More QKD WIP
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@ -249,6 +249,28 @@ computers. Quantum Key Distribution systems use photons and only perform a handf
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between generation and measurement, with the vast majority of the state's lifetime spent in transit between the two
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endpoints of the QKD protocol.
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While QKD systems are easy to build and operationally robust compared to general quantum computers, at their core they
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still exchange information through quantum states that physically need to transit the distance from one endpoint to the
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other. For classical computer networks, bridging distances of several hundred kilometers is no big challenge. Using
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appropriate high-power transceivers, a single optical link can already bridge upwards of 100km. % FIXME cite
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Longer ranges can easily be achieved by either logically chaining multiple links, or by using optical amplifiers.
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In contrast, the quantum states at the core of QKD systems must necessarily be ``weak''. A single quantum state on the
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wire on average must consist of approximately a single photon. If the system's quantum states consisted of more than one
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photon carrying the same information, this would enable a \emph{Photon Number Splitting Attack}, in which an attacker
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extracts one of the state's photons for later analysis, and forwards the remaining photons to the receiver. The attacker
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can then later measure the captured photon to extract the same information that the receiver measured.
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The practical implication of this is that the optical brightness of a QKD system is directly proportional to the rate
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at which the system can prepare, and later measure the individual quantum states. With today's electronics, rates up to
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a few GHz are feasible. Alas, this brightness limit interacts poorly with the reality of optical communication,
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especially through fibers. Even modern, high-quality fiber-optic cables have attenuation in the order of 0.5 dB/km,
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which corresponds to roughly half of the signal being lost every 5 km. In classical optical networks, this can be
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compensated by increasing transmit power--i.e. packing more photons into each bit--or by optically amplifying the signal
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partway through the fiber. In QKD systems however, the signal cannot be amplified, and the system's bit rate
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exponentially decreases with distance due to absorption. Some QKD systems can reach ranges of several hundred kilometer,
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but the useable data rate (here called \emph{key rate}) of these systems usually is in the kilobits per second or worse.
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\section{Quantum Networking}
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\section{Securing QKD Networks with Inertial HSMs}
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@ -269,7 +291,7 @@ depth,
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meaning the QKD setup will at worst degrade to the same security a purely classical system would provide, never less.
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The second prediction we can make is that any practical QKD network will have to use trusted relays to bridge large
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distances. While in certain specialized applications such as the proposed financial QKD network in Swizerland
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distances. While in certain specialized applications such as the proposed financial QKD network in Switzerland
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% FIXME citation
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smaller, isolated networks are conceivable, in every telecommunication system from the telegraph through the telephone
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system and up to the internet it has been shown conclusively that there is a real demand for a unified, global
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