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chapter-introduction/chapter.tex
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@ -12,11 +12,12 @@ All Cops Are Bastards, or ACAB is a slogan popular in far left and anarchist cir
that expresses a rejection of state authority~\cite{constantinouAppliedResearchPolicing2021}. While politically, this
blanket rejection is a fringe viewpoint with no mainstream acceptance, there exists an interesting parallel between this
and modern cryptographic best practice. In modern cryptography, it is generally seen as best practice to have the least
amount of keys possible involved in any computation, and cryptographers have time and time again strongly rejected
amount of keys possible involved in any computation. and cryptographers have time and time again strongly rejected
attempts by states and other authorities to insert backdoor access mechanisms into cryptographic systems~\cite{
abelsonRisksKeyRecovery1997,
abelsonKeysDoormats2015,
andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020,
rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic2015,
}.
The aversion of cryptographers against backdoor access shows up everywhere. From cryptographic protocol standards like
@ -70,16 +71,26 @@ businesses.
\section{Cryptographic Principles and Physical Reality}
% cypherpunks: andersonCypherpunkEthicsRadical2022
% cypherpunks: hughesCypherpunksManifesto
% cypherpunks: CryptoWarsFight
% moxie / "we should all have something to hide": marlinspikeWeShouldAll2013
\todo{Cite cypherpunk and hacker movements}
Cryptographers' aversion to backdoor access derives from a combination of two fundamental computing principles:
Kerckhoffs' principle, and the principle of least authority. Kerckhoffs' principle, named after Dutch military
cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs, expresses that the security of a cryptographic system should only depend on the
secrecy of its keys, not on the secrecy of its design. In this way, Kerckhoff's principle states the opposite of the
widespread industry practice of \emph{Security by Obscurity}, which aims to achieve security by making it sufficiently
annoying to cryptoanalyze a system that nobody bothers. Complementary to Kerckhoff's principle is the principle of least
authority, which describes that in a secure system each component should only have access to the smallest set of
capabilities necessary to fulfill its purpose. Applying both to a cryptographic system means that the system's design
should be transparent and not include any hidden components or opaque parts that cannot be inspected, and that the
system's keys should be scoped to place the least amount of trust possible in each participating party.
Kerckhoffs' principle, and the principle of least authority. Kerckhoffs'
principle\footnote{
\textcite{petitcolasKerckhoffsPrinciplesCryptographie} contains a high-quality OCR'ed copy of the original source, as
well as a translation of the cited part from French. The original source is
\textcite{kerckhoffsCryptographieMilitaire1883}.
}, named after Dutch military cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs, expresses that the security of a cryptographic system
should only depend on the secrecy of its keys, not on the secrecy of its design. In this way, Kerckhoff's principle
states the opposite of the widespread industry practice of \emph{Security by Obscurity}, which aims to achieve security
by making it sufficiently annoying to cryptoanalyze a system that nobody bothers. Complementary to Kerckhoff's principle
is the principle of least authority, which describes that in a secure system each component should only have access to
the smallest set of capabilities necessary to fulfill its purpose. Applying both to a cryptographic system means that
the system's design should be transparent and not include any hidden components or opaque parts that cannot be
inspected, and that the system's keys should be scoped to place the least amount of trust possible in each participating
party.
Let's take a basic videoconferencing system as an example. In our example system's deployment, users log on to a central
conference server, which receives and distributes the users' video streams. Allowing backdoor access to the video