Fixes from notes
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@ -12,11 +12,23 @@ line of defense in such physical security systems goes back more than a century,
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being used in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, around the widespread commercialization of electricity. Today,
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active tamper sensing meshes are used in a wide array of devices ranging from card payment terminals to atomic bombs.
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In this chapter, we will start with a brief history of secure hardware with a particular focus on tamper sensing meshes.
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Complementing our historical analysis, we will present the results of a survey of a range of real-world devices that use
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tamper sensing meshes and analyze their implementation. We will analyze the gaps left by the current state of the art in
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commercial practice, and evaluate how Inertial HSMs could close these gaps to make secure hardware accessible to a wider
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range of applications.
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In this chapter, we will start with a brief history of tamper sensing meshes. Complementing our historical analysis, we
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will present the results of a survey of a range of real-world devices that use tamper sensing meshes and we will analyze
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their implementation. We will analyze the gaps left by the current state of the art in commercial practice, and evaluate
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how Inertial HSMs could close these gaps to make secure hardware accessible to a wider range of applications. The
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contributions in this chapter are as follows:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item We provide a historical overview of uses of tamper sensing meshes.
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\item We provide the first large-scale analysis of real devices incorporating tamper sensing meshes in the academic
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record.
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\item We create a taxonomy of practical construction techniques and provide both detailed analyis and photos
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illustrating them.
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\item From our sample, we extract several design patterns that can be applied to increase the security of a design.
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\item We note security flaws in several of our samples.
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\item We provide the results of CT measurements of multiple samples, and we evaluate their impact on tamper sensing
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mesh security.
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\end{itemize}
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\section{The History of Tamper Sensing Meshes}
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@ -54,8 +66,9 @@ the widespread adoption of cryptography in commercial applications~\cite{
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\subsection{Use by the US Military}
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One of the earliest practical uses of tamper sensing meshes is documented in notes on a series of lectures given by
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Dr.~David~G. Boak, a specialist in communications security and signal intelligence at the US National Security
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One early practical uses of tamper sensing meshes for information security as opposed to the security of some physical
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good is documented in notes on a series of lectures given by Dr.~David~G. Boak, a specialist in communications security
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and signal intelligence at the US National Security
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Agency~\cite{nsaHistoryUSCommunications1973,nsaHistoryUSCommunications1981}. In this lecture series, Boak mentions that
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around World War \RN{2}, the US became concerned about the security of their ciphering machines, which at the time were
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large, fridge-sized electro-mechanical contraptions. Initially, simple safes were used to protect those
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@ -1255,29 +1268,29 @@ large-area photodiode coupled to a scintillator crystal converting X-ray photons
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\subsection{Application of Inertial HSM technology}
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The widespread use of inexpensive but low-security commodity processes shows that in practical applications, cost is
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often prioritized over security. The IHSM approach naturally complements such a system that uses a low-security mesh
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material and increases its security without needing a more advanced mesh material. The beneficial construction
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techniques that we identified above such as the use of multiple, spaced layers and low-contrast trace materials
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complement IHSM technology naturally. The three-dimensional layout of a mesh becomes easier in an IHSM implementation
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since features like corners between mesh panels or gaps between mesh layers in most layouts are protected by the mesh's
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motion. An unintended advantage that results in IHSM implementations over conventional meshes is that they would provide
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a level of intrinsic resistance to X-ray and CT imaging. In contrast to optical cameras in the visible spectrum, X-ray
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image sensors need integration times in the hundreds of milliseconds or longer, which makes them unsuitable to image a
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quickly moving target.
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often prioritized over security. The IHSM approach complements such a system that uses a low-security mesh material and
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increases its security without needing a more advanced mesh material. Construction techniques that improve the security
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of conventional systems such as the use of multiple, spaced layers and low-contrast trace materials can be directly
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applied to IHSM systems. The three-dimensional layout of a mesh becomes easier in an IHSM implementation since features
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like corners between mesh panels or gaps between mesh layers in most layouts are protected by the mesh's motion. An
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unintended advantage that results in IHSM implementations over conventional meshes is that they would provide a level of
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intrinsic resistance to X-ray and CT imaging. In contrast to optical cameras in the visible spectrum, X-ray image
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sensors need integration times in the hundreds of milliseconds or longer, which makes them unsuitable to image a quickly
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moving target.
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\section{Conclusion}
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In our survey, we have found a wide variety in tamper sensing mesh construction techniques. Meshes are commonly
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In this survey, we have analyzed a wide variety in tamper sensing mesh construction techniques. Meshes are commonly
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implemented as part of both rigid (PCB) and flexible (FPC) circuit boards, either standalone, or as part of a board also
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carrying other components. Silver or carbon trace patterning techniques that are normally used for membrane keyboards
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are also used in some meshes, but are limited in their structure size. The meshes we found in the wild almost never push
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the boundaries of achievable structure size for a given process.
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The strongest systems we found combined a mesh with potting such that separating mesh and potting destroyed the mesh's
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traces. Silver printed circuits like they are normally used for keyboard matrices performed particularly well in this
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regard since the silver ink adheres better to some potting compounds than to its plastic carrier substrate. We found
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copper FPCs are commonly used for meshes. Interestingly, they seem to be a poor choice since they are very robust and
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can even be forcibly separated from some potting compounds without destroying their traces.
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traces. Silver or carbon ink printed circuits like they are normally used for keyboard matrices performed particularly
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well in this regard since such inks adheres better to some potting compounds than to its plastic carrier substrate. We
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found copper FPCs are commonly used for meshes. Interestingly, they seem to be a poor choice since they are very robust
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and can even be forcibly separated from some potting compounds without destroying their traces.
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The weakest systems we found completely omitted a tamper sensing mesh. Ironically, all of these systems were devices
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marketed as hardware security modules. Given the inexpensive nature of tamper sensing meshes and the high price point of
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@ -1285,7 +1298,7 @@ such devices, we suspect market segmentation as a driving force behind their man
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sensing meshes despite their low cost. The primary security standard that is most often cited for the certification of
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HSMs is the US government's FIPS-140, now in its third
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version~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019}. A peculiarity of this
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standard is that it only requires active tamper sensing meshes in the highest of the four security levels it defeies.
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standard is that it only requires active tamper sensing meshes in the highest of the four security levels it defines.
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Overall, we can conclude that the term ``HSM'' does not imply state-of-the-art physical tamper sensing.
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From an academic point of view, the core finding of our survey is that for academic research on mesh manufacturing,
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