chip power analysis attack about 27k traces are needed for key recovery, our cross-device jitter-based attack only needs as few as 47k traces, depending on the setup. Galvanic isolation does not change that significantly. That is an increase by only 1.7x, showing that fine-grained jitter timing information can be a very potent attack vector even under galvanic isolation. In summary, we introduce a new side-channel attack vector that can leak information in many presumably secure systems. Communication channels can inadvertently leak information through tiny timing variations, known as signal jitter. This could affect millions of devices and needs to be considered.},
  issue = {3},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {galvanically isolated,jitter,power,side-channel,timing}
}

@online{scott-railtonWhoseAuthorityPegasus2024,
  title = {By {{Whose Authority}}? {{Pegasus}} Targeting of {{Russian}} \& {{Belarusian-speaking}} Opposition Activists and Independent Media in {{Europe}}},
  shorttitle = {By {{Whose Authority}}?},
  author = {Scott-Railton, John and Marczak, Bill and Razzak, Bahr Abdul and Ermoshina, Ksenia and Anstis, Siena and Deibert, Ron},
  date = {2024-05-30T07:59:44-04:00},
  url = {https://citizenlab.ca/2024/05/pegasus-russian-belarusian-speaking-opposition-media-europe/},
  urldate = {2025-11-26},
  abstract = {In a joint investigation with Access Now, we found that seven Russian and Belarusian-speaking independent journalists and opposition activists based in Europe were targeted and/or infected with NSO Group’s Pegasus mercenary spyware.},
  organization = {Citizen Lab, University of Toronto},
  keywords = {Apple,Pegasus,spyware}
}

@article{sculleyMachineLearningHighInterest,
  title = {Machine {{Learning}}: {{The High-Interest Credit Card}} of {{Technical Debt}}},
  author = {Sculley, D and Holt, Gary and Golovin, Daniel and Davydov, Eugene and Phillips, Todd and Ebner, Dietmar and Chaudhary, Vinay and Young, Michael},
  abstract = {Machine learning offers a fantastically powerful toolkit for building complex systems quickly. This paper argues that it is dangerous to think of these quick wins as coming for free. Using the framework of technical debt, we note that it is remarkably easy to incur massive ongoing maintenance costs at the system level when applying machine learning. The goal of this paper is highlight several machine learning specific risk factors and design patterns to be avoided or refactored where possible. These include boundary erosion, entanglement, hidden feedback loops, undeclared consumers, data dependencies, changes in the external world, and a variety of system-level anti-patterns.},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{SD04203RB25D5,
  title = {{{SD-04203RB25-D5}}},
  author = {{Securitas Technology GmbH}},
  date = {2019},
  url = {https://setec-security.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SD-04203RB25-D5.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-10-30},
  organization = {Setec Sicherheitstechnik}
}

@online{SecureFlexPaymentTerminal,
  title = {Secure-{{Flex}}™ for {{Payment Terminal Security}} | {{Johnson Electric}}},
  url = {https://www.johnsonelectric.com/en/solutions/secure-flex-for-payment-terminal-security},
  urldate = {2025-08-13}
}

@article{selmkeApplicationTwoPhotonAbsorption2022,
  title = {On the Application of {{Two-Photon Absorption}} for {{Laser Fault Injection}} Attacks: {{Pushing}} the Physical Boundaries for {{Laser-based Fault Injection}}},
  shorttitle = {On the Application of {{Two-Photon Absorption}} for {{Laser Fault Injection}} Attacks},
  author = {Selmke, Bodo and Pollanka, Maximilian and Duensing, Andreas and Strieder, Emanuele and Wen, Hayden and Mittermair, Michael and Kienberger, Reinhard and Sigl, Georg},
  date = {2022-08-31},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  pages = {862--885},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2022.i4.862-885},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9843},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {Laser Fault Injection (LFI) is considered to be the most powerful semiinvasive fault injection method for implementation attacks on security devices. In this work we discuss for the first time the application of the nonlinear Two-Photon Absorption (TPA) effect for the purpose of LFI. Though TPA is an established technique in other areas, e.g. fluorescence microscopy, so far it did not receive any attention in the field of physical attack methods on integrated circuits. We show that TPA has several superior properties over the regular linear LFI method. The TPA effect allows to work on non-thinned devices without increasing the induced energy and hence the stress on the device. In contrast to regular LFI, the nonlinearity of the TPA effect leads to increased precision due to the steeper descent in intensity and also a vertically restricted photoelectric effect. By practical experiments, we demonstrate the general applicability of the method for a specific device and that unlike a regular LFI setup, TPA-LFI is capable to inject faults without triggering a latch-up effect. In addition we discuss the possible implications of TPA-LFI on various sensor-based countermeasures.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Countermeasures,Fault Attacks,Laser Fault Injection,Single-Photon Absorption,Two-Photon Absorption}
}

@article{senOrigamiInductorFoldable2024,
  title = {Origami {{Inductor}}: {{Foldable}} 3-{{D Polyhedron Multiphase Air-Coupled Inductors With Flux Cancellation}} and {{Faster Transient}}},
  shorttitle = {Origami {{Inductor}}},
  author = {Sen, Tanuj and Elasser, Youssef and Chen, Minjie},
  date = {2024-06},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {39},
  number = {6},
  pages = {7312--7328},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2024.3374572},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10462531/?arnumber=10462531},
  urldate = {2024-10-30},
  abstract = {Traditional air-coupled inductors are usually limited to two phases. This article presents the concept of multiphase 3-D polyhedron air-coupled inductors – termed “origami inductors” – formed by folding planar windings on modular surfaces into symmetric 3-D structures, which enables symmetric air-coupling of more than two phases. The air-coupled origami inductors, unlike traditional multiphase coupled inductors, do not need a magnetic core and can operate at high frequencies. Compared to discrete air-core inductors, the origami inductors can be easily transported and assembled and can offer reduced size, smaller current ripple, and faster transient due to dc and ac flux cancellation. Models are developed to quantify the performance benefits of the origami inductor. A tetrahedron-shaped four-phase origami inductor was designed and through FEM simulations, its reduced volume was verified. The origami inductor was also tested as a part of a 5 V input, 12 V output, 80 W four-phase interleaved dc–dc boost converter, switching between frequencies ranging from 1 to 5 MHz, to verify its operational effectiveness.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Air-coupled inductor,Analytical models,Atmospheric modeling,dc–dc converter,inductance dual model,Inductors,Integrated circuit modeling,interleaving,magnetic circuit model,multiphase,origami,permeance-capacitor model,polyhedron,Semiconductor device modeling,Solid modeling,Windings}
}

@article{seolTrustedIaaSEnvironment2016,
  title = {A {{Trusted IaaS Environment}} with {{Hardware Security Module}}},
  author = {Seol, Jinho and Jin, Seongwook and Lee, Daewoo and Huh, Jaehyuk and Maeng, Seungryoul},
  date = {2016-05},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Services Computing},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {343--356},
  issn = {1939-1374},
  doi = {10.1109/TSC.2015.2392099},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7010017/?arnumber=7010017&tag=1},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  abstract = {With the proliferation of cloud computing, security concerns about confidentiality violations of user data by the privileged domain and system administrators have been growing. This paper proposes secure cloud architecture with a hardware security module, which isolates cloud user data from potentially malicious privileged domains or cloud administrators. Within a securely isolated execution environment, the hardware security module provides essential security functionality with only restricted interfaces exposed to vulnerable management systems or cloud administrators. Such restriction prevents cloud administrators from affecting the security of guest VMs. The proposed architecture not only defends against wide attack vectors but also achieves a small TCB. This paper discusses our hardware and software implementation of the proposed cloud architecture, analyzes its security, and presents its performance results.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Services Computing}}},
  keywords = {Cloud computing,Computer architecture,Cryptography,Hardware,hardware security module,Hardware Security Module,Protocols,security,TCB}
}

@article{sh2016,
  title = {Application of {{MEMS}} Accelerometer for Detection and Diagnosis of Multiple Faults in the Roller Element Bearings of Three Phase Induction Motor},
  author = {S., Maruthi G. and Hegde, Vishwanath},
  date = {2016},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Sensors Journal},
  volume = {16},
  number = {1},
  issn = {1558-1748},
  doi = {10.1109/JSEN.2015.2476561},
  url = {https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Vishwanath-Hegde-2/publication/282389149_Application_of_MEMS_Accelerometer_for_Detection_and_Diagnosis_of_Multiple_Faults_in_the_Roller_Element_Bearings_of_Three_Phase_Induction_Motor/links/568bace808aebccc4e1c01fa/Application-of-MEMS-Accelerometer-for-Detection-and-Diagnosis-of-Multiple-Faults-in-the-Roller-Element-Bearings-of-Three-Phase-Induction-Motor.pdf}
}

@book{shabany2009,
  title = {Heat Transfer: {{Thermal}} Management of Electronics},
  author = {Shabany, Younes},
  date = {2009},
  publisher = {CRC Press},
  isbn = {978-1-4398-1468-0}
}

@article{shenDAENetMakingStrong2022,
  title = {{{DAENet}}: {{Making Strong Anonymity Scale}} in a {{Fully Decentralized Network}}},
  shorttitle = {{{DAENet}}},
  author = {Shen, Tianxiang and Jiang, Jianyu and Jiang, Yunpeng and Chen, Xusheng and Qi, Ji and Zhao, Shixiong and Zhang, Fengwei and Luo, Xiapu and Cui, Heming},
  date = {2022-07},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing},
  volume = {19},
  number = {4},
  pages = {2286--2303},
  issn = {1941-0018},
  doi = {10.1109/TDSC.2021.3052831},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9328493/?arnumber=9328493},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {Traditional anonymous networks (e.g., Tor) are vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks that monitor the whole network traffic to determine which users are communicating. To preserve user anonymity against traffic analysis attacks, the emerging mix networks mess up the order of packets through a set of centralized and explicit shuffling nodes. However, this centralized design of mix networks is insecure against targeted DoS attacks that can completely block these shuffling nodes. In this article, we present DAENet, an efficient mix network that resists both targeted DoS attacks and traffic analysis attacks with a new abstraction called Stealthy Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Network. The stealthy P2P network effectively hides the shuffling nodes used in a routing path into the whole network, such that adversaries cannot distinguish specific shuffling nodes and conduct targeted DoS attacks to block these nodes. In addition, to handle traffic analysis attacks, we leverage the confidentiality and integrity protection of Intel SGX to ensure trustworthy packet shuffles at each distributed host and use multiple routing paths to prevent adversaries from tracking and revealing user identities. We show that our system is scalable with moderate latency (2.2s) when running in a cluster of 10,000 participants and is robust in the case of machine failures, making it an attractive new design for decentralized anonymous communication. DAENet ’s code is released on https://github.com/hku-systems/DAENet.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Dependable}} and {{Secure Computing}}},
  keywords = {Cryptography,Denial-of-service attack,DoS attack,mix network,P2P network,Peer-to-peer computing,Relays,Resists,Routing,Scalable anonymous communication,Servers,SGX,traffic analysis attack}
}

@article{shenThermalModelingDesign2020,
  title = {Thermal {{Modeling}} and {{Design Optimization}} of {{PCB Vias}} and {{Pads}}},
  author = {Shen, Yanfeng and Wang, Huai and Blaabjerg, Frede and Zhao, Hui and Long, Teng},
  date = {2020-01},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Power Electron.},
  volume = {35},
  number = {1},
  pages = {882--900},
  issn = {0885-8993, 1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2019.2915029},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8706634/},
  urldate = {2024-01-30},
  abstract = {Miniature power semiconductor devices mounted on printed circuit boards (PCBs) are normally cooled by means of PCB vias, copper pads, and/or heatsinks. Various reference PCB thermal designs have been provided by semiconductor manufacturers and researchers. However, the recommendations are not optimal, and there are some discrepancies among them, which may confuse electrical engineers. This paper aims to develop analytical thermal resistance models for PCB vias and pads, and further to obtain the optimal design for thermal resistance minimization. First, the PCB via array is thermally modeled in terms of multiple design parameters. A systematic parametric analysis leads to an optimal trajectory for the via diameter at different PCB specifications. Then, an axisymmetric thermal resistance model is developed for PCB thermal pads where the heat conduction, convection, and radiation all exist; due to the interdependence between the conductive/radiative heat transfer coefficients and the board temperatures, an algorithm is proposed to fast obtain the board-ambient thermal resistance and to predict the semiconductor junction temperature. Finally, the proposed thermal models and design optimization algorithms are verified by computational fluid dynamics simulations and experimental measurements.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{shorAlgorithmsQuantumComputation1994,
  title = {Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Logarithms and Factoring},
  shorttitle = {Algorithms for Quantum Computation},
  booktitle = {Proceedings 35th {{Annual Symposium}} on {{Foundations}} of {{Computer Science}}},
  author = {Shor, P.W.},
  date = {1994-11},
  pages = {124--134},
  doi = {10.1109/SFCS.1994.365700},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/365700},
  urldate = {2024-09-02},
  abstract = {A computer is generally considered to be a universal computational device; i.e., it is believed able to simulate any physical computational device with a cost in computation time of at most a polynomial factor: It is not clear whether this is still true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. Several researchers, starting with David Deutsch, have developed models for quantum mechanical computers and have investigated their computational properties. This paper gives Las Vegas algorithms for finding discrete logarithms and factoring integers on a quantum computer that take a number of steps which is polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. These two problems are generally considered hard on a classical computer and have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. We thus give the first examples of quantum cryptanalysis.{$<>$}},
  eventtitle = {Proceedings 35th {{Annual Symposium}} on {{Foundations}} of {{Computer Science}}},
  keywords = {Circuit simulation,Computational modeling,Computer simulation,Costs,Cryptography,Mechanical factors,Physics computing,Polynomials,Quantum computing,Quantum mechanics}
}

@article{shorPolynomialTimeAlgorithmsPrime1997,
  title = {Polynomial-{{Time Algorithms}} for {{Prime Factorization}} and {{Discrete Logarithms}} on a {{Quantum Computer}}},
  author = {Shor, Peter W.},
  date = {1997-10},
  journaltitle = {SIAM Journal on Computing},
  shortjournal = {SIAM J. Comput.},
  volume = {26},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1484--1509},
  publisher = {{Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics}},
  issn = {0097-5397},
  doi = {10.1137/S0097539795293172},
  url = {https://epubs.siam.org/doi/10.1137/S0097539795293172},
  urldate = {2024-09-02},
  abstract = {A digital computer is generally believed to be an efficient universal computing device; that is, it is believed able to simulate any physical computing device with an increase in computation time by at most a polynomial factor. This may not be true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. This paper considers factoring integers and finding discrete logarithms, two problems which are generally thought to be hard on a classical computer and which have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. Efficient randomized algorithms are given for these two problems on a hypothetical quantum computer. These algorithms take a number of steps polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. MSC codes 81P10 11Y05 68Q10 03D10 Keywords algorithmic number theory prime factorization discrete logarithms Church's thesis quantum computers foundations of quantum mechanics spin systems Fourier transforms}
}

@online{siffermanUnlockingPerformanceProximity2023,
  title = {Unlocking the {{Performance}} of {{Proximity Sensors}} by {{Utilizing Transient Histograms}}},
  author = {Sifferman, Carter and Wang, Yeping and Gupta, Mohit and Gleicher, Michael},
  date = {2023-08-25},
  eprint = {2308.13473},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2308.13473},
  urldate = {2023-12-21},
  abstract = {We provide methods which recover planar scene geometry by utilizing the transient histograms captured by a class of close-range time-of-flight (ToF) distance sensor. A transient histogram is a one dimensional temporal waveform which encodes the arrival time of photons incident on the ToF sensor. Typically, a sensor processes the transient histogram using a proprietary algorithm to produce distance estimates, which are commonly used in several robotics applications. Our methods utilize the transient histogram directly to enable recovery of planar geometry more accurately than is possible using only proprietary distance estimates, and consistent recovery of the albedo of the planar surface, which is not possible with proprietary distance estimates alone. This is accomplished via a differentiable rendering pipeline, which simulates the transient imaging process, allowing direct optimization of scene geometry to match observations. To validate our methods, we capture 3,800 measurements of eight planar surfaces from a wide range of viewpoints, and show that our method outperforms the proprietary-distance-estimate baseline by an order of magnitude in most scenarios. We demonstrate a simple robotics application which uses our method to sense the distance to and slope of a planar surface from a sensor mounted on the end effector of a robot arm.},
  langid = {english},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,Computer Science - Robotics}
}

@www{signal2019,
  title = {Technology {{Preview}} for Secure Value Recovery},
  author = {Lund, Joshua},
  date = {2019-12-19},
  journaltitle = {Signal},
  url = {https://signal.org/blog/secure-value-recovery/},
  urldate = {2021-07-12}
}

@article{simmonsHowInsureThat1988,
  title = {How to Insure That Data Acquired to Verify Treaty Compliance Are Trustworthy},
  author = {Simmons, G.J.},
  date = {1988-05},
  journaltitle = {Proceedings of the IEEE},
  volume = {76},
  number = {5},
  pages = {621--627},
  issn = {1558-2256},
  doi = {10.1109/5.4446},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4446/},
  urldate = {2025-06-26},
  abstract = {The author presents a solution to the problem of how to make it possible for two mutually distrusting (and presumed deceitful) parties, the host and the monitor, to both trust a data acquisition system that informs the monitor and perhaps third parties, whether the host has or has not violated the terms of a treaty. He starts by assuming that such a data acquisition system exists, and that the opportunities for deception lie only in the manipulation, i.e. forgery, modification, retransmission, etc. The author shows that it is possible to satisfy simultaneously the interests of all parties. The technical device on which this resolution depends is the concatenation of two or more private authentication channels to create a system in which each participant need only trust that part of the whole that he or she contributed. In the resulting scheme, no part of the data need to be kept secret from any participant at any time; no party nor collusion of fewer than all of the parties can utter an undetectable forgery; no unilateral action on the part of any party can lessen the confidence of others as to the authenticity of the data, and third parties, i.e. arbiters, can be logically persuaded of the authenticity of data.{$<>$}},
  keywords = {Arm,Computer security,Computer Society,Control systems,Data acquisition,Forgery,Laboratories,Monitoring,Nuclear weapons,System testing}
}

@article{skorobogatovHardwareSecurityImplications2018,
  title = {Hardware {{Security Implications}} of {{Reliability}}, {{Remanence}}, and {{Recovery}} in {{Embedded Memory}}},
  author = {Skorobogatov, Sergei},
  date = {2018-12-01},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Hardware and Systems Security},
  shortjournal = {J Hardw Syst Secur},
  volume = {2},
  number = {4},
  pages = {314--321},
  issn = {2509-3436},
  doi = {10.1007/s41635-018-0050-5},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-018-0050-5},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Secure semiconductor devices usually destroy key material on tamper detection. However, data remanence effect in SRAM and Flash/EEPROM makes secure erasure process more challenging. On the other hand, data integrity of the embedded memory is essential to mitigate fault attacks and Trojan malware. Data retention issues could influence the reliability of embedded systems. Some examples of such issues in industrial and automotive applications are presented. When it comes to the security of semiconductor devices, both data remanence and data retention issues could lead to possible data recovery by an attacker. This paper introduces a new power glitching technique that reduces the data remanence time in embedded SRAM from seconds to microseconds at almost no cost. This would definitely help in designing systems with better secret key guarding. Data remanence in non-volatile memory could be influenced in the same way. The effect of data remanence and data retention on hardware security is discussed and possible countermeasures are suggested. This should raise awareness among the designers of secure embedded systems.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Data remanence,Data retention,EEPROM,Flash,Glitching,Hardware security,PRNG,PUF,SRAM}
}

@online{slanySicherheitsanalyseZurSicherheit2020,
  title = {Sicherheitsanalyse zur Sicherheit der kritischen Komponenten der elektronischen Patientenakte nach §291a SGB V},
  author = {Slany, Wolfgang},
  date = {2020-03},
  url = {https://www.gematik.de/media/gematik/Medien/Newsroom/Presse/Dokumente/Sicherheitsanalyse_TU_Graz_zur_ePA_mit_Vorwort_der_gematik.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-05-15},
  langid = {german}
}

@online{SmaugDracheUnd,
  title = {Smaug, der Drache, und die ePA: Ein zentraler Schlüsselgenerierungsdienst, ein zentrales Risiko},
  shorttitle = {Smaug, der Drache, und die ePA},
  url = {https://de.linkedin.com/pulse/smaug-der-drache-und-die-epa-ein-zentraler-zentrales-risiko-block-vh3ue},
  urldate = {2025-05-10},
  abstract = {Stell Dir vor, wir befinden uns in Tolkiens Welt von Der Hobbit: Smaug, der mächtige Drache, liegt auf einem Berg aus Gold, überzeugt davon, dass er unbesiegbar ist. Doch in seiner scheinbar uneinnehmbaren Festung gibt es eine winzige Schwachstelle – eine kleine Stelle in seinem Panzer.},
  langid = {ngerman},
  annotation = {Archive 1: https://archive.is/PVJO8\\
Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pulse/smaug-der-drache-und-die-epa-ein-zentraler-zentrales-risiko-block-vh3ue}
}

@article{smithBuildingHighperformanceProgrammable1999,
  title = {Building a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor},
  author = {Smith, Sean W and Weingart, Steve},
  date = {1999-04},
  journaltitle = {Computer Networks},
  shortjournal = {Computer Networks},
  volume = {31},
  number = {8},
  pages = {831--860},
  issn = {13891286},
  doi = {10.1016/S1389-1286(98)00019-X},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S138912869800019X},
  urldate = {2025-11-04},
  abstract = {Secure coprocessors enable secure distributed applications by providing safe havens where an application program can execute Žand accumulate state., free of observation and interference by an adversary with direct physical access to the device. However, for these coprocessors to be effective, participants in such applications must be able to verify that they are interacting with an authentic program on an authentic, untampered device. Furthermore, secure coprocessors that support general-purpose computation and will be manufactured and distributed as commercial products must provide these core sanctuary and authentication properties while also meeting many additional challenges, including: Ø the applications, operating system, and underlying security management may all come from different, mutually suspicious authorities; Ø configuration and maintenance must occur in a hostile environment, while minimizing disruption of operations; Ø the device must be able to recover from the vulnerabilities that inevitably emerge in complex software; Ø physical security dictates that the device itself can never be opened and examined; and Ø ever-evolving cryptographic requirements dictate that hardware accelerators be supported by reloadable on-card software. This paper summarizes the hardware, software, and cryptographic architecture we developed to address these problems. Furthermore, with our colleagues, we have implemented this solution, into a commercially available product. q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{smithDesignOptimizationVoice2015,
  title = {Design and {{Optimization}} of a {{Voice Coil Motor With}} a {{Rotary Actuator}} for an {{Ultrasound Scanner}}},
  author = {Smith, Kristopher J. and Graham, David J. and Neasham, Jeffrey A.},
  date = {2015-11},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics},
  volume = {62},
  number = {11},
  pages = {7073--7078},
  issn = {1557-9948},
  doi = {10.1109/TIE.2015.2449780},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7132747/?arnumber=7132747},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {This paper proposes a new application for the rotary voice coil motor (VCM). In developing a low-cost ultrasound scanner for the developing world, an oscillating transducer is required to sweep over the skin. The ultrasound scanner must operate from a USB power supply in remote locations. The application requires a 3.3-N force on the coils of the motor to overcome the inertia of the skin. A proof-of-concept prototype motor with electronics has been designed, simulated, and tested. The VCM optimization is discussed in detail with the unique separation of the magnets being critical to reduce the axial bearing forces for this application.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industrial Electronics}}},
  keywords = {3-D finite-element analysis (FEA),3D Finite-Element Analysis,Force,Magnetic flux leakage,Magnetic levitation,Magnetic separation,Optimization,Permanent Magnet (PM) Motor,Permanent-magnet (PM) motor,rotary actuator,Rotary Actuator,Saturation magnetization,Ultrasonic imaging,voice coil motor (VCM),Voice Coil Motor (VCM)}
}

@patent{smithMethodApparatusActive1999,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Method and Apparatus for Active Tamper Indicating Device Using Optical Time-Domain Reflectometry},
  author = {Smith, D. Barton and Muhs, Jeffrey D. and Pickett, Chris A. and Earl, D. Duncan},
  holder = {{Lockheed Martin Energy Research Corp}},
  date = {1999-12-14},
  number = {6002501A},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US6002501A/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-11},
  keywords = {breach,loop,operative,reflectometer,signals}
}

@report{smithRobustInexactGeometric,
  title = {Towards Robust Inexact Geometric Computation},
  author = {Smith, Julian M.},
  pages = {186 pages},
  institution = {Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge},
  doi = {10.48456/TR-766},
  url = {https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-766.html},
  urldate = {2024-06-26},
  abstract = {Geometric algorithms implemented using rounded arithmetic are prone to robustness problems. Geometric algorithms are often a mix of arithmetic and combinatorial computations, arising from the need to create geometric data structures that are themselves a complex mix of numerical and combinatorial data. Decisions that influence the topology of a geometric structure are made on the basis of certain arithmetic calculations, but the inexactness of these calculations may lead to inconsistent decisions, causing the algorithm to produce a topologically invalid result or to fail catastrophically. The research reported here investigates ways to produce robust algorithms with inexact computation. I present two algorithms for operations on piecewise linear (polygonal/polyhedral) shapes. Both algorithms are topologically robust, meaning that they are guaranteed to generate a topologically valid result from a topologically valid input, irrespective of numerical errors in the computations. The first algorithm performs the Boolean operation in 3D, and also in 2D. The main part of this algorithm is a series of interdependent operations. The relationship between these operations ensures a consistency in these operations, which, I prove, guarantees the generation of a shape representation with valid topology. The basic algorithm may generate geometric artifacts such as gaps and slivers, which generally can be removed by a data-smoothing post-process. The second algorithm presented performs simplification in 2D, converting a geometrically invalid (but topologically valid) shape representation into one that is fully valid. This algorithm is based on a variant of the Bentley-Ottmann sweep line algorithm, but with additional rules to handle situations not possible under an exact implementation. Both algorithms are presented in the context of what is required of an algorithm in order for it to be classed as robust in some sense. I explain why the formulaic approach used for the Boolean algorithm cannot readily be used for the simplification process. I also give essential code details for a C++ implementation of the 2D simplification algorithm, and discuss the results of extreme tests designed to show up any problems. Finally, I discuss floating-point arithmetic, present error analysis for the floating-point computation of the intersection point between two segments in 2D, and discuss how such errors affect both the simplification algorithm and the basic Boolean algorithm in 2D.}
}

@inproceedings{songhoriTinyGarbleHighlyCompressed2015,
  title = {{{TinyGarble}}: {{Highly Compressed}} and {{Scalable Sequential Garbled Circuits}}},
  shorttitle = {{{TinyGarble}}},
  booktitle = {2015 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}},
  author = {Songhori, Ebrahim M. and Hussain, Siam U. and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Schneider, Thomas and Koushanfar, Farinaz},
  date = {2015-05},
  pages = {411--428},
  issn = {2375-1207},
  doi = {10.1109/SP.2015.32},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7163039/},
  urldate = {2025-08-15},
  abstract = {We introduce Tiny Garble, a novel automated methodology based on powerful logic synthesis techniques for generating and optimizing compressed Boolean circuits used in secure computation, such as Yao's Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol. Tiny Garble achieves an unprecedented level of compactness and scalability by using a sequential circuit description for GC. We introduce new libraries and transformations, such that our sequential circuits can be optimized and securely evaluated by interfacing with available garbling frameworks. The circuit compactness makes the memory footprint of the garbling operation fit in the processor cache, resulting in fewer cache misses and thereby less CPU cycles. Our proof-of-concept implementation of benchmark functions using Tiny Garble demonstrates a high degree of compactness and scalability. We improve the results of existing automated tools for GC generation by orders of magnitude, for example, Tiny Garble can compress the memory footprint required for 1024-bit multiplication by a factor of 4,172, while decreasing the number of non-XOR gates by 67\%. Moreover, with Tiny Garble we are able to implement functions that have never been reported before, such as SHA-3. Finally, our sequential description enables us to design and realize a garbled processor, using the MIPS I instruction set, for private function evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scalable emulation of a general purpose processor.},
  eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}},
  keywords = {Garbled Circuit,Hardware design languages,Hardware Synthesis,Libraries,Logic Design,Logic gates,Optimization,Protocols,Secure Function Evaluation,Sequential circuits,Wires}
}

@inproceedings{songPOSTERInaudibleVoice2017,
  title = {{{POSTER}}: {{Inaudible Voice Commands}}},
  shorttitle = {{{POSTER}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Song, Liwei and Mittal, Prateek},
  date = {2017-10-30},
  pages = {2583--2585},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Dallas Texas USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3133956.3138836},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3133956.3138836},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Voice assistants like Siri enable us to control IoT devices conveniently with voice commands, however, they also provide new attack opportunities for adversaries. Previous papers attack voice assistants with obfuscated voice commands by leveraging the gap between speech recognition system and human voice perception. The limitation is that these obfuscated commands are audible and thus conspicuous to device owners. In this poster, we propose a novel mechanism to directly attack the microphone used for sensing voice data with inaudible voice commands. We show that the adversary can exploit the microphone’s non-linearity and play welldesigned inaudible ultrasounds to cause the microphone to record normal voice commands, and thus control the victim device inconspicuously. We demonstrate via end-to-end real-world experiments that our inaudible voice commands can attack an Android phone and an Amazon Echo device with high success rates at a range of 2-3 meters.},
  eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '17: 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-4946-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{songRotationLightweightWirelessPower2019,
  title = {A {{Rotation-Lightweight Wireless Power Transfer System}} for {{Solar Wing Driving}}},
  author = {Song, Kai and Ma, Bingqing and Yang, Guang and Jiang, Jinhai and Wei, Ruizhi and Zhang, Hang and Zhu, Chunbo},
  date = {2019-09},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {34},
  number = {9},
  pages = {8816--8830},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2018.2886910},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8576647/?arnumber=8576647},
  urldate = {2024-12-10},
  abstract = {In this paper, a novel magnetic coupler of wireless power transfer system for the solar wing driving of the spacecraft is designed. Compared with the traditional slip-ring power supply, the proposed magnetic coupler is characterized by non-contact, high efficiency, wear free, safety, and reliability. Particularly, it can be applied to the rotating condition. To realize light weight and small volume of the receiver, the magnetic coupler has been optimized from both compensation topology and coil configuration. First, a series-none topology is employed to eliminate the bulky secondary-side compensation capacitor. Second, a new nested solenoid coil with strip core is proposed to ensure miniaturization, stable power transfer, and high efficiency. Finally, the experimental setup is built to verify the performance of the designed magnetic coupler. Experimental results are well matched to simulations, demonstrating that the weight of the prototype is 1.3 kg and the transfer power is 3 kW at an ac-dc efficiency of 92.7\%.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Couplers,Couplings,Magnetic cores,Magnetic flux,Power generation,Resistance,Rotary magnetic coupler,series-none (S-0) topology,solar wing driving,solenoid coil,strip core,Topology,wireless power transfer (WPT)}
}

@inproceedings{sozioPatchableHardwareSecurity2021,
  title = {Patchable {{Hardware Security Module}} ({{PHaSM}}) for {{Extending FPGA Root-of-Trust Capabilities}}},
  booktitle = {2021 {{IEEE Physical Assurance}} and {{Inspection}} of {{Electronics}} ({{PAINE}})},
  author = {Sozio, Christopher and Jordan, Zachary and Skipper, Grant and Lukefahr, Andrew and Duncan, Adam},
  date = {2021-11},
  pages = {1--8},
  doi = {10.1109/PAINE54418.2021.9707698},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9707698/?arnumber=9707698},
  urldate = {2024-07-10},
  abstract = {Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are re-programmable hardware devices widely used in consumer and defense applications. Their specific functionality is determined by programming the FPGA with a configuration file, or bitstream, which often occurs at bootup. FPGAs rely on a hardware Root-of-Trust (RoT) to verify the authenticity of these (re)programming attempts. Any vulnerability in an FPGA’s RoT enables adversarial (re)programming, tampering, and information extraction from the FPGA. Unlike software, when hardware RoT vulnerabilities are exposed the FPGA cannot be patched, but remains forever vulnerable to exploit.This work assumes a hardware RoT on an FPGA will be compromised at some point by an adversary. We propose incorporating a second, patchable, layer of security to prevent adversarial attacks on FPGAs, even those with potentially compromised hardware RoT schemes. To accomplish this, we present Patchable Hardware Security Module (PHaSM), a patchable hybrid security framework that enables a secondary RoT. PHaSM implements a small bootloader in the FPGA’s reconfigurable fabric and incorporates user-defined authentication and decryption schemes. The bootloader loads an application configuration, PHaSM then decrypts and authenticates it using the user-defined schemes, and programs the application design into the remaining FPGA fabric using partial reconfiguration. Should the user-defined security scheme become vulnerable, a new security scheme can be incorporated without modifying the original application design.},
  eventtitle = {2021 {{IEEE Physical Assurance}} and {{Inspection}} of {{Electronics}} ({{PAINE}})},
  keywords = {Authentication,Bitstream,Fabrics,FPGA,Hardware,Information retrieval,Inspection,Programming,Reconfiguration,Security,Software}
}

@standard{SpezifikationFachmodulEPA2023,
  title = {Spezifikation Fachmodul ePA},
  date = {2023-04-03},
  langid = {ngerman},
  version = {1.53.0}
}

@article{sproHighVoltageInsulationDesign2021,
  title = {High-{{Voltage Insulation Design}} of {{Coreless}}, {{Planar PCB Transformers}} for {{Multi-MHz Power Supplies}}},
  author = {Spro, Ole Christian and Mauseth, Frank and Peftitsis, Dimosthenis},
  date = {2021-08},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {36},
  number = {8},
  pages = {8658--8671},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2021.3049353},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9314282/?arnumber=9314282},
  urldate = {2024-10-30},
  abstract = {This article investigates the insulation design for printed, planar, coreless, and high-frequency transformers with high isolation-voltage. By using finite element analysis on 2-D axial-symmetry, the transformer circuit parameters and electric field distribution are modeled and estimated. Several transformers are designed for an operating frequency of 6.78 MHz. The high frequency, coreless design allows for using thicker insulation material while ensuring a high transformer efficiency. The inclusion of the coupling capacitance in the design optimization results in several design solutions with the same figure of merit, but with different footprint and isolation voltages. Moreover, high electric fields are identified around the sharp edges of the printed circuit board (PCB) windings. Finally, the electrical and isolation performance is verified experimentally. The measured electrical properties are close to the simulated values, validating the chosen model. Breakdown tests demonstrate the feasibility of isolation voltage levels up to several tens of kilovolts. The majority of breakdowns occurs at the outer edge of the PCB winding that was identified as a high-field area. Additionally, a concept for grading the electric field of PCB windings is also proposed. Based on the results, the design aspects are discussed in detail for planar, high-frequency isolation transformers with medium-voltage isolation level.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Capacitance,Couplings,Design methodology,dielectric breakdown,insulation,Insulation,Power supplies,Power transformer insulation,resonant power conversion,Transformer cores,transformers,Windings}
}

@inproceedings{staatAntiTamperRadioSystemLevel2022,
  title = {Anti-{{Tamper Radio}}: {{System-Level Tamper Detection}} for {{Computing Systems}}},
  shorttitle = {Anti-{{Tamper Radio}}},
  booktitle = {2022 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  author = {Staat, Paul and Tobisch, Johannes and Zenger, Christian and Paar, Christof},
  date = {2022-05},
  pages = {1722--1736},
  issn = {2375-1207},
  doi = {10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833631},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9833631/},
  urldate = {2025-04-09},
  abstract = {A whole range of attacks becomes possible when adversaries gain physical access to computing systems that process or contain sensitive data. Examples include side-channel analysis, bus probing, device cloning, or implanting hardware Trojans. Defending against these kinds of attacks is considered a challenging endeavor, requiring anti-tamper solutions to monitor the physical environment of the system. Current solutions range from simple switches, which detect if a case is opened, to meshes of conducting material that provide more fine-grained detection of integrity violations. However, these solutions suffer from an intricate trade-off between physical security on the one side and reliability, cost, and difficulty to manufacture on the other.In this work, we demonstrate that radio wave propagation in an enclosed system of complex geometry is sensitive against adversarial physical manipulation. We present an anti-tamper radio (ATR) solution as a method for tamper detection, which combines high detection sensitivity and reliability with ease-of-use. ATR constantly monitors the wireless signal propagation behavior within the boundaries of a metal case. Tamper attempts such as insertion of foreign objects, will alter the observed radio signal response, subsequently raising an alarm.The ATR principle is applicable in many computing systems that require physical security such as servers, ATMs, and smart meters. As a case study, we use 19” servers and thoroughly investigate capabilities and limits of the ATR. Using a custom-built automated probing station, we simulate probing attacks by inserting needles with high precision into protected environments. Our experimental results show that our ATR implementation can detect 16mm insertions of needles of diameter as low as 0.1mm under ideal conditions. In the more realistic environment of a running 19” server, we demonstrate reliable detection of 40mm insertions of needles of diameter 1mm for a period of 10 days.},
  eventtitle = {2022 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})},
  keywords = {Geometry,Needles,Robot sensing systems,Sensitivity,Servers,Wireless communication,Wireless sensor networks}
}

@online{stmicroelectronicsSTM32G474xBDatasheet2021,
  title = {{{STM32G474xB}}/{{C}}/{{E Datasheet}}},
  author = {{ST Microelectronics}},
  date = {2021-11},
  annotation = {DS12288 Rev 6}
}

@book{struttVerstarkerUndEmpfanger1951,
  title = {Verstärker Und {{Empfänger}}},
  author = {Strutt, M. J. O.},
  date = {1951},
  series = {Lehrbuch Der {{Drahtlosen Nachrichtentechnik}}},
  edition = {2},
  volume = {4},
  publisher = {Springer-Verlag},
  keywords = {twisted-inductors}
}

@article{stuckiLongtermPerformanceSwissQuantum2011,
  title = {Long-Term Performance of the {{SwissQuantum}} Quantum Key Distribution Network in a Field Environment},
  author = {Stucki, D and Legré, M and Buntschu, F and Clausen, B and Felber, N and Gisin, N and Henzen, L and Junod, P and Litzistorf, G and Monbaron, P and Monat, L and Page, J-B and Perroud, D and Ribordy, G and Rochas, A and Robyr, S and Tavares, J and Thew, R and Trinkler, P and Ventura, S and Voirol, R and Walenta, N and Zbinden, H},
  date = {2011-12-01},
  journaltitle = {New Journal of Physics},
  shortjournal = {New J. Phys.},
  volume = {13},
  number = {12},
  pages = {123001},
  issn = {1367-2630},
  doi = {10.1088/1367-2630/13/12/123001},
  url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1367-2630/13/12/123001},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  abstract = {In this paper, we report on the performance of the SwissQuantum quantum key distribution (QKD) network. The network was installed in the Geneva metropolitan area and ran for more than one-and-a-half years, from the end of March 2009 to the beginning of January 2011. The main goal of this experiment was to test the reliability of the quantum layer over a long period of time in a production environment. A key management layer has been developed to manage the key between the three nodes of the network. This QKD-secure network was utilized by end-users through an application layer.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{suhDesignDiscreteBending2017,
  title = {Design of a Discrete Bending Joint Using Multiple Unit {{PREF}} Joints for Isotropic 2-{{DOF}} Motion},
  author = {Suh, Jung-wook and Kim, Ki-young},
  date = {2017-02-01},
  journaltitle = {International Journal of Control, Automation and Systems},
  shortjournal = {Int. J. Control Autom. Syst.},
  volume = {15},
  number = {1},
  pages = {64--72},
  issn = {2005-4092},
  doi = {10.1007/s12555-016-0474-z},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12555-016-0474-z},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  abstract = {Miniature steerable robots are required for various medical applications. Although a typical continuum joint mechanism has a great advantage of miniaturization, it is difficult to have a small bending radius of curvature. With a discrete joint, it is easy to secure definite bending with strength; however, a coarsely structured joint cannot provide a stable distal rolling motion to the end-effector. This paper proposes a method to construct a 2-DOF discrete bending joint using multiple pulleyless rolling joints with an example of a 4-segmental joint. The effects of the stacking sequence on its performance are analyzed. Then, three evaluation criteria are established, and the best stacking sequences are determined. The proposed design method is valid for various numbers of unit joints, and it can be easily applied to the structural design of soft robots resembling snakes or elephant trunks.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Continuum joint,discrete joint,isotropic bending,PREF joint,stacking sequence,surgical robot}
}

@article{sutardjaIsolatorLessNearFieldRFID2018,
  title = {Isolator-{{Less Near-Field RFID Reader}} for {{Sub-Cranial Powering}}/{{Data Link}} of {{Millimeter-Sized Implants}}},
  author = {Sutardja, Christopher and Rabaey, Jan M.},
  date = {2018-07},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits},
  shortjournal = {IEEE J. Solid-State Circuits},
  volume = {53},
  number = {7},
  pages = {2032--2042},
  issn = {0018-9200, 1558-173X},
  doi = {10.1109/JSSC.2018.2822673},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8356220/},
  urldate = {2023-10-31}
}

@patent{suttonElectricallyprotectedStructure1902,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Electrically-Protected Structure},
  author = {Sutton, Henry M. and Steele, Walter L. and Coerver, Michael},
  holder = {{Individual}},
  date = {1902-09-02},
  number = {708093A},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US708093A/en?oq=US708093},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {circuit,grooves,protected,wires,wiring}
}

@article{takeokaFundamentalRatelossTradeoff2014,
  title = {Fundamental Rate-Loss Tradeoff for Optical Quantum Key Distribution},
  author = {Takeoka, Masahiro and Guha, Saikat and Wilde, Mark M.},
  date = {2014-10-24},
  journaltitle = {Nature Communications},
  shortjournal = {Nat Commun},
  volume = {5},
  number = {1},
  pages = {5235},
  issn = {2041-1723},
  doi = {10.1038/ncomms6235},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms6235},
  urldate = {2024-09-05},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{TamperResistance2020,
  title = {Tamper {{Resistance}}},
  booktitle = {Security {{Engineering}}},
  date = {2020},
  pages = {599--637},
  publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd},
  doi = {10.1002/9781119644682.ch18},
  url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781119644682.ch18},
  urldate = {2024-12-03},
  abstract = {The security engineer needs to understand what tamper resistance is, and what it can and can't do. In this chapter, the author takes the reader through the past thirty years of evolution of attack and defence. The banking community realised that commercial operating systems were likely to remain insufficient to protect PINs, particularly from bank insiders, and decided to use separate hardware to manage them. This led to the development of standalone cryptographic modules or hardware security modules (HSMs). The chapter provides a few comments about the evaluation of HSMs. Each of the product categories discussed in this chapter, from HSMs down through FPGAs to smartcards, has a wide range of offerings with wide variability in the quality of protection. The security engineer will therefore have to pay attention to the many failure modes of systems involving tamper-resistant processors that are more or less independent of the price or technical tamper-resistance of the device.},
  isbn = {978-1-119-64468-2},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {banking community,FPGAs,hardware security modules,security engineer,smartcards,tamper resistance}
}

@article{tangMeasurementDeviceIndependentQuantumKey2016,
  title = {Measurement-{{Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution}} over {{Untrustful Metropolitan Network}}},
  author = {Tang, Yan-Lin and Yin, Hua-Lei and Zhao, Qi and Liu, Hui and Sun, Xiang-Xiang and Huang, Ming-Qi and Zhang, Wei-Jun and Chen, Si-Jing and Zhang, Lu and You, Li-Xing and Wang, Zhen and Liu, Yang and Lu, Chao-Yang and Jiang, Xiao and Ma, Xiongfeng and Zhang, Qiang and Chen, Teng-Yun and Pan, Jian-Wei},
  date = {2016-03-04},
  journaltitle = {Physical Review X},
  shortjournal = {Phys. Rev. X},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {011024},
  issn = {2160-3308},
  doi = {10.1103/PhysRevX.6.011024},
  url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevX.6.011024},
  urldate = {2024-05-02},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{tanImprovedParasiticCapacitance2012,
  title = {An {{Improved Parasitic Capacitance Cancellation Method}} for {{Planar Differential Mode Inductor}} in {{EMI Filters}}},
  booktitle = {2012 7th {{International Conference}} on {{Integrated Power Electronics Systems}} ({{CIPS}})},
  author = {Tan, Wenhua and Margueron, Xavier and Duquesne, Thierry and Idir, Nadir},
  date = {2012-03},
  pages = {1--6},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6170646/?arnumber=6170646},
  urldate = {2024-09-23},
  abstract = {Power semiconductor components with high switching speed are widely used in static converters. However, they produce conducted electromagnetic interferences in high frequencies. Filters are one solution for reducing the conducted emissions. However, the parasitic elements of the passive components in the EMI filter deteriorate its performances. In this paper, we propose to study a differential mode (DM) inductor in planar technology. The goal is to reduce the parasitic capacitance of the planar DM inductor via an improved parasitic capacitance cancellation technique. The technique is based on the results of an analytical method using Electric Field Decomposition and energy based approach. The cancellation is then realized through the structural parasitic capacitances under an optimal geometry configuration. The efficiency of the proposed cancellation technique is validated by measurements.},
  eventtitle = {2012 7th {{International Conference}} on {{Integrated Power Electronics Systems}} ({{CIPS}})},
  keywords = {Conductors,Delta modulation,Ferrites,Inductors,Parasitic capacitance,Windings}
}

@article{taoDesignPCBRogowski2016,
  title = {Design of {{PCB Rogowski Coil}} and {{Analysis}} of {{Anti-interference Property}}},
  author = {Tao, Tao and Zhao, Zhihua and Ma, Weiming and Pan, Qijun and Hu, Anqi},
  date = {2016-04},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.},
  volume = {58},
  number = {2},
  pages = {344--355},
  issn = {0018-9375, 1558-187X},
  doi = {10.1109/TEMC.2013.2252906},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7397992/},
  urldate = {2024-09-19}
}

@report{tedeschiTimeDomainReflectometryTamper2014,
  title = {Time-{{Domain Reflectometry}} for {{Tamper Indication}} in {{Unattended Monitoring Systems}} for {{Safeguards}}},
  author = {Tedeschi, Jonathan R. and Smith, Leon E. and Moore, David E. and Sheen, David M. and Conrad, Ryan C.},
  date = {2014-12-01},
  number = {PNNL--23893, 1167318},
  pages = {PNNL--23893, 1167318},
  doi = {10.2172/1167318},
  url = {http://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1167318/},
  urldate = {2025-04-11},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{tehranipoorHardwareSecurityPrimitives2023,
  title = {Hardware {{Security Primitives}}},
  author = {Tehranipoor, Mark and Pundir, Nitin and Vashistha, Nidish and Farahmandi, Farimah},
  date = {2023},
  publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-19185-5},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-19185-5},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  isbn = {978-3-031-19184-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@book{tehranipoorIntroductionHardwareSecurity2012,
  title = {Introduction to {{Hardware Security}} and {{Trust}}},
  editor = {Tehranipoor, Mohammad and Wang, Cliff},
  date = {2012},
  publisher = {Springer New York},
  location = {New York, NY},
  doi = {10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  isbn = {978-1-4419-8079-3},
  langid = {english}
}

@misc{tektronixinc.TektronixS6Sampling1982,
  title = {Tektronix {{S-6 Sampling Head Instruction Manual}}},
  author = {{Tektronix Inc.}},
  date = {1982-09},
  url = {https://w140.com/tekwiki/images/2/22/070-1128-01_1987.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-04-08}
}

@www{terdiman2013,
  title = {Aboard {{America}}'s {{Doomsday}} Command and Control Plane},
  author = {Terdiman, Daniel},
  date = {2013-07-23},
  journaltitle = {CNET},
  url = {https://www.cnet.com/news/aboard-americas-doomsday-command-and-control-plane}
}

@www{thales2015hsmha,
  title = {{{SafeNet PCI-e HSM}} 6.2 Product Documentation: {{High}} Availability ({{HA}}) Overview},
  author = {NV, Gemalto},
  date = {2015-12-18},
  publisher = {Gemalto NV},
  url = {https://thalesdocs.com/gphsm/luna/6.2/docs/pci/Content/administration/ha/ha_overview.htm},
  urldate = {2021-07-12}
}

@www{thales2021,
  title = {Thales Luna {{HSM}} Product Family Overview Page},
  author = {Group, Thales},
  date = {2021},
  publisher = {Thales Group},
  url = {https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/encryption/hardware-security-modules/network-hsms},
  urldate = {2021-07-08}
}

@misc{ThalesLunaNetwork2024,
  title = {Thales {{Luna Network HSM Product Brief}}},
  date = {2024-10},
  url = {https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/content/product_briefs/luna-sa-network-attached-hsm-pb.pdf},
  urldate = {2025-10-27},
  organization = {Thales}
}

@online{thalesLunaNetworkHardware,
  title = {Luna {{Network Hardware Security Modules}}},
  author = {{Thales}},
  url = {https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/encryption/hardware-security-modules/network-hsms},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  abstract = {Luna Network HSMs is a high-assurance, tamper-resistant, network-attached appliance that's an easy to integrate HSM solution.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{tobisch2020,
  title = {Electromagnetic Enclosure {{PUF}} for Tamper Proofing Commodity Hardware and Other Applications},
  author = {Tobisch, Johannes and Zenger, Christian and Paar, Christof},
  date = {2020-03-13},
  journaltitle = {TRUDEVICE 2020: 9th Workshop on Trustworthy Manufacturing and Utilization of Secure Devices},
  url = {https://www.emsec.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2020/05/13/trudevice_submission_enclosure_puf.pdf},
  urldate = {2020-09-17}
}

@article{tobischPhysicalSystemsIntegrity,
  title = {Physical Systems for Integrity Protection and Authentication},
  author = {Tobisch, Johannes},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{tobischPhysicalSystemsIntegritya,
  title = {Physical Systems for Integrity Protection and Authentication},
  author = {Tobisch, Johannes},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{tolkSafeguardsSensorsSystems2007,
  title = {Safeguards {{Sensors}} and {{Systems}}: {{Past}}, {{Present}}, and {{Future}}},
  shorttitle = {Safeguards {{Sensors}} and {{Systems}}},
  author = {Tolk, Keith and Mangan, Dennis and Glidewell, Don and Matter, John and Whichello, Julian},
  date = {2007-07-01},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Nuclear Materials Management},
  shortjournal = {Journal of Nuclear Materials Management},
  volume = {35},
  number = {4},
  pages = {101--110},
  issn = {0893-6188},
  abstract = {Sensors are a vital and critical element in measuring and monitoring systems for technical safeguards approaches. Safeguards sensors have evolved from standalone analog devices to integrated digital systems. Safeguards sensor technologies are a niche market that has been driven by other commercial and military demands and applications. Developers and manufacturers have successfully adapted technologies of the day to be effective products for safeguards applications. In this paper commemorating the first fifty years of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its role in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and international safeguards, we highlight the evolution of sensor technologies applied to international safeguards. This history began with the use of cameras and seals for containment and surveillance to maintain continuity of knowledge on safeguarded materials and activities. The current international safeguards norm is based on a combination of onsite verification measures and unattended and remote measurement and monitoring systems. The near-term need for detection of undeclared nuclear materials, facilities, and activities will likely be addressed by the engineering development of several novel technologies. The long-range development of safeguards sensor systems will be shaped by research in materials, computing, and communication technologies.}
}

@article{trebbelsMiniaturizedFPGABasedHighResolution2013,
  title = {Miniaturized {{FPGA-Based High-Resolution Time-Domain Reflectometer}}},
  author = {Trebbels, Dennis and Kern, Alois and Fellhauer, Felix and Huebner, Christof and Zengerle, Roland},
  date = {2013-07},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement},
  volume = {62},
  number = {7},
  pages = {2101--2113},
  issn = {1557-9662},
  doi = {10.1109/TIM.2013.2245190},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6484979},
  urldate = {2025-04-08},
  abstract = {Time-domain reflectometry (TDR) is a well-known measurement principle for evaluating frequency-dependent electric and dielectric properties of various materials and substances. Although TDR is a proven method, the high price for TDR measurement equipment and complex laboratory setups is often a limiting factor for cost-sensitive applications or large-scale field experiments, where a large number of TDR meters is required. This paper reports on the development of a new miniaturized low-cost TDR meter capable of sampling a repetitive rectangular waveform, which is used as an excitation signal. The developed sampling circuit is based on a digital delta modulator (DM) and allows for capturing the waveform of a repetitive measurement signal. A 1-MHz signal can be captured with a virtual sampling resolution of 1 ps within a measurement interval of 1 s. The generated pulses have a rise time of 2 ns and can be captured with an amplitude resolution of approximately 10 bit and an accuracy of approximately 8 bit. The developed digital DM architecture is implemented inside a small field programmable gate array and integrated into a miniaturized low-power TDR meter prototype for battery-powered outdoor applications. The captured measurement data are stored on integrated micro-SD card memory and can be read out either via a Universal Serial Bus, an RS-485 bus system, or a wireless interface. The TDR meter is controlled by an integrated microcontroller and a real-time clock and therefore can operate completely independent from any additional control setup. The TDR meter targets applications within the field of geoscience and agricultural monitoring, where large-scale measurement systems are required.},
  keywords = {Delta-modulation,Impedance,Power cables,Signal resolution,time-domain reflectometry (TDR),Time-frequency analysis,Transmission line measurements,undersampling}
}

@inproceedings{trippel2017,
  title = {{{WALNUT}}: {{Waging}} Doubt on the Integrity of {{MEMS}} Accelerometers with Acoustic Injection Attacks},
  booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE European}} Symposium on Security and Privacy},
  author = {Trippel, Timothy and Weisse, Ofir and Xu, Wenyuan and Honeyman, Peter and Fu, Kevin},
  date = {2017},
  pages = {3--18},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  doi = {10.1109/EuroSP.2017.42},
  x-fetchedfrom = {Google Scholar}
}

@inproceedings{tropgen16YearsSPEC2024,
  title = {16 {{Years}} of {{SPEC Power}}: {{An Analysis}} of X86 {{Energy Efficiency Trends}}},
  shorttitle = {16 {{Years}} of {{SPEC Power}}},
  booktitle = {2024 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Cluster Computing Workshops}} ({{CLUSTER Workshops}})},
  author = {Tröpgen, Hannes and Schöne, Robert and Ilsche, Thomas and Hackenberg, Daniel},
  date = {2024-09},
  pages = {76--80},
  doi = {10.1109/CLUSTERWorkshops61563.2024.00020},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10740865},
  urldate = {2025-10-27},
  abstract = {The SPEC Power benchmark offers valuable insights into the energy efficiency of server systems, allowing comparisons across various hardware and software configurations. Benchmark results are publicly available for hundreds of systems from different vendors, published since 2007. We leverage this data to perform an analysis of trends in x86 server systems, focusing on power consumption, energy efficiency, energy proportionality and idle power consumption. Through this analysis, we aim to provide a clearer understanding of how server energy efficiency has evolved and the factors influencing these changes.},
  eventtitle = {2024 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Cluster Computing Workshops}} ({{CLUSTER Workshops}})},
  keywords = {Benchmark testing,Computer architecture,Computer performance,Conferences,Energy efficiency,Focusing,Hardware,High performance computing,Market research,Performance analysis,Power demand,Processor energy efficiency,Servers,Software}
}

@online{tschirsichHackerHinOder2019,
  title = {"{{Hacker}} Hin Oder Her": {{Die}} Elektronische {{Patientenakte}} Kommt!},
  shorttitle = {"{{Hacker}} Hin Oder Her"},
  author = {Tschirsich, Martin and Brodowski, Dr med Christian and Zilch, Dr André},
  date = {2019-12-27},
  url = {https://media.ccc.de/v/36c3-10595-hacker_hin_oder_her_die_elektronische_patientenakte_kommt},
  urldate = {2025-05-15},
  abstract = {Herzstück der digitalen Gesundheitsversorgung für 73 Millionen Versicherte ist die hochsichere, kritische Telematik-Infrastruktur mit ber...},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{tschirsichKonnteBisherNoch2024,
  title = {„{{Konnte}} Bisher Noch Nie Gehackt Werden“: {{Die}} Elektronische {{Patientenakte}} Kommt - Jetzt Für Alle!},
  shorttitle = {„{{Konnte}} Bisher Noch Nie Gehackt Werden“},
  author = {Tschirsich, Martin and Kastl, Bianca},
  date = {2024-12-27},
  url = {https://media.ccc.de/v/38c3-konnte-bisher-noch-nie-gehackt-werden-die-elektronische-patientenakte-kommt-jetzt-fr-alle},
  urldate = {2025-05-15},
  abstract = {In wenigen Wochen werden die Gesundheitsdaten von rund 73 Millionen in Deutschland Krankenversicherten ohne deren Zutun über Praxis- und ...},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{tschofenig2015,
  title = {Performance of State-of-the-Art Cryptography on {{ARM-based}} Microprocessors},
  booktitle = {{{NIST}} Lightweight Cryptography Workshop 2015},
  author = {Tschofenig, Hannes and Pegourie-Gonnard, Manuel and Vincent, Hugo},
  date = {2015-07-21},
  url = {https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/events/lightweight-cryptography-workshop-2015/documents/presentations/session7-vincent.pdf},
  urldate = {2021-07-13}
}

@incollection{tuylsVisualCryptoDisplays2004,
  title = {Visual {{Crypto Displays Enabling Secure Communications}}},
  booktitle = {Security in {{Pervasive Computing}}},
  author = {Tuyls, Pim and Kevenaar, Tom and Schrijen, Geert-Jan and Staring, Toine and Van Dijk, Marten},
  editor = {Hutter, Dieter and Müller, Günter and Stephan, Werner and Ullmann, Markus},
  editora = {Goos, Gerhard and Hartmanis, Juris and Van Leeuwen, Jan},
  editoratype = {redactor},
  date = {2004},
  volume = {2802},
  pages = {271--284},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-39881-3_23},
  url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-540-39881-3_23},
  urldate = {2025-08-15},
  abstract = {In this paper we describe a low-tech and user friendly solution for secure two-way communication between two parties over a network of untrusted devices. We present a solution in which displays play a central role. Our approach guarantees privacy and allows to check the authenticity of information presented on displays. Furthermore, we provide the user with a secure return channel. To this end we propose to provide every user with a small decryption display which is, for example, integrated in a credit card and requires very limited computing power. The authentication and security are based on visual cryptography which was first introduced by Naor and Shamir in 1994. We solve some practical shortcomings of traditional visual cryptography and develop protocols for two-way authentication and privacy in untrusted environments.},
  isbn = {978-3-540-20887-7 978-3-540-39881-3},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{tyagiOrcaBlocklistingSenderAnonymous,
  title = {Orca: {{Blocklisting}} in {{Sender-Anonymous Messaging}}},
  author = {Tyagi, Nirvan and Len, Julia and Miers, Ian and Ristenpart, Thomas},
  abstract = {Sender-anonymous end-to-end encrypted messaging allows sending messages to a recipient without revealing the sender’s identity to the messaging platform. Signal recently introduced a sender anonymity feature that includes an abuse mitigation mechanism meant to allow the platform to block malicious senders on behalf of a recipient.},
  langid = {english}
}

@report{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002,
  title = {Security {{Requirements}} for {{Cryptographic Modules}}},
  author = {{(US) National Institute of Standards and Technology}},
  date = {2002-12-03},
  number = {Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2},
  institution = {U.S. Department of Commerce},
  doi = {10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-2},
  url = {https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/140-2/upd2/final},
  urldate = {2025-04-08},
  abstract = {This Federal Information Processing Standard (140-2) specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module, providing four increasing, qualitative levels intended to cover a wide range of potential applications and environments. The areas covered, related to the secure design and implementation of a cryptographic module, include specification; ports and interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; finite state model; physical security; operational environment; cryptographic key management; electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC); self-tests; design assurance; and mitigation of other attacks.},
  langid = {english}
}

@report{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019,
  title = {Security {{Requirements}} for {{Cryptographic Modules}}},
  author = {{(US) National Institute of Standards and Technology}},
  date = {2019-03-22},
  number = {Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3},
  institution = {U.S. Department of Commerce},
  doi = {10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3},
  url = {https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/140-3/final},
  urldate = {2025-05-15},
  abstract = {The selective application of technological and related procedural safeguards is an important responsibility of every federal organization in providing adequate security in its computer and telecommunication systems.~ ~This standard is applicable to all federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106 and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Public Law 107-347.~  This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract.~ The standard provides four increasing, qualitative levels of security intended to cover a wide range of potential applications and environments.~ The security requirements cover areas related to the secure design,...},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{utimacoUseCases,
  title = {Use {{Cases}}},
  author = {{Utimaco}},
  url = {https://utimaco.com/use-cases},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{utimacoWhatCloudHSM2025,
  title = {What Is {{Cloud HSM}}?},
  shorttitle = {What Is {{Cloud HSM}}?},
  author = {{Utimaco}},
  date = {2025-09-10},
  url = {https://utimaco.com/service/knowledge-base/hardware-security-modules/what-cloud-hsm},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  abstract = {Cloud HSM is a cloud-hosted Hardware Security Module (HSM) that enables the user to host encryption keys and perform cryptographic operations with the benefits of a cloud service deployment while leveraging the benefits of cloud service deployment and eliminating the need to host and maintain on-premises appliances.},
  langid = {english}
}

@online{Utrust_GP_HSM_Se_Series_Datasheet_ENpdf,
  title = {U.Trust {{General Purpose HSM Se-Series Datasheet}}},
  date = {2025-04},
  url = {https://utimaco.com/resources/downloads/data-sheets/utrust-general-purpose-hsm-se-series-datasheet},
  urldate = {2025-10-27},
  organization = {utimaco}
}

@inproceedings{uzunCryptographicKeyDerivation2021,
  title = {Cryptographic {{Key Derivation}} from {{Biometric Inferences}} for {{Remote Authentication}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2021 {{ACM Asia Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Uzun, Erkam and Yagemann, Carter and Chung, Simon and Kolesnikov, Vladimir and Lee, Wenke},
  date = {2021-05-24},
  pages = {629--643},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Virtual Event Hong Kong},
  doi = {10.1145/3433210.3437512},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3433210.3437512},
  urldate = {2023-01-17},
  eventtitle = {{{ASIA CCS}} '21: {{ACM Asia Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-8287-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{vaiSecureArchitectureEmbedded2015,
  title = {Secure Architecture for Embedded Systems},
  booktitle = {2015 {{IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference}} ({{HPEC}})},
  author = {Vai, Michael and Nahill, Ben and Kramer, Josh and Geis, Michael and Utin, Dan and Whelihan, David and Khazan, Roger},
  date = {2015-09},
  pages = {1--5},
  doi = {10.1109/HPEC.2015.7322461},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7322461/},
  urldate = {2025-04-09},
  abstract = {Devices connected to the internet are increasingly the targets of deliberate and sophisticated attacks [1]. Embedded system engineers tend to focus on well-defined functional capabilities rather than “obscure” security and resilience. However, “after-the-fact” system hardening could be prohibitively expensive or even impossible. The co-design of security and resilience with functionality has to overcome a major challenge; rarely can the security and resilience requirements be accurately identified when the design begins. This paper describes an embedded system architecture that decouples secure and functional design aspects.},
  eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference}} ({{HPEC}})},
  keywords = {AES,Computer architecture,confidentiality,cryptography,embedded systems,Embedded systems,Encryption,Hardware,integrity,key management,PUF,security,security coprocessor,Suite B}
}

@inproceedings{vanstrydonckCHERITrEEFlexibleEnclaves2023,
  title = {{{CHERI-TrEE}}: {{Flexible}} Enclaves on Capability Machines},
  shorttitle = {{{CHERI-TrEE}}},
  booktitle = {2023 {{IEEE}} 8th {{European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})},
  author = {Van Strydonck, Thomas and Noorman, Job and Jackson, Jennifer and Alves Dias, Leonardo and Vanderstraeten, Robin and Oswald, David and Piessens, Frank and Devriese, Dominique},
  date = {2023-07},
  pages = {1143--1159},
  doi = {10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00070},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10190507/?arnumber=10190507},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {This paper studies the integration of two successful hardware-supported security mechanisms: capabilities and enclaved execution. Capabilities are a powerful and flexible security mechanism for implementing fine-grained memory access control and compartmentalizing untrusted or buggy software components. Capabilities have a long history but have gained significant momentum recently, as evidenced by ARM’s experimental Morello processor that supports the Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI). Enclaved execution is a popular mechanism for dynamically creating Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), called enclaves. Enclaves are isolated execution contexts that protect the integrity and confidentiality of software in the enclave (even against compromised system software) and that support attestation.Integrating capabilities and enclaved execution in a single processor is challenging because they overlap partially in their security objectives, and a clean integration should unify the way in which these overlapping objectives are achieved. In addition, it is not obvious how attestation should interact with capabilities. In this paper, we propose CHERI-TrEE: a novel design for a processor that cleanly integrates support for both capabilities and enclaved execution. CHERI-TrEE targets low-end embedded systems without virtual memory. We show that CHERI-TrEE is greater than the sum of its parts by showing how it naturally supports useful features that have traditionally been hard to support in enclaved execution, like dynamically growing and shrinking enclaves, non-contiguous and nested enclaves, sharing of memory between enclaves etc. We implement our proposal both in hardware on a RISC-V processor, as well as in a small software hypervisor on top of ARM Morello, and evaluate impact on performance and hardware resources.},
  eventtitle = {2023 {{IEEE}} 8th {{European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})},
  keywords = {Access control,ARM Morello,capability machines,CHERI,CHERI-RISC-V,Context,Embedded systems,enclaves,Hardware,Reduced instruction set computing,System software,TEE,trusted execution,Virtual machine monitors}
}

@inproceedings{vasileActiveTamperDetection2017,
  title = {Active Tamper Detection Circuit Based on the Analysis of Pulse Response in Conductive Mesh},
  author = {Vasile, Daniel-Ciprian and Svasta, Paul and Codreanu, Norocel and Safta, Mariana},
  date = {2017-05},
  pages = {1--6},
  issn = {2161-2536},
  doi = {10.1109/ISSE.2017.8000987},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8000987/?arnumber=8000987},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Tamper detection circuits provide the first and most important defensive wall in protecting electronic modules containing security data. A widely used procedure is to cover the entire module with a foil containing fine conductive mesh, which detects intrusion attempts. Detection circuits are further classified as passive or active. Passive circuits have the advantage of low power consumption, however they are unable to detect small variations in the conductive mesh parameters. Since modern tools provide an upper leverage over the passive method, the most efficient way to protect security modules is thus to use active circuits. The active tamper detection circuits are typically probing the conductive mesh with short pulses, analyzing its response in terms of delay and shape. The method proposed in this paper generates short pulses at one end of the mesh and analyzes the response at the other end. Apart from measuring pulse delay, the analysis includes a frequency domain characterization of the system, determining whether there has been an intrusion or not, by comparing it to a reference (un-tampered with) spectrum. The novelty of this design is the combined analysis, in time and frequency domains, of the small variations in mesh characteristic parameters.},
  eventtitle = {40th {{International Spring Seminar}} on {{Electronics Technology}} ({{ISSE}})},
  keywords = {Clocks,Delays,Frequency-domain analysis,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,sampling-mesh,Security,Shape}
}

@inproceedings{vasileImprovedTamperDetection2016,
  title = {Improved Tamper Detection Circuit Based on Linear-Feedback Shift Register},
  booktitle = {2016 {{IEEE}} 22nd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
  author = {Vasile, D. C. and Marghescu, A. and Svasta, P.},
  date = {2016-10},
  pages = {130--133},
  doi = {10.1109/SIITME.2016.7777261},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7777261/?arnumber=7777261},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The paper presents an improved method to detect tamper intrusions based on an active circuit. It is composed of a logical part, a microcontroller, capable of generating pulses that follow the rule of a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), and an analogical part made of a mesh network, used to cover secure modules, and a pulse forming circuit. Pulses resulted from this forming circuit are analyzed by the microcontroller to determine the durations between pulses and the durations of pulses. The novelty of this method is that the pulses are generated synchronously at both ends of the mesh network in order to prevent any attempts of an attacker to break the wire of the mesh network and to simulate the generation of pulses.},
  eventtitle = {2016 {{IEEE}} 22nd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
  keywords = {active,Copper,Delays,Generators,LFSR,mesh,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,Pins,Resistance,sampling-mesh,security,tamper}
}

@inproceedings{vasileProtectingSecretsAdvanced2019,
  title = {Protecting the {{Secrets}}: {{Advanced Technique}} for {{Active Tamper Detection Systems}}},
  shorttitle = {Protecting the {{Secrets}}},
  author = {Vasile, Daniel-Ciprian and Svasta, Paul},
  date = {2019-10},
  pages = {212--215},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  issn = {2642-7036},
  doi = {10.1109/SIITME47687.2019.8990877},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8990877/?arnumber=8990877},
  urldate = {2024-12-13},
  abstract = {Cryptographic modules and security circuits are the kernels of every piece of equipment that process security data. No matter where they are deployed, the equipment must be protected against physical attacks, as no one can access the electronic circuits that process the security data: firmware implementations, cryptographic keys and secret data. The most effective way to protect this kind of electronic circuits is to wrap them in a special conductive mesh and probe it with proper signals in order to detect intrusions. This paper provides a complete solution for intrusions detection: a system made of a special conductive mesh and an active tamper detection circuit. The conductive mesh consists of three layers that detect intrusions earlier than the effective penetration of the mesh. The active tamper detection circuit is designed to probe the mesh with signals that cannot be emulated by an adversary.},
  eventtitle = {25th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
  keywords = {anti-tamper,cryptography,mesh,security}
}

@inproceedings{vasileTemperatureSensitiveActive2017,
  title = {Temperature Sensitive Active Tamper Detection Circuit},
  author = {Vasile, D. C. and Svasta, P. M.},
  date = {2017-10},
  pages = {175--178},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  doi = {10.1109/SIITME.2017.8259885},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8259885/?arnumber=8259885},
  urldate = {2024-12-12},
  abstract = {Electronic modules designed for processing sensitive data, such as cryptographic modules, firmware solutions protected by intellectual property rights and secure communication devices, use special circuits designed for protecting these solutions from unauthorized physical access. The main components of these circuits are the conductive mesh structure, which acts as a protective cover, and the active tamper detection circuit. Besides the physical attacks, there are side channel attacks, where an attacker takes advantage of the errors produced by the logic circuits functioning in extreme conditions. When logic circuits are subject of temperatures that exceed the operational limits, they may run with faults and create proper conditions for cryptographic attacks. This paper proposes an active tamper detection circuit that analyses the temperature (and its variation gradient) of the conductive mesh. This method improves and complements the protection functions of the active tamper detection circuits.},
  eventtitle = {23rd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
  keywords = {active,Cryptography,Electronic circuits,Ports (Computers),Program processors,sampling-mesh,security,tamper,temperature,Temperature distribution,Temperature measurement,Temperature sensors}
}

@article{vidakovicHardwareBasedMethodsElectronic2023,
  title = {Hardware-{{Based Methods}} for {{Electronic Device Protection}} against {{Invasive}} and {{Non-Invasive Attacks}}},
  author = {Vidaković, Marin and Vinko, Davor},
  date = {2023-11-02},
  journaltitle = {Electronics},
  shortjournal = {Electronics},
  volume = {12},
  number = {21},
  pages = {4507},
  issn = {2079-9292},
  doi = {10.3390/electronics12214507},
  url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/12/21/4507},
  urldate = {2025-03-21},
  abstract = {This paper reviews hardware-based protection methods for electronic devices, encompassing scientific publications and published patents. This review covers insights from the scientific community and innovative solutions patented in the industry. By combining these two sources, this paper offers a comprehensive and holistic review of electronic device security. Electronic devices are integral to modern life, but their widespread use invites security threats, both digital and physical. This paper reviews hardware-based protection methods against invasive and non-invasive attacks, emphasizing the importance of a dual approach through hardware design. Invasive attacks involve physical tampering, and we explore anti-tampering techniques such as conductive meshes, sensors and physically unclonable functions (PUFs). Non-invasive, side-channel attacks encompass various attack vectors, focusing on electromagnetic analysis. To counter these attacks, we analyze techniques like reducing and masking electromagnetic radiation. This paper bridges the gap between invasive and non-invasive attack mitigation. It underscores the necessity of a multifaceted approach to safeguard electronic devices in an interconnected world, preserving their reliability and functionality.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{voloshynovskiyInformationtheoreticAnalysisElectronic2006,
  title = {Information-Theoretic Analysis of Electronic and Printed Document Authentication},
  author = {Voloshynovskiy, Sviatoslav and Koval, Oleksiy and Villan, Renato and Topak, Emre and Vila Forcén, José Emilio and Deguillaume, Frederic and Rytsar, Yuriy and Pun, Thierry},
  editor = {Delp III, Edward J. and Wong, Ping Wah},
  date = {2006-02-02},
  pages = {60721D},
  location = {San Jose, CA},
  doi = {10.1117/12.641940},
  url = {http://proceedings.spiedigitallibrary.org/proceeding.aspx?doi=10.1117/12.641940},
  urldate = {2024-05-29},
  abstract = {In this paper we consider the problem of document authentication in electronic and printed forms. We formulate this problem from the information-theoretic perspectives and present the joint source-channel coding theorems showing the performance limits in such protocols. We analyze the security of document authentication methods and present the optimal attacking strategies with corresponding complexity estimates that, contrarily to the existing studies, crucially rely on the information leaked by the authentication protocol. Finally, we present the results of experimental validation of the developed concept that justifies the practical efficiency of the elaborated framework.},
  eventtitle = {Electronic {{Imaging}} 2006},
  langid = {english}
}

@thesis{vrijaldenhoven2004,
  type = {mathesis},
  title = {Acoustical Physical Uncloneable Functions},
  author = {Vrijaldenhoven, Serge},
  date = {2004-10-01},
  institution = {Technische Universiteit Eindhoven},
  url = {https://pure.tue.nl/ws/files/46971492/600055-1.pdf}
}

@article{vuDesignPerformanceRelayAssisted2020,
  title = {Design and {{Performance}} of {{Relay-Assisted Satellite Free-Space Optical Quantum Key Distribution Systems}}},
  author = {Vu, Minh Quang and Pham, Thanh V. and Dang, Ngoc T. and Pham, Anh T.},
  date = {2020},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Access},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Access},
  volume = {8},
  pages = {122498--122510},
  issn = {2169-3536},
  doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3007461},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9133575/},
  urldate = {2024-05-02},
  abstract = {This paper studies the design and performance analysis of relay-assisted satellite freespace optics (FSO) quantum key distribution (QKD) systems for secure vehicular networks. High-altitude platforms (HAPs) equipped with optical amplify-and-forward nodes are used as relay stations. Secrecy performances in terms of quantum bit error rate and ergodic secret-key rate are analytically investigated under the effects of transceiver misalignment, receiver’s velocity variation, receiver noises, and atmospheric turbulence conditions. Based on the analyzed results, the design criteria for the legitimate user are determined so that the security of the considered system could be guaranteed.},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{wadeMagneticStripeReader2015,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Magnetic Stripe Reader Tamper Protection},
  author = {Wade, Jeremy and Guise, Max Joseph},
  holder = {{Square Inc}},
  date = {2015-12-01},
  number = {9203546B1},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9203546B1/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  keywords = {card,card reader,data,pseudo,signal}
}

@patent{wadeTamperProtectionMesh2016,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Protection Mesh in an Electronic Device},
  author = {Wade, Jeremy and Templeton, Thomas and Weber, Trent and Lamfalusi, Michael},
  holder = {{Square Inc}},
  date = {2016-03-29},
  number = {9298956B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9298956B2/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {control signal,detector,electrical condition,electronic device,housing}
}

@thesis{wandelAttenuationSilicabasedOptical2006,
  title = {Attenuation in Silica-Based Optical Fibers},
  author = {Wandel, Marie Emilie},
  date = {2006},
  institution = {Technical University of Denmark},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{wangBeatingPhotonNumberSplittingAttack2005,
  title = {Beating the {{Photon-Number-Splitting Attack}} in {{Practical Quantum Cryptography}}},
  author = {Wang, Xiang-Bin},
  date = {2005-06-16},
  journaltitle = {Physical Review Letters},
  shortjournal = {Phys. Rev. Lett.},
  volume = {94},
  number = {23},
  pages = {230503},
  issn = {0031-9007, 1079-7114},
  doi = {10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.230503},
  url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.230503},
  urldate = {2024-09-02},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{wangBernoulliHoneywords2024,
  title = {Bernoulli {{Honeywords}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  author = {Wang, Ke Coby and Reiter, Michael K.},
  date = {2024},
  publisher = {Internet Society},
  location = {San Diego, CA, USA},
  doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.23295},
  url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-295-paper.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Decoy passwords, or “honeywords,” planted in a credential database can alert a site to its breach if ever submitted in a login attempt. To be effective, some honeywords must appear at least as likely to be user-chosen passwords as the real ones, and honeywords must be very difficult to guess without having breached the database, to prevent false breach alarms. These goals have proved elusive, however, for heuristic honeyword generation algorithms. In this paper we explore an alternative strategy in which the defender treats honeyword selection as a Bernoulli process in which each possible password (except the user-chosen one) is selected as a honeyword independently with a fixed probability. We show how Bernoulli honeywords can be integrated into two existing system designs for leveraging honeywords: one based on a honeychecker that stores the secret index of the user-chosen password in the list of account passwords, and another that does not leverage secret state at all. We show that Bernoulli honeywords enable analytic derivation of false breach-detection probabilities irrespective of what information the attacker gathers about the sites’ users; that their true and false breach-detection probabilities demonstrate compelling efficacy; and that they can even enable performance improvements in modern honeyword system designs.},
  eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{wangCascadingAttackTrustedrelay2021,
  title = {Cascading Attack on Trusted-Relay Quantum Key Distribution Networks},
  author = {Wang, Jian and Liu, Xing-tong},
  date = {2021-06-01},
  journaltitle = {Communications in Theoretical Physics},
  shortjournal = {Commun. Theor. Phys.},
  volume = {73},
  number = {6},
  pages = {065105},
  issn = {0253-6102, 1572-9494},
  doi = {10.1088/1572-9494/abeedc},
  url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1572-9494/abeedc},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  abstract = {Trusted relays are the main state-of-the-art way to realize quantum key distribution networks. However, it is hard to require that all nodes in the network are fully trusted. In a multipath keytransmission mechanism, the nodes can be weakly trusted because the secret key can be split into many parts and each part is transmitted to the receiver through a different path. However, if the capacity of a node’s quantum key pool is poorly designed, an attacker, Eve may eavesdrop on the communicating parties’ secret message by initiating a redirection attack. In this paper, we show that Eve can trigger a cascading collapse effect by collapsing one of the edges in the network and forcing the communication parties to transmit the message through the nodes controlled by Eve. The influence of the traffic transfer ratio and the control parameters of the edge load on the breakdown probability of the edge are analyzed using a simulation. In order to effectively defend against the cascading attack, it is important for the designer to handle the relationship between the traffic and the capacity of the quantum key pool of each node in the network.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{wangCoaxialNestedCouplersBased2020,
  title = {Coaxial {{Nested Couplers-Based Offset-Tolerance Rotary Wireless Power Transfer Systems}} for {{Electric Excitation Motors}}},
  author = {Wang, Longyang and Li, Jiangui and Nie, Hui and Liu, Jincheng and Ke, Shaoxing},
  date = {2020},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Access},
  volume = {8},
  pages = {44913--44923},
  issn = {2169-3536},
  doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2978130},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9022913/?arnumber=9022913},
  urldate = {2024-12-10},
  abstract = {In order to improve poor anti-offset capability of rotary transformer in electric excitation motor, a coaxial nested rotary wireless power transfer (CNR-WPT) system has been proposed in this paper. Firstly, considering the spatial geometric relationship of the coils and the power transmission efficiency of the CNR-WPT, the preliminary coil structure has been proposed. Secondly, through theoretical derivation, the specific relationship between the mutual inductance of the coils and the offset have been studied to verify the feasibility of the preliminary design. Thirdly, aiming at the problem that the CNR-WPT is susceptible to steel interference, the magnetic field has been optimized by adding ferrite and introducing a protective casing in this paper. Finally, an experimental platform for CNR-WPT system has been built. The experimental results verify that the power transmission efficiency of the CNR-WPT system can reach 90\% when the radial offset and axial offset are below 5 mm, and the angular offset is below 5°. The energy losses can be reduced by adding ferrite and protecting the casing. The CNR-WPT system thereof can also be applied to other rotary power transmission occasions.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Access}}},
  keywords = {anti-offset capability,Brushless motors,coaxial nested rotary wireless power transfer system,Coils,Electric excitation motor,Induction motors,power transmission efficiency,Reluctance motors,Shafts,Wireless power transfer}
}

@inproceedings{wangGhostTalkInteractiveAttack2022,
  title = {{{GhostTalk}}: {{Interactive Attack}} on {{Smartphone Voice System Through Power Line}}},
  shorttitle = {{{GhostTalk}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings 2022 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  author = {Wang, Yuanda and Guo, Hanqing and Yan, Qiben},
  date = {2022},
  eprint = {2202.02585},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {cs},
  doi = {10.14722/ndss.2022.24254},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.02585},
  urldate = {2023-02-24},
  abstract = {Inaudible voice command injection is one of the most threatening attacks towards voice assistants. Existing attacks aim at injecting the attack signals over the air, but they require the access to the authorized user’s voice for activating the voice assistants. Moreover, the effectiveness of the attacks can be greatly deteriorated in a noisy environment. In this paper, we explore a new type of channel, the power line side-channel, to launch the inaudible voice command injection. By injecting the audio signals over the power line through a modified charging cable, the attack becomes more resilient against various environmental factors and liveness detection models. Meanwhile, the smartphone audio output can be eavesdropped through the modified cable, enabling a highly-interactive attack.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,dumb}
}

@article{wangGhostTouchTargetedAttacks,
  title = {{{GhostTouch}}: {{Targeted Attacks}} on {{Touchscreens}} without {{Physical Touch}}},
  author = {Wang, Kai and Ji, Xiaoyu and Mitev, Richard and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Yan, Chen and Xu, Wenyuan},
  abstract = {Capacitive touchscreens have become the primary humanmachine interface for personal devices such as smartphones and tablets. In this paper, we present GhostTouch, the first active contactless attack against capacitive touchscreens. GhostTouch uses electromagnetic interference (EMI) to inject fake touch points into a touchscreen without the need to physically touch it. By tuning the parameters of the electromagnetic signal and adjusting the antenna, we can inject two types of basic touch events, taps and swipes, into targeted locations of the touchscreen and control them to manipulate the underlying device. We successfully launch the GhostTouch attacks on nine smartphone models. We can inject targeted taps continuously with a standard deviation of as low as 14.6 × 19.2 pixels from the target area, a delay of less than 0.5s and a distance of up to 40mm. We show the real-world impact of the GhostTouch attacks in a few proofof-concept scenarios, including answering an eavesdropping phone call, pressing the button, swiping up to unlock, and entering a password. Finally, we discuss potential hardware and software countermeasures to mitigate the attack.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{wangGlobalScaleSecureMultiparty2017,
  title = {Global-{{Scale Secure Multiparty Computation}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Wang, Xiao and Ranellucci, Samuel and Katz, Jonathan},
  date = {2017-10-30},
  pages = {39--56},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Dallas Texas USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3133956.3133979},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3133956.3133979},
  urldate = {2025-08-15},
  abstract = {We propose a new, constant-round protocol for multi-party computation of boolean circuits that is secure against an arbitrary number of malicious corruptions. At a high level, we extend and generalize recent work of Wang et al. in the two-party setting. Namely, we design an efficient preprocessing phase that allows the parties to generate authenticated information; we then show how to use this information to distributively construct a single “authenticated” garbled circuit that is evaluated by one party. Our resulting protocol improves upon the state-of-the-art both asymptotically and concretely. We validate these claims via several experiments demonstrating both the efficiency and scalability of our protocol: • Efficiency: For three-party computation over a LAN, our protocol requires only 95 ms to evaluate AES. This is roughly a 700× improvement over the best prior work, and only 2.5× slower than the best known result in the two-party setting. In general, for n-party computation our protocol improves upon prior work (which was never implemented) by a factor of more than 230n, e.g., an improvement of 3 orders of magnitude for 5-party computation. • Scalability: We successfully executed our protocol with a large number of parties located all over the world, computing (for example) AES with 128 parties across 5 continents in under 3 minutes. Our work represents the largest-scale demonstration of secure computation to date.},
  eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '17: 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-4946-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{wangGroupCrossSymmetricalInductor2006,
  title = {Group-{{Cross Symmetrical Inductor}} ({{GCSI}}): {{A New Inductor Structure With Higher Self-Resonance Frequency}} and\${{Q}}\${{Factor}}},
  shorttitle = {Group-{{Cross Symmetrical Inductor}} ({{GCSI}})},
  author = {Wang, Y.-Y. and Li, Z.-F.},
  date = {2006-06},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Magnetics},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Magn.},
  volume = {42},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1681--1686},
  issn = {0018-9464},
  doi = {10.1109/TMAG.2006.873301},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1634478/},
  urldate = {2023-10-31},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{wangLongdistanceCopropagationQuantum2017,
  title = {Long-Distance Copropagation of Quantum Key Distribution and Terabit Classical Optical Data Channels},
  author = {Wang, Liu-Jun and Zou, Kai-Heng and Sun, Wei and Mao, Yingqiu and Zhu, Yi-Xiao and Yin, Hua-Lei and Chen, Qing and Zhao, Yong and Zhang, Fan and Chen, Teng-Yun and Pan, Jian-Wei},
  date = {2017-01-03},
  journaltitle = {Physical Review A},
  shortjournal = {Phys. Rev. A},
  volume = {95},
  number = {1},
  pages = {012301},
  issn = {2469-9926, 2469-9934},
  doi = {10.1103/PhysRevA.95.012301},
  url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.95.012301},
  urldate = {2024-09-04},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{wangNovelRotatingWireless2024,
  title = {A {{Novel Rotating Wireless Power Transfer System}} for {{Slipring}} with {{Redundancy Enhancement Characteristics}}},
  author = {Wang, Qiyue and Wang, De’an and Zhang, Jiantao},
  date = {2024-01},
  journaltitle = {Sustainability},
  volume = {16},
  number = {13},
  pages = {5628},
  publisher = {Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute},
  issn = {2071-1050},
  doi = {10.3390/su16135628},
  url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/16/13/5628},
  urldate = {2024-12-10},
  abstract = {This study investigates the dynamics of wireless power supply technology under rotation and its system redundancy, aiming to design a redundant, rotating wireless power supply system. In order to satisfy specifications of redundancy and fault tolerance, the circuit design of the wireless power transmission system was developed, and a planar three-sector coil coupling mechanism was designed; finally, the stability and power output characteristics of the system were assessed under static and dynamic working conditions, and the results show that the maximum output power of the system can reach 3 kW and the efficiency is more than 91\% under both static and dynamic working conditions. The study improved the rotating wireless charging system’s efficiency, which improves the energy utilization efficiency.},
  issue = {13},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {multi-coil coupling mechanism,rotating equipment,wireless power supply}
}

@article{wangTopologicalOptimizationHybrid2020,
  title = {Topological Optimization of Hybrid Quantum Key Distribution Networks},
  author = {Wang, Yaxing and Li, Qiong and Mao, Haokun and Han, Qi and Huang, Furong and Xu, Hongwei},
  date = {2020-08-31},
  journaltitle = {Optics Express},
  shortjournal = {Opt. Express},
  volume = {28},
  number = {18},
  pages = {26348},
  issn = {1094-4087},
  doi = {10.1364/OE.401672},
  url = {https://opg.optica.org/abstract.cfm?URI=oe-28-18-26348},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  abstract = {With the growing complexity of quantum key distribution (QKD) network structures, aforehand topology design is of great significance to support a large-number of nodes over a large-spatial area. However, the exclusivity of quantum channels, the limitation of key generation capabilities, the variety of QKD protocols and the necessity of untrusted-relay selection, make the optimal topology design a very complicated task. In this research, a hybrid QKD network is studied for the first time from the perspective of topology, by analyzing the topological differences of various QKD protocols. In addition, to make full use of hybrid networking, an analytical model for optimal topology calculation is proposed, to reach the goal of best secure communication service by optimizing the deployment of various QKD devices and the selection of untrusted-relays under a given cost limit. Plentiful simulation results show that hybrid networking and untrusted-relay selection can bring great performance advantages, and then the universality and effectiveness of the proposed analytical model are verified.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{wangTwinfieldQuantumKey2022,
  title = {Twin-Field Quantum Key Distribution over 830-Km Fibre},
  author = {Wang, Shuang and Yin, Zhen-Qiang and He, De-Yong and Chen, Wei and Wang, Rui-Qiang and Ye, Peng and Zhou, Yao and Fan-Yuan, Guan-Jie and Wang, Fang-Xiang and Chen, Wei and Zhu, Yong-Gang and Morozov, Pavel V. and Divochiy, Alexander V. and Zhou, Zheng and Guo, Guang-Can and Han, Zheng-Fu},
  date = {2022-02},
  journaltitle = {Nature Photonics},
  shortjournal = {Nat. Photon.},
  volume = {16},
  number = {2},
  pages = {154--161},
  publisher = {Nature Publishing Group},
  issn = {1749-4893},
  doi = {10.1038/s41566-021-00928-2},
  url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41566-021-00928-2},
  urldate = {2025-05-08},
  abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a promising solution for sharing information-theoretic secure keys between remote peers with physics-based protocols. According to the law of quantum physics, the photons carrying signals cannot be amplified or relayed via classical optical techniques to maintain quantum security. As a result, the transmission loss of the channel limits its achievable distance, and this has been a huge barrier towards building large-scale quantum-secure networks. Here we present an experimental QKD system that could tolerate a channel loss beyond 140\,dB and obtain a secure distance of 833.8\,km, setting a new record for fibre-based QKD. Furthermore, the optimized four-phase twin-field protocol and high-quality set-up make its secure key rate more than two orders of magnitude greater than previous records over similar distances. Our results mark a breakthrough towards building reliable and efficient terrestrial quantum-secure networks over a scale of 1,000\,km.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Quantum information,Single photons and quantum effects}
}

@article{wegmanNewHashFunctions1981,
  title = {New Hash Functions and Their Use in Authentication and Set Equality},
  author = {Wegman, Mark N. and Carter, J.Lawrence},
  date = {1981-06},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Computer and System Sciences},
  shortjournal = {Journal of Computer and System Sciences},
  volume = {22},
  number = {3},
  pages = {265--279},
  issn = {00220000},
  doi = {10.1016/0022-0000(81)90033-7},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0022000081900337},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{weichselbraunBrokenSealsBroken2019,
  title = {Of {{Broken Seals}} and {{Broken Promises}}: {{Attributing Intention}} at the {{IAEA}}},
  shorttitle = {Of {{Broken Seals}} and {{Broken Promises}}},
  author = {Weichselbraun, Anna},
  date = {2019-11-07},
  journaltitle = {Cultural Anthropology},
  volume = {34},
  number = {4},
  pages = {503--528},
  issn = {1548-1360},
  doi = {10.14506/ca34.4.02},
  url = {https://journal.culanth.org/index.php/ca/article/view/4139},
  urldate = {2024-09-04},
  abstract = {In the world of global politics, talk is cheap. States sign negotiated agreements, but a treaty without an enforcement mechanism is considered weak, because states are not expected to adhere to commitments whose materiality is merely that of ink and paper. To verify the terms of state commitments to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in 1970, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards inspectors place tamper-evident seals in nuclear facilities. While seals appear to work simply as a binary signal, their meanings are multivalent. This article draws on fieldwork at the IAEA, and on broken seals in Iran between 2004 and 2006 that escalated into an international crisis, to examine the relationship between the material properties of the seal and its signifying potentialities. Bringing the perspective of semiotic ontology to the question of materiality, this essay argues that seals constitute a semiotic infrastructure of nuclear governance that materializes international law.},
  issue = {4},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {agency}
}

@patent{weidnerHardwareschutzFormHalbschalen2007,
  type = {patent},
  title = {Hardwareschutz in Form von zu Halbschalen tiefgezogenen Leiterplatten},
  author = {Weidner, Karl and Wimmer, Anton},
  holder = {{Siemens Aktiengesellschaft}},
  date = {2007-01-11},
  number = {WO2007003227A1},
  location = {WO},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/WO2007003227A1/en?oq=WO2007003227A1},
  urldate = {2025-09-10},
  langid = {ngerman},
  keywords = {circuit,hardware,hardware protection,protected,substrate}
}

@patent{wernerFabricatingTamperrespondentSensors2024,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Fabricating Tamper-Respondent Sensors with Random Three-Dimensional Security Patterns},
  author = {Werner, John S. and Wertz, Jason T. and Torok, John and Singer, Noah and Tsfasman, Arkadiy O. and Notohardjono, Budy},
  holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}},
  date = {2024-01-16},
  number = {11877390B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US11877390B2/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {security,sensor,tamper,trace,volume}
}

@inproceedings{wernerTransparentMemoryEncryption2017,
  title = {Transparent Memory Encryption and Authentication},
  booktitle = {2017 27th {{International Conference}} on {{Field Programmable Logic}} and {{Applications}} ({{FPL}})},
  author = {Werner, Mario and Unterluggauer, Thomas and Schilling, Robert and Schaffenrath, David and Mangard, Stefan},
  date = {2017-09},
  pages = {1--6},
  publisher = {IEEE},
  location = {Ghent, Belgium},
  doi = {10.23919/FPL.2017.8056797},
  url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8056797/},
  urldate = {2024-07-02},
  abstract = {Security features of modern (SoC) FPGAs permit to protect the confidentiality of hard- and software IP when the devices are powered off as well as to validate the authenticity of IP when being loaded at startup. However, these approaches are insufficient since attackers with physical access can also perform attacks during runtime, demanding for additional security measures. In particular, RAM used by modern (SoC) FPGAs is under threat since RAM stores software IP as well as all kinds of other sensitive information during runtime.},
  eventtitle = {2017 27th {{International Conference}} on {{Field Programmable Logic}} and {{Applications}} ({{FPL}})},
  isbn = {978-90-90-30428-1},
  langid = {english}
}

@patent{wesselhoffTamperResponsiveSensor2018,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Responsive Sensor},
  author = {Wesselhoff, Erling},
  holder = {{Cryptera AS}},
  date = {2018-09-18},
  number = {10078764B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10078764B2/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {circuitry,line,mesh,tamper,track}
}

@patent{wesselhoffTamperResponsiveSensor2020,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper Responsive Sensor},
  author = {Wesselhoff, Erling},
  holder = {{Cryptera AS}},
  date = {2020-06-09},
  number = {10678957B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10678957B2/en},
  urldate = {2025-04-04},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {detecting circuitry,line,mesh,tamper,track}
}

@online{WhatCloudHSM,
  title = {What Is a {{Cloud HSM}}?},
  shorttitle = {What Is a {{Cloud HSM}}?},
  author = {{Entrust Corporation}},
  url = {https://www.entrust.com/resources/learn/what-is-cloud-hsm},
  urldate = {2025-11-21},
  abstract = {Learn what a cloud hardware security module (HSM) is and how a cloud HSM can deliver the same cryptographic functionalities as on-premises HSMs.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{wheelerTransmissionLinePropertiesParallel1965,
  title = {Transmission-{{Line Properties}} of {{Parallel Strips Separated}} by a {{Dielectric Sheet}}},
  author = {Wheeler, H.A.},
  date = {1965-03},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  pages = {172--185},
  issn = {1557-9670},
  doi = {10.1109/TMTT.1965.1125962},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1125962/?arnumber=1125962},
  urldate = {2025-04-02},
  abstract = {A transmission line is made of a symmetrical pair of strip conductors, or a single strip and a ground plane, on opposite faces of a sheet of dielectric material. There is computed, to a close approximation, the relations among the dielectric constant of the sheet, the effective dielectric constant of the sheet and the empty space, the shape ratio, and the wave resistance, for the entire range of possible values. These relations are summarized in a graphical chart covering the range of practical interest. The computation is based on conformal mapping of the dielectric boundary on coordinates such that its effect can be most closely evaluated by simple principles. All relations are approximated in terms of ordinary functions (exponential and hyperbolic). Of particular interest is the effective filling fraction of the dielectric material, which depends mainly on the shape ratio and only slightly on the dielectric constant. Explicit formulas are given for analysis or synthesis.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Microwave Theory}} and {{Techniques}}},
  keywords = {Conducting materials,Conformal mapping,Dielectric constant,Dielectric materials,Filling,Shape,Sheet materials,Strips,Transmission line theory,Transmission lines}
}

@online{wierdaWhenChatGPTSummarises2024,
  title = {When {{ChatGPT}} Summarises, It Actually Does Nothing of the Kind.},
  author = {Wierda, Gerben},
  date = {2024-05-27T21:58:15+00:00},
  url = {https://ea.rna.nl/2024/05/27/when-chatgpt-summarises-it-actually-does-nothing-of-the-kind/},
  urldate = {2025-12-04},
  abstract = {One of the use cases I thought was reasonable to expect from ChatGPT and Friends (LLMs) was summarising. It turns out I was wrong. What ChatGPT isn’t summarising at all, it only looks like it…},
  langid = {english},
  organization = {R\&A IT Strategy \& Architecture}
}

@article{wiesmannEffectChloroquineCultured1975,
  title = {Effect of Chloroquine on Cultured Fibroblasts: Release of Lysosomal Hydrolases and Inhibition of Their Uptake},
  shorttitle = {Effect of Chloroquine on Cultured Fibroblasts},
  author = {Wiesmann, U. N. and DiDonato, S. and Herschkowitz, N. N.},
  date = {1975-10-27},
  journaltitle = {Biochemical and Biophysical Research Communications},
  shortjournal = {Biochem Biophys Res Commun},
  volume = {66},
  number = {4},
  eprint = {4},
  eprinttype = {pubmed},
  pages = {1338--1343},
  issn = {1090-2104},
  doi = {10.1016/0006-291x(75)90506-9},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Biological Transport,Cells Cultured,Cerebroside-Sulfatase,Chloroquine,Dextrans,Fibroblasts,Glucuronidase,Humans,Leukodystrophy Metachromatic,Lysosomes,Pinocytosis,Skin,Sulfatases}
}

@book{wiggeRundfunktechnischesHandbuch1930,
  title = {Rundfunktechnisches {{Handbuch}}},
  author = {Wigge, Heinrich},
  date = {1930},
  edition = {2},
  volume = {1},
  publisher = {Verlag von M. Krayn},
  keywords = {twisted-inductors}
}

@online{WikiQuoteGraceHopper,
  title = {{{WikiQuote}}: {{Grace Hopper}}},
  date = {2025-04-08},
  url = {https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Grace_Hopper},
  urldate = {2025-10-22}
}

@article{worathumrongEffectOsalicylatePentose1975,
  title = {The Effect of O-Salicylate upon Pentose Phosphate Pathway Activity in Normal and {{G6PD-deficient}} Red Cells},
  author = {Worathumrong, N. and Grimes, A. J.},
  date = {1975-06},
  journaltitle = {British Journal of Haematology},
  shortjournal = {Br J Haematol},
  volume = {30},
  number = {2},
  eprint = {35},
  eprinttype = {pubmed},
  pages = {225--231},
  issn = {0007-1048},
  doi = {10.1111/j.1365-2141.1975.tb00536.x},
  abstract = {The effect of the major metabolite of aspirin, namely salicylic acid, upon the pentose phosphate pathway (PPP) of normal and G6PD-deficient red cells has been studied. Salicylic acid was shown to inhibit this pathway in proportion to the amount present. At any concentration of this substance there was greater inhibition of the PPP in G6PD-deficient than in normal red cells.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Blood Glucose,Erythrocytes,Glucosephosphate Dehydrogenase Deficiency,Humans,Hydrogen-Ion Concentration,Methylene Blue,Pentosephosphates,Sodium Salicylate}
}

@article{wuGenericServeraidedSecure2022,
  title = {Generic Server-Aided Secure Multi-Party Computation in Cloud Computing},
  author = {Wu, Yulin and Wang, Xuan and Susilo, Willy and Yang, Guomin and Jiang, Zoe L. and Yiu, Siu-Ming and Wang, Hao},
  date = {2022-01-01},
  journaltitle = {Computer Standards \& Interfaces},
  shortjournal = {Computer Standards \& Interfaces},
  volume = {79},
  pages = {103552},
  issn = {0920-5489},
  doi = {10.1016/j.csi.2021.103552},
  url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0920548921000477},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Cloud computing has become one of the most popular distributed computing paradigms in recent years. With its advantages of low cost, on-demand flexibility, and high data processing abilities, more and more enterprises have adopted the cloud computing paradigm to build up their IT infrastructure. By performing collaborative computation tasks (e.g., big data analysis tasks) with multiple datasets of different correlated enterprises in cloud computing, the generated valuable information will provide the enterprises with higher productivity and financial gains. However, due to the privacy concerns from the enterprises, how to efficiently enable them to achieve secure multi-party joint datasets analysis in cloud computing without leaking their own private dataset becomes a critical but challenging problem for the enterprises. In this paper, focusing on securely performing any collaborative computation task in cloud computing, we construct a generic server-aided secure multi-party computation protocol to tackle the problem. Our solution can provide security guarantee in the setting where at most n-1 client parties are malicious while the server is semi-honest and there is no collusion between the server and clients. The security and experimental performance analysis show that this work is currently the most efficient server-aided secure multi-party computation protocol with the same security guarantee compared with all the previous works to the best of our knowledge.},
  keywords = {Cloud computing,Garbled circuit,Secure multi-party computation,Server-aided computation}
}

@inproceedings{xiaoHardwareFingerprintAccess2024,
  title = {From {{Hardware Fingerprint}} to {{Access Token}}: {{Enhancing}} the {{Authentication}} on {{IoT Devices}}},
  shorttitle = {From {{Hardware Fingerprint}} to {{Access Token}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  author = {Xiao, Yue and He, Yi and Zhang, Xiaoli and Wang, Qian and Xie, Renjie and Sun, Kun and Xu, Ke and Li, Qi},
  date = {2024},
  publisher = {Internet Society},
  location = {San Diego, CA, USA},
  doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.241231},
  url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-1231-paper.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The proliferation of consumer IoT products in our daily lives has raised the need for secure device authentication and access control. Unfortunately, these resource-constrained devices typically use token-based authentication, which is vulnerable to token compromise attacks that allow attackers to impersonate the devices and perform malicious operations by stealing the access token. Using hardware fingerprints to secure their authentication is a promising way to mitigate these threats. However, once attackers have stolen some hardware fingerprints (e.g., via MitM attacks), they can bypass the hardware authentication by training a machine learning model to mimic fingerprints or by reusing these fingerprints to craft forged requests.},
  eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{xiaRotaryWirelessPower2024,
  title = {A {{Rotary Wireless Power Transfer System With Rail-Type Coupling Structure}}},
  author = {Xia, Kun and Zhu, Benjing and Lou, Yang and Huang, Daming},
  date = {2024},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Access},
  volume = {12},
  pages = {63967--63975},
  issn = {2169-3536},
  doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3393943},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10508729/?arnumber=10508729&tag=1},
  urldate = {2024-12-10},
  abstract = {Traditional power supply methods for rotating mechanisms are found to face problems, including complex structures, limited functionality, and potential safety hazards. To address these problems, a rotary wireless power transfer system with new rail-type coupling structure (RTR-WPT) is proposed in this paper. This system, characterized by safety, reliability, and flexible installation, is designed to provide power to devices mounted on rotating shafts. Firstly, the topological structure of the RTR-WPT system is introduced, and the corresponding circuit model is established. Secondly, MAXWELL is utilized for finite element analysis to design and optimize the rail-type rotary coupler. Finally, an experimental platform for the RTR-WPT system is built and tested. From the experimental results, it is validated that the new rail-type coupler and the design methodology are feasible, and the system can achieve a power transmission of 10.33W with an overall efficiency of 72.1\% under rotating conditions.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Access}}},
  keywords = {Coils,Couplers,Couplings,finite element analysis,Finite element analysis,Power supplies,rail-type coupling structure,Reliability,Rotating mechanism,Topology,wireless power transfer,Wireless power transfer}
}

@article{xuMeasurementdeviceindependentQuantumCryptography2015,
  title = {Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Cryptography},
  author = {Xu, Feihu and Curty, Marcos and Qi, Bing and Lo, Hoi-Kwong},
  date = {2015-05},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics},
  shortjournal = {IEEE J. Select. Topics Quantum Electron.},
  volume = {21},
  number = {3},
  eprint = {1409.5157},
  eprinttype = {arXiv},
  eprintclass = {quant-ph},
  pages = {148--158},
  issn = {1077-260X, 1558-4542},
  doi = {10.1109/JSTQE.2014.2381460},
  url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1409.5157},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  abstract = {In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security based on the laws of physics. Owing to the imperfections of real-life implementations, however, there is a big gap between the theory and practice of QKD, which has been recently exploited by several quantum hacking activities. To fill this gap, a novel approach, called measurementdevice-independent QKD (mdiQKD), has been proposed. It can remove all side-channels from the measurement unit, arguably the most vulnerable part in QKD systems, thus offering a clear avenue towards secure QKD realisations. Here, we review the latest developments in the framework of mdiQKD, together with its assumptions, strengths and weaknesses.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Quantum Physics}
}

@article{xuSecureQuantumKey2020,
  title = {Secure Quantum Key Distribution with Realistic Devices},
  author = {Xu, Feihu and Ma, Xiongfeng and Zhang, Qiang and Lo, Hoi-Kwong and Pan, Jian-Wei},
  date = {2020-05-26},
  journaltitle = {Reviews of Modern Physics},
  shortjournal = {Rev. Mod. Phys.},
  volume = {92},
  number = {2},
  pages = {025002},
  issn = {0034-6861, 1539-0756},
  doi = {10.1103/RevModPhys.92.025002},
  url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/RevModPhys.92.025002},
  urldate = {2024-05-15},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{yamashitaRedshiftManipulatingSignal2022,
  title = {Redshift: {{Manipulating Signal Propagation Delay}} via {{Continuous-Wave Lasers}}},
  shorttitle = {Redshift},
  author = {Yamashita, Kohei and Cyr, Benjamin and Fu, Kevin and Burleson, Wayne and Sugawara, Takeshi},
  date = {2022-08-31},
  journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
  pages = {463--489},
  issn = {2569-2925},
  doi = {10.46586/tches.v2022.i4.463-489},
  url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9828},
  urldate = {2024-07-15},
  abstract = {We propose a new laser injection attack Redshift that manipulates signal propagation delay, allowing for precise control of oscillator frequencies and other behaviors in delay-sensitive circuits. The target circuits have a significant sensitivity to light, and a low-power continuous-wave laser, similar to a laser pointer, is sufficient for the attack. This is in contrast to previous fault injection attacks that use highpowered laser pulses to flip digital bits. This significantly reduces the cost of the attack and extends the range of possible attackers. Moreover, the attack potentially evades sensor-based countermeasures configured for conventional pulse lasers. To demonstrate Redshift, we target ring-oscillator and arbiter PUFs that are used in cryptographic applications. By precisely controlling signal propagation delays within these circuits, an attacker can control the output of a PUF to perform a state-recovery attack and reveal a secret key. We finally discuss the physical causality of the attack and potential countermeasures.},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {Delay-Sensitive Circuits,Laser Fault Injection,Oscillator,Physically Unclonable Function}
}

@article{yanFeasibilityInjectingInaudible2019,
  title = {The {{Feasibility}} of {{Injecting Inaudible Voice Commands}} to {{Voice Assistants}}},
  author = {Yan, Chen and Zhang, Guoming and Ji, Xiaoyu and Zhang, Tianchen and Zhang, Taimin and Xu, Wenyuan},
  date = {2019},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.},
  pages = {1--1},
  issn = {1545-5971, 1941-0018, 2160-9209},
  doi = {10.1109/TDSC.2019.2906165},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8669818/},
  urldate = {2024-07-25}
}

@article{yanFreeRotationWirelessPower2023,
  title = {Free-{{Rotation Wireless Power Transfer System Based}} on {{Composite Anti-Misalignment Method}} for {{AUVs}}},
  author = {Yan, Zhengchao and Wu, Min and Zhao, Chenxu and Hu, Qianyu and Zhu, Lei and Qiao, Lin and Wang, Laili},
  date = {2023-04},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {38},
  number = {4},
  pages = {4262--4266},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2023.3238066},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10021879/?arnumber=10021879},
  urldate = {2024-12-10},
  abstract = {In the underwater environment, the ocean current will have a great influence on the anti-misalignment performance of the wireless power transfer (WPT) system for the autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). In this letter, a free-rotation WPT system with a new magnetic coupler for AUVs is proposed to improve the rotational and axial misalignment tolerance. The magnetic coupler has two decoupled transmitters and one segmented arc solenoid receiver with reversely wound adjacent receiver coils. The mutual inductances between the receiver and the two transmitters can compensate each other. Moreover, cooperated with the phase control between the two transmitters, the system can achieve more stable output power under the rotational and axial misalignment. A free-rotation WPT prototype was set up and the experimental results showed that the output power can reach 700 W and the output power fluctuation is below 5\% based on the proposed anti-misalignment method.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Anti-misalignment,autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV),Couplers,Ferrites,Fluctuations,free-rotation,Magnetic resonance,Power generation,Receivers,Transmitters,wireless power transfer (WPT)}
}

@article{yangFPGABasedLDPCDecoder2021,
  title = {An {{FPGA-Based LDPC Decoder With Ultra-Long Codes}} for {{Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution}}},
  author = {Yang, Shen-Shen and Liu, Jian-Qiang and Lu, Zhen-Guo and Bai, Zeng-Liang and Wang, Xu-Yang and Li, Yong-Min},
  date = {2021},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Access},
  shortjournal = {IEEE Access},
  volume = {9},
  pages = {47687--47697},
  issn = {2169-3536},
  doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3065776},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9376906/},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  abstract = {In this paper, we propose a good decoding performance, low-complexity, and high-speed decoder architecture for ultra-long quasi-cyclic LDPC codes by using the layered sum-product decoding scheme. To reduce implementation complexity and hardware resource consumption, the messages in the iteration process are uniformly quantified and the function (x) is approximated with second-order functions. The decoder architecture improves the decoding throughput by using partial parallel and pipeline structures. A modified construction method of parity check matrices was applied to prevent read\&write conflicts and achieve high-speed pipeline structure. The simulation results show that our decoder architecture has good performance at signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) as low as −0.6 dB. We have implemented our decoder architecture on a Virtex-7 XC7VX690T field programmable gate array (FPGA) device. The implementation results show that the FPGA-based LDPC decoder can achieve throughputs of 108.64 Mb/s and 70.32 Mb/s at SNR of 1.0 dB when the code length is 262,144 and 349,952, respectively. The decoder can find useful applications in those scenarios that require very low SNRs and high throughputs, such as the information reconciliation of continuous-variable quantum key distribution.},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{yangQuantumKeyDistribution2018,
  title = {Quantum Key Distribution Network: {{Optimal}} Secret-Key-Aware Routing Method for Trust Relaying},
  shorttitle = {Quantum Key Distribution Network},
  author = {Yang, Chao and Zhang, Hongqi and Su, Jinhai},
  date = {2018-02},
  journaltitle = {China Communications},
  shortjournal = {China Commun.},
  volume = {15},
  number = {2},
  pages = {33--45},
  issn = {1673-5447},
  doi = {10.1109/CC.2018.8300270},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8300270/},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  abstract = {Since the QKD network can overcome the distance limitation and expand the point-to-point QKD system to a multi-user key distribution system, some testing QKD networks have been built. However, all of this previous research seldom focused on the routing mechanism of QKD network in detail. Therefore, this paper focuses on the routing issue in trust relaying QKD network, builds a model of the trust relaying QKD network and proposes a secret-key-aware routing method. In our method, a dynamic model for the residual local key is proposed to forecast the residual local key quantity of each QKD link more accurately, and the cost of QKD link and relaying path are defined by multiple affecting factors, e.g. the generation, consumption rate and the local key depletion index. The proposed method is implemented and evaluated in a simulation environment. The simulation results show that our routing method can increase the success rate of key exchange, make all the QKD links participate key exchange with almost equal opportunity to achieve load balance, and trade off the local key generation and consumption of each QKD link. Therefore, our proposed method can contribute to effectively improve the holistic performance of the trust relaying QKD network.},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{yaoHowGenerateExchange1986,
  title = {How to Generate and Exchange Secrets},
  booktitle = {27th {{Annual Symposium}} on {{Foundations}} of {{Computer Science}} (Sfcs 1986)},
  author = {Yao, Andrew Chi-Chih},
  date = {1986-10},
  pages = {162--167},
  issn = {0272-5428},
  doi = {10.1109/SFCS.1986.25},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4568207},
  urldate = {2025-08-14},
  abstract = {In this paper we introduce a new tool for controlling the knowledge transfer process in cryptographic protocol design. It is applied to solve a general class of problems which include most of the two-party cryptographic problems in the literature. Specifically, we show how two parties A and B can interactively generate a random integer N = p·q such that its secret, i.e., the prime factors (p, q), is hidden from either party individually but is recoverable jointly if desired. This can be utilized to give a protocol for two parties with private values i and j to compute any polynomially computable functions f(i,j) and g(i,j) with minimal knowledge transfer and a strong fairness property. As a special case, A and B can exchange a pair of secrets sA, sB, e.g. the factorization of an integer and a Hamiltonian circuit in a graph, in such a way that sA becomes computable by B when and only when sB becomes computable by A. All these results are proved assuming only that the problem of factoring large intergers is computationally intractable.},
  eventtitle = {27th {{Annual Symposium}} on {{Foundations}} of {{Computer Science}} (Sfcs 1986)},
  keywords = {Circuits,Computer science,Cryptographic protocols,Cryptography,History,Knowledge transfer,Polynomials,Privacy,Probability distribution,Turing machines}
}

@inproceedings{yetisInvestigationNoiseEffects2021,
  title = {Investigation of {{Noise Effects}} for {{Different Quantum Computing Architectures}} in {{IBM-Q}} at {{NISQ Level}}},
  booktitle = {2021 25th {{International Conference}} on {{Information Technology}} ({{IT}})},
  author = {Yetis, Hasan and Karakoes, Mehmet},
  date = {2021-02},
  pages = {1--4},
  doi = {10.1109/IT51528.2021.9390130},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9390130},
  urldate = {2024-09-02},
  abstract = {Today, all the implemented quantum computers are in Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) level. In such quantum computers, when circuit length and size increase, the results become less reliable because of the increasing effect of noise. The noise is an important factor that should be handled in NISQ level quantum computers. In this study, we investigate the noise factor on 5 qubit IBM-Q computers for basic circuits. For this purpose, existing 5 qubit IBM-Q computers with different architectures are examined. Then quantum circuit equivalents corresponding to basic logic gates such as XOR, AND, and OR are presented. Quantum circuits created for XOR, AND, and OR are run 10 times on different quantum computers of 5 qubits named Santiago, Athens, Valencia, Vigo, Ourance, and IBMQX2. Statistical information such as std., mean is obtained from the results. The consistency of the results obtained and their difference from the optimum result are discussed. As a result of the study, there is no contradiction in the results obtained with quantum volume. Studies show that even small growths in XOR, AND, and OR circuits can lead to a big deflection in results.},
  eventtitle = {2021 25th {{International Conference}} on {{Information Technology}} ({{IT}})},
  keywords = {Computer architecture,Computers,Integrated circuit reliability,Logic gates,Quantum circuit,Qubit,Standards}
}

@article{yoshimitsu1990,
  title = {A New Attenuation Relation for Peak Horizontal Acceleration of Strong Earthquake Ground Motion in {{Japan}}},
  author = {Fukushima, Yoshimitsu and Tanaka, Teiji},
  date = {1990},
  journaltitle = {Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America},
  volume = {80},
  number = {4},
  pages = {757--783},
  issn = {0037-1106},
  url = {https://pubs.geoscienceworld.org/ssa/bssa/article-abstract/80/4/757/102395/A-new-attenuation-relation-for-peak-horizontal},
  urldate = {2021-07-07}
}

@article{yuSecretKeyProvisioningCollaborative2022,
  title = {Secret-{{Key Provisioning With Collaborative Routing}} in {{Partially-Trusted-Relay-based Quantum-Key-Distribution-Secured Optical Networks}}},
  author = {Yu, Xiaosong and Liu, Yuhang and Zou, Xingyu and Cao, Yuan and Zhao, Yongli and Nag, Avishek and Zhang, Jie},
  date = {2022-06-15},
  journaltitle = {Journal of Lightwave Technology},
  shortjournal = {J. Lightwave Technol.},
  volume = {40},
  number = {12},
  pages = {3530--3545},
  issn = {0733-8724, 1558-2213},
  doi = {10.1109/JLT.2022.3153992},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9721069/},
  urldate = {2024-05-21},
  langid = {english}
}

@incollection{zahurTwoHalvesMake2015,
  title = {Two {{Halves Make}} a {{Whole}}: {{Reducing Data Transfer}} in {{Garbled Circuits Using Half Gates}}},
  shorttitle = {Two {{Halves Make}} a {{Whole}}},
  booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} - {{EUROCRYPT}} 2015},
  author = {Zahur, Samee and Rosulek, Mike and Evans, David},
  editor = {Oswald, Elisabeth and Fischlin, Marc},
  date = {2015},
  volume = {9057},
  pages = {220--250},
  publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
  location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
  doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_8},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_8},
  urldate = {2025-08-15},
  abstract = {The well-known classical constructions of garbled circuits use four ciphertexts per gate, although various methods have been proposed to reduce this cost. The best previously known methods for optimizing AND gates (two ciphertexts; Pinkas et al., ASIACRYPT 2009) and XOR gates (zero ciphertexts; Kolesnikov and Schneider, ICALP 2008) were incompatible, so most implementations used the best known method compatible with free-XOR gates (three ciphertexts; Kolesnikov and Schneider, ICALP 2008). In this work we show how to simultaneously garble AND gates using two ciphertexts and XOR gates using zero ciphertexts, resulting in smaller garbled circuits than any prior scheme. The main idea behind our construction is to break an AND gate into two half-gates —AND gates for which one party knows one input. Each half-gate can be garbled with a single ciphertext, so our construction uses two ciphertexts for each AND gate while being compatible with free-XOR gates. The price for the reduction in size is that the evaluator must perform two cryptographic operations per AND gate, rather than one as in previous schemes. We experimentally demonstrate that our garbling scheme leads to an overall decrease in time (up to 25\%), bandwidth (up to 33\%), and energy use (up to 20\%) over several benchmark applications. We show that our construction is optimal for a large class of garbling schemes encompassing all known practical garbling techniques.},
  isbn = {978-3-662-46802-9 978-3-662-46803-6},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{zeppelzauerSoniControlMobileUltrasonic2018,
  title = {{{SoniControl}} - {{A Mobile Ultrasonic Firewall}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 26th {{ACM}} International Conference on {{Multimedia}}},
  author = {Zeppelzauer, Matthias and Ringot, Alexis and Taurer, Florian},
  date = {2018-10-15},
  series = {{{MM}} '18},
  pages = {1250--1252},
  publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  location = {New York, NY, USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3240508.3241393},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3240508.3241393},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {The exchange of data between mobile devices in the near-ultrasonic frequency band is a new promising technology for near field communication (NFC) but also raises a number of privacy concerns. We present the first ultrasonic firewall that reliably detects ultrasonic communication and provides the user with effective means to prevent hidden data exchange. This demonstration showcases a new media-based communication technology ("data over audio") together with its related privacy concerns. It enables users to (i) interactively test out and experience ultrasonic information exchange and (ii) shows how to protect oneself against unwanted tracking.},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-5665-7}
}

@article{zhangBallJointWirelessPower2018,
  title = {Ball-{{Joint Wireless Power Transfer Systems}}},
  author = {Zhang, Cheng and Lin, Deyan and Hui, S. Y. Ron},
  date = {2018-01},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {33},
  number = {1},
  pages = {65--72},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2017.2700898},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7918527/?arnumber=7918527},
  urldate = {2024-12-10},
  abstract = {A new wireless power transfer (WPT) system based on ball-joint structure is presented in this paper. A ball-joint WPT system consists of a ball structure with a mechanical rod attached to the ball and a ball socket that accommodates the ball structure. This ball-joint structure comprises at least one winding in the ball structure and at least one winding in the ball socket structure. The ball structure can be flexibly rotated over a wide range of angle inside the ball socket, while wireless power can still be transferred from the transmitter winding to the receiver winding through magnetic resonance. The magnetic coupling coefficient between the transmitter and receiver coil over a wide rotating angular range has been analyzed and experimentally checked. Experimental results confirm that an energy efficiency of up to 81\% can be achieved.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Ball-joint structure,Inductance,magnetic resonance,Magnetic resonance,Receivers,Sockets,Transmitters,Windings,Wireless power transfer,wireless power transfer (WPT)}
}

@inproceedings{zhangDolphinAttackInaudibleVoice2017,
  title = {{{DolphinAttack}}: {{Inaudible Voice Commands}}},
  shorttitle = {{{DolphinAttack}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  author = {Zhang, Guoming and Yan, Chen and Ji, Xiaoyu and Zhang, Tianchen and Zhang, Taimin and Xu, Wenyuan},
  date = {2017-10-30},
  pages = {103--117},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {Dallas Texas USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3133956.3134052},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3133956.3134052},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Speech recognition (SR) systems such as Siri or Google Now have become an increasingly popular human-computer interaction method, and have turned various systems into voice controllable systems (VCS). Prior work on attacking VCS shows that the hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to people can control the systems. Hidden voice commands, though ‘hidden’, are nonetheless audible. In this work, we design a completely inaudible attack, DolphinAttack, that modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers (e.g., f {$>$} 20 kHz) to achieve inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits, the modulated lowfrequency audio commands can be successfully demodulated, recovered, and more importantly interpreted by the speech recognition systems. We validate DolphinAttack on popular speech recognition systems, including Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Huawei HiVoice, Cortana and Alexa. By injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, we show a few proof-of-concept attacks, which include activating Siri to initiate a FaceTime call on iPhone, activating Google Now to switch the phone to the airplane mode, and even manipulating the navigation system in an Audi automobile. We propose hardware and software defense solutions. We validate that it is feasible to detect DolphinAttack by classifying the audios using supported vector machine (SVM), and suggest to re-design voice controllable systems to be resilient to inaudible voice command attacks.},
  eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '17: 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-4946-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{zhangDynamicWirelessPower2025,
  title = {A {{Dynamic Wireless Power Transfer System Using DC-Controlled Variable Inductor}} for {{Segment Transmitter Automatic Switching}}},
  author = {Zhang, Zeheng and Li, Zheng and Zhang, Xiaojun and Yang, Bin and He, Zhengyou and Mai, Ruikun and Chen, Yang},
  date = {2025-01},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {40},
  number = {1},
  pages = {23--27},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2024.3426100},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10592813/?arnumber=10592813},
  urldate = {2024-12-11},
  abstract = {Segmented transmitter coils are commonly employed in dynamic wireless power transfer, and automatic switching is a preferred function to limit the transmitter current. This letter proposes a method for segment transmitter automatic switching utilizing a dc-controlled variable inductor (DCCVI), where the dc current can change the ac side's self-inductance. When the coils are decoupled, the dc current is small, so the inductance of the DCCVI is relatively large, leading to the suppression of the transmitter current. When the coils meet certain coupling conditions, the dc current becomes large, leading to a significant reduction in the ac inductance of the DCCVI, resulting in higher transmission power, thereby enabling segment transmitter automatic switching. The proposed method is straightforward and does not need additional position feedback. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed system can automatically limit the coil current within the range of [0, 0.15] and achieve higher power transmission with higher efficiency within the coupling range of [0.165, 0.3].},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Automatic switching,Coils,Couplings,dynamic wireless power transfer (DWPT),Inductance,Inductors,Receivers,Switches,Transmitters,variable inductor}
}

@article{zhangEnergyEncryptionWireless2015,
  title = {Energy {{Encryption}} for {{Wireless Power Transfer}}},
  author = {Zhang, Zhen and Chau, K. T. and Qiu, Chun and Liu, Chunhua},
  date = {2015-09},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {30},
  number = {9},
  pages = {5237--5246},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2014.2363686},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6928497/?arnumber=6928497},
  urldate = {2024-11-07},
  abstract = {This paper presents a novel energy encryption strategy for wireless power transfer (WPT) systems, which can effectively improve the security performance of wirelessly transferred energy. In a WPT system, energy is expected to transfer to specific receptors as well as to switch off other unauthorized energy transmission channels, so the security of energy transmission is an important issue. In the proposed secure WPT system, the energy is encrypted by chaotically regulating the frequency of the power source. Then, the authorized receptor can receive the energy by simultaneously adjusting the circuit to decrypt the encrypted energy based on the security key obtained from the power supply, while the unauthorized receptor cannot receive the energy without knowledge of the security key. Hence, a secure energy transmission channel is established to effectively prevent unauthorized receptors from stealing the energy. In this paper, both simulation and experimental results are provided to verify the validity of the proposed encrypted WPT system.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Capacitors,Chaos,Coils,Contactless charging,Couplings,Encryption,energy encryption,magnetic resonant coupling (MRC),security,Wireless communication,wireless power transmission (WPT)}
}

@article{zhangImprovedCompensationMethod2025,
  title = {An {{Improved Compensation Method Reducing Displacement Current Loss}} for {{Multilayer Coils}} in {{IPT System}}},
  author = {Zhang, Yiming and Cheng, Hao and Chen, Yang and Luo, Bo and Zhou, Wei and Mai, Ruikun and He, Zhengyou},
  date = {2025-01},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {40},
  number = {1},
  pages = {87--91},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2024.3462669},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10681322/?arnumber=10681322},
  urldate = {2024-12-11},
  abstract = {Dual-layer or multilayer coils are often used to increase the power density of inductive power transfer systems. However, compared to single-layer coils, multilayer coils suffer from additional loss caused by interlayer displacement current (IDC), which can reduce system transmission efficiency. Therefore, this letter establishes a general mathematical model for IDC loss in multilayer coils regardless of whether the adjacent layers are symmetric. The traditional centralized compensation capacitor is split into two capacitors (interlayer and auxiliary capacitors), and a novel parameteric design method for the interlayer capacitor is proposed to optimize the IDC losses. The auxiliary capacitor is used to adjust the resonance state of the circuit. The experimental results show that compared to the traditional method, the prototype with the double-layer symmetrical coil achieves efficiency improvements of 0.5\% under light load and 2.27\% under heavy load. The double-layer asymmetrical coil prototype achieves efficiency improvements of 0.58\% under light load and 2.11\% under heavy load compared to the traditional method.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Capacitors,Coils,Dielectrics,Inductance,Inductive power transfer (IPT),interlayer displacement current (IDC) loss,multilayer coil,Nonhomogeneous media,Resistance,Wire}
}

@article{zhangLargeScaleQuantum2018,
  title = {Large Scale Quantum Key Distribution: Challenges and Solutions [{{Invited}}]},
  shorttitle = {Large Scale Quantum Key Distribution},
  author = {Zhang, Qiang and Xu, Feihu and Chen, Yu-Ao and Peng, Cheng-Zhi and Pan, Jian-Wei},
  date = {2018-09-03},
  journaltitle = {Optics Express},
  shortjournal = {Opt. Express},
  volume = {26},
  number = {18},
  pages = {24260},
  issn = {1094-4087},
  doi = {10.1364/OE.26.024260},
  url = {https://opg.optica.org/abstract.cfm?URI=oe-26-18-24260},
  urldate = {2024-05-15},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{zhangPerformanceEnhancementSubSampling2007,
  title = {Performance {{Enhancement}} of a {{Sub-Sampling Circuit}} for {{Ultra-Wideband Signal Processing}}},
  author = {Zhang, Cemin and Fathy, Aly E. and Mahfouz, Mohamed},
  date = {2007-12},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Microwave and Wireless Components Letters},
  volume = {17},
  number = {12},
  pages = {873--875},
  issn = {1558-1764},
  doi = {10.1109/LMWC.2007.910500},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4385758/?arnumber=4385758},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {An ultra-wideband (UWB) sampling mixer has been developed based on utilizing the combined advantages of two known circuit topologies: a wideband balun and a balanced-feed mixer. The developed sampler is integrated with a step-recovery diode strobe-step generator to sub-sample UWB signals. The fabricated sub-sampler demonstrated a 3.5-dB radio frequency to intermediate frequency (RF-IF) conversion loss up to 1 GHz (without the IF amplification), and a wide 3 dB bandwidth that exceeded 3.5-GHz. It has a reduced spurious level of better than -38 dBc, a lower sensitivity to the Schottky diode-placement, an excellent input match, and good isolation.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Microwave}} and {{Wireless Components Letters}}},
  keywords = {Circuit topology,Frequency conversion,Impedance matching,Mixers,Radio frequency,Sampler,sampling mixer,Schottky diodes,Signal generators,Signal processing,Signal sampling,step recovery diode (SRD),strobe generator,Ultra wideband technology,ultra-wideband (UWB)}
}

@inproceedings{zhangRobustCounterfeitPCB2015,
  title = {Robust Counterfeit {{PCB}} Detection Exploiting Intrinsic Trace Impedance Variations},
  booktitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 33rd {{VLSI Test Symposium}} ({{VTS}})},
  author = {Zhang, Fengchao and Hennessy, Andrew and Bhunia, Swarup},
  date = {2015-04},
  pages = {1--6},
  issn = {2375-1053},
  doi = {10.1109/VTS.2015.7116294},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7116294/?arnumber=7116294},
  urldate = {2024-10-31},
  abstract = {The long and distributed supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) makes them vulnerable to different forms of counterfeiting attacks. Existing chip-level integrity validation approaches cannot be readily extended to PCB. In this paper, we address this issue with a novel PCB authentication approach that creates robust, unique signatures from a PCB based on process-induced variations in its trace impedances. The approach comes at virtually zero design and hardware overhead and can be applied to legacy PCBs. Experiments with two sets of commercial PCBs as well as a set of custom designed PCBs show that the proposed approach can obtain unique authentication signature with inter-PCB hamming distance of 47.94\% or higher.},
  eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 33rd {{VLSI Test Symposium}} ({{VTS}})},
  keywords = {Authentication,Copper,Counterfeiting,Electrical resistance measurement,High definition video,Impedance,Impedance measurement,Piracy,Printed Circuit Board (PCB),Probes,PUF,Trust}
}

@inproceedings{zhangRobustCounterfeitPCB2015a,
  title = {Robust Counterfeit {{PCB}} Detection Exploiting Intrinsic Trace Impedance Variations},
  booktitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 33rd {{VLSI Test Symposium}} ({{VTS}})},
  author = {Zhang, Fengchao and Hennessy, Andrew and Bhunia, Swarup},
  date = {2015-04},
  pages = {1--6},
  issn = {2375-1053},
  doi = {10.1109/VTS.2015.7116294},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7116294/?arnumber=7116294},
  urldate = {2024-10-04},
  abstract = {The long and distributed supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) makes them vulnerable to different forms of counterfeiting attacks. Existing chip-level integrity validation approaches cannot be readily extended to PCB. In this paper, we address this issue with a novel PCB authentication approach that creates robust, unique signatures from a PCB based on process-induced variations in its trace impedances. The approach comes at virtually zero design and hardware overhead and can be applied to legacy PCBs. Experiments with two sets of commercial PCBs as well as a set of custom designed PCBs show that the proposed approach can obtain unique authentication signature with inter-PCB hamming distance of 47.94\% or higher.},
  eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 33rd {{VLSI Test Symposium}} ({{VTS}})},
  keywords = {Authentication,Copper,Counterfeiting,Electrical resistance measurement,High definition video,Impedance,Impedance measurement,Piracy,Printed Circuit Board (PCB),Probes,PUF,Trust}
}

@patent{zhangTamperrespondentAssembliesPorous2023,
  type = {patentus},
  title = {Tamper-Respondent Assemblies with Porous Heat Transfer Element(s)},
  author = {Zhang, Hongqing and HIGBY, Arthur J. and Lewison, David J. and REGO, Philipp K. BUCHLING and Bunt, Jay A. and Busby, James and Campbell, Levi},
  holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}},
  date = {2023-08-01},
  number = {11716808B2},
  url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US11716808B2/en?q=(hardware+security+module+heatsink)&assignee=International+Business+Machines+Corporation},
  urldate = {2025-12-03},
  langid = {english},
  keywords = {circuit board,electronic component,enclosure,tamper,thermally conductive}
}

@article{zhangWirelessPowerTransfer2019,
  title = {Wireless {{Power Transfer}}—{{An Overview}}},
  author = {Zhang, Zhen and Pang, Hongliang and Georgiadis, Apostolos and Cecati, Carlo},
  date = {2019-02},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics},
  volume = {66},
  number = {2},
  pages = {1044--1058},
  issn = {1557-9948},
  doi = {10.1109/TIE.2018.2835378},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8357386/?arnumber=8357386},
  urldate = {2024-11-07},
  abstract = {Due to limitations of low power density, high cost, heavy weight, etc., the development and application of battery-powered devices are facing with unprecedented technical challenges. As a novel pattern of energization, the wireless power transfer (WPT) offers a band new way to the energy acquisition for electric-driven devices, thus alleviating the over-dependence on the battery. This paper presents an overview of WPT techniques with emphasis on working mechanisms, technical challenges, metamaterials, and classical applications. Focusing on WPT systems, this paper elaborates on current major research topics and discusses about future development trends. This novel energy transmission mechanism shows significant meanings on the pervasive application of renewable energies in our daily life.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industrial Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Batteries,Capacitive coupled power transfer (CCPT),contactless charging,Couplings,dynamic charging,Electromagnetic interference,Impedance,inductive power transfer (IPT),Integrated circuit modeling,Load modeling,overview,Wireless power transfer,wireless power transfer (WPT)}
}

@article{zhangWirelessSensorPower2024,
  title = {Wireless {{Sensor Power Supply}} for {{Rotating Shaft Using DC-Side Diode Array With Stable Output}}},
  author = {Zhang, Zeheng and Cheng, Hao and Li, Zheng and Chen, Fuao and Chen, Yang and He, Zhengyou and Mai, Ruikun},
  date = {2024-12},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics},
  volume = {39},
  number = {12},
  pages = {15414--15419},
  issn = {1941-0107},
  doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2024.3439718},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10629183/?arnumber=10629183},
  urldate = {2024-12-11},
  abstract = {24 × 7 health monitoring of rotating shaft is very important for the safe operation of automotive axles. Wireless sensor power supply technology is one of the promising power supply means for monitoring systems. Since the radius of many rotation shafts is large up to 1 m, segmented coils are adopted to reduce the magnetic interference and power loss compared to single receiver coils, but this will lead to output voltage fluctuation causing the monitoring system failures. This letter proposes a fluctuation suppression method by a dc-side diode array and parameter optimization. Using multiple reverse parallel diode groups to connect the dc side of multiple receivers and the load, the diodes will be conducted when corresponding coils are activated, while those without induced voltage will not be conducted. In this way, the mutual inductance fluctuation as per different rotation angles can be greatly reduced. In addition, a detuned system has been designed, rendering the output gain insensitive to variations in mutual inductance, thereby enhancing the output stability. A prototype was built to verify the theoretical analysis. The experimental results indicate that the output voltage fluctuation is only 5.0\%. The proposed method can achieve significant output stability without complex control and dedicated coil design.},
  eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}},
  keywords = {Coils,Diode array,Diodes,Fluctuations,Inductance,Power supplies,Receivers,Rectifiers,Shafts,stable output,Transmitters,Wireless sensor networks,wireless sensor power supply (WSPS)}
}

@online{zhaoDesignOptimizationLitzWire2023,
  title = {Design and {{Optimization}} of {{Litz-Wire Planar Spiral Coil}} for {{Inductive Power Transfer Application}}},
  author = {Zhao, Weihao and Peng, Yingzhou and Zhan, Shen and Wang, Huai},
  date = {2023-04-07},
  doi = {10.36227/techrxiv.22491235.v1},
  url = {https://www.techrxiv.org/doi/full/10.36227/techrxiv.22491235.v1},
  urldate = {2024-10-30},
  abstract = {Litz wire planar spiral coils are widely used in inductive power transfer systems due to low power loss in high-frequency operation and low profile. However, the complicated structure of the litz wire coil imposes difficulties in estimating the frequency-dependent resistance and quality factor accurately. In this work, we present an 2D analytical model for calculating the frequency-dependent resistance and quality factor of multi-coil inductive power transfer systems based on superposition of different loss effects. Its accuracy is validated with multiple coils and litz wires over wide frequency range. Meanwhile, a fast and accurate multi-objective optimization method is developed to improve the product quality factor and coupling factor. From the optimization results, there are five factors affecting the quality factor and coupling factor. A set of design guidelines is proposed to cope with these design factors. The final prototypes show 33\textbackslash\% increase in quality factor and 23\textbackslash\% improvement in coupling factor compared with the state-of-the-art designs. Meanwhile, a 30W, 500kHz inductive power transfer system is designed with 91\textbackslash\% peak efficiency.},
  langid = {english},
  pubstate = {prepublished},
  keywords = {preprint}
}

@article{zhouHiddenVoiceCommands2019,
  title = {Hidden {{Voice Commands}}: {{Attacks}} and {{Defenses}} on the {{VCS}} of {{Autonomous Driving Cars}}},
  shorttitle = {Hidden {{Voice Commands}}},
  author = {Zhou, Man and Qin, Zhan and Lin, Xiu and Hu, Shengshan and Wang, Qian and Ren, Kui},
  date = {2019-10},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Wireless Communications},
  volume = {26},
  number = {5},
  pages = {128--133},
  issn = {1558-0687},
  doi = {10.1109/MWC.2019.1800477},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8694199},
  urldate = {2025-05-28},
  abstract = {Autonomous driving is becoming one of the most popular applications of AI. Meanwhile, the advances in deep learning have promoted the rapid development of the voice controllable systems (VCSs), which have almost reached the maturity stage. Before autonomous driving cars reach the highest level of automation, intelligent voice interaction remains the primary approach for human-vehicle interaction. Recent works show that such intelligent systems are vulnerable to hidden voice commands that are unnoticed or unintelligible to humans. In particular, an adversary utilizing hidden voice commands is able to control autonomous driving cars. For example, malicious voice commands embedded into the sound of online shared videos can stealthily control the vehicle when people watch the videos in the car. In this article, we investigate the potential perniciousness of hidden voice commands on the VCS of autonomous driving cars, and then discuss feasible defense strategies. We finally propose a pop-noisebased general defense strategy that can resist various kinds of attacks.},
  keywords = {Automobiles,Autonomous vehicles,Machine learning,Microphones,Speech recognition,Ultrasonic imaging,Videos}
}

@inproceedings{zhouPPMLACHighPerformance2022,
  title = {{{PPMLAC}}: High Performance Chipset Architecture for Secure Multi-Party Computation},
  shorttitle = {{{PPMLAC}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 49th {{Annual International Symposium}} on {{Computer Architecture}}},
  author = {Zhou, Xing and Xu, Zhilei and Wang, Cong and Gao, Mingyu},
  date = {2022-06-18},
  pages = {87--101},
  publisher = {ACM},
  location = {New York New York},
  doi = {10.1145/3470496.3527392},
  url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3470496.3527392},
  urldate = {2025-08-13},
  abstract = {Privacy issue is a main concern restricting data sharing and crossorganization collaborations. While Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning techniques such as Multi-Party Computations (MPC), Homomorphic Encryption, and Federated Learning are proposed to solve this problem, no solution exists with both strong security and high performance to run large-scale, complex machine learning models. This paper presents PPMLAC, a novel chipset architecture to accelerate MPC, which combines MPC’s strong security and hardware’s high performance, eliminates the communication bottleneck from MPC, and achieves several orders of magnitudes speed up over software-based MPC. It is carefully designed to only rely on a minimum set of simple hardware components in the trusted domain, thus is robust against side-channel attacks and malicious adversaries. Our FPGA prototype can run mainstream large-scale ML models like ResNet in near real-time under a practical network environment with non-negligible latency, which is impossible for existing MPC solutions.},
  eventtitle = {{{ISCA}} '22: {{The}} 49th {{Annual International Symposium}} on {{Computer Architecture}}},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-8610-4},
  langid = {english}
}

@inproceedings{zhouPPMLACHighPerformance2022a,
  title = {{{PPMLAC}}: High Performance Chipset Architecture for Secure Multi-Party Computation},
  shorttitle = {{{PPMLAC}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 49th {{Annual International Symposium}} on {{Computer Architecture}}},
  author = {Zhou, Xing and Xu, Zhilei and Wang, Cong and Gao, Mingyu},
  date = {2022-06-11},
  series = {{{ISCA}} '22},
  pages = {87--101},
  publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
  location = {New York, NY, USA},
  doi = {10.1145/3470496.3527392},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3470496.3527392},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Privacy issue is a main concern restricting data sharing and cross-organization collaborations. While Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning techniques such as Multi-Party Computations (MPC), Homomorphic Encryption, and Federated Learning are proposed to solve this problem, no solution exists with both strong security and high performance to run large-scale, complex machine learning models. This paper presents PPMLAC, a novel chipset architecture to accelerate MPC, which combines MPC's strong security and hardware's high performance, eliminates the communication bottleneck from MPC, and achieves several orders of magnitudes speed up over software-based MPC. It is carefully designed to only rely on a minimum set of simple hardware components in the trusted domain, thus is robust against side-channel attacks and malicious adversaries. Our FPGA prototype can run mainstream large-scale ML models like ResNet in near real-time under a practical network environment with non-negligible latency, which is impossible for existing MPC solutions.},
  isbn = {978-1-4503-8610-4}
}

@inproceedings{zhouPrintListenerUncoveringVulnerability2024,
  title = {{{PrintListener}}: {{Uncovering}} the {{Vulnerability}} of {{Fingerprint Authentication}} via the {{Finger Friction Sound}}},
  shorttitle = {{{PrintListener}}},
  booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  author = {Zhou, Man and Su, Shuao and Wang, Qian and Li, Qi and Zhou, Yuting and Ma, Xiaojing and Li, Zhengxiong},
  date = {2024},
  publisher = {Internet Society},
  location = {San Diego, CA, USA},
  doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.24618},
  url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-618-paper.pdf},
  urldate = {2024-07-25},
  abstract = {Fingerprint authentication has been extensively employed in contemporary identity verification systems owing to its rapidity and cost-effectiveness. Due to its widespread use, fingerprint leakage may cause sensitive information theft, enormous economic and personnel losses, and even a potential compromise of national security. As a fingerprint that can coincidentally match a specific proportion of the overall fingerprint population, MasterPrint rings the alarm bells for the security of fingerprint authentication. In this paper, we propose a new side-channel attack on the minutiae-based Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), called PrintListener, which leverages users’ fingertip swiping actions on the screen to extract fingerprint pattern features (the first-level features) and synthesizes a stronger targeted PatternMasterPrint with potential second-level features. The attack scenario of PrintListener is extensive and covert. It only needs to record users’ fingertip friction sound and can be launched by leveraging a large number of social media platforms. Extensive experimental results in realworld scenarios show that Printlistener can significantly improve the attack potency of MasterPrint.},
  eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}},
  isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8},
  langid = {english}
}

@article{zhuPDNPulseSensingPCB2023,
  title = {{{PDNPulse}}: {{Sensing PCB Anomaly With}} the {{Intrinsic Power Delivery Network}}},
  shorttitle = {{{PDNPulse}}},
  author = {Zhu, Huifeng and Shan, Haoqi and Sullivan, Dean and Guo, Xiaolong and Jin, Yier and Zhang, Xuan},
  date = {2023},
  journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security},
  volume = {18},
  pages = {3590--3605},
  issn = {1556-6021},
  doi = {10.1109/TIFS.2023.3285490},
  url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10153638/},
  urldate = {2025-04-09},
  abstract = {The ubiquitous presence of printed circuit boards (PCBs) in modern electronic systems and embedded devices makes their integrity a top security concern. To take advantage of the economies of scale, today’s PCB design and manufacturing are often performed by suppliers around the globe, exposing them to many security vulnerabilities along the segmented PCB supply chain. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the PCB designs also leaves ample room for numerous sneaky board-level attacks to be implemented throughout each stage of a PCB’s lifetime, threatening many electronic devices. In this paper, we propose PDNPulse, a power delivery network (PDN) based PCB anomaly detection framework that can identify a wide spectrum of board-level malicious modifications. PDNPulse leverages the fact that the PDN’s characteristics are inevitably affected by modifications to the PCB. By detecting changes to the PDN impedance profile against the golden model and using the Frechet distance-based anomaly detection algorithms, PDNPulse can robustly and successfully discern malicious modifications across the system. Using PDNPulse, we conduct extensive experiments on seven commercial-off-the-shelf PCBs, covering different design scales, different threat models, and seven different anomaly types. The results confirm that PDNPulse creates an effective security asymmetry between attack and defense.},
  keywords = {anomaly detection,Anomaly detection,cyberattack,impedance,Impedance,Impedance measurement,power distribution networks,Printed circuits,Probes,Sensitivity,Trojan horses,Voltage measurement}
}

@incollection{zicknerSpulen1927,
  title = {Spulen},
  booktitle = {Taschenbuch Der Drahtlosen {{Telegraphie}} Und {{Telephonie}}},
  author = {Zickner, G.},
  editor = {Banneitz, Fritz},
  date = {1927},
  publisher = {Verlag von Julius Springer},
  keywords = {twisted-inductors}
}