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\chaptertitle{Active Tamper Sensing in the Wild}
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In this chapter we will take a look at how the tamper-sensing meshes that provide the core tamper response in Hardware
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Security Modules are built and what they are used for. We will analyze the gaps left by the current state of the
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industry, and evaluate how Inertial HSMs could close these gaps to make secure hardware accessible to everyone. We will
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start with a brief history of secure hardware with a particular focus on tamper-sensing meshes since the tamper-sensing
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mesh is the primary line of defense that delineates a hardware security module from other, weaker secure hardware
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primitives such as Smart Cards or Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs).
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% FIXME include stuff from EPA paper
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\section{The History of Tamper Sensing Meshes}
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Tamper-sensing meshes can be implemented in many different ways. Their design offers various degrees of freedom from the
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precise conductor layout, through the manufacturing technology of the mesh and how it is wrapped around the payload
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during manufacturing up to its monitoring circuitry. As a result, manufacturers across application domains from
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datacenter appliance HSMs through card payment terminals have historically used patents on parts of their tamper-sensing
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mesh implementations as a means to prevent copying of their designs~\cite{
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Tamper-sensing meshes are highly effective at preventing a large array of physical attacks and provide the core of the
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tamper-response system of a Hardware Security Module. In this chapter we will take a look at a range of real-world
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devices using tamper-sensing meshes and analyze their implementation. We will analyze the gaps left by the current state
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of the industry, and evaluate how Inertial HSMs could close these gaps to make secure hardware accessible to a wider
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range of applications. We will start with a brief history of secure hardware with a particular focus on tamper-sensing
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meshes.
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Tamper-sensing meshes offer many degrees of freedom in their design ranging from the precise conductor layout, through
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the manufacturing technology of the mesh and how it is wrapped around the payload during manufacturing up to their
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monitoring circuitry. As a result, manufacturers across application domains from datacenter appliance HSMs through card
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payment terminals have historically used patents on parts of their tamper-sensing mesh implementations as a means to
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prevent copying of their designs~\cite{
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razaghiCircuitBoardHold2019,
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heitmannTamperBarrierElectronic2005,
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clarkTamperDetectionSystem2005,
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heitmannMethodMakingTamper2009,
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perreaultSystemMethodInstalling2005,
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}. The basic principle of modern tamper-sensing meshes of preventing intrusion by force through embedding a looped
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conductor to cover a surface traces back as far as at least 1870~\cite{
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}. The basic principle of modern tamper-sensing meshes, preventing physical intrusion using an embedded looped conductor
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to cover a surface traces back as far as at least 1870~\cite{
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ImprovementProtectingSafes1870,
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ImprovementElectromagneticEnvelopes1870}, when it was applied to the protection of bank vaults from robbers
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attempting to dig, drill and saw through the vault's floor and walls. Even multi-layer, orthogonal tamper-sensing meshes
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@ -51,9 +49,8 @@ the widespread adoption of cryptography in commercial applications~\cite{
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\subsection{Use by the US Military}
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Electronic tamper sensing meshes are documented in literature beginning around World War \RN{2}. The earliest mention of
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such a system we are aware of is from notes on a series of lectures given by Dr.~David~G. Boak, a specialist in
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communications security and signal intelligence at the US National Security
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One of the earliest practical uses of tamper sensing meshes is documented in notes on a series of lectures given by
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Dr.~David~G. Boak, a specialist in communications security and signal intelligence at the US National Security
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Agency\cite{nsaHistoryUSCommunications1973,nsaHistoryUSCommunications1981}. In this lecture series, Boak mentions that
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around World War \RN{2}, the US became concerned about the security of their ciphering machines, which at the time were
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large, fridge-sized electro-mechanical contraptions. Initially, simple safes were used to protect those
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@ -129,15 +126,15 @@ Commercially, tamper sensing meshes have entered widespread use beginning around
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in then-new HSMs, cryptographic coprocessors primarily aimed at the financial
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industry~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. Today, their use in finance has spread from HSMs in datacenters
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and ATMs to the ATM pin pads themselves, which encrypt the customer's PIN right at the source, as well as in all kinds
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of card payment terminals. We will analyze two such ATM pin pads later in this paper.
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of card payment terminals. We will analyze two such ATM pin pads later in this chapter.
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HSMs are used for highly sensitive operations even outside of the financial industry, although their adoption is
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hampered by their high cost. Such applications include key management in the TLS certificate infrastructure. In this
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paper, we will analyze a commercial HSM that was used in the key management infrastructure of a premium TV provider.
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chapter, we will analyze a commercial HSM that was used in the key management infrastructure of a premium TV provider.
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Beyond finance, tamper-sensing meshes have found applications in a variety of other use cases as well. For instance, we
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have found them being used in mail franking machines to protect the credit counter and franking data, with one such unit
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analyzed in this paper. Furthermore, we have identified at least one model of key safe that in Germany is mounted
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analyzed in this chapter. Furthermore, we have identified at least one model of key safe that in Germany is mounted
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externally on public buildings to provide keys to emergency services, and which includes a tamper sensing mesh on its
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outside-facing wall to detect attempts at drilling into it. Finally, we have found a processing unit used in a series of
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mid-2000s era slot machines in Germany that includes a tamper-sensing mesh, presumably to prevent modification or
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@ -145,7 +142,7 @@ cloning. This device will also be analyzed later in this chapter.
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\section{The Principles of Tamper-Sensing Mesh Construction and Monitoring}
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\subsection{Tamper-sensing Mesh Manufacturing}
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%\subsection{Tamper-sensing Mesh Manufacturing}
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The manufacturing technology of a tamper sensing mesh is a critical factor in its security. While in many applications,
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meshes manufactured from off-the-shelf processes such as Flexible Printed Circuit (FPC) processes are used, these
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@ -170,7 +167,7 @@ mesh is embedded inside after installation are clearly co-designed with the carb
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material adheres well to both, leading to the traces being destroyed when either are peeled off.
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The design of these IBM/Gore meshes is documented in an extensive list of patents, mostly under IBM's name. Its
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fundamental layout has not changed much since the early 1990ies~\cite{
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basic construction and layout has not changed much since the early 1990ies~\cite{
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macphersonImprovementsSecurityEnclosures1993,
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macphersonTamperRespondentEnclosure1999}.
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@ -188,18 +185,15 @@ e.g.\ 5 years, this corresponds to a maximum average power consumption of \qty{4
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% keyword: wire covering
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To achieve low power consumption, a popular technique known since at least
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1902~\cite{suttonElectricallyprotectedStructure1902} and still used
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today~\cite{cesanaTamperResistantCard2001,razaghiCircuitBoardHold2019} is to measure the mesh's deviation from its
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baseline value. This measurement can be implemented either by directly comparing a mesh trace's resistance with a
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reference resistor, or using a wheatstone bridge. Using a bridge circuit was already used in early tamper-sensing mesh
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implementations~\cite{
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today~\cite{cesanaTamperResistantCard2001,razaghiCircuitBoardHold2019} is to measure the deviation of the mesh's
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end-to-end ohmic resistance from its baseline value. This measurement can be implemented either by directly comparing a
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mesh trace's resistance with a reference resistor, or using a wheatstone bridge. Using a bridge circuit was already used
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in early tamper-sensing mesh implementations~\cite{
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ElektrischeSicherheitseinrichtungSchutze1932,
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hamPrintedcircuitTypeSecurity1971,
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dalphinEnceinteProtegeeAvec1987,
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} and makes it possible to detect small changes in the mesh's resistance with little complexity.
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% TODO US7345497B2 uses balanced transmission lines / fast pulses
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% NOTE: US3882324A mentions exploding the device as tamper response
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\subsection{Other Tamper Sensing Techniques}
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Besides tamper-sensing meshes, environmental sensors such as temperature or light sensors are frequently used as a
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@ -302,8 +302,8 @@ to use in online searches, and when using Large Language Models (LLMs), it frequ
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\section{A Motivating Counter-Example}
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% EPA paper from ESORICS HS3 workshop
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\todo{FIXME: Proper citation here}
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\sourceattrib{This part is based on a short paper presented at the HS3 workshop at ESORICS 2025.}
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Looking at the landscape of computer security solutions, we are presented with a wide variety of vendors and products
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that may give the impression that hardware security is a solved problem. Vendors sell various claims rangning from
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\emph{You don't need hardware security, just do it in the cloud!} to \emph{Buy our HSM and you will be secure!}. In
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@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ tampering is detected~\cite{
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ISOIEC24759,
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pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2021}.
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Like other PUF-based systems, their system naturally lacks this capability.
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~
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Key differences of our system include:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Our system can cover larger meshes without loss of precision using a single TDR frontend through multiplexing.
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@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ Closest to our proposal in the academic corpus is the work of
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domain response of a mesh using a circuit made from a pulse generator and a fast Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC). To
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avoid an expensive, high-speed digital processing pipeline, their design is centered around a specialized high-speed ADC
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that has a built-in sample memory. Using this part, they capture a pulse at high speed after it traverses the mesh.
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Subsequently, they slowly process the captured data from memory.
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Subsequently, they slowly process the captured data from memory. A 2007
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patent~\cite{matsunoProtectionCircuitSemiconductor2008} proposes the same delay-based approach.
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Advantages of their design include better sensitivity to changes in total mesh trace length compared to simple
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continuity monitoring and the low complexity of their analog frontend. Disadvantages include the reliance on a specialty
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@ -88,6 +88,7 @@
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\newcommand{\todo}[1]{
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\ifdefined\thesispreviewmode
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\noindent%
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\marginpar{
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\setlength{\fboxsep}{2mm}
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\shadowbox{
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@ -104,6 +105,16 @@
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\fi
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}
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\newcommand{\sourceattrib}[1]{%
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\noindent%
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\marginpar{%
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\raggedleft%
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\footnotesize%
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\textit{#1}%
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}%
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\ignorespaces%
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}
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\newcommand{\todoplaceholder}[1]{\textbf{TODO}\todo{#1}}
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% https://tex.stackexchange.com/questions/30720/footnote-without-a-marker
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@ -141,15 +152,17 @@
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\newcommand{\chapterbibliography}{
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\clearpage % clearpage flushes all figures. force this here so we don't get figures floating in between references.
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\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{References}
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\newrefcontext{webref}
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\printbibliography[type={online},title={Web sources},heading=subbibintoc,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment]
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\printbibliography[type={online},title={Web sources},heading=none,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment]
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\newrefcontext{defref}
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\printbibliography[nottype={online},nottype={patent},heading=subbibintoc,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment]
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\printbibliography[nottype={online},nottype={patent},heading=none,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment]
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\newrefcontext{patref}
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\printbibliography[type={patent},title={Patent References},heading=subbibintoc,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment]
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\printbibliography[type={patent},title={Patent References},heading=none,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment]
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}
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\newrefcontext{defref}
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\hyphenation{a-me-na-ble}
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\hyphenation{da-ta-cen-ter}
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