Cosmetic changes
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2 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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import re
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import sys
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import subprocess
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import string
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@ -61,8 +62,7 @@ def generate_git_tex_diff(texfile, bibliography, revision):
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line = line.rstrip()
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if document_started: # diff results in preamble
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import sys
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debug = 'battery' in line
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debug = False #'battery' in line
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if debug:
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print('orig:', repr(line), file=sys.stderr)
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@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ feed-through as potential weak spots.
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The third and last way to attack a conventional HSM is to disable the mesh monitoring circuit~\cite{dexter2015}. An
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attacker may need to insert several probes to wiretap the payload processor's secrets, but if poorly implemented, they
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may be able to disable the mesh monitor with only one. This type of attack can be mitigated by careful electronic
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design.
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design that avoids single points of failure as well as fail-open failure modes.
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\subsection{Attacks that work on any HSM}
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