thesis: expand introduction
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jaseg
parent
6dd75fd080
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7 changed files with 73594 additions and 2279 deletions
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@ -10,22 +10,33 @@ height = case_inside_h - case_standoff_h - pcb_h - switch_h - glue_h - tolerance
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eps = 0.01;
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base_w = 20;
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base_h = base_w;
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base_d = 3;
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stem_w = 7;
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base_d = 5;
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stem_w = 10;
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stem_h = stem_w;
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plunger_w = 20;
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plunger_h = 25;
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plunger_d = 3;
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module narf(w, h, d) {
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translate([0, 0, 1])
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minkowski(){
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cube([w-2*d, h-2*d, eps], center=true);
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cylinder(d, d, 0, $fn=32);
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};
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minkowski(){
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cube([base_w, base_h, eps], center=true);
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cylinder(base_d, base_d, 0, $fn=32);
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};
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minkowski(){
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cube([w-2*d, h-2*d, eps], center=true);
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cylinder(1, d, d, $fn=32);
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};
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}
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translate([0, 0, height/2])
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cube([stem_w, stem_h, height], center=true);
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rotate ([0, 180, 0]) {
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narf(base_w, base_h, base_d);
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translate([0, 0, height-plunger_d])
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translate([0, 0, plunger_d/2])
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cube([plunger_w, plunger_h, plunger_d], center=true);
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translate([0, 0, height/2])
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cube([stem_w, stem_h, height], center=true);
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translate([0, 0, height])
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mirror([0, 0, 1])
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narf(plunger_w, plunger_h, plunger_d);
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}
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@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ DEF Regulator_Linear_AP1117-33 U 0 10 Y Y 1 F N
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F0 "U" -150 125 50 H V C CNN
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F1 "Regulator_Linear_AP1117-33" 0 125 50 H V L CNN
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F2 "Package_TO_SOT_SMD:SOT-223-3_TabPin2" 0 200 50 H I C CNN
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F3 "" 100 -250 50 H I C CNN
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F3 "http://www.diodes.com/datasheets/AP1117.pdf" 100 -250 50 H I C CNN
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$FPLIST
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SOT?223*TabPin2*
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$ENDFPLIST
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@ -705,6 +705,7 @@ S -200 -200 200 75 0 1 10 f
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X GND 1 0 -300 100 U 50 50 1 1 W
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X VO 2 300 0 100 L 50 50 1 1 w
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X VI 3 -300 0 100 R 50 50 1 1 W
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X PAD 4 300 -100 100 L 50 50 1 1 w
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ENDDRAW
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ENDDEF
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#
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@ -714,7 +715,7 @@ DEF Regulator_Linear_NCP1117-12_SOT223 U 0 10 Y Y 1 F N
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F0 "U" -150 125 50 H V C CNN
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F1 "Regulator_Linear_NCP1117-12_SOT223" 0 125 50 H V L CNN
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F2 "Package_TO_SOT_SMD:SOT-223-3_TabPin2" 0 200 50 H I C CNN
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F3 "" 100 -250 50 H I C CNN
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F3 "http://www.diodes.com/datasheets/AP1117.pdf" 100 -250 50 H I C CNN
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ALIAS AP1117-18 AP1117-25 AP1117-33 AP1117-50 LD1117S33TR_SOT223 LD1117S12TR_SOT223 LD1117S18TR_SOT223 LD1117S25TR_SOT223 LD1117S50TR_SOT223 NCP1117-12_SOT223 NCP1117-1.5_SOT223 NCP1117-1.8_SOT223 NCP1117-2.0_SOT223 NCP1117-2.5_SOT223 NCP1117-2.85_SOT223 NCP1117-3.3_SOT223 NCP1117-5.0_SOT223 AMS1117-1.5 AMS1117-1.8 AMS1117-2.5 AMS1117-2.85 AMS1117-3.3 AMS1117-5.0
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$FPLIST
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SOT?223*TabPin2*
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@ -724,6 +725,7 @@ S -200 -200 200 75 0 1 10 f
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X GND 1 0 -300 100 U 50 50 1 1 W
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X VO 2 300 0 100 L 50 50 1 1 w
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X VI 3 -300 0 100 R 50 50 1 1 W
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X PAD 4 300 -100 100 L 50 50 1 1 w
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ENDDRAW
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ENDDEF
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#
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@ -3007,4 +3007,17 @@ Wire Wire Line
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1975 9050 2525 9050
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Text Label 14950 4400 2 50 ~ 0
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LED_STB
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$Comp
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L 4xxx:bom_item E?
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U 1 1 5DBC606B
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P 12700 7050
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F 0 "E?" H 12618 7096 50 0000 L CNN
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F 1 "MicroSDHC-Speicherkarte 8GB - Kingston Industrial Temperature" H 12618 7005 50 0000 L CNN
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F 2 "" H 12700 7050 50 0001 C CNN
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F 3 "" H 12700 7050 50 0001 C CNN
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F 4 "https://www.reichelt.de/microsdhc-speicherkarte-8gb-kingston-industrial-temperature-sdcit-8gb-p207884.html?&trstct=pos_13" H 12700 7050 50 0001 C CNN "Link"
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F 5 "SDCIT/8GB" H 12700 7050 50 0001 C CNN "Reichelt"
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1 12700 7050
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1 0 0 -1
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$EndComp
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$EndSCHEMATC
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619
ma/safety_reset.bib
Normal file
619
ma/safety_reset.bib
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@ -0,0 +1,619 @@
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@online{bnetza1,
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author = {Bundesnetzagentur},
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publisher = {Bundesnetzagentur},
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title = {Smart Meter},
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919100204/https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetundGas/Verbraucher/NetzanschlussUndMessung/SmartMetering/SmartMeter_node.html},
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urldate = {2019-09-19},
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year = {2019}
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}
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@online{bmwi1,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik} and {Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie}},
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month = jan,
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publisher = {Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie},
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title = {Standardisierungsstrategie zur sektor{\"u}bergreifenden Digitalisierung nach dem Gesetz zur Digitalisierung der Energiewende},
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919100713/https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/S-T/standardisierungsstrategie.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4},
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urldate = {2019-09-19},
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year = {2019}
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}
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@online{bsi-tr-03109,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
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month = nov,
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organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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title = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102010/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR03109.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
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urldate = 2019-09-19,
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year = {2015}
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}
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-1,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
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||||
month = jan,
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||||
number = {v1.0.1},
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||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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title = {TR-03109-1: Anforderungen an die Interoperabilit{\"a}t der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems},
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102217/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR03109-1.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
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urldate = 2019-09-19,
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||||
year = {2019}
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||||
}
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-6,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
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month = nov,
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||||
number = {v1.0},
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||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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title = {TR-03109-6: Smart Meter Gateway Administration},
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102651/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-6-Smart_Meter_Gateway_Administration.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=4},
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urldate = 2019-09-19,
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||||
year = {2015}
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||||
}
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-4,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
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month = aug,
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number = {v1.2.1},
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||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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title = {TR-03109-4: Public Key Infrastruktur f{\"u}r Smart Meter Gateways},
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102649/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-4_PKI.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
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urldate = 2019-09-19,
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year = {2017}
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||||
}
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-2,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
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month = dec,
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number = {v1.1},
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organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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title = {TR-03109-2: Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an die Funktionalit{\"a}t und Interoperabilit{\"a}t des Sicherheitsmoduls},
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102644/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-2-Anforderungen_an_die_Funktionalitaet.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
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||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
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year = {2014}
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||||
}
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-3,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
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month = apr,
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||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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||||
title = {TR-03109-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben f{\"u}r die Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsystemen},
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||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102648/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-3_Kryptographische_Vorgaben.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=1},
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||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2014}
|
||||
}
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||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-I,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
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||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage I: CMS-Datenformat f{\"u}r die Inhaltsdatenverschl{\"u}sselung und -signatur},
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||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919104234/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1\_Anlage\_CMS.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2\_cid351?\_\_blob=publicationFile\&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-II,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage II: COSEM/HTTP Webservices},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919104234/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1\_Anlage\_CMS.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2\_cid351?\_\_blob=publicationFile\&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2012}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IIIb,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
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month = mar,
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||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
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title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage III: Feinspezifikation "Drahtlose LMN-Schnittstelle" Teil b: "OMS Technical Report Security"},
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110101/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Feinspezifikation_Drahtlose_LMN-Schnittstelle-Teil2.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IIIa,
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
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month = mar,
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||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
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title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage III: Feinspezifikation "Drahtlose LMN-Schnittstelle" Teil a: "OMS Specification Volume 2, Primary Communication"},
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110054/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Feinspezifikation_Drahtlose_LMN-Schnittstelle.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IVa,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage IV: Feinspezifikation "Drahtgebundene LMN-Schnittstelle" Teil a: "HDLC f{\"u}r LMN"},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110101/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Feinspezifikation_Drahtlose_LMN-Schnittstelle-Teil2.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IVb,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage IV: Feinspezifikation "Drahtgebundene LMN-Schnittstelle" Teil b: "SML Smart Message Language"},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110756/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1\_Anlage\_Feinspezifikation\_Drahtgebundene\_LMN-Schnittstelle\_Teilb.pdf jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2\_cid351?\_\_blob=publicationFile\&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-VI,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage VI: Betriebsprozesse},
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||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111203/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Betriebsprozesse.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=1},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-VII,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = jan,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage VII: Interoperabilit{\"a}tsmodell und Ger{\"a}teprofile f{\"u}r Smart-Meter- Gateways},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111350/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Interop-Modell-Geraeteprofile.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2019}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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@online{bsi-tr-03109-2-a,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.1},
|
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month = dec,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-2 Anhang A: Smart Meter Gateway Sicherheitsmodul Use Cases},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111540/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-2-Sicherheitsmodul_Use_Cases.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
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year = {2014}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-2-b,
|
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
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edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = jun,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-2 Anhang B: Smart Meter Mini-HSM Anforderungen an die Funktionalit{\"a}t und Interoperabilit{\"a}t des Sicherheitsmoduls},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111832/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-2_Anhang_B_Smart_Meter_Mini_HSM.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
|
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urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
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year = {2017}
|
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}
|
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|
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@online{bsi-tr-03116-3,
|
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116 Kryptographische Vorgaben f{\"u}r Projekte der Bundesregierung},
|
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month = jan,
|
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organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
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title = {TR-03116-3: Intelligente Messsysteme},
|
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919112052/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03116/BSI-TR-03116-3.pdf; jsessionid=CB56FC0D3137C5624CA697AB9E57671F.1_cid360?__blob=publicationFile&v=9},
|
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urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
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year = {2019}
|
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}
|
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|
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|
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
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booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
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edition = {00.91},
|
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month = jan,
|
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organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
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title = {TR-03109-TS-1: Testkonzept zu BSI TR-03109-1},
|
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919112310/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-TS-1_Testkonzept.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=1},
|
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|
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|
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|
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author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
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edition = {v1.5},
|
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month = jan,
|
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organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
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title = {TR-Pr{\"u}fstellen: Anforderungen an Antragsteller zur Anerkennung als Pr{\"u}fstelle im Bereich Technischer Richtlinien},
|
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url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919112552/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Zertifizierung/TR-Pruefstellen.pdf; jsessionid=A6B4CB8AD2C038741C656276CE874B61.2_cid369?__blob=publicationFile&v=10},
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publisher = {KIT University of the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and National Research Center of the Helmholtz Association},
|
||||
title = {Formal verification of industrial C code using Frama-C: a case study},
|
||||
year = {2010}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inbook{rogers01,
|
||||
author = {Graham Rogers},
|
||||
publisher = {Kluwer},
|
||||
title = {Power System Oscillations},
|
||||
year = {2000}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@proceedings{grebe01,
|
||||
author = {E. Grebe and J. Kabouris and S. L{\'o}pez Barba and W. Sattinger and W. Winter},
|
||||
doi = { 10.1109/PES.2010.5589932 {\textperiodcentered}},
|
||||
journaltitle = {IEEE PES General Meeting},
|
||||
month = aug,
|
||||
publisher = {IEEE},
|
||||
title = {Low Frequency Oscillations in the Interconnected System of Continental Europe},
|
||||
year = {2010}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{mcdaniel01,
|
||||
author = {McDaniel Patrick and McLaughlin Stephen},
|
||||
journaltitle = {Secure Systems},
|
||||
month = may,
|
||||
organization = {IEEE},
|
||||
title = {Security and Privacy Challenges in the Smart Grid},
|
||||
year = {2009}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{schafer01,
|
||||
author = {Benjamin Sch{\"a}fer and Moritz Matthiae and Marc Timme and Dirk Witthaut},
|
||||
doi = { doi:10.1088/1367-2630/17/1/015002
|
||||
},
|
||||
journaltitle = {New Journal of Physics},
|
||||
month = jan,
|
||||
publisher = {IOP/DPG},
|
||||
title = {Decentral Smart Grid Control},
|
||||
volume = {17},
|
||||
year = {2015}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@article{kosut01,
|
||||
author = {Oliver Kosut and Liyan Jia and Robert J. Thomas and Lang Tong},
|
||||
journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid},
|
||||
month = nov,
|
||||
number = {4},
|
||||
pages = {645-658},
|
||||
publisher = {IEEE},
|
||||
title = {Malicious Data Attacks on the Smart Grid},
|
||||
volume = {2},
|
||||
year = {2011}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{schneier01,
|
||||
author = {Bruce Schneier},
|
||||
journaltitle = {Crypto-Gram May 15 2002},
|
||||
month = may,
|
||||
publisher = {Counterplane Internet Security},
|
||||
title = {Secrecy, Security, and Obscurity},
|
||||
url = {https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2002/0515.html},
|
||||
year = {2002}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -89,6 +89,14 @@
|
|||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Smart metering}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Smart meter technology}
|
||||
\subsubsection{Common components}
|
||||
|
||||
Smart meters usually are built around a standard microcontroller. \label{sm-cpu}
|
||||
\subsubsection{Cryptographic coprocessors}
|
||||
\subsubsection{Physical structure}
|
||||
\subsubsection{Physical installation}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Regulatory frameworks around the world}
|
||||
\subsection{International standards}
|
||||
\subsection{Regulations in Europe}
|
||||
|
|
@ -117,6 +125,22 @@ grid need to be built to a much higher standard of security than most consumer d
|
|||
well-funded attackers even decades down the road. This requirement intensifies the challenges of embedded security and
|
||||
distributed systems security among others that are inherent in any modern complex technological system.
|
||||
|
||||
A point we will not consider in much depth is theft of electricity. A large part of the motivation of the introduction
|
||||
of smart meters seems to be % TODO weak statement
|
||||
to reduce the level of fraud by consumers. Academic papers tend to either focus on other benefits such as generation
|
||||
efficiency gains through better forecasting or try to rationalize the funamentally anti-consumer nature of smart
|
||||
metering with strenuous claims of ``enormous social benefits''\cite{mcdaniel01}. We will entirely focus on grid
|
||||
stability and discard electricity theft in the context of this paper for two reasons: One, billing inaccuracies of
|
||||
electricity companies are of very low urgency compared to grid stability, and the one is a precondition for the other.
|
||||
Two, utility companies can already put strong bounds on the amount of theft by simply cross-refrencing meter readings
|
||||
against trusted readings from upstream sections of the grid. This capability works even without smart meters and only
|
||||
gains speed from smart meters, just as the old exploit of bypassing the meter with a section of wire can't be prevented
|
||||
like this.
|
||||
|
||||
Due to these bounds on its volume, electricity theft using smart meter hacking would not scale. Hackers would simply be
|
||||
rooted up one by one with no damage to consumers and very limmited damage to utility companies. Damage in these
|
||||
scenarios would be a far cry from the efficiency of an exponentially growing botnet.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Smart grid components as embedded devices}
|
||||
A fundamental challenge in smart grid implementations is the central role smart electricity meters play. Smart meters
|
||||
are used both for highly-granular load measurement and (in some countries) load switching\cite{zheng01}.
|
||||
|
|
@ -128,8 +152,9 @@ against attacks and simplify updates. Combined with the small market sizes in sm
|
|||
\footnote{
|
||||
Most vendors of smart electricity meters only serve a handful of markets. For the most part, smart meter development
|
||||
cost lies in the meter's software % TODO cite?
|
||||
and most countries use their own home-grown standards, creating a large development burden for new market entrants
|
||||
\cite{cenelec01}.
|
||||
There exist multiple competing standards applicable to various parts of a smart electricity meter. In addition,
|
||||
most countries have their own certification regimen\cite{cenelec01}. This complexity creates a large development
|
||||
burden for new market entrants.
|
||||
}
|
||||
this produces a high cost pressure on the software development process for smart electricity meters.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -194,6 +219,12 @@ service attack. Thus, in addition to cryptographic security safety under DoS con
|
|||
continued system performance under attacks. This safety property is identical with the safety required to withstand
|
||||
random outages of components, such as communications link outages due to physical damage from storms, flooding etc.
|
||||
% FIXME cite papers on attack impact, on coutermeasures and on attack realization
|
||||
In general, attacks at the meter level may be hard to weaponize % may be -> weak statement?
|
||||
since meters are used mostly for billing and forecasting purposes % FIXME cite
|
||||
and for more critical grid control purposes there exist several additional layers of sensors above smart meters that
|
||||
limit how much an attacker can falsify smart meter readings without the manipulation being obvious. In order for an
|
||||
attack to have more far-reaching consequences the attacker would need to compromise additional grid
|
||||
infrastructure\cite{kim01,kosut01}.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Exploiting centralized control systems}
|
||||
The type of smart grid attack most often cited in popular discourse, and to the author's knowledge % FIXME verify, cite
|
||||
|
|
@ -245,8 +276,8 @@ access to thousands of devices hidden inaccessible in private homes.
|
|||
By compromising smart electricity meters, an attacker can trivially forge the distributed energy measurements these
|
||||
devices perform. In a best-case scenario, this might only affect billing and lead to customers being under- or
|
||||
over-charged if the attack is not noticed in time. However, in a less ideal scenario the energy measurements taken by
|
||||
these devices migth be used to inform the grid centralized control systems % FIXME cite (straightforward)
|
||||
and a falsification of these measurements might lead to inefficiency or even instability.
|
||||
these devices migth be used to inform the grid centralized control systems % FIXME cite
|
||||
and a falsification of these measurements might lead to inefficiency.
|
||||
|
||||
In some countries and for some customers, these smart meters have one additional function that is highly useful to an
|
||||
attacker: They contain high-current load switches to disconnect the entire household or business in case electricity
|
||||
|
|
@ -266,9 +297,76 @@ that was mentioned above, this scenario poses a serious danger to grid stability
|
|||
\subsection{Practical attacks}
|
||||
\subsection{Practical threats}
|
||||
\subsection{Conclusion, or why we are doomed}
|
||||
We can conclude that a compromise of a large number of smart electricity meters cannot be ruled out. The complexity of
|
||||
network-connected smart meter firmware makes it exceedingly unlikely that it is in fact flawless. Large-scale
|
||||
deployments of these devices under some circumstances such as where they are used with load disconnect relays make them
|
||||
an attractive target for attackers interested in causing grid instability. The attacker model for these devices very
|
||||
definitely includes enemy states, who have considerable resources at their disposal.
|
||||
|
||||
For a reasonable guarantee that no large-scale compromises of hard- and software built today will happen over a span of
|
||||
some decades, we would have to radically simplify its design and limit attack surface. Unfortunately, the complexity of
|
||||
smart electricity meter implementations mostly stems from the large list of requirements these devices have to conform
|
||||
with. Additionally, standards have already been written and changes that reduce scope or functionality have become
|
||||
exceedingly unlikely at this point.
|
||||
|
||||
A general observation with smart grid systems of any kind is that they comprise a zealous departure of the decentralized
|
||||
control structure of yesterday's dumb grid and the advent of centralization at an enormous scale. This modern,
|
||||
centralized infrastructure has been carefully designed to defend against malicious actors%FIXME cite
|
||||
and all involved parties have an interest in keeping it secure. Still, like in any other system this centralization also
|
||||
makes a very attractive target for attackers since an attacker can likewise employ this centralized control to their
|
||||
goals. Fundamentally, decentralized systems tend to make attacks of any kind a lot more costly and one might question
|
||||
whether security has truly been gained during smart grid rollout. % FIXME hot take maybe
|
||||
|
||||
\chapter{Restoring endpoint safety in an age of smart devices}
|
||||
If as layed out in the previous paragraph we cannot rule out a large-scale compromise of smart energy meters, we have to
|
||||
rephrase our claim to security. If we cannot rule out exploitation, we have to limit its impact. If we assume that we
|
||||
cannot strip any functionality from smart meters since it may be required by standards or for enormous social
|
||||
benefits\cite{mcdaniel01} % FIXME is sarcasm ok here?
|
||||
all we can do is to flush out an attacker once they are in.
|
||||
|
||||
In a worst-case scenario an attacker would gain unconstrained code execution e.g. by exploiting a flaw in a network
|
||||
protocol implentation. Since smart meters use standard microcontrollers that do not have advanced memory protection
|
||||
functions (see pg. \ref{sm-cpu}), at this point we can assume the attacker has full control over the main
|
||||
microcontroller. With this control they can actuate the load switch if present, transmit data through the device's
|
||||
communication interfaces or use the user interface components such as LEDs and the LCD. Using the self-programming
|
||||
capabilities of modern flash microcontrollers, an attacker may even gain persistency without much trouble. Note that in
|
||||
systems separating cryptographic functions into some form of cryptographic module such as systems used in Germany
|
||||
% TODO list other countries as well? FIXME cite BSI standard requiring this
|
||||
we can be optimistic and assume the attacker has not in fact compromised this cryptographic co-processor yet and does
|
||||
not have access to any cryptographic secrets yet.
|
||||
|
||||
Given that the attacker has complete control over the meter's core microcontroller and given that due to cost
|
||||
constraints we are bound to use whatever microcontroller the meter OEM has chosen for their design, we cannot rely on
|
||||
software running on the core mircocontroller to restore system integrity.
|
||||
|
||||
Our solution to this problem is to add another, very small microcontroller to the smart meter design. This
|
||||
microcontroller will contain a small piece of software to receive cryptographically authenticated commands from utility
|
||||
companies and on demand reset the meter's core microcontroller to a known-good state. We have to assume the code in the
|
||||
core controller's flash memory has been compromised, so our only option to flush out an attacker is to re-program the
|
||||
core microcontroller in its entirety. We propose using JTAG to re-program the core microcontroller
|
||||
% TODO get terminology consistent. Is "core microcontroller" a good term here?
|
||||
with a known-good firmware image read from a sufficiently large SPI flash connected to the reset controller. JTAG is
|
||||
supported by most microcontrollers complex enough to end up in a smart meter design % TODO colloquialism
|
||||
and given adequate documentation JTAG programming functionality can be ported to new microcontrollers with relatively
|
||||
little work.
|
||||
|
||||
On the microcontroller side our solution requires the JTAG interface to be activated (i.e. not fused-shut) and for our
|
||||
solution to work core microcontroller firmware must not be able to permanently disable the JTAG interface from within.
|
||||
In microcontrollers that do not yet provide this functionality this is a minor change that could be added to a custom
|
||||
microcontroller variant at low cost. On most microcontrollers keeping JTAG open should not interfere with code readout
|
||||
protection. Code secrecy should be of no concern\cite{schneier01} here but besides security manufacturers have strong
|
||||
preferences about this due to fear of copyright infringement.
|
||||
|
||||
\section{The theory of endpoint safety}
|
||||
In order to gain anything by adding our reset controller to the smart meter's already complex design we must satisfy two
|
||||
conditions.
|
||||
\begin{enumerate}
|
||||
\item \textbf{security} means our reset controller itself does not have any exploitable flaws
|
||||
\item \textbf{safety} menas our reset controller will perform its job as intended
|
||||
\end{enumerate}
|
||||
|
||||
% FIXME expand
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Attack characteristics}
|
||||
\subsection{Complex microcontroller firmware}
|
||||
\subsection{Modern microcontroller hardware}
|
||||
|
|
@ -313,6 +411,21 @@ that was mentioned above, this scenario poses a serious danger to grid stability
|
|||
\section{Technical standardization}
|
||||
\section{Regulatory adoption}
|
||||
\section{Practical implementation}
|
||||
\section{Zones of trust}
|
||||
In our design, we opted for a safety reset controller
|
||||
% FIXME is "safety reset" the proper name here? We need some sort of branding, but is this here really about "safety"?
|
||||
in form of a separate micocontroller entirely separate from whatever application microcontroller the smart meter design
|
||||
is already using.
|
||||
|
||||
This design nicely separates the meter into an untrusted application (the core microcontroller) and the trusted reset
|
||||
controller. Since the interface between the two is simple and logically one-way, it can be validated to a high standard
|
||||
of security.
|
||||
|
||||
Despite these security benefits, the cost of such a separate hardware device might prove high in a mass-market rollout.
|
||||
In this case, one might attempt to integrate the reset controller into the core microcontroller in some way. Primarily,
|
||||
there would be two ways to accomplish this.
|
||||
% separate die/submodule
|
||||
% trustzone
|
||||
|
||||
\newpage
|
||||
\appendix
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue