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@ -585,13 +585,13 @@ meaning the QKD setup will at worst degrade to the same security a purely classi
The second prediction we can make is that any practical QKD network will have to use trusted relays to bridge large
distances. While in certain specialized applications such as the proposed financial QKD network in Switzerland
\todo{citation on swiss deployment} smaller, isolated networks are conceivable, in every telecommunication system from
the telegraph through the telephone system and up to the internet it has been shown conclusively that there is a real
demand for a global, interconnected network\footnote{In fact, history repeats, and the enthusiasm that Quantum Key
Distribution networks have kindled parallels the one that the first trans-atlantic telegraph cables brought forth as
described by \textcite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. Both parallel not just in the extensive promises attributed to
their respective technologies, but also in the facade of technological determinism that in both cases hides a number of
social and political motivations.}\cite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. \todo{at least one more citation on historic
networks}
the telegraph through the telephone system and up to the internet it has been shown conclusively that considering
utility, a global, interconnected network is greater than the sum of its parts\footnote{In fact, history repeats, and
the enthusiasm that Quantum Key Distribution networks have kindled parallels the one that the first trans-atlantic
telegraph cables brought forth as described by \textcite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. Both parallel not just in the
extensive promises attributed to their respective technologies, but also in the facade of technological determinism that
in both cases hides a number of social and political motivations.}\cite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. \todo{at least one
more citation on historic networks}
In this section, we will outline a solution that provides practical, end-to-end security in large-scale QKD networks by
delegating the hardware trust issue of QKD relays to Inertial Hardware Security Modules. The primary design challenges
@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ assumptions behind the IHSM's heartbeat and alarm subsystem to those of the QKD
With the exception of special cases such as the middle node in a MDI-QKD system, a general QKD relay contains the same
components that the endpoint of a QKD connection uses. Only in a QKD relay, two transceivers are connected back-to-back
to one another. QKD provides physical security for the photons traversing the fiber that forms the systme's channel, and
to one another. QKD provides physical security for the photons traversing the fiber that forms the system's channel, and
the security envelope of the system begins where this fiber is terminated in the power splitters, single-photon
detectors, lasers, and interferometers of the QKD transmitter and receiver. To process the raw measurements of the QKD
system into a usable stream of secret key bits, in addition to these components implementing the physics of the QKD
@ -660,7 +660,8 @@ fiber's minimum bending radius, which for common fibers is usually in the range
Concluding the above paragraphs, a QKD node is not a particularly challenging payload for an IHSM. The most problematic
requirement is feeding through a number of fibers for its various input and output signals, but fundamentally it is no
different from any server or other piece of IT equipment. In the following section, we will present a design that
provides a combined power and multi-fiber passthrough that is sufficient for QKD applications.
provides a combined power and multi-fiber passthrough that is sufficient for QKD applications before concluding with an
analysis of post-quantum heartbeat signal security.
\subsection{Multi-fiber passthrough with active secondary mesh}
@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ power connections to penetrate the mesh, it also provides an easy target for an
of physical probe into the IHSM's security envelope. While to a certain extent this attack vector can be made more
difficult though simple construction techniques such as making the shaft as thin as possible, and getting the mesh as
close to it as possible, as well as using a solid steel shaft on the motor end of the mesh, the level of security that
these mitigations provide is much below that of the rest of the mesh. Thus, a better solution is needed.
these mitigations provide is much below that of the remainder of the mesh. Thus, a better solution is needed.
Previously, in Chapter \todoplaceholder{provide link to mesh protection overview from OG IHSM paper} we have alluded to
several \emph{shielding} methods that use a second, independently rotating mesh on the inside of the primary mesh,

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