ma: work out small issues
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1 changed files with 7 additions and 8 deletions
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@ -1046,8 +1046,7 @@ denial-of-service attacks on our system by any of the four attacker types. All r
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from the \emph{reset authority} and are cryptographically secured to provide authentication and tamper detection.
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Under this model, attacks on the electrical grid components between the \emph{reset authority} and the customer device
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degrade into man-in-the-middle attacks. To ensure the \textsc{safety} criterion from Section \ref{sec_criteria} holds we
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must % TODO check whether this \ref displays as intended
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make sure our cryptography is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks and we must try to harden the system against
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must make sure our cryptography is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks and we must try to harden the system against
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denial-of-service attacks by the attacker types listed above. Given our attacker model we cannot fully guard against
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this sort of attack but we can at least choose a commmunication channel that is resilient against denial of service
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attacks under the above model.
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@ -1623,6 +1622,7 @@ realistically be up to $\mathcal O\left(10^3\right)$, which is easily enough for
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% FIXME here and in previous ~2 pages get transmitter/receiver and sender/listener terminology straight. Also perhaps do
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% some sort of scenario definition introducing those terms somewhere.
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% Also sort out term for "safety reset controller" throughout document
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\chapter{Practical implementation}
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@ -1737,12 +1737,11 @@ that more complex perform worse when the input signal deviates from their models
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\subsection{Frequency sensor hardware design}
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\label{sec-fsensor}
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Our safety reset controller % FIXME is this the right term?
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will have to measure mains frequency to later demodulate a reset signal transmitted through it. Since we have decided to
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do our own frequency measurement system here we can use this frequency measurement setup as a prototype for the
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frequency measurement subcomponent of the demodulation system we will later develop. Since we do not plan to do a
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large-scale field deployment of our measurement setup we can keep the hardware implementation simple by moving most of
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the signal processing to a regular computer and concentrating our hardware efforts on raw signal capture.
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Our safety reset controller will have to measure mains frequency to later demodulate a reset signal transmitted through
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it. Since we have decided to do our own frequency measurement system here we can use this frequency measurement setup as
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a prototype for the frequency measurement subcomponent of the demodulation system we will later develop. Since we do not
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plan to do a large-scale field deployment of our measurement setup we can keep the hardware implementation simple by
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moving most of the signal processing to a regular computer and concentrating our hardware efforts on raw signal capture.
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\begin{figure}
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\begin{center}
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