Add lots of citations to introduction
This commit is contained in:
jaseg
parent
eb3e0b0c6b
commit
1edd5317fe
3 changed files with 272 additions and 20 deletions
|
|
@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
\chaptertitle{Active Tamper Sensing in the Wild}
|
||||
\label{chapter-survey}
|
||||
|
||||
Inertial Hardware Security Modules are the latest link in a series of developments bringing hardware security primitives
|
||||
from niche military cipher machines to mass-market applications. The tamper sensing technology that forms the primary
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -49,8 +49,8 @@ rejection of authorities~\cite{broussaisOriginesDeviseAnarchiste2022,guerinNoGod
|
|||
cryptography, it is generally seen as best practice to have the least amount of parties possible involved in any
|
||||
computation.
|
||||
Most cryptographic problems are easily solved by involving a trusted third party (TTP).
|
||||
% FIXME cite TTP examples
|
||||
Yet, cryptographers have time and again rejected attempts to involve third parties in cryptographic protocols~\cite{
|
||||
Yet, cryptographers have time and again vocally rejected attempts to involve third parties in cryptographic
|
||||
protocols~\cite{
|
||||
abelsonRisksKeyRecovery1997,
|
||||
abelsonKeysDoormats2015,
|
||||
andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020,
|
||||
|
|
@ -58,13 +58,20 @@ Yet, cryptographers have time and again rejected attempts to involve third parti
|
|||
}.
|
||||
|
||||
Considerable research has been focused on creating a versatile set of tools to perform tasks as diverse as secure
|
||||
communication,
|
||||
% FIXME cite: signal, noise, something metadata resistant
|
||||
private information retrieval,
|
||||
% FIXME PIR = ORAM?
|
||||
%FIXME cite ORAM papers, and oblivious transfer papers
|
||||
and even general computation in a decentralized way that avoids trusted authorities.
|
||||
% FIXME cite MPC papers
|
||||
communication~\cite{
|
||||
alwenDoubleRatchetSecurity2019,
|
||||
marlinspikeDoubleRatchetAlgorithm2025,
|
||||
dowlingFlexibleAuthenticatedConfidential2020,
|
||||
sasySoKMetadataProtectingCommunication2024},
|
||||
oblivious database access~\cite{
|
||||
chorPrivateInformationRetrieval,
|
||||
aguilar-melchorXPIRPrivateInformation2016,
|
||||
reichertMenhirObliviousDatabase2024},
|
||||
and even general computation~\cite{
|
||||
goosInformationTheoreticallySecure1999,
|
||||
aumannSecurityCovertAdversaries2010,
|
||||
chorPrivateInformationRetrieval}
|
||||
in a decentralized way that avoids trusted authorities.
|
||||
While politically, this blanket rejection of authority represents a fringe viewpoint, in cryptography it has a long
|
||||
tradition originating with the Cypherpunk and Hacker movements~\cite{
|
||||
andersonCypherpunkEthicsRadical2022,
|
||||
|
|
@ -74,18 +81,23 @@ tradition originating with the Cypherpunk and Hacker movements~\cite{
|
|||
and extending throughout mainstream academic cryptography.
|
||||
|
||||
While the aforementioned cryptographic tools enable a large gamut of use cases in theory, in practice cryptographic
|
||||
systems are still routinely compromised.
|
||||
% FIXME cite cellphone attacks
|
||||
The fundamental flaw of any practical cryptographic system is that secure algorithms have to run on hardware, and even
|
||||
today, average computing hardware provides little physical security.
|
||||
% FIXME cite TPM attacks
|
||||
% FIXME cite Intel TXE etc. attacks
|
||||
systems are still routinely compromised~\cite{
|
||||
gellmanNSAInfiltratesLinks2013,
|
||||
goldmanUnrestrainedChineseCyberattackers2025,
|
||||
scott-railtonWhoseAuthorityPegasus2024,
|
||||
quintinSomethingRememberUs2024,
|
||||
marczakGraphiteCaughtFirst2025}.
|
||||
A fundamental flaw of any practical cryptographic system is that secure algorithms have to run on hardware, and even
|
||||
today, average computing hardware provides little physical security~\cite{
|
||||
gotzfriedCacheAttacksIntel2017,
|
||||
Lipp2018meltdown,
|
||||
Kocher2018spectre,
|
||||
moghimiTPMFAILTPMMeets2020}.
|
||||
\emph{Hardware Security Modules} are a class of devices specifically designed to execute cryptographic algorithms while
|
||||
providing strict physical security guarantees, but these systems are expensive,
|
||||
% FIXME citation
|
||||
and their physical security is often questionable.
|
||||
% FIXME cite anderson, and immler et al in the early paper with the two HSMs taken apart
|
||||
% FIXME reference chapter hsm survey?
|
||||
and their physical security is often questionable (cf.~Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey})~\cite{
|
||||
obermaier2018,
|
||||
andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}.
|
||||
As \textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} writes on HSMs and their security standards:
|
||||
% FIXME page numbers
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -96,7 +108,7 @@ As \textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} writes on HSMs and their secu
|
|||
level 4, and understand that level 3 can sometimes be defeated with a Swiss army knife. The buying incentive
|
||||
there is compliance, and where real security clashes with operations it’s not surprising to see weaker standards
|
||||
designed to make compliance easier.
|
||||
\textit{\textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} p. }
|
||||
\textit{\textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} p. 629}
|
||||
\end{flushright}
|
||||
\end{quote}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
239
main.bib
239
main.bib
|
|
@ -80,6 +80,23 @@
|
|||
keywords = {Lithium niobate,Optical delay lines,Optical fibers,Polarization mode dispersion,Quantum key distribution,Single-photon avalanche diodes}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{aguilar-melchorXPIRPrivateInformation2016,
|
||||
title = {{{XPIR}} : {{Private Information Retrieval}} for {{Everyone}}},
|
||||
shorttitle = {{{XPIR}}},
|
||||
author = {Aguilar-Melchor, Carlos and Barrier, Joris and Fousse, Laurent and Killijian, Marc-Olivier},
|
||||
date = {2016-04-01},
|
||||
journaltitle = {Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies},
|
||||
volume = {2016},
|
||||
number = {2},
|
||||
pages = {155--174},
|
||||
issn = {2299-0984},
|
||||
doi = {10.1515/popets-2016-0010},
|
||||
url = {https://petsymposium.org/popets/2016/popets-2016-0010.php},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme is a protocol in which a user retrieves a record from a database while hiding which from the database administrators. PIR can be achieved using mutuallydistrustful replicated databases, trusted hardware, or cryptography. In this paper we focus on the later setting which is known as single-database computationallyPrivate Information Retrieval (cPIR). Classic cPIR protocols require that the database server executes an algorithm over all the database content at very low speeds which impairs their usage. In [1], given certain assumptions, realistic at the time, Sion and Carbunar showed that cPIR schemes were not practical and most likely would never be. To this day, this conclusion is widely accepted by researchers and practitioners. Using the paradigm shift introduced by lattice-based cryptography, we show that the conclusion of Sion and Carbunar is not valid anymore: cPIR is of practical value. This is achieved without compromising security, using standard crytosystems, and conservative parameter choices.},
|
||||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{albartus2020,
|
||||
title = {{{DANA}} Universal Dataflow Analysis for Gate-Level Netlist Reverse Engineering},
|
||||
author = {Albartus, Nils and Hoffmann, Max and Temme, Sebastian and Azriel, Leonid and Paar, Christof},
|
||||
|
|
@ -137,6 +154,25 @@
|
|||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@incollection{alwenDoubleRatchetSecurity2019,
|
||||
title = {The {{Double Ratchet}}: {{Security Notions}}, {{Proofs}}, and {{Modularization}} for the {{Signal Protocol}}},
|
||||
shorttitle = {The {{Double Ratchet}}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2019},
|
||||
author = {Alwen, Joël and Coretti, Sandro and Dodis, Yevgeniy},
|
||||
editor = {Ishai, Yuval and Rijmen, Vincent},
|
||||
date = {2019},
|
||||
volume = {11476},
|
||||
pages = {129--158},
|
||||
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
|
||||
location = {Cham},
|
||||
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-17653-2_5},
|
||||
url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-17653-2_5},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {Signal is a famous secure messaging protocol used by billions of people, by virtue of many secure text messaging applications including Signal itself, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Skype, and Google Allo. At its core it uses the concept of “double ratcheting,” where every message is encrypted and authenticated using a fresh symmetric key; it has many attractive properties, such as forward security, post-compromise security, and “immediate (no-delay) decryption,” which had never been achieved in combination by prior messaging protocols.},
|
||||
isbn = {978-3-030-17652-5 978-3-030-17653-2},
|
||||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{amazonAWSCloudHSM,
|
||||
title = {{{AWS CloudHSM}}},
|
||||
author = {{Amazon}},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1345,6 +1381,13 @@
|
|||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{chorPrivateInformationRetrieval,
|
||||
title = {Private Information Retrieval},
|
||||
author = {Chor, Benny and Goldreich, Oded and Kushilevitz, Eyal},
|
||||
abstract = {Publicly accessible databases are an indispensable resource for retrieving up-to-date information. But they also pose a significant risk to the privacy of the user, since a curious database operator can follow the user’s queries and infer what the user is after. Indeed, in cases where the users’ intentions are to be kept secret, users are often cautious about accessing the database. It can be shown that when accessing a single database, to completely guarantee the privacy of the user, the whole database should be down-loaded; namely n bits should be communicated (where n is the number of bits in the database).},
|
||||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@incollection{choudhuriComplexitySecureComputation2020,
|
||||
title = {The {{Round Complexity}} of {{Secure Computation Against Covert Adversaries}}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Security and {{Cryptography}} for {{Networks}}},
|
||||
|
|
@ -1793,6 +1836,25 @@
|
|||
organization = {Moog, Inc.}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@incollection{dowlingFlexibleAuthenticatedConfidential2020,
|
||||
title = {Flexible {{Authenticated}} and {{Confidential Channel Establishment}} ({{fACCE}}): {{Analyzing}} the {{Noise Protocol Framework}}},
|
||||
shorttitle = {Flexible {{Authenticated}} and {{Confidential Channel Establishment}} ({{fACCE}})},
|
||||
booktitle = {Public-{{Key Cryptography}} – {{PKC}} 2020},
|
||||
author = {Dowling, Benjamin and Rösler, Paul and Schwenk, Jörg},
|
||||
editor = {Kiayias, Aggelos and Kohlweiss, Markulf and Wallden, Petros and Zikas, Vassilis},
|
||||
date = {2020},
|
||||
volume = {12110},
|
||||
pages = {341--373},
|
||||
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
|
||||
location = {Cham},
|
||||
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-45374-9_12},
|
||||
url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-45374-9_12},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {The Noise protocol framework is a suite of channel establishment protocols, of which each individual protocol ensures various security properties of the transmitted messages, but keeps specification, implementation, and configuration relatively simple. Implementations of the Noise protocols are themselves, due to the employed primitives, very performant. Thus, despite its relative youth, Noise is already used by large-scale deployed applications such as WhatsApp and Slack. Though the Noise specification describes and claims the security properties of the protocol patterns very precisely, there has been no computational proof yet. We close this gap.},
|
||||
isbn = {978-3-030-45373-2 978-3-030-45374-9},
|
||||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{drimer2008,
|
||||
title = {Thinking inside the Box: System-Level Failures of Tamper Proofing},
|
||||
booktitle = {2008 {{IEEE}} Symposium on Security and Privacy (Sp 2008)},
|
||||
|
|
@ -2232,6 +2294,19 @@
|
|||
organization = {R\&A IT Strategy \& Architecture}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{gellmanNSAInfiltratesLinks2013,
|
||||
entrysubtype = {newspaper},
|
||||
title = {{{NSA}} Infiltrates Links to {{Yahoo}}, {{Google}} Data Centers Worldwide, {{Snowden}} Documents Say},
|
||||
author = {Gellman, Barton and Soltani, Ashkan},
|
||||
date = {2013-10-30},
|
||||
journaltitle = {The Washington Post},
|
||||
issn = {0190-8286},
|
||||
url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {Agency positioned itself to collect from among millions of accounts, many of them belonging to Americans},
|
||||
langid = {american}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{gematikSpezifikationAktensystemEPA2025,
|
||||
title = {Spezifikation Aktensystem ePA für alle v1.4.1},
|
||||
author = {{gematik}},
|
||||
|
|
@ -2392,6 +2467,21 @@
|
|||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{goldmanUnrestrainedChineseCyberattackers2025,
|
||||
entrysubtype = {newspaper},
|
||||
title = {‘{{Unrestrained}}’ {{Chinese Cyberattackers May Have Stolen Data From Almost Every American}}},
|
||||
author = {Goldman, Adam},
|
||||
date = {2025-09-04},
|
||||
journaltitle = {The New York Times},
|
||||
issn = {0362-4331},
|
||||
url = {https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/04/world/asia/china-hack-salt-typhoon.html},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {Information collected during the yearslong Salt Typhoon attack could allow Beijing’s intelligence services to track targets from the United States and dozens of other countries.},
|
||||
journalsubtitle = {World},
|
||||
langid = {american},
|
||||
keywords = {China,Cyberattacks and Hackers,Cyberwarfare and Defense,Defense and Military Forces,Espionage and Intelligence Services,International Relations,Surveillance of Citizens by Government,United States Politics and Government}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@book{golumbiaCulturalLogicComputation2009,
|
||||
title = {The Cultural Logic of Computation},
|
||||
author = {Golumbia, David},
|
||||
|
|
@ -2495,6 +2585,22 @@
|
|||
eventtitle = {Conference on {{Cryptographic Hardware}} and {{Embedded Systems}} 2026}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{gotzfriedCacheAttacksIntel2017,
|
||||
title = {Cache {{Attacks}} on {{Intel SGX}}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th {{European Workshop}} on {{Systems Security}}},
|
||||
author = {Götzfried, Johannes and Eckert, Moritz and Schinzel, Sebastian and Müller, Tilo},
|
||||
date = {2017-04-23},
|
||||
series = {{{EuroSec}}'17},
|
||||
pages = {1--6},
|
||||
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
|
||||
location = {New York, NY, USA},
|
||||
doi = {10.1145/3065913.3065915},
|
||||
url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3065913.3065915},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {For the first time, we practically demonstrate that Intel SGX enclaves are vulnerable against cache-timing attacks. As a case study, we present an access-driven cache-timing attack on AES when running inside an Intel SGX enclave. Using Neve and Seifert's elimination method, as well as a cache probing mechanism relying on Intel PMC, we are able to extract the AES secret key in less than 10 seconds by investigating 480 encrypted blocks on average. The AES implementation we attack is based on a Gladman AES implementation taken from an older version of OpenSSL, which is known to be vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. In contrast to previous works on cache-timing attacks, our attack is executed with root privileges running on the same host as the vulnerable enclave. Intel SGX, however, was designed to precisely protect applications against such root-level attacks. As a consequence, we show that SGX cannot withstand its designated attacker model when it comes to side-channel vulnerabilities. To the contrary, the attack surface for side-channels increases dramatically in the scenario of SGX due to the power of root-level attackers, for example, by exploiting the accuracy of PMC, which is restricted to kernel code.},
|
||||
isbn = {978-1-4503-4935-2}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{Goutimacocom84813320240417,
|
||||
title = {Go.Utimaco.Com/l/848133/2024-04-17/3ld3sv/848133/{{1713340754fcnmfM7d}}/u.trust\_{{GP}}\_{{HSM}}\_{{Se}}\_{{Series}}\_{{Datasheet}}\_{{EN}}.Pdf},
|
||||
url = {https://go.utimaco.com/l/848133/2024-04-17/3ld3sv/848133/1713340754fcnmfM7d/u.trust_GP_HSM_Se_Series_Datasheet_EN.pdf},
|
||||
|
|
@ -3635,6 +3741,17 @@
|
|||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Kocher2018spectre,
|
||||
title = {Spectre Attacks: {{Exploiting}} Speculative Execution},
|
||||
author = {Kocher, Paul and Horn, Jann and Fogh, Anders and Genkin, {and} Daniel and Gruss, Daniel and Haas, Werner and Hamburg, Mike and Lipp, Moritz and Mangard, Stefan and Prescher, Thomas and Schwarz, Michael and Yarom, Yuval},
|
||||
date = {2020},
|
||||
journaltitle = {Communications of the ACM},
|
||||
volume = {63},
|
||||
number = {7},
|
||||
pages = {93--101},
|
||||
doi = {10.1145/3399742}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{kochMoreMoreExperts2025,
|
||||
title = {More and More Experts Warn against Electronic Patient Records},
|
||||
author = {Koch, Marie-Claire},
|
||||
|
|
@ -3706,6 +3823,21 @@
|
|||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{kohnoAnalysisElectronicVoting2004,
|
||||
title = {Analysis of an Electronic Voting System},
|
||||
booktitle = {{{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}, 2004. {{Proceedings}}. 2004},
|
||||
author = {Kohno, T. and Stubblefield, A. and Rubin, A.D. and Wallach, D.S.},
|
||||
date = {2004-05},
|
||||
pages = {27--40},
|
||||
issn = {1081-6011},
|
||||
doi = {10.1109/SECPRI.2004.1301313},
|
||||
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1301313/},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {With significant U.S. federal funds now available to replace outdated punch-card and mechanical voting systems, municipalities and states throughout the U.S. are adopting paperless electronic voting systems from a number of different vendors. We present a security analysis of the source code to one such machine used in a significant share of the market. Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts. We identify several problems including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network threats, and poor software development processes. We show that voters, without any insider privileges, can cast unlimited votes without being detected by any mechanisms within the voting terminal software. Furthermore, we show that even the most serious of our outsider attacks could have been discovered and executed without access to the source code. In the face of such attacks, the usual worries about insider threats are not the only concerns; outsiders can do the damage. That said, we demonstrate that the insider threat is also quite considerable, showing that not only can an insider, such as a poll worker, modify the votes, but that insiders can also violate voter privacy and match votes with the voters who cast them. We conclude that this voting system is unsuitable for use in a general election. Any paperless electronic voting system might suffer similar flaws, despite any certification it could have otherwise received. We suggest that the best solutions are voting systems having a voter-verifiable audit trail, where a computerized voting system might print a paper ballot that can be read and verified by the voter.},
|
||||
eventtitle = {{{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}, 2004. 2004},
|
||||
keywords = {Computer science,Cryptography,Electronic voting,Electronic voting systems,Face detection,Information security,Nominations and elections,Privacy,Programming,Robustness}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{kolesnikovGateEvaluationSecret2005,
|
||||
title = {Gate {{Evaluation Secret Sharing}} and {{Secure One-Round Two-Party Computation}}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} - {{ASIACRYPT}} 2005},
|
||||
|
|
@ -4130,6 +4262,17 @@
|
|||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{Lipp2018meltdown,
|
||||
title = {Meltdown: {{Reading}} Kernel Memory from User Space},
|
||||
author = {Lipp, Moritz and Schwarz, Michael and Gruss, Daniel and Prescher, Thomas and Haas, Werner and Fogh, Anders and Horn, Jann and Mangard, Stefan and Kocher, Paul and Genkin, Daniel and Yarom, Yuval and Hamburg, Mike},
|
||||
date = {2018},
|
||||
journaltitle = {Communications of the ACM},
|
||||
volume = {63},
|
||||
number = {6},
|
||||
pages = {46--56},
|
||||
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3357033}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{litinskiHowCompute256bit2023,
|
||||
title = {How to Compute a 256-Bit Elliptic Curve Private Key with Only 50 Million {{Toffoli}} Gates},
|
||||
author = {Litinski, Daniel},
|
||||
|
|
@ -4441,6 +4584,18 @@
|
|||
organization = {Make Your Electronics Tamper-Evident}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@report{marczakGraphiteCaughtFirst2025,
|
||||
title = {Graphite {{Caught}}: {{First Forensic Confirmation}} of {{Paragon}}’s {{iOS Mercenary Spyware Finds Journalists Targeted}}},
|
||||
shorttitle = {Graphite {{Caught}}},
|
||||
author = {Marczak, Bill and Scott-Railton, John},
|
||||
date = {2025-06-12T07:55:29-04:00},
|
||||
institution = {Citizen Lab, University of Toronto},
|
||||
url = {https://citizenlab.ca/2025/06/first-forensic-confirmation-of-paragons-ios-mercenary-spyware-finds-journalists-targeted/},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {On April 29, 2025, a select group of iOS users were notified by Apple that they were targeted with advanced spyware. Among the group were two journalists who consented to the technical analysis of their cases. In this report, we discuss key findings from our forensic analyses of their devices.},
|
||||
keywords = {Italy,Mercenary Spyware,Paragon Solutions}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{marhoeferApplicabilityQuantumCryptography,
|
||||
title = {Applicability of {{Quantum Cryptography}} for {{Securing Mobile Communication Networks}}},
|
||||
author = {Marhoefer, Michael and Wimberger, Ilse and Poppe, Andreas},
|
||||
|
|
@ -4466,6 +4621,16 @@
|
|||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@misc{marlinspikeDoubleRatchetAlgorithm2025,
|
||||
title = {The {{Double Ratchet Algorithm}}},
|
||||
author = {Marlinspike, Moxie and Schmidt, Rolfe},
|
||||
editor = {Perrin, Trevor},
|
||||
date = {2025-11-04},
|
||||
url = {https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/doubleratchet.pdf},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{marlinspikeWeShouldAll2013,
|
||||
title = {We {{Should All Have Something To Hide}}},
|
||||
author = {Marlinspike, Moxie},
|
||||
|
|
@ -4694,6 +4859,21 @@
|
|||
urldate = {2024-07-25}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{moghimiTPMFAILTPMMeets2020,
|
||||
title = {{{TPM-FAIL}}: {{TPM}} Meets {{Timing}} and {{Lattice Attacks}}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 29th {{USENIX Security Symposium}}},
|
||||
author = {Moghimi, Daniel and Sunar, Berk and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Heninger, Nadia},
|
||||
date = {2020-08},
|
||||
pages = {2057--2073},
|
||||
publisher = {USENIX Association},
|
||||
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/moghimi-tpm},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {Trusted Platform Module (TPM) serves as a hardwarebased root of trust that protects cryptographic keys from privileged system and physical adversaries. In this work, we perform a black-box timing analysis of TPM 2.0 devices deployed on commodity computers. Our analysis reveals that some of these devices feature secret-dependent execution times during signature generation based on elliptic curves. In particular, we discovered timing leakage on an Intel firmwarebased TPM as well as a hardware TPM. We show how this information allows an attacker to apply lattice techniques to recover 256-bit private keys for ECDSA and ECSchnorr signatures. On Intel fTPM, our key recovery succeeds after about 1,300 observations and in less than two minutes. Similarly, we extract the private ECDSA key from a hardware TPM manufactured by STMicroelectronics, which is certified at Common Criteria (CC) EAL 4+, after fewer than 40,000 observations. We further highlight the impact of these vulnerabilities by demonstrating a remote attack against a StrongSwan IPsec VPN that uses a TPM to generate the digital signatures for authentication. In this attack, the remote client recovers the server’s private authentication key by timing only 45,000 authentication handshakes via a network connection.},
|
||||
eventtitle = {{{USENIX Security Symposium}}},
|
||||
isbn = {978-1-939133-17-5},
|
||||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{mohanSimpleAccurateExpressions1999,
|
||||
title = {Simple Accurate Expressions for Planar Spiral Inductances},
|
||||
author = {Mohan, S.S. and Del Mar Hershenson, M. and Boyd, S.P. and Lee, T.H.},
|
||||
|
|
@ -5700,6 +5880,18 @@ Website contains OCR'ed original source and a translation}
|
|||
urldate = {2024-10-30}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@report{quintinSomethingRememberUs2024,
|
||||
title = {Something to {{Remember Us By}}: {{Device Confiscated}} by {{Russian Authorities Returned}} with {{Monokle-Type Spyware Installed}}},
|
||||
shorttitle = {Something to {{Remember Us By}}},
|
||||
author = {Quintin, Cooper and Brown, Rebekah and Scott-Railton, John},
|
||||
date = {2024-12-05T05:57:38-05:00},
|
||||
institution = {Citizen Lab, University of Toronto},
|
||||
url = {https://citizenlab.ca/2024/12/device-confiscated-by-russian-authorities-returned-with-monokle-type-spyware-installed/},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {In a joint investigation with The First Department, The Citizen Lab uncovered spyware covertly implanted on the phone of a Russian programmer following his release from Russian custody. The Monokle-like spyware allows an operator to track the device’s location, record phone calls, keystrokes, and read messages from encrypted messaging apps.},
|
||||
keywords = {Russia,spyware}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{quisquaterElectroMagneticAnalysisEMA2001,
|
||||
title = {{{ElectroMagnetic Analysis}} ({{EMA}}): {{Measures}} and {{Counter-measures}} for {{Smart Cards}}},
|
||||
shorttitle = {{{ElectroMagnetic Analysis}} ({{EMA}})},
|
||||
|
|
@ -5782,6 +5974,23 @@ Website contains OCR'ed original source and a translation}
|
|||
organization = {Error 417 Expectation Failed}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{reichertMenhirObliviousDatabase2024,
|
||||
title = {Menhir: {{An Oblivious Database}} with {{Protection}} against {{Access}} and {{Volume Pattern Leakage}}},
|
||||
shorttitle = {Menhir},
|
||||
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 19th {{ACM Asia Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}},
|
||||
author = {Reichert, Leonie and Chandran, Gowri R and Schoppmann, Phillipp and Schneider, Thomas and Scheuermann, Björn},
|
||||
date = {2024-07-01},
|
||||
series = {{{ASIA CCS}} '24},
|
||||
pages = {1675--1690},
|
||||
publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery},
|
||||
location = {New York, NY, USA},
|
||||
doi = {10.1145/3634737.3657005},
|
||||
url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3634737.3657005},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {Analyzing user data while protecting the privacy of individuals remains a big challenge. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are a possible solution as they protect processes and Virtual Machines (VMs) against malicious hosts. However, TEEs can leak access patterns to code and to the data being processed. Furthermore, when data is stored in a TEE database, the data volume required to answer a query is another unwanted side channel that contains sensitive information. Both types of information leaks, access patterns and volume patterns, allow for database reconstruction attacks.In this paper, we present Menhir, an oblivious TEE database that hides access patterns with ORAM guarantees and volume patterns through differential privacy. The database allows range and point queries with SQL-like WHERE-clauses. It builds on the state-of-the-art oblivious AVL tree construction Oblix (S\&P'18), which by itself does not protect against volume leakage. We show how volume leakage can be exploited in range queries and improve the construction to mitigate this type of attack. We prove the correctness and obliviousness of Menhir. Our evaluation shows that our approach is feasible and scales well with the number of rows and columns in the database.},
|
||||
isbn = {9798400704826}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@misc{renesaselectronicscorporationApplicationNoteAN2242019,
|
||||
title = {Application {{Note AN-224}}: {{ALVC}}/{{LVC Logic Characteristics}} and {{Applications}}},
|
||||
author = {{Renesas Electronics Corporation}},
|
||||
|
|
@ -6146,6 +6355,24 @@ Website contains OCR'ed original source and a translation}
|
|||
urldate = {2024-05-15}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{sasySoKMetadataProtectingCommunication2024,
|
||||
title = {{{SoK}}: {{Metadata-Protecting Communication Systems}}},
|
||||
shorttitle = {{{SoK}}},
|
||||
author = {Sasy, Sajin and Goldberg, Ian},
|
||||
date = {2024-01},
|
||||
journaltitle = {Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies},
|
||||
shortjournal = {PoPETs},
|
||||
volume = {2024},
|
||||
number = {1},
|
||||
pages = {509--524},
|
||||
issn = {2299-0984},
|
||||
doi = {10.56553/popets-2024-0030},
|
||||
url = {https://petsymposium.org/popets/2024/popets-2024-0030.php},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {Protecting metadata of communications has been an area of active research since the dining cryptographers problem was introduced by David Chaum in 1988. The Snowden revelations from 2013 resparked research in this direction. Consequently over the last decade we have witnessed a flurry of novel systems designed to protect metadata of users' communications online. However, such systems leverage different assumptions and design choices to achieve their goal; resulting in a scattered view of the desirable properties, potential vulnerabilities, and limitations of existing metadata-protecting communication systems (MPCS). In this work we survey 31 systems targeting metadata-protected communications, and present a unified view of the current state of affairs. We provide two different taxonomies for existing MPCS, first into four different categories by the precise type of metadata protections they offer, and next into six families based on the core techniques that underlie them. By contrasting these systems we identify potential vulnerabilities, as well as subtle privacy implications of design choices of existing MPCS. Furthermore, we identify promising avenues for future research for MPCS, and desirable properties that merit more attention.},
|
||||
langid = {english}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{satoToucheEnhancingTouch2012,
|
||||
title = {Touché: Enhancing Touch Interaction on Humans, Screens, Liquids, and Everyday Objects},
|
||||
shorttitle = {Touché},
|
||||
|
|
@ -6226,6 +6453,18 @@ Website contains OCR'ed original source and a translation}
|
|||
keywords = {galvanically isolated,jitter,power,side-channel,timing}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@report{scott-railtonWhoseAuthorityPegasus2024,
|
||||
title = {By {{Whose Authority}}? {{Pegasus}} Targeting of {{Russian}} \& {{Belarusian-speaking}} Opposition Activists and Independent Media in {{Europe}}},
|
||||
shorttitle = {By {{Whose Authority}}?},
|
||||
author = {Scott-Railton, John and Marczak, Bill and Razzak, Bahr Abdul and Ermoshina, Ksenia and Anstis, Siena and Deibert, Ron},
|
||||
date = {2024-05-30T07:59:44-04:00},
|
||||
institution = {Citizen Lab, University of Toronto},
|
||||
url = {https://citizenlab.ca/2024/05/pegasus-russian-belarusian-speaking-opposition-media-europe/},
|
||||
urldate = {2025-11-26},
|
||||
abstract = {In a joint investigation with Access Now, we found that seven Russian and Belarusian-speaking independent journalists and opposition activists based in Europe were targeted and/or infected with NSO Group’s Pegasus mercenary spyware.},
|
||||
keywords = {Apple,Pegasus,spyware}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{sculleyMachineLearningHighInterest,
|
||||
title = {Machine {{Learning}}: {{The High-Interest Credit Card}} of {{Technical Debt}}},
|
||||
author = {Sculley, D and Holt, Gary and Golovin, Daniel and Davydov, Eugene and Phillips, Todd and Ebner, Dietmar and Chaudhary, Vinay and Young, Michael},
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue