Add tobi's comments
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@ -72,18 +72,41 @@
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\section{Introduction}
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% Tobi: Intro Reihenfolge der Topics
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% Hin- und Her-Switchen
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% Related Work in Intro nach vorne
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% Im Abstact kurz auf related work eingehen.
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% Related work: Bullets zu lang
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% Bullet-Listen sind uneven
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% Capacitive PUFs: bei Limitaitons zitieren, welche der Arbeiten gemeint ist.
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% Bei Diss-Citations in der bib dazu schreiben, dass das ne Diss ist.
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% 2.2 / 2.3 Wie related? Warum interessant? In Intro erwähnen?
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% In Intro herausstellen, dass TDR-Setup neu ist.
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% zitierte patente zu 4-5 zusammenstreichen
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% in intro kein vergleich zu commercial systems
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% Unterschied zu time domain mesh monitoring besser rausstellen?
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% Storyline für Intro: Wir sind die ersten die die Auflösung hinbekommen, und deshalb geht bei uns TDR.
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% Vielleicht Standardkomponenten besser herausstellen? USA?
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% Intro besser in einen klaren Storyfaden bauen: Generelle Intro, was machen andere, was machen wir.
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% Conclusion time domain besser rausstellen. Fingerprint erwähnen!
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% Figure 10: 2A/2B a/b klarer machen
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Security meshes continue to be the state of the art for tamper sensing in in applications where sophisticated physical
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attacks such as attempts at drilling or sawing through the device's enclosure to place probes must be prevented. Common
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applications for such meshes include Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) used to store and process cryptographic keys while
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applying certain security standards such as
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FIPS-140-2\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002} or ISO/IEC
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24759\cite{ISOIEC24759}, as well as card payment terminals where PCI PTS HSM
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24759\cite{ISOIEC24759}. Other applications include as card payment terminals where PCI PTS HSM
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standards\cite{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2021} are applicable. Security meshes usually consist of
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two or more conductive traces that are laid out in a meandering pattern to cover a surface, and which are monitored
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electrically to detect attempts at penetrating this surface. While commercial designs often only monitor for short
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circuits or breaks in the mesh traces, monitoring this coarse is incapable of detecting even less sophisticated attacks
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attempting to circumvent part of the mesh, thus requring the mesh to be made from a special material that is difficult
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to manipulate without breaking it.
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electrically to detect attempts at penetrating this surface. Commercial designs often only monitor for short circuits or
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breaks in the mesh traces and are incapable of detecting attacks that circumvent part of the mesh, thus requring the
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mesh to be made from a special material that is difficult to manipulate without breaking it. Cretaing such meshes
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is expensive and requires specialized technology.
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To enable the use of less expensive, commodity materials such as Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs), mesh integrity must be
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monitored with higher fidelity. In this paper, we present a low-cost monitoring circuit for security meshes based on a
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