Bunch of layout changes
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3 changed files with 99 additions and 10 deletions
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\documentclass[12pt,a4paper,notitlepage,twoside]{report}
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\documentclass[11pt,a4paper,notitlepage,twoside]{report}
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\usepackage[ngerman, english]{babel}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[a4paper, top=2cm, bottom=3.5cm, inner=3.5cm, outer=5cm]{geometry}
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\usepackage[a4paper, top=3cm, bottom=3.5cm, inner=3.5cm, outer=5cm, marginpar=4cm]{geometry}
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% Matti remarkable tablet special size
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%\usepackage[paperwidth=15cm, paperheight=244mm, top=1cm, bottom=1cm, left=5mm, right=5mm]{geometry}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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@ -36,12 +36,15 @@
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\usepackage{extdash}
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\usepackage{amsthm}
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\usepackage{tabularx}
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%\usepackage{showframe} Useful for page layout debugging
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\usepackage{multirow}
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\usepackage{multicol}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usepackage{mathtools}
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\usepackage{setspace}
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\usepackage{titlesec}
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\usepackage{fancybox}
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\usepackage{fancyhdr}
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\DeclarePairedDelimiter{\ceil}{\lceil}{\rceil}
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\DeclarePairedDelimiter{\paren}{(}{)}
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@ -81,9 +84,45 @@
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\newcommand{\degree}{\ensuremath{^\circ}}
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\newcolumntype{P}[1]{>{\centering\arraybackslash}p{#1}}
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\setlength{\marginparwidth}{3cm}
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\definecolor{todoboxcolor}{RGB}{251 224 252}
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\newcommand{\todo}[1]{\marginpar{\setlength{\fboxsep}{4mm}\colorbox{todoboxcolor}{\parbox{\marginparwidth}{\raggedright\textsf{\small\textbf{To do}\\\footnotesize#1}}}}}
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\pagestyle{fancy}
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\fancyhead[C]{}
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\fancyhead[ER]{\footnotesize\leftmark}
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\fancyhead[OL]{\footnotesize\rightmark}
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\fancyhead[EL,OR]{\thepage}
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\fancyfoot[LCR]{}
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\fancypagestyle{plain}{%
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\fancyhf{}%
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\renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0pt}%
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\renewcommand{\footrulewidth}{0pt}%
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}
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\raggedbottom
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\renewcommand{\chaptermark}[1]{\markboth{#1}{}}
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\renewcommand{\sectionmark}[1]{\markright{\thesection\ #1}}
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\addtolength{\headwidth}{\marginparsep}
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\addtolength{\headwidth}{\marginparwidth}
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\addtolength{\headwidth}{-1cm}
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\newcommand{\todo}[1]{
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\marginpar{
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\setlength{\fboxsep}{2mm}
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\shadowbox{
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\parbox{3cm}{
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\raggedright
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\textsf{
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\small\textbf{To do}\\
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\footnotesize#1
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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\begin{document}
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\dominitoc
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62
main.bib
62
main.bib
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@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
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isbn = {978-1-4503-4139-4}
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}
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@inproceedings{arpPrivacyThreatsUltrasonic2017,
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@inproceedings{arpPrivacyThreatsUltrasonic2017a,
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title = {Privacy {{Threats}} through {{Ultrasonic Side Channels}} on {{Mobile Devices}}},
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booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})},
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author = {Arp, Daniel and Quiring, Erwin and Wressnegger, Christian and Rieck, Konrad},
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@ -190,6 +190,22 @@
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file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4PL34JUV/Barnett and Phoenix - 2011 - Securing a quantum key distribution relay network .pdf}
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}
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@inproceedings{barootiPublicKeyEncryptionQuantum2023,
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title = {Public-{{Key Encryption}} with~{{Quantum Keys}}},
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booktitle = {Theory of {{Cryptography}}},
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author = {Barooti, Khashayar and Grilo, Alex B. and Huguenin-Dumittan, Loïs and Malavolta, Giulio and Sattath, Or and Vu, Quoc-Huy and Walter, Michael},
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editor = {Rothblum, Guy and Wee, Hoeteck},
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date = {2023},
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pages = {198--227},
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publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland},
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location = {Cham},
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doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-48624-1_8},
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abstract = {In the framework of Impagliazzo’s five worlds, a distinction is often made between two worlds, one where public-key encryption exists (Cryptomania), and one in which only one-way functions exist (MiniCrypt). However, the boundaries between these worlds can change when quantum information is taken into account. Recent work has shown that quantum variants of oblivious transfer and multi-party computation, both primitives that are classically in Cryptomania, can be constructed from one-way functions, placing them in the realm of quantum MiniCrypt (the so-called MiniQCrypt). This naturally raises the following question: Is it possible to construct a quantum variant of public-key encryption, which is at the heart of Cryptomania, from one-way functions or potentially weaker assumptions?},
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isbn = {978-3-031-48624-1},
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langid = {english},
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file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Barooti et al_2023_Public-Key Encryption with Quantum Keys.pdf}
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}
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@online{bartusekCryptographyCertifiedDeletion2023,
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title = {Cryptography with {{Certified Deletion}}},
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author = {Bartusek, James and Khurana, Dakshita},
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@ -311,6 +327,24 @@
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langid = {english}
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}
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@article{bibakQuantumKeyDistribution2021,
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title = {Quantum Key Distribution with {{PRF}}({{Hash}}, {{Nonce}}) Achieves Everlasting Security},
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author = {Bibak, Khodakhast and Ritchie, Robert},
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date = {2021-07},
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journaltitle = {Quantum Information Processing},
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shortjournal = {Quantum Inf Process},
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volume = {20},
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number = {7},
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pages = {228},
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issn = {1570-0755, 1573-1332},
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doi = {10.1007/s11128-021-03164-3},
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url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11128-021-03164-3},
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urldate = {2024-07-29},
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abstract = {Peev et al. (Int J Quantum Inf 03:225–231, 2005) introduced a key-efficient two-step hash function for authentication in quantum key distribution (QKD). They suggested using a publicly known hash function as part of this scheme. Improving on this, Pacher et al. (Quantum Inf Process 15:327–362, 2016) suggested a method to restore information-theoretic security (ITS) by using almost universal hash functions instead of publicly known hash functions. While their scheme is a key-efficient almost-strongly universal (ASU) family, like any other ASU family, it only provides a one-time MAC. Here, we propose the use of a MAC paradigm called PRF(Hash, Nonce) for authentication in QKD. This MAC has several advantages which make it suited for QKD. In particular, unlike the above constructions, it is a many-time MAC and is also more key-efficient. In fact, PRF(Hash, Nonce) is even more key-efficient than the Wegman–Carter paradigm, the most widely used MAC scheme for authentication in QKD. Furthermore, it provides everlasting security, which means that if authentication remains unbroken during the execution of QKD, then the resulting keys retain ITS, which guarantees that the adversary cannot gain any new information on the keys even with unlimited computational power.},
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langid = {english},
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file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RDABDXY6/Bibak and Ritchie - 2021 - Quantum key distribution with PRF(Hash, Nonce) ach.pdf}
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}
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@inproceedings{blantonPrivateObliviousSet2012,
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title = {Private and Oblivious Set and Multiset Operations},
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author = {Blanton, Marina and Aguiar, Everaldo},
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@ -1104,6 +1138,22 @@
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file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/J7DQKVVH/Goos et al. - 1999 - Information Theoretically Secure Communication in .pdf}
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}
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@inproceedings{griloObliviousTransferMiniQCrypt2021,
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title = {Oblivious {{Transfer Is}} in {{MiniQCrypt}}},
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booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2021},
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author = {Grilo, Alex B. and Lin, Huijia and Song, Fang and Vaikuntanathan, Vinod},
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editor = {Canteaut, Anne and Standaert, François-Xavier},
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date = {2021},
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pages = {531--561},
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publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
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location = {Cham},
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doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_18},
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abstract = {MiniQCrypt is a world where quantum-secure one-way functions exist, and quantum communication is possible. We construct an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in MiniQCrypt that achieves simulation-security in the plain model against malicious quantum polynomial-time adversaries, building on the foundational work of Crépeau and Killian (FOCS 1988) and Bennett, Brassard, Crépeau and Skubiszewska (CRYPTO 1991). Combining the OT protocol with prior works, we obtain secure two-party and multi-party computation protocols also in MiniQCrypt. This is in contrast to the classical world, where it is widely believed that one-way functions alone do not give us OT.},
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isbn = {978-3-030-77886-6},
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langid = {english},
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file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Grilo et al_2021_Oblivious Transfer Is in MiniQCrypt.pdf}
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}
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@article{grisafiPISTISTrustedComputing,
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title = {{{PISTIS}}: {{Trusted Computing Architecture}} for {{Low-end Embedded Systems}}},
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author = {Grisafi, Michele and Ammar, Mahmoud and Crispo, Bruno and Roveri, Marco},
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@ -1703,11 +1753,11 @@
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issn = {2511-9044, 2511-9044},
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doi = {10.1002/qute.201800011},
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url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09278},
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urldate = {2024-05-02},
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urldate = {2024-05-27},
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abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.},
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langid = {english},
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keywords = {Quantum Physics},
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file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/A2BQHUUW/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf}
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file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/I7UL2SKX/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf}
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}
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@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018a,
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@ -1725,11 +1775,11 @@
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issn = {2511-9044, 2511-9044},
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doi = {10.1002/qute.201800011},
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url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09278},
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urldate = {2024-05-27},
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urldate = {2024-05-02},
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abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.},
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langid = {english},
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keywords = {Quantum Physics},
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file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/I7UL2SKX/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf}
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file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/A2BQHUUW/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf}
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}
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@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018b,
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@ -2162,7 +2212,7 @@
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file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EBAXQHG5/Mosavirik et al. - 2022 - ImpedanceVerif On-Chip Impedance Sensing for Syst.pdf}
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}
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@article{mosavirikSiliconEchoesNonInvasive2023,
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@article{mosavirikSiliconEchoesNonInvasive2023a,
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title = {Silicon {{Echoes}}: {{Non-Invasive Trojan}} and {{Tamper Detection}} Using {{Frequency-Selective Impedance Analysis}}},
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shorttitle = {Silicon {{Echoes}}},
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author = {Mosavirik, Tahoura and Monfared, Saleh Khalaj and Safa, Maryam Saadat and Tajik, Shahin},
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