More citations and include Konrad's first batch of fixes

chapter-introduction/chapter.tex

@@ -20,17 +20,22 @@ attempts by states and other authorities to insert backdoor access mechanisms in
     rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic2015,
 }.
 
-The aversion of cryptographers against backdoor access shows up everywhere. From cryptographic protocol standards like
-TLS, to cryptographic applications like the Signal messenger, backdoor access is not only excluded from the system
-design, its possibility is considered a potential vulnerability. Measures such as forward secrecy and post-compromise
-security are taken to mitigate its impact. In computing, this design aspect makes cryptographic protocols a unique
-holdout. In other parts of the stack, explicit or implicit backdoor access is commonplace, and attempts at preventing it
-are rare. For instance, network providers are generally required to comply with so-called \emph{Lawful Interception}
-orders on particular customers or traffic types, and datacenter operators commonly provide hardware access to state
-authorities. The design decisions in cryptographic protocols generally hold, and the gold standard for backdoor access
-to modern systems is either exploiting a \emph{zero-day} flaw that is not yet publically known, or acquiring physical
-access to the target system.
-\todo{Make sure all figures have nice short titles for list of figures}
+While at a glance it might sound like a fringe position held by people from the Cypherpunk and Hacker movements~\cite{
+    andersonCypherpunkEthicsRadical2022,
+    hughesCypherpunksManifesto,
+    jarvisCryptoWarsFight2020,
+    marlinspikeWeShouldAll2013},
+it enjoys support far beyond those circles and throughout mainstream academic cryptography. The aversion of
+cryptographers against backdoor access shows up everywhere. From cryptographic protocol standards like TLS, to
+cryptographic applications like the Signal messenger, backdoor access is not only excluded from the system design, its
+possibility is considered a potential vulnerability. Measures such as forward secrecy and post-compromise security are
+taken to mitigate its impact. In computing, this design aspect makes cryptographic protocols a unique holdout. In other
+parts of the stack, explicit or implicit backdoor access is commonplace, and attempts at preventing it are rare. For
+instance, network providers are generally required to comply with so-called \emph{Lawful Interception} orders on
+particular customers or traffic types, and datacenter operators commonly provide hardware access to state authorities.
+The design decisions in cryptographic protocols generally hold, and the gold standard for backdoor access to modern
+systems is either exploiting a \emph{zero-day} flaw that is not yet publically known, or acquiring physical access to
+the target system. \todo{Make sure all figures have nice short titles for list of figures}
 
 \section{Research Questions}
 
@@ -71,16 +76,11 @@ businesses.
 
 \section{Cryptographic Principles and Physical Reality}
 
-% cypherpunks: andersonCypherpunkEthicsRadical2022
-% cypherpunks: hughesCypherpunksManifesto
-% cypherpunks: CryptoWarsFight
-% moxie / "we should all have something to hide": marlinspikeWeShouldAll2013
-\todo{Cite cypherpunk and hacker movements}
+While anarchists, Cypherpunks and Hackers often reject backdoor access out of political conviction alone,
 Cryptographers' aversion to backdoor access derives from a combination of two fundamental computing principles:
-Kerckhoffs' principle, and the principle of least authority. Kerckhoffs'
-principle\footnote{
-\textcite{petitcolasKerckhoffsPrinciplesCryptographie} contains a high-quality OCR'ed copy of the original source, as
-    well as a translation of the cited part from French. The original source is
+Kerckhoffs' principle, and the principle of least authority. Kerckhoffs' principle\footnote{
+    \textcite{petitcolasKerckhoffsPrinciplesCryptographie} contains a high-quality OCR'ed copy of the original source,
+    as well as a translation of the cited part from French. The original source is
     \textcite{kerckhoffsCryptographieMilitaire1883}.
 }, named after Dutch military cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs, expresses that the security of a cryptographic system
 should only depend on the secrecy of its keys, not on the secrecy of its design. In this way, Kerckhoff's principle
@@ -143,19 +143,19 @@ Inertial HSMs are the first fully open source HSM with advanced tamper sensing f
 Inertial HSMs can be applied to gain resistance to physical attacks in scenarios where conventional HSMs were not used
 because of cost, computing power or implementation effort. Where conventional HSMs come as fully integrated devices that
 only expose limited APIs to their users, Inertial HSMs at their core are just an enclosure that the user can put
-whatever hardware they need into. Since the simpler tamper-sensing mesh construction of IHSMs scales to larger payload
-volumes, entire servers can be protected---something that is impossible with conventional HSMs. Since the mesh in an
-IHSM is constantly moving, unlike a mesh in a conventional HSM, it does not have to entirely cover the payload. Instead,
-it can have gaps that allow for air flow between outside and inside, enabling active cooling of the IHSM's payload. This
-cooling capability sharply increases computing power by increasing feasible payload power dissipation by
-two orders of magnitude.
+whatever hardware they need into, adapting the tamper response to their application's needs. Since the simpler
+tamper-sensing mesh construction of IHSMs scales to larger payload volumes, entire servers can be protected---something
+that is impossible with conventional HSMs. Since the mesh in an IHSM is constantly moving, unlike a mesh in a
+conventional HSM, it does not have to entirely cover the payload. Instead, it can have gaps that allow for air flow
+between outside and inside, enabling active cooling of the IHSM's payload. This cooling capability sharply increases
+computing power by increasing feasible payload power dissipation by two orders of magnitude.
 
 \section{Conclusion}
 
 Looking at the practice of applied hardware security, we observe that despite ample availability of commercial solutions
 promising easy hardware security, clearly there is still a lack of solutions that provide the adaptability necessary for
 some real use cases at low enough cost. By publishing the tamper-sensing technology we developed during the making of
-this thesis as open source hardware designs, we wish to provide this missing building block to provide high-level
+this thesis as open source hardware designs, we aim to provide this missing building block to provide high-level
 hardware security in real-world applications. Our hardware designs can be adapted to a devices ranging from Single-Board
 Computers (SBCs) to servers, they are compatible with non-computing applications like Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and
 their design approaches can even be integrated into existing HSM designs to provide better security at little additional