Add terminology notes

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@ -111,12 +111,19 @@ mid-2000s era slot machines in Germany that includes a tamper-sensing mesh, pres
cloning. This device will also be analyzed later in this chapter. cloning. This device will also be analyzed later in this chapter.
\section{The Principles of Tamper-Sensing Mesh Construction and Monitoring} \section{The Principles of Tamper-Sensing Mesh Construction and Monitoring}
\subsection{Security Mesh Manufacturing} \subsection{Security Mesh Manufacturing}
\subsection{Security Mesh Monitoring} \subsection{Security Mesh Monitoring}
\subsection{Other Tamper Sensing Techniques} \subsection{Other Tamper Sensing Techniques}
\subsection{Hardware Security Module Applications} \subsection{Hardware Security Module Applications}
\subsection{The Patent Landscape} \subsection{The Patent Landscape}
Tamper-sensing meshes can be implemented
\section{A Survey of Meshes in the Wild} \section{A Survey of Meshes in the Wild}
Concluding the brief history of tamper sensing meshes above, we find that they were initially developed for sensitive Concluding the brief history of tamper sensing meshes above, we find that they were initially developed for sensitive

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@ -121,7 +121,77 @@ it can have gaps that allow for air flow between outside and inside, enabling ac
cooling capability sharply increases computing power by increasing feasible payload power dissipation by cooling capability sharply increases computing power by increasing feasible payload power dissipation by
two orders of magnitude. two orders of magnitude.
\section{A note on terminology}
\section{Hardware Security Modules}
In this thesis, we use the term \emph{Hardware Security Module (HSM)} to refer to a security device that has the
following three properties.
\begin{enumerate}
\item A HSM targets the prevention of any conceivable physical attack. In particular, this includes intrusion attempts
such as careful drilling or cutting into the device from any direction.
\item A HSM includes tamper sensors that when triggered result in an active tamper response, usually deleting all
cryptographic secrets and rendering the device inoperable.
\item A HSM's tamper sensing and response subsystem is continuously powered from a backup power supply, usually a
battery. Loss of power triggers the tamper response.
\end{enumerate}
This use of the term \emph{HSM} aligns with common usage of the term both in the academic literature and in everyday
conversation. Particularly the requirement of active tamper detection and response is crucial to distinguish a HSM from
simpler devices such as TPMs, smart cards or secure enclaves in SoCs. Note that our use of the term HSM is slightly
different from its use in government standards, from its use in the PCI (card payment industry asscociation) standards,
and from its industry use.
In industry, the term HSM is often used for solutions that are only logically segregated and that do not include any
particular defense against hardware attacks. Our conjecture is that this is a consequence of the standardization
landscape, where for applications outside of card payment processing the US FIPS
140-22~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002} standard was central to
the industry. Despite encompassing both devices that include active tamper detection and response, FIPS 140-2 did not
draw a distinction in its terminology between the two classes.
\paragraph{Use in government standards}
Under US national standard FIPS 140 in in its 2002 version
2~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002}, a HSM would be called a
\emph{Multiple-Chip Cryptographic Module} that conforms to the standard's \emph{Security Level 4}. Interesting to note
are that only security level 4 requires any active tamper detection and response, so its security levels 3 and below do
not align with our HSM definition. Futher of note is that according to the standard, a single-chip solution does not
require any tamper detection and response either to meet the standard's security level 4, which is in misalignment with
our definition. The standard's 2019 updated version FIPS
140-3~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019} defers to the
international standards ISO/IEC 19790 and 24759.
ISO/IEC 19790~\cite{ISOIEC19790} and ISO/IEC 24759~\cite{ISOIEC24759} call what we call a HSM a \emph{Hardware
Cryptographic Module} corresponding with the standards \emph{Security Level 4}. However, these standards only require
active tamper detection and response when cryptographic secrets are transmitted in plaintext between chips.
\paragraph{Use in card payment processing (PCI SSC) standards}
The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) is an association of credit card network operators that
defines standards for all layes of card payment processing from card payment terminals in stores through the handling of
payment data in online shop backend systems.
PCI SSC terminology aligns with our use and with common everyday use of the term HSM. In PCI SSC terminology, a HSM is a
crytographic device that has active tamper detecion and response circuitry. However, PCI SSC terminology only differs
from our use of the term HSM in one nuance: In PCI SSC terminology, a HSM is specifically a datacenter device used for
backend processing of payment data. The general class of ``hardware devices performing some security function with or
without particular physical security requirements'' that ISO/IEC 19790 and other standards call a \emph{Hardware
Cryptographic Module}, in PCI SSC terminology is termed \emph{Secure Cryptographic Device (SCD)} in more recent standard
versions, which was updated from the previous term \emph{Tamper-Resistant Security Module (TRSM)}. Other than HSMs, PCI
SSC includes smartcards and card payment terminals in this category. Card payment terminals, referred to as
\emph{Pin-Entry Device (PED)} in PCI SSC standards, have to include a surprising amount of active tamper detection and
response functionality including partial coverage of areas like they system's main cryptographic processor and smart
card reader by battery-backed tamper-sensing meshes.
\section{Tamper-Sensing Meshes}
In this thesis, we use the terms \emph{Tamper-Sensing Mesh} and \emph{Security Mesh} synonymous. We use both terms to
refer to any electrical circuit whose path is laid out to cover a surface with the intent of detecting attempts at
drilling, cutting or otherwise manipulating this surface. While the term \emph{Security Mesh} is more concise, it is
less clear to people unfamiliar with the matter. It is also polysemous, and depending on context can also refer to woven
or stamped metal meshes used as fences or as screens in front of windows to prevent break-in. As a result, it is harder
to use in online searches, and when using Large Language Models (LLMs), it frequently leads to amusing hallucinations.
%In the early days of mass-market computing, the expectations towards this new tool were high. Even before people %In the early days of mass-market computing, the expectations towards this new tool were high. Even before people
%realized the potential of computers and the internet for commercial gain, there was widespread optimism about the %realized the potential of computers and the internet for commercial gain, there was widespread optimism about the

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@ -4505,7 +4505,6 @@
author = {{National Institute of Standards and Technology (US)}}, author = {{National Institute of Standards and Technology (US)}},
date = {2019}, date = {2019},
number = {error: 140-3}, number = {error: 140-3},
pages = {error: 140-3},
institution = {{National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)}}, institution = {{National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)}},
location = {Washington, D.C.}, location = {Washington, D.C.},
doi = {10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3}, doi = {10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3},
@ -5016,6 +5015,16 @@
urldate = {2025-04-09} urldate = {2025-04-09}
} }
@standard{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2025,
title = {Payment {{Card Industry PIN Transaction Security Device Testing}} and {{Approval Program Guide}}},
author = {{PCI Security Standards Council}},
date = {2025-06},
url = {https://docs-prv.pcisecuritystandards.org/PTS/Supporting%20Document/PTS_Program_Guide_v2.2.pdf},
urldate = {2025-08-22},
pagetotal = {75},
version = {2.2}
}
@article{perrigTESLABroadcastAuthentication, @article{perrigTESLABroadcastAuthentication,
title = {The {{TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol}}}, title = {The {{TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol}}},
author = {Perrig, Adrian and Canetti, Ran and Tygar, J D and Song, Dawn}, author = {Perrig, Adrian and Canetti, Ran and Tygar, J D and Song, Dawn},