Add comparison commercial conventional HSM / laptop, resources appendix
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@ -400,4 +400,13 @@
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urldate = {2021-07-08},
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urldate = {2021-07-08},
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}
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}
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@WWW{thales2021,
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author = {Thales Group},
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publisher = {Thales Group},
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title = {Thales Luna HSM Product Family Overview Page},
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url = {https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/encryption/hardware-security-modules/network-hsms},
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urldate = {2021-07-08},
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date = {2021},
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}
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@Comment{jabref-meta: databaseType:biblatex;}
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@Comment{jabref-meta: databaseType:biblatex;}
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@ -370,6 +370,12 @@ Given that for modern high core-count CPUs, power dissipation is mostly linear i
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applications performance is mostly linear in core count this severely limits the achievable performance in a
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applications performance is mostly linear in core count this severely limits the achievable performance in a
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traditional, hermetically sealed HSM.
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traditional, hermetically sealed HSM.
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This estimated performance discrepancy matches up with our observation. Vendor of conventional HSMs Thales reports
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$\SI{20}{\kilo Ops\per\second}$ ECC signature operations on NIST Curve P-256 per device of their top-of-range ``Luna HSM
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790''~\cite{thales2021}, which compares to be slightly more than half of the $\SI{36}{\kilo Ops\per\second}$ signing
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operations that \texttt{openssl speed} in single-thread mode is able to do on an AMD Ryzen 7 PRO 4750U laptop CPU at a
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power consumption of $\SI{2.0}{\watt}$ on the active core.
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\subsection{Long-term Operation}
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\subsection{Long-term Operation}
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Like with other HSMs, practical use may require an IHSM to continuously run for a decade or even longer. As with other
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Like with other HSMs, practical use may require an IHSM to continuously run for a decade or even longer. As with other
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@ -437,7 +443,7 @@ accelerations large enough to cause a false alarm.
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To put the above relations into perspective, consider that at an angular frequency of $\SI{1000}{rpm}$, we can expect an
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To put the above relations into perspective, consider that at an angular frequency of $\SI{1000}{rpm}$, we can expect an
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IHSM's tamper sensor to measure an acceleration of about $\SI{100}{g}$. Even the strongest earthquakes rarely reach a
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IHSM's tamper sensor to measure an acceleration of about $\SI{100}{g}$. Even the strongest earthquakes rarely reach a
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Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) of $\SI{0.1}{g}$~\cite{yoshimitsu1990}. The highest measured PGA of the 2011 Tohoku
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Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) of $\SI{0.1}{g}$~\cite{yoshimitsu1990}. The highest PGA measured during the 2011 Tohoku
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earthquake was approximately $\SI{0.3}{g}$. Since earthquake vibrations are low-frequency and happen across a large
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earthquake was approximately $\SI{0.3}{g}$. Since earthquake vibrations are low-frequency and happen across a large
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geographic area, they nontheless dissipate a tremendous amound of mechanical power through an absolute acceleration that
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geographic area, they nontheless dissipate a tremendous amound of mechanical power through an absolute acceleration that
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may seem low at first glance, but we can largely ignore them for the purposes of our tamper detection system. As
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may seem low at first glance, but we can largely ignore them for the purposes of our tamper detection system. As
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@ -862,8 +868,13 @@ secure hardware.
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\printbibliography[heading=bibintoc]
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\printbibliography[heading=bibintoc]
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\appendix
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\section{Source code and Design artifacts}
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%%% FIXME remove appendix and work into text.
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During our research on this paper, we have created a number of digital design artifacts including a 3D mechanical CAD
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model of our prototype IHSM, schematics and PCB layouts for all of its PCBs including the prototype security mesh
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monitor PCB as well as firmware and data analysis scripts for the experiments we ran on the prototype IHSM. All of these
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digital artifacts as well as the sources to this paper are included in the git repository linked below.
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\center{
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\center{
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\center{This is version \texttt{\input{version.tex}\unskip} of this paper, generated on \today. The git repository
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\center{This is version \texttt{\input{version.tex}\unskip} of this paper, generated on \today. The git repository
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@ -871,4 +882,5 @@ secure hardware.
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\center{\censorIfSubmission{\url{https://git.jaseg.de/rotohsm.git}}}
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\center{\censorIfSubmission{\url{https://git.jaseg.de/rotohsm.git}}}
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}
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}
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\end{document}
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\end{document}
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