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@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
@book{2019ConferenceInformation2019,
title = {2019 {{Conference}} on {{Information Communications Technology}} and {{Society}} ({{ICTAS}}): {{Durban}}, {{South Africa}}, 6, 7 and 8 {{March}} 2019},
shorttitle = {2019 {{Conference}} on {{Information Communications Technology}} and {{Society}} ({{ICTAS}})},
date = {2019},
publisher = {IEEE},
location = {Piscataway, NJ},
eventtitle = {Conference on {{Information Communications Technology}} and {{Society}}},
isbn = {978-1-5386-7365-2},
langid = {english},
pagetotal = {1}
}
@online{adhikariDonLookUbiquitous2022,
title = {Don't {{Look Up}}: {{Ubiquitous Data Exfiltration Pathways}} in {{Commercial Spaces}}},
shorttitle = {Don't {{Look Up}}},
@ -43,6 +55,23 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/586UJPWU/Albertini et al. - How to Abuse and Fix Authenticated Encryption With.pdf}
}
@article{alendalChipChopSmashing2021,
title = {Chip Chop — Smashing the Mobile Phone Secure Chip for Fun and Digital Forensics},
author = {Alendal, Gunnar and Axelsson, Stefan and Dyrkolbotn, Geir Olav},
date = {2021-07},
journaltitle = {Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation},
shortjournal = {Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation},
volume = {37},
pages = {301191},
issn = {26662817},
doi = {10.1016/j.fsidi.2021.301191},
url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2666281721000998},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
langid = {english},
keywords = {sampling-mesh},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Alendal et al_2021_Chip chop — smashing the mobile phone secure chip for fun and digital forensics.pdf}
}
@online{alievExperimentalDemonstrationScalable2023,
title = {Experimental Demonstration of Scalable Quantum Key Distribution over a Thousand Kilometers},
author = {Aliev, A. and Statiev, V. and Zarubin, I. and Kirsanov, N. and Strizhak, D. and Bezruchenko, A. and Osicheva, A. and Smirnov, A. and Yarovikov, M. and Kodukhov, A. and Pastushenko, V. and Pflitsch, M. and Vinokur, V.},
@ -67,6 +96,22 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/ITYF3KAN/Alomair - Information Theoretically Secure Encryption with A.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{amhenriorDesignImplementationAutomatic2017,
title = {Design and Implementation of an Automatic Tamper Detection and Reporting Capability for a Single Phase Energy Meter},
booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE}} 3rd {{International Conference}} on {{Electro-Technology}} for {{National Development}} ({{NIGERCON}})},
author = {Amhenrior, H. E. and Edeko, F. O. and Ogujor, E. A. and Emagbetere, J. O.},
date = {2017-11},
pages = {1--9},
issn = {2377-2697},
doi = {10.1109/NIGERCON.2017.8281947},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8281947/?arnumber=8281947&tag=1},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
abstract = {In this paper, the design and implementation of automatic tamper detection and reporting capability of Energy meter was carried out. The system has the capability to detect bypass internally on the meter and externally on the service cables from the electric pole. It also incorporates wireless disconnection and connection of load capabilities. This becomes imperative as a result of high rate of energy theft that arises from meter tampering. The system comprises of a developed Single Phase Prepayment Energy Meter and the supply authority Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) capable device platform. The meter is made of the energy meter IC, two microcontrollers which are suitably programmed in C++, one for Energy measurement and the other for monitoring of meter activities especially terminal tamper and communications. It also has the tamper switch, the circuit breaker and the GSM modem (SIM900) which is interfaced to the monitoring microcontroller. The modem is used for communication particularly in Short Message Service (SMS) form with the supply authority. The server and the Application Platform communicates with the meter using developed commands available to only the supply authority. The use of Wireless Current Transducers (WCT) for the detection of energy theft through external bypass of the Prepaid Meter was also proposed to be incorporated in the system. The results obtained show satisfactory tamper detection and reporting as well as wireless connection with 100\% success rate recorded as implemented.},
eventtitle = {2017 {{IEEE}} 3rd {{International Conference}} on {{Electro-Technology}} for {{National Development}} ({{NIGERCON}})},
keywords = {Automatic Tamper Reporting,Companies,Developed Commands,GSM,Meters,Microcontroller,Microcontrollers,Monitoring,Pins,SMS,Wireless Connection},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Amhenrior et al_2017_Design and implementation of an automatic tamper detection and reporting.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8E7R2D7Z/8281947.html}
}
@incollection{amiriEfficientUnconditionallySecure2018,
title = {Efficient {{Unconditionally Secure Signatures Using Universal Hashing}}},
booktitle = {Applied {{Cryptography}} and {{Network Security}}},
@ -106,6 +151,15 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Amitonova et al_Quantum key establishment via a multimode fiber.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{anderson1996tamper,
title = {Tamper Resistance-a Cautionary Note},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Second {{Usenix}} Workshop on Electronic Commerce},
author = {Anderson, Ross and Kuhn, Markus},
date = {1996},
volume = {2},
pages = {1--11}
}
@book{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020,
title = {Security {{Engineering}}: {{A Guide}} to {{Building Dependable Distributed Systems}}},
shorttitle = {Security {{Engineering}}},
@ -143,7 +197,7 @@
isbn = {978-1-4503-4139-4}
}
@inproceedings{arpPrivacyThreatsUltrasonic2017,
@inproceedings{arpPrivacyThreatsUltrasonic2017a,
title = {Privacy {{Threats}} through {{Ultrasonic Side Channels}} on {{Mobile Devices}}},
booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})},
author = {Arp, Daniel and Quiring, Erwin and Wressnegger, Christian and Rieck, Konrad},
@ -394,6 +448,23 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VVPMC5NB/pal.html}
}
@article{bencivenniTimeDomainReflectometer2013,
title = {A {{Time Domain Reflectometer}} with 100 ~ Ps Precision Implemented in a Cost-Effective {{FPGA}} for the Test of the {{KLOE-2 Inner Tracker}} Readout Anodes},
author = {Bencivenni, G. and Czerwinski, E. and De Lucia, E. and De Robertis, G. and Domenici, D. and Erriquez, O. and Fanizzi, G. and Felici, G. and Liuzzi, R. and Loddo, F. and Mongelli, M. and Morello, G. and Ranieri, A. and Valentino, V.},
date = {2013-01-11},
journaltitle = {Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment},
shortjournal = {Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment},
volume = {698},
pages = {185--191},
issn = {0168-9002},
doi = {10.1016/j.nima.2012.10.023},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168900212011552},
urldate = {2025-03-11},
abstract = {A Time Domain Reflectometer implemented in a single cost-effective Field Programmable Gate Array device is shown to achieve a precision around 100ps. The Time to Digital Converter section of the device is based on a tapped delay line followed by an encoder and shows both Differential and Integral Non-Linearity below one least significant bit. The same Field Programmable Gate Array houses an 8051 8-bits microprocessor, for the control of the pulse signals generation, the acquisition and the first treatment of raw data. Principles of operation, architecture, performance and preliminary trials on the prototype are presented in this paper. As an example of possible application, the proposed circuit has been usefully used to perform the quality control of the micro-strip anodic planes of the Gas Electron Multiplier Inner Tracker of the KLOE-2 experiment.},
keywords = {Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA),Micro-strip,Statistical Code Method,Tapped delay line,Time Domain Reflectometer (TDR)},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WITGACG9/S0168900212011552.html}
}
@inproceedings{benderDangersStochasticParrots2021,
title = {On the {{Dangers}} of {{Stochastic Parrots}}: {{Can Language Models Be Too Big}}? 🦜},
shorttitle = {On the {{Dangers}} of {{Stochastic Parrots}}},
@ -816,6 +887,16 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Chafi et al_2021_Design Method of PCB Inductors for High-Frequency GaN Converters.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WNNSSCEQ/9110799.html}
}
@book{chanceWaveforms1949,
title = {Waveforms},
editor = {Chance, Britton and Hughes, Vernon and MacNichol, Edward F. and Sayre, David and Williams, Frederic C.},
date = {1949},
series = {{{MIT Radiation Laboratory}}},
volume = {19},
publisher = {McGraw-Hill},
location = {New York}
}
@incollection{chanCommittingAuthenticatedEncryption2022,
title = {On {{Committing Authenticated-Encryption}}},
booktitle = {Computer {{Security}} – {{ESORICS}} 2022},
@ -877,7 +958,7 @@
urldate = {2024-10-31},
abstract = {Protection of the Critical Security Parameters is a permanent concern for the designers, but also for the users of cryptographic equipment. The usage of a conductive mesh is a sensitive and efficient solution in order to protect the firmware, keys or any other sensitive data that could be contained in a cryptographic module. In order to improve the security provided by this principle, based on the flexibility of common technology that can be used to produce PCBs, an algorithm to produce particular designs of conductive mesh on PCBs starting from random bit strings is present in this article. Random design of conductive mesh is useful in order to increase the unpredictability of its electrical characteristics so, in addition to the sensitivity of this conductive mesh which will detect and react even to any attempt of measuring it by probes, an attacker will not have any information which can be exploited. The proposed innovative algorithm provides filling of the full area of envelope which cover the cryptographic module, even if its perimeter is irregular, according to necessary dimensions and profile, keeping traces on a dense grid, without any uncovered areas. The main advantage of the proposed solution consists of the possibility to implement a fully automated production flux, without human participation, and with an increased level of security due to unpredictable electrical characteristics of conductive mesh generated from a true random bit string.},
eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE}} 26th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
keywords = {algorithm,Cryptography,Electric variables,Electronics packaging,Generators,mesh,Probes,Production,random,security,Sensitivity,tamperproof},
keywords = {algorithm,Cryptography,Electric variables,Electronics packaging,Generators,mesh,Probes,Production,random,sampling-mesh,security,Sensitivity,tamperproof},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Chiţu et al_2020_Algorithm to Design Conductive Mesh for Tamperproof Envelope.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XPN3D8DA/9292275.html}
}
@ -958,6 +1039,24 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RKFV7HX5/Choudhuri et al. - 2021 - Fluid MPC Secure Multiparty Computation with Dyna.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{cifuentesPoorMansHardware2016,
title = {Poor {{Man}}'s {{Hardware Security Module}} ({{pmHSM}}): {{A Threshold Cryptographic Backend}} for {{DNSSEC}}},
shorttitle = {Poor {{Man}}'s {{Hardware Security Module}} ({{pmHSM}})},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 9th {{Latin America Networking Conference}}},
author = {Cifuentes, Francisco and Hevia, Alejandro and Montoto, Francisco and Barros, Tomás and Ramiro, Victor and Bustos-Jiménez, Javier},
date = {2016-10-13},
pages = {59--64},
publisher = {ACM},
location = {Valparaiso Chile},
doi = {10.1145/2998373.2998452},
url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2998373.2998452},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
eventtitle = {{{LANC}} '16: {{Latin America Networking Conference}}},
isbn = {978-1-4503-4591-0},
langid = {english},
keywords = {sampling-mesh}
}
@online{ClavisXGQKD2024,
title = {Clavis {{XG QKD System Brochure}}},
date = {2024-07},
@ -1033,7 +1132,7 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Couteau et al_2021_Silver.pdf}
}
@article{cuellarStaticFatigueLifetime1987a,
@article{cuellarStaticFatigueLifetime1987,
title = {Static Fatigue Lifetime of Optical Fibers in Bending},
author = {Cuellar, E. and Roberts, D. and Middleman, L.},
date = {1987-01-01},
@ -1153,6 +1252,25 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/S8S9P8L5/Deshotels - Inaudible Sound as a Covert Channel in Mobile Devi.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{desouzaAuditBackupProcedures2008,
title = {Audit and Backup Procedures for Hardware Security Modules},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th Symposium on {{Identity}} and Trust on the {{Internet}}},
author = {family=Souza, given=Túlio Cicero Salvaro, prefix=de, useprefix=true and Martina, Jean Everson and Custódio, Ricardo Felipe},
date = {2008-03-04},
pages = {89--97},
publisher = {ACM},
location = {Gaithersburg Maryland USA},
doi = {10.1145/1373290.1373302},
url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1373290.1373302},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
abstract = {Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are an useful tool to deploy public key infrastructure (PKI) and its applications. This paper presents necessary procedures and protocols to perform backup and audit in such devices when deployed in PKIs. These protocols were evaluated in an implementation of a real HSM, enabling it to perform secure backups and to provide an audit trail, two important considerations for a safe PKI operation. It also introduces a ceremony procedure to support the operation of such HSMs in a PKI environment.},
eventtitle = {{{IDtrust}} 2008: 7th {{Symposium}} on {{Identity}} and {{Trust}} on the {{Internet}}},
isbn = {978-1-60558-066-1},
langid = {english},
keywords = {sampling-mesh},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8ACFQAKY/de Souza et al. - 2008 - Audit and backup procedures for hardware security .pdf}
}
@article{diamantiPracticalChallengesQuantum2016,
title = {Practical Challenges in Quantum Key Distribution},
author = {Diamanti, Eleni and Lo, Hoi-Kwong and Qi, Bing and Yuan, Zhiliang},
@ -1243,6 +1361,22 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/KAKTBELB/Dumitru et al. - The Impostor Among US(B) Off-Path Injection Attac.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{duncanFLATSFillingLogic2019,
title = {{{FLATS}}: {{Filling Logic}} and {{Testing Spatially}} for {{FPGA Authentication}} and {{Tamper Detection}}},
shorttitle = {{{FLATS}}},
booktitle = {2019 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Hardware Oriented Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{HOST}})},
author = {Duncan, Adam and Skipper, Grant and Stern, Andrew and Nahiyan, Adib and Rahman, Fahim and Lukefahr, Andrew and Tehranipoor, Mark and Swany, Martin},
date = {2019-05},
pages = {81--90},
doi = {10.1109/HST.2019.8741025},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8741025/?arnumber=8741025},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
abstract = {Security-critical field programmable gate array (FPGA) designs traditionally rely on bitstream encryption and hashing to prevent bitstream modifications and provide design authentication. Recent attacks to extract bitstream encryption keys, and research in automated bitstream manipulation tools, have created a class of vulnerabilities involving post-synthesis low-level FPGA editing. Current authentication and tamper (e.g., malicious modification) detection approaches dependent upon hash-based comparison mechanisms and register transfer level safeguards are vulnerable to these post-synthesis exploits. In this paper, we propose FLATS, which provides filling logic and testing spatially to combat such vulnerability. FLATS fills unused lookup tables (LUTs) within the FPGA design and inserts infrared-emitting spatial watermarks into the partially used LUTs at the post-synthesis stage for physical authentication and tamper detection using backside infrared imaging. FLATS takes an existing synthesized design and re-purposes a portion of its LUT initialization to function as a watermark allowing for the detection of changes to the post-synthesis placement and initialization. Experimental results validate the FLATS architecture on a 28nm Xilinx FPGA with less than 12\% look-up table utilization overhead and negligible compromises in power and speed.},
eventtitle = {2019 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Hardware Oriented Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{HOST}})},
keywords = {3PIPs,Authentication,Encryption,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,infrared,Table lookup,watermark,Watermarking},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Duncan et al_2019_FLATS.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3C4TK3U3/8741025.html}
}
@article{dupontMiniaturizedUltraLowPowerTamper2022,
title = {A {{Miniaturized}} and {{Ultra-Low-Power Tamper Detection Sensor}} for {{Portable Applications}}},
author = {Dupont, François and Laurent, Philippe and Montfort, Francis and Pierre, Hervé and Jeanne, Léo and Stoukatch, Serguei and Dricot, Samuel and Redouté, Jean-Michel},
@ -1257,7 +1391,7 @@
urldate = {2024-07-25},
abstract = {This article presents a tamper detection sensor complementing cryptographic techniques in order to protect data from unauthorized access and/or from data falsification. Both the mechanical and electronic parts of the systems are described. The proposed architecture targets portable devices and can be realized using commercially available components, widely available materials and known manufacturing and assembly techniques. The tamper detection circuit is based on a capacitive sensing principle and uses ultra-low-power electronic components, leading to an overall consumed current below 10 \textbackslash mu \textbackslash textA . Autonomy is a crucial reported drawback of miniaturized battery backed-up anti-tampering hardware systems: the presented architecture and implementation ensures a lifetime of at least 3 years when powered by one CR2032 coin cell battery. The paper also assesses the sensitivity of the tamper detection: measurements show that the system is able to detect a variation of at least one percent of the capacitance of the tamper layer, resulting from an attempt to breach the outer shell surrounding the circuit for accessing the sensitive data.},
eventtitle = {{{IEEE Sensors Journal}}},
keywords = {Batteries,Capacitive sensor,Computer architecture,data security,Encryption,FIPS 140-2,Hardware,Security,Sensors,tamper detection,Temperature sensors,ultra-low-power electronics},
keywords = {Batteries,Capacitive sensor,Computer architecture,data security,Encryption,FIPS 140-2,Hardware,sampling-mesh,Security,Sensors,tamper detection,Temperature sensors,ultra-low-power electronics},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Dupont et al_A Miniaturized and Ultra-Low-Power Tamper Detection Sensor for Portable.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RHDYLUS7/9682743.html}
}
@ -1794,6 +1928,23 @@
abstract = {Contact discovery allows users of mobile messengers to conveniently connect with people in their address book. In this work, we demonstrate that severe privacy issues exist in currently deployed contact discovery methods and propose suitable mitigations.Our study of three popular messengers\ (WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram) shows that large-scale crawling attacks are\ (still) possible. Using an accurate database of mobile phone number prefixes and very few resources, we queried\ 10 \% of\ US mobile phone numbers for\ WhatsApp and\ 100 \% for\ Signal. For\ Telegram, we find that its\ API exposes a wide range of sensitive information, even about numbers not registered with the service. We present interesting\ (cross-messenger) usage statistics, which also reveal that very few users change the default privacy settings.Furthermore, we demonstrate that currently deployed hashing-based contact discovery protocols are severely broken by comparing three methods for efficient hash reversal. Most notably, we show that with the password cracking tool\ “JTR,” we can iterate through the entire worldwide mobile phone number space in\ \< 150 s on a consumer-grade\ GPU. We also propose a significantly improved rainbow table construction for non-uniformly distributed input domains that is of independent interest.Regarding mitigations, we most notably propose two novel rate-limiting schemes: our\ incremental contact discovery for services without server-side contact storage strictly improves over\ Signal’s current approach while being compatible with private set intersection, whereas our\ differential scheme allows even stricter rate limits at the overhead for service providers to store a small constant-size state that does not reveal any contact information.}
}
@inproceedings{hanScalingHardwareSecurity2019,
title = {Toward Scaling Hardware Security Module for Emerging Cloud Services},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th {{Workshop}} on {{System Software}} for {{Trusted Execution}}},
author = {Han, Juhyeng and Kim, Seongmin and Kim, Taesoo and Han, Dongsu},
date = {2019-10-27},
pages = {1--6},
publisher = {ACM},
location = {Huntsville Ontario Canada},
doi = {10.1145/3342559.3365335},
url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3342559.3365335},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
eventtitle = {{{SOSP}} '19: {{ACM SIGOPS}} 27th {{Symposium}} on {{Operating Systems Principles}}},
isbn = {978-1-4503-6888-9},
langid = {english},
keywords = {sampling-mesh}
}
@article{hanspachCovertAcousticalMesh2013,
title = {On {{Covert Acoustical Mesh Networks}} in {{Air}}},
author = {Hanspach, Michael and Goetz, Michael},
@ -1916,6 +2067,26 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Hong et al_2020_Design and Compensation Control of a Flexible Instrument for Endoscopic Surgery.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8CGJKAZ8/9196955.html}
}
@article{houtman1GHzSamplingOscilloscope2000,
title = {1-{{GHz Sampling Oscilloscope Front End}} Is {{Easily Modified}}},
author = {Houtman, Hubert},
date = {2000-09-18},
journaltitle = {Electronic Design},
volume = {48},
number = {19},
pages = {175--176},
issn = {0013-4872}
}
@book{HP187BDualTrace1962,
title = {{{HP 187B Dual-Trace Vertical Amplifier Operating}} and {{Service Manual}}},
date = {1962},
publisher = {Hewlett-Packard Company},
url = {http://hparchive.com/Manuals/HP-187B-Manual.pdf},
urldate = {2025-03-11},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XU2M8JAG/HP-187B-Manual.pdf}
}
@article{hsuAnalyticalDesignAlgorithm2008,
title = {Analytical {{Design Algorithm}} of {{Planar Inductor Layout}} in {{CMOS Technology}}},
author = {Hsu, Heng-Ming and Chan, Kai-Yuen and Chien, Hung-Chi and Kuan, Han-Chien},
@ -2013,16 +2184,16 @@
@online{IEEEXploreFullTexta,
title = {{{IEEE Xplore Full-Text PDF}}:},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8558378},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=6520632},
urldate = {2024-09-10},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/HJJK32NF/stamp.html}
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PQYCW7K7/stamp.html}
}
@online{IEEEXploreFullTextb,
title = {{{IEEE Xplore Full-Text PDF}}:},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=6520632},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8558378},
urldate = {2024-09-10},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PQYCW7K7/stamp.html}
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/HJJK32NF/stamp.html}
}
@online{ImpactPolarizationMode,
@ -2119,6 +2290,23 @@
urldate = {2024-09-03}
}
@article{kahrs50YearsRF2003,
title = {50 Years of {{RF}} and Microwave Sampling},
author = {Kahrs, M.},
date = {2003-06},
journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques},
volume = {51},
number = {6},
pages = {1787--1805},
issn = {1557-9670},
doi = {10.1109/TMTT.2002.806934},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1201815?casa_token=VuzEwA0qx64AAAAA:wyySGOSgyLvNaLEjg05oV0MmQNihh4WH-A66_PYtI9IlkUjW6x6YlbAXePITdT68FFKHMN36wA},
urldate = {2025-03-11},
abstract = {Measurement of microwave and UHF signals is often done with sampling techniques. In this paper, the techniques and technology of sampling of electrical signals is reviewed from 1950 to the present. It includes both references to the open literature, as well as an extensive review of relevant patents. It also provides an overview of sampling applications and the use of computer technology to compensate and correct for errors in the sampling process.},
eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Microwave Theory}} and {{Techniques}}},
keywords = {Circuit testing,Distortion measurement,Instruments,Microwave theory and techniques,Oscilloscopes,Probes,Pulse generation,Radio frequency,Sampling methods,Signal sampling}
}
@incollection{kalaiArgumentQuantumComputers2020,
title = {The {{Argument Against Quantum Computers}}},
booktitle = {Quantum, {{Probability}}, {{Logic}}},
@ -2516,11 +2704,11 @@
issn = {2511-9044, 2511-9044},
doi = {10.1002/qute.201800011},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09278},
urldate = {2024-05-02},
urldate = {2024-05-27},
abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.},
langid = {english},
keywords = {Quantum Physics},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/A2BQHUUW/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf}
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/I7UL2SKX/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf}
}
@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018a,
@ -2538,11 +2726,11 @@
issn = {2511-9044, 2511-9044},
doi = {10.1002/qute.201800011},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09278},
urldate = {2024-05-27},
urldate = {2024-05-02},
abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.},
langid = {english},
keywords = {Quantum Physics},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/I7UL2SKX/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf}
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/A2BQHUUW/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf}
}
@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018b,
@ -2588,7 +2776,24 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SPNJ8KBL/Launchbury et al. - 2014 - Application-Scale Secure Multiparty Computation.pdf}
}
@article{leePrintedSpiralWinding2011,
@inproceedings{lee16psresolutionRandomEquivalent2003,
title = {A 16ps-Resolution {{Random Equivalent Sampling}} Circuit for {{TDR}} Utilizing a {{Vernier}} Time Delay Generation},
booktitle = {2003 {{IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium}}. {{Conference Record}} ({{IEEE Cat}}. {{No}}.{{03CH37515}})},
author = {Lee, Donghwan and Sung, Jinho and Park, Jaehong},
date = {2003-10},
volume = {2},
pages = {1219-1223 Vol.2},
issn = {1082-3654},
doi = {10.1109/NSSMIC.2003.1351912},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1351912},
urldate = {2025-03-11},
abstract = {A Random Equivalent Sampling (RES) circuit that has 16ps sampling resolution has been developed for a high-resolution Time-Domain Reflectometer (TDR). The high-resolution TDR uses an expensive programmable delay chip or a complex Time-to-Digital Converter (TDC) circuit to capture the waveform with very fine time interval. The Vernier time delay generation technique using two crystal oscillators of slightly different frequency is proposed, which is simpler and more cost-effective and provides subpicosecond time resolution. One of the two clocks is used for the reference time to generate incident periodic pulses, and another clock is used for the sampling, The implemented RES circuit consists of the Vernier clock generator, the pulse generator and the control logic for pulse generation, interface and high-speed memory control. Using the ADC of relatively low sampling rate, the periodic pulse waveform is reconstructed with tens of GSPS high equivalent sampling rate by the repetitive sampling utilizing the incremental Vernier time delay. The performance of RES circuit is measured through the operation of TDR. The resolution of the RES circuit is 16.8ps equal to 59.5GSPS sampling rate, which means that the signal waveform in the 66.7\%VOP RG58C/U cable can be sampled by 1.6mm interval.},
eventtitle = {2003 {{IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium}}. {{Conference Record}} ({{IEEE Cat}}. {{No}}.{{03CH37515}})},
keywords = {Clocks,Delay effects,Frequency,Logic circuits,Oscillators,Propagation delay,Pulse circuits,Pulse generation,Sampling methods,Time domain analysis},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2003_Lee et al_A 16ps-resolution Random Equivalent Sampling circuit for TDR utilizing a.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/68D63ZM5/1351912.html}
}
@article{leePrintedSpiralWinding2011a,
title = {Printed {{Spiral Winding Inductor With Wide Frequency Bandwidth}}},
author = {Lee, Chi Kwan and Su, Y. P. and Ron Hui, S. Y.},
date = {2011-10},
@ -2790,7 +2995,7 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WBSKAYAN/Long et al. - 2024 - EM Eye Characterizing Electromagnetic Side-channe.pdf}
}
@article{lopeFirstSelfresonantFrequency2021,
@article{lopeFirstSelfResonant2021,
title = {First Self‐resonant Frequency of Power Inductors Based on Approximated Corrected Stray Capacitances},
author = {Lope, Ignacio and Carretero, Claudio and Acero, Jesus},
date = {2021-02},
@ -2929,6 +3134,44 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FCPRRWEK/Marhoefer et al. - Applicability of Quantum Cryptography for Securing.pdf}
}
@book{markantonakisSecureSmartEmbedded2014,
title = {Secure Smart Embedded Devices, Platforms and Applications},
author = {Markantonakis, Konstantinos and Mayes, Keith},
date = {2014},
publisher = {Springer},
location = {New York, NY Heidelberg},
isbn = {978-1-4614-7914-7 978-1-4614-7915-4},
langid = {english},
pagetotal = {568}
}
@article{markettosActiveElectromagneticAttacks,
title = {Active Electromagnetic Attacks on Secure Hardware},
author = {Markettos, A Theodore},
abstract = {The field of side-channel attacks on cryptographic hardware has been extensively studied. In many cases it is easier to derive the secret key from these attacks than to break the cryptography itself. One such sidechannel attack is the electromagnetic side-channel attack, giving rise to electromagnetic analysis (EMA).},
langid = {english},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/W3QDPN4U/Markettos - Active electromagnetic attacks on secure hardware.pdf}
}
@incollection{martinaOpenHSMOpenKey2007,
title = {{{OpenHSM}}: {{An Open Key Life Cycle Protocol}} for {{Public Key Infrastructure}}’s {{Hardware Security Modules}}},
shorttitle = {{{OpenHSM}}},
booktitle = {Public {{Key Infrastructure}}},
author = {Martina, Jean Everson and family=Souza, given=Tulio Cicero Salvaro, prefix=de, useprefix=true and Custodio, Ricardo Felipe},
editor = {Lopez, Javier and Samarati, Pierangela and Ferrer, Josep L.},
editora = {Hutchison, David and Kanade, Takeo and Kittler, Josef and Kleinberg, Jon M. and Mattern, Friedemann and Mitchell, John C. and Naor, Moni and Nierstrasz, Oscar and Pandu Rangan, C. and Steffen, Bernhard and Sudan, Madhu and Terzopoulos, Demetri and Tygar, Doug and Vardi, Moshe Y. and Weikum, Gerhard},
editoratype = {redactor},
date = {2007},
volume = {4582},
pages = {220--235},
publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-73408-6_16},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-540-73408-6_16},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
isbn = {978-3-540-73407-9 978-3-540-73408-6}
}
@inproceedings{martinMultiturnTwistedInductor2016,
title = {A Multi-Turn Twisted Inductor for on-Chip Cross-Talk Reduction},
booktitle = {2016 {{IEEE International Conference}} on the {{Science}} of {{Electrical Engineering}} ({{ICSEE}})},
@ -3060,6 +3303,24 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/TMI3LX3I/Melara et al. - CONIKS Bringing Key Transparency to End Users.pdf}
}
@video{mikeselectricstuffNeopostPostalFranking2023,
entrysubtype = {video},
title = {Neopost {{Postal Franking Machines}}},
editor = {{mikeselectricstuff}},
editortype = {director},
date = {2023-10-03},
url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eO7AoHI2Tpk},
urldate = {2025-02-17},
abstract = {A look at some machines for printing money... sort of! mikeselectricstuff merch : https://mikeselectricstuff.creator-sp...}
}
@online{MiniaturizedFPGABasedHighResolution,
title = {Miniaturized {{FPGA-Based High-Resolution Time-Domain Reflectometer}} | {{IEEE Journals}} \& {{Magazine}} | {{IEEE Xplore}}},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6484979},
urldate = {2025-03-11},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/KCF63LLU/6484979.html}
}
@inproceedings{mishraFaultsOurBus2024,
title = {Faults in {{Our Bus}}: {{Novel Bus Fault Attack}} to {{Break ARM TrustZone}}},
shorttitle = {Faults in {{Our Bus}}},
@ -3171,6 +3432,23 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EBAXQHG5/Mosavirik et al. - 2022 - ImpedanceVerif On-Chip Impedance Sensing for Syst.pdf}
}
@article{mosavirikImpedanceVerifOnChipImpedance2023,
title = {{{ImpedanceVerif}}: {{On-Chip Impedance Sensing}} for {{System-Level Tampering Detection}}},
shorttitle = {{{ImpedanceVerif}}},
author = {Mosavirik, Tahoura and Schaumont, Patrick and Tajik, Shahin},
date = {2023},
journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems},
pages = {301--325},
issn = {2569-2925},
doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i1.301-325},
url = {https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9954},
urldate = {2025-02-17},
abstract = {Physical attacks can compromise the security of cryptographic devices. Depending on the attack’s requirements, adversaries might need to (i) place probes in the proximity of the integrated circuits (ICs) package, (ii) create physical connections between their probes/wires and the system’s PCB, or (iii) physically tamper with the PCB’s components, chip’s package, or substitute the entire PCB to prepare the device for the attack. While tamper-proof enclosures prevent and detect physical access to the system, their high manufacturing cost and incompatibility with legacy systems make them unattractive for many low-cost scenarios. In this paper, inspired by methods known from the field of power integrity analysis, we demonstrate how the impedance characterization of the system’s power distribution network (PDN) using on-chip circuit-based network analyzers can detect various classes of tamper events. We explain how these embedded network analyzers, without any modifications to the system, can be deployed on FPGAs to extract the frequency response of the PDN. The analysis of these frequency responses reveals different classes of tamper events from board to chip level. To validate our claims, we run an embedded network analyzer on FPGAs of a family of commercial development kits and perform extensive measurements for various classes of PCB and IC package tampering required for conducting different side-channel or fault attacks. Using the Wasserstein Distance as a statistical metric, we further show that we can confidently detect tamper events. Our results, interestingly, show that even environment-level tampering activities, such as the proximity of contactless EM probes to the IC package or slightly polished IC package, can be detected using on-chip impedance sensing.},
langid = {english},
keywords = {Anti-Tamper,PCB Verification,Physical Attacks,Physical Layer Security,Power Distribution Network},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Mosavirik et al_2023_ImpedanceVerif.pdf}
}
@article{mosavirikSiliconEchoesNonInvasive2023,
title = {Silicon {{Echoes}}: {{Non-Invasive Trojan}} and {{Tamper Detection}} Using {{Frequency-Selective Impedance Analysis}}},
shorttitle = {Silicon {{Echoes}}},
@ -3187,7 +3465,7 @@
abstract = {The threat of chip-level tampering and its detection has been widely researched. Hardware Trojan insertions are prominent examples of such tamper events. Altering the placement and routing of a design or removing a part of a circuit for side-channel leakage/fault sensitivity amplification are other instances of such attacks. While semi- and fully-invasive physical verification methods can confidently detect such stealthy tamper events, they are costly, time-consuming, and destructive. On the other hand, virtually all proposed non-invasive side-channel methods suffer from noise and, therefore, have low confidence. Moreover, they require activating the tampered part of the circuit (e.g., the Trojan trigger) to compare and detect the modifications. In this work, we introduce a non-invasive post-silicon tamper detection technique applicable to different classes of tamper events at the chip level without requiring the activation of the malicious circuit. Our method relies on the fact that physical modifications (regardless of their physical, activation, or action characteristics) alter the impedance of the chip. Hence, characterizing the impedance can lead to the detection of the tamper events. To sense the changes in the impedance, we deploy known RF tools, namely, scattering parameters, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies to the power distribution network (PDN) of the system and measure the “echo” of the signal. The reflected signals in various frequency bands reveal different tamper events based on their impact size on the die. To validate our claims, we performed measurements on several proof-ofconcept tampered hardware implementations realized on FPGAs manufactured with a 28 nm technology. We further show that deploying the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance can distinguish between tamper events and noise resulting from manufacturing process variation of different chips/boards. Based on the acquired results, we demonstrate that stealthy hardware Trojans, as well as sophisticated modifications of P\&R, can be detected.},
issue = {4},
langid = {english},
keywords = {Backscattered Side-channel,Hardware Trojans,Impedance Characterization,Physical Layer Security,Scattering Parameters,Tamper Detection},
keywords = {Backscattered Side-channel,Hardware Trojans,Impedance Characterization,Physical Layer Security,sampling-mesh,Scattering Parameters,Tamper Detection},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Mosavirik et al_Silicon Echoes2.pdf}
}
@ -3299,6 +3577,31 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3XBD9Z7V/Murali et al. - 2023 - Continuous Authentication Using Human-Induced Elec.pdf}
}
@article{murtazaPortableHardwareSecurity2022,
title = {A Portable Hardware Security Module and Cryptographic Key Generator},
author = {Murtaza, Malik Hamza and Tahir, Hasan and Tahir, Shahzaib and Alizai, Zahoor Ahmed and Riaz, Qaiser and Hussain, Mehdi},
date = {2022-11-01},
journaltitle = {Journal of Information Security and Applications},
shortjournal = {Journal of Information Security and Applications},
volume = {70},
pages = {103332},
issn = {2214-2126},
doi = {10.1016/j.jisa.2022.103332},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212622001776},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
abstract = {It has been noted with concern that the ability of a password to keep an information system secure is diminishing. Increasingly sophisticated attack vectors and low memorability associated with complicated passwords are among the leading reasons limiting security provisioned by passwords. Cryptographic keys suffer from issues including lack of memorability, vulnerable storage mechanisms, key retrieval attacks, lockouts due to key loss and risk of using the same key for multiple services. This study proposes a novel Hardware Security Module (HSM) as a basis for the generation/ re-creation of cryptographic keys. The designed hardware module entirely eliminates the stored cryptographic keys thus eliminating attacks against stored keys. The HSM derives the cryptographic key from sub-components behaving similar to multi-factor authentication, where each factor is an independent authenticator. The proposed scheme enhances security by incorporating physical security into digital security, i.e. as long as either the crypto provider device remains secure or the human component remains secure, the system security remains intact. The scheme proposes a strategy based on defense in depth to secure the HSM, its user, the related service from attacks ranging from simple shoulder surfing to sophisticated Man-in-the-Middle attacks. The proposed HSM is based on commodity hardware components thus having limited cost implications.},
keywords = {Cryptography,Hardware security module,Key generator,Key-based authentication,Multi factor authentication,Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QP5FG729/S2214212622001776.html}
}
@article{nabilIST2002507932ECRYPTEuropean,
title = {{{IST-2002-507932 ECRYPT European Network}} of {{Excellence}} in {{Cryptology Network}} of {{Excellence Information Society Technologies D}}.{{VAM}}.5 {{Report}} on {{DPA}} and {{EMA}} Attacks on {{FPGAs}}},
author = {Nabil, Mohamed},
url = {https://www.academia.edu/38939774/IST_2002_507932_ECRYPT_European_Network_of_Excellence_in_Cryptology_Network_of_Excellence_Information_Society_Technologies_D_VAM_5_Report_on_DPA_and_EMA_attacks_on_FPGAs},
urldate = {2025-03-13},
abstract = {Project co-funded by the European Commission within the 6th Framework Programme Dissemination Level PU Public X PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission services) RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium}
}
@article{nassiLamphonePassiveSound,
title = {Lamphone: {{Passive Sound Recovery}} from a {{Desk Lamp}}’s {{Light Bulb Vibrations}}},
author = {Nassi, Ben and Pirutin, Yaron and Swissa, Raz and Shamir, Adi and Elovici, Yuval and Zadov, Boris},
@ -3349,6 +3652,21 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FV5RHTLR/global_20220721_01.html}
}
@inproceedings{negreaSequentialSamplingTime2009,
title = {Sequential Sampling Time Domain Reflectometer},
booktitle = {2009 15th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} of {{Electronics Packages}} ({{SIITME}})},
author = {Negrea, Catalin and Rangu, Marius},
date = {2009-09},
pages = {367--371},
doi = {10.1109/SIITME.2009.5407341},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5407341/?arnumber=5407341},
urldate = {2025-03-11},
abstract = {Time domain reflectometry (TDR) is a well-known technique used to detect and characterize impedance discontinuities in transmission lines. Usually the application of this technique employs the usage of a step generator to drive one end of the transmission line and a high speed oscilloscope to visualize the signal reflected at various impedance discontinuities points. This paper presents the design and implementation of an USB-based time domain reflectometer which integrates the functions of both equipments and is intended to be a low cost solution for time domain reflectometry. The acquisition technique used is sequential sampling based on integrated delay lines, giving a time step of 250 [ps] at a total acquisition time of about 2.6 [us]. Sequential sampling is successfully used for high speed sampling oscilloscopes and can be implemented using commercially available components. Unlike similar implementations of the method, our proposal uses internal delay calibration to eliminate the ghost effect which limits the minimum measurable cable length. Also, by comparison with random sampling TDRs, our approach allows an improved control over the acquisition parameters.},
eventtitle = {2009 15th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} of {{Electronics Packages}} ({{SIITME}})},
keywords = {Cost function,Drives,Impedance,Oscilloscopes,Reflectometry,Sampling methods,Signal generators,Transmission line discontinuities,Transmission lines,Visualization},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2009_Negrea_Rangu_Sequential sampling time domain reflectometer.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/NDQTGESM/5407341.html}
}
@online{nelsonLittleHelpMy2022,
title = {With a {{Little Help}} from {{My Friends}}: {{Transport Deniability}} for {{Instant Messaging}}},
shorttitle = {With a {{Little Help}} from {{My Friends}}},
@ -3528,6 +3846,32 @@
keywords = {twisted-inductors}
}
@book{nsaHistoryUSCommunications1973,
title = {A {{History}} of {{U}}.{{S}}. {{Communications Security}} ({{The David G}}. {{Boak Lectures}}), {{Volume I}}},
author = {{NSA}},
namea = {{Michael Best}},
nameatype = {collaborator},
date = {1973},
url = {http://archive.org/details/history_comsec-nsa},
urldate = {2025-02-18},
langid = {english},
keywords = {NSA},
annotation = {2015 re-declassified version contains more material}
}
@book{nsaHistoryUSCommunications1981,
title = {A {{History}} of {{U}}.{{S}}. {{Communications Security}} ({{The David G}}. {{Boak Lecture}}), {{Volume II}}},
author = {{NSA}},
namea = {{Michael Best}},
nameatype = {collaborator},
date = {1981},
url = {http://archive.org/details/history_comsec_ii-nsa},
urldate = {2025-02-18},
langid = {english},
keywords = {NSA},
annotation = {2015 re-declassified version contains more material}
}
@article{obermaierBreakingRestoringEmbedded,
title = {Breaking and {{Restoring Embedded System Security}} - {{From Practical Attacks}} to {{Novel PUF-Based Physical Security Enclosures}}},
author = {Obermaier, Johannes},
@ -3800,6 +4144,33 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MJR5J958/Coil Winding.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{quisquaterElectroMagneticAnalysisEMA2001,
title = {{{ElectroMagnetic Analysis}} ({{EMA}}): {{Measures}} and {{Counter-measures}} for {{Smart Cards}}},
shorttitle = {{{ElectroMagnetic Analysis}} ({{EMA}})},
booktitle = {Smart {{Card Programming}} and {{Security}}},
author = {Quisquater, Jean-Jacques and Samyde, David},
editor = {Attali, Isabelle and Jensen, Thomas},
date = {2001},
pages = {200--210},
publisher = {Springer},
location = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
doi = {10.1007/3-540-45418-7_17},
abstract = {A processor can leak information by different ways [1], electromagnetic radiations could be one of them. This idea, was first introduced by Kocher, with timing and power measurements. Here we developed the continuation of his ideas by measuring the field radiated by the processor. Therefore we show that the electromagnetic attack obtains at least the same result as power consumption and consequently must be carefuly taken into account. Finally we enumerate countermeasures to be implemented.},
isbn = {978-3-540-45418-2},
langid = {english},
keywords = {DEMA,DPA,electromagnetic and power analysis,SEMA,smartcard,SPA,tamper resistance},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Quisquater_Samyde_2001_ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA).pdf}
}
@article{rahmanComprehensiveSurveyHardwareSoftware,
title = {A {{Comprehensive Survey}} on {{Hardware-Software}} Co-{{Protection}} against {{Invasive}}, {{Non-Invasive}} and {{Interactive Security Threats}}},
author = {Rahman, Habibur},
abstract = {In the face of escalating security threats in modern computing systems, there is an urgent need for comprehensive defense mechanisms that can effectively mitigate invasive, noninvasive and interactive security vulnerabilities in hardware and software domains. Individually, hardware and software weaknesses and probable remedies have been practiced but protecting a combined system has not yet been discussed in detail. This survey paper provides a comprehensive overview of the emerging field of Hardware-Software co-Protection against Invasive and Non-Invasive Security Threats. We systematically review state-of-the-art research and developments in hardware and software security techniques, focusing on their integration to create synergistic defense mechanisms. The survey covers a wide range of security threats, including physical attacks, side-channel attacks, and malware exploits, and explores the diverse strategies employed to counter them. Our survey meticulously examines the landscape of security vulnerabilities, encompassing both physical and software-based attack vectors, and explores the intricate interplay between hardware and software defenses in mitigating these threats.Furthermore, we discuss the challenges and opportunities associated with Hardware-Software co-Protection and identify future research directions to advance the field. Through this survey, we aim to provide researchers, practitioners, and policymakers with valuable insights into the latest advancements and best practices for defending against complex security threats in modern computing environments.},
langid = {english},
keywords = {sampling-mesh},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EKJ87EQG/Rahman - A Comprehensive Survey on Hardware-Software co-Pro.pdf}
}
@article{RenesasRA6T1Group,
title = {Renesas {{RA6T1 Group User}}'s {{Manual}}: {{Hardware}}},
langid = {english},
@ -4001,6 +4372,24 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LYZND7TS/Saeif et al. - 2023 - The Day-After-Tomorrow On the Performance of Radi.pdf}
}
@article{samiAdvancingTrustworthinessSysteminPackage2024,
title = {Advancing {{Trustworthiness}} in {{System-in-Package}}: {{A Novel Root-of-Trust Hardware Security Module}} for {{Heterogeneous Integration}}},
shorttitle = {Advancing {{Trustworthiness}} in {{System-in-Package}}},
author = {Sami, Md Sami Ul Islam and Zhang, Tao and Shuvo, Amit Mazumder and Haque, Md Saad Ul and Calzada, Paul E. and Azar, Kimia Zamiri and Kamali, Hadi Mardani and Rahman, Fahim and Farahmandi, Farimah and Tehranipoor, Mark},
date = {2024},
journaltitle = {IEEE Access},
volume = {12},
pages = {48081--48107},
issn = {2169-3536},
doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3375874},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10466542/?arnumber=10466542},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
abstract = {The semiconductor industry has adopted heterogeneous integration (HI), incorporating modular intellectual property (IP) blocks (chiplets) into a unified system-in-package (SiP) to overcome the slowdown in Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling and to respond to the increasing demand for advanced integrated circuits (ICs). Despite the manifold benefits of HI, such as enhanced performance, reduced area overhead, and improved yield, this transformation has also led to security vulnerabilities in the SiP supply chain and in-field operations, ranging from chiplet piracy and SiP reverse engineering (RE) to information leakage. Although conventional countermeasures provide the desired robustness for monolithic ICs, they are insufficient for addressing these challenges in the context of HI. To address these concerns, this paper presents a novel root-of-trust architecture, augmenting the process of integration using a centralized chiplet hardware security module (CHSM), aiming to provide comprehensive and robust protection throughout the SiP supply chain and in-field operations. Also, the proposed architecture equipped with the CHSM effectively addresses potential security breaches while providing robust protection against zero-day attacks through its reconfigurable capabilities. Throughout five detailed case studies, this paper performs a comprehensive security analysis to illustrate the resilience of CHSM against contemporary attack scenarios in the HI domain.},
eventtitle = {{{IEEE Access}}},
keywords = {chiplet,Hardware security,hardware security module,Heterogeneous integration,Information leakage,Intellectual property,Multichip modules,Packaging,packaging technology,Reverse engineering,Security management,Semiconductor device manufacture,SiP security,Supply chain management,supply chain security,system-in-package,System-in-package,Trust management,vulnerability mitigation},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Sami et al_2024_Advancing Trustworthiness in System-in-Package.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CHJP67V4/10466542.html}
}
@article{sasakiQuantumNetworksWhere2017,
title = {Quantum Networks: Where Should We Be Heading?},
shorttitle = {Quantum Networks},
@ -4018,6 +4407,25 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Sasaki_2017_Quantum networks.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{satoToucheEnhancingTouch2012,
title = {Touché: Enhancing Touch Interaction on Humans, Screens, Liquids, and Everyday Objects},
shorttitle = {Touché},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the {{SIGCHI Conference}} on {{Human Factors}} in {{Computing Systems}}},
author = {Sato, Munehiko and Poupyrev, Ivan and Harrison, Chris},
date = {2012-05-05},
pages = {483--492},
publisher = {ACM},
location = {Austin Texas USA},
doi = {10.1145/2207676.2207743},
url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2207676.2207743},
urldate = {2025-03-10},
abstract = {Touché proposes a novel Swept Frequency Capacitive Sensing technique that can not only detect a touch event, but also recognize complex configurations of the human hands and body. Such contextual information significantly enhances touch interaction in a broad range of applications, from conventional touchscreens to unique contexts and materials. For example, in our explorations we add touch and gesture sensitivity to the human body and liquids. We demonstrate the rich capabilities of Touché with five example setups from different application domains and conduct experimental studies that show gesture classification accuracies of 99\% are achievable with our technology.},
eventtitle = {{{CHI}} '12: {{CHI Conference}} on {{Human Factors}} in {{Computing Systems}}},
isbn = {978-1-4503-1015-4},
langid = {english},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/544SAJVE/Sato et al. - 2012 - Touché enhancing touch interaction on humans, scr.pdf}
}
@article{schermerImprovedBendLoss2007,
title = {Improved {{Bend Loss Formula Verified}} for {{Optical Fiber}} by {{Simulation}} and {{Experiment}}},
author = {Schermer, Ross T. and Cole, James H.},
@ -4129,6 +4537,24 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2024_Sen et al_Origami Inductor.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/35VMZ29J/10462531.html}
}
@article{seolTrustedIaaSEnvironment2016,
title = {A {{Trusted IaaS Environment}} with {{Hardware Security Module}}},
author = {Seol, Jinho and Jin, Seongwook and Lee, Daewoo and Huh, Jaehyuk and Maeng, Seungryoul},
date = {2016-05},
journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Services Computing},
volume = {9},
number = {3},
pages = {343--356},
issn = {1939-1374},
doi = {10.1109/TSC.2015.2392099},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7010017/?arnumber=7010017&tag=1},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
abstract = {With the proliferation of cloud computing, security concerns about confidentiality violations of user data by the privileged domain and system administrators have been growing. This paper proposes secure cloud architecture with a hardware security module, which isolates cloud user data from potentially malicious privileged domains or cloud administrators. Within a securely isolated execution environment, the hardware security module provides essential security functionality with only restricted interfaces exposed to vulnerable management systems or cloud administrators. Such restriction prevents cloud administrators from affecting the security of guest VMs. The proposed architecture not only defends against wide attack vectors but also achieves a small TCB. This paper discusses our hardware and software implementation of the proposed cloud architecture, analyzes its security, and presents its performance results.},
eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Services Computing}}},
keywords = {Cloud computing,Computer architecture,Cryptography,Hardware,hardware security module,Hardware Security Module,Protocols,security,TCB},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Seol et al_2016_A Trusted IaaS Environment with Hardware Security Module.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/ZFNE2NAZ/7010017.html}
}
@article{shenDAENetMakingStrong2022,
title = {{{DAENet}}: {{Making Strong Anonymity Scale}} in a {{Fully Decentralized Network}}},
shorttitle = {{{DAENet}}},
@ -4414,22 +4840,6 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XURXLX9C/Takeoka et al. - 2014 - Fundamental rate-loss tradeoff for optical quantum.pdf}
}
@incollection{TamperResistance2020,
title = {Tamper {{Resistance}}},
booktitle = {Security {{Engineering}}},
date = {2020},
pages = {599--637},
publisher = {John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd},
doi = {10.1002/9781119644682.ch18},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781119644682.ch18},
urldate = {2024-12-03},
abstract = {The security engineer needs to understand what tamper resistance is, and what it can and can't do. In this chapter, the author takes the reader through the past thirty years of evolution of attack and defence. The banking community realised that commercial operating systems were likely to remain insufficient to protect PINs, particularly from bank insiders, and decided to use separate hardware to manage them. This led to the development of standalone cryptographic modules or hardware security modules (HSMs). The chapter provides a few comments about the evaluation of HSMs. Each of the product categories discussed in this chapter, from HSMs down through FPGAs to smartcards, has a wide range of offerings with wide variability in the quality of protection. The security engineer will therefore have to pay attention to the many failure modes of systems involving tamper-resistant processors that are more or less independent of the price or technical tamper-resistance of the device.},
isbn = {978-1-119-64468-2},
langid = {english},
keywords = {banking community,FPGAs,hardware security modules,security engineer,smartcards,tamper resistance},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Tamper Resistance.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EMWJABZF/9781119644682.html}
}
@incollection{TamperResistance2020a,
title = {Tamper {{Resistance}}},
booktitle = {Security {{Engineering}}},
@ -4443,7 +4853,7 @@
isbn = {978-1-119-64468-2},
langid = {english},
keywords = {banking community,FPGAs,hardware security modules,security engineer,smartcards,tamper resistance},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/DSFCQBZB/9781119644682.html}
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Tamper Resistance.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EMWJABZF/9781119644682.html}
}
@article{tangMeasurementDeviceIndependentQuantumKey2016,
@ -4492,6 +4902,20 @@
urldate = {2024-09-19}
}
@book{tehranipoorIntroductionHardwareSecurity2012,
title = {Introduction to {{Hardware Security}} and {{Trust}}},
editor = {Tehranipoor, Mohammad and Wang, Cliff},
date = {2012},
publisher = {Springer New York},
location = {New York, NY},
doi = {10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9},
url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
isbn = {978-1-4419-8079-3 978-1-4419-8080-9},
langid = {english},
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QX3DYZC3/Tehranipoor and Wang - 2012 - Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust.pdf}
}
@article{tobischPhysicalSystemsIntegrity,
title = {Physical Systems for Integrity Protection and Authentication},
author = {Tobisch, Johannes},
@ -4550,7 +4974,7 @@
urldate = {2024-07-25},
abstract = {Tamper detection circuits provide the first and most important defensive wall in protecting electronic modules containing security data. A widely used procedure is to cover the entire module with a foil containing fine conductive mesh, which detects intrusion attempts. Detection circuits are further classified as passive or active. Passive circuits have the advantage of low power consumption, however they are unable to detect small variations in the conductive mesh parameters. Since modern tools provide an upper leverage over the passive method, the most efficient way to protect security modules is thus to use active circuits. The active tamper detection circuits are typically probing the conductive mesh with short pulses, analyzing its response in terms of delay and shape. The method proposed in this paper generates short pulses at one end of the mesh and analyzes the response at the other end. Apart from measuring pulse delay, the analysis includes a frequency domain characterization of the system, determining whether there has been an intrusion or not, by comparing it to a reference (un-tampered with) spectrum. The novelty of this design is the combined analysis, in time and frequency domains, of the small variations in mesh characteristic parameters.},
eventtitle = {2017 40th {{International Spring Seminar}} on {{Electronics Technology}} ({{ISSE}})},
keywords = {Clocks,Delays,Frequency-domain analysis,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,Security,Shape},
keywords = {Clocks,Delays,Frequency-domain analysis,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,sampling-mesh,Security,Shape},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Vasile et al_Active tamper detection circuit based on the analysis of pulse response in2.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CY2XYJWB/8000987.html}
}
@ -4565,10 +4989,27 @@
urldate = {2024-07-25},
abstract = {The paper presents an improved method to detect tamper intrusions based on an active circuit. It is composed of a logical part, a microcontroller, capable of generating pulses that follow the rule of a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), and an analogical part made of a mesh network, used to cover secure modules, and a pulse forming circuit. Pulses resulted from this forming circuit are analyzed by the microcontroller to determine the durations between pulses and the durations of pulses. The novelty of this method is that the pulses are generated synchronously at both ends of the mesh network in order to prevent any attempts of an attacker to break the wire of the mesh network and to simulate the generation of pulses.},
eventtitle = {2016 {{IEEE}} 22nd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
keywords = {active,Copper,Delays,Generators,LFSR,mesh,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,Pins,Resistance,security,tamper},
keywords = {active,Copper,Delays,Generators,LFSR,mesh,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,Pins,Resistance,sampling-mesh,security,tamper},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2016_Vasile et al_Improved tamper detection circuit based on linear-feedback shift register.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RRHPBYLR/7777261.html}
}
@inproceedings{vasileProtectingSecretsAdvanced2019,
title = {Protecting the {{Secrets}}: {{Advanced Technique}} for {{Active Tamper Detection Systems}}},
shorttitle = {Protecting the {{Secrets}}},
booktitle = {2019 {{IEEE}} 25th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
author = {Vasile, Daniel-Ciprian and Svasta, Paul},
date = {2019-10},
pages = {212--215},
issn = {2642-7036},
doi = {10.1109/SIITME47687.2019.8990877},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8990877/?arnumber=8990877},
urldate = {2024-12-13},
abstract = {Cryptographic modules and security circuits are the kernels of every piece of equipment that process security data. No matter where they are deployed, the equipment must be protected against physical attacks, as no one can access the electronic circuits that process the security data: firmware implementations, cryptographic keys and secret data. The most effective way to protect this kind of electronic circuits is to wrap them in a special conductive mesh and probe it with proper signals in order to detect intrusions. This paper provides a complete solution for intrusions detection: a system made of a special conductive mesh and an active tamper detection circuit. The conductive mesh consists of three layers that detect intrusions earlier than the effective penetration of the mesh. The active tamper detection circuit is designed to probe the mesh with signals that cannot be emulated by an adversary.},
eventtitle = {2019 {{IEEE}} 25th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
keywords = {anti-tamper,cryptography,mesh,security},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Vasile_Svasta_2019_Protecting the Secrets.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/TBDMU8PT/8990877.html}
}
@inproceedings{vasileTemperatureSensitiveActive2017,
title = {Temperature Sensitive Active Tamper Detection Circuit},
booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE}} 23rd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
@ -4580,10 +5021,28 @@
urldate = {2024-12-12},
abstract = {Electronic modules designed for processing sensitive data, such as cryptographic modules, firmware solutions protected by intellectual property rights and secure communication devices, use special circuits designed for protecting these solutions from unauthorized physical access. The main components of these circuits are the conductive mesh structure, which acts as a protective cover, and the active tamper detection circuit. Besides the physical attacks, there are side channel attacks, where an attacker takes advantage of the errors produced by the logic circuits functioning in extreme conditions. When logic circuits are subject of temperatures that exceed the operational limits, they may run with faults and create proper conditions for cryptographic attacks. This paper proposes an active tamper detection circuit that analyses the temperature (and its variation gradient) of the conductive mesh. This method improves and complements the protection functions of the active tamper detection circuits.},
eventtitle = {2017 {{IEEE}} 23rd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})},
keywords = {active,Cryptography,Electronic circuits,Ports (Computers),Program processors,security,tamper,temperature,Temperature distribution,Temperature measurement,Temperature sensors},
keywords = {active,Cryptography,Electronic circuits,Ports (Computers),Program processors,sampling-mesh,security,tamper,temperature,Temperature distribution,Temperature measurement,Temperature sensors},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Vasile_Svasta_2017_Temperature sensitive active tamper detection circuit.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RDC8GN3K/8259885.html}
}
@article{vidakovicHardwareBasedMethodsElectronic2023,
title = {Hardware-{{Based Methods}} for {{Electronic Device Protection}} against {{Invasive}} and {{Non-Invasive Attacks}}},
author = {Vidaković, Marin and Vinko, Davor},
date = {2023-11-02},
journaltitle = {Electronics},
shortjournal = {Electronics},
volume = {12},
number = {21},
pages = {4507},
issn = {2079-9292},
doi = {10.3390/electronics12214507},
url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/12/21/4507},
urldate = {2025-03-21},
abstract = {This paper reviews hardware-based protection methods for electronic devices, encompassing scientific publications and published patents. This review covers insights from the scientific community and innovative solutions patented in the industry. By combining these two sources, this paper offers a comprehensive and holistic review of electronic device security. Electronic devices are integral to modern life, but their widespread use invites security threats, both digital and physical. This paper reviews hardware-based protection methods against invasive and non-invasive attacks, emphasizing the importance of a dual approach through hardware design. Invasive attacks involve physical tampering, and we explore anti-tampering techniques such as conductive meshes, sensors and physically unclonable functions (PUFs). Non-invasive, side-channel attacks encompass various attack vectors, focusing on electromagnetic analysis. To counter these attacks, we analyze techniques like reducing and masking electromagnetic radiation. This paper bridges the gap between invasive and non-invasive attack mitigation. It underscores the necessity of a multifaceted approach to safeguard electronic devices in an interconnected world, preserving their reliability and functionality.},
langid = {english},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Vidaković_Vinko_2023_Hardware-Based Methods for Electronic Device Protection against Invasive and.pdf}
}
@inproceedings{voloshynovskiyInformationtheoreticAnalysisElectronic2006,
title = {Information-Theoretic Analysis of Electronic and Printed Document Authentication},
author = {Voloshynovskiy, Sviatoslav and Koval, Oleksiy and Villan, Renato and Topak, Emre and Vila Forcén, José Emilio and Deguillaume, Frederic and Rytsar, Yuriy and Pun, Thierry},
@ -4847,6 +5306,24 @@
file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2D23R8P8/Werner et al. - 2017 - Transparent memory encryption and authentication.pdf}
}
@article{wheelerTransmissionLinePropertiesParallel1965,
title = {Transmission-{{Line Properties}} of {{Parallel Strips Separated}} by a {{Dielectric Sheet}}},
author = {Wheeler, H.A.},
date = {1965-03},
journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques},
volume = {13},
number = {2},
pages = {172--185},
issn = {1557-9670},
doi = {10.1109/TMTT.1965.1125962},
url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1125962/?arnumber=1125962},
urldate = {2025-04-02},
abstract = {A transmission line is made of a symmetrical pair of strip conductors, or a single strip and a ground plane, on opposite faces of a sheet of dielectric material. There is computed, to a close approximation, the relations among the dielectric constant of the sheet, the effective dielectric constant of the sheet and the empty space, the shape ratio, and the wave resistance, for the entire range of possible values. These relations are summarized in a graphical chart covering the range of practical interest. The computation is based on conformal mapping of the dielectric boundary on coordinates such that its effect can be most closely evaluated by simple principles. All relations are approximated in terms of ordinary functions (exponential and hyperbolic). Of particular interest is the effective filling fraction of the dielectric material, which depends mainly on the shape ratio and only slightly on the dielectric constant. Explicit formulas are given for analysis or synthesis.},
eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Microwave Theory}} and {{Techniques}}},
keywords = {Conducting materials,Conformal mapping,Dielectric constant,Dielectric materials,Filling,Shape,Sheet materials,Strips,Transmission line theory,Transmission lines},
file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1965_Wheeler_Transmission-Line Properties of Parallel Strips Separated by a Dielectric Sheet.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/J6YQL49I/1125962.html}
}
@book{wiggeRundfunktechnischesHandbuch1930,
title = {Rundfunktechnisches {{Handbuch}}},
author = {Wigge, Heinrich},

104
paper/paper.tex
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@ -517,6 +517,110 @@ content such that it was still able to turn on the sampling gate's diode bridge
\label{tab_edge_risetime}
\end{table}
\begin{table}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{r|cccc}
\textbf{Specimen}
&1
&2
&3
&4\\\hline
\textbf{Trace width}&
\qty{150}{\micro\meter}&
\qty{200}{\micro\meter}&
\qty{300}{\micro\meter}&
\qty{500}{\micro\meter}\\
\textbf{Trace spacing}&
\qty{150}{\micro\meter}&
\qty{200}{\micro\meter}&
\qty{300}{\micro\meter}&
\qty{500}{\micro\meter}\\
\textbf{Trace pitch}&
\qty{300}{\micro\meter}&
\qty{400}{\micro\meter}&
\qty{600}{\micro\meter}&
\qty{1.00}{\milli\meter}\\\hline
\textbf{Trace length}&
\qty{1.07}{\meter}&
\qty{1.93}{\meter}&
\qty{2.86}{\meter}&
\qty{3.86}{\meter}\\
\textbf{Approximate Delay}&
\qty{7.1}{\nano\second}&
\qty{13}{\nano\second}&
\qty{19}{\nano\second}&
\qty{26}{\nano\second}\\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\caption{Specifications of mesh test specimens used in the experiments in this paper. All four speciments were
placed on a single, four-layer, \qty{1.0}{\milli\meter} thickness PCB. The meshes were placed two per side on the
outer layers, and the inner layers were used as ground. Approximate signal delays were calculated using wave
velocity $v=\frac{c}{\sqrt{\epsilon_r}}\approx\frac{c}{2}$\cite{wheelerTransmissionLinePropertiesParallel1965}
assuming $\epsilon_r\approx 4$\cite{mumbyDielectricPropertiesFR41989} for the test specimens' FR-4 substrate.}
\label{tab_mesh_spec}
\end{table}
\begin{table}
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{r|cccc|cc}
&\multicolumn{4}{c|}{Specimen}&\multicolumn{2}{c}{Fit}\\
&
1&
2&
3&
4&
$c$&
$\Delta t$
\\\hline
\texttt{PI3HDX12211}&
\qty{16.9}{\nano\second}&
\qty{26.0}{\nano\second}&
\qty{36.4}{\nano\second}&
\qty{46.1}{\nano\second}&
$\qty{1.90d8}{\meter\per\second}$&
$\qty{5.74}{\nano\second}$
\\
\texttt{74LVC1G157}&
\qty{17.1}{\nano\second}&
\qty{26.4}{\nano\second}&
\qty{36.6}{\nano\second}&
\qty{48.2}{\nano\second}&
$\qty{1.80d8}{\meter\per\second}$&
$\qty{5.01}{\nano\second}$
\\
\texttt{MAX3748}&
\qty{17.2}{\nano\second}&
\qty{26.4}{\nano\second}&
\qty{36.6}{\nano\second}&
\qty{45.6}{\nano\second}&
$\qty{1.95d8}{\meter\per\second}$&
$\qty{6.50}{\nano\second}$
\\
\texttt{TDP0604}&
\qty{17.0}{\nano\second}&
\qty{26.2}{\nano\second}&
\qty{36.5}{\nano\second}&
\qty{45.8}{\nano\second}&
$\qty{1.92d8}{\meter\per\second}$&
$\qty{6.01}{\nano\second}$
\\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\caption{Speed of light and time offset calculated from delays read from the graphs in Figure\
\ref{fig_mesh_length}. $c$ is the speed of light determined by linear fit. $\Delta t$ is a residual time offset
common to all four mesh measurements.}
\label{tab_speed_of_light}
\end{table}
\begin{figure}
\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig_mesh_length.pdf}

2
paper/version.tex
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@ -1 +1 @@
v-spectrum-measurements-20-gbb5d784

116
risetime_measurements/Speed of Light.ipynb Normal file
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119
risetime_measurements/Traces.ipynb
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2
sampling-mesh-monitor/sampling-mesh-monitor.kicad_prl
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@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
"conflict_shadows",
"shapes"
],
"visible_layers": "00001000_fffffaa5",
"visible_layers": "00000000_00000000_00001000_fffffaa5",
"zone_display_mode": 0
},
"git": {

2
uut_meshes_density/uut_meshes.kicad_prl
View file

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
"conflict_shadows",
"shapes"
],
"visible_layers": "0ffcf3ff_ffffffff",
"visible_layers": "00000000_00000000_0ffcf3ff_ffffffff",
"zone_display_mode": 0
},
"git": {