Finish reference fixes
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@ -949,6 +949,17 @@
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url = {https://purehost.bath.ac.uk/ws/files/134381670/a_comparative_study_between_diode_and_thyristor_based_AC_to_DC_converters_for_aluminium_smelting_process.pdf}
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}
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@article{pvyh03,
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author={Pavlidou, N. and Han Vinck, A.J. and Yazdani, J. and Honary, B.},
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journal={IEEE Communications Magazine},
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title={Power line communications: state of the art and future trends},
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year={2003},
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volume={41},
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number={4},
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pages={34-40},
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doi={10.1109/MCOM.2003.1193972}}
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}
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@misc{wright01,
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author = {Paul S. Wright},
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year = {2019},
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@ -21,12 +21,11 @@
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\copyrightyear{2022}
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\acmYear{2022}
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\setcopyright{acmlicensed}
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\acmConference[ACSAC 2022]{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference}{December 5--9, 2022}{Austin, USA}
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\acmBooktitle{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2022), December 5--9, 2022, Austin, USA}
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\acmPrice{XX.XX}
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\acmDOI{10.1145/XXXXXXX.XXXXXXX}
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\acmISBN{978-X-XXXX-XXXX-X/XX/XX}
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\setcopyright{rightsretained}
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\acmConference[ACSAC]{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference}{December 5--9, 2022}{Austin, TX, USA}
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\acmBooktitle{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC), December 5--9, 2022, Austin, TX, USA}
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\acmDOI{10.1145/3564625.3564640}
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\acmISBN{978-1-4503-9759-9/22/12}
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\begin{document}
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@ -186,11 +185,14 @@ grid-connected generators and motors is what regulates frequency.
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Grid frequency modulation works by quickly modulating the power of a large, grid-connected load or generator. When this
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modulation is at low amplitude and high frequency, it is below the thresholds set for the grid's automated control
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systems and monitoring systems and it will directly affect frequency according to the grid's inertia. GFM differs from
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traditional Powerline Communication (PLC) systems in that it reaches every device within one synchronous area as the
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signal is embedded into the fundamental grid frequency. Traditional PLC uses a superimposed voltage, which is quickly
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attenuated across long distances. Practically speaking, using GFM a single large transmitter can cover an entire
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synchronous area, while in traditional PLC hundreds or thousands of smaller transmitters would be necessary. Unlike
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traditional PLC, any large industrial load that allows for fast computer control can act as a GFM transmitter.
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traditional Powerline Communication (PLC) systems in that it works at much lower frequencies, it directly modulates the
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grid's fundamental frequency instead of superimposing an additional signal on top of it, and by nature it reaches every
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device within one synchronous area as the signal is embedded into the fundamental grid frequency. Traditional PLC uses a
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superimposed voltage, which is quickly attenuated across long distances. Practically speaking, using GFM a single large
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transmitter can cover an entire synchronous area, while in traditional PLC hundreds or thousands of smaller transmitters
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would be necessary. Unlike traditional PLC, any large industrial load that allows for fast computer control with slew
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rates in the order of several percent of total load per second can act as a GFM transmitter with minimal or no hardware
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modifications.
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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@ -384,10 +386,11 @@ chosen for the meters' uplink.
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Since the early days of the electrical grid, powerline communication has been used to control devices spread throughout
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the grid from a central transmitter~\cite{rs48}. PLC systems super-impose a modulated high-frequency signal on top of
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the grid voltage. When the carrier frequency of this modulation is in the audible frequency range, low data rates can be
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transmitted over distances of several tens of kilometers. By using a radio frequency carrier, higher data rates can be
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achieved across shorter distances. Audio frequency PLC, called ``ripple control'', is still used today by utilities to
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enable demand-side response, by remotely switching on and off water heaters to avoid times of peak electricity demand.
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the grid voltage. When the carrier frequency of this modulation is in the audible frequency range, low data
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rates can be transmitted over distances of several tens of kilometers. By using a radio frequency carrier, higher data
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rates can be achieved across shorter distances\cite{pvyh03}. Audio frequency PLC, called ``ripple control'', is still
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used today by utilities to enable demand-side response, by remotely switching on and off water heaters to avoid times of
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peak electricity demand.
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Usually, such powerline communication systems are uni-directional but they are instance of bi-directional powerline
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communication for smart meter reading such as the italian smart meter deployment~\cite{ec03,rs48,gungor01,agf16}.
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@ -454,10 +457,11 @@ continental European grid. A report on an event where an oscillation on one such
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\cite{entsoe01}.
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In~\cite{zlmz+21}, Zou, Liu, Ma et al.\ analyzed the possibility of a modal attack in which electric vehicle chargers
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rapidly modulate their power to force an oscillation of a poorly dampened wide-area electromechanical mode. Using
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mathematical analysis, small-scale simulations and practical experiments they validated the attack scenario and
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rapidly modulate their power to force an oscillation of a poorly dampened wide-area electromechanical mode. In their
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model an attacker compromises a backend smart grid control system that controls a large number of EV chargers. Using
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mathematical analysis, small-scale simulations and limited practical experiments they validated the attack scenario and
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developed a countermeasure that can be implemented as part of generator control systems and that when activated can
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suppress forced oscillations of wide-area electromechanical modes.
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suppress forced oscillations of wide-area electromechanical modes.
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On the device side of the smart grid, research has concentrated on smart meter security. Smart meters are
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architecturally similar to IoT devices~\cite{zheng01,ifixit01}, but come with different challenges. Similar to a
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@ -786,7 +790,7 @@ public key cryptography inside the smart meter.
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Formally, we can describe our simple cryptographic protocol as follows. Given an $m$-bit cryptographic hash function $H
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: \{0,1\}^*\rightarrow\{0,1\}^m$ and a private key $k_0 \in \{0,1\}^m$, we construct the public key as
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$k_{n_\text{total}} = H^{n_\text{total}}(k_0)$ where $H^n(x)$ denotes the $n$-times recursive application of $H$ to
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$k_{n_\text{total}} = H^{n_\text{total}}(k_0)$ where $H^n(x)$ denotes the $n$-fold recursive application of $H$ to
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itself, i.e.\ $H(H(\hdots H(x)))$. $n_\text{total}$ is the total number of signatures that the system can
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issue over its lifetime. $n_\text{total}$ must be chosen with adequate safety margin to account for unpredictable future
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use of the system. The choice of $n_\text{total}$ is of no consequence when a device checks reset authorization, but key
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@ -968,19 +972,15 @@ a practical demonstration of broadcast data transmission through grid frequency
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controllable load as well as further optimization of the modulation and data encoding as well as the demodulator
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implementation.
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Source code and EDA designs are available at the public repository listed at the end of this document.
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\subsection{Artifacts}
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Source code for the demonstrator and simulations, as well as hardware EDA designs are available at the public git
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repository at the following URL:\\\center{\url{https://git.jaseg.de/safety-reset.git}}
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\begin{acks}
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This work has been co-funded by the LOEWE initiative (Hesse, Germany) within the emergenCITY center.
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\end{acks}
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\center{
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\footnotesize
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%\center{This is version \texttt{\input{version.tex}\unskip} of this paper, generated on \today.}
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\center{Source files and associated data for this work can be found in the git repository at the following URL:
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\url{https://git.jaseg.de/safety-reset.git} }
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}
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\bibliographystyle{ACM-Reference-Format}
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\bibliography{\jobname}
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