SMPC chapter WIP, add missing photos

chapter-smpc/chapter.tex

@@ -8,18 +8,29 @@
 \label{chapter-smpc}
 
 Inertial Hardware Security Modules do not only support much larger payloads compared to conventional HSMs, they also
-support much higher power dissipation since they allow for direct air cooling of their payload. Because they rotate at
-high speed, IHSM meshes do not need to be contiguous to provide adequate security. While a non-contiuous rotating mesh
-might theoretically allow a stationary attack tool to quickly penetrate, then retract through one of the mesh's gaps
-while the mesh is rotating, the time available for such an attack would be too short for a practical attack. For a mesh
-with three vertical connecting segments (cf.\ Figure~\ref{fig_proto_mesh} in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}) rotating at
-\qty{1000}{\rpm}, this time would be in the order of \qty{20}{\milli\second}. Conventional HSM monitoring circuits often
-require a similar amount of time to react to an attack~\cite{obermaier2018}.
+support much higher power dissipation since they allow for direct air cooling of their payload. The tamper-sensing
+membrane of a conventional HSM must be continuous to provide security, so any heat dissipated by the payload must pass
+through it. Since the polymers used in tamper sensing membranes are poor conductors of heat, and since security benefits
+from a thicker tamper sensing assembly (cf.\ Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}), power dissipation in conventional HSMs is
+limited~\cite{
+    petriePartIITechnical,
+    curetHardwareSecurityModule2025,
+    zhangTamperrespondentAssembliesPorous2023,
+    dragoneVentedTamperrespondentAssemblies2020}.
 
-Similar to how the increase in payload \emph{size} unlocks new applications such as the Quantum Key Distribution relay
-use case we presented in Chapter~\ref{chapter-qkd}, this increase in sustainable power dissipation by a factor of
-several hundred also unlocks a number of new applications. Especially applications that require large amounts of
-computing power benefit from IHSM technology, as their needs fundamentally cannot be met by conventional HSMs.
+Because IHSMs rotate at high speed, IHSM meshes do not need to be contiguous to provide adequate security. While a
+non-contiguous rotating mesh might theoretically allow a stationary attack tool to quickly penetrate, then retract
+through one of the mesh's gaps while the mesh is rotating, the time available for such an attack would be too short for
+a practical attack. For a mesh with three vertical connecting segments (cf.\ Figure~\ref{fig_proto_mesh} in
+Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}) rotating at \qty{1000}{\rpm}, this time would be in the order of \qty{20}{\milli\second}.
+Conventional HSM monitoring circuits would likely require a similar amount of time to react to an
+attack~\cite{obermaier2018}.
+
+Similar to how the increase in payload \emph{sizew} of IHSMs compared to conventional HSMs unlocks new applications such
+as the Quantum Key Distribution relay use case we presented in Chapter~\ref{chapter-qkd}, the increase in sustainable
+power dissipation enabled by air cooling also unlocks a number of new applications. Especially applications that require
+large amounts of computing power benefit from IHSM technology, as their needs fundamentally cannot be met by
+conventional HSMs.
 
 One such application that does not translate to conventional HSMs due to its need for large amounts of computing power
 is Multiparty Computation (MPC). MPC is a cryptographic construct that allows several networked parties to jointly