Improve HSM survey chapter, move IHSM chapter up front
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\chaptertitle{Active Tamper Sensing in the Wild}
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% FIXME introduction
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Inertial Hardware Security Modules are the latest link in a series o developments bringing hardware security primitives
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from niche military cipher machines to mass-market applications. The tamper-sensing technology that forms the primary
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line of defense in such physical security systems goes back more than a century, with the earliest tamper-sensing meshes
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being used in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, around the widespread commercialization of electricity. Today,
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active tamper-sensing meshes are used in a wide array of devices ranging from card payment terminals to atomic bombs.
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In this chapter, we will start with a brief history of secure hardware with a particular focus on tamper-sensing meshes.
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Complementing our historical analysis, we will present the results of a survey of a range of real-world devices using
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tamper-sensing meshes and analyze their implementation. We will analyze the gaps left by the current state of the
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industry, and evaluate how Inertial HSMs could close these gaps to make secure hardware accessible to a wider range of
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applications. We will start with a brief history of secure hardware with a particular focus on tamper-sensing meshes.
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\section{The History of Tamper Sensing Meshes}
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Tamper-sensing meshes are highly effective at preventing a large array of physical attacks and provide the core of the
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tamper-response system of a Hardware Security Module. In this chapter we will take a look at a range of real-world
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devices using tamper-sensing meshes and analyze their implementation. We will analyze the gaps left by the current state
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of the industry, and evaluate how Inertial HSMs could close these gaps to make secure hardware accessible to a wider
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range of applications. We will start with a brief history of secure hardware with a particular focus on tamper-sensing
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meshes.
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Tamper-sensing meshes offer many degrees of freedom in their design ranging from the precise conductor layout, through
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the manufacturing technology of the mesh and how it is wrapped around the payload during manufacturing up to their
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monitoring circuitry. As a result, manufacturers across application domains from datacenter appliance HSMs through card
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@ -819,6 +822,19 @@ imaging can be actively detected to trigger a tamper alarm. During CT imaging, a
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images are taken. X-ray radiation can be reliably detected using off-the-shelf sensors that usually consist of a
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large-area photodiode coupled to a scintillator crystal converting X-ray photons to visible light.
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\subsection{Application of Inertial HSM technology}
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The widespread use of inexpensive but low-security commodity processes shows that in practical applications, cost is
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often prioritized over security. The IHSM approach naturally complements such a system that uses a low-security mesh
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material, increasing its security without the use of a more advanced mesh material. The beneficial construction
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techniques that we identified above such as the use of multiple, spaced layers and low-contrast trace materials
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complement IHSM technology naturally. The three-dimensional layout of a mesh becomes easier in an IHSM implementation
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since features like corners between mesh panels or gaps between mesh layers are often naturally protected by the mesh's
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motion. An unintended advantage that results in IHSM implementations over conventional meshes is that they would provide
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a level of intrinsic resistance to X-ray and CT imaging. In contrast to optical cameras in the visible spectrum, X-ray
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image sensors need integration times in the hundreds of milliseconds or longer, which makes them unsuitable to image a
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quickly moving targets.
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\section{Conclusion}
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In our survey, we have found a wide variety in tamper sensing mesh construction techniques. Meshes are commonly
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@ -848,4 +864,7 @@ Form an engineering point of view, we observe that across application domains, t
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construction techniques. Implementing such a system that matches the security of other systems seen in the wild should
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be achievable to most engineers.
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We find that the IHSM approach is a natural extension of the state of the art that we saw reflected in tamper-sensing
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mesh implementations in the field, and that the construction techniques that have been applied to improve their security
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can be carried over to IHSM implementations.
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@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
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\dochapter{chapter-introduction} % Status: In pretty good shape
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\dochapter{chapter-epa} % Status: In pretty good shape
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\dochapter{chapter-hsms} % Status: TODO
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\dochapter{chapter-ihsm} % Status: Copy-paste done, build works, integration TODO
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\dochapter{chapter-hsms} % Status: In pretty good shape
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\dochapter{chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor} % Status: Copy-paste done, build works, integration TODO
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\dochapter{chapter-nice-coils} % Status: Copy-paste done, build works, integration TODO
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\dochapter{chapter-qkd} % Status: Re-integration of changes from workshop paper TODO
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