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Initial PCB draft

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jaseg 2018-11-21 22:18:37 +09:00
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old/architecture/architecture.tex
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@ -91,13 +91,8 @@ programmers do not recognize the USB interface as a potential target for attack
one USB device can potentially compromise this USB device as part of a larger attack.
Issues like these can in part be mitigated with host-based filtering, such as explicit whitelisting of physical USB
ports for HID devices. In this case, however, the USB driver stack of the linux kernel running the USB VM remains as a
very large attack surface. The USB device drivers in Linux in general are not a paragon of code quality, and since the
device can choose which driver the kernel will load a flaw in any one of them suffices. Approaches such as whitelisting
or explicit approval of driver loads interfere too much with a computer's day-to-day operation and thus are not
generally implemented. Also, like any kind of application firewall the user would quickly be desensitized to the
frequent but harmless warning message popping up decreasing the probability of the protection working in case of an
actual attack by a large margin.
ports for HID devices. In this case, however, the USB driver stack of the linux kernel running the USB VM remains as an
attack surface.
A possible secure solution for this problem would be to completely separate security-critical USB devices such as
keyboard and mouse from everything else. A practical implementation of this would require two separate USB host