QKD WIP
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@ -585,13 +585,13 @@ meaning the QKD setup will at worst degrade to the same security a purely classi
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The second prediction we can make is that any practical QKD network will have to use trusted relays to bridge large
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distances. While in certain specialized applications such as the proposed financial QKD network in Switzerland
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\todo{citation on swiss deployment} smaller, isolated networks are conceivable, in every telecommunication system from
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the telegraph through the telephone system and up to the internet it has been shown conclusively that there is a real
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demand for a global, interconnected network\footnote{In fact, history repeats, and the enthusiasm that Quantum Key
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Distribution networks have kindled parallels the one that the first trans-atlantic telegraph cables brought forth as
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described by \textcite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. Both parallel not just in the extensive promises attributed to
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their respective technologies, but also in the facade of technological determinism that in both cases hides a number of
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social and political motivations.}\cite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. \todo{at least one more citation on historic
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networks}
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the telegraph through the telephone system and up to the internet it has been shown conclusively that considering
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utility, a global, interconnected network is greater than the sum of its parts\footnote{In fact, history repeats, and
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the enthusiasm that Quantum Key Distribution networks have kindled parallels the one that the first trans-atlantic
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telegraph cables brought forth as described by \textcite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. Both parallel not just in the
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extensive promises attributed to their respective technologies, but also in the facade of technological determinism that
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in both cases hides a number of social and political motivations.}\cite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. \todo{at least one
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more citation on historic networks}
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In this section, we will outline a solution that provides practical, end-to-end security in large-scale QKD networks by
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delegating the hardware trust issue of QKD relays to Inertial Hardware Security Modules. The primary design challenges
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@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ assumptions behind the IHSM's heartbeat and alarm subsystem to those of the QKD
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With the exception of special cases such as the middle node in a MDI-QKD system, a general QKD relay contains the same
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components that the endpoint of a QKD connection uses. Only in a QKD relay, two transceivers are connected back-to-back
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to one another. QKD provides physical security for the photons traversing the fiber that forms the systme's channel, and
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to one another. QKD provides physical security for the photons traversing the fiber that forms the system's channel, and
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the security envelope of the system begins where this fiber is terminated in the power splitters, single-photon
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detectors, lasers, and interferometers of the QKD transmitter and receiver. To process the raw measurements of the QKD
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system into a usable stream of secret key bits, in addition to these components implementing the physics of the QKD
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@ -660,7 +660,8 @@ fiber's minimum bending radius, which for common fibers is usually in the range
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Concluding the above paragraphs, a QKD node is not a particularly challenging payload for an IHSM. The most problematic
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requirement is feeding through a number of fibers for its various input and output signals, but fundamentally it is no
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different from any server or other piece of IT equipment. In the following section, we will present a design that
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provides a combined power and multi-fiber passthrough that is sufficient for QKD applications.
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provides a combined power and multi-fiber passthrough that is sufficient for QKD applications before concluding with an
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analysis of post-quantum heartbeat signal security.
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\subsection{Multi-fiber passthrough with active secondary mesh}
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@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ power connections to penetrate the mesh, it also provides an easy target for an
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of physical probe into the IHSM's security envelope. While to a certain extent this attack vector can be made more
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difficult though simple construction techniques such as making the shaft as thin as possible, and getting the mesh as
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close to it as possible, as well as using a solid steel shaft on the motor end of the mesh, the level of security that
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these mitigations provide is much below that of the rest of the mesh. Thus, a better solution is needed.
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these mitigations provide is much below that of the remainder of the mesh. Thus, a better solution is needed.
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Previously, in Chapter \todoplaceholder{provide link to mesh protection overview from OG IHSM paper} we have alluded to
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several \emph{shielding} methods that use a second, independently rotating mesh on the inside of the primary mesh,
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Subproject commit 3a7edbd1127cacc8f4c90376595b894105f3d479
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Subproject commit 601159904f4269366e29d85c2e90cbf000157f4f
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