More detail on attacks, future work
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After Width: | Height: | Size: 20 KiB |
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@ -488,19 +488,44 @@ In the sections below, we will go into detail on such attacks on IHSMs. To put t
|
|||
we will start with a brief overview on attacks on conventional HSMs that the IHSM is defended against.
|
||||
%FIXME \paragraph{...}
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Contactless probing of the payload}
|
||||
In principle, there are three ways to attack a conventional HSM. The hard way is to find a way to go through the
|
||||
security mesh without triggering the alarm, e.g.\ by using a probe that is finer than the mesh's structure size. An
|
||||
attacker willing to invest some effort can also try to uncover the mesh traces buried in plastic to then hot-wire the
|
||||
mesh, bridging over a part that will subsequently be removed. HSMs attempt to detect such attacks by measuring the mesh
|
||||
traces' resistance instead of only checking their continuity~\cite{obermaier2019}. However, if an attacker only wishes
|
||||
to disable a small section of the mesh to insert a handful of fine probes into the device, this hardening approach
|
||||
becomes challenging. Consider a mesh is covering an area of $\SI{100}{\milli\meter}$ by $\SI{100}{\milli\meter}$. An
|
||||
attacker who circumvents a $\SI{5}{\milli\meter}$ by $\SI{5}{\milli\meter}$ section of this mesh using wires with a low
|
||||
resistance will change the mesh trace's resistance by approximately
|
||||
$\frac{\SI{5}{\milli\meter}\cdot\SI{5}{\milli\meter}}{\SI{100}{\milli\meter}\cdot\SI{100}{\milli\meter}} = 0.25
|
||||
\%$. Detecting this change would require a resistance measurement of at least $\SI{9}{bit}$ of precision and
|
||||
corresponding temperature stability of the mesh material.
|
||||
|
||||
Irrespective of the HSM's technology (conventional or IHSM), there are some types of attack bypassing the HSM's security
|
||||
mesh that in principle cannot be prevented. One such type are contactless attacks such as electromagnetic (EM)
|
||||
sidechannel attacks, but attacks through the HSM's application interface such as Ethernet also follow this theme. While
|
||||
IHSMs allow for the use of off-the-shelf server hardware as their payload, the combination of payload hardware and the
|
||||
software running on top of this hardware still has to be evaluated for fitness in this particular application. EM
|
||||
sidechannel attacks can be mitigated by shielding and by designing the IHSM's payload such that critical components such
|
||||
as CPUs are physically distant to the security mesh, preventing EM probes from being brought close. Conducted EMI
|
||||
sidechannels that could be used for power analysis can be mitigated by placing filters on the inside of the security
|
||||
mesh at the point where the power and network connections penetrate the mesh. Attacks through the network interface must
|
||||
be prevented as in any other networked system by only exposing the minimum necessary amount of API surface to the
|
||||
outside world, and by carefully vetting this remaining attack surface.
|
||||
The second way to attack a HSM is to go \emph{around} the mesh. Many commercial HSMs sandwich the payload PCB between
|
||||
two mesh-equipped enclosure halves. This design in particular is vulnerable to attempts to stick a fine needle through
|
||||
the interface between mesh lid and PCB. Conventional HSMs mitigate this weak spot by wrapping a patterned conductive
|
||||
foil that forms the security mesh around the HSM, leaving only the foil's corners and the payload's power and data
|
||||
feed-through as potential weak spots.
|
||||
|
||||
The third and last way to attack a conventional HSM is to disable the mesh monitoring circuit~\cite{dexter2015}. An
|
||||
attacker may need to insert several probes to wiretap the payload processor's secrets, but depending on its
|
||||
implementation they may be able to disable the mesh alarm circuit with only one. To harden a conventional HSM against
|
||||
this type of attack, the mesh monitoring circuit must be carefully designed to avoid single points of failure as well as
|
||||
any fail-open failure modes.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Attacks that work on any HSM}
|
||||
|
||||
While an IHSM provides an effective mitigation against direct attacks on the security mesh as described in the previous
|
||||
paragraphs, certain attacks are generic against any HSM technology, conventional or IHSM. One type of such attacks are
|
||||
contactless attacks such as electromagnetic (EM) sidechannel attacks. EM sidechannel attacks can be mitigated by
|
||||
shielding and by designing the IHSM's payload such that critical components such as CPUs are physically distant to the
|
||||
security mesh, preventing EM probes from being brought close. Conducted EMI sidechannels that could be used for power
|
||||
analysis can be mitigated by placing filters on the inside of the security mesh at the point where the power and network
|
||||
connections penetrate the
|
||||
mesh~\cite{anderson2020}.
|
||||
Finally, the API between the HSM's payload and the outside world provides attack surface. Attacks through the network
|
||||
interface must be prevented as in any other networked system by only exposing the minimum necessary amount of API
|
||||
surface to the outside world, and by carefully vetting this remaining attack surface~\cite{anderson2020}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{The Swivel Chair Attack}
|
||||
\label{sec_swivel_chair_attack}
|
||||
|
|
@ -520,6 +545,41 @@ acceleration is $a=\omega^2 r$. In our example this results in a minimum angular
|
|||
$\SI{1000}{rpm}$ and above, a manual attack is no longer possible and any attack would have to be carried out using some
|
||||
kind of mechanical tool.
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{figure}
|
||||
\center
|
||||
\includegraphics[width=6cm]{attack-robot.pdf}
|
||||
\caption{Schematic overview of a robotic rotating-stage attack. An optical sensor (1) observes the IHSM's rotation
|
||||
and adjusts the setpoint of a servo motor (2) that rotates the attack stage (3). On the rotating attack stage, a
|
||||
remote controlled manipulator (4) is mounted that deactivates the security mesh (7) and creates an opening (5).
|
||||
Through this opening, a human operator can then insert tools such as probes to read out sensitive information from
|
||||
the actual payload (6).}
|
||||
\label{fig_attack_robot}
|
||||
\end{figure}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
While it is certainly possible to create a mechanical tool to attack an IHSM in motion, we also consider this attack
|
||||
method reasonably remote. Figure~\ref{fig_attack_robot} shows a schematic overview of what such an attack tool would
|
||||
have to look like. Most fundamentally, the tool itself has to rotate at the IHSM's speed, and cannot simply rotate the
|
||||
IHSM. If the tool were to counter-rotate the IHSM such that relative to a stationary observer the rotor would be slowed
|
||||
down, the accelerometer on the rotor would measure lower centrifugal acceleration and detect this attempt. Instead, the
|
||||
attack tool has to follow the rotation of the IHSM. At the high speeds an IHSM would be rotating at, following the
|
||||
rotation closely enough that a manipulator mounted on the attack tool is stationary w.r.t.\ the IHSM is not easy. To
|
||||
stay within $\pm\SI{5}{\milli\meter}$ of a target over a period of $\SI{10}{\second}$ on an IHSM mesh with radius
|
||||
$r=\SI{100}{\milli\meter}$ requires both speeds to be matched to better than
|
||||
$\frac{\SI{5}{\milli\meter}}{\SI{10}{\second}} \cdot \frac{1}{2\pi r} = \SI{8.0}{\milli\hertz} = \SI{0.048}{rpm}$.
|
||||
Relative to a realsistic IHSM's speed of $\SI{1000}{rpm}$ this corresponds to approximately $\SI{50}{ppm}$. Active servo
|
||||
control of the attack tool's rotation locked against optical tracking of the IHSM's rotor would likely be the most
|
||||
realistic option to achieve this precision. This strict accuracy requirement leads to a complex attack setup.
|
||||
|
||||
If an attacker were to solve the tracking issue, the remaining issue is that they still need to construct a
|
||||
remote-controlled manipulator that can be mounted on the attack tool's rotating stage and that is able to actually
|
||||
disable the IHSM's mesh. Consider that simply bypassing the mesh e.g. by drilling an undetected hole does not gain an
|
||||
attacker much in this scenario, as the payload is stationary and an attack tool rotating at $\SI{1000}{rpm}$ is useless
|
||||
against it. Instead, the attacker would have to disable the mesh using the rotating tool, in order to then cut an
|
||||
opening into it through which they could insert a stationary tool to attack the payload with. Given the degree of manual
|
||||
skill necessary even for normal soldering work, we estimate that creating a remote-controllable manipulator that can be
|
||||
used to successfully attack a security mesh is infeasible.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Mechanical weak spots}
|
||||
|
||||
The tamper defense of an IHSM rests on the security mesh moving too fast to tamper. Depending on the type of motion
|
||||
|
|
@ -864,12 +924,16 @@ allow the construction of devices secure against a wide range of practical attac
|
|||
specialized tools. The rotating mesh allows longitudinal gaps, which enables new applications that are impossible with
|
||||
traditional HSMs. Such gaps can be used to integrate a fan for air cooling into the HSM, allowing the use of powerful
|
||||
computing hardware inside the HSM. We hope that this simple construction will stimulate academic research into (more)
|
||||
secure hardware.
|
||||
secure hardware. We have published all design artifacts of our PoC online, see Appendix~\ref{sec_repo}. The next steps
|
||||
towards a practical application of our design will be to design a manufacturable stator/rotor interface with inductive
|
||||
power and data transfer integrated into the motor's magnetics and a custom motor driver tuned for the application that
|
||||
is able to precisely measure both angular velocity and winding current for an added degree of tamper detection.
|
||||
|
||||
\printbibliography[heading=bibintoc]
|
||||
|
||||
\appendix
|
||||
\section{Source code and Design artifacts}
|
||||
\section{Source code and design artifacts}
|
||||
\label{sec_repo}
|
||||
|
||||
During our research on this paper, we have created a number of digital design artifacts including a 3D mechanical CAD
|
||||
model of our prototype IHSM, schematics and PCB layouts for all of its PCBs including the prototype security mesh
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue