Paper WIP
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@ -108,13 +108,13 @@ standards\cite{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2021} are applicabl
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two or more conductive traces that are laid out in a meandering pattern to cover a surface, and which are monitored
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electrically to detect attempts at penetrating this surface. Commercial designs often only monitor for short circuits or
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breaks in the mesh traces and are incapable of detecting attacks that circumvent part of the mesh, thus requring the
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mesh to be made from a special material that is difficult to manipulate without breaking it. Cretaing such meshes
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mesh to be made from a special material that is difficult to manipulate without breaking it. Creating such meshes
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is expensive and requires specialized technology.
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To enable the use of less expensive, commodity materials such as Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs), mesh integrity must be
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monitored with higher fidelity. In this paper, we present a low-cost monitoring circuit for security meshes based on a
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Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) approach that provides such improved measurement fidelity and enables the use of meshes
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made from less expensive materials.
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Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) approach that provides high measurement fidelity and enables the use of meshes made from
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less expensive materials.
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Our circuit generates a very fast pulse with a rise time lower than \qty{200}{\pico\second} that is broadcast into the
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mesh. While the pulse traverses the mesh, parts of it are reflected on imperfections inside the mesh. Our circuit
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@ -170,26 +170,22 @@ In this paper, we introduce an approach for the design of improved, higher fidel
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and present a practical prototype demonstrating our design's capabilities. The contributions of our work are as follows:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Our approach provides higher fidelity compared to state-of-the-art security mesh conductivity monitoring and
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improves the sensitivity of meshes including when manufactured using less advanced technologies such as standard
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FPC or PCB processes. Our TDR frontend produces 70 data points for each meter of mesh length, resulting in a
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measurement density per mesh area of \qty{200}{\bit\per\centi\meter^2} when using a $\qty{200}{\micro\meter}$
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pitch mesh manufactured in a standard low-cost commercial PCB process.
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\item Our approach consists of an optimized, low-cost differential Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) frontend built
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around a commodity microcontroller and an amplifier IC originally intended for digital video applications. Our
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design achieves pulse risetimes below \qty{200}{\pico\second}, corresponding to only \qty{3}{\centi\meter} of
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wave propagation inside the mesh at the speed of light in PCB material, a $25\times$ improvement over the
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closest previous work\cite{vasileActiveTamperDetection2017,vasileTemperatureSensitiveActive2017}.
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\item We explain the design rationale behind our design. Our design is based entirely around commercially available,
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inexpensive mass-market components, which means our design can be replicated and extended by anyone, without
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necessitating access to bespoke production equipment or semiconductor manufacturing capabilities. To facilitate
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easy replication, further research and practical applications, we publish our prototype under an Open Source
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license and chose not to patent our approach.
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\item We present a working prototype along extensive experimental results, including laboratory measurements of the
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technical performance of our design. Furthermore, we practically demonstrate that our design is able to not only
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detect, but distinguish and even localize faults in several realistic attack scenarios. We demonstrate that our
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design shows sufficient sensitivity to detect and localize an attack using a commercial, high-impedance
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oscilloscope probe.
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\item To our knowledge, our design is first to apply a low-cost embedded differential Time Domain Reflectometry
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(TDR) frontend to security mesh monitoring. Our design achieves pulse risetimes below \qty{200}{\pico\second}, a
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$25\times$ improvement over the closest previous
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work\cite{vasileActiveTamperDetection2017,vasileTemperatureSensitiveActive2017}.
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\item Our approach provides higher fidelity compared to state-of-the-art security mesh conductivity monitoring or
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previous low cost approaches. It enables the use of meshes manufactured using less advanced technologies such as
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standard FPC or PCB processes. Our TDR frontend produces 70 data points for each meter of mesh length, resulting
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in a measurement density per mesh area of \qty{200}{\bit\per\centi\meter^2} when using a
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$\qty{200}{\micro\meter}$ pitch mesh manufactured in a standard low-cost PCB process.
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\item We present a working prototype along extensive experimental results, including laboratory performance
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measurements. We practically demonstrate that our design is able to not only detect, but distinguish and even
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localize attacks in several realistic attack scenarios.
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\item Our design is based entirely around commercially available, inexpensive mass-market components. It can be
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replicated and improved without access to bespoke production equipment or semiconductor manufacturing
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capabilities. To facilitate further research and practical applications, we publish our prototype under an Open
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Source license and chose not to patent our approach.
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\end{itemize}
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\section{Related Work}
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@ -241,6 +237,8 @@ Advantages of their system include high sensitivity to modifications, as well as
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require a continuous power supply. However, there are several significant differences between their proposed system and
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our design.
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% Cannot delete keys during tamper response!
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Their system is limited by sensing circuit dynamic range, which they compensate by using a large number (32)
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of electrodes in parallel. Covering larger volumes with such a system would require increasing electrode count
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