ma: first batch of corrections
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\documentclass[12pt,a4paper,notitlepage]{report}
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\usepackage[ngerman, english]{babel}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[a4paper,textwidth=17cm, top=2cm, bottom=3.5cm]{geometry}
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\usepackage[a4paper, top=2cm, bottom=3.5cm, left=3cm, right=4cm]{geometry}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage[
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backend=biber,
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@ -118,22 +118,22 @@
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\chapter{Introduction}
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%FIXME: sprinkle this section with citations.
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Like in all fields of engineering there is an ongoing diffusion of information systems into industrial control systems
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in the power grid. Automation of these control systems has been practised for the better part of a century already.
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Until recently this automation was mostly limited to core components of the grid. Generators in power stations are
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computer-controlled according to electromechanical and economic models. Switching in substations is automated to allow
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for fast failure recovery. Humans are still vital to these systems, but their tasks have shifted from pure operation to
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engineering, maintenance and surveillance.
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In the power grid as in other engineered systems we can observe an ongoing diffusion of information systems into
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industrial control systems. Automation of these control systems has been practised for the better part of a century
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already. Throughout the 20th century this automation was mostly limited to core components of the grid. Generators in
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power stations are computer-controlled according to electromechanical and economic models. Switching in substations is
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automated to allow for fast failure recovery. Human operators are still vital to these systems, but their tasks have
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shifted from pure operation to engineering, maintenance and surveillance.
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A large-scale trend in power systems is the move from a model of centralized generation built around massive large-scale
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fossil and nuclear power plants towards a more heterogenous model. In this new model large-scale fossil power plants
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still serve a major role but two new factors come into play. One is the advance of renewable energies. The large-scale
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use of wind and solar power in particular from a current standpoint seems unavoidable for our continued existence on
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this planet. For the electrical grid however, these systems constitute a significant challenge. Fossil-fueled power
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plants can be precisely controlled to match the expected energy consumption at any point in time. This tracking of
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production and consumption is vital to the stability of the grid. Renewable energies such as wind and solar power do not
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provide the same degree of controllability, and they introduce a large degree of uncertainty due to the
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unpredictable way of the forces of nature.
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With the turn of the century came a large-scale trend in power systems to move from a model of centralized generation
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built around massive large-scale fossil and nuclear power plants towards a more heterogenous model of smaller-scale
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generators working together. In this new model large-scale fossil power plants still serve a major role but two new
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factors come into play. One is the advance of renewable energies. The large-scale use of wind and solar power in
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particular from a current standpoint seems unavoidable for our continued existence on this planet. For the electrical
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grid these systems constitute a significant challenge. Fossil-fueled power plants can be controlled in a precise and
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quick way to match energy consumption. This tracking of consumption with production is vital to the stability of the
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grid. Renewable energies such as wind and solar power do not provide the same degree of controllability, and they
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introduce a large degree of uncertainty due to the unpredictable way of the forces of nature.
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Along with this change in dynamic behavior renewable energies have brought forth the advance of distributed generation.
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In distributed generation end-customers that previously only consumed energy have started to feed energy into the grid
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@ -146,52 +146,51 @@ computerization of end-user energy metering. Despite the widespread use of indus
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electrical grid and the far-reaching diffusion of computers into people's everyday lifes the energy meter has long been
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one of the last remnants of an offline, analog time. Until the 2010s many households were still served through
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electromechanical Ferraris-style meters that have their origin in the late 19th
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century\cite{borlase01,ukgov04,bnetza02}.
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Today under the umbrella term \emph{Smart Grid} the shift towards fully computerized, often networked meters has been
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partially accomplished. The roll out of these \emph{Smart Meters} has not been very smooth overall with some countries
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severely lagging behind other countries. As a safety-critical technology smart meter technology is usually standardized
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on a per-country basis. This leads to an inhomogenous landscape with in some instances wildly incompatible systems.
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Often vendors only serve a single country or have a separate model of their meter for each country. This complex
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standardization landscape and market situation has led to a proliferation of highly complex, custom-coded
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microcontroller firwmare. The complexity and scale of this often network-connected firmware makes for a ripe substrate
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for bugs to surface.
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century\cite{borlase01,ukgov04,bnetza02}. Today under the umbrella term \emph{Smart Metering} the shift towards fully
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computerized, often networked meters is well underway. The roll out of these \emph{Smart Meters} has not been very
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smooth overall with some countries severely lagging behind other countries. As a safety-critical technology smart
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metering technology is usually standardized on a per-country basis. This leads to an inhomogenous landscape with in some
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instances wildly incompatible systems. Often vendors only serve a single country or have separate models of a meter for
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each country. This complex standardization landscape and market situation has led to a proliferation of highly complex,
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custom-coded microcontroller firwmare. The complexity and scale of this often network-connected firmware makes for a
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ripe substrate for bugs to surface.
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A remotely exploitable flaw inside a smart meter's firmware\footnote{
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There are several smart metering architectures that ascribe different roles to the component called \emph{smart
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meter}. Coarsely divided into two camps these are systems where all metering and communication code resides within
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one physical unit and systems where metering and communication are separated into two units, the \emph{smart meter}
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and the \emph{smart meter gateway}\cite{stuber01}. An example for the former are setups in the USA, an example of
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the latter is the one in Germany. For clarity in this introductory chapter we use \emph{smart meter} to describe the
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entire system at the customer premises including both the meter and a potential gateway.
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} could have consequences ranging from impaired billing
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functionality to an existential threat to grid stability\cite{anderson01,anderson02}. A coördinated attack on meters in
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a country where load switches are common could at worst cause widespread activation of grid safety systems by repeatedly
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connecting and disconnecting megawatts of load capacity in just the wrong moments\cite{wu01}.
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meter}. Coarsely divided into two camps these are systems where all metering and communication functions resides
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within one physical unit and systems where metering and communication functions are separated into two units called
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the \emph{smart meter} and the \emph{smart meter gateway}\cite{stuber01}. An example for the former are setups in
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the USA, an example of the latter is the setup in Germany. For clarity, in this introductory chapter we use
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\emph{smart meter} to describe the entire system at the customer premises including both the meter and a potential
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gateway.
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} could have consequences ranging from impaired billing functionality to an existential threat to grid
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stability\cite{anderson01,anderson02}. In a country where meters commonly include disconnect switches for purposes such
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as prepaid tariffs a coördinated attack could at worst cause widespread activation of grid safety systems by repeatedly
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connecting and disconnecting Megawatts of load capacity in just the wrong moments\cite{wu01}.
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Mitigation of these attacks through firmware security measures is unlikely to yield satisfactory results. The enormous
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complexity of smart meter firmware makes firmware security extremely labor-intensive. The diverse standardization
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landscape makes a coördinated, comprehensive response unlikely.
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In this thesis instead of lamenting the state of firmware security we introduce a pragmatic solution to the in our minds
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likely scenario of a large-scale compromise of smart meter firmware. In our proposal the components of the smart meter
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that are threatened by remote compromise are equipped with a physically separate \emph{safety reset controller} that
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listens for a reset command transmitted through the electrical grid itself and on reception forcibly resets the smart
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meter's entire firmware to a known-good state. Our safety reset controller receives commands through Direct Sequence
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Spread Spectrum (DSSS) modulation carried out on grid frequency through a large controllable load such as an aluminium
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smelter. After forward error correction and cryptographic verification it re-flashes the target application
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microcontroller over the standard JTAG interface.
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In this thesis instead of focusing on the very hard task of improving firmware security we introduce a pragmatic
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solution to the in our minds likely scenario of a large-scale compromise of smart meter firmware. In our proposal the
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components of the smart meter that are threatened by remote compromise are equipped with a physically separate
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\emph{safety reset controller} that listens for a reset command transmitted through the electrical grid's frequency and
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on reception forcibly resets the smart meter's entire firmware to a known-good state. Our safety reset controller
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receives commands through Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) modulation carried out on grid frequency through a
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large controllable load such as an aluminium smelter. After forward error correction and cryptographic verification it
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re-flashes the meter's main microcontroller over the standard JTAG interface.
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In this thesis starting from a high-level architecture we have carried out extensive simulations of our proposal's
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In this thesis, starting from a high-level architecture we have carried out extensive simulations of our proposal's
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performance under real-world conditions. Based on these simulations we implemented an end-to-end prototype of our
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proposed safety reset controller as part of a realistic smart meter demonstrator. Finally we experimentally validate our
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results and give an outline of further steps towards practical implementation.
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proposed safety reset controller as part of a realistic smart meter demonstrator. Finally we experimentally validated
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our results and we will conclude with an outline of further steps towards a practical implementation.
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\chapter{Fundamentals}
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\section{Structure and operation of the electrical grid}
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Since this thesis is filed under \emph{computer science} we will provide a very brief overview of some basic aspects of
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Since this thesis is filed under \emph{computer science} we will provide a very brief overview of some basic concepts of
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modern power grids.
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\subsection{Structure of the electrical grid}
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@ -202,9 +201,9 @@ interconnected by long transmission lines. Mostly due to ohmic losses\footnote{
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U_\text{drop} \cdot I = I^2 \cdot R$. Fixing power $P_\text{transmitted} [W] = U_\text{line} \cdot I$ this yields a
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dependency on line voltage $U_\text{line} [V]$ of $P_\text{loss} =
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\left(\frac{P_\text{transmitted}}{U_\text{line}}\right)^2 \cdot R$. Thus, ignoring other losses a $2\times$ increase
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in transmission voltage halves current and cuts ohmic losses to a quarter. In practice the economics of this are
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much more complicated due to the cost of better isolation for higher-voltage parts and the added factor of power
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factor compensation. }
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in transmission voltage halves current and cuts ohmic losses to a quarter. In practice the economics are much more
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complicated due to the cost of better insulation for higher-voltage parts and the cost of power factor compensation.
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}
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the efficiency of transmission of electricity through long transmission lines increases with the square of
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voltage\cite{crastan01,simon01}. % simon01: p. 425, 9.4.1.1, crastan p.55, 3.1
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In practice economic considerations take into account a reduction of the considerable transmission losses (about
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@ -213,8 +212,8 @@ and the cost increase for the increased volatage rating of components such as tr
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considerations have led to a hierarchical structure where large amounts of energy are transmitted over very long
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distances (up to thousands of kilometers) at very high voltages (upwards of \SI{200}{\kilo\volt}) and voltages get lower
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the closer one gets to end-customer premises. In Germany at the local level a substation will distribute
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\SIrange{10}{30}{\kilo\volt} to large industrial consumers and streets with small transformer substations converting
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this to the \SI{400}{\volt} three-phase AC households are usually hooked up with\cite{crastan01}.
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\SIrange{10}{30}{\kilo\volt} to large industrial consumers and small transformer substations which converting this to
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the \SI{400}{\volt} three-phase AC households are usually hooked up with\cite{crastan01}.
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\subsubsection{Transmission lines, bus bars and tie lines}
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@ -223,61 +222,63 @@ parts of a substation are called \emph{bus bars}. Transmission lines that couple
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called \emph{tie lines}. A tie line often connects grid segments operated by two different operators e.g.\ across a
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country border.
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\emph{Short} transmission lines can be approximated as a simple lumped-component
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RLC\footnote{resistor-inductor-capacitor} circuit. In this case the effect of wave propagation along the line does not
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have to be taken into consideration. In this lumped model the transmission line is represented by a circuit of one or
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two inductors, one or two capacitors and some resistors. This representation simplifies analysis. For \emph{long}
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In mathematical analysis \emph{short} transmission lines can be approximated as a simple lumped-component
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RLC\footnote{Resistor-inductor-capacitor.} circuit. In longer lines the effect of wave propagation along the line has to
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be taken into consideration. In the lumped model the transmission line is represented by a circuit of one or two
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inductors, one or two capacitors and some resistors. This representation simplifies analysis. For \emph{long}
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transmission lines above \SI{50}{\kilo\meter} (cable) or \SI{250}{\kilo\meter} (overhead lines) this approximation
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breaks down and wave propagation along the line's length has to be taken into account. The resulting model is what RF
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engineering calls a \emph{transmission line} and models the line's parasitics\footnote{stray capacitance, ohmic
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resistance and stray inductance} as being uniformly distributed along the length of the line. To approximate this model
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in lumped-element evaluations the line is represented as a long chain of small lumped-component RLC sections. This
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complex structure makes modelling more difficult in comparison to short lines\cite{crastan01}.
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engineering calls a transmission line and models the line's parasitics\footnote{Stray capacitance, ohmic resistance and
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stray inductance.} as being uniformly distributed along the length of the line. To approximate this model in
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lumped-element evaluations the line is represented as a long chain of small lumped-component RLC sections. This complex
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structure makes simulation and analysis more difficult in comparison to short lines\cite{crastan01}.
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Almost all transmission lines used in the transmission and distribution grid use three-phase AC. Long-distance overland
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lines are usually implemented as overhead lines due to their low cost and ease of maintenance. Underground cables are
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much more expensive due to their isolation and are only used when overhead lines cannot be used for e.g.\ safety or
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aesthetic reasons. In some specialized applications such as long, high-power undersea cables high-voltage DC (HVDC) is
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used. In HVDC converter stations at both ends of the line convert between three-phase AC and the line's DC voltage.
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These converter stations are controlled electronically and do not exhibit any of the electromechanical effects
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generators in a power plant do. Since HVDC re-synthesizes three-phase AC from DC at the receiving end of the line it can
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be used to couple non-synchronous grids. This also allows for additional degrees of control over the transmission of
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power compared to a regular transmission line. These technical benefits are offset by the high initial cost (mostly due
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to the converter stations) leading to HVDC being used in specific situations only\cite{crastan03}.
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Almost all transmission lines used in the transmission and distribution grid use three-phase alternating current (AC).
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Long-distance overland lines are usually implemented as overhead lines due to their low cost and ease of maintenance.
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Underground cables are much more expensive because of their insulation and are only used when overhead lines cannot be
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used for reasons such as safety or aesthetics. In specialized applications such as long, high-power undersea cables
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high-voltage DC (HVDC) is used. In HVDC converter stations at both ends of the line convert between three-phase AC and
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the line's DC voltage. These converter stations are controlled electronically and do not exhibit any of the mechanical
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inertia that is characteristic for rotating generators in a power plant. Since HVDC re-synthesizes three-phase AC from
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DC at the receiving end of the line it can be used to couple non-synchronous grids. This allows for additional degrees
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of control over the transmission of power compared to a regular transmission line. These technical benefits are offset
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by high initial cost (mostly due to the converter stations) leading to HVDC being used in specific situations
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only\cite{crastan03}.
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\subsubsection{Generators}
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Traditionally all generators in the power grid were synchronous machines. A synchronous machine is a generator that is
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wound and connected in such a way that during normal operation its rotation is synchonous with the grid frequency. Grid
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frequency and generator rotation speed are bidirectionally electromechanically coupled. If a generator would lag behind
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the grid it would receive electrical energy from the grid and convert it into mechanical energy, acting as a motor.
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Small deviations between rotational speed and grid frequency will be absorbed by the electromechanical coupling between
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both. All generators connected to the grid operate synchronously. Maintaining this synchronization over time is the task
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of complex control systems within each power station\cite{simon01,crastan01}.
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Traditionally all generators in the power grid were synchronous machines. A synchronous machine is a generator whose
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copper coils are wound and connected in such a way that during normal operation its rotation is synchonous with the grid
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frequency. Grid frequency and generator rotation speed are bidirectionally electromechanically coupled. If a generator's
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angle of rotation would lag behind the grid it would receive electrical energy from the grid and convert it into
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mechanical energy, acting as a motor--When the machine leads it acts as a generator and is braked. Small deviations
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between rotational speed and grid frequency will be absorbed by the electromechanical coupling between both. Maintaining
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optimal synchronization over time is the task of complex control systems inside power stations' speed
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governors\cite{simon01,crastan01}.
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Nowadays besides traditional rotating generators the grid also contains a large amount of electronically controlled
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inverters. These inverters are used in photovoltaic installations and other setups where either DC or non-synchronous AC
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is to be fed into the grid. Setups like this behave differently to rotating generators. In particular \emph{inertia} in
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these setups is either absent or a software parameter potentially reducing their overload capacity compared to rotating
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generators. The fundamentally different nature of electronically controlled inverters has to be taken into account in
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planning and regulation\cite{crastan03}.
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is to be fed into the grid. Setups like these behave differently to rotating generators. In particular \emph{inertia} in
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these setups is either absent or a software parameter. This potentially reduces their overload capacity compared to
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rotating generators. The fundamentally different nature of electronically controlled inverters has to be taken into
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account in planning and regulation\cite{crastan03}.
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\subsubsection{Switchgear}
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In the electrical grid switches perform various roles. The ones a computer scientist would recognize are used for
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routing electricity between transmission lines and transformers and can be classified into ones that can be switched
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under load (called load switches) and ones that can not (called disconnectors). The latter are used to ensure parts of
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the network are free from voltage. The former are used to re-route flows of electrical currents. A major difference in
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their construction is that in contrast to disconnectors load switches have built-in components that extinguish the
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high-power arc discharge that forms when the circuit is interrupted under load\footnote{
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the network are free from voltage e.g.\ during maintenance. The former are used to re-route flows of electrical
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currents. A major difference in their construction is that in contrast to disconnectors load switches have built-in
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components that extinguish the high-power arc discharge that forms when the circuit is interrupted under load\footnote{
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While an arc discharge is considered a fault condition in most low-voltage systems including computers, in energy
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systems it is often part of normal operation.
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}. Beyond this there are circuit breakers. Circuit breakers are safety devices that can still switch even under failure
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conditions at several times the circuit's nominal current. They are activated automatically on conditions such as
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overcurrent or overvoltage. Fuses can be considered non-resettable switches. The fuse in a computer power supply is
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barely more than a glass tube with some wire in it that is designed to melt at the designated current. In energy systems
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fuses are often much more complex devices that in some cases even utilize explosivese to quickly and decisively open the
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circuit and extinguish the resulting arc discharge\cite{nelles01,crastan01,simon01}.
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}. Beyond this there are circuit breakers. Circuit breakers are safety devices that even under failure conditions can
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still switch at several times the circuit's nominal current. They are activated automatically on conditions such as
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overcurrent or overvoltage. Finally, fuses can be considered non-resettable switches. The fuse in a computer power
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supply is barely more than a glass tube with some wire in it that is designed to melt at the designated current. In
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energy systems fuses are often much more complex devices that in some cases utilize explosives to quickly and decisively
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open the circuit and extinguish the resulting arc discharge\cite{nelles01,crastan01,simon01}.
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% disconnect switches, fuses, breakers -> crastan 1 (ch. 8)
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\subsubsection{Transformers}
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@ -285,14 +286,15 @@ circuit and extinguish the resulting arc discharge\cite{nelles01,crastan01,simon
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Along with transmission lines transformers are one of the main components most people will be thinking of when talking
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about the electrical grid. Transformers connect grid segments at different voltage levels with one another. In the
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distribution grid transformers are used to provide standard end-user voltage levels to the customer (e.g. 230/400V in
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Europe) from a \SIrange{10}{25}{\kilo\volt} feeder. Transformers can also be used to convert between buses without a
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fourth neutral conductor and buses with one.
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Europe) from a \SIrange{10}{25}{\kilo\volt} feeder. In places that use overhead wiring to connect customer households
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this is the role of the pole-mounted gray devices the size of a small refrigerator that are characteristic for these
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systems. Transformers can also be used to convert between buses without a fourth neutral conductor and buses with one.
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Transformers are large and heavy devices consisting of thick copper wire or copper foil windings arranged around a core
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made from thin stacked, insulated iron sheets. The entire core sits within a large metal enclosure that is filled with
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liquid (usually a specialized oil) for both cooling and electrical insulation. This cooling liquid is cooled by means
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such as radiator fins on the transformer enclosure itself or an external radiator. Depending on the design cooling may
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rely on natural convection within the cooling liquid or on electrical pumps\cite{crastan01,simon01}.
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liquid (usually a specialized oil) for both cooling and electrical insulation. This cooling liquid is cooled by radiator
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fins on the transformer enclosure itself or an external heat exchanger. Depending on the design cooling may rely on
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natural convection within the cooling liquid or on electrical pumps\cite{crastan01,simon01}.
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Transformers come in a large variety of coil and wiring configurations. There exist autotransformers where the secondary
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is part of the primary (or vice-versa) that are used to translate between voltage levels without galvanic isolation at
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@ -313,11 +315,11 @@ substations\cite{crastan01}.
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Chokes are large inductors. In power grid applications their construction is similar to the construction of a
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transformer with the exception that they only have a single winding on the core. They are used for a variety of
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purposes. A frequent use is as a series inductor on one of the phases or the neutral connection to limit transient fault
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currents. In addition to use as simple series inductances for current limiting inductors are also used to tune LC
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circuits. One such use are Petersen coils, large inductors in series with the earth connection at a transformer's star
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point are used to quickly extinguish arcs between phase and ground on a transmission line. The Petersen coil forms a
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parrallel LC resonant circuit with the transmission line's earth capacitance. Tuning this circuit through adjusting the
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petersen coil reduces earth fault current to levels low enough to quickly extinguish the arc\cite{simon01}.
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currents. In addition to this inductors are also used to tune LC circuits. One such use are Petersen coils, large
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inductors in series with the earth connection at a transformer's star point that are used to quickly extinguish arcs
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between phase and ground on a transmission line. The Petersen coil forms a parrallel LC resonant circuit with the
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transmission line's earth capacitance. Tuning this circuit through adjusting the petersen coil reduces earth fault
|
||||
current to a level low enough to quickly extinguish the arc\cite{simon01}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Power factor correction}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -330,56 +332,53 @@ the current at time $t$ is linear in voltage at constant factor $\frac{1}{R}$.
|
|||
|
||||
In contrast to this idealized scenario reality provides us with two common issues: One, the load may be reactive. This
|
||||
means its current waveform is an ideal sinusoid, but there is a phase difference between mains voltage and load current
|
||||
like so: $I(t) = \frac{V(t)}{R} = \frac{1}{\left|Z\right|} V_\text{pk} \sin\paren{\omega_\text{nom} t + \varphi}$ $Z$
|
||||
would be the load's complex impedance combining inductive, capacitive and resistive components and $\varphi$ the phase
|
||||
difference between the resulting current waveform and the mains voltage waveform. A common case of such loads are motors
|
||||
and the inductive ballasts in old fluorescent lighting fixtures.
|
||||
like so: $I(t) = \frac{V(t)}{R} = \frac{1}{\left|Z\right|} V_\text{pk} \sin\paren{\omega_\text{nom} t + \varphi}$. $Z$
|
||||
is the load's complex impedance combining inductive, capacitive and resistive components and $\varphi$ is the phase
|
||||
difference between the resulting current waveform and the mains voltage waveform. Examples of such loads are motors and
|
||||
the inductive ballasts in old fluorescent lighting fixtures.
|
||||
|
||||
The second potential issue are loads with non-sinusoidal current waveform. There are many classes of these but the most
|
||||
common one are switching-mode power supplies. Most SMPS for modern electronic devices have an input stage consisting of
|
||||
a bridge rectifier followed by a capacitor that provide high-voltage DC power to the following switch-mode convert
|
||||
circuit. This rectifier-capacitor input stage under normal load draws a high current only at the very peak of the input
|
||||
voltage sinusoid and draws almost zero current for most of the period.
|
||||
The second potential issue are loads with a non-sinusoidal current waveform. There are many classes of these but the
|
||||
most common one are the switching-mode power supplies (SMPS) used in most modern electronic devicese.. Most SMPS have an
|
||||
input stage consisting of a bridge rectifier followed by a capacitor that provide high-voltage DC power to the following
|
||||
switch-mode convert circuit. This rectifier-capacitor input stage under normal load draws a high current only at the
|
||||
very peak of the input voltage sinusoid and draws almost zero current for most of the period.
|
||||
|
||||
These two cases are measured by \emph{displacement power factor} and \emph{distortion power factor} that when combined
|
||||
yield the overall true power factor. The power factor is a key quantity in the design and operation of the power grid
|
||||
since a high power factor (close to $1.0$ or an in-phase sinusoidal current waveform) yields lowest transmission and
|
||||
generation losses.
|
||||
|
||||
Reactive power (also referred to as \emph{VAR} after its is unit Volt-Ampère Reactive) an important variable in the
|
||||
operation of electrical grids (see sec.\ \ref{frequency_estimation}). If reactive power generation and consumption are
|
||||
mismatched and power factor is low, high currents develop that lead to high transmission losses. For this reason grids
|
||||
include circuits to compensate reactive power imbalances\cite{crastan01}. These circuits can be as simple as inductors
|
||||
or capacitors connected to a power line but often can be switched to adapt to changing load conditions. Static Var
|
||||
compensators are particularly fast-acting reactive power compensation devices whose purpose is to maintain bus
|
||||
voltage\cite{rogers01}.
|
||||
yield the overall true power factor. The power factor is a key quantity in the design and operation of the power grid.
|
||||
As a variable in the operation of electrical grids it is also referred to as \emph{VAR} after its is unit Volt-Ampère
|
||||
Reactive. A high power factor (close to $1.0$, i.e.\ an in-phase sinusoidal current waveform) yields lowest
|
||||
transmission and generation losses. If reactive power generation and consumption are mismatched and power factor is
|
||||
low, high currents develop that lead to high transmission losses. For this reason grids include circuits to compensate
|
||||
reactive power imbalances\cite{crastan01}. These circuits can be as simple as inductors or capacitors connected to a
|
||||
power line but often can be switched to adapt to changing load conditions. Static var compensators are particularly
|
||||
fast-acting reactive power compensation devices whose purpose is to maintain a constant bus voltage\cite{rogers01}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Loads}
|
||||
|
||||
Lastly, there is the loads that the electrical grid serves. Loads range from mains-powered indicator lights in devices
|
||||
such as light switches or power strips weighing in at mere milliwatts to large smelters in industrial metal production
|
||||
that can consume a good fraction of a gigawatt all on their own.
|
||||
that can consume a fraction of a gigawatt all on their own.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Operational concerns}
|
||||
\subsubsection{Modelling the electrical grid}
|
||||
|
||||
Modelling performs an important role in the engineering of a reliable power infrastructure. The grid is a complex,
|
||||
highly dynamic system. To maintain operational parameters such as voltage in various parts of the grid, grid frequency
|
||||
and currents inside their specified ranges complex control systems are necessary. To design and parametrize such control
|
||||
systems simulations are a valuable tool. Using model calculations the effects of control systems on operational
|
||||
variables such as transmission efficiency or generation losses can be estimated. Model simulations can be used to
|
||||
identify structural issues such as potential points of congestion. The same models can then be used to engineer
|
||||
solutions to such issues, e.g.\ by simulating the effect of a new transmission line.
|
||||
highly dynamic system. To maintain operational parameters such as voltage, grid frequency and currents inside their
|
||||
specified ranges complex control systems are necessary. To design and parametrize such control systems simulations are a
|
||||
valuable tool. Using model calculations the effects of control systems on operational variables such as transmission
|
||||
efficiency or generation losses can be estimated. Model simulations can be used to identify structural issues such as
|
||||
potential points of congestion. The same models can then be used to engineer solutions to such issues, e.g.\ by
|
||||
simulating the effect of a new transmission line.
|
||||
|
||||
There are several aspects under which the grid or parts of the grid can be simulated. There are static analysis methods
|
||||
such as modal analysis that yield information on electromechanical oscillations by computing the eigenvalues of a
|
||||
large system of differential equations describing the collective behavior of all components of the grid. Modal analysis
|
||||
is one example of simulations used in grid planning. Using modal analysis likely oscillatory modes can be identified and
|
||||
ultimately these results can inform a decision to install additional stabilization systems in a particular location.
|
||||
In contrast to static analysis, transient simulations calculate an approximation of the time-domain behavior of some
|
||||
variable of interest under a given model. Transient simulations are used e.g.\ in the design of control systems.
|
||||
Power flow equations describe the flow of electrical energy throughout the network from generator to load. Numerical
|
||||
solutions these equations are used to optimize control parameters to increase overall efficiency.
|
||||
such as modal analysis that yield information on problematic electromechanical oscillations by computing the eigenvalues
|
||||
of a large system of differential equations describing the collective behavior of all components of the grid. Modal
|
||||
analysis is one example of simulations used in grid planning. Modal analysis is used in decisions to install additional
|
||||
stabilization systems in a particular location. In contrast to static analysis, transient simulations calculate an
|
||||
approximation of the time-domain behavior of some variable of interest under a given model. Transient simulations are
|
||||
used e.g.\ in the design of control systems. Finally, power flow equations describe the flow of electrical energy
|
||||
throughout the network from generator to load. Numerical solutions these equations are used to optimize control
|
||||
parameters to increase overall efficiency.
|
||||
|
||||
% TODO decide what of this to keep.
|
||||
% \subsubsection{Generator controls}
|
||||
|
|
@ -389,96 +388,100 @@ solutions these equations are used to optimize control parameters to increase ov
|
|||
|
||||
\section{Smart meter technology}
|
||||
|
||||
Smart meters were a concept pushed by utility companies throughout the 00's. Smart metering is one component of the
|
||||
Smart meters were a concept pushed by utility companies throughout the early 21st century. Smart metering is one component of the
|
||||
larger societal shift towards digitally interconnected technology. Old analog meters required that service pesonnel
|
||||
physically come to read the meter. \emph{Smart} meters automatically transmit their readings through modern
|
||||
technologies. Utility companies were very interested in this move not only because of the cost savings for meter reading
|
||||
personnel. Beyond this, an always-connected meter allows several entirely new use cases that have not been possible
|
||||
before. One often-cited one is utilizing the new high-resolution load data to improve load forecasting to allow for
|
||||
greater generation efficiency. Computerizing the meter also allows for new fee models where electricity cost is no
|
||||
longer fixed over time but adapts to market conditions. Models such as prepayment electricity plans where the customer
|
||||
is automatically disconnected until they pay their bill are significantly aided by a fully electronic system that can be
|
||||
personnel: An always-connected meter also allows several entirely new use cases that have not been possible before. One
|
||||
often-cited one is utilizing the new high-resolution load data to improve load forecasting to allow for greater
|
||||
generation efficiency. Computerizing the meter also allows for new fee models where electricity cost is no longer fixed
|
||||
over time but adapts to market conditions. Models such as prepayment electricity plans where the customer is
|
||||
automatically disconnected until they pay their bill are significantly aided by a fully electronic system that can be
|
||||
controlled and monitored remotely\cite{anderson02}. A remotely controllable load switch can also be used to coerce
|
||||
customers in situations where that was not previously economically possible\footnote{
|
||||
The swiss association of electrical utility companies in sec.\ 7.2 par.\ (2)a of their 2010 whitepaper on the
|
||||
introduction of smart metering\cite{vseaes01} cynically writes that remotely controllable load switches ``lead a new
|
||||
tenant to swiftly register'' with the utility company. This whitepaper completely vanished from their website some
|
||||
time after publication, but the internet archive has a copy.
|
||||
}. Figure \ref{fig_smgw_schema} shows a schema of the smart metering installation in a typical household\cite{stuber01}.
|
||||
}. Figure \ref{fig_smgw_schema} shows a schema of a smart metering installation in a typical household\cite{stuber01}.
|
||||
|
||||
\begin{figure}
|
||||
\centering
|
||||
\includegraphics{resources/smgw_usage_scenario}
|
||||
\caption{A typical usage scenario of a smart metering system in a typical home.}
|
||||
\caption{A typical usage scenario of a smart metering system in a typical home. This diagram shows a gateway
|
||||
connected to multiple smart meters through its local metrological network (LMN) and a multitude of devices on the
|
||||
customer's home area network (HAN). A solar inverter and an electric car are connected through a controllable local
|
||||
systems (CLS) adaptor.}
|
||||
\label{fig_smgw_schema}
|
||||
\end{figure}
|
||||
|
||||
To the customer the utility of a smart meter is largely limited to the convenience of being able to read it without
|
||||
going to the basement. In the long term it is said that there will be second-order savings to the customer since
|
||||
going to their basement. In the long term it is said that there will be second-order savings to the customer since
|
||||
electricity prices adapting to the market situation along with this convenience will lead them to consume less
|
||||
electricity and to consume it in a way that is more amenable to utilities, both leading to reduced
|
||||
cost\cite{borlase01,bmwi03,anderson02}.
|
||||
|
||||
Traditional Ferraris counters with their distinctive rotating aluminium disc are simple electromechanical devices. Since
|
||||
it does not include any failure-prone semiconductors or other high technology a cheap Ferraris-style meter can easily
|
||||
last decades. In contrast to this, smart meters are complex high technology. They are vastly more expensive to develop
|
||||
in the first place since they require the development and integration of large amounts of complex, custom firwmare. Once
|
||||
deployed, their lifetime is severely limited by this very complexity. Complex semiconductor devices tend to fail, and
|
||||
firmware that needs to communicate with the outside world tends to not age well\cite{borkar01}.
|
||||
This combination of higher unit cost and lower expected lifetime leads to grossly increased costs per household. This
|
||||
cost is usually shared between utility and customer.
|
||||
they do not include any semiconductors or other high technology that might be prone to failure a cheap Ferraris-style
|
||||
meter can last decades. In contrast to this, smart meters are complex high technology. They are vastly more expensive to
|
||||
develop in the first place since they require the development and integration of large amounts of complex, custom
|
||||
firwmare. Once deployed, their lifetime is limited by this complexity. Complex semiconductor devices tend to fail, and
|
||||
firmware that needs to communicate with the outside world tends to not age well\cite{borkar01}. This combination of
|
||||
higher unit cost and lower expected lifetime leads to increased costs per household. This cost is usually shared between
|
||||
utility and customer.
|
||||
|
||||
As part of its smart metering rollout the German government in 2013 had a study conducted on the economies of smart
|
||||
meter installations. This study came to the conclusion that for the majority of households computerizing an existing
|
||||
ferraris meter is uneconomical. For larger consumers or new installations the higher cost of installation over time is
|
||||
offset by the resulting savings in electricity cost\cite{bmwi03}.
|
||||
expected to be offset by the resulting savings in electricity cost\cite{bmwi03}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Human-Computer Interaction aspects of smart meter technology}
|
||||
\subsection{Smart metering and Human-Computer Interaction}
|
||||
|
||||
A fundamental aspect in realizing the cost and energy savings promised by the smart metering revolution is that it
|
||||
requires a paradigm shift in consumer interaction. Previously most consumers would only confront their energy use when
|
||||
their monthly or yearly electricity bill arrived. All of the cost savings smart meters promise over traditional metering
|
||||
infrastructure\footnote{
|
||||
We are excluding savings from Demand-Side Response (DSR) implemented through smart meters here: Traditional ripple
|
||||
control systems already allowed for these, and due to the added cost of high-power relays many smart meters do not
|
||||
include such features.
|
||||
} critically depend on the consumer regularly interacting with the meter through an in-home display or app. We live in
|
||||
an era where our attention is already highly contested. A myriad of apps and platforms compete for our attention through
|
||||
our smart phones and other devices. Introducing an entirely new service into this already complex battleground is a large
|
||||
endeavour. On the one hand it is not clear how this new service would compete with everything else. On the other hand if
|
||||
it does manage to capture our attention and lead us to modify our behavior, what are the side effects? For instance,
|
||||
does an in-home display increase financial anxiety in economically disadvantaged customers?
|
||||
A fundamental aspect in realizing many of the cost and energy savings promised by the smart metering revolution is that
|
||||
it requires a paradigm shift in consumer interaction. Previously most consumers would only confront their energy use
|
||||
when they receive their monthly or yearly electricity bill. A large part of the cost savings smart meters promise over
|
||||
traditional metering infrastructure\footnote{ We are excluding savings from Demand-Side Response (DSR) implemented
|
||||
through smart meters here: Traditional ripple control systems already allowed for these\cite{dzung01}, and due to the
|
||||
added cost of high-power relays many smart meters do not include such features. } critically depend on the consumer
|
||||
regularly interacting with the meter through an in-home display or app, then changing their behavior. We live in an era
|
||||
where our attention is already highly contested. A myriad of apps and platforms compete for our attention through our
|
||||
smart phones and other devices. Introducing an entirely new service exerting cognitive pressure into this already
|
||||
complex battleground is a large endeavour. On the one hand it is not clear how this new service would compete with
|
||||
everything else. On the other hand if it does manage to capture our attention and lead us to modify our behavior, what
|
||||
are the side effects? For instance an in-home display might increase financial anxiety in economically disadvantaged
|
||||
customers.
|
||||
|
||||
Human Computer Interaction research has touched the topic of smart metering several times and has many insights to offer
|
||||
for technologists\cite{pierce01,rodden01,lupton01,costanza01,fell01}. An issue pointed out in \cite{rodden01} is that at
|
||||
least in some countries consumers fundamentally distrust their utility companies. This trust issue is exacerbated by
|
||||
smart meters being unilaterally forced onto consumers by utility companies. Much of the success of smart metering's
|
||||
ubiquitous promises of energy savings fundamentally depends on consumer coöperation. Here, the aforementioned trust
|
||||
issue calls into question smart metering's chances of long-term success.
|
||||
ubiquitous promises of energy savings depends on consumer coöperation. Here, the aforementioned trust issue calls into
|
||||
question smart metering's chances of long-term success.
|
||||
|
||||
As \text{pierce01} pointed out smart metering developments could benefit greatly from early involvement of HCI research.
|
||||
As \cite{pierce01} pointed out smart metering developments could benefit greatly from early involvement of HCI research.
|
||||
HCI research certainly would not have overlooked entire central issues such as privacy as it happened in the dutch
|
||||
case\cite{cuijpers01}. The current corporate-driven approach to a technological advance forced through national
|
||||
standardization bears a serious risk of failing to meet its ostensible objectives for consumers. The role of consumers
|
||||
and the complex sociotechnological environment posed by this new technology is seriously considered nowhere in the
|
||||
standardization process. While certainly noone will admit to outright ignoring consumers in smart meter standardization
|
||||
their role is largely limited to the occassional public consultation. At the same time the standards are written by
|
||||
technologists--it seems largely without input on their practicality or socio-technological implications from fields such
|
||||
as HCI. % TODO citation? too much burn?
|
||||
standardization bears a risk of failing to meet its ostensible objectives for consumers. The role of consumers and the
|
||||
complex sociotechnological environment posed by this new technology is not seriously considered in the standardization
|
||||
process. While certainly no one will admit to outright ignoring consumers in smart meter standardization, their role is
|
||||
largely limited to the occassional public consultation. At the same time the standards are written by technologists--it
|
||||
seems largely without input on their practicality or socio-technological implications from fields such as HCI.
|
||||
% TODO citation? too much burn?
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Common components}
|
||||
\label{sm-cpu}
|
||||
|
||||
Smart meters usually are built around an off-the-shelf microcontroller. Some meters use specialized smart metering
|
||||
SOCs\cite{ifixit01} while others use standard microcontrollers with core metering functions implemented in external
|
||||
circuitry (cf.\ sec.\ \ref{sec-easymeter} where we detail the meter in our demonstration setup). Specialized SoCs
|
||||
usually contain a segment LCD driver along with some high-resolution analog-to-digital converters for the actual
|
||||
measurement functions. In many smart meter designs used outside of Germany the metering SoC will be connected to another
|
||||
full-featured SoC acting as the modem. At a casual glance this might seem to be a security measure, but it may be more
|
||||
likely that this is done to ease integration of one metering platform with several different communication stacks (e.g.\
|
||||
proprietary sub-gigahertz wireless, powerline communication (PLC) or ethernet). In these architectures there is a clear
|
||||
line of functional demarcation between the metering SoC and the modem. As evidenced by over-the-air software update
|
||||
functionality (see e.g.\ \cite{honeywell01}) this does not however extend to an actual security boundary.
|
||||
Smart meters usually are built around an off-the-shelf microcontroller (microcontroller unit, MCU). Some meters use
|
||||
specialized smart metering system-on-chips (SoCs)\cite{ifixit01} while others use standard microcontrollers with core
|
||||
metering functions implemented in external circuitry (cf.\ sec.\ \ref{sec-easymeter} where we detail the meter in our
|
||||
demonstration setup). Specialized SoCs usually contain a segment LCD driver along with some high-resolution
|
||||
analog-to-digital converters for the actual measurement functions. In many smart meter designs the metering SoC is
|
||||
connected to another full-featured SoC acting as the modem. At a casual glance this might seem to be a security measure,
|
||||
but it is be more likely that this is done to ease integration of one metering platform with several different
|
||||
communication stacks (e.g.\ proprietary sub-gigahertz wireless, powerline communication (PLC) or ethernet). In these
|
||||
architectures there is a clear line of functional demarcation between the metering SoC and the modem. As evidenced by
|
||||
over-the-air software update functionality (see e.g.\ \cite{honeywell01}) this does not however extend to an actual
|
||||
security boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
Energy usage is calculated by measuring both voltage and current at high resolution and then integrating the
|
||||
measurements. Current measurements are usually made with either a current transformer or a shunt in a four-wire
|
||||
|
|
@ -490,29 +493,27 @@ as well as an indirect indication of power through a rotating wheel one of the s
|
|||
ability to calculate advanced statistics on energy use. These statistics are supposed to help customers better target
|
||||
energy conservation measures\cite{bmwi03}.
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to the pure measurement and data aggregation functions smart meters can perform additional functions. One is
|
||||
to serve as a gateway between the utility company's control systems and large controllable loads in the consumer's
|
||||
household for Demand-Side Management (DSM)\cite{borlase01}. In DSM the utility company can control when exactly a
|
||||
high-power device such as a water storage heater is turned on. To the customer the precise timing does not matter since
|
||||
the storage heater is set so that it has enough hot water in its reservoir at all times. The utility company however can
|
||||
use this degree of control to reduce load variations during temporary imbalances such as peaks. The efficiency gains
|
||||
realized with this system translate into lower electricity prices for DSM-enabled loads for the customer. Traditionally
|
||||
DSM was realized on a local level using ripple control systems. In ripple control control data is coded by modulating a
|
||||
carrier at a low frequency such as \SI{400}{\hertz} on top of the regular mains voltage. These systems require
|
||||
high-power transmitters at tens of kilowatts and still can only bridge regional distances\cite{dzung01}.
|
||||
Smart meters can perform additional functions in addition to pure measurement and data aggregation. One is to serve as a
|
||||
gateway between the utility company's control systems and large controllable loads in the consumer's household for
|
||||
Demand-Side Management (DSM)\cite{borlase01}. In DSM the utility company can control when exactly a high-power device
|
||||
such as a water storage heater is switched on. To the customer the precise timing does not matter since the storage
|
||||
heater is set so that it has enough hot water in its reservoir at all times. The utility company however can use this
|
||||
degree of control to reduce load variations during peak times. The efficiency gains realized with this system translate
|
||||
into lower electricity prices for DSM-enabled loads for the customer. Traditionally DSM was realized on a local level
|
||||
using ripple control systems. In ripple control control data is coded by modulating a carrier at a low frequency such as
|
||||
\SI{400}{\hertz} on top of the regular mains voltage. These systems require high-power transmitters at tens of kilowatts
|
||||
and still can only bridge regional distances\cite{dzung01}.
|
||||
|
||||
Another important additional function is that in some countries some smart meters can be used to remotely disconnect
|
||||
consumer households with outstanding bills. Using euphemisms such as \emph{utility revenue protection}\cite{kamstrup01}
|
||||
or \emph{reducing nontechnical losses}\cite{brown01} while cynically claiming \emph{Consumer
|
||||
Empowerment}\cite{kamstrup01} these systems allow an utility company to remotely disconnect a customer at any time.
|
||||
Whereas before smart metering this required either additional hardware or an expensive site visit by a qualified
|
||||
technician smart meters have ushered in an era of frictionless control\footnote{
|
||||
Note that in some countries such as the UK non-networked mechanical prepayment meters did exist. In such systems the
|
||||
user inserts coins into a coin slot that activates a load switch at the household's main electricity connection.
|
||||
These systems were non-networked and did not allow for remote control. A disadvantage of such systems compared to
|
||||
modern \emph{smart} systems are the high cost of the coin acceptor and the overhead of site visits required to empty
|
||||
the coin box\cite{anderson02}.
|
||||
}.
|
||||
Another important additional function is that some smart meters can be used to remotely disconnect consumer households
|
||||
with outstanding bills. Using euphemisms such as \emph{utility revenue protection}\cite{kamstrup01} or \emph{reducing
|
||||
nontechnical losses}\cite{brown01} while cynically claiming \emph{Consumer Empowerment}\cite{kamstrup01} these systems
|
||||
allow an utility company to remotely disconnect a customer at any time\cite{anderson01}. Whereas before smart metering
|
||||
this required either additional hardware or an expensive site visit by a qualified technician smart meters have ushered
|
||||
in an era of frictionless control\footnote{ Note that in some countries such as the UK non-networked mechanical
|
||||
prepayment meters did exist. In such systems the user inserts coins into a coin slot that activates a load switch at the
|
||||
household's main electricity connection. These systems were non-networked and did not allow for remote control. A
|
||||
disadvantage of such systems compared to modern \emph{smart} systems are the high cost of the coin acceptor and the
|
||||
overhead of site visits required to empty the coin box\cite{anderson02}. }.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Cryptographic coprocessors}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -521,11 +522,11 @@ design. Since in both types of meter cost depends on physical quantities being m
|
|||
customers can save cost in case they are able to falsify the meter's measurements without being
|
||||
detected\cite{anderson02}. For this reason both types of meters employ countermeasures against physical intrusion.
|
||||
Compared to high-risk devices such as card payment processing terminals or ATMs the tamper proofing used in smart meters
|
||||
is only basic\cite{anderson02}. Common measures include sealing the case by irreversibly ultrasonically welding front
|
||||
and back plastic shells together or the use of security seals on the lid covering the input/output screw terminals.
|
||||
Low-tech attacks using magnets to saturate the current transformer's ferrite cores are detected using hall
|
||||
sensors\cite{anderson02,anderson03,itron01,hager01,easymeter01}. German smart metering standards specify the use of a
|
||||
smartcard-like security module to provide transport encryption and other cryptographic
|
||||
is only basic\cite{anderson02}. Common measures include sealing the case by irreversibly ultrasonically welding the
|
||||
front and back plastic shells together or the use of security seals on the lid covering the input and output screw
|
||||
terminals. The common low-tech attack of using magnets to saturate the current transformer's ferrite cores is detected
|
||||
using hall sensors\cite{anderson02,anderson03,itron01,hager01,easymeter01}. German smart metering standards specify the
|
||||
use of a smartcard-like security module to provide transport encryption and other cryptographic
|
||||
services\cite{bsi-tr-03109-2,bsi-tr-03109-2-a}. During our literature review we did not find many references to similar
|
||||
requirements in other national standards, though this does not mean that individual manufacturers do not use smartcards
|
||||
for engineering reasons or due to pressure from utilities. The limited documentation on meter internals that we did find
|
||||
|
|
@ -543,10 +544,10 @@ wired into the house or apartment's electrical connection.
|
|||
|
||||
Modern smart meters are usually made with plastic cases. Ferraris meters often used cases stamped from sheet metal with
|
||||
glass windows on them. Smart meters now look much more like other modern electronic devices. A common construction style
|
||||
is to separate the case in a front and back half with both halves clipped or ultrasonically welded together. Ultrasonic
|
||||
welding gives a robust, airtight interface. This interface cannot easily be separated and re-connected without leaving
|
||||
visible traces, which helps with tamper evidence properties. As an industry-standard process common in various consumer
|
||||
goods ultrasonic welding is a cheap and accessible technology\cite{easymeter01,ifixit01}.
|
||||
is to separate the case into front and back halves with both clipped or ultrasonically welded together. Ultrasonic
|
||||
welding gives a robust, airtight interface that cannot easily be separated and re-connected without leaving visible
|
||||
traces, which helps with tamper evidence properties. As an industry-standard process common in various consumer goods
|
||||
ultrasonic welding is a cheap and accessible technology\cite{easymeter01,ifixit01}.
|
||||
|
||||
Communication interfaces sometimes are brought out through regular electromechanical connectors but often also are
|
||||
optical interfaces. A popular style here is to use a regular UART connected to an LED/phototransistor optocoupler
|
||||
|
|
@ -572,19 +573,19 @@ supported.
|
|||
|
||||
The family of standards one encounters most in smart metering applications are IEC 62056 specifying the Device Language
|
||||
Message Specification (DLMS) and the Companion Specification for Electronic Metering (COSEM). DLMS/COSEM are
|
||||
application-layer standards describing a request/response schema similar to e.g.\ HTTP. DLMS/COSEM are mapped onto a
|
||||
application-layer standards describing a request/response schema similar to HTTP. DLMS/COSEM are mapped onto a
|
||||
multitude of wire protocols. They can be spoken over TCP/IP or mapped onto low-speed UART serial interfaces
|
||||
\cite{sato01,stuber01}. Besides DLMS/COSEM there are a multitude of standards usually specifying how DLMS/COSEM are to
|
||||
be applied.
|
||||
|
||||
DLMS/COSEM show some amount of feature creep. They do not adhere to the age-old systems design adage that a tool should
|
||||
\emph{do one thing and do it well}. Instead they try to capture the convex hull of all possible applications. This led
|
||||
to a complicated design that requires extensive additional specification and testing to maintain even basic
|
||||
interoperability. In particular in the area of transport security it becomes evident that the IEC as an electrical
|
||||
engineering standards body stretched their area of expertise and resorting to established standard protocols would have
|
||||
improved the situation\cite{weith01}. Compared to industry-standard transport security the IEC standards provide
|
||||
a simplistic key management framework based on a static shared key with unlimited lifetime and provide sub-optimal
|
||||
transport security properties (e.g.\ lack of forward-secrecy)\cite{khurana01,sato01}.
|
||||
to a complicated design that requires extensive additional specification and testing to maintain interoperability. In
|
||||
particular in the area of transport security it becomes evident that the IEC as an electrical engineering standards body
|
||||
stretched their area of expertise where resorting to established standard protocols would have led to a better
|
||||
outcome\cite{weith01}. Compared to industry-standard transport security the IEC standards provide a simplistic key
|
||||
management framework based on a static shared key with unlimited lifetime and provide sub-optimal transport security
|
||||
properties (e.g.\ lack of forward-secrecy)\cite{khurana01,sato01}.
|
||||
% TODO maybe expand this?
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{The regulatory situation in selected countries}
|
||||
|
|
@ -592,7 +593,7 @@ transport security properties (e.g.\ lack of forward-secrecy)\cite{khurana01,sat
|
|||
In this section we will give an overview of the situation in a number of countries. This list of countries is not
|
||||
representative and notably does not include any developing countries and is geographically biased. We selected these
|
||||
countries for illustration only and based our selection in a large part on the availability of information in a language
|
||||
we read. We will conclude this section with a summarization of common themes.
|
||||
we can read. We will conclude this section with a summarization of common themes.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Germany}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -604,33 +605,33 @@ major renovations but does not require most legacy residential installations to
|
|||
customers\cite{bmwi03,bmwi1,bmwe01,brown01}.
|
||||
|
||||
The German standards strictly separate between metering and communication functions. Both are split into separate
|
||||
devices, the \emph{meter} and the \emph{gateway} (called emph{smart meter gateway} in full and often abbreviated
|
||||
emph{SMGW}). One or several meters connect to a gateway through a COSEM-derived protocol. The communication interface
|
||||
devices, the \emph{meter} and the \emph{gateway} (called \emph{smart meter gateway} in full and often abbreviated
|
||||
\emph{SMGW}). One or several meters connect to a gateway through a COSEM-derived protocol. The communication interface
|
||||
between meter and gateway can optionally be physically unidirectional. An unidirectional interface eliminates any
|
||||
possibility of meter firmware compromise. The gateway contains a cryptographic security module similar to a
|
||||
smartcard\cite{mahlknecht01} that is entrusted with signing of measurements and maintaining an authenticated and
|
||||
encrypted communication channel with its authorities. Security of the system is certified according to a Common Criteria
|
||||
process.
|
||||
|
||||
The German specification does not include any support for load switches outside of demand-side management as they are
|
||||
common in some other countries. It does not prohibit the installation of one behind the smart meter installation. This
|
||||
makes it theoretically possible for a utility company to still install a load switch to disconnect a customer, but this
|
||||
would be a spearate installation from the smart meter. In Germany there are significant barriers that have to be met
|
||||
before a utility company may cut power to a household\cite{delaw01}. The elision of a load switch means attacks on
|
||||
German meters will be limited in influence to billing irregularities and attacks using DSM equipment.
|
||||
The German specification does not include any support for load switches as they are common in some other countries
|
||||
outside of demand-side management. It only does not prohibit the installation of one behind the smart meter
|
||||
installation. This makes it theoretically possible for a utility company to still install a load switch to disconnect a
|
||||
customer, but this would be a spearate installation from the smart meter. In Germany there are significant barriers that
|
||||
have to be met before a utility company may cut power to a household\cite{delaw01}. The elision of a load switch means
|
||||
attacks on German meters will be limited in influence to billing irregularities and attacks using DSM equipment.
|
||||
|
||||
% TODO elaborate DSM attacks vs. whole-household attacks in attacks section
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{The Netherlands}
|
||||
The Netherlands were early to take initiative to roll out smart metering after its recognition by the European
|
||||
Commission in 2006\cite{cuijpers01,ec04}. After overcoming political issuses the Netherlands were above the European
|
||||
median in 2018 having replaced almost half of all meters\cite{cuijpers01,ec03}. Dutch smart meters are standardized by a
|
||||
consortium of distribution system operators. They integrate gateway and metrology functions into one device. The
|
||||
utility-facing interface is a IEC DLMS/COSEM-based interface over cellular radio such as GPRS or
|
||||
LTE\cite{aubel01}. Like e.g.\ the German standard, the Dutch standard precisely specifies all communication
|
||||
interfaces of the meter\cite{dsmrp3}. Another parallel is that the Dutch standard also does not cover any functionality
|
||||
for remotely disconnecting a household. This absence of a load switch limits attacks on Dutch smart meters to causing
|
||||
billing irregularities.
|
||||
median in 2018, having replaced almost half of all meters\cite{cuijpers01,ec03}. Dutch smart meters are standardized by
|
||||
a consortium of distribution system operators. They integrate gateway and metrology functions into one device. The
|
||||
utility-facing interface is a IEC DLMS/COSEM-based interface over cellular radio such as GPRS or LTE\cite{aubel01}. Like
|
||||
e.g.\ the German standard, the Dutch standard precisely specifies all communication interfaces of the
|
||||
meter\cite{dsmrp3}. Another parallel is that the Dutch standard also does not cover any functionality for remotely
|
||||
disconnecting a household. This absence of a load switch limits attacks on Dutch smart meters, too to causing billing
|
||||
irregularities.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{The UK}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -643,8 +644,8 @@ smart metering standard, as is remote firmware update functionality\cite{ukgov02
|
|||
standards is performed through a gateway (there called \emph{communications hub}) that can be shared between several
|
||||
meters \cite{ukgov01,ukgov02,ukgov03,brown01,sato01}. The combination of both gas and electricity metering into one
|
||||
family of standards and the exceptionally large set of \emph{required} features make the UK regulations the maximalist
|
||||
among the ones in this section. The mandatory inclusion of both load switches and remote connectivity up to remote
|
||||
firmware update make it an interesting attack target.
|
||||
option among the regulations in this section. The mandatory inclusion of both load switches and remote connectivity up
|
||||
to remote firmware update make it an interesting attack target\cite{anderson01}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Italy}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -661,10 +662,11 @@ gateways\cite{gungor01}.
|
|||
|
||||
Japan is currently rolling out smart metering infrastructure. Compared to other countries in Japan significant
|
||||
standardization effort has been spent on smart home integration\cite{usitc01,sato01,brown01}. Japan has domestic
|
||||
standards (JIS) for metrology and physical dimensions. The TEPCO deployment currently being rolled out is based on the
|
||||
IEC DLMS/COSEM standards suite for remote meter reading in conjuction with the Japanese ECHONET protocol for the
|
||||
home-area network. Smart meters are connected to TEPCO's backend systems through the customer's internet connection,
|
||||
sub-gigahertz radio based on 802.15.4 framing, regular landline internet or PLC\cite{toshiba01,sato01}.
|
||||
standards under its Japanese Industrial Standards organization (JIS) that determine metrology and physical dimensions.
|
||||
Tokyo utility company TEPCO is currently rolling out a deployment that is based on the IEC DLMS/COSEM standards suite
|
||||
for remote meter reading in conjuction with the Japanese ECHONET home-area network protocol. Smart meters are
|
||||
connected to TEPCO's backend systems through the customer's internet connection, sub-gigahertz radio based on 802.15.4
|
||||
framing, regular landline internet or PLC\cite{toshiba01,sato01}.
|
||||
|
||||
A unique point in the Japanese utility metering landscape is that the current practice is monthly manual readings. In
|
||||
Japan residential utility meters are usually mounted outside the building on an exterior wall and every month someone
|
||||
|
|
@ -675,18 +677,19 @@ consumption but does incur significant pesonnel overhead. % TODO decide on citat
|
|||
\subsubsection{The USA}
|
||||
|
||||
In the USA the rollout of smart meters has been promoted by law as early as 2005. The US electricity market is highly
|
||||
complex with states having significant authority to decide on their own policies\cite{brown01}. Different from the IEC
|
||||
standards used in large fraction of the rest of the world, the USA have their own domestic set of standards for smart
|
||||
meters developed by ANSI\cite{sato01}. The main difference between IEC and ANSI-standard meters is that ANSI-standard
|
||||
meters are round devices that plug into a wall-mounted socket while IEC devices are usually rectangular and connected
|
||||
directly to the mains wiring through large screw terminals\cite{ifixit01}.
|
||||
complex with states having significant authority to decide on their own policies\cite{brown01}. Originally different
|
||||
from the IEC standards used in large fraction of the rest of the world the USA developed their own domestic set of
|
||||
standards for smart meters under the Americal National Standards Institute (ANSI)\cite{sato01}. Today ANSI is converging
|
||||
with the IEC on the protcol layer. An obvious feature of ANSI-standard meters is that they are round and plug into a
|
||||
wall-mounted socket while IEC devices are usually rectangular and connected directly to the mains wiring through large
|
||||
screw terminals\cite{ifixit01}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Common themes}
|
||||
|
||||
Researching the current situation around the world for the above sections we were able to distill some common themes.
|
||||
First, smart metering is slowly advancing on a global scale and despite significant reservations from privacy-conscious
|
||||
people and consumer advocates it seems it is here to stay. There are some notable exceptions of countries that have
|
||||
decided to scale-back an ongoing rollout effort after subsequent analysis showed economical or other
|
||||
people and consumer advocates it seems it is here to stay. Still, there are some notable exceptions of countries that
|
||||
have decided to scale-back an ongoing rollout effort after subsequent analysis showed economical or other
|
||||
issues\footnote{cf.\ the Netherlands and Germany}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{The introduction of smart metering}
|
||||
|
|
@ -696,8 +699,8 @@ rollout. The most prominent argument is a general increase in energy-efficiency
|
|||
This argument is based on the estimation that smart metering will increase private customers' awareness of their own
|
||||
consumption and this will lead them to reduce their consumption. The second highly popular argument for smart metering
|
||||
is that it is necessary for the widespread adoption of renewable energies. This argument again builds on the trend
|
||||
towards \emph{green} energy to rationalize smart metering. Often it is formulated as an \emph{inevitability} instead of
|
||||
a choice.
|
||||
towards green energy to rationalize smart metering. Interestingly this argument is often formulated as an inevitability
|
||||
instead of a choice.
|
||||
|
||||
Academic reception of smart metering is dyed with an almost unanimous enthusiasm. In particular smart meter
|
||||
communication infrastructure has received a large amount of research
|
||||
|
|
@ -707,46 +710,46 @@ interaction claims that smart meters will reduce customer energy consumption hav
|
|||
\subsubsection{Standardization and reality of smart devices}
|
||||
|
||||
Regulators, utilities and academics meet in their enthusiasm on the issue of smart home integration of smart metering. A
|
||||
feature of many setups is that the meter acts as the centerpiece of a modern, fully integrated smart
|
||||
feature of many concepts is that the meter acts as the centerpiece of a modern, fully integrated smart
|
||||
home\cite{aubel01,geelen01,bsi-tr-03109-1,abdallah01}. The smart meter serves as a communication hub between a new class
|
||||
of grid-aware loads and the utility company's control center. Large (usually thermal) loads such as dishwashers,
|
||||
refrigerators and air conditioners are forecasted to intelligently adapt their heating/cooling cycles to better match
|
||||
the grid's supply. A frequent scenario is that in which the meter bills the customer using near-real time pricing, and
|
||||
refrigerators and air conditioners are expected to intelligently adapt their heating/cooling cycles to better match
|
||||
the grid's supply. A frequent scenario is one in which the meter bills the customer using near-real time pricing, and
|
||||
supplies large loads in the customer's household with this pricing information. These loads then intelligently schedule
|
||||
their operation to minimize cost\cite{sato01}. At the time in the mid-2000nds when smart metering proposals were first
|
||||
advanced this vision might have been an effect of the \emph{law of the instrument}\cite{kaplan01,anderson02}. Back then
|
||||
outside of specialty applications household devices were not usually networked\cite{merz01}. Smart meters at the time
|
||||
may have seemed the obvious choice for a smart home communications hub.
|
||||
their operation to minimize cost\cite{sato01}. At the time between 2000 and 2005 when smart metering proposals were
|
||||
first advanced this vision might have been an effect of the \emph{law of the instrument}\cite{kaplan01,anderson02}. Back
|
||||
then outside of specialty applications household devices were not usually networked\cite{merz01}. Smart meters at the
|
||||
time may have seemed to be the obvious choice for a smart home communications hub.
|
||||
|
||||
From today's perspective, this idea is obviously outdated. Smart \emph{things} now have found their way into many homes.
|
||||
Only these things are directly interconnected through the internet--foregoing the home-area network (HAN) technologies
|
||||
anticipated by the smart metering pioneers. The simple reason for this is that nowadays anyone has Wifi, and Wifi
|
||||
anticipated by smart metering pioneers. The simple reason for this is that nowadays anyone has Wifi, and Wifi
|
||||
transceivers have become inexpensive enough to disappear in the bill of materials (BOM) cost of a large home device such
|
||||
as a washing machine. Smart meters are usually situated in the basement--physically far away from most of one's devices.
|
||||
This makes connecting them to said devices awkward and connecting them via the local Wifi lends the question why the
|
||||
smart devices should not simply use the internet in the first place.
|
||||
smart devices should not simply use the internet directly.
|
||||
|
||||
Connecting things to a smart meter through a local bus is academically appealing. It promises cost-savings from a
|
||||
simpler physical layer (such as ZigBee instead of Wifi) and it neatly separates concerns into \emph{home infrastructure}
|
||||
and the regular internet. Communication between smart meter and devices never leaves the house. This gives potential
|
||||
additional tolerance to utility backend systems breaking. It also physically keeps communication inside the house,
|
||||
bypassing the utility's eyes improving both customer privacy and agency. The presently popular model of a device as
|
||||
simple as a light switch proxying its every action through a manufacturer's servers somewhere on the public internet is
|
||||
in stark contrast to this scenario. Alas, the reason that this model is as popular is that in most cases it simply
|
||||
works. Device manufacturers simply integrate one of many off-the-shelf Wifi modules. The resulting device will work
|
||||
anywhere on earth\footnote{For some places channel assignments may have to be updated. This is a configuration-level
|
||||
change and in some devices is done by the end-user during provisioning.}. A HAN-connected device would have several
|
||||
variants with different modems for different standards. Some might work across countries, but some might not. And in
|
||||
some countriese there might not even be a standard for smart grid HANs.
|
||||
simpler physical layer (such as ZigBee instead of Wifi) and it neatly separates concerns into home infrastructure and
|
||||
the regular internet. Communication between smart meter and devices never leaves the house. This promises tolerance to
|
||||
utility backend systems breaking. It also physically keeps communication inside the house, bypassing the utility's eyes
|
||||
improving both customer privacy and agency. The presently popular model of a device as simple as a light bulb proxying
|
||||
its every action through a manufacturer's servers somewhere on the public internet is in stark contrast to this
|
||||
scenario. Alas, the reason that this model is as popular is that in most cases it simply works. Device manufacturers
|
||||
integrate one of many off-the-shelf Wifi modules. The resulting device will work anywhere on earth\footnote{For some
|
||||
places channel assignments may have to be updated. This is a configuration-level change and in some devices can be done
|
||||
by the end-user during provisioning.}. A HAN-connected device would have several variants with different modems for
|
||||
different standards. Some might work across countries, but some might not. And in some countries there might not even be
|
||||
a standard for smart grid HANs.
|
||||
|
||||
Looking at the situation like this begs the question why this realization has not yet found its way into mainstream
|
||||
acceptance by smart metering implementors. The customer-facing functionality promised through smart meters would be
|
||||
simple to implement as part of a now-standard \emph{internet of things} application. An in-home display that shows
|
||||
real-time energy consumption and cost statistics would simply be an android tablet fetching summarized data from the
|
||||
utility's billing backend. Demand-side response by large loads would be as simple as an HTTP request with a token
|
||||
identifying the customer's contract that returns the electricity price the meter is currently charging along with a
|
||||
recommendation to switch on or off. It seems the smart home has already arrived while smart metering standardization is
|
||||
still getting off the starting blocks\cite{anderson02}.
|
||||
simple to implement as part of a now-standard \emph{Internet of Things} application. An in-home display that shows
|
||||
real time energy consumption and cost statistics would simply be an Android tablet fetching summarized data from the
|
||||
utility's billing backend. Custom hardware for this purposes seems anachronistic today. Demand-side response by large
|
||||
loads would be as simple as an HTTPS request with a token identifying the customer's contract that returns the
|
||||
electricity price the meter is currently charging along with a recommendation to switch on or off. It seems the smart
|
||||
home has already arrived while smart metering is still getting off the starting blocks\cite{anderson02}.
|
||||
% TODO is this too critical? Is maybe the modern smart home compatible with smart meters? Is maybe the local-only path
|
||||
% of data, avoiding utility clouds a design feature? (may be true in DE, NL, probably not anywhere else)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -754,36 +757,27 @@ still getting off the starting blocks\cite{anderson02}.
|
|||
|
||||
The smart grid in practice is nothing more or less than an aggregation of embedded control and measurement devices that
|
||||
are part of a large control system. This implies that all the same security concerns that apply to embedded systems in
|
||||
general also apply to most components of a smart grid in some way. Where programmers have been struggling for decades
|
||||
now with input validation\cite{leveson01}, the same potential issue raises security concerns in smart grid scenarios as
|
||||
well\cite{mo01, lee01}. Only, in smart grid we have two complicating factors present: Many components are embedded
|
||||
systems, and as such inherently hard to update. Also, the smart grid and its control algorithms act as a large
|
||||
(partially-)distributed system, making problems such as input validation or authentication difficult to
|
||||
implement\cite{blaze01} and adding a host of distributed systems problems on top\cite{lamport01}.
|
||||
general also apply to most components of a smart grid. Where programmers have been struggling for decades now with input
|
||||
validation\cite{leveson01}, the same potential issue raises security concerns in smart grid scenarios as well\cite{mo01,
|
||||
lee01}. Only, in smart grid we have two complicating factors present: Many components are embedded systems, and as such
|
||||
inherently hard to update. Also, the smart grid and its control algorithms act as a large (partially-)distributed
|
||||
system making problems such as input validation or authentication harder\cite{blaze01} and adding a host of distributed
|
||||
systems problems on top\cite{lamport01}.
|
||||
|
||||
Given that the electrical grid is a major piece of essential infrastructure in modern civilization, these problems
|
||||
amount to significant issues in practice. Attacks on the electrical grid may have grave
|
||||
consequences\cite{anderson01,lee01} all the while the long maintenance cycles of various components make the system slow
|
||||
to adapt. Thus, components for the smart grid need to be built to a much higher standard of security than most consumer
|
||||
devices to ensure they live up to well-funded attackers even decades down the road. This requirement intensifies the
|
||||
challenges of embedded security and distributed systems security among others that are inherent in any modern complex
|
||||
technological system. The safety-critical nature of modern smart metering ecosystems in particular was quickly
|
||||
recognized by security experts\cite{anderson01}.
|
||||
Given that the electrical grid is essential infrastructure in our modern civilization, these problems amount to
|
||||
significant issues in practice. Attacks on the electrical grid may have grave consequences\cite{anderson01,lee01} while
|
||||
the long maintenance cycles of various components make the system slow to adapt. Thus, components for the smart grid
|
||||
need to be built to a much higher standard of security than most consumer devices to ensure they live up to well-funded
|
||||
attackers even decades down the road. This requirement intensifies the challenges of embedded security and distributed
|
||||
systems security among others that are inherent in any modern complex technological system. The safety-critical nature
|
||||
of the modern smart metering ecosystem in particular was quickly recognized by security experts\cite{anderson01}.
|
||||
|
||||
A point we will not consider in much depth is theft of electricity. An incentive for the introduction of smart metering
|
||||
that is frequently cited in utility industry publications outside of a general public's view is the reduction of
|
||||
electricity theft\cite{czechowski01}. Academic papers tend to either focus on other benefits such as generation
|
||||
efficiency gains through better forecasting or try to rationalize the funamentally anti-consumer nature of smart
|
||||
metering with strenuous claims of ``enormous social benefits''\cite{mcdaniel01}. Academics rarely point out the large
|
||||
economical incentive such \emph{revenue protection} mechanisms provide\cite{anderson01,anderson02}.
|
||||
|
||||
This thesis will entirely focus on grid stability and discard electricity theft. For the attack scenarios we lay out
|
||||
billing inaccuracies of utility companies are of very low urgency compared to grid stability. In fact stability is a
|
||||
precondition for billing to happen. Additionally utility companies can already limit the volume of theft by
|
||||
cross-refrencing meter readings against trusted readings from upstream sections of the grid. This capability works even
|
||||
without smart meters and only gains speed from smart meters. A smart meter cannot prevent the customer from bypassing it
|
||||
with a section of wire. Due to the limit on its volume, electricity theft using smart meter hacking would not scale.
|
||||
Hackers would quickly be triangulated with no damage to consumers and limited damage to utility companies.
|
||||
A point we will not consider in much depth in this work is theft of electricity. An incentive for the introduction of
|
||||
smart metering that is frequently cited in utility industry publications outside of a general public's view is the
|
||||
reduction of electricity theft\cite{czechowski01}. Academic publications tend to either focus on other benefits such as
|
||||
generation efficiency gains through better forecasting or rationalize the consumer-unfriendly aspects of smart metering
|
||||
with ``enormous social benefits''\cite{mcdaniel01}. They do not usually point out the economical incentive such
|
||||
\emph{revenue protection} mechanisms provide\cite{anderson01,anderson02}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Privacy in the smart grid}
|
||||
|
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|
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