Update paper template, update abstract
Update abstract w/ reviewer comments
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\documentclass[sigconf,anonymous]{acmart}
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\documentclass[sigconf]{acmart}
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\usepackage[binary-units]{siunitx}
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\DeclareSIUnit{\baud}{Bd}
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@ -14,17 +14,60 @@
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\newcolumntype{P}[1]{>{\centering\arraybackslash}p{#1}}
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\newcommand{\partnum}[1]{\texttt{#1}}
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\begin{document}
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% https://eepublicdownloads.entsoe.eu/clean-documents/pre2015/publications/entsoe/Operation_Handbook/Policy_1_Appendix%20_final.pdf
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%\keywords{Security, privacy and resilience in critical infrastructures \and Security and privacy in ``internet of
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%things'' \and Cyber-physical systems \and Hardware security \and Network Security \and Energy systems \and Signal theory}
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\copyrightyear{2022}
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\acmYear{2022}
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\setcopyright{acmlicensed}
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\acmConference[ACSAC 2022]{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference}{December 5--9, 2022}{Austin, USA}
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\acmBooktitle{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2022), December 5--9, 2022, Austin, USA}
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\acmPrice{XX.XX}
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\acmDOI{10.1145/XXXXXXX.XXXXXXX}
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\acmISBN{978-X-XXXX-XXXX-X/XX/XX}
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\begin{document}
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\acmConference[ACSAC '22]{Annual Computer Security Applications
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Conference}{December 5--9}{Austin, TX, USA}
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\title{
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Ripples in the Pond: Transmitting Information through Grid Frequency Modulation
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}
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\author{Jan Götte}
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\affiliation{
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\institution{Technische Universität Darmstadt}
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\city{Darmstadt}
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\country{Germany}
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}
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\email{research@jaseg.de}
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\author{Liran Katzir}
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\affiliation{
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\institution{Tel Aviv University}
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\city{Tel Aviv}
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\country{Israel}
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}
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\email{lirankat@tau.ac.il}
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\author{Björn Scheuermann}
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\affiliation{
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\institution{Technische Universität Darmstadt}
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\city{Darmstadt}
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\country{Germany}
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}
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\email{scheuermann@kom.tu-darmstadt.de}
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\begin{abstract}
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The dependence of the electrical grid on networked control systems is steadily rising. While utilities are defending
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The dependence of the electrical grid on networked control systems is steadily rising. While utilities can defend
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their side of the grid effectively through rigorous IT security measures such as physically separated control
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networks, the increasing number of networked devices on the consumer side such as smart meters or large
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IoT-connected appliances such as air conditioners are much harder to secure due to their heterogeneity. We consider
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a crisis scenario in which an attacker compromises a large number of consumer-side devices and modulates their
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electrical to destabilize the grid and cause an electrical outage~\cite{ctap+11,wu01,zlmz+21,kgma21,smp18,hcb19}.
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networks, the increasingly large heterogenous ecosystem of networked devices on the consumer side such as smart
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meters or large IoT-connected appliances such as air conditioners is much harder to secure. We consider a crisis
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scenario in which an attacker compromises a large number of consumer-side devices and modulates their electrical
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power to destabilize the grid and cause an electrical outage~\cite{ctap+11,wu01,zlmz+21,kgma21,smp18,hcb19}.
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In this paper propose a broadcast channel based on the modulation of grid frequency through which utility operators
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can issue commands to devices at the consumer premises both during an attack for mitigation and in its wake to aid
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@ -40,15 +83,7 @@
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equipped with a prototype safety reset system based on an inexpensive commodity microcontroller.
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\end{abstract}
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\date{}
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\title{\large\bf Ripples in the Pond:\\Transmitting Information through Grid Frequency Modulation}
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\author{{\rm Jan Sebastian Götte}\\TU Darmstadt \and {\rm Liran Katzir}\\Tel Aviv University\and {\rm Björn Scheuermann}\\TU Darmstadt}
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%\institute{TU Darmstadt\\ Communication Networks Lab\\ \email{safetyreset@jaseg.de}
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%\and Tel Aviv University\\ Faculty of Engineering\\ \email{lirankat@tau.ac.il}
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%\and TU Darmstadt\\ Communication Networks Lab\\ \email{scheuermann@informatik.hu-berlin.de}}
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\maketitle
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%\keywords{Security, privacy and resilience in critical infrastructures \and Security and privacy in ``internet of
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%things'' \and Cyber-physical systems \and Hardware security \and Network Security \and Energy systems \and Signal theory}
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\section{Introduction}
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@ -123,9 +158,9 @@ restored after the attack. One powerful function this allows is ``flushing out``
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meters after an attack, before restoring smart meter internet connectivity.
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Using simulations we have determined that control of a $\SI{25}{\mega\watt}$ load such as a large aluminium smelter,
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load bank or photovoltaic farm would allow for the transmission of a crytographically secured safety reset signal within
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$15$ minutes. We have designed and constructed a proof-of-concept prototype receiver that demonstrates the feasibility
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of decoding such signals on a resource-constrained microcontroller.
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load bank or photovoltaic farm would allow for the transmission of a cryptographically secured safety reset signal
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within $15$ minutes. We have designed and constructed a proof-of-concept prototype receiver that demonstrates the
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feasibility of decoding such signals on a resource-constrained microcontroller.
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\subsection{Motivation}
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@ -221,8 +256,8 @@ frequency during day-to-day operations. Fast-acting automatic primary control st
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while slower automatic secondary control and manual tertiary control re-adjust device's operating points back to their
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nominal values after they have shifted due to primary control action.
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In day-to-day operation, the frequency of the electrical grid is maintained at a
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fixed, stable level through several layers of control systems.
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In day-to-day operation, the frequency of the electrical grid is maintained at a fixed, stable level through several
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layers of control systems.
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\subsection{Black-start recovery}
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@ -786,5 +821,5 @@ Source code and EDA designs are available at the public repository listed at the
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\center{
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\footnotesize
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\center{This is version \texttt{\input{version.tex}\unskip} of this paper, generated on \today.}
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\center{Source files and associated data for this work can be found in the git repository at the following URL: (URL elided for blind peer review)} }
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\end{document}
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\center{Source files and associated data for this work can be found in the git repository at the following URL:
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\url{https://git.jaseg.de/safety-reset.git} }
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