Initial commit
This commit is contained in:
jaseg
parent
f2c7387637
commit
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4 changed files with 515 additions and 461 deletions
19
ma/Makefile
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19
ma/Makefile
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SHELL := bash
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.ONESHELL:
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.SHELLFLAGS := -eu -o pipefail -c
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.DELETE_ON_ERROR:
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MAKEFLAGS += --warn-undefined-variables
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MAKEFLAGS += --no-builtin-rules
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all: safety_reset.pdf
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%.pdf: %.tex %.bib
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pdflatex $<
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biber $*
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pdflatex $<
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.PHONY: clean
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clean:
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rm -f safety_reset.aux safety_reset.bbl safety_reset.bcf safety_reset.log safety_reset.blg
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rm -f safety_reset.out safety_reset.run.xml texput.log
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160
ma/murks.tex
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160
ma/murks.tex
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% LaTeX-Vorlage für die Titelseite und Selbständigkeitserklärung einer Abschlussarbeit
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% basierend auf der vorigen Institutsvorlage des Instituts für Informatik
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% sowie der Vorlage für Promotionsarbeiten.
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%
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% erweitert: 2014-06-12 Dennis Schneider <dschneid@informatik.hu-berlin.de>
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% gepunktete Linie unter Objekt:
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\newcommand{\TitelPunkte}[1]{%
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\tikz[baseline=(todotted.base)]{
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\node[inner sep=1pt,outer sep=0pt] (todotted) {#1};
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\draw[dotted] (todotted.south west) -- (todotted.south east);
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}%
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}%
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% gepunktete Linie mit gegebener Länge:
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\newcommand{\TitelPunktLinie}[1]{\TitelPunkte{\makebox[#1][l]{}}}
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\makeatletter
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\newcommand*{\@titelTitel}{Titel der Arbeit}
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\newcommand{\titel}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelTitel}{#1}} % Titel der Arbeit
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\newcommand*{\@titelArbeit}{Arbeitstyp}
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\newcommand{\typ}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelArbeit}{#1}} % Typ der Arbeit
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\newcommand*{\@titelGrad}{akademischer Grad}
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\newcommand{\grad}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelGrad}{#1}} % Akademischer Grad
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\newcommand*{\@titelAutor}{Autor}
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\newcommand{\autor}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelAutor}{#1}} % Autor der Arbeit
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\newcommand*{\@titelGeburtsdatum}{\TitelPunktLinie{2cm}}
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\newcommand{\gebdatum}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelGeburtsdatum}{#1}} % Geburtsdatum des Autors
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\newcommand*{\@titelGeburtsort}{\TitelPunktLinie{5cm}}
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\newcommand{\gebort}[1]{\renewcommand*{\@titelGeburtsort}{#1}} % Geburtsort des Autors
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\newcommand*{\@titelGutachterA}{\TitelPunktLinie{5cm}}
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\newcommand*{\@titelGutachterB}{\TitelPunktLinie{5cm}}
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\newcommand{\gutachter}[2]{\renewcommand*{\@titelGutachterA}{#1}\renewcommand*{\@titelGutachterB}{#2}} % Erst- und Zweitgutachter
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\newcommand*{\@titelEinreichungsdatum}{\TitelPunktLinie{3cm}} % Datum der Einreichung, wird nicht vom Studenten ausgefüllt
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\newcommand*{\@titelVerteidigungsdatum}{} % Verteidigungstext, wird nicht vom Studenten ausgefüllt
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\newcommand{\mitverteidigung}{\renewcommand*{\@titelVerteidigungsdatum}{verteidigt am: \,\,\TitelPunktLinie{3cm}}} % Verteidigungsplatzhalter erzeugen
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\newcommand*{\@wastwoside}{}
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% Titelseite erzeugen:
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\newcommand{\makeTitel}{%
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% Speichere, ob doppelseitiges Layout gewählt wurde:
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\if@twoside%
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\renewcommand*{\@wastwoside}{twoside}
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\else
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\renewcommand*{\@wastwoside}{twoside=false}
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\fi
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\begin{titlepage}
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% Ändern der Einrückungen
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\newlength{\parindentbak} \setlength{\parindentbak}{\parindent}
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\newlength{\parskipbak} \setlength{\parskipbak}{\parskip}
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\setlength{\parindent}{0pt}
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\setlength{\parskip}{\baselineskip}
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\thispagestyle{empty}
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\begin{minipage}[c][3cm][c]{12cm}
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\textsc{%
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% optischer Randausgleich per Hand:
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\hspace{-0.4mm}\textls*[68]{\Large Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin}\\
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\normalsize \textls*[45]{
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Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät\\
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Institut für Informatik
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}
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}
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\end{minipage}
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\hfill
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% Also wenn schon serifenlose Schriften (Titel), dann ganz oder gar nicht
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\sffamily
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\vfill
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\begin{center}
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\begin{doublespace}
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\vspace{\baselineskip}
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{\LARGE \textbf{\@titelTitel}}\\
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%\vspace{1\baselineskip}
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{\Large
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\@titelArbeit\\
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zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades\\
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\@titelGrad
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\vspace{\baselineskip}
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}
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\end{doublespace}
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\end{center}
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\vfill
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\newcolumntype{L}{>{\raggedright\arraybackslash}X}
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{\large \raggedleft
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\begin{tabularx}{\textwidth}{l@{\,\,\raggedright~}L} % verbreiterter Abstand zwischen Feldern wurde gewünscht
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eingereicht von: & \@titelAutor\\
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geboren am: & {\@titelGeburtsdatum}\\
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geboren in: & \@titelGeburtsort
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\vspace{0.5\baselineskip}\\
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Gutachter/innen: & \@titelGutachterA \\
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& \@titelGutachterB
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\vspace{0.5\baselineskip}\\
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eingereicht am: & \@titelEinreichungsdatum \hfill \@titelVerteidigungsdatum
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\end{tabularx}}
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\vspace{-1\baselineskip}\\\phantom{x} % Übler Hack, um eine Warnung wg. einer zu leeren hbox zu verhindern
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% Wiederherstellen der Einrückung
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\setlength{\parindent}{\parindentbak}
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\setlength{\parskip}{\parskipbak}
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\end{titlepage}
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% Aufräumen:
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\let\@titelTitel\undefined
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\let\titel\undefined
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\let\@titelArbeit\undefined
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\let\typ\undefined
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\let\@titelGrad\undefined
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\let\grad\undefined
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\let\@titelAutor\undefined
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\let\autor\undefined
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\let\@titelGeburtsdatum\undefined
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\let\gebdatum\undefined
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\let\@titelGeburtsort\undefined
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\let\gebort\undefined
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\let\@titelGutachterA\undefined
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\let\@titelGutachterB\undefined
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\let\gutachter\undefined
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\let\@titelEinreichungsdatum\undefined
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\let\einreichungsdatum\undefined
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\let\@titelVerteidigungsdatum\undefined
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\let\verteidigungsdatum\undefined
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\let\@wastwoside\undefined
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\cleardoublepage % ganzes Blatt für die Titelseite
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}
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% Als Allerallerletztes kommt Selbständigkeitserklärung:
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% Aufruf mit dem Datum in deutscher und englischer Form
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\newcommand{\selbstaendigkeitserklaerung}[1]{%
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\cleardoublepage% Wieder auf eine eigene Doppelseite
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{\parindent0cm
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\subsection*{Selbständigkeitserklärung}
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Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig verfasst
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und noch nicht für andere Prüfungen eingereicht habe.
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Sämtliche Quellen einschließlich Internetquellen, die unverändert oder
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abgewandelt wiedergegeben werden, insbesondere Quellen für Texte, Grafiken,
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Tabellen und Bilder, sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Mir ist bekannt,
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dass bei Verstößen gegen diese Grundsätze ein Verfahren wegen
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Täuschungsversuchs bzw. Täuschung eingeleitet wird.
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\vspace{3\baselineskip}
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{\raggedright Berlin, den #1 \hfill \TitelPunktLinie{8cm}\\}
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% \vspace{3\baselineskip}
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%
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% \selectlanguage{english}
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% \subsection*{Statement of authorship}
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% Hier würde die englische Selbständigkeitserklärung folgen, falls gewünscht. Doch es fehlt eine akzeptable Übersetzung.
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% \vspace{3\baselineskip}
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%
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% Berlin, #2 \hfill \TitelPunktLinie{6cm}
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}
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}%
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\makeatother
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336
ma/safety_reset.tex
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ma/safety_reset.tex
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\documentclass[12pt,a4paper,notitlepage]{report}
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[a4paper,textwidth=17cm, top=2cm, bottom=3.5cm]{geometry}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage[
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backend=biber,
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style=numeric,
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natbib=true,
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url=true,
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doi=true,
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eprint=false
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]{biblatex}
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\addbibresource{safety_reset.bib}
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\usepackage{amssymb,amsmath}
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\usepackage{listings}
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\usepackage{eurosym}
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\usepackage{wasysym}
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\usepackage{amsthm}
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\usepackage{tabularx}
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\usepackage{multirow}
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\usepackage{multicol}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows}
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\usetikzlibrary{backgrounds}
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\usetikzlibrary{calc}
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\usetikzlibrary{decorations.markings}
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\usetikzlibrary{decorations.pathreplacing}
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\usetikzlibrary{fit}
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\usetikzlibrary{patterns}
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\usetikzlibrary{positioning}
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\usetikzlibrary{shapes}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{tabularx}
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\usepackage{commath}
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\usepackage{graphicx,color}
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\usepackage{subcaption}
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\usepackage{float}
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\usepackage{footmisc}
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\usepackage{array}
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\usepackage[underline=false]{pgf-umlsd}
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\usetikzlibrary{calc}
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%\usepackage[pdftex]{graphicx,color}
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%\usepackage{epstopdf}
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% Needed for murks.tex
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\usepackage{setspace}
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\usepackage[draft=false,babel,tracking=true,kerning=true,spacing=true]{microtype} % optischer Randausgleich etc.
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% For german quotation marks
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\newcommand{\foonote}[1]{\footnote{#1}}
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\newcommand{\degree}{\ensuremath{^\circ}}
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\newcolumntype{P}[1]{>{\centering\arraybackslash}p{#1}}
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\begin{document}
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% Beispielhafte Nutzung der Vorlage für die Titelseite (bitte anpassen):
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\input{murks}
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\titel{FIXME} % Titel der Arbeit
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\typ{Masterarbeit} % Typ der Arbeit: Diplomarbeit, Masterarbeit, Bachelorarbeit
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\grad{Master of Science (M. Sc.)} % erreichter Akademischer Grad
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% z.B.: Master of Science (M. Sc.), Master of Education (M. Ed.), Bachelor of Science (B. Sc.), Bachelor of Arts (B. A.), Diplominformatikerin
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\autor{Jan Sebastian Götte}
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\gebdatum{Aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen nicht abgedruckt} % Geburtsdatum des Autors
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\gebort{Aus datenschutzrechtlichen Gründen nicht abgedruckt} % Geburtsort des Autors
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\gutachter{Prof. Dr. Björn Scheuermann}{FIXME} % Erst- und Zweitgutachter der Arbeit
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\mitverteidigung % entfernen, falls keine Verteidigung erfolgt
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\makeTitel
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\selbstaendigkeitserklaerung{31.03.2020}
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\newpage
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% Hier folgt die eigentliche Arbeit (bei doppelseitigem Druck auf einem neuen Blatt):
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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\chapter{Introduction}
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\section{Structure and operation of the electrical grid}
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\subsection{Structure of the electrical grid}
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\subsubsection{Generators and loads}
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\subsubsection{Transformers}
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\subsubsection{Tie lines}
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\subsection{Operational concerns}
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\subsubsection{Modelling the electrical grid}
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\subsubsection{Generator controls}
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\subsubsection{Load shedding}
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\subsubsection{System stability}
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\subsubsection{Power System Stabilizers}
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\subsubsection{Smart metering}
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\section{Regulatory frameworks around the world}
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\subsection{International standards}
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\subsection{Regulations in Europe}
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\subsection{The regulatory situation in Germany}
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\subsection{The regulatory situation in France}
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\subsection{The regulatory situation in the UK}
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\subsection{The regulatory situation in Italy}
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\subsection{The regulatory situation in northern America}
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\subsection{The regulatory situation in Japan}
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\subsection{Common themes}
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\section{Security in smart grids}
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The smart grid in practice is nothing more or less than an aggregation of embedded control and measurement devices that
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are part of a large control system. This implies that all the same security concerns that apply to embedded systems in
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general also apply to most components of a smart grid in some way. Where programmers have been struggling for decades
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now with input validation\cite{leveson01}, the same potential issue raises security concerns in smart grid scenarios as
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well\cite{mo01, lee01}. Only, in smart grid we have two complicating factors present: Many components are embedded
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systems, and as such inherently hard to update. Also, the smart grid and its control algorithms act as a large
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(partially-)distributed system, making problems such as input validation or authentication difficult to
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implement\cite{blaze01} and adding a host of distributed systems problems on top\cite{lamport01}.
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Given that the electrical grid is a major piece of essential infrastructure in modern civilization, these problems
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amount to significant issues in practice. Attacks on the electrical grid may have grave consequences\cite{lee01} all the
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while the long maintenance cycles of various components make the system slow to adapt. Thus, components for the smart
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grid need to be built to a much higher standard of security than most consumer devices to ensure they live up to
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well-funded attackers even decades down the road. This requirement intensifies the challenges of embedded security and
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distributed systems security among others that are inherent in any modern complex technological system.
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\subsection{Smart grid components as embedded devices}
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A fundamental challenge in smart grid implementations is the central role smart electricity meters play. Smart meters
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are used both for highly-granular load measurement and (in some countries) load switching\cite{zheng01}.
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Smart electricity meters are effectively consumer devices. They are built down to a certain price point that is
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measured by the burden it puts on consumers and that is generally fixed by regulatory authorities. % FIXME cite
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This requirement precludes some hardware features such as the use of a standard hardened software environment on a
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high-powerded embedded system (such as a hypervirtualized embedded linux setup) that would both increase resilience
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against attacks and simplify updates. Combined with the small market sizes in smart grid deployments
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\footnote{
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Most vendors of smart electricity meters only serve a handful of markets. For the most part, smart meter development
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cost lies in the meter's software % TODO cite?
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and most countries use their own home-grown standards, creating a large development burden for new market entrants
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\cite{cenelec01}.
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}
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this produces a high cost pressure on the software development process for smart electricity meters.
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\subsection{The state of the art in embedded security}
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Embedded security generally is much harder than security of higher-level systems. This is due to a combination of the
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unique constraints of embedded devices (hard to update, usually small quantity) and their lack of capabilities
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(processing power, memory protection functions, user interface devices). Even very well-funded companies continue to
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have serious problems securing their embedded systems. A spectacular example of this difficulty is the recently-exposed
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flaw in Apple's iPhone SoC first-stage ROM bootloader\footnote{
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Modern system-on-chips integrate one or several CPUs with a multitude of peripherals, from memory and DMA
|
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controllers over 3D graphics accelerators down to general-purpose IO modules for controlling things like indicator
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LEDs. Most SoCs boot from one of several boot devices such as flash memory, ethernet or USB according to a
|
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configuration set e.g. by connecting some SoC pins a certain way or set by device-internal write-only fuse bits.
|
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Physically, one of the processing cores of the SoC (usually one of the main CPU cores) is connected such that it is
|
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taken out of reset before all other devices, and is tasked with switching on and configuring all other devices of
|
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the SoC. In order to run later intialization code or more advanced bootloaders, this core on startup runs a very
|
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small piece of code hard-burned into the SoC in the factory. This ROM loader initializes the most basic peripherals
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such as internal SRAM memory and selects a boot device for the next bootloader stage.
|
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Apple's ROM loader performs some authorization checks, to ensure no unauthorized software is loaded. The present
|
||||
flaw allows an attacker to circumvent these checks, booting code not authorized by Apple on a USB-connected iPhone,
|
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compromising Apple's chain of trust from ROM loader to userland right at its root.
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}, that allows a full compromise of any iPhone before the iPhone X. iPhone 8, one of the affected models, is still being
|
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manufactured and sold by Apple today\footnote{
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i.e. at the time this paragraph was written, on %FIXME
|
||||
}. In another instance, Samsung put a flaw in their secure-world firmware used for protection of sensitive credentials
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in their mobile phone SoCs in % FIXME year % .
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||||
If both of these very large companies have trouble securing parts of their secure embedded software stacks measuring a
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||||
mere few hundred bytes in Apple's case or a few kilobytes in Samsung's, what is a smart electricity meter manufacturer
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to do? For their mass-market phones, these two companies have R\&D budgets that dwarf some countries' national budgets.
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% FIXME hyperbole?
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% FIXME cite
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Since thorough formal verification of code is not yet within reach for either large-scale software development or
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code heavy in side-effects such as embedded firmware or industrial control software\cite{pariente01}
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the two most effective measures for embedded security is reducing the amount of code on one hand, and labour-intensively
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checking and double-checking this code on the other hand. A smart electricity manufacturer does not have a say in the
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former since it is bound by the official regulations it has to comply with, and will almost certainly not have sufficient
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resources for the latter.
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% FIXME expand?
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% FIXME cite some figures on code size in smart meter firmware?
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\subsection{Attack avenues in the smart grid}
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If we model the smart grid as a control system responding to changes in inputs by regulating outputs, on a very high
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||||
level we can see two general categories of attacks: Attacks that directly change the state of the outputs, and attacks
|
||||
that try to influence the outputs indirectly by changing the system's view of its inputs. The former would be an attack
|
||||
such as one that shuts down a power plant to decrease generation capacity. The latter would be an attack such as one
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||||
that forges grid frequency measurements where they enter a power plant's control systems to provoke increasing
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||||
oscillation in the amount of power generated by the plant according to the control systems' directions.
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% FIXME cite
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% FIXME expand
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\subsubsection{Communication channel attacks}
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Communication channel attacks are attacks on the communication links between smart grid components. This could be
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||||
attacks on IP-connected parts of the core network or attacks on shared busses between smart meters and IP gateways in
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substations. Generally, these attacks can be mitigated by securing the aforementioned communication links using modern
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cryptography. IP links can be protected using TLS, and more low-level busses can be protected using more lightweight
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||||
Noise-based protocols. % FIXME cite
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Cryptographic security transforms an attackers ability to manipulate communication contents into a mere denial of
|
||||
service attack. Thus, in addition to cryptographic security safety under DoS conditions must be ensured to ensure
|
||||
continued system performance under attacks. This safety property is identical with the safety required to withstand
|
||||
random outages of components, such as communications link outages due to physical damage from storms, flooding etc.
|
||||
% FIXME cite papers on attack impact, on coutermeasures and on attack realization
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Exploiting centralized control systems}
|
||||
The type of smart grid attack most often cited in popular discourse, and to the author's knowledge % FIXME verify, cite
|
||||
the only type that has so far been conducted in practice, is a direct attack on centralized control systems. In this
|
||||
attack, computer components of control systems are compromised by the same techniques used to compromise any other kind
|
||||
of computer system such as exploiting insecure services running on internet-exposed ports and using one compromised
|
||||
system to compromised other systems connected with it through an ostensably secure internal network. These attacks are
|
||||
very powerful as they yield the attacker direct control over whatever outputs the control systems are controlling. If an
|
||||
attacker manages to compromise a power stations control computers, they may be able to influence generation output or
|
||||
even cause an emergency shutdown. % FIXME
|
||||
|
||||
Despite their potentially large impact, these attacks are only moderately interesting from a scientific perspective. For
|
||||
one, their mitigation mostly consists of a straightforward application of security practices well-known for decades.
|
||||
Though there is room for the implementation of genuinely new, application-specific security systems in this field, the
|
||||
general state of the art is lacking behind the rest of the computer industry such that the low-hanging fruit should take
|
||||
priority. % FIXME cite this bold claim very properly
|
||||
|
||||
In addition, given political will these systems can readily be secured since there is only a comparatively small number
|
||||
of them and driving a technician to every one of them in turn to install some security update is perfectly feasible.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Control function exploits}
|
||||
Control function exploits are attacks on the mathematical control loops used by the centralized control system. One
|
||||
example of such an attack would be resonance attacks as described in \textcite{wu01}.
|
||||
In this kind of attack, inputs from peripheral sensors indicating grid load to the centralized control system are
|
||||
carefully modified to cause a disproportionally large oscillation in control system action. This type of attack relies
|
||||
on complex resonance effects that arise when mechanical generators are electrically coupled. These resonances,
|
||||
coloquially called ``modes'' are well-studied in power system engineering\cite{rogers01,grebe01,entsoe01}.
|
||||
% FIXME: refer to section on stability control above here
|
||||
Even disregarding modern attack scenarios, for stability electrical grids are designed with measures in place to dampen
|
||||
any resonances inherent to grid structure. Still, requiring an accurate grid model these resonances are hard to analyze
|
||||
and unlikely to be noiticed under normal operating conditions.
|
||||
|
||||
Mitigation of these attacks is most easily done by on the one hand ensuring unmodified sensor inputs to the control
|
||||
systems in the first place, and on the other hand carefully designing control systems not to exhibit exploitable
|
||||
behavior such as oscillations.
|
||||
% FIXME cite mitigation approaches
|
||||
|
||||
\subsubsection{Endpoint exploits}
|
||||
One rather interesting attack on smart grid systems is one exploiting the grid's endpoint devices such as smart
|
||||
electricity meters\footnote{
|
||||
Though potentially this could also aim at other kinds of devices distributed on a large scale such as sensors in
|
||||
unmanned substations. % FIXME cite verify
|
||||
}
|
||||
These meters are deployed on a massive scale, with several thousand meters deployed for every substation.
|
||||
% FIXME cite (this should be straightforward)
|
||||
Thus, once compromised restoration to an uncompromised state can be potentially very difficult if it requires physical
|
||||
access to thousands of devices hidden inaccessible in private homes.
|
||||
|
||||
By compromising smart electricity meters, an attacker can trivially forge the distributed energy measurements these
|
||||
devices perform. In a best-case scenario, this might only affect billing and lead to customers being under- or
|
||||
over-charged if the attack is not noticed in time. However, in a less ideal scenario the energy measurements taken by
|
||||
these devices migth be used to inform the grid centralized control systems % FIXME cite (straightforward)
|
||||
and a falsification of these measurements might lead to inefficiency or even instability.
|
||||
|
||||
In some countries and for some customers, these smart meters have one additional function that is highly useful to an
|
||||
attacker: They contain high-current load switches to disconnect the entire household or business in case electricity
|
||||
bills are left unpaid for a certain period. In countries that use these kinds of systems, the load disconnect is often
|
||||
simply hooked up to one of the smart merter's central microcontroller's general-purpose IO pins, allowing anyone
|
||||
compromising this microcontroller's firmware to actuate the load switch at will. % FIXME validate cite add pictures
|
||||
|
||||
Given control over a large number of network-connected smart meters, an attacker might thus be able to cause large-scale
|
||||
disruptions of power consumption by repeatedly disconnecting and re-connecting a large number of consumers.
|
||||
% FIXME cite some analysis of this
|
||||
Combined with an attack method such as the resonance attack from \textcite{wu01}
|
||||
that was mentioned above, this scenario poses a serious danger to grid stability.
|
||||
|
||||
% FIXME add small-scale load shedding for heaters etc.
|
||||
|
||||
\subsection{Attacker models in the smart grid}
|
||||
\subsection{Practical attacks}
|
||||
\subsection{Practical threats}
|
||||
\subsection{Conclusion, or why we are doomed}
|
||||
|
||||
\chapter{Restoring endpoint safety in an age of smart devices}
|
||||
\section{The theory of endpoint safety}
|
||||
\subsection{Attack characteristics}
|
||||
\subsection{Complex microcontroller firmware}
|
||||
\subsection{Modern microcontroller hardware}
|
||||
\subsection{Regulatory and economical constraints}
|
||||
\subsection{Safety vs. Security: Opting for restoration instead of prevention}
|
||||
\subsection{Technical outline of a safety reset}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Communication channels on the grid}
|
||||
\subsection{Powerline communication systems and their use}
|
||||
\subsection{Proprietary wireless systems}
|
||||
\subsection{Landline IP}
|
||||
\subsection{IP-based wireless systems}
|
||||
\subsection{Frequency modulation as a communication channel}
|
||||
\subsubsection{The frequency dependance of grid frequency}
|
||||
\subsubsection{Control systems coupled to grid frequency}
|
||||
\subsubsection{Avoiding dangerous modes}
|
||||
\subsubsection{Overall system parameters}
|
||||
\subsubsection{An outline of practical implementation}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{From grid frequency to a reliable communications channel}
|
||||
\subsection{Channel properties}
|
||||
\subsection{Modulation and its parameters}
|
||||
\subsection{Error-correcting codes}
|
||||
\subsection{Cryptographic security}
|
||||
|
||||
\chapter{Practical implementation}
|
||||
\section{Cryptographic validation}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Data collection for channel validation}
|
||||
\subsection{Frequency sensor hardware design}
|
||||
\subsection{Frequency sensor measurement results}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Channel simulation and parameter validation}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Implementation of a demonstrator unit}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Experimental results}
|
||||
|
||||
\section{Lessons learned}
|
||||
|
||||
\chapter{Future work}
|
||||
\section{Technical standardization}
|
||||
\section{Regulatory adoption}
|
||||
\section{Practical implementation}
|
||||
|
||||
\newpage
|
||||
\appendix
|
||||
\chapter{Acknowledgements}
|
||||
\newpage
|
||||
|
||||
\chapter{References}
|
||||
\nocite{*}
|
||||
\printbibliography
|
||||
\newpage
|
||||
|
||||
\chapter{Demonstrator schematics and code}
|
||||
|
||||
\chapter{Economic viability of countermeasures}
|
||||
\section{Attack cost}
|
||||
\section{Countermeasure cost}
|
||||
\section{Conclusion}
|
||||
|
||||
\chapter{The ethics and security implications of centralized crackdown on energy theft}
|
||||
|
||||
\end{document}
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
|
|||
@online{bnetza1,
|
||||
author = {Bundesnetzagentur},
|
||||
publisher = {Bundesnetzagentur},
|
||||
title = {Smart Meter},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919100204/https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetundGas/Verbraucher/NetzanschlussUndMessung/SmartMetering/SmartMeter_node.html},
|
||||
urldate = {2019-09-19},
|
||||
year = {2019}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bmwi1,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik} and {Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie}},
|
||||
month = jan,
|
||||
publisher = {Bundesministerium f{\"u}r Wirtschaft und Energie},
|
||||
title = {Standardisierungsstrategie zur sektor{\"u}bergreifenden Digitalisierung nach dem Gesetz zur Digitalisierung der Energiewende},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919100713/https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/S-T/standardisierungsstrategie.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4},
|
||||
urldate = {2019-09-19},
|
||||
year = {2019}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
month = nov,
|
||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
title = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102010/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR03109.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2015}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
month = jan,
|
||||
number = {v1.0.1},
|
||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1: Anforderungen an die Interoperabilit{\"a}t der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102217/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR03109-1.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2019}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-6,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
month = nov,
|
||||
number = {v1.0},
|
||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-6: Smart Meter Gateway Administration},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102651/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-6-Smart_Meter_Gateway_Administration.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=4},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2015}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-4,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
month = aug,
|
||||
number = {v1.2.1},
|
||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-4: Public Key Infrastruktur f{\"u}r Smart Meter Gateways},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102649/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-4_PKI.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2017}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-2,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
month = dec,
|
||||
number = {v1.1},
|
||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-2: Smart Meter Gateway - Anforderungen an die Funktionalit{\"a}t und Interoperabilit{\"a}t des Sicherheitsmoduls},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102644/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-2-Anforderungen_an_die_Funktionalitaet.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2014}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-3,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
month = apr,
|
||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-3: Kryptographische Vorgaben f{\"u}r die Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsystemen},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919102648/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-3_Kryptographische_Vorgaben.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=1},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2014}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-I,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage I: CMS-Datenformat f{\"u}r die Inhaltsdatenverschl{\"u}sselung und -signatur},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919104234/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1\_Anlage\_CMS.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2\_cid351?\_\_blob=publicationFile\&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-II,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage II: COSEM/HTTP Webservices},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919104234/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1\_Anlage\_CMS.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2\_cid351?\_\_blob=publicationFile\&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2012}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IIIb,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage III: Feinspezifikation {\glqq}Drahtlose LMN-Schnittstelle`` Teil b: {\glqq}OMS Technical Report Security``},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110101/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Feinspezifikation_Drahtlose_LMN-Schnittstelle-Teil2.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IIIa,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage III: Feinspezifikation {\glqq}Drahtlose LMN-Schnittstelle`` Teil a: {\glqq}OMS Specification Volume 2, Primary Communication``},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110054/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Feinspezifikation_Drahtlose_LMN-Schnittstelle.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IVa,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage IV: Feinspezifikation {\glqq}Drahtgebundene LMN-Schnittstelle`` Teil a: {\glqq}HDLC f{\"u}r LMN``},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110101/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Feinspezifikation_Drahtlose_LMN-Schnittstelle-Teil2.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-IVb,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage IV: Feinspezifikation {\glqq}Drahtgebundene LMN-Schnittstelle`` Teil b: {\glqq}SML Smart Message Language``},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919110756/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1\_Anlage\_Feinspezifikation\_Drahtgebundene\_LMN-Schnittstelle\_Teilb.pdf jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2\_cid351?\_\_blob=publicationFile\&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-VI,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = mar,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage VI: Betriebsprozesse},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111203/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Betriebsprozesse.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=1},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2013}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-1-VII,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = jan,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-1 Anlage VII: Interoperabilit{\"a}tsmodell und Ger{\"a}teprofile f{\"u}r Smart-Meter- Gateways},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111350/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-1_Anlage_Interop-Modell-Geraeteprofile.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2019}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-2-a,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.1},
|
||||
month = dec,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-2 Anhang A: Smart Meter Gateway Sicherheitsmodul Use Cases},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111540/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-2-Sicherheitsmodul_Use_Cases.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=2},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2014}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-2-b,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = jun,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-2 Anhang B: Smart Meter Mini-HSM Anforderungen an die Funktionalit{\"a}t und Interoperabilit{\"a}t des Sicherheitsmoduls},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919111832/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-2_Anhang_B_Smart_Meter_Mini_HSM.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=3},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2017}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03116-3,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116 Kryptographische Vorgaben f{\"u}r Projekte der Bundesregierung},
|
||||
month = jan,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03116-3: Intelligente Messsysteme},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919112052/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03116/BSI-TR-03116-3.pdf; jsessionid=CB56FC0D3137C5624CA697AB9E57671F.1_cid360?__blob=publicationFile&v=9},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2019}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-03109-ts-1,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
booktitle = {Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109},
|
||||
edition = {00.91},
|
||||
month = jan,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-03109-TS-1: Testkonzept zu BSI TR-03109-1},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919112310/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR03109/TR-03109-TS-1_Testkonzept.pdf; jsessionid=BD197BE4CB44C76EE7945640B8703844.2_cid351?__blob=publicationFile&v=1},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2015}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online{bsi-tr-pruefstellen,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
edition = {v1.5},
|
||||
month = jan,
|
||||
organization = {Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik},
|
||||
title = {TR-Pr{\"u}fstellen: Anforderungen an Antragsteller zur Anerkennung als Pr{\"u}fstelle im Bereich Technischer Richtlinien},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919112552/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Zertifizierung/TR-Pruefstellen.pdf; jsessionid=A6B4CB8AD2C038741C656276CE874B61.2_cid369?__blob=publicationFile&v=10},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
year = {2019}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
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|
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month = jan,
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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organization = {IEEE},
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|
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volume = {55},
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x-color = {#009966},
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year = {2014}
|
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|
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|
||||
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organization = {IEEE},
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|
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x-color = {#009966},
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year = {2015}
|
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|
||||
|
||||
@book{borlase01,
|
||||
editor = {Stuart Borlase},
|
||||
isbn = {978-1-4987-9955-3},
|
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publisher = {CRC Press},
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series = {Electric Power and Energy Engineering},
|
||||
title = {Smart Grids: Advanced Technologies and Solutions},
|
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|
||||
month = feb,
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
||||
volume = {35},
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|
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|
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|
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|
||||
@article{mahmood01,
|
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author = {Anzar Mahmood and Nadeem Javaid and Sohail Razzaq},
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title = {A review of wireless communications for smart grid},
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volume = {41},
|
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|
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|
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}
|
||||
|
||||
@techreport{bsi01,
|
||||
author = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
edition = {v1.0},
|
||||
month = jan,
|
||||
organization = {{Bundesamt f{\"u}r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik}},
|
||||
title = {Marktanalyse zur Feststellung der technischen M{\"o}glichkeit zum Einbau intelligenter Messsysteme nach {\S} 30 MsbG},
|
||||
url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20190919124052/https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/SmartMeter/Marktanalysen/Marktanalyse_nach_Para_30_MsbG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=8},
|
||||
urldate = 2019-09-19,
|
||||
x-color = {#009966},
|
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year = {2019}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@inproceedings{czechowski01,
|
||||
author = {R. {Czechowski} and A. M. {Kosek}},
|
||||
booktitle = {2016 Joint Workshop on Cyber- Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids (CPSR-SG)},
|
||||
doi = {10.1109/CPSRSG.2016.7684098},
|
||||
issn = {},
|
||||
keywords = {power consumption; power engineering computing; power system measurement; power system security; security of data; smart meters; energy theft techniques; power energy consumption; electric energy distribution; electricity theft detection; energy consumers; cyber security; smart metering; low voltage network; Energy consumption; Security; Energy measurement; Companies; Power systems; Wheels; Smart Grid; energy theft; cyber-physical security; digital data flow; energy hacking},
|
||||
month = {April},
|
||||
organization = {IEEE},
|
||||
pages = {1--7},
|
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title = {The most frequent energy theft techniques and hazards in present power energy consumption},
|
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url = {https://project-sparks.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/czechowski-cpsr-sg-paper-four.pdf},
|
||||
x-color = {#009966},
|
||||
year = {2016}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@datasheet{st-db3636,
|
||||
author = {{ST Microelectronics}},
|
||||
edition = {r1},
|
||||
month = {jun},
|
||||
organization = {ST Microelectronics},
|
||||
subtitle = {Security module of a smart meter gateway as defined by the BSI},
|
||||
title = {STSAFE-J100-BS Data brief},
|
||||
url = {https://www.st.com/resource/en/data_brief/stsafe-j100-bs.pdf},
|
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urldate = 2019-09-20,
|
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x-color = {#009966},
|
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year = {2018}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@slides{dalheimer01,
|
||||
author = {Mathias Dalheimer},
|
||||
eventtitle = {Gulaschprogrammiernacht 2014},
|
||||
title = {Smartin Meter-Einf{\"u}hrung Deutschland},
|
||||
url = {https://entropia.de/images/2/2c/GPN14-SmartMeterEinf%C3%BChrung.pdf}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@online resource{heise01,
|
||||
author = {Heise Medien},
|
||||
title = {checkm8: Boot-Exploit soll neuere iPhones knacken},
|
||||
url = {https://www.heise.de/mac-and-i/meldung/checkm8-Boot-Exploit-soll-neuere-iPhones-knacken-4542075.html}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
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Reference in a new issue