diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 598898e..edab937 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -14,21 +14,34 @@ all: thesis.pdf # We need three runs for biblatex's defernumbers %.pdf: %.tex common-packages.tex common-defs.tex main.bib version.tex - pdflatex -shell-escape $< + pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname $* '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\input{$<}' biber $* - pdflatex -shell-escape $< - pdflatex -shell-escape $< + pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname $* '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\input{$<}' + pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname $* '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\input{$<}' echo echo "Undefined biblatex references:" grep -A2 'Package biblatex Warning: The following entry could not be found' thesis.log | sed -n '3~4{s/(biblatex) *//;p}' || echo "" -#.PHONY: preview -#preview: -# pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname thesis '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\input{thesis.tex}' -# biber thesis -# pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname thesis '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\input{thesis.tex}' -# pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname thesis '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\input{thesis.tex}' -# pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname thesis '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\input{thesis.tex}' +%-oneside.pdf: %.tex common-packages.tex common-defs.tex main.bib version.tex + pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname $*-oneside '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\def\thesisoneside{}\input{$<}' + biber $*-oneside + pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname $*-oneside '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\def\thesisoneside{}\input{$<}' + pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname $*-oneside '\def\thesispreviewmode{}\def\thesisoneside{}\input{$<}' + echo + echo "Undefined biblatex references:" + grep -A2 'Package biblatex Warning: The following entry could not be found' thesis.log | sed -n '3~4{s/(biblatex) *//;p}' || echo "" + +%-final.pdf: %.tex common-packages.tex common-defs.tex main.bib version.tex abstract.tex abstract-de.tex + pdflatex -jobname $*-final -shell-escape $< + biber $*-final + pdflatex -jobname $*-final -shell-escape $< + pdflatex -jobname $*-final -shell-escape $< + +%-final-oneside.pdf: %.tex common-packages.tex common-defs.tex main.bib version.tex + pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname $*-final-oneside '\def\thesisoneside{}\input{$<}' + biber $*-final-oneside + pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname $*-final-oneside '\def\thesisoneside{}\input{$<}' + pdflatex -shell-escape -jobname $*-final-oneside '\def\thesisoneside{}\input{$<}' version.tex: thesis.tex $(addsuffix /chapter.tex,${CHAPTERS}) echo "${VERSION_STRING}" > $@ diff --git a/abstract-de.tex b/abstract-de.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f527db5 --- /dev/null +++ b/abstract-de.tex @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ + +\begin{otherlanguage}{ngerman} +\chapter*{Kurzzusammenfassung} +\adjustmtc +\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Kurzzusammenfassung} + + \marginpar{This section is a translated copy of the English abstract below.} + Im Laufe der letzten Jahrzehnte habe Fortschritte in der Kryptographie sowie Techniken wie formale Verifikation den + Stand der Softwaresicherheit stetig verbessert. Gleichzeitig hat das Gebiet der Hardwaresicherheit mit diesen + Entwicklungen nicht Schritt halten können. Trotz Fortschritten in Teilgebieten wie der Resilienz gegenüber + Seitenkanalangriffen und Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) ist der Stand der Technik in der Hardwaresicherheit + nach wie vor auf die Verwendung mikroelektronischer Strukturen fokussiert. Solche erreichen einen Grad der Security + by Obscurity, liefern jedoch keine fundierteren Sicherheitsgarantien. Systemweite Manipulationsschutzmaßnahmen + werden nur vereinzelt in Geräten wie z.B.\ Hardware-Sicherheitsmodulen (HSMs) und Kartenzahlungsterminals + eingesetzt. Insbesondere HSMs werden aufgrund ihrer hohen Kosten und geringen Rechenleistung nur in + Nischenanwendungen wie z.B.\ der Zertifikatsausstellung im Transport Layer Security (TLS)-System sowie der + Zahlungsdatenverarbeitung eingesetzt. + + In dieser Dissertation wird das Inertiale Hardware-Sicherheitsmodul (IHSM) vorgestellt, eine neue Architektur für + Hardware-Sicherheitsmodule. IHSMs stellen einen hoch sicheren, aktiven Manipulationsschutz bereit. + Gleichzeitig können mithilfe der IHSM-Technologie kryptographische Rechnersysteme von wesentlich größeren + Abmessungen, Gewicht und elektrischer Leistungsaufnahme geschützt werden, als es in konventionellen HSMs möglich + ist. IHSMs ersetzen die kostenintensiven und in der Herstellung aufwendigen Meshes + (Manipulationserkennungsmembranen) konventioneller HSMs durch eine Konstruktion, in der Meshes aus einfachen + Platinen aufgebaut werden. Diese Meshes rotieren schnell um das geschützte Rechnersystem, was eine unerkannte + Manipulation verhindert. IHSMs erreichen so mithilfe wensentlich einfacherer und kostengünstiger + Konstruktionstechniken ein Sicherheitsniveau, das dem konventioneller Manipulationsschutzmembranen gleicht, die in + spezialisierten Herstellungsprozessen gefertigt werden. In der Dissertation werden die Ergebnisse einer + Übersichtsstudie vorgestellt, die etwa 30 echte Implementierungen socher Meshes untersucht. In der Studie werden + Kriterien für die Entwicklung sicherer Meshes abgeleitet, anhand derer das IHSM-Konzept kontextualisiert wird. Um + die Notwendigkeit sicherer Hardware zu erörtern, wird in dieser Dissertation darüber hinaus eine Analyse einiger + problematischer Aspekte des Hardwaresicherheitskonzeptes der Deutschen elektronischen Patientenakte vorgestellt. + + Um den Weg für zukünftige, praktische Implementierungen der IHSM-Technologie zu bereiten, werden weiterhin Lösungen + für wichtige Schlüsselprobleme der Konstruktion von IHSMs vorgestellt. Diese Lösungen umfassen ein neues Konzept für + rotationssymmetrische Planarspulen für die drahtlose Energieübertragung an rotierende Empfänger, sowie ein + hochpräzises und dennoch kostengünstiges Überwachungssystem für Meshes. Dieses Überwachungssystem beruht auf dem + Prinzip der Zeitbereichsreflektometrie und erkennt selbst fortgeschrittene Angriffstechniken zuverlässig. In + praktischen Versuchen zeigte sich, dass das System ausreichend empfindlich ist, um mehrere identische Kopien + desselben Meshes voneinander zu unterscheiden, was auf PUF-ähnliche Eigenschaften hindeutet. + + In der Dissertation werden zwei konkrete Anwendungsszenarien erläutert, die erst durch das größere Volumen und die + höhere Leistungsaufnahme möglich werden, die die IHSM-Technologie ermöglicht. Im ersten Anwendungsszenario wird eine + IHSM-geschützte Zwischenstation vorgeschlagen, um die durch physikalische Grundgesetze sonst stark eingeschränkte + erreichbare Entfernung eines Quantenschlüsselaustausch (QKD)-Systems zu vergrößern. Im Rahmen dieses + Anwendungsszenarios wird ein sekundäres Mesh vorgestellt, dass die Achsdurchführung des primären IHSM-Meshes + zusätzlich schützt. Weiterhin wird in der Fallstudie der Entwurf eines mechanischen Trägers für diese zusätzlich + geschützte Achsdurchführung vorgestellt, der das QKD-System im inneren des IHSM mit der Außenwelt über + verlustarme Glasfaserleitungen verbindet. + + In der zweiten Fallstudie wird ein Konzept vorgestellt, das mithilfe IHSM-geschützter, leistungsstarker + Serverhardware kolokierte Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC)-Berechnungen ermöglicht. Hierzu wird IHSM-Technologie + an die Anforderungen leistungsstaker Serverhardware in Größe, Leistungsaufnahme, und ableitbarer Verlustleistung + angepasst. Wird MPC praktisch eingesetzt, werden Knoten über mehrere Rechenzentren verteilt um einen Single Point of + Failure zu vermeiden. Diese Verteilung führt jedoch zu geringer Netzwerkbandbreite und hohen Latenzen zwischen den + MPC-Knoten, was die erreichbare MPC-Rechenleistung stark einschränkt. Durch den Einsatz von IHSMs können physisch + gesicherte MPC-Knoten innerhalb desselben Rechenzentrums betrieben werden, was durch die damit erreichbare höheren + Bandbreiten und geringeren Latenzen einen Leistungsbereich der MPC-Berechnungen erschließt. +\end{otherlanguage} diff --git a/abstract-template.tex b/abstract-template.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b9c238 --- /dev/null +++ b/abstract-template.tex @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +\documentclass[11pt,a4paper,notitlepage,twoside]{report} +\usepackage[a4paper, top=3cm, bottom=3.5cm, inner=3.5cm, outer=5cm, marginpar=3.8cm]{geometry} + +\input{common-packages} +\input{common-defs} +\newcommand{\figurepath}{figures} +\graphicspath{{\figurepath}} + +\newcommand{\chaptertitle}[1]{ + \chapter{#1} + \ifdefined\thesispreviewmode + \vspace*{-1cm} + {\Large \textbf{Draft build}, git revision \texttt{\input{version}}} + \vspace*{1cm} + \fi + \printchapterquote + \setstretch{1} + \minitoc + \newpage + \setstretch{1.3} +} + +\title{Bootstrapping Physical Security with Inertial Hardware Security Modules} +\author{Jan Sebastian Götte} + +\begin{document} +\maketitle + +\setlength{\headheight}{13.6pt} + +\faketableofcontents + +\input{abstract} + +\chapterbibliography + +\appendix + +\end{document} diff --git a/abstract.tex b/abstract.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8699c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/abstract.tex @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ + +\chapter*{Abstract} +\adjustmtc +\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Abstract} + +In the past decades, cryptographic advancements and techniques like formal verification have steadily improved software +security. Meanwhile, the field of hardware security has not kept pace. Research has made progress in subfields such as +resilience to Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) and Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). However, the state of the art still +often relies on microelectronic integration to achieve security by obscurity insted of more fundamental security +guarantees. While effective, system-level tamper protection is only used in few devices such as Hardware Security +Modules (HSMs) and card payment terminals. Due to the high cost and low performance of HSMs in particular, they remain +relegated to niche applications such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificate issuance and payment data processing. + +In this thesis, we introduce the Inertial Hardware Security Module (IHSM), a new architecture for low-cost hardware +security modules that provide high-level active tamper protection, while supporting computing payloads of much larger +size, weight and power dissipation compared to conventional HSMs. In an IHSM, the costly and difficult to source +tamper-sensing mesh of a conventional HSM is replaced by a mesh made from simple PCBs that is rotating at high speed +around the payload. Since the mesh is rotating at high speed, it cannot be manipulated, and the security of conventional +meshes created in bespoke manufacturing processes can be achieved using much simpler and less expensive construction +techniques. We present the results of a survey of approximately 30 real world tamper sensing mesh implementations. Based +on our findings, we deduce design criteria for secure meshes and contextualize our design. We further motivate the +necessity of secure hardware by presenting an analysis of problematic aspects in the hardware security design of +Germany's new national electronic health record system. + +To pave the way for practical implementations of IHSM technology, we present solutions to key engineering challenges in +IHSM construction. We present a design and analysis of highly symmetric planar inductors for rotating wireless power +transfer that improves self-resonant frequency by up to \qty{58}{\percent} and inductance by up to \qty{6.5}{\percent} +in our tests. Complementing this research, we present a high-fidelity, low-cost monitoring system for security meshes +that is based on the principles of Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR), reaching \qty{184}{\pico\second} time resolution. We +validate our system and find that it is able to reliably detect several classes of advanced physical attacks. We find +that our system is sensitive enough to detect differences between identical copies of the same mesh, suggesting PUF-like +properties. + +Applying IHSM technology, we analyse two use cases that are unlocked by the increased size and power dissipation +capability of IHSMs. In the first analysis, an IHSM-secured relay node for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems is +proposed, enabling their practical implementation across arbitrary distances, which requires trusted relay stations due +to fundamental physical limitations. In the study, IHSMs are adapted for such high-security QKD relays by securing the +IHSM mesh passthrough with a secondary tamper-sensing mesh. In this setup, a bracket design is proposed that supports +passing through optical fibers at low loss. + +The second proposed use case adapts an IHSM enclosure to the size, power and thermal dissipation requirements of a +high-power server to support co-located secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) workloads. In practical MPC deployments, +nodes are distributed across data centers to avoid a single point of failure for physical attacks. As a result, +practical MPC deployments are limited by network bandwidth and latency constraints. Using IHSMs, physically secured MPC +nodes can be deployed within the same data center, increasing bandwidth, reducing latency and unlocking a new +performance spectrum. diff --git a/ai-llm-use-disclosure.tex b/ai-llm-use-disclosure.tex index 5ebc561..0ac6104 100644 --- a/ai-llm-use-disclosure.tex +++ b/ai-llm-use-disclosure.tex @@ -1,29 +1,31 @@ \chapter*{Use of Artificial Intelligence in This Thesis} +\adjustmtc \addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Use of Artificial Intelligence in This Thesis} This thesis has been written during the years of 2020 - 2025. In this time, Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology including Large Language Models (LLMs) has entered widespread adoption. I have used such LLM systems in the preparation of this thesis. At the time this thesis was written, LLMs were a powerful and useful technology, but often produced -wrong output. Thus, I used the following list of observations to guide my LLM use during the writing of this thesis. +wrong output. Thus I used the following list of observations to guide my LLM use during the writing of this thesis. \begin{enumerate} \item Passing text through an LLM is an imprecise operation. Especially when large amounts of text are passed - through an LLM, despite clear instructions such as ``only fix spelling errors'', the LLM output might deviate + through an LLM, despite clear instructions such as ``only fix spelling errors,'' the LLM output might deviate from the source text. Therefore, the document text should never be passed through the LLM, and the LLM should be prompted to point out problems, or to produce a list of suggestions for improvements instead. - \item LLMs are really bad at summarizing text that contains novel concepts. LLM summaries of text often converge to - a re-stating of the general consensus on the text's main topic. Where the source text deviates from conventionla - wisdom or makes novel points, an LLM summary will likely mis-represent those conclusions. Additionally, LLMs are - bad at capturing the point of a text. Unless extreme care is taken when prompting, it is easy to lead an LLM to - produce an inaccurate summary of a text that agrees with the prompt, but misses the gist of the text. Therefore, - extreme caution should be applied when using an LLM for summarization, and LLM output should be checked - diligently in such instances. - \item LLMs are bad at generating text from scratch. Especially on topics of academic interest that are novel and - that do not have well-known answers that can be found in the training corpus for these models, in general they - will not produce useful text when prompted. Therefore, LLMs should never be used to generate novel text. - \item LLMs are really bad at giving references. Prompts that ask for academic references on a topic are likely to - produce non-existing ``hallucinated'' references. The existing references an LLM is most likely to dig up + \item Contemporary LLMs are bad at summarizing text that contains novel concepts. LLM summaries of text often + converge to a re-stating of the general consensus on the text's main topic. Where the source text deviates from + conventional wisdom or makes novel points, an LLM summary will likely mis-represent those conclusions. + Additionally, LLMs are bad at capturing the point of a text. Unless extreme care is taken when prompting, it is + easy to lead an LLM to produce an inaccurate summary of a text that agrees with the prompt, but misses the gist + of the text. Therefore, extreme caution should be applied when using an LLM for summarization, and LLM output + should be checked diligently in such instances. + \item Contemporary LLMs are bad at generating text from scratch. Especially on topics of academic interest that are + novel and that do not have well-known answers that can be found in the training corpus for these models, in + general they will not produce useful text when prompted. Therefore, LLMs should never be used to generate novel + text. + \item Contemporary LLMs are bad at giving references. Prompts that ask for academic references on a topic are likely + to produce non-existing ``hallucinated'' references. The existing references an LLM is most likely to dig up usually occur on the first page of a web search on the topic, or are frequently cited in literature on the topic. Thus, LLMs should never be directly queried for references. When researching a new concept, a better use of an LLM is the generation of query strings for search engines like Google Scholar. @@ -56,4 +58,7 @@ documentation of AI-generated materials dated September 22, 2025\cite{Recommenda where I used an LLM to edit parts of the text of this thesis as described above have not been explicitly labelled in the text. The LLM in this use assumes a similar role a human editor might assume reviewing the text. +Besides the use of LLMs as described above, a specialized machine translation tool was used to create the German +translation of the abstract at the beginning of this thesis. This use is marked explicitly. + \chapterbibliography diff --git a/chapter-conclusion/chapter.tex b/chapter-conclusion/chapter.tex index be4a14d..f11e0e8 100644 --- a/chapter-conclusion/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-conclusion/chapter.tex @@ -1,22 +1,34 @@ -\chaptertitle{Conclusion} +\chapterquote{Phillip Rogaway~\cite{rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic2015}}{ + Cryptography rearranges power: it configures who can do what, from what. This makes cryptography an inherently + political tool, and it confers on the field an intrinsically moral dimension.} +\chapter{Conclusion} -In this thesis, we proposed Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs), a completely new approach to physical security -that combines conventional tamper-sensing meshes with physical movement to bootstrap a highly secure system from -low-security, off-the-shelf parts. To motivate our research, we showed on the German national digital health record -system how hardware security is hard to achieve in practice. Besides some minor cryptographic oddities, our analysis -revealed at least one essential specification mistake that negates the hardware security of the system by unnecessarily -introducing a poorly protected HSM. In the following chapters, we first introduced IHSM technology, then provided deep -analyses of two of its engineering challenges, mesh monitoring and power transfer. We propose a low-cost TDR-based mesh -monitoring system that exceeds the capabilities of all previous systems from academic or from patent literature by -monitoring large meshes while simultaneously providing detailed results. Our TDR-based mesh monitoring system is of -independent interest, since it can also be integrated into traditional HSM designs. Besides improved mesh monitoring, we -also proposed a new, generalized design for high-frequency PCB inductors with low parasitic capacitance. Our design -provides better bandwidth and lower parasitic capacitance compared to the state of the art without increasing -implementation cost. We concluded our thesis with two chapters elaborating on two new use cases that are made possible -by IHSM technology due to its ability to protect large payloads that have high power consumption. +In this thesis, we provided an examination of the field of Hardware Security Modules both from an academic perspective +and with regards to their practical implementation. We answered our first research question introduced in +Chapter~\ref{chapter-intro} on the current state of the art in Chapters~\ref{chapter-epa} and \ref{chapter-survey}, +providing a comprehensive view of practical implementations. Chapter~\ref{chapter-epa} motivates our research using the +German national digital health record system as an example that demonstrates the difficulties in achieving practical +hardware security. Besides some minor cryptographic oddities, our analysis reveals at least one essential specification +mistake that negates the hardware security of the system by unnecessarily introducing a poorly protected HSM. In +Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}, we answer our second research question in a detailed survey of a wide range of devices +that utilize tamper-sensing meshes, distilling a set of criteria for the design of secure tamper-sensing meshes. In +Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}, we propose Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs), a new approach to physical security +that combines conventional tamper-sensing meshes with physical movement. IHSMs enable bootstrapping a highly secure +system from low-security, off-the-shelf parts, thereby solving our third research question on achieving physical +security without bespoke components. We support the construction of concretely secure IHSMs by providing deep analyses +of two key engineering challenges in IHSM construction, mesh monitoring and power transfer. Solving our fourth research +question on mesh monitoring fidelity, we propose a low-cost TDR-based mesh monitoring system that exceeds the +capabilities of previous systems from academic or from patent literature. Our system is capable of monitoring large +meshes while simultaneously providing detailed results. Our TDR-based mesh monitoring system is of independent interest, +since it can also be integrated into traditional HSM designs. Solving our fifth research question on ripple reduction +for rotating Wireless Power Transfer for IHSMs, we propose a new, generalized design for high-frequency PCB inductors +with low parasitic capacitance. Beyond our IHSM application, our design provides better bandwidth and lower parasitic +capacitance compared to the state of the art without increasing implementation cost. We conclude this thesis with two +chapters elaborating on two new use cases that are made possible by IHSM technology due to its ability to protect large +payloads that have high power consumption. Together, these results answer our sixth and final research question. -We believe that with the research presented in this thesis, we substantially advanced the physical security field. In -particular, we belive that by publishing our research including its artifacts under open-source licenses, we provide the +The research presented in this thesis is aimed at advancing both academic research and applied engineering in hardware +security. We believe that by publishing our research including its artifacts under open source licenses, we provide the basis for future research in tamper-sensing technology, a field that remains under-served in today's academic landscape. Recent history has shown that state-level adversaries are a mounting threat to civil rights organizations, human rights @@ -25,3 +37,36 @@ rights, today human rights are under attack both from within and from the outsid Publishing IHSM technology as open source, we hope to provide one building block for new computing systems accessible to all that are resilient and secure in the face of growing adversity. +\section*{Outlook} + +With the research contributions we presented in this thesis, we open up a new field of hardware security research +centered on Inertial HSMs and improvements to conventional tamper sensing meshes. Below, we will list some research +directions that we consider worthwhile for future investigation. + +\begin{itemize} +\item Improving the resolution of the sampling mesh monitoring approach we presented in + Chapter~\ref{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon}. Possible improvements include increasing pulse risetime through a discrete + transistor amplifier circuit, as well as evaluating an FPGA as a replacement for the microcontroller to take + advantage of the improved delay primitives offered by many FPGA families. +\item Characterizing the PUF-like effects we observed in Chapter~\ref{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon} in mesh coupons using + our sampling mesh monitoring approach. +\item Integrating IHSM technology with a HSM firmware implementation into a small form factor to create a portable IHSM. + A small form factor introduces new challenges besides the mere integration of the necessary circuitry and placement + of the mesh. For instance, wireless power and data transfer would need to be integrated with the device without + disrupting mesh monitoring. An on-axis solution would likely require magnetic shielding materials and possible + non-magnetic ceramic bearings. Furthermore, integrating a sufficiently small motor and optimizing the design for + long bearing life is challenging at the high rotation speed necessary at a small overall diameter. Finally, at high + speeds, precisely balancing the whole assembly to avoid vibrations that could lead to early mechanical failure is + difficult. +\item Tackling motor control algorithms for IHSMs and developing tamper sensors based on counter-electromotive force as + a defense-in-depth measure. +\item Integrating the IHSM hardware concept with software research on secure enclave and cryptographic coprocessors. +\item Exploring IHSM applications beyond what we outlined in this thesis. For instance, one application of recent + interests would be physically securing GPUs used for AI training. The background for such work could be either + export control motivations, or a concern for security and privacy of user input, training data, or even trained + weights. +\end{itemize} + +We will proceed with future research into IHSM applications. We have published our results up to this point as open +source hardware and software, and we intend to build on these publications. + diff --git a/chapter-epa/chapter.tex b/chapter-epa/chapter.tex index 48a75a4..2965e9d 100644 --- a/chapter-epa/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-epa/chapter.tex @@ -7,31 +7,42 @@ } \chaptertitle{The German ePA: A Motivating Counter-Example} +\label{chapter-epa} \todo{FIXME: Proper citation here} -\sourceattrib{This part is based on a short paper presented at the HS3 workshop at ESORICS 2025.} +\sourceattrib{This part is based on a short paper written by Jan Sebastian Götte and presented by Jan Sebastian Götte at +the HS3 workshop at ESORICS 2025~\cite{gotteGermanyRollingOut2026}.} Looking at the landscape of computer security solutions, we are presented with a wide variety of vendors and products that may give the impression that hardware security is a solved problem. Vendors sell various claims rangning from -\emph{You don't need hardware security, just do it in the cloud!} to \emph{Buy our HSM and you will be secure!}. In +\emph{``You don't need hardware security, just do it in the cloud!''}~\cite{ + utimacoWhatCloudHSM2025, + microsoftOverviewAzureCloud, + ibmCloudHSM2016, + amazonAWSCloudHSM, + googleCloudHSMCloud2025, + WhatCloudHSM} +to \emph{``Buy our HSM and you will be secure!''}~\cite{utimacoUseCases,thalesLunaNetworkHardware}. In practice, things are not as easy and even well-intentioned projects still often go awry on the hardware security -dimension. Concluding this chapter, we will now have a look at one such project that was done by capable people with the -best intentions, yet it resulted in a hardware security design that is dangerously inadequate for the purpose. +dimension. To motivate our research into physical security in this thesis, in this chapter we will have a look at one +such project that was done by capable people with the best intentions, yet it resulted in a hardware security design +that is dangerously inadequate for the purpose. Beginning May 2025, after several delays, Germany has started the nation-scale rollout of its new electronic medical -record system. The system aims to create a national database accessible to all healthcare providers that holds the -complete electronic medical records of all publically insured people living in Germany. The system aims to replace -paper-based workflows that are error-prone and lead to healthcare providers often only having access to a subset of -patient's medical records. Data in scope for the system includes medical letters, laboratory results, and medical -imaging files. +record system, named ePA (short for \emph{elektronische Patientenakte}, ``electronic patient +record'')~\cite{kochNochVieleUnklarheiten2025}. The system aims to create a national database accessible to all +healthcare providers that holds the complete electronic medical records of all publically insured people living in +Germany. The system aims to replace paper-based workflows that are error-prone and lead to healthcare providers often +only having access to a subset of patient's medical records. Data in scope for the system includes medical letters, +laboratory results, and medical imaging files. Due to Germany's mandatory health insurance laws, the system's user base encompasses the majority of all German -residents. People who have replaced their public health insurance with private insurance as of now are not subject to -the system. In Germany, by law private health insurance is only available to people from the top 10th percentile of -household income. This means that the system disproportionally affects people who have low income, creating an equity -issue. While it is possible to opt out from the use of the system, the process of opting out is difficult. Additionally, -the government and health insurance providers have publically depicted the system in a one-sidedly positive way, meaning -that it is unlikely the majority of people subject to the system have a comprehensive understanding of the system's -benefits and risks that would be necessary for an informed decision. +residents, approximately 90\%. People who have replaced their public health insurance with private insurance as of now +are not subject to the system. In Germany, by law private health insurance is only available to people from the top 10th +percentile of household income. This means that the system disproportionally affects people who have low income, +creating an equity issue. While it is possible to opt out from the use of the new digital record, the process of opting +out is difficult. Additionally, the government and health insurance providers have publically depicted the system in a +one-sidedly positive way, meaning that it is unlikely the majority of people subject to the system have a comprehensive +understanding of the system's benefits and risks that would be necessary for an informed decision. While there has been loud criticism of the system's security from civil society organizations such as digital rights nonprofit organization Chaos Computer Club (CCC) \cite{kochMoreMoreExperts2025} and several severe security flaws have @@ -39,11 +50,11 @@ been demonstrated practically, this criticism has largely been ignored by the po that despite this civil society outrage and the system's large scale, it has received little attention from the academic cryptography and information security community. -In this chapter, we aim to point out some perplexing cryptographic engineering decisions in the system. In particular, -we point out that the system's core per-user secrets are kept in a rudimentary key escrow system whose security is based -on engineering assumptions, not on cryptographic principles. Furthermore, we observe that by specification, the -individual user keys of the system are derived from a per-user cleartext salt based on a system-wide long-term secret -with only 256 bits of entropy\footnote{ +In this chapter, we aim to highlight some unconventional cryptographic engineering decisions in the system. In +particular, we point out that the system's core per-user secrets are kept in a rudimentary key escrow system whose +security is based on engineering assumptions, not on cryptographic principles. Furthermore, we observe that by +specification, the individual user keys of the system are derived from a per-user cleartext salt based on a system-wide +long-term secret with only 256 bits of entropy\footnote{ In previous versions of the standard \cite{ gematikSpezifikationSchluesselgenerierungsdienstEPA2023, gematikUebergreifendeSpezifikationVerwendung2025, @@ -51,29 +62,24 @@ with only 256 bits of entropy\footnote{ The current standard only requires one escrow service, and drops the entropy requirement of the root keys from 512 bits to 256 bits. The apparent reason for the long-term nature of these keys is that they are updated manually. }. Finally, we note that according to specification, the only physical security requirement for the protection of this -highly sensitive secret is a ``hard, opaque potting material'', with no tamper detection and response required. We -belive that Inertial HSMs provide a path forward for systems like this, enabling physical security in applications that -currently rely on insecure, legacy systems. Even if for regulatory reasons a poorly secured conventional HSM without -active tamper sensing is chosen, it would be conceivable to construct an IHSM enclosure \emph{around} this conventional -HSM, in effect retrofitting the missing active tamper-sensing envelope. +highly sensitive secret is a ``hard, opaque potting material'', with no tamper detection and response required. We base our analysis of the ePA on the system's publicly available standards in their latest version as of the writing of the paper underlying this chapter in April 2025, describing version 3.0 of the healthcare record system \cite{ gematikSpezifikationAktensystemEPA2025, gematikUbergreifendeSpezifikationVerwendung2024, -}. We note that the implementation might well deviate from these standards and be more secure--however, with the -system's history of flaws, we believe this is unlikely to be the case. The reference implementation provided by the -specification authority \cite{GithubRepositoryERPFD} follows the specified minimum requirements closely. As of now, -there is no meaningful way for either the public or for researchers such as us to ascertain the concrete implementation -security of the system. +}. We note that hypothetically, the implementation might deviate from these standards and be more secure. The reference +implementation provided by the specification authority \cite{GithubRepositoryERPFD} follows the specified minimum +requirements closely. As of now, there is no meaningful way for either the public or for researchers such as us to +ascertain the concrete implementation security of the system. \section{The Design of ePA} -ePA (short for \emph{elektronische Patientenakte}, ``electronic patient record''), is embedded into Germany's national -public healthcare backend system ``Telematikinfrastruktur'' (TI). TI is a highly complex system, and a detailed -description would exceed the limits of this analysis. Briefly put, TI consists of a shared DMZ that parties like -insurance providers and healthcare providers connect to through a VPN. At the client location, usually an individual -doctor's office or a hospital, this VPN connection is terminated by a specialized VPN appliance named ``Konnektor'' that +ePA is embedded into Germany's national public healthcare backend system ``Telematikinfrastruktur'' (abbreviated TI; +German for ``telematics infrastructure''). TI is a highly complex system, and a detailed description would exceed the +limits of this analysis. Briefly put, TI consists of a shared demilitarized zone (DMZ) that parties like insurance +providers and healthcare providers connect to through a VPN. At the client location, usually an individual doctor's +office or a hospital, this VPN connection is terminated by a specialized VPN appliance named ``Konnektor'' that simultaneously acts as a trusted component inside the client network hosting some software for purposes such as authentication. The Konnektor contains several smart cards that store keys used for authentication. Konnektor devices are offered by several vendors and healthcare providers like doctor's offices are indivudally responsible for purchasing @@ -82,49 +88,51 @@ and maintaining a Konnektor. % FIXME: Is there a threat/trust model of the system that you could summarise in a few sentences? Every person enrolled in the system as well as every healthcare professional providing services under it is issued an ID -card that contains a smart card that contains keys used to authenticate towards the central infrastructure. The primary -use of these smart cards up to now is that when someone visits a healthcare provider, they will insert their ID card -into a terminal so the healthcare provider can automatically fetch their personal information such as name, birth date, -address and enrollment status from their insurance provider. +card that contains a smart card with keys to authenticate towards the central infrastructure. The primary use of these +smart cards previously was to automatically provide personal information such as name, birth date, address and insurance +enrollment status when an enrolled person visits a healthcare provider. ePA is implemented inside the TI system. Its centralized services are accessed by healthcare providers through the TI's -VPN. Patient records are encrypted and decrypted inside TI's backend systems. Smart cards authenticate parties and -hardware devices to each other. Each insurance provider picks one of several implementations of ePA's server-side -infrastructure to run for its clients. Currently, there are two approved implementations of this server-side -infrastructure. +VPN, and by patients through proxy servers connected to TI's VPN. Patient records are encrypted and decrypted inside +TI's backend systems. Smart cards authenticate parties and hardware devices to each other. Each insurance provider picks +one of several implementations of ePA's server-side infrastructure to run for its clients. Currently, there are two +approved implementations of this server-side infrastructure. With the current version of the specificatoin, the overall architecture of ePA heavily relies on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Data processing on the server side is done in plaintext inside TEEs, with some cryptographic key -management delegated to a Hardware Security Module. While attacks on the TEEs are considered in the system, the HSMs are -assumed to be perfectly secure, and the system does not include mitigations for a compromised HSM. The primary +management delegated to a Hardware Security Module (HSM). While attacks on the TEEs are considered in the system, the +HSMs are assumed to be perfectly secure, and the system does not include mitigations for a compromised HSM. The primary motivation for plaintext processing seems to be to enable large-scale data analysis for research purposes without -requiring consent or cooperation of the people whose records are being processed. +requiring consent or cooperation of the people whose records are being +processed~\cite{gematikWhitepaperDatenschutzUnd2025}. The primary services offered by the server side are authentication services, key escrow, and a database storing the encrypted records themselves. Records are symmetrically encrypted with keys that are derived from system-wide secrets inside an HSM. The primary motivation behind the use of a key escrow service seems to be to enable the creation of a -duplicate patient ID smartcard in case a person looses theirs. While the current version of the standard is unclear on -the exact mechanism of key derivation, in previous versions of the standard, the escrow service's root key, a random -salt, and the healthcare ID number of the person owning the record was used in SHA256-HKDF. The specification requires +duplicate user ID smartcard in case an enrolled person looses theirs. While the current version of the standard is +unclear on the exact mechanism of key derivation, in previous versions of the standard, the escrow service's root key, a +random salt, and the healthcare ID number of the enrolled person was used in SHA256-HKDF. The specification requires that a new root key is generated once a year, but as far as we can tell, record key rollover is not done automatically but is only meant to be done when the \emph{user} requests it, and old root keys must be retained forever to ensure old -records can be accessed. +records can be accessed. Through this lack of automatic key rollover combined with the need to retain root keys +indefinitely, attack surface is maximized and incremental compromises of the system over long time spans become possible. -\section{Related Work} +\subsection{Previous Analyses} -The state-owned company specifying the system commissioned several security assessments of the system relating to the -key escrow service. \textcite{fischlinKryptographischeAnalyseSpezifikation2021} focuses on the cryptographic -dimension of the key escrow service used in an older version of the standard, and is now obsolete. -\textcite{slanySicherheitsanalyseZurSicherheit2020} approaches the system at a higher level, and focuses on the -cryptography of the inner protocol layers spoken between the system's components. Industry research organization +\emph{gematik}, the state-owned company specifying the system, commissioned several security assessments of the system +relating to the key escrow service. +\citeauthor{fischlinKryptographischeAnalyseSpezifikation2021}~\cite{fischlinKryptographischeAnalyseSpezifikation2021} +focuses on the cryptographic dimension of the key escrow service used in an older version of the standard, and is now +obsolete. \textcite{slanySicherheitsanalyseZurSicherheit2020} approaches the system at a higher level, and focuses on +the cryptography of the inner protocol layers spoken between the system's components. Industry research organization Fraunhofer SIT was comissioned for a structured, theoretical assessment of attack paths to the system -\cite{fraunhofersitAbschlussberichtSicherheitsanalyseGesamtsystems2024}. We are not currently aware of -independent academic security research on the system. +\cite{fraunhofersitAbschlussberichtSicherheitsanalyseGesamtsystems2024}. We are not currently aware of independent +academic security research on the system. The design and operation of the system have been independently described in detail by civil society activists, who have -demonstrated several successful attacks on the system. \textcite{tschirsichHackerHinOder0100} demonstrated how they +demonstrated several successful attacks on the system. \textcite{tschirsichHackerHinOder2019} demonstrated how they could trivially acquire each of the smartcards as well as the Konnektor necessary for accessing the system. -\textcite{tschirsichKonnteBisherNoch0100} summarize the history of attacks demonstrated on the system and show multiple +\textcite{tschirsichKonnteBisherNoch2024} summarize the history of attacks demonstrated on the system and show multiple practical attacks on various parts of the system's implementation. \section{Concerning Cryptographic Engineering Choices} @@ -134,11 +142,11 @@ by no means an exhaustive list, and is only meant to underscore why we believe t \subsection{Use of Key Escrow} -First, the system's general approach of using a key escrow service instead of securely storing the keys inside the -system's already existing smart card infrastructure is concerning, given that this key escrow service poses a -centralized security risk. The system's designers made this decision since it was deemed important that access to an -encrypted record can be restored quickly after an insurance ID card is lost, without requiring the cooperation of the -healthcare providers holding the primary copies of the person's medical records. +Key escrow describes a concept that was originally devised during the 1990ies out of a fear that the widespread +availability of strong encryption would stifle the ability of law enforcement agencies to wiretap communications in the +prosecution of crime. At the core of the concept rests the idea that a trusted \emph{key escrow} service should hold a +copy of every private key in use. In case the government wants to access one of these keys, the key escrow service can +provide this access\textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020,jarvisCryptoWarsFight2020}. While key escrow services have been a topic of political debate in decades past, in the cryptographic community, consensus generally is that they are a bad idea since they pose a centralized target for attack, and increase attack @@ -146,10 +154,19 @@ surface \cite{ abelsonRisksKeyRecovery1997, abelsonKeysDoormats2015, andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020, + rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic2015, }. +Our first concern is the system's general approach of using a key escrow service instead of securely storing the keys +inside the system's already existing smart card infrastructure. Like any other key escrow system, this key escrow +service poses a centralized security risk. The system's designers made this decision since it was considered important +that when an encrypted record must be restored after an insurance ID card is lost, it can be re-created without the +cooperation of the healthcare providers holding the primary copies of the person's medical records. + \subsection{Cryptographic Design} +\todo{Feedback from HS3 reviewer: I feel that this section is a mix-up of critique on the cryptographic design and the + approach to privacy protection and data minimisation. How are they linked? I'm missing some discussion here.} The system's overall cryptographic design is intentionally kept simple. The standard explicitly mentions that symmetric primitives have been preferred over asymmetric primitives in the core key escrow functions due to the risk of an attack on asymmetric primitives in the long term. Notably, other advanced cryptographic techniques such as secret sharing @@ -164,28 +181,25 @@ For instance, the system leaks a person's insurance ID number to the key escrow requested. Along with the timing and frequency of these requests, this leaks information on the person's condition to the key escrow service in an identifiable way. -% TODO I feel that this section is a mix-up of critique on the cryptographic design and the approach to privacy -% protection and data minimisation. How are they linked? I'm missing some discussion here. - \subsection{A Realistic Attacker Model} -We observe that the system as a whole does not appear to be designed to defend against well-resourced adversaries. The -series of practical attacks that have been demonstrated on the system confirm this impression. In -\textcite{tschirsichKonnteBisherNoch0100} summarize a series of successful attacks. Attacks include social engineering -resulting in access to copies of smartcards enabling accessing patient records, using misconfigured Konnektor VPN -appliances with their LAN DMZ and authentication interface exposed on the public internet, circumventing video-based -authentication processes resulting in duplicate file keys being provided, classis SQL injection on a backend service -maintaining an authentication database, accessing all national patient records through brute-force enumeration of weak -identifiers, and several more. +We observe that the system as a whole does not appear to be designed to defend against well-resourced adversaries. A +series of demonstrated practical attacks on the system, none of which required advanced capabilities, confirm this +impression. In \textcite{tschirsichKonnteBisherNoch2024} summarize a series of successful attacks. Attacks include +social engineering resulting in access to copies of smartcards enabling accessing patient records, using misconfigured +Konnektor VPN appliances with their local network DMZ and authentication interface exposed on the public internet, +circumventing video-based authentication processes resulting in duplicate file keys being provided, classis SQL +injection on a backend service maintaining an authentication database, accessing all national patient records through +brute-force enumeration of weak identifiers, and several more. -We believe that a system like this must be designed to withstand well-resourced adversaries such as enemy secret +We believe that a system like this must be designed to withstand well-resourced adversaries such as foreign secret services, since the medical data stored in such as information on chronic illness, sexually transmittable disease or severe food allergies has intelligence value. Repeated breaches of national digital infrastructure such as the 2015 breach of the US Office of Personnel Management \cite{barrettUSSuspectsHackers2015} or the 2024 compromise of US telecommunications wiretapping systems \cite{mennChineseGovernmentHackers2024} demonstrate that such state-sponsored attacks on national digital infrastructure are a realistic concern. A possible scenario in the ePA system would be an -enemy secret service gaining access to one of the HSMs storing the systems' root secrets, extracting the root secret by -an advanced physical attack, then being able to decrypt captured encrypted health records at will. Similarly, a +foreign secret service gaining access to one of the HSMs storing the systems' root secrets, extracting the root secret +by an advanced physical attack, then being able to decrypt captured encrypted health records at will. Similarly, a nation-state adversary might have access to an exploit allowing the compromise of the system's TEEs, which would enable the extraction of any patient records being processed in plaintext inside these TEEs. @@ -193,19 +207,20 @@ the extraction of any patient records being processed in plaintext inside these Physical security has received some consideration in the system's specification. First, smart cards are used extensively for authentication. Second, Hardware Security Modules are used in key locations of the system to process some -cryptographic secrets. The core of the system's key escrow service is implemented inside an HSM. However, it is notable -that the actual security level required for this HSM is only FIPS 140-2 level -3 \cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002}. Not only has FIPS 140-2 -been superseded by FIPS 140-3 since -2019 \cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019}, its security level 3 -mostly provides logical separation of cryptographic functions from other logic and is not very meaningful in the context -of physical attacks. The only physical requirement of FIPS 140-2 level 3 is that the HSM has a hard, opaque coating. -This coating is specified to be tamper-evident, but notably no active tamper detection or response features are required -by this standard. In contrast to the newer FIPS 140-3 standard and the related ISO/IEC 19790 \cite{ISOIEC19790} as well -as ISO/IEC 24759 \cite{ISOIEC24759} standards, FIPS 140-2 does not make any particular requirements regarding resistance -to side-channel attacks. The lack of tamper response, unspecified resistance to side-channel attacks and the fact that -the ePA specification only requires the long-lived key escrow root key inside the HSM to have 256 bits of entropy lead -to an unsatisfactory overall constellation. +cryptographic secrets. The core of the system's key escrow service is implemented inside an HSM that is part of a +redundant HSM cluster. However, it is notable that the actual security level required for this HSM is only FIPS 140-2 +level 3 \cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002}. FIPS 140-2 is a US +government standard that used to be popular for the specification of HSMs. However, not only has FIPS 140-2 been made +obsolete by FIPS 140-3 in 2019 \cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019}, +its security level 3 mostly provides logical separation of cryptographic functions from other logic and is not very +meaningful in the context of physical attacks. The only physical requirement of FIPS 140-2 level 3 is that the HSM has a +hard, opaque coating. This coating is specified to be tamper-evident, but notably no active tamper detection or response +features are required by this standard~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. In contrast to the newer FIPS 140-3 +standard and the related ISO/IEC 19790 \cite{ISOIEC19790} as well as ISO/IEC 24759 \cite{ISOIEC24759} standards, FIPS +140-2 does not make any particular requirements regarding resistance to side-channel attacks. The lack of tamper +response, unspecified resistance to side-channel attacks and the fact that the ePA specification only requires the +long-lived key escrow root key inside the HSM to have 256 bits of entropy lead to an unsatisfactory overall +constellation. \section{Conclusion} @@ -226,11 +241,13 @@ From an academic perspective, it is interesting to see how the ePA ended up in i cryptographic solutions left by academic research that contributed. A fundamental truth in cryptographic engineering is that in the absence of technical checks, political promises are no guarantees of restraint. As such, the degree of trust the ePA system places on organizational measures leads to a concerning overall picture. In particular, the system's -strong reliance on conventional HSMs built to long obsolete security standards as well as on trusted execution -environment technology that has been broken multiple times highlights the need for new approaches to hardware security +extensive reliance on not just conventional HSMs built to long obsolete security standards but also on trusted execution +environments that have been broken multiple times highlights the need for new approaches to hardware security that better accomodate real-world use cases. We believe that Inertial HSMs can address this use case by cleanly separating the physical security primitive into a retargetable design that can be applied to entire servers if needed, and augment or replace technology like conventional -HSMs or trusted execution environments to provide high-level hardware security. +HSMs or trusted execution environments to provide high-level hardware security. Before introducing IHSMs in +Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}, in the following chapter, we will first complement this chapter's outlook on the state of +the art in hardware security with a survey of tamper sensing meshes in a wide range of real world devices. diff --git a/chapter-hsms/chapter.tex b/chapter-hsms/chapter.tex index e4387f1..fc4be09 100644 --- a/chapter-hsms/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-hsms/chapter.tex @@ -5,36 +5,49 @@ } \chaptertitle{Active Tamper Sensing in the Wild} +\label{chapter-survey} -Inertial Hardware Security Modules are the latest link in a series o developments bringing hardware security primitives -from niche military cipher machines to mass-market applications. The tamper-sensing technology that forms the primary -line of defense in such physical security systems goes back more than a century, with the earliest tamper-sensing meshes +Inertial Hardware Security Modules are the latest link in a series of developments bringing hardware security primitives +from niche military cipher machines to mass-market applications. The tamper sensing technology that forms the primary +line of defense in such physical security systems goes back more than a century, with the earliest tamper sensing meshes being used in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, around the widespread commercialization of electricity. Today, -active tamper-sensing meshes are used in a wide array of devices ranging from card payment terminals to atomic bombs. +active tamper sensing meshes are used in a wide array of devices ranging from card payment terminals to atomic bombs. -In this chapter, we will start with a brief history of secure hardware with a particular focus on tamper-sensing meshes. -Complementing our historical analysis, we will present the results of a survey of a range of real-world devices using -tamper-sensing meshes and analyze their implementation. We will analyze the gaps left by the current state of the -industry, and evaluate how Inertial HSMs could close these gaps to make secure hardware accessible to a wider range of -applications. We will start with a brief history of secure hardware with a particular focus on tamper-sensing meshes. +In this chapter, we will start with a brief history of tamper sensing meshes. Complementing our historical analysis, we +will present the results of a survey of a range of real-world devices that use tamper sensing meshes and we will examine +their implementation. We will analyze the gaps left by the current state of the art in commercial practice, and evaluate +how Inertial HSMs could close these gaps to make secure hardware accessible to a wider range of applications. The +contributions in this chapter are as follows: + +\begin{itemize} + \item We provide a historical overview of uses of tamper sensing meshes. + \item We provide the first large-scale analysis of real devices incorporating tamper sensing meshes in the academic + record. + \item We create a taxonomy of practical construction techniques and provide both detailed analyis and photos + illustrating them. + \item From our sample, we extract several design patterns that can be applied to increase the security of a design. + \item We note security flaws in several of our samples. + \item We provide the results of Computed Tomography (CT) imaging of multiple samples, and we evaluate their impact + on tamper sensing mesh security. +\end{itemize} \section{The History of Tamper Sensing Meshes} -Tamper-sensing meshes offer many degrees of freedom in their design ranging from the precise conductor layout, through +Tamper sensing meshes offer many degrees of freedom in their design ranging from the precise conductor layout, through the manufacturing technology of the mesh and how it is wrapped around the payload during manufacturing up to their -monitoring circuitry. As a result, manufacturers across application domains from datacenter appliance HSMs through card -payment terminals have historically used patents on parts of their tamper-sensing mesh implementations as a means to +monitoring circuitry. As a result, manufacturers across application domains from datacenter appliance HSMs to card +payment terminals have historically used patents on parts of their tamper sensing mesh implementations as a means to prevent copying of their designs~\cite{ razaghiCircuitBoardHold2019, heitmannTamperBarrierElectronic2005, clarkTamperDetectionSystem2005, heitmannMethodMakingTamper2009, perreaultSystemMethodInstalling2005, -}. The basic principle of modern tamper-sensing meshes, preventing physical intrusion using an embedded looped conductor -to cover a surface traces back as far as at least 1870~\cite{ +}. The basic principle of modern tamper sensing meshes is to reliably detect physical intrusion using an embedded looped +conductor to cover a surface. This concept traces back at least as far as 1870~\cite{ ImprovementProtectingSafes1870, ImprovementElectromagneticEnvelopes1870}, when it was applied to the protection of bank vaults from robbers -attempting to dig, drill and saw through the vault's floor and walls. Even multi-layer, orthogonal tamper-sensing meshes +attempting to dig, drill and saw through the vault's floor and walls. Even multi-layer, orthogonal tamper sensing meshes are documented as far back as 1902~\cite{suttonElectricallyprotectedStructure1902}. Using printed circuits instead of wires for this purpose occurs in literature as soon as printed circuit technology finds widespread commercial adoption in the 1960ies~\cite{hamPrintedcircuitTypeSecurity1971}. The history of more HSM-like devices begins in the 1990ies with @@ -54,11 +67,12 @@ the widespread adoption of cryptography in commercial applications~\cite{ \subsection{Use by the US Military} -One of the earliest practical uses of tamper sensing meshes is documented in notes on a series of lectures given by -Dr.~David~G. Boak, a specialist in communications security and signal intelligence at the US National Security -Agency\cite{nsaHistoryUSCommunications1973,nsaHistoryUSCommunications1981}. In this lecture series, Boak mentions that -around World War \RN{2}, the US became concerned about the security of their ciphering machines, which at the time were -large, fridge-sized electro-mechanical contraptions. Initially, simple safes were used to protect those +One early practical uses of tamper sensing meshes for information security as opposed to the security of some physical +good is documented in notes on a series of lectures given by Dr.~David~G. Boak, a specialist in communications security +and signal intelligence at the US National Security +Agency~\cite{boakHistoryUSCommunications1981,boakHistoryUSCommunications1973}. In this lecture series, Boak mentions +that around World War \RN{2}, the US became concerned about the security of their ciphering machines, which at the time +were large, fridge-sized electro-mechanical contraptions. Initially, simple safes were used to protect those devices---however, as Boak notes, the US was well aware that they could not build a safe that a well-equipped specialist could not break open within an hour. As a solution, the NSA started development on what we would today call a Hardware Security Module by encapsulating a crypto coprocessor in a tamper sensing envelope. Boak observes that as a tamper @@ -68,7 +82,7 @@ exciting--exploding the device. \subsection{Use in Nuclear Weapons} -Communications security was not the earliest use of tamper-sensing membranes in the US military, with Boak mentioning +Communications security was not the earliest use of tamper sensing membranes in the US military, with Boak mentioning HSMs still being under development in the second volume of the lecture series, dated 1972. An earlier reference to such systems can be found in literature on Permissive Action Links (PALs) for nuclear weapons. In US military terminology, a PAL is a chain of locked, tamper-proof systems required to trigger the detonation of a nuclear weapon. PALs were @@ -83,13 +97,13 @@ explosion that the weapon is capable of. This goal is achievable in practice sin sensitive to the timing of their primary explosive charges, as the nuclear payload only produces a full-scale detonation when triggered in just the right way. -While it is difficult to date, \textcite{carterManagingNuclearOperations1987} specifically mention a tamper-sensing +While it is difficult to date, \textcite{carterManagingNuclearOperations1987} specifically mention a tamper sensing membrane being used in US PALs. Given the nature of the matter, it is safe to assume that this technology will have been in use for some years at the point it was being discussed in an unclassified, civilian book on nuclear armament control. \subsection{Use in Nuclear Safeguards} -Besides being used in nuclear weapons, tamper-sensing systems have another, more peaceful application in the nuclear +Besides being used in nuclear weapons, tamper sensing systems have another, more peaceful application in the nuclear field. In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded to coordinate and verify that civilian nuclear energy installations are not used for military purposes. A core part of the IAEA's tasks is observing the operations at civilian nuclear installations through inspections and through a variety of permanently deployed sensors to track the @@ -97,24 +111,29 @@ history of nuclear material passing through these facilities. When using sensors to monitor treaty compliance, the IAEA has to consider the possibility of a host state tampering with its sensors to abuse nuclear material without being noticed. Historically, the IAEA has responded to this threat by the -extensive use of tamper-indicating enclosures and of seals. In both systems, the approach taken is that the enclosure or -seal is treated similarly to what these days, in computing we call a Physically Uncloneable Function. The enclosure or -seal is manufactured in a process that leaves an unpredictable and uncontrollable pattern of manufacturing variations -such as surface imperfections. A process used in the IAEA is to package devices in aluminium enclosures passivated in a -brigh color, which leaves a random, microscopic pattern of pits in the surface from the etching step. Before such a -device is deployed in the field, it is precisely measured from all sides. Later on, after field deployment, its -integrity can then be checked by comparing its current state to these initial measurements. The underlying assumption is -that drilling or cutting into something like a steel enclosure will leave detectable traces, and that perfectly -replicating an object including features such as minute surface imperfections is infeasible even to a nation -state~\cite{iaea2011}. +extensive use of tamper-indicating enclosures and of seals\footnote{ + Note that in IAEA terminology, both tamper detection and tamper evidence are combined into the term ``tamper + indication''. The IAEA distinguishes between active tamper indication, which we conventionally call tamper + detection, and passive tamper indication, which we conventionally call tamper evidence. Tamper indicating devices + include seals, but also the aforementioned uniquely characterizable enclosures, which IAEA terminology calls + intrinsically tamper-indicating. An example for an active tamper indicating device would be a seismic sensor at the + bottom of a borehole that has been back-filled with concrete such that any attempt to reach the sensor would be + well-visible in the sensor's own readings~\cite{simmonsHowInsureThat1988}. +}. In both systems, the approach taken is that the enclosure or seal is treated similarly to what these days, in +computing we call a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). The concept of a PUF centers on electronic component +manufactured such that random manufacturing variations can later be measured by the finished circuit. The core idea is +that since these manufacturing variations are random, they can be used as a source for cryptographic entropy. +Furthermore, the concept is based on the assumption that these manufacturing variations cannot be controlled, hence +making the device \emph{unclonable}. -In IAEA terminology, both tamper detection and tamper evidence are combined into the term ``tamper indication''. The -IAEA distinguishes between active tamper indication, which we conventionally call tamper detection, and passive tamper -indication, which we conventionally call tamper evidence. Tamper indicating devices include seals, but also the -aforementioned uniquely characterizable enclosures, which IAEA terminology calls intrinsically tamper-indicating. An -example for an active tamper indicating device would be a seismic sensor at the bottom of a borehole that has been -back-filled with concrete such that any attempt to reach the sensor would be well-visible in the sensor's own -readings~\cite{simmonsHowInsureThat1988} +Similar to a PUF, in the IAEA's application an enclosure or seal is manufactured in a process that leaves an +unpredictable and uncontrollable pattern of manufacturing variations such as surface imperfections. A process used in +the IAEA is to package devices in aluminium enclosures passivated in a bright color, which leaves a random, microscopic +pattern of pits in the surface from the etching step. Before such a device is deployed in the field, it is precisely +measured from all sides. Later on, after field deployment, its integrity can then be checked by comparing its current +state to these initial measurements. The underlying assumption is that drilling or cutting into something like a metal +enclosure will leave detectable traces, and that perfectly replicating an object including features such as minute +surface imperfections is infeasible even to a nation state~\cite{iaea2011}. With smarter electronics becoming more affordable in both monetary and in power budget, over the decades, other active tamper sensors have received attention as well. The IAEA reports on attempts at burying sensors such as piezoelectric @@ -131,60 +150,74 @@ Commercially, tamper sensing meshes have entered widespread use beginning around in then-new HSMs, cryptographic coprocessors primarily aimed at the financial industry~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. Today, their use in finance has spread from HSMs in datacenters and ATMs to the ATM pin pads themselves, which encrypt the customer's PIN right at the source, as well as in all kinds -of card payment terminals. We will analyze two such ATM pin pads later in this chapter. +of card payment terminals. HSMs are used for highly sensitive operations even outside of the financial industry, although their adoption is -hampered by their high cost. Such applications include key management in the TLS certificate infrastructure. In this -chapter, we will analyze a commercial HSM that was used in the key management infrastructure of a premium TV provider. - -Beyond finance, tamper-sensing meshes have found applications in a variety of other use cases as well. For instance, we -have found them being used in mail franking machines to protect the credit counter and franking data, with one such unit -analyzed in this chapter. Furthermore, we have identified at least one model of key safe that in Germany is mounted -externally on public buildings to provide keys to emergency services, and which includes a tamper sensing mesh on its -outside-facing wall to detect attempts at drilling into it. Finally, we have found a processing unit used in a series of -mid-2000s era slot machines in Germany that includes a tamper-sensing mesh, presumably to prevent modification or +hampered by their high cost. In this chapter, we will analyze a commercial HSM that was used in the key management +infrastructure of a premium TV provider as one example of such uses. Examples of other applications include mail +franking machines, where they are used to protect the credit counter and franking data, with one such unit analyzed in +this chapter. Furthermore, we have identified several models of key safes that in Germany are mounted externally on +public buildings to provide keys to emergency services, and which include tamper sensing meshes on their door and +interior walls to detect attempts at drilling into them~\cite{SD04203RB25D5, +krusesicherheitssystemeDatenblattKRUSEFWSchlusseldepot2018}. Finally, we have found a processing unit used in a series +of mid-2000s era slot machines in Germany that includes a tamper sensing mesh, presumably to prevent modification or cloning. This device will also be analyzed later in this chapter. -\section{The Principles of Tamper-Sensing Mesh Construction and Monitoring} +\section{Tamper Sensing Mesh Design Principles} -%\subsection{Tamper-sensing Mesh Manufacturing} +%\subsection{tamper sensing Mesh Manufacturing} The manufacturing technology of a tamper sensing mesh is a critical factor in its security. While in many applications, meshes manufactured from off-the-shelf processes such as Flexible Printed Circuit (FPC) processes are used, these processes tend to be optimzed to maximize the robustness of the produced circuits to mechanical stress. In contrast, the -ideal tamper-sensing mesh is exactly as robust as it needs to be not to be destroyed accidentially during normal +ideal tamper sensing mesh is exactly as robust as it needs to be not to be destroyed accidentially during normal handling, but should not be more robust than that. As a result, more secure meshes tend to be manufactured in bespoke manufacturing processes~\cite{ immlerBTREPIDBatterylessTamperresistant2018, immlerSecurePhysicalEnclosures2018, - ImprovementProtectingSafes1870}. -% TODO cite hennigApparatusMethodComprising2020 and obermaierPUFfilmMethodProducing2023 on immler et al PUF tech + ImprovementProtectingSafes1870, + hennigApparatusMethodComprising2020, + obermaierPUFfilmMethodProducing2023, + vasileProtectingSecretsAdvanced2019, + smithBuildingHighperformanceProgrammable1999}. -One more widely cited tamper-sensing mesh implementation is a commercial product developed by IBM in collaboration with -chemical company W.\ L.\ Gore \& Asscociates Inc.\ and used in IBM's datacenter HSM products up to approximately 2020. -This mesh design uses a stack of multiple layers of a clear, flexible plastic substrate on which carbon-based traces are -printed. Vias, i.e. contacts between layers, are made by laser cutting small holes into the substrate before the traces -are printed. The flexible circuit layers are joined with a opaque black, stretchy glue and after installation embedded -in an elastic opaque resin. The plastic substrate foil is thinner and significantly less resistant to tearing than -plastic substrates commonly used in the electronics industry for applications like key pads and circuit boards, which -improves its security against tampering. Furthermore, both the glue fusing the foil layers together and the resin the -mesh is embedded inside after installation are clearly co-designed with the carbon trace material such that the trace -material adheres well to both, leading to the traces being destroyed when either are peeled off. +One more widely cited tamper sensing mesh implementation is a commercial product developed by IBM in collaboration with +chemical company W.\ L.\ Gore \& Asscociates Inc. This product is used in IBM's datacenter HSM products up to +approximately 2020~\cite{ + obermaier2018, + andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020, + smithBuildingHighperformanceProgrammable1999}. +It uses a stack of multiple layers of a clear, flexible plastic substrate on which carbon-based traces are printed. +Vias, i.e. contacts between layers, are made by laser cutting small holes into the substrate before the traces are +printed. The flexible circuit layers are joined with a opaque black, stretchy glue and are embedded in an elastic opaque +resin after installation. The plastic substrate foil is thinner and significantly less resistant to tearing than plastic +substrates commonly used in the electronics industry for applications like key pads and circuit boards, which improves +its security against tampering. It is clear that both the glue fusing the foil layers together and the resin that the +mesh is embedded inside are co-designed with the carbon trace material such that the trace material adheres well to +both, leading to the traces being destroyed when either are peeled off. The design of these IBM/Gore meshes is documented in an extensive list of patents, mostly under IBM's name. Its basic construction and layout has not changed much since the early 1990ies~\cite{ macphersonImprovementsSecurityEnclosures1993, macphersonTamperRespondentEnclosure1999}. -\subsection{Tamper-sensing Mesh Monitoring} +Concluding this brief history of tamper sensing meshes, we find that they were initially developed for sensitive +military applications, and their use in civil applications is a recent phenomenon. The implementation of tamper sensing +meshes in civil applications was likely catalyzed by two advancements in electronics. First, electronic components +became less expensive and more integrated reducing the cost overhead of tamper sensing circuits. Second, the mass-scale +adoption of PCB and FPC production processes enabled their use as inexpensive, high-resolution substrates for such +meshes. -Tamper-sensing meshes are most effective when they are continuously monitored using a backup power supply when the -larger system is powered off. In practice, the main challenge with continuous monitoring of tamper-sensing meshes is in +\subsection{Monitoring Circuit Approaches} + +Tamper sensing meshes are most effective when they are continuously monitored using a backup power supply while the rest +of the system is powered off. In practice, the main challenge with continuous monitoring of tamper sensing meshes is in the design of the monitoring circuit. A large portion of industry attention has been spent on designing low-power monitoring circuits that are sensitive to tampering with the mesh while using little enough power to enable years of operation from a battery. Commonly, one or two cylindrical or large coin cell Lithium primary batteries are used, -providing in the order of \qtyrange{10}{20}{\watt\hour} over their lifetime. Broken down to an unpowered storage life of -e.g.\ 5 years, this corresponds to a maximum average power consumption of \qty{450}{\micro\watt}. +providing in the order of \qty{10}{\watt\hour} over their lifetime\cite{horowitzArtElectronics2024}. Broken down to an +unpowered storage life of e.g.\ 5 years, this corresponds to a maximum average power consumption of less than +\qty{230}{\micro\watt}. % relevant categories: (H01L23/576), (G06K19/07372) % keyword: wire covering @@ -192,45 +225,133 @@ To achieve low power consumption, a popular technique known since at least 1902~\cite{suttonElectricallyprotectedStructure1902} and still used today~\cite{cesanaTamperResistantCard2001,razaghiCircuitBoardHold2019} is to measure the deviation of the mesh's end-to-end ohmic resistance from its baseline value. This measurement can be implemented either by directly comparing a -mesh trace's resistance with a reference resistor, or using a wheatstone bridge. Using a bridge circuit was already used -in early tamper-sensing mesh implementations~\cite{ +mesh trace's resistance with a reference resistor, or using a Wheatstone bridge. Bridge circuits were already used +in early tamper sensing mesh implementations~\cite{ ElektrischeSicherheitseinrichtungSchutze1932, hamPrintedcircuitTypeSecurity1971, dalphinEnceinteProtegeeAvec1987, -} and makes it possible to detect small changes in the mesh's resistance with little complexity. +} since they make it possible to detect small changes in the mesh's resistance with little complexity. \subsection{Other Tamper Sensing Techniques} -Besides tamper-sensing meshes, environmental sensors such as temperature or light sensors are frequently used as a +Besides tamper sensing meshes, environmental sensors such as temperature or light sensors are frequently used as a secondary line of defence in HSMs and similar devices. By placing such sensors in the device and verifying the device is within its nominal operating environment, tampering can be made less convenient. Modern security standards often mandate -the implementation of at least a temperature sensor to prevent cold-boot attacks on a device. A multitude of other -sensors have been proposed, including humidity sensors, vibration sensors, light sensors, magnetometers, and radiation -sensors such as X-ray sensors have been proposed. While the implementation cost of most sensor types is low, each -additional environmental sensor comes with an increased false alarm rate. Anecdotally, we have heard of light sensors -being removed from a datacenter HSM product because they caused frequent false alarms despite extensive efforts like -custom injection-molded plastic light baffles at all air vents of the device designed to prevent ingress of outside -light. -% FIXME citations? +the implementation of at least a temperature sensor to prevent cold-boot attacks on a device~\cite{ + usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019, + ISOIEC19790}. +A multitude of other sensors have been proposed, including vibration sensors, light sensors, +magnetometers, and radiation sensors such as X-ray sensors have been proposed. While the implementation cost of most +sensor types is low, each additional environmental sensor comes with an increased false alarm +rate~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. \section{A Survey of Meshes in the Wild} -Concluding the brief history of tamper sensing meshes above, we find that they were initially developed for sensitive -military applications, and their use in civil applications is a recent phenomenon. The implementation of tamper sensing -meshes in civil applications was likely catalyzed by two advancements in electronics. First, electronic components -became less expensive and more integrated reducing the cost overhead of tamper sensing circuits. Second, the mass-scale -adoption of PCB and Flexible Printed Circuit (FPC) production processes enabled their use as inexpensive, -high-resolution substrates for such meshes. In this section, we will examine a large sample of recent devices that -include tamper-sensing meshes to gain an understanding of how they are implemented, and what security level they are -targeted towards. Since we were unable to acquire a nuclear weapon for our research, we limited our survey to commercial -devices with a focus on card payment terminals, which represent the most varied class of device incorporating such -meshes. +In this section, we will examine a large sample of recent devices that include tamper sensing meshes to gain an +understanding of how they are implemented, and what security level they are targeted towards. Since we were unable to +acquire a nuclear weapon for our research, we limited our survey to commercial devices. While we analyzed devices across +a broad spectrum of applications, our survey includes a large variety of card payment terminals, which represent the +most varied class of device incorporating such meshes. -\subsection{Sample Selection} +\subsection{Specimen Selection} Given their niche applications and high cost, devices incorporating tamper sensing meshes tend to be hard to find. For -this survey, we chose 21 different models of card payment terminals, and 6 other devices. All devices were procured from -ebay, and the majority were sold by electronic waste recycling companies. +this survey, we chose 30 total devices including 23 different models of card payment terminals, and 7 other devices. +Some devices were procured by intercepting electronic waste, while most were sourced from ebay in Februrary and March +2025. The majority of these were sold by electronic waste recycling companies. A complete list of our specimens can be +found in Table~\ref{tab_hsm_survey_sample_list}. External photos of each device are shown in +Figure~\ref{fig_hsm_survey_sample_pics} and internal photos are shown in +Figure~\ref{fig_hsm_survey_sample_internal_pics}. In the following sections, we will go into detail on the classes of +devices we selected for this study. + +\begin{table} + \footnotesize + \rowcolors{2}{gray!15}{white} + \begin{tabular}[c]{c>{\RaggedRight\arraybackslash}p{20mm}>{\RaggedRight\arraybackslash}p{30mm}llc} + \textbf{ID} & \textbf{Device} & \textbf{Manufacturer} & \textbf{Type code} & \textbf{Year} \\ + \hline + H01 & PED & Verifone & VX 570 & ca. 2010 \\ + H02 & Slot machine CPU module & Merkur / ADP Gauselmann & Sam 12 EC2 & ca. 2012 \\ + H03 & EPP & Sagem & USA1315-4240 R1A & 2014 \\ + H04 & EPP & Sagem & USA1316-5120 R1A & 2007 \\ + H05 & PED & Xac & xAPT-103 & 2014 \\ + H06 & PED & Ingenico & iCT250-11T1860A & 2016-17 \\ + H08 & PED & Sagem & NOR4100-4220 R1A & 2012 \\ + H09 & PED & Hypercom & M4230 & 2010 \\ + H10 & PED & Worldline & YOMANI XR & 2016 \\ + H11 & PED & Banksys & C-ZAM Smash Portable & 2004 \\ + H12 & PED & Hypercom & Optimum P2100 & 2010 \\ + H13 & PED & Ingenico & iCT 220-11T2938A & 2016 \\ + H14 & PED & Verifone & H5000 & 2016 \\ + H15 & PED & Verifone & MX 925 & 2018 \\ + H16 & PED & Verifone & V200c CTLS & 2021 \\ + H17 & PED & Verifone & VX 680 & 2014 \\ + H18 & PED & Ingenico & i7910 & 2010 \\ + H19 & PED & Banksys & XENTA & 2004-2011 \\ + H20 & PED & Verifone & VX 520 3G & 2017 \\ + H21 & PED & Verifone & V400m Plus 4G & 2018 \\ + H22 & PED & Ingenico & Move 3500 & 2020 \\ + H23 & PED & Ingenico & iPP 350-11T1718A & 2015 \\ + H24 & PED & Ingenico & iWL255-01T2117A & 2016 \\ + H25 & Franking Machine & Neopost & IJ-25 & ca. 2001 \\ + H27 & PED & Sumup & AIR1E205 & 2021 \\ + H28 & EPP & NCR & 5814 UEPP & 2019 \\ + H29 & HSM & SafeNet & VBD-05 & 2018 \\ + H30 & HSM & Irdeto & Mayflower-IDX/C201 & 2011 \\ + H31 & PED & SumUp & SumUp 3G & 2019 \\ + H32 & PED & SumUp & SumUp Air & 2022 \\ + \end{tabular} + \caption[Tamper sensing mesh survey specimen list]{The specimens we dissected in our survey. PED stands for + \emph{Pin Entry Device}, the industry term for card payment terminals that have sufficient security to handle + credit card PINs. EPP stands for \emph{Encrypting Pin Pad}, the type of keypad used for pin entry on ATMs. HSM + stands for Hardware Security Module.} + \label{tab_hsm_survey_sample_list} +\end{table} + +\newcommand{\surveypic}[2]{ + \begingroup + \setlength{\fboxsep}{0.2mm} + \begin{overpic}[percent,width=25mm]{#2} + \put(100,85){\makebox[0pt][r]{\colorbox{white}{\large H#1}}} + \end{overpic} + \endgroup + } + +\begin{figure} + \begin{tabular}[c]{cccc} + \surveypic{02}{survey_diag_S02.jpg}& + \surveypic{03}{survey_diag_S03.jpg}& + \surveypic{04}{survey_diag_S04.jpg}& + \surveypic{05}{survey_diag_S05.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{06}{survey_diag_S06.jpg}& + \surveypic{08}{survey_diag_S08.jpg}& + \surveypic{09}{survey_diag_S09.jpg}& + \surveypic{10}{survey_diag_S10.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{11}{survey_diag_S11.jpg}& + \surveypic{12}{survey_diag_S12.jpg}& + \surveypic{13}{survey_diag_S13.jpg}& + \surveypic{14}{survey_diag_S14.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{15}{survey_diag_S15.jpg}& + \surveypic{16}{survey_diag_S16.jpg}& + \surveypic{17}{survey_diag_S17.jpg}& + \surveypic{18}{survey_diag_S18.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{19}{survey_diag_S19.jpg}& + \surveypic{20}{survey_diag_S20.jpg}& + \surveypic{21}{survey_diag_S21.jpg}& + \surveypic{22}{survey_diag_S22.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{23}{survey_diag_S23.jpg}& + \surveypic{24}{survey_diag_S24.jpg}& + \surveypic{25}{survey_diag_S25.jpg}& + \surveypic{27}{survey_diag_S27.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{28}{survey_diag_S28.jpg}& + \surveypic{29}{survey_diag_S29.jpg}& + \surveypic{30}{survey_diag_S30.jpg}& + \surveypic{31}{survey_diag_S31.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{32}{survey_diag_S32.jpg}& + \end{tabular} + \caption[Tamper sensing mesh survey specimen external photos]{External photos of all survey specimens.} + \label{fig_hsm_survey_sample_pics} +\end{figure} \subsubsection{Card Payment Terminals} @@ -239,35 +360,38 @@ skimming that aim to exfiltrate card data and PINs entered by the customer. The Council (PCI SSC), an association of all major western credit card network operators assumes the role of the de-facto standardization organization in the card payment space. Due to the international scale of the large credit card networks, almost all payment terminals on the market irrespective of their country of origin are certified under PCI SSC -standards. Adding on to PCI's ecosystem impact, its security standards are thought out well and provide a higher level -of security than one might expect from an industry association. +standards. Adding on to PCI's ecosystem impact, its security standards are thought out well. -Physical security standards in card payment applications both on the client side -- payment terminals -- and on the -server side -- HSM appliances -- are more stringent than one might expect since the finance industry has been reluctant -to adopt modern cryptography. Not only are modern cryptographic protocols like Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) or +One reason for the high level of physical security standards in card payment applications both on the client side +(payment terminals) and on the server side (HSM appliances) is that the finance industry has been reluctant to adopt +modern cryptography. Not only are modern cryptographic protocols like secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) or Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) not commonly used. Even asymmetric cryptography has only been adopted reluctantly, and ancient ciphers such as Triple DES are still commonly referenced in industry -standards~\cite{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2025}. As a result, increased hardware security is necessary to -safeguard weak symmetric keys, compensating for the systems' modest cryptographic security. +standards~\cite{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2025}. As a result, increased hardware security is +necessary to safeguard weak symmetric keys, compensating for the systems' modest cryptographic security. Since card payment terminals are widely deployed, many different models from various manufacturers are available. Each -manufacturer tends to have their own, patented tamper-sensing implementation. Being manufactured at scale, card payment -terminals are cost-sensitive devices, which is reflected in the construction of their tamper-sensing implementations. +manufacturer tends to have their own, patented tamper sensing implementation. Being manufactured at scale, card payment +terminals are cost-sensitive devices, which is reflected in the construction of their tamper sensing implementations. \subsubsection{HSM Appliances} -For datacenter applications, HSMs are sold both as add-in cards and as standalone rackmount appliances with a network -interface. In practice, the standalone appliances are just low-end computers in a rackmount enclosure that expose the -API of an internal HSM add-in card to the network. In this survey, we were only able to procure a single such HSM since -these devices are expensive, and even used specimens of older models are usually listed for several hundreds to several -thousands of EUR. The one sample we procured was a 2011 model Utimaco CryptoServer LAN. Our unit was a white-label -variant procured by premium TV encryption technology provider Irdeto, presumably used in Germany to produce -cryptographic key streams for TV signal encryption. We bought the device from a recycling company specialized on -datacenter components. The device was sold with any HDDs removed. The device consisted of an older mainboard for -embedded applications containing an Intel Core 2 Duo-brand processor and 2 GiB of DDR2 RAM, which was connected to the -HSM add-in card through PCI. The device contained a small Lithium backup battery on the add-in card, and another, larger -battery in an enclosure at the front of the device that was connected to the card through a cable. The device did not -contain any obvious case intrusion sensors. +When credit card payments are handled on the web as opposed to in a physical store, HSMs are used in data centers to +handle plaintext payment data such as credit card numbers. Such HSM appliances are usually standalone rackmount devices +and are used across application domains. Depending on the application, these HSMs can be programmed with custom code, or +can be used as coprocessors through an API~\cite{LunaNetworkHSM}. In practice, the standalone appliances are just +low-end computers in a rackmount enclosure that expose the API of an internal HSM add-in card to the network. In this +survey, we obtained two devices labelled as HSMs. We were only able to procure two such devices since they are +expensive, and we found that even used specimens of older models are usually listed for several hundreds to several +thousands of Euro. Unfortunately, one of the devices we obtained did not contain any security meshes in its case, and +thus would not provide adequate protection against advanced attacks. The other specimen we procured was a 2011 model +Utimaco CryptoServer LAN. Our unit was a white-label variant procured by premium TV encryption technology provider +Irdeto, presumably used in Germany to produce cryptographic key streams for TV signal encryption. We bought the device +from a recycling company specialized on datacenter components. The device was sold with any HDDs removed. The device +consisted of an older mainboard for embedded applications containing an Intel Core 2 Duo-brand processor and 2 GiB of +DDR2 RAM, which was connected to the HSM add-in card through PCI. The device contained a small Lithium backup battery on +the add-in card, and another, larger battery in an enclosure at the front of the device that was connected to the card +through a cable. The device did not contain any obvious case intrusion sensors. \subsubsection{ATM Encrypting Pin Pads} @@ -275,52 +399,113 @@ ATMs are built in a modular construction approach. Physically, the enclosure of barrier. Besides the enclosure, there are two security barriers worthy of note. First, the bank notes in the machine are stored in an automatic cash dispenser that is built into a traditional vault inside the machine. This vault primarily acts as a mechanical barrier to discourage theft, but it also often includes tamper sensors that activate an Intelligent -Banknote Neutralisation System (IBNS). The IBNS is designed to spread hard-to-remove ink over the bank notes inside the -vault when tampered. The permanently stained bank notes are not accepted by banks or retailers anymore. -% FIXME cite https://www.oberthurcp.com/hubfs/Oberthur_December2020/Pdf/IBNS_Introduction_to_ink_staining_Oberthur_Cash_Protection_2019.pdf -% archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20250822134238/https://www.oberthurcp.com/hubfs/Oberthur_December2020/Pdf/IBNS_Introduction_to_ink_staining_Oberthur_Cash_Protection_2019.pdf -% FIXME cite https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/banknotes/damaged/html/index.en.html -% FIXME cite https://www.bcl.lu/en/Banknotes-and-Coins/remboursement/billets-macules1/index.html +Banknote Neutralisation System (IBNS)~\cite{ + banquecentraleduluxembourgInkstainedBanknotes, + europeancentralbankDamagedInkstainedBanknotes2023, + oberthurcashprotectionIntroductionCashProtection2019}. +The IBNS is designed to spread hard-to-remove ink over the bank notes inside the vault when tampered. The permanently +stained bank notes are not accepted by banks or retailers anymore. -Besides the vault, the other secondary security barrier is located inside the ATM's pin pad. While all communication -with the customer's card passes through an end-to-end encrypted channel from the bank's backends into the card's -smartcard IC, the customer must necessarily enter their pin in plain text. To prevent leakage of the plaintext PIN, the -PIN is encrypted inside the PIN pad itself. To this end, the PIN pad contains a microcontroller handling the encryption. -Often, both the circuit board containing the PIN pad's keyboard matrix and this microcontroller are shielded by a -tamper-sensing mesh to prevent physical attacks such as the installation of a skimming device that would record and -transmit the plaintex PIN. +Besides the vault, the another security barrier is located inside the ATM's pin pad. While all communication with the +customer's card passes through an end-to-end encrypted channel from the bank's backends into the card's smartcard IC, +the customer must necessarily enter their pin in plain text. To prevent leakage of the plaintext PIN, the PIN is +encrypted inside the PIN pad itself. To this end, the PIN pad contains a microcontroller handling the +encryption~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. Often, both the circuit board containing the PIN pad's keyboard +matrix and this microcontroller are shielded by a tamper sensing mesh to prevent physical attacks such as the +installation of a skimming device that would record and transmit the plaintex PIN. We acquired three different EPPs for analysis: Two designed by Sagem and apparently re-sold as a whitelabel product by Cryptera and Diebold, respectively, and one made by and branded NCR. All three devices have robust stainless steel front -cases. +cases, and are built in a sandwich construction of several layers of steel sheets and PCBs. \subsubsection{Other miscellaneous devices} -Sometimes, tamper-sensing meshes show up in other types of devices. We acquired two such devices. First, we acquired a +Sometimes, tamper sensing meshes show up in other types of devices. We acquired two such devices. First, we acquired a Neopost mail franking machine, a type of device that is used to directly print a code on an envelope that replaces a -conventional postage stamp. +conventional postage stamp. Since in businesses handling large volumes of mail these devices were routinely charged with +large sums of money in postage, such devices have security features ranging from physical seals on their enclosure to +full security meshes encasing their CPU modules. In case of Neopost, we are aware of one online source showing a +security mesh inside one such device~\cite{mikeselectricstuffNeopostPostalFranking2023}, but we found that our older +specimen only contained a sturdy cast zinc case that was welded shut with a spring-loaded lid switch inside. The other +miscellaneous device we found is a broken CPU module from a German slot machine manufacturer. While it would be +reasonable to assume this type of device might include active tamper sensing features to enforce state gambling +regulations, other slot machine manufacturers seem not to use tamper sensing in their systems so the more likely reason +is DRM. Our specimen included both a tamper sensing mesh as well as a semiconductor junction light sensor inside of a +sealed sheet metal enclosure. \subsection{Methodology} -We proceeded by first photographing every test specimen from multiple angles, then disassembling them. After -disassembly, we photographed each major component. After photos were taken, we proceeded with destructive techniques -where necessary to obtain microscope photos of each tamper-sensing mesh component. PCBs were sectioned using a sanding -drum attachment on a Dremel rotary tool. Potted modules were disassembled using milling, cutting and prying, applying -heat from a heat gun as necessary to soften polymer compounds and to break glue joints. +In this survey, we aim to create a comprehensive taxonomy of tamper sensing mesh construction methods across a range of +devices. To this purpose, we proceeded by first photographing every test specimen from multiple angles, then +disassembling them. After disassembly, we photographed each major component. +Figure~\ref{fig_hsm_survey_sample_internal_pics} shows a selection of these photos showing the major internal components +of the devices. After photos were taken, we proceeded with destructive techniques where necessary to understand the +devices' use of tamper-sensing meshes. We took microscope photos where we found interesting small structures. PCBs were +sectioned using a sanding drum attachment on a Dremel rotary tool. Potted modules were disassembled using milling, +cutting and prying, and applying heat from a heat gun as necessary to soften polymer compounds and to break glue joints. + +\begin{figure} + \begin{tabular}[c]{cccc} + \surveypic{01}{survey_internal_09_S01.jpg}& + \surveypic{02}{survey_internal_20_S02.jpg}& + \surveypic{03}{survey_internal_11_S03.jpg}& + \surveypic{04}{survey_internal_03_S04.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{05}{survey_internal_10_S05.jpg}& + \surveypic{06}{survey_internal_08_S06.jpg}& + \surveypic{08}{survey_internal_24_S08.jpg}& + \surveypic{09}{survey_internal_13_S09.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{10}{survey_internal_23_S10.jpg}& + \surveypic{11}{survey_internal_17_S11.jpg}& + \surveypic{12}{survey_internal_19_S12.jpg}& + \surveypic{13}{survey_internal_02_S13.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{14}{survey_internal_00_S14.jpg}& + \surveypic{14}{survey_internal_01_S14.jpg}& + \surveypic{15}{survey_internal_04_S15.jpg}& + \surveypic{16}{survey_internal_05_S16.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{17}{survey_internal_22_S17.jpg}& + \surveypic{18}{survey_internal_21_S18.jpg}& + \surveypic{19}{survey_internal_26_S19.jpg}& + \surveypic{20}{survey_internal_12_S20.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{21}{survey_internal_15_S21.jpg}& + \surveypic{22}{survey_internal_16_S22.jpg}& + \surveypic{23}{survey_internal_07_S23.jpg}& + \surveypic{24}{survey_internal_06_S24.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{25}{survey_internal_25_S25.jpg}& + \surveypic{27}{survey_internal_18_S27.jpg}& + \surveypic{28}{survey_internal_14_S28.jpg}& + \surveypic{30}{survey_internal_29_S30.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{31}{survey_internal_27_S31.jpg}& + \surveypic{32}{survey_internal_28_S32.jpg}& + % make sure the last row with a single dangling landscape picture is full height to avoid the last row's label + % overlapping the previous row + \rule{0pt}{25mm} + \end{tabular} + \caption[Tamper sensing mesh survey specimen internal photos]{Internal overview photos of the survey specimens.} + \label{fig_hsm_survey_sample_internal_pics} +\end{figure} \subsection{Results} +In the following sections, we will list some observations we made while dissecting our specimens. A complete set of +internal pictures and micrographs of selected components that goes beyond the following description is available in the +supplementary material to this thesis. +\todo{Actually assemble the supplementary material and include all photos} + \subsubsection{Mesh materials.} -We found meshes constructed from rigid PCBs as well as a number of Flexible Printed Circuit (FPC) processes. -Tamper-sensing meshes constructed from PCBs sometimes used parts of an existing PCB, and sometimes additional PCBs only -containing a mesh were added. Sometimes, multiple rigid PCB meshes were assembled in a house of cards fashion to enclose -part of a device. For flexible meshes, with the exception of the Utimaco HSM appliance's HSM card that used an -off-the-shelf Gore tamper sensing mesh foil were all clearly manufactured either entirely or mostly in standard -processes. We found silkscreened silver ink and silkscreened carbon ink-based foils similar to those used for membrane -keyboards, as well as conventional photolithographically etched copper/polyimide Flexible Printed Circuits (FPCs). -Overall, etched PCBs showed better resolution compared to silkscreen-printed meshes. Feature size for both rigid and -flexible etched PCB meshes was generally in the order of \qtyrange{100}{200}{\micro\meter}, while feature size for -printed foil meshes was coarser at between \qtyrange{500}{3000}{\micro\meter}. + +We found meshes constructed from rigid PCBs (e.g.\ specimens~\sampleno{H02}, \sampleno{H03} and \sampleno{H08}) as well +as a number of FPC processes. Tamper sensing meshes constructed from PCBs sometimes used parts of an existing PCB (e.g.\ +specimens~\sampleno{H03} and \sampleno{H10}), and sometimes additional PCBs only containing a mesh were added (e.g.\ +specimen~\sampleno{H02} and \sampleno{H08}). In some samples (e.g.\ specimens~\sampleno{H08} and \sampleno{H18}), +multiple rigid PCB meshes were assembled in a house of cards fashion to enclose a card slot. All flexible meshes that we +found with the exception of the Utimaco HSM appliance's HSM card (specimen~\sampleno{H30}) were clearly manufactured +either entirely or mostly in standard processes. We found printed silver ink (e.g.\ specimen~\sampleno{H12}) and printed +carbon ink-based foils (e.g.\ specimen~\sampleno{H09}) similar to those used for membrane keyboards, as well as +conventional photolithographically etched copper/polyimide FPCs (e.g.\ specimens~\sampleno{H03}, \sampleno{H04} and +\sampleno{H08}). Overall, etched PCBs showed better resolution compared to silkscreen-printed meshes. Feature size for +both rigid and flexible etched PCB meshes was generally in the order of \qtyrange{100}{200}{\micro\meter}, while feature +size for screen printed foil meshes was coarser at between \qtyrange{500}{3000}{\micro\meter}. In contrast to these +standard processes, the Utimaco HSM used a mesh foil that is manufactured in a proprietary, bespoke process by Gore. \subsubsection{Mesh layout.} @@ -328,61 +513,65 @@ printed foil meshes was coarser at between \qtyrange{500}{3000}{\micro\meter}. \centering \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.45\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{hsm_mesh_offset.jpg} - \caption{Offset layers for more complete coverage} + \caption{Offset layers for more complete coverage (specimen~\sampleno{H12}).} \label{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_offset} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.45\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{hsm_mesh_orthogonal.jpg} - \caption{Orthogonal patterns on subsequent layers} + \caption{Orthogonal patterns on subsequent layers (specimen~\sampleno{H14}).} \label{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_orthogonal} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.45\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{hsm_utimaco_mesh_gore.jpg} - \caption{Combining orthogonal layers with area-covering pattern} + \caption{Combining orthogonal layers with area-covering pattern (specimen~\sampleno{H30}).} \label{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_utimaco} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.45\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{hsm_mesh_stack_epp.jpg} - \caption{Spacing mesh layers apart to constrict angular freedom of an attack tool} + \caption{Spacing mesh layers apart to constrict angular freedom of an attack tool (specimen~\sampleno{H28}).} \label{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_epp} \end{subfigure} \caption{Mesh trace layout approaches for multi-layer meshes.} \label{hsm_fig_mesh_layout} \end{figure} -A key goal in tamper-sensing mesh design is to avoid any gaps in coverage. In single-layer meshes, gaps between adjacent +A key goal in tamper sensing mesh design is to avoid any gaps in coverage. In single-layer meshes, gaps between adjacent mesh traces cannot be avoided, and provide an easy approach for an attack. In multi-layer meshes, these structure -size-dependent gaps can be mitigated in multiple ways as shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout}. +size-dependent gaps can be mitigated in multiple ways as shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout}. In the following +list, we will address several common structural features that we observed across samples. -\paragraph{Offset patterns.} In a two-sided foil mesh, most of the gaps between adjacent traces can be covered by simply -offsetting the pattern by one structure size in both axes between the foil's top and bottom layers as shown in -Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_offset}. Depending on the mesh layout, only a small number of point-shaped gaps remain -at corners in mesh traces on one of the layers. The number of these gaps can be reduced by reducing the number of -misaligned corners between both layers for instance by choosing a systematic serpentine or spiral trace layout. - -\paragraph{Orthogonal patterns.} In some other specimens, the manufacturer chose the opposite approach of keeping the -mesh pattern mostly orthogonal on the mesh's two layers as shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_orthogonal}. While -this leads to a larger amount of gaps compared to offset patterns as described above, it also reduces the largest gap -size to about one structure size by one structure size. - -\paragraph{Combined approaches.} Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_utimaco} shows the layout of a Gore tamper-sensing mesh -foil used in an Utimaco HSM. This mesh consists of two foil layers bonded to each other. The outer foil is patterned on -both sides with a sparse pattern of thin serpentine traces with the patterns on both layers being orthogonal to each -other. Both patterns are oriented at a \qty{45}{\degree} angle relative to the sides of the rectangular enclosed volume. -The inner foil is only patterned on one side, and contains a thicker serpentine trace laid out in a zigzag pattern. The -two foil layers are aligned such that no gaps remain between the layers. - -\paragraph{Using layer spacing.} Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_epp} shows how an ATM Encrypting Pin Pad (EPP) -implemented the mesh on its keypad. Off-the-shelf metal snap dome contacts were used on the surface of a conventional -rigid PCB to create the keys. On top of the rigid PCB and contact domes, a two-layer copper/polyimide FPC with an -additional polyimide cover layer was glued down. Meshes were placed on both layers of the FPC, as well as on one -internal layer of the rigid PCB. The resulting structure had the FPC mesh layers separated from the rigid PCB mesh layer -by several hundred micrometers of the rigid PCB's substrate. The meshes on both the FPC and the rigid PCB used a -structure size of \qty{150}{\micro\meter}. The vertical separation between the two meshes was several times that -structure size, which limits the possible angles an attack tool could be inserted through both mesh layers. +\begin{enumerate} + \item\textbf{Offset patterns.} In a two-sided foil mesh, most of the gaps between adjacent traces can be covered by + simply offsetting the pattern by one structure size in both axes between the foil's top and bottom layers as + shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_offset}. Depending on the mesh layout, only a small number of + point-shaped gaps remain at corners in mesh traces on one of the layers. The number of these gaps can be reduced + by reducing the number of misaligned corners between both layers for instance by choosing a systematic + serpentine or spiral trace layout. + \item \textbf{Orthogonal patterns.} In some other specimens, the manufacturer chose the opposite approach of keeping + the mesh pattern mostly orthogonal on the mesh's two layers as shown in + Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_orthogonal}. While this leads to a larger amount of gaps compared to offset + patterns as described above, it also reduces the largest gap size to about one structure size by one structure + size. + \item \textbf{Combined approaches.} Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_utimaco} shows the layout of a Gore tamper + sensing mesh foil used in an Utimaco HSM. This mesh consists of two foil layers bonded to each other. The outer + foil is patterned on both sides with a sparse pattern of thin serpentine traces with the patterns on both layers + being orthogonal to each other. Both patterns are oriented at a \qty{45}{\degree} angle relative to the sides of + the rectangular enclosed volume. The inner foil is only patterned on one side, and contains a thicker serpentine + trace laid out in a zigzag pattern. The two foil layers are aligned such that no gaps remain between the + layers.\todo{sample number here and below (ingenico)} + \item \textbf{Using layer spacing.} Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_mesh_layout_epp} shows how an ATM Encrypting Pin Pad (EPP) + implemented the mesh on its keypad. Off-the-shelf metal snap dome contacts were used on the surface of a + conventional rigid PCB to create the keys. On top of the rigid PCB and contact domes, a two-layer + copper/polyimide FPC with an additional polyimide cover layer was glued down. Meshes were placed on both layers + of the FPC, as well as on one internal layer of the rigid PCB. The resulting structure had the FPC mesh layers + separated from the rigid PCB mesh layer by several hundred micrometers of the rigid PCB's substrate. The meshes + on both the FPC and the rigid PCB used a structure size of \qty{150}{\micro\meter}. The vertical separation + between the two meshes was several times that structure size, which limits the possible angles an attack tool + could be inserted through both mesh layers. +\end{enumerate} \subsubsection{Contact and trace construction.} @@ -390,56 +579,59 @@ structure size, which limits the possible angles an attack tool could be inserte \centering \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{trace_material_copper_pcb.jpg} - \caption{Standard photolithographic copper PCB process on rigid FR-4 fiberglass substrate} + \caption{Standard photolithographic copper PCB process on rigid FR-4 fiberglass substrate + (specimen~\sampleno{H10}).} \label{hsm_fig_materials_pcb_rigid} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{trace_material_copper_flex.jpg} - \caption{Standard photolithographic copper PCB process on flexible polyimide substrate} + \caption{Standard photolithographic copper PCB process on flexible polyimide substrate (specimen~\sampleno{H15}).} \label{hsm_fig_materials_pcb_flex} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{trace_material_silver.jpg} - \caption{Screen printing process using silver ink with some carbon ink contact pads for embedded buttons} + \caption{Screen printing process using silver ink with some carbon ink contact pads for embedded buttons + (specimen~\sampleno{H14}).} \label{hsm_fig_materials_silver_ink} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{trace_material_contact_gold_lds.jpg} - \caption{Laser direct structuring using electroless gold plating} + \caption{Laser direct structuring using electroless gold plating (specimen~\sampleno{H32}).} \label{hsm_fig_materials_gold_lds} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{trace_material_carbon.jpg} - \caption{Screen printing process using carbon ink} + \caption{Screen printing process using carbon ink (specimen~\sampleno{H30}).} \label{hsm_fig_materials_carbon_ink} \end{subfigure} - \caption[Mesh materials]{Materials and manufacturing processes used for mesh traces and contacts.} + \caption[Mesh materials and manufacturing processes]{Materials and manufacturing processes used for mesh traces and + contacts.} \label{hsm_fig_materials} \end{figure} -Regular Printed Circuit Boards are frequently used to implement tamper-sensing meshes as shown in +\todo{FIXME: Add scale / structure size to photos?} +Regular Printed Circuit Boards are frequently used to implement tamper sensing meshes as shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_pcb_rigid}. PCB production is a highly advanced, large-scale industry and PCBs are inexpensive, commodity products. PCBs can be manufactured with many layers, at almost arbitrary total thickness, and offer small structure sizes enabling the creation of fine features down to approximately \qty{100}{\micro\meter} even on -commodity processes. The primary disadvantage of using PCBs to implement tamper-sensing meshes is that PCBs are +commodity processes. The primary disadvantage of using PCBs to implement tamper sensing meshes is that PCBs are fundamentally designed to be as robust as possible. The traces on the top of a PCB are etched from a thick (usually \qty{35}{\micro\meter} on the outer layers) copper foil adhered to the PCB substrate. As a result, the PCB and the traces on its surface are easy to manipulate by hand using tools like knives and techniques like soldering. For a -tamper-sensing mesh, trace patterns manufactured to be more fragile might be advantageous. Additionally, standard PCBs -are made using a rigid FR-4 fiberglass/epoxy substrate. Since a tamper-sensing mesh must often enclose all sides of a +tamper sensing mesh, trace patterns manufactured to be more fragile might be advantageous. Additionally, standard PCBs +are made using a rigid FR-4 fiberglass/epoxy substrate. Since a tamper sensing mesh must often enclose all sides of a payload, flexible foils offer benefits over rigid PCBs. -Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_pcb_flex} shows a Flexible Printed Circuits (FPCs) produced in a standard commercial -process similar to PCB production. In FPCs, a copper foil adhered to a substrate is etched, but the substrate here -usually is a thin foil made from polyimide, an orange, temperature-resistant polymer that survives common reflow (hot -air) soldering temperatures. In contrast to rigid PCBs, FPCs are usually limited to no more than four layers before -losing flexibility. Flexible PCBs are often used for tamper-sensing meshes that wrap around a payload, but they come -with the same limitation as standard PCBs: Due to their robust substrate and thick copper layers, they are easily -manipulated by hand. +Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_pcb_flex} shows an FPCs produced in a standard commercial process similar to PCB +production. In FPCs, a copper foil adhered to a substrate is etched, but the substrate here usually is a thin foil made +from polyimide, an orange, temperature-resistant polymer that survives common reflow (hot air) soldering temperatures. +In contrast to rigid PCBs, FPCs are usually limited to no more than four layers before losing flexibility. Flexible PCBs +are often used for tamper sensing meshes that wrap around a payload, but they come with the same limitation as standard +PCBs: Due to their robust substrate and thick copper layers, they are easily manipulated by hand. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_silver_ink} shows an FPC created in a different process. Here, instead of photolithographically etching a continuous copper foil adhered to a flexible substrate, the substrate is instead printed @@ -448,17 +640,19 @@ small conductive particles suspended in a hardening binder. Common conductive in Silver-based inks offer lower resistance compared to carbon-based inks, but are prone to surface oxitation and as such are not suitable for contacts. As such, they are often combined with a carbon ink used in contact areas. Carbon-based inks have high resistance, and can be used to create embedded resistors. The circuit shown in -Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_silver_ink} contains a tamper-sensing mesh on a lower layer, and a keypad matrix with +Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_silver_ink} contains a tamper sensing mesh on a lower layer, and a keypad matrix with carbon contacts on its surface. -Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_gold_lds} shows part of a mesh and a contact created using Laser Direct Structuring and -electroless gold plating. Where in electroplating electrical current is used to deposit metal atoms on a surface, in -electroless plating a series of chemical reactions is used. Electroplating requires all traces to be electrically -connected to form a single electrode, while electroless plating can be used on the finished circuit. In -Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_gold_lds}, it is visible how the trace was created using three parallel passes by the -laser. The micrograph also shows the rather coarse edge structure created by LDS, which is caused by the rough surface -left after pulsed laser ablation. The uneven, thin layer of metallization created by LDS results in mechanically fragile -contacts. They must be contacted using a soft material, usually an elastomeric connector. +Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_gold_lds} shows part of a mesh and a contact created using Laser Direct Structuring, an +industrial technique combining selective activation of a plastic surface using a scanning laser and electroless gold +plating~\cite{lpkflaser&electronicsagLPKFLDSLaser2014}. Where in electroplating electrical current is used to deposit +metal atoms on a surface, in electroless plating a series of chemical reactions is used. Electroplating requires all +traces to be electrically connected to form a single electrode, while electroless plating can be used on the finished +circuit. Laser Direct Structuring allows patterning complex surfaces with fine structures made from metal deposited in a +thin layer. In Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_gold_lds}, it is visible how the trace was created using three parallel +passes by the laser. The micrograph also shows the rather coarse edge structure created by LDS, which is caused by the +rough surface left after pulsed laser ablation. The uneven, thin layer of metallization created by LDS results in +mechanically fragile contacts that must be contacted using a soft material, usually an elastomeric connector. \subsubsection{Connection methods} @@ -466,66 +660,68 @@ contacts. They must be contacted using a soft material, usually an elastomeric c \centering \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{connector_castellated_edge.jpg} - \caption{} + \caption{Direct soldering (specimen~\sampleno{H05}).} \label{hsm_fig_connector_castellations} \end{subfigure} \quad - \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} - \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{connector_stacking.jpg} - \caption{} - \label{hsm_fig_connector_stack} - \end{subfigure} - \quad - \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} - \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{connector_zif_fpc_2.jpg} - \caption{} - \label{hsm_fig_connector_fpc} - \end{subfigure} - \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{connector_elastomeric.jpg} - \caption{} + \caption{Direct soldering of an FPC and an elastomeric connector (specimen~\sampleno{H31}).} \label{hsm_fig_connector_elastomeric} \end{subfigure} \quad + \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} + \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{connector_zif_fpc_2.jpg} + \caption{Landing pads for tactile contact domes as well as FPC connector (specimen~\sampleno{H20}).} + \label{hsm_fig_connector_fpc} + \end{subfigure} + \quad + \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} + \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{connector_stacking.jpg} + \caption{Elastomeric connector landing pattern as well as stacking board-to-board connector + (specimen~\sampleno{H17}).} + \label{hsm_fig_connector_stack} + \end{subfigure} + \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{connector_rf_gasket.jpg} - \caption{} + \caption{Soft, conductive EM shielding gaskets used as connectors (specimen~\sampleno{H14}).} \label{hsm_fig_connector_gasket} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{connector_metal_dome.jpg} - \caption{} + \caption{Tactile dome (specimen~\sampleno{H06}).} \label{hsm_fig_connector_dome} \end{subfigure} - \caption[Mesh connecting methods]{Connecting methods used between tamper-sensing mesh assemblies and their base PCBs} + \caption[Mesh connecting methods]{Connecting methods used between tamper sensing mesh assemblies and their base PCBs} \label{hsm_fig_connector} \end{figure} -In our survey, we found a wide variety of connecting methods used to connect tamper-sensing mesh assemblies with their +In our survey, we found a wide variety of connecting methods used to connect tamper sensing mesh assemblies with their base PCBs with a selection shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector}. Both rigid PCBs and FPCs can be soldered directly to a PCB using either a Land Grid Array (LGA) technique where pads on both PCBs are soldered facing each other, or using \emph{castellated} edges, where pads on the base PCB are soldered sideways to holes on the top PCB that have been milled -in half as shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_castellations}. FPCs can also be soldered by draggin a solder blob +in half as shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_castellations}. FPCs can also be soldered by dragging a blob of solder across the contact as shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_elastomeric}, but this technique is only suitable for hand +soldering. Hand soldering increases unit cost over mechanized soldering techniques such as wave soldering or reflow soldering. -FPCs are suitable for use with standard Zero Insertion Force (ZIF) FPC connectors as shown in -Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_fpc} that directly mate to a contact area, called \emph{gold fingers} in industry terms, -on the FPC. Both FPCs and rigid PCBs can be used with standard board-to-board stacking connectors such as the one -visible in the center of Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_stack}, but their use on FPCs requires a stiffener on the FPC's -back side to ensure the solder joints don't break from mechanical stress when connecting or disconnecting. +FPCs are suitable for use with standard FPC connectors as shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_fpc}. These connectors +mate directly to a contact area on the FPC, called \emph{gold fingers} in industry terms. Both FPCs and rigid PCBs can +be used with standard board-to-board stacking connectors such as the one visible in the center of +Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_stack}, but their use on FPCs requires a stiffener on the FPC's back side to ensure the +solder joints don't break from mechanical stress when connecting or disconnecting. -In our survey, we frequently found elastomeric connectors used to connect to both flexible and rigid tamper-sensing mesh +In our survey, we frequently found elastomeric connectors used to connect to both flexible and rigid tamper sensing mesh assemblies. Elastomeric connectors such as the one shown in the center of Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_elastomeric} are usually used in LCD construction to contact a PCB to the LCD's Indium Tin Oxide (ITO)-coated conductive glass, but they -can be used between any two parallel, conductive surfaces\cite{andreaElectronicConnectorBook2022}. Elastomeric +can be used between any two parallel, conductive surfaces~\cite{andreaElectronicConnectorBook2022}. Elastomeric connectors consist of two insulating elastic polymer layers on the outside, with a thin strip of fine, alternating conductive and insulating elastic polymer layers sandwiched in between. In Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_elastomeric} the outer insulating layers are the blue polymer, and the alternating pattern can be seen embedded in their middle. The fine alternating pattern mates to much larger pads on the two contact surfaces, ensuring that adjacent contacts are -electrically insulated. In tamper-sensing mesh applications, elastomeric connectors provide an intrinsic disassembly +electrically insulated. In tamper sensing mesh applications, elastomeric connectors provide an intrinsic disassembly detection since they require continuous pressure to maintain electrical contact. In the top part of Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_stack}, a land pattern for an elastomeric connector is visible. @@ -542,7 +738,7 @@ to a base PCB. Here, a tactile metal dome intended to be used for creating butto connect the mesh to the base PCB. An alternative to soldering and elastomeric connectors that we did not observe during our survey but that deserves -mention here is Anisotropic Conductive Film (ACF)\cite{huangHardwareHackerAdventures2019}. Similar to elastomeric +mention here is Anisotropic Conductive Film (ACF)~\cite{huangHardwareHackerAdventures2019}. Similar to elastomeric connectors, ACF is industrially used to contact flexible PCBs to ITO-coated glass in TFT displays. ACF comes as a double-sided tape that is bonded using pressure and sometimes high temperatures, and creates a connection between conductive surfaces on both sides of the tape. This connection has an anisotropic nature, meaning that the tape only @@ -557,31 +753,31 @@ connection while guaranteeing adjacent spheres never touch each other. \centering \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{hsm_3d_style_fold_overlap.jpg} - \caption{Folded with overlap} + \caption{Folded with overlap (specimen~\sampleno{H03})} \label{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{hsm_3d_style_fold_no_overlap.jpg} - \caption{Folded without overlap} + \caption{Folded without overlap (specimen~\sampleno{H14})} \label{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_no_overlap} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{hsm_3d_style_vacform.jpg} - \caption{Thermoformed} + \caption{Thermoformed (specimen~\sampleno{H12})} \label{hsm_fig_3d_struct_vacuum_form} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{3d_construction_cards_standalone.jpg} - \caption{House-of-Cards construction} + \caption{House-of-Cards construction (specimen~\sampleno{H08})} \label{hsm_fig_3d_struct_house_of_cards} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{3d_construction_lds_top.jpg} - \caption{Laser Direct Structuring} + \caption{Laser Direct Structuring (specimen~\sampleno{H32})} \label{hsm_fig_3d_struct_lds} \end{subfigure} \caption[3D mesh construction styles]{Construction styles used to fit tamper sensing meshes into 3D envelopes. Grids @@ -589,17 +785,18 @@ connection while guaranteeing adjacent spheres never touch each other. \label{hsm_fig_3d_struct} \end{figure} -In practice, meshes are almost always manufactured in planar processes first, and then transformed into a -three-dimensional shape. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct} -\subref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap}-\subref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_house_of_cards} show the construction styles we saw -among our samples that shape a planar mesh into a three-dimensional structure. -Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap} and Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_no_overlap} have meshes produced -as flexible printed circuits, in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap} using a standard photolithographic -copper/polyimide FPC process usually used for flexible PCBs, and in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap} using -a standard silver ink screenprinting process. The choice in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_no_overlap} not to -overlap the mesh in the corner is likely caused by manufacturing considerations, since it mig~ht be difficult to ensure -proper folding of a small foil tab with adhesive pre-applied. -~ +While practical meshes are almost always manufactured in planar processes first, their applications usually require at +least partially covering a three-dimensional volume. In our survey, we saw a number of methods being used to create +three-dimensional structures from planar meshes. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct} +\subref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap}-\subref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_house_of_cards} show the major construction styles +we saw among our samples. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap} and +Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_no_overlap} have meshes produced as flexible printed circuits, in +Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap} using a standard photolithographic copper/polyimide FPC process usually +used for flexible PCBs, and in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_no_overlap} using a standard silver ink +screenprinting process. The choice in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_no_overlap} not to overlap the mesh in the +corner is likely caused by manufacturing considerations, since it might be difficult to ensure proper folding of a small +foil tab with adhesive pre-applied. + Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_vacuum_form} shows a sample of a flexible circuit manufactured in a screenprinted silver-ink process thermoformed into a three-dimensional shape~\cite{weidnerHardwareschutzFormHalbschalen2007}. The flexible circuit mesh is first produced in a standard planar printing process. After printing and curing, the resulting @@ -612,15 +809,62 @@ Thermoforming is a cheap industry standard process, but applied to flexible circ only 2.5-dimensional structures can be created since the starting product is always a planar sheet. Second, the sheet cannot be cut or contain slots or large holes before forming since it needs to be kept under a constant tension from all sides to ensure it evenly stretches into the mold. Finally, the depth achievable in such a process is rather limited, -with no sample in our survey exceeding \qty{2}{\milli\meter}\todo{Get proper number}. Higher depths would require +with no sample in our survey exceeding \qty{2}{\milli\meter}.\todo{Get proper number} Higher depths would require extensive deformation of the mesh circuit's plastic substrate, which could lead to tears in the mesh traces since the -particle-based conductive inks used for screen-printed electronics are inelastic. +particle-based conductive inks used for screen-printed electronics are inelastic. Among our samples, we saw two +instances of thermoformed meshes. First, all recent Ingenico terminals (\sampleno{H06,H13,H23,H24}) integrated an ink +printed mesh with thermoformed cavities into their key pad overlay. These terminals implement their key pad using +tactile domes with contacts patterned on their main PCBs' surface. These domes are commonly placed on an adhesive sheet +that is die cut to size so that the whole sheet can be placed on the PCB in one assembly step, instead of individually +placing each dome. In these samples, a mesh was integrated into this adhesive sheet using a silver ink printing process, +and two additional domes were used to provide contact between this integrated mesh and the main PCB. Cavities were +formed into this mesh to enclose the upper side of the main cryptographic processor and associated components. -The specimen in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_vacuum_form} shows one further design defect. The mesh shown does not -extend to the edges of the plastic cover it has been molded into. When this cover is placed on top of a PCB to protect -components on the PCB from tampering, this leaves a large gap between the bottom edge of the mesh and the PCB surface, -through which probes can be inserted to access either the payload circuit or the mesh monitoring circuitry. -\todoplaceholder{take pic of sample H08 card slot cover} +Figure~\ref{fig_ingenico_forming} shows the mesh of specimen~\sampleno{H24} both before and after removing the black +opaque cover lacquer used on the bottom side of these meshes to obscure their features. The lacquer was removed by +gently rubbing it with a cotton swap soaked with acetone. In Figure~\ref{fig_ingenico_forming_after}, we see how the +mesh's structure was adapted around the formed cavities to reduce the risk of a break during the forming process: The +mesh's traces were kept parallel to the direction the foil was stretched, and the feature size of the mesh was increased +by a large factor in these areas. In the corners of the formed cavity, where the foil experiences stretching in both +directions, the features were scaled even larger than along the cavity's edges. This increase in structure size +compromises the mesh's security level, especially given that the edges of the cavity are at a convenient direction for +access by probes. + +\begin{figure} + \begin{center} + \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.4\textwidth} + \includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{survey_formed_mesh_before.jpg} + \caption{Before removing opaque cover lacquer.} + \label{fig_ingenico_forming_before} + \end{subfigure} + \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.4\textwidth} + \includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{survey_formed_mesh_after.jpg} + \caption{After removing opaque cover lacquer.} + \label{fig_ingenico_forming_after} + \end{subfigure} + \end{center} + \caption{Formed cavities in printed foil mesh in specimen~\sampleno{H24}.} + \label{fig_ingenico_forming} +\end{figure} + +Specimen~\sampleno{H12}, shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_vacuum_form}, displays one further design defect. The mesh +shown does not extend to the edges of the plastic cover it has been molded into. When this cover is placed on top of a +PCB to protect components on the PCB from tampering, this leaves a large gap between the bottom edge of the mesh and the +PCB surface, through which probes can be inserted to access either the payload circuit or the mesh monitoring circuitry. + +A similar design defect was mitigated in the specimens manufactured by Banksys, card payment terminal \sampleno{H08} and +ATM encrypting pin pads \sampleno{H03} and \sampleno{H04}. These specimens all have a polyimide/copper FPC mesh glued to +the inside of a casted zinc lid form five sides of a cuboid. These meshes sit atop their base PCBs, and a possible +vulnerability would be the interface between the mesh and the PCB, where there will be an unavoidable gap of at least +several hundred micrometers. In specimen~\sampleno{H03}, this was mitigated by milling a slot into the base PCB for the +mesh to sit inside, thereby placing the top layer of the base PCB as well as any internal mesh layers inside the cavity +of the mesh lid. In specimen~\sampleno{H04}, the payload circuit was instead placed on a daughterboard sitting inside +the lid using board-to-board stacking connectors (cf. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_connector_stack}). Here, an additional rigid +mesh PCB was soldered flat on top of the base PCB to cover the open side of the mesh lid, creating an overlap at the +edges. In specimen~\sampleno{H08}, a card payment terminal, a simpler construction was used with a simple metal ring +soldered to the base PCB mechanically shielding the edge. We are unable to ascertain why this purely mechanical +shielding technique was used instead of the more secure overlapping technique seen in sample~\sampleno{H03}, which +should have a similar, low manufacturing cost. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_lds} shows the result of Laser Direct Structuring (LDS), a process that avoids some of the limitations of thermoformed planar meshes. In LDS, a plastic part is covered in a conductive pattern in a combination of @@ -644,25 +888,25 @@ which would be a flaw in a more standard HSM application. \centering \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.45\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{3d_construction_offset_mesh_delayered_contrast_improved.jpg} - \caption{Small obstacle mesh coupons} + \caption{Small obstacle mesh coupons (specimen~\sampleno{H17}).} \label{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_obstacle} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.45\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{3d_construction_via_stitch_mesh_delayer_2.jpg} - \caption{Via-fence meshes} + \caption{Via-fence meshes (specimen~\sampleno{H24}).} \label{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_via_fence} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.45\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{3d_construction_planar_stack.jpg} - \caption{Planar sandwich stack protecting the back of a connector} + \caption{Planar sandwich stack protecting the back of a connector (specimen~\sampleno{H24}).} \label{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_stack} \end{subfigure} \quad \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.45\textwidth} \centering\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{3d_construction_cavity_2.jpg} - \caption{PCB lid with routed cavity and embedded planar and via-fence meshes} + \caption{PCB lid with routed cavity and embedded planar and via-fence meshes (specimen~\sampleno{H14}).} \label{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_lid} \end{subfigure} \caption[Sandwich mesh construction styles]{Construction styles used to cover 3D volumes using sandwich-style @@ -673,10 +917,10 @@ which would be a flaw in a more standard HSM application. Besides the house of cards construction style shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_house_of_cards} where PCBs are hand-assembled into a 3D shape, rigid PCBs are also often soldered planar on top of other PCBs to serve as meshes. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich} shows examples of such sandwich-style constructions. -Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_obstacle} and Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_via_fence} show a popular construction +Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_obstacle} and Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_via_fence} show a widely used construction technique where a small mesh PCB coupon is soldered using a Land Grid Array (LGA)-technique on top of a larger base PCB containing circuitry. The goal in this technique is to project a small part of the mesh into the space above the base -PCB. While this does not prvevent targeted drilling, as the small coupon is easy to avoid, it does prevent an attacker +PCB. While this does not prevent targeted drilling as the small coupon is easy to avoid, it does prevent an attacker from sawing or laser-cutting into the side of the device parallel to the base PCB. In the implementation shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_obstacle}, the coupon simply contains a small mesh embedded in an inner layer. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_via_fence} shows a different technique, where the mesh inside the coupon is not @@ -691,11 +935,11 @@ terminal. While a similar result could also be achieved by milling a slot into t PCB, the economics of PCB manufacturing are such that it may be more cost-effective to bond two standard-thickness PCBs on top of one another instead. -Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_lid} finally shows an advanced construction technique that uses a custom PCB with a -large indent milled into its underside soldered on top of a base PCB to create a protected cavity on top of the base -PCB. This PCB lid shows a complex internal structure. It is built up in a custom stackup with a total of six layers: A -ground plane filling the top layer, then two orthogonal planar mesh layers covering the inside of the lid above the -cavity. Below this standard mesh stackup are two that are used to create a via fence structure similar to that shown in +Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_lid} shows an advanced construction technique that uses a custom PCB with a large indent +milled into its underside soldered on top of a base PCB to create a protected cavity on top of the base PCB. This PCB +lid shows a complex internal structure. It is built up in a custom stackup with a total of six layers: A ground plane +filling the top layer, then two orthogonal planar mesh layers covering the inside of the lid above the cavity. Below +this standard mesh stackup are two that are used to create a via fence structure similar to that shown in Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_via_fence} in an attempt to protect the sides around the central cavity. Below these two via fence layers, at the bottom of the PCB is one more layer containing the pads connecting it to the base PCB. @@ -706,7 +950,7 @@ via fence layers, at the bottom of the PCB is one more layer containing the pads \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.45\textwidth} \centering \includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{mesh_contact_joint.pdf} - \caption{CT section cut with part of a mesh layer and the riveted metal mesh contacts visible.} + \caption{CT section cut with part of a mesh layer and the crimped metal mesh contacts visible.} \label{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted_ct_cut} \end{subfigure} \quad @@ -723,19 +967,26 @@ via fence layers, at the bottom of the PCB is one more layer containing the pads \caption{Photo of the HSM module seated on the payment terminal's main PCB.} \label{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted_seated} \end{subfigure} - \caption[Potted module CT images]{Optical photograph and CT pictures of a potted HSM module.} + \caption[Potted module CT images]{Optical photograph and CT pictures of a potted HSM module + (specimen~\sampleno{H18}).} \label{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted} \end{figure} % FIXME put the CT people in the acknowledgements! Also the microwave people! -To evaluate CT imaging as an attack method, we performed CT imaging of the potted HSM module of an Ingenico payment -terminal. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted} shows the module we analyzed and two images exported from the resulting -CT scan data. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted_ct_cut} shows a horizontal cut across part of the module. In this cut, -we can clearly identify a mesh layer with multiple traces, four solid metal contacts riveted to the mesh foil, and two -unused contact pads and mesh traces in the lower part of the picture. An attacker would be able to use this information -to target the metal contacts with a tool like a needle probe. From the CT scan we were able to measure that the mesh of -the device has a pitch of \qty{1.0}{\milli\meter}. Thus, even inserting a thin needle probe right through one of the -mesh's traces should be possible without breaking the trace. +Hardware manufacturers implementing security meshes often attempt to keep the meshes' layouts hidden as a way of +security by obscurity. In practice, this can take the form of opaque potting compounds (cf. +Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted_seated}), opaque cover layers (cf. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_materials_gold_lds}), and +burying the mesh beneath other features such as PCB ground planes (cf. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_lid}, e.g.\ +specimens~\sampleno{H03}, \sampleno{H17} and \sampleno{H32}). To circumvent such attempts, an obvious attack vector is +to use radiographical imaging techniques such as X-ray or CT imaging. To evaluate CT imaging as an attack method, we +experimentally imaged the potted HSM module of specimen~\sampleno{H18}, an Ingenico payment terminal, using an +industrial CT. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted} shows the module we analyzed and two images exported from the +resulting CT scan data. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted_ct_cut} shows a horizontal cut across part of the module. In +this cut, we can clearly identify a mesh layer with multiple traces, four solid metal contacts crimped to the mesh foil, +and two unused contact pads and mesh traces in the lower part of the picture. An attacker would be able to use this +information to target the metal contacts with a tool like a needle probe. From the CT scan we were able to measure that +the mesh of the device has a pitch of \qty{1.0}{\milli\meter}. Thus, even inserting a thin needle probe right through +one of the mesh's traces should be possible without breaking the trace. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted_ct_3d} shows a 3D reconstruction of the mesh's conductor layout. While the reconstruction is slightly noisy due to the limited scan time available, it contains ample detail to reconstruct the @@ -745,42 +996,248 @@ reflected in the reconstructed 3D mesh geometry. This information could be used selectively ablate the device's potting precisely down to the mesh's conductors to enable direct patching attacks on the mesh. + +\subsubsection{Results summary} + +Below is a table representing which features discussed in the sections above we found in which of our samples. Overall, +we commonly found a combination of a rigid PCB mesh in the specimen's main PCB and and flexible meshes formed into a lid +structure above its main PCB. The mesh inside the rigid PCB would protect the payload components soldered to the top +surface of the PCB such as pin pad buttons or crytographic coprocessors from probing from underneath, while the flexible +mesh lid would protect them from attacks from above or from the side. We only found two specimens that wrapped an entire +payload PCB inside of a mesh, the Utimaco datacenter HSM appliance (\sampleno{H30}) and an older Ingenico payment +terminal (\sampleno{H18}). Only the datacenter HSM followed this approach through, its manufacturer going to some length +to carefully fold the mesh around corners and the entry point of its Flat Flex Cable (FFC) connections to the outside +world to avoid possible weak points there. The payment terminal module had weak points at the corners of the wrapped +mesh, and its wrapping pattern only covered five of the six sides of a cuboid, with the remaining side left open to +allow for the payload PCB to pass out of the mesh for its external connections. + +We found an approximately even split between copper/polyimide FPCs and silver ink printing processes being used for +flexible meshes. Printed carbon ink processes were less popular, presumably because they offer no significant cost +savings but the resulting mesh has a much higher electrical resistance, limiting possible mesh length. + +We found potting was only infrequently used across our sample, presumably because of the limited protection it provides. +We found conductive ink printed meshes commonly used opaque base foils and opaque lacquer cover layers to obscure their +features, but when dissecting these specimens we noticed that usually these opaque lacquers are easily removed without +damaging the underlying printed mesh traces using a cotton swab soaked in acetone. Additionally, in almost all instances +the trace structure was easily recognizable from the mesh traces' thickness showing through to the surface of the +opaque cover lacquer. In practice it served as electrical insulation, but did not convey meaningful protection against +reverse engineering. + +\begin{landscape} +\begin{table} +\footnotesize +\centering +\newcolumntype{M}{>{\centering\arraybackslash}p{4mm}} +\setlength{\tabcolsep}{0pt} + \begin{tabular}{ll|MMMMM|MMMM|MMMMM|MMMMM|MMMMM|MMM|MM} + &&\multicolumn{29}{c}{\textbf{Specimen}}\\ +\textbf{Feature} & \textbf{Figures} & +1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 8 & 9 & 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 18 & 19 & 20 & 21 & 22 & 23 & 24 & 25 & 27 & 28 & 30 & 31 & 32 + \\\hline + +\multicolumn{31}{l}{\textbf{Mesh Contacts.}} \\\hline +Elastomeric & \ref{hsm_fig_connector_elastomeric}, \ref{hsm_fig_connector_stack} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & ⬤ & % 0 - 9 + & ⬤ & & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & & % 10 - 19 + & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & & ⬤ & ⬤ % 20 - 29 + & & ⬤ & ⬤\\ % 30 - 32 +Soldered & \ref{hsm_fig_connector_castellations} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & ⬤ & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & % 0 - 9 + & & & ⬤ & & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & % 10 - 19 + & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & % 20 - 29 + & & ⬤ & \\ % 30 - 32 +Stacking & \ref{hsm_fig_connector_stack} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & & & ⬤ & % 0 - 9 + & & & & & & & & ⬤ & & % 10 - 19 + & & & & & & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & \\ % 30 - 32 +\hline +Tactile Dome & \ref{hsm_fig_connector_dome}, \ref{hsm_fig_connector_fpc} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & & ⬤ & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & ⬤ & & & & & & % 10 - 19 + & & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & \\ % 30 - 32 +FPC Connector & \ref{hsm_fig_connector_fpc} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & ⬤ & & & ⬤ % 0 - 9 + & ⬤ & & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & % 10 - 19 + & & ⬤ & & & & & & % 20 - 29 + & ⬤ & & \\ % 30 - 32 +Mesh EMI Gasket & \ref{hsm_fig_connector_gasket} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & & & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & & ⬤ & & & & & % 10 - 19 + & & & & & & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & \\ % 30 - 32 + +\hline +\multicolumn{31}{l}{\textbf{Mesh Material}} \\ +\hline +Rigid PCB & \ref{hsm_fig_materials_pcb_rigid} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ % 0 - 9 + & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & % 10 - 19 + & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ % 20 - 29 + & & ⬤ & ⬤\\ % 30 - 32 +Copper FPC & \ref{hsm_fig_materials_pcb_flex} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & % 0 - 9 + & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & % 10 - 19 + & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ % 20 - 29 + & & ⬤ & \\ % 30 - 32 +Printed silver ink & \ref{hsm_fig_materials_silver_ink} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & % 0 - 9 + & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & % 10 - 19 + & & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & \\ % 30 - 32 +\hline +Printed carbon ink & \ref{hsm_fig_materials_carbon_ink} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & ⬤ & & & & & & & ⬤ % 0 - 9 + & & & & & & & & & & % 10 - 19 + & & & & & & & & % 20 - 29 + & ⬤ & & \\ % 30 - 32 +Gold (Laser Direct Structuring) & \ref{hsm_fig_materials_gold_lds} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & & & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & & & & & & & % 10 - 19 + & & & & & & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & ⬤\\ % 30 - 32 + +\hline +\multicolumn{31}{l}{\textbf{3D Construction}} \\ +\hline +Folded mesh & \ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap}, \ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_no_overlap} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ % 0 - 9 + & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & % 10 - 19 + & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ & % 20 - 29 + & ⬤ & ⬤ & \\ % 30 - 32 +House of cards & \ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_house_of_cards} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & ⬤ & & & & & & ⬤ & % 0 - 9 + & ⬤ & & & & & & & & ⬤ & % 10 - 19 + & & & & & & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & \\ % 30 - 32 +Laser Direct Structuring & \ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_lds} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & & & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & & & & & & & % 10 - 19 + & & & & & & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & ⬤\\ % 30 - 32 +\hline +Thermoformed & \ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_vacuum_form}, \ref{fig_ingenico_forming} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & & ⬤ & & % 0 - 9 + & & & ⬤ & & & & & & & % 10 - 19 + & & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & \\ % 30 - 32 +Planar obstacle & \ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_obstacle}, \ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_via_fence} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & ⬤ & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & % 10 - 19 + & & & & ⬤ & & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & \\ % 30 - 32 +Complex planar & \ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_stack}, \ref{hsm_fig_3d_sandwich_lid} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & ⬤ & & & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & & ⬤ & & & & & % 10 - 19 + & & & & & & & & % 20 - 29 + & & & \\ % 30 - 32 + +\hline +\multicolumn{31}{l}{\textbf{Obscurity Features}} \\ +\hline +Metal enclosure & \ref{hsm_fig_3d_struct_folded_overlap} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & ⬤ & ⬤ & ⬤ & & & ⬤ & % 0 - 9 + & & & & & & & ⬤ & & & % 10 - 19 + & & ⬤ & & & & & ⬤ & % 20 - 29 + & ⬤ & & \\ % 30 - 32 +Potting & \ref{hsm_fig_ingenico_potted_seated} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & ⬤ & & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & & & & & & ⬤ & % 10 - 19 + & & & & & & & & % 20 - 29 + & ⬤ & & \\ % 30 - 32 +\hline +Opaque foil & \ref{hsm_fig_connector_dome} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ % 0 - 9 + & ⬤ & & & ⬤ & & & & ⬤ & & % 10 - 19 + & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ & & & & % 20 - 29 + & ⬤ & & \\ % 30 - 32 +Opaque lacquer & \ref{fig_ingenico_forming} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & ⬤ & & & & ⬤ & & % 10 - 19 + & ⬤ & & & ⬤ & & & & % 20 - 29 + & ⬤ & & ⬤\\ % 30 - 32 + +\hline +\multicolumn{31}{l}{\textbf{Other Features}} \\ +\hline +Integrated tactile domes & \ref{hsm_fig_connector_dome} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & ⬤ & & & & ⬤ & & % 10 - 19 + & & ⬤ & & ⬤ & ⬤ & & ⬤ & % 20 - 29 + & & ⬤ & \\ % 30 - 32 +Integrated contact pads & \ref{hsm_fig_connector_fpc} + % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 + & & & & & & & & % 0 - 9 + & & & & & ⬤ & & ⬤ & & & % 10 - 19 + & & ⬤ & & & & & ⬤ & % 20 - 29 + & & & \\ % 30 - 32 + + \end{tabular} + \caption[Feature matrix of all specimens analyzed.]{Feature matrix of all specimens analyzed. Dots indicate presence + of a feature. The figures column lists which figures above contain examples of a particular feature.} + \label{tab_hsm_survey_sample_results} +\end{table} +\end{landscape} + \section{Discussion} -% FIXME intro here - -\subsection{Tamper-sensing meshes then and now} - -Concluding both our patent research and our experimental survey, we find that tamper-sensing meshes have been a -commonplace technology throughout the past 150 years. While mesh manufacturing technology has experienced some +In our survey, we have seen the technological state of the art to which tamper-sensing meshes have evolved since the +earliest designs evidenced in patents from 150 years ago. While mesh manufacturing technology has experienced some advancements from historical wire-wound meshes to modern meshes always being constructed in printed circuit processes, mesh monitoring approaches have received surprisingly little attention through the centuries and even in recent, -state-of-the-art systems, a simple comparator monitoring a mesh arranged in a wheatstone bridge configuration is still -considered sufficient by manufacturers. -% FIXME todo above: show wheatstone bridge schematic +state-of-the-art systems, a simple comparator monitoring a mesh arranged in a bridge configuration is still considered +sufficient in high-security applications~\cite{obermaier2018}. \subsection{Mesh construction techniques} -We found that in almost all cases, practical tamper-sensing meshes are constructed using standard manufacturing +We found that in almost all cases, practical tamper sensing meshes are constructed using standard manufacturing processes. In some card payment terminals, we found meshes that used slightly customized standard processes and e.g. integrated a mesh layer produced in a carbon printing process into a membrane keypad, but customizations were minimal. We only found one mesh manufactured in a bespoke process in the datacenter HSM appliance we examined, and that bespoke -process turns out to be a turnkey solution used by at least two HSM vendors. +process turns out to be a turnkey solution used by at least two HSM vendors. Underscoring stagnating development in the +field, this particular mesh manufacturing process seems to have seen only minimal changes since the first patents +covering it were published in the late +1990ies~\cite{macphersonTamperRespondentEnclosure1999,macphersonImprovementsSecurityEnclosures1993,obermaier2018}. \subsection{Mesh monitoring circuits} We observed that in general, academic research leads before patent literature, which is ahead of actual implementations -in the field. Practical monitoring circuitry seems basic. Particularly the datacenter HSM appliance we examined showed a -contrast between a mesh manufactured in a bespoke process combined with a unsophisticated, discrete monitoring circuit -based around a number of voltage comparators. +in the field. Practical monitoring circuitry seems basic. Particularly the datacenter HSM appliance we examined +(specimen~\sampleno{H30}) showed a contrast between a mesh manufactured in a bespoke process combined with an +unsophisticated, discrete monitoring circuit based around a number of voltage comparators~\cite{obermaier2018}. We will +go into more detail on improved monitoring methods as well as the academic state of the art in this field in +Chapter~\ref{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon}. \subsection{Computed Tomography Imaging} CT imaging presents a serious threat to any HSM design that relies on its mesh layout remaining secret. For instance, -the Gore tamper-sensing mesh product used in IBM and Utimaco HSMs includes a feature where after production, small vias -are lasered into a specially preparte area on the mesh foil to randomize the connection pattern of the mesh on a +the Gore tamper sensing mesh product used in IBM and Utimaco HSMs includes a feature where after production, small vias +are lasered into a specially prepared area on the mesh foil to randomize the connection pattern of the mesh on a unit-by-unit basis. CT imaging could be used to discern this type of customization. Furthermore, CT imaging can be used -to provide sub-millimeter accurate positioning for an attack, even if the sample to be attacked has large production +to provide sub-millimeter accurate positioning for an attack, even if the specimen to be attacked has large production tolerances. We found that CT imaging can be made more difficult using three complementary techniques. \begin{figure} @@ -795,16 +1252,16 @@ tolerances. We found that CT imaging can be made more difficult using three comp \paragraph{Low-contrast trace materials.} CT imaging can be made more difficult by manufacturing the mesh with very thin conductive traces, and using a trace -material that has low atomic number, corresponding to low X-ray absorption. For instance, the Gore mesh sample used a +material that has low atomic number, corresponding to low X-ray absorption. For instance, the Gore mesh specimen used a carbon-based ink that judging by structure size was screen-printed, which leads to an economical yet relatively secure -solution. +solution~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020,smithBuildingHighperformanceProgrammable1999}. \paragraph{Use of X-ray attenuating materials.} We found that placing any highly X-ray attenuating material in the HSM makes CT imaging more difficult. Figure~\ref{hsm_fig_utimaco_ct} shows a CT image taken from an Utimaco HSM. The device has two thick metal layers with a -potting resin and the tamper-sensing mesh in between, so high-energy X-rays were necessary to penetrate both metal +potting resin and the tamper sensing mesh in between, so high-energy X-rays were necessary to penetrate both metal layers and image the device. As a result, the contrast on X-ray-transparent features like polymers is low. In -comparison, the Ingenico sample was easy to image since it consisted of a PCB wrapped with a mesh foil and encased in +comparison, the Ingenico specimen was easy to image since it consisted of a PCB wrapped with a mesh foil and encased in resin inside of an injection-molded plastic enclosure. Thus, we were able to image it at a low X-ray energy and we were able to easily reconstruct detail on both the mesh's layout and the PCB's circuitry. To apply X-ray dense materials for defense in a practical design, a sheet made from elementary tin or a tin alloy would be a suitable choice for such an @@ -822,49 +1279,46 @@ imaging can be actively detected to trigger a tamper alarm. During CT imaging, a images are taken. X-ray radiation can be reliably detected using off-the-shelf sensors that usually consist of a large-area photodiode coupled to a scintillator crystal converting X-ray photons to visible light. -\subsection{Application of Inertial HSM technology} - -The widespread use of inexpensive but low-security commodity processes shows that in practical applications, cost is -often prioritized over security. The IHSM approach naturally complements such a system that uses a low-security mesh -material, increasing its security without the use of a more advanced mesh material. The beneficial construction -techniques that we identified above such as the use of multiple, spaced layers and low-contrast trace materials -complement IHSM technology naturally. The three-dimensional layout of a mesh becomes easier in an IHSM implementation -since features like corners between mesh panels or gaps between mesh layers are often naturally protected by the mesh's -motion. An unintended advantage that results in IHSM implementations over conventional meshes is that they would provide -a level of intrinsic resistance to X-ray and CT imaging. In contrast to optical cameras in the visible spectrum, X-ray -image sensors need integration times in the hundreds of milliseconds or longer, which makes them unsuitable to image a -quickly moving targets. - \section{Conclusion} -In our survey, we have found a wide variety in tamper sensing mesh construction techniques. Meshes are commonly +In this survey, we have analyzed a wide variety in tamper sensing mesh construction techniques. Meshes are commonly implemented as part of both rigid (PCB) and flexible (FPC) circuit boards, either standalone, or as part of a board also carrying other components. Silver or carbon trace patterning techniques that are normally used for membrane keyboards are also used in some meshes, but are limited in their structure size. The meshes we found in the wild almost never push the boundaries of achievable structure size for a given process. The strongest systems we found combined a mesh with potting such that separating mesh and potting destroyed the mesh's -traces. Silver printed circuits like they are normally used for keyboard matrices performed particularly well in this -regard since the silver ink adheres better to some potting compounds than to its plastic carrier substrate. We found -copper FPCs are commonly used for meshes. Interestingly, they seem to be a poor choice since they are very robust and -can even be forcibly separated from some potting compounds without destroying their traces. +traces. Silver or carbon ink printed circuits like they are normally used for keyboard matrices performed particularly +well in this regard since such inks adheres better to some potting compounds than to its plastic carrier substrate. We +found copper FPCs are commonly used for meshes. Interestingly, they seem to be a poor choice since they are very robust +and can even be forcibly separated from some potting compounds without destroying their traces. The weakest systems we found completely omitted a tamper sensing mesh. Ironically, all of these systems were devices marketed as hardware security modules. Given the inexpensive nature of tamper sensing meshes and the high price point of such devices, we suspect market segmentation as a driving force behind their manufacturers' decision to omit tamper -sensing meshes. We conclude from this observation that the term ``HSM'' does not imply state-of-the-art physical tamper -sensing. +sensing meshes despite their low cost. The primary security standard that is most often cited for the certification of +HSMs is the US government's FIPS-140, now in its third +version~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019}. A peculiarity of this +standard is that it only requires active tamper sensing meshes in the highest of the four security levels it defines. +Overall, we can conclude that the term ``HSM'' does not imply state-of-the-art physical tamper sensing. -From an academic point of view, the core finding of our survey is that tamper sensing meshes manufactured in a number of -commercial manufacturing processes would yield acceptable surrogates for real devices found in the wild. With the -exception of a single device that used a particularly fine structure size in the \qty{100}{\micro\meter} range, none of -the devices we examined utilized particularly non-obvious construction techniques. +From an academic point of view, the core finding of our survey is that for academic research on mesh manufacturing, +monitoring or attacks on meshese, realistic tamper sensing mesh samples can easily be created. A number of commercial +manufacturing processes would yield acceptable standins for real devices found in the wild. With the exception of a +single device that used a particularly fine structure size in the \qty{100}{\micro\meter} range approaching the limit of +inexpensive PCB manufacturing processes, none of the devices we examined utilized particularly non-obvious construction +techniques. -Form an engineering point of view, we observe that across application domains, tamper sensing meshes often use basic -construction techniques. Implementing such a system that matches the security of other systems seen in the wild should -be achievable to most engineers. +From an engineering point of view, we observe that across application domains, tamper sensing meshes often use basic +construction techniques for both the mesh itself and for its monitoring circuit. Implementing such a system that matches +the security of devices seen in the wild should be achievable to most engineers. -We find that the IHSM approach is a natural extension of the state of the art that we saw reflected in tamper-sensing +We find that the IHSM approach is a natural extension of the state of the art that we saw reflected in tamper sensing mesh implementations in the field, and that the construction techniques that have been applied to improve their security -can be carried over to IHSM implementations. +can be carried over to IHSM implementations. The three-dimensional layout of a mesh becomes easier in an IHSM +implementation since features like corners between mesh panels or gaps between mesh layers in most layouts are protected +by the mesh's motion. An unintended advantage that results in IHSM implementations over conventional meshes is that they +would provide a level of intrinsic resistance to X-ray and CT imaging. In contrast to optical cameras in the visible +spectrum, X-ray image sensors need integration times in the hundreds of milliseconds or longer, which makes them +unsuitable to image a quickly moving target. diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S02.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S02.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3deaa9f Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S02.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S03.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S03.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6599f1d Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S03.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S04.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S04.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c92c13 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S04.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S05.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S05.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5731526 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S05.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S06.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S06.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b17d22 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S06.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S07.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S07.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24ee306 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S07.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S08.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S08.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e85b64 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S08.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S09.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S09.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..965d0ad Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S09.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S10.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S10.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3eaf48 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S10.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S11.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S11.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1c4d04 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S11.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S12.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S12.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ae4437 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S12.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S13.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S13.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a27597 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S13.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S14.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S14.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fdd739e Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S14.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S15.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S15.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2772b6c Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S15.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S16.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S16.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..677a7b7 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S16.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S17.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S17.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f86d31b Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S17.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S18.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S18.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7277ff Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S18.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S19.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S19.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f7348c Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S19.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S20.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S20.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4fb53e Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S20.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S21.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S21.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b0e1bb Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S21.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S22.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S22.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53ff30e Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S22.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S23.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S23.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b86f342 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S23.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S24.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S24.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b06737 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S24.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S25.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S25.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..19db2f5 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S25.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S26.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S26.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90012b1 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S26.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S27.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S27.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..783d82b Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S27.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S28.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S28.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..198453a Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S28.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S29.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S29.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f63d0bc Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S29.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S30.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S30.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bfd62a6 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S30.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S31.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S31.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a417ec9 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S31.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S32.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S32.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf405c4 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_diag_S32.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_formed_mesh_after.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_formed_mesh_after.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f6f6a9 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_formed_mesh_after.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_formed_mesh_before.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_formed_mesh_before.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad3bf66 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_formed_mesh_before.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_00_S14.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_00_S14.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6c139e Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_00_S14.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_01_S14.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_01_S14.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b570a51 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_01_S14.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_02_S13.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_02_S13.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..937522a Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_02_S13.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_03_S04.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_03_S04.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa5ab4f Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_03_S04.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_04_S15.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_04_S15.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6ce4d5 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_04_S15.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_05_S16.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_05_S16.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11c10ae Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_05_S16.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_06_S24.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_06_S24.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb85be7 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_06_S24.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_07_S23.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_07_S23.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c764214 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_07_S23.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_08_S06.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_08_S06.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9251092 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_08_S06.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_09_S01.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_09_S01.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a239889 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_09_S01.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_10_S05.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_10_S05.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..51d28b4 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_10_S05.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_11_S03.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_11_S03.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cde04ea Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_11_S03.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_12_S20.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_12_S20.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2aa8217 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_12_S20.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_13_S09.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_13_S09.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79ff771 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_13_S09.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_14_S28.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_14_S28.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8eb6937 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_14_S28.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_15_S21.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_15_S21.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2951da3 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_15_S21.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_16_S22.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_16_S22.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e09d2dd Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_16_S22.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_17_S11.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_17_S11.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc25d20 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_17_S11.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_18_S27.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_18_S27.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53ebb6e Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_18_S27.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_19_S12.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_19_S12.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0761b7d Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_19_S12.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_20_S02.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_20_S02.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99376a5 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_20_S02.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_21_S18.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_21_S18.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0aa469b Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_21_S18.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_22_S17.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_22_S17.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d7e799 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_22_S17.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_23_S10.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_23_S10.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac2cc70 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_23_S10.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_24_S08.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_24_S08.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab35c0e Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_24_S08.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_25_S25.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_25_S25.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aea297c Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_25_S25.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_26_S19.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_26_S19.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c660ca2 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_26_S19.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_27_S31.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_27_S31.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f241a2 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_27_S31.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_28_S32.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_28_S32.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37bba17 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_28_S32.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_29_S30.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_29_S30.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd4ec39 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_internal_29_S30.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_sagem_mesh_lid.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_sagem_mesh_lid.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa6ac29 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_sagem_mesh_lid.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_sagem_mesh_unfolded.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_sagem_mesh_unfolded.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2081072 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_sagem_mesh_unfolded.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_sagem_slot.jpg b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_sagem_slot.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd4607f Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-hsms/figures/survey_sagem_slot.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-hsms/pres-harris.tex b/chapter-hsms/pres-harris.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0daedc --- /dev/null +++ b/chapter-hsms/pres-harris.tex @@ -0,0 +1,493 @@ +\documentclass[aspectratio=169]{beamer} +\usetheme{default} +\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} +\usepackage{textcomp} +\usepackage{graphicx} +\usepackage{subcaption} +\usepackage{siunitx} +\usepackage{booktabs} +\usepackage{array} +\usepackage{ragged2e} +\usepackage{colortbl} +\usepackage{pdflscape} +\usepackage[percent]{overpic} +\usepackage[backend=biber,style=numeric,sorting=none]{biblatex} +\addbibresource{../main.bib} + +\graphicspath{{figures}} + +% Define custom commands if not already defined +\newcommand{\surveypic}[2]{ + \begingroup + \setlength{\fboxsep}{0.2mm} + \begin{overpic}[percent,height=10mm]{#2} + \put(100,85){\makebox[0pt][r]{\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize H#1}}} + \end{overpic} + \endgroup + } +\newcommand{\sampleno}[1]{#1} + +\title{Tamper-Sensing Meshes in the Wild} +\author{\textbf{Jan Sebastian Götte} \& Björn Scheuermann\\TU Darmstadt\\contact: \texttt{research@jaseg.de}} +\date{2026-03-24} + +\begin{document} + +\begin{frame} +\titlepage +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{What is a Tamper Sensing Mesh?} +\begin{itemize} +\item Embedded looped conductor covering a surface +\item Detects physical intrusion + \begin{itemize} + \item Drills, saws, lasers etc. + \end{itemize} +\item Triggers some tamper response + \begin{itemize} + \item Deleting keys + \item Raising alarms + \item Explosions? + \end{itemize} +\item Widely used in HSMs, payment terminals, ATMs, nuclear weapons +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{The History of Tamper-Sensing Meshes} +\begin{itemize} +\item \textbf{1870}: First patents using literal wire meshes to protect bank vaults~\cite{ImprovementProtectingSafes1870,ImprovementElectromagneticEnvelopes1870} +\item \textbf{1902}: Multi-layer, orthogonal meshes documented~\cite{suttonElectricallyprotectedStructure1902} +\item \textbf{1971}: Printed circuit technology adopted~\cite{hamPrintedcircuitTypeSecurity1971} +\item \textbf{1990s}: Widespread commercial adoption with cryptographic applications +\end{itemize} + +Other, hard to date examples: NSA use for protecting ciphering machines~\cite{boakHistoryUSCommunications1973,boakHistoryUSCommunications1981}, US use in nuclear weapons~\cite{carterManagingNuclearOperations1987} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Commercial Applications Today} +\begin{itemize} +\item Datacenter HSMs (Key management, payment processing) +\item Card Payment Terminals (PIN encryption) +\item ATM Encrypting Pin Pads (PIN encryption) +\item Key Safes for Emergency services access (Germany only?) +\item Mail Franking Machines (credit counter) +\item Slot Machines (likely for DRM) +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + + +\begin{frame}{Our Survey} +\textbf{Sample Size}: 30 devices + +\textbf{Device Types}: +\begin{itemize} + \item 23 Card payment terminals (Verifone, Ingenico, SumUp, etc.) + \item 3 ATM Encrypting Pin Pads (NCR, Sagem) + \item 2 HSM modules (SafeNet, Utimaco) + \item 1 Franking machine + \item 1 German slot machine CPU +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Mesh Materials and Structure Sizes Observed} +\begin{itemize} + \item \textbf{Rigid PCB (FR-4):} Photolithographic etching, \SIrange{100}{200}{\micro\meter} + \item \textbf{Polyimide/Copper FPC:} Photolithographic etching, \SIrange{100}{200}{\micro\meter} + \item \textbf{Silver ink FPC:} Screen printing, \SIrange{500}{3000}{\micro\meter} + \item \textbf{Carbon ink FPC:} Screen printing, \SIrange{500}{3000}{\micro\meter} + \item \textbf{Gold laser direct structuring:} Laser Direct Structuring, \SIrange{50}{200}{\micro\meter} + \item \textbf{IBM/Gore mesh:} Printed, \SIrange{200}{1500}{\micro\meter} +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Survey Specimens - External Photos} +\begin{figure} + \centering + \footnotesize + \begin{tabular}[c]{cccccc} + \surveypic{02}{survey_diag_S02.jpg}& + \surveypic{03}{survey_diag_S03.jpg}& + \surveypic{04}{survey_diag_S04.jpg}& + \surveypic{05}{survey_diag_S05.jpg}& + \surveypic{06}{survey_diag_S06.jpg}& + \surveypic{08}{survey_diag_S08.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{09}{survey_diag_S09.jpg}& + \surveypic{10}{survey_diag_S10.jpg}& + \surveypic{11}{survey_diag_S11.jpg}& + \surveypic{12}{survey_diag_S12.jpg}& + \surveypic{13}{survey_diag_S13.jpg}& + \surveypic{14}{survey_diag_S14.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{15}{survey_diag_S15.jpg}& + \surveypic{16}{survey_diag_S16.jpg}& + \surveypic{17}{survey_diag_S17.jpg}& + \surveypic{18}{survey_diag_S18.jpg}& + \surveypic{19}{survey_diag_S19.jpg}& + \surveypic{20}{survey_diag_S20.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{21}{survey_diag_S21.jpg}& + \surveypic{22}{survey_diag_S22.jpg}& + \surveypic{23}{survey_diag_S23.jpg}& + \surveypic{24}{survey_diag_S24.jpg}& + \surveypic{25}{survey_diag_S25.jpg}& + \surveypic{27}{survey_diag_S27.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{28}{survey_diag_S28.jpg}& + \surveypic{29}{survey_diag_S29.jpg}& + \surveypic{30}{survey_diag_S30.jpg}& + \surveypic{31}{survey_diag_S31.jpg}& + \surveypic{32}{survey_diag_S32.jpg}& + \\ + \end{tabular} +\end{figure} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Survey Specimens - Internal Photos} +\begin{figure} + \centering + \footnotesize + \begin{tabular}[c]{cccccc} + \surveypic{01}{survey_internal_09_S01.jpg}& + \surveypic{02}{survey_internal_20_S02.jpg}& + \surveypic{03}{survey_internal_11_S03.jpg}& + \surveypic{04}{survey_internal_03_S04.jpg}& + \surveypic{05}{survey_internal_10_S05.jpg}& + \surveypic{06}{survey_internal_08_S06.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{08}{survey_internal_24_S08.jpg}& + \surveypic{09}{survey_internal_13_S09.jpg}& + \surveypic{10}{survey_internal_23_S10.jpg}& + \surveypic{11}{survey_internal_17_S11.jpg}& + \surveypic{12}{survey_internal_19_S12.jpg}& + \surveypic{13}{survey_internal_02_S13.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{14}{survey_internal_00_S14.jpg}& + \surveypic{15}{survey_internal_04_S15.jpg}& + \surveypic{16}{survey_internal_05_S16.jpg}& + \surveypic{17}{survey_internal_22_S17.jpg}& + \surveypic{18}{survey_internal_21_S18.jpg}& + \surveypic{19}{survey_internal_26_S19.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{20}{survey_internal_12_S20.jpg}& + \surveypic{21}{survey_internal_15_S21.jpg}& + \surveypic{22}{survey_internal_16_S22.jpg}& + \surveypic{23}{survey_internal_07_S23.jpg}& + \surveypic{24}{survey_internal_06_S24.jpg}& + \surveypic{25}{survey_internal_25_S25.jpg}\\ + \surveypic{27}{survey_internal_18_S27.jpg}& + \surveypic{28}{survey_internal_14_S28.jpg}& + \surveypic{30}{survey_internal_29_S30.jpg}& + \surveypic{31}{survey_internal_27_S31.jpg}& + \surveypic{32}{survey_internal_28_S32.jpg}& + \\ + \end{tabular} +\end{figure} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Mesh Trace Layouts} +\begin{columns}[T] +\begin{column}{0.5\textwidth} + \centering + \begin{overpic}[width=.45\textwidth]{hsm_mesh_offset.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries A}} + \end{overpic} + \hspace{1mm} + \begin{overpic}[width=.45\textwidth]{hsm_mesh_orthogonal.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries B}} + \end{overpic} + + \vspace{5mm} + + \begin{overpic}[width=.45\textwidth]{hsm_utimaco_mesh_gore.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries C}} + \end{overpic} + \hspace{1mm} + \begin{overpic}[width=.45\textwidth]{hsm_mesh_stack_epp.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries D}} + \end{overpic} +\end{column} +\begin{column}{0.45\textwidth} + \raggedright + \textbf{A:} Offset layers (H12) + + \textbf{B:} Orthogonal patterns (H14) + + \textbf{C:} Orthogonal + area pattern (H30) + + \textbf{D:} Spaced layers (H28) +\end{column} +\end{columns} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Mesh Materials and Manufacturing} +\centering +\begin{tabular}{lll} + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{trace_material_copper_pcb.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries A}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{trace_material_copper_flex.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries B}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{trace_material_silver.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries C}} + \end{overpic} + \\[3mm] + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{trace_material_contact_gold_lds.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries D}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{trace_material_carbon.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries E}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{tabular}[b]{@{}l@{}} + \textbf{A:} Rigid PCB (H10) \\ + \textbf{B:} Flexible PCB (H15) \\ + \textbf{C:} Silver ink (H14) \\ + \textbf{D:} Laser Direct Structuring (H32) \\ + \textbf{E:} Carbon ink (H30) + \end{tabular} +\end{tabular} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Mesh Connection Methods} +\centering +\begin{tabular}{ccc} + \begin{overpic}[width=.20\textwidth]{connector_castellated_edge.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries A}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.20\textwidth]{connector_elastomeric.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries B}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.20\textwidth]{connector_rf_gasket.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries C}} + \end{overpic} + \\[2mm] + \begin{overpic}[width=.20\textwidth]{connector_zif_fpc_2.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries D}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.20\textwidth]{connector_stacking.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries E}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.20\textwidth]{connector_metal_dome.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries F}} + \end{overpic} +\end{tabular} + +\vspace{3mm} + +\small +\textbf{A:} Direct soldering (H05) \quad +\textbf{B:} Elastomeric connector (H31) \quad +\textbf{C:} EMI gasket (H14) \\ +\textbf{D:} FPC connector (H20) \quad +\textbf{E:} Stacking connector (H17) \quad +\textbf{F:} Tactile dome (H06) +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{3D Mesh Construction Styles} +\centering +\begin{tabular}{lll} + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{hsm_3d_style_fold_overlap.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries A}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{hsm_3d_style_fold_no_overlap.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries B}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{3d_construction_lds_top.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries C}} + \end{overpic} + \\[3mm] + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{hsm_3d_style_vacform.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries D}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{overpic}[width=.22\textwidth]{3d_construction_cards_standalone.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries E}} + \end{overpic} + & + \begin{tabular}[b]{@{}l@{}} + \textbf{A:} Folded with overlap (H03) \\ + \textbf{B:} Folded without overlap (H14) \\ + \textbf{C:} Laser Direct Structuring (H32) \\ + \textbf{D:} Thermoformed (H12) \\ + \textbf{E:} House-of-Cards (H08) + \end{tabular} +\end{tabular} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Thermoforming Example} +\begin{columns}[T] +\begin{column}{0.48\textwidth} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=.6\textwidth]{survey_formed_mesh_before.jpg}\\ + \small Before removing lacquer +\end{column} +\begin{column}{0.48\textwidth} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=.6\textwidth]{survey_formed_mesh_after.jpg}\\ + \small After removing lacquer +\end{column} +\end{columns} +\vspace{3mm} +\centering +\small Formed cavities in printed foil mesh specimen H24 +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Sandwich-Style Construction} +\begin{columns}[T] +\begin{column}{0.5\textwidth} + \centering + \begin{overpic}[width=.45\textwidth]{3d_construction_offset_mesh_delayered_contrast_improved.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries A}} + \end{overpic} + \hspace{1mm} + \begin{overpic}[width=.45\textwidth]{3d_construction_via_stitch_mesh_delayer_2.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries B}} + \end{overpic} + + \vspace{3mm} + + \begin{overpic}[width=.45\textwidth]{3d_construction_planar_stack.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries C}} + \end{overpic} + \hspace{1mm} + \begin{overpic}[width=.45\textwidth]{3d_construction_cavity_2.jpg} + \put(5,92){\colorbox{white}{\footnotesize\bfseries D}} + \end{overpic} +\end{column} +\begin{column}{0.45\textwidth} + \raggedright + \textbf{A:} Obstacle mesh coupons (H17) + + \textbf{B:} Via-fence meshes (H24) + + \textbf{C:} Planar sandwich stack (H24) + + \textbf{D:} PCB lid with cavity (H14) +\end{column} +\end{columns} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Security Issues Observed} +\begin{itemize} + \item Incomplete mesh coverage + \item Meshes not overlapping at edges leaving gaps for probe insertion + \item Gaps at mesh-PCB interfaces + \item Thermoformed cavities with enlarged structure size at corners + \item In one case, an opaque lacquer was easily removed with acetone (without damaging the mesh!) + \item Trace patterns visible through cover layers due to surface unevenness +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Design Recommendations (1/2)} + \begin{itemize} + \item Commodity PCB manufacturing process design rules in the \SIrange{100}{200}{\micro\meter} range are better than the state of the art in mesh structure size + \item Avoid ink printing processes or thermoforming because of their large structure size + \item Carefully think about your literal corner cases (and edges)! + \begin{itemize} + \item Overlap meshes where possible. + \end{itemize} + \item Use potting and cover layers, but verify that they work + \begin{itemize} + \item Check that you \emph{actually} can't see what's below + \item Test their chemical resistance (and that of your mesh) + \end{itemize} + \end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Design Recommendations (2/2)} + \begin{itemize} + \item Mixing tough potting or enclosure materials and fragile mesh materials makes life harder for an attacker + \begin{itemize} + \item Consider using steel instead of plastic (also helps against X-ray inspection!) + \item Use thin substrates and thin conductive layers for the mesh + \item Balance adhesion so removing potting / cover layers tears away traces below + \end{itemize} + \item Overlap mesh layers at a 50\% structure size offset + \item Space (some) mesh layers apart in Z direction to constrain attack tools + \item Use a pressure-sensitive connection method like tactile domes or elastomeric conncetors + \end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\centering +\Huge Thank you! + +\vspace{1cm} + +\Large Questions? + +\texttt{research@jaseg.de} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\centering +Long-form version of this presentation in my thesis (pre-release, to be published this summer): + +\url{https://jaseg.de/thesis-final-web.pdf} + +\includegraphics{thesis_qr.png} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Specimen List (1/2)} +\footnotesize +\begin{tabular}{c>{\RaggedRight\arraybackslash}p{25mm}>{\RaggedRight\arraybackslash}p{35mm}ll} +\toprule +\textbf{ID} & \textbf{Device} & \textbf{Manufacturer} & \textbf{Type} & \textbf{Year} \\ +\midrule +H01 & PED & Verifone & VX 570 & ca. 2010 \\ +H02 & Slot machine & Merkur / ADP & Sam 12 EC2 & ca. 2012 \\ +H03 & EPP & Sagem & USA1315-4240 & 2014 \\ +H04 & EPP & Sagem & USA1316-5120 & 2007 \\ +H05 & PED & Xac & xAPT-103 & 2014 \\ +H06 & PED & Ingenico & iCT250-11T1860A & 2016-17 \\ +H08 & PED & Sagem & NOR4100-4220 & 2012 \\ +H09 & PED & Hypercom & M4230 & 2010 \\ +H10 & PED & Worldline & YOMANI XR & 2016 \\ +H11 & PED & Banksys & C-ZAM Smash & 2004 \\ +H12 & PED & Hypercom & Optimum P2100 & 2010 \\ +H13 & PED & Ingenico & iCT 220-11T2938A & 2016 \\ +H14 & PED & Verifone & H5000 & 2016 \\ +H15 & PED & Verifone & MX 925 & 2018 \\ +H16 & PED & Verifone & V200c CTLS & 2021 \\ +H17 & PED & Verifone & VX 680 & 2014 \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}{Specimen List (2/2)} +\footnotesize +\begin{tabular}{c>{\RaggedRight\arraybackslash}p{25mm}>{\RaggedRight\arraybackslash}p{35mm}ll} +\toprule +\textbf{ID} & \textbf{Device} & \textbf{Manufacturer} & \textbf{Type} & \textbf{Year} \\ +\midrule +H18 & PED & Ingenico & i7910 & 2010 \\ +H19 & PED & Banksys & XENTA & 2004-2011 \\ +H20 & PED & Verifone & VX 520 3G & 2017 \\ +H21 & PED & Verifone & V400m Plus 4G & 2018 \\ +H22 & PED & Ingenico & Move 3500 & 2020 \\ +H23 & PED & Ingenico & iPP 350-11T1718A & 2015 \\ +H24 & PED & Ingenico & iWL255-01T2117A & 2016 \\ +H25 & Franking Mach. & Neopost & IJ-25 & ca. 2001 \\ +H27 & PED & Sumup & AIR1E205 & 2021 \\ +H28 & EPP & NCR & 5814 UEPP & 2019 \\ +H29 & HSM & SafeNet & VBD-05 & 2018 \\ +H30 & HSM & Irdeto & Mayflower & 2011 \\ +H31 & PED & SumUp & SumUp 3G & 2019 \\ +H32 & PED & SumUp & SumUp Air & 2022 \\ +\bottomrule +\end{tabular} +\vspace{3mm} + +\tiny PED: Pin Entry Device; EPP: Encrypting Pin Pad; HSM: Hardware Security Module +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame}[allowframebreaks]{References} +\printbibliography[heading=none] +\end{frame} + +\end{document} diff --git a/chapter-ihsm/chapter.tex b/chapter-ihsm/chapter.tex index e815a45..68a0f41 100644 --- a/chapter-ihsm/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-ihsm/chapter.tex @@ -1,12 +1,23 @@ -\chapterquote{Russell Impagliazzo~\cite{impagliazzoPersonalViewAveragecase1995}}{ - One should always assume that people willing to break a system are also willing to use significantly more resources - doing so than legitimate users are willing to spend routinely! +\chapterquote{Dungeons \& Dragons 2024 Player's Handbook~\cite{crawfordDungeonsDragonsPlayers2024}}{ + \begin{center} + \includegraphics[scale=0.85]{resilient sphere.pdf} + \end{center} } -\chaptertitle{Inertial Hardware Security Modules} +% Manually do the chapter preamble stuff instead of using our \chaptertitle def from thesis.tex to bring the minitoc to +% a new page because of the large graphic embedded in the chapterquote. +\chapter{Inertial Hardware Security Modules} \label{chapter-ihsm} +\printchapterquote +\newpage +\begin{spacing}{1.1} + \minitoc +\end{spacing} +\newpage \section{Introduction} +\sourceattrib{This part is adapted from a paper written by Jan Sebastian Götte and Prof.\ Dr.\ Björn Scheuermann and +presented by Jan Sebastian Götte at CHES 2022~\cite{gotteCantTouchThis2022}.} While information security technology has matured a great deal in the last half-century, physical security did not keep up with the pace of the remainder of this industry. Given the right skills, physical access to a computer still often allows full compromise. The physical security of modern server hardware hinges on what lock you put on the room it is @@ -22,7 +33,7 @@ TPM~\cite{newman2020,frazelle2019,johnson2018}. Like smartcards, TPMs rely on a modern IC being hard to tamper with. Shrinking things to the nanoscopic level to secure them against tampering is a good engineering solution for some years to come. However, in essence, this is a type of security by obscurity: Obscurity here referring to the rarity of the equipment necessary to attack modern -ICs~\cite{albartus2020,anderson2020}. +ICs~\cite{albartus2020,andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. In contrast to TPMs and Smartcards, HSMs rely on an active security barrier usually consisting of a fragile foil with conductive traces. These traces are much larger scale than a smart card IC's microscopic structures and instead are @@ -56,15 +67,14 @@ This chapter contains the following contributions: \begin{figure} \center \includegraphics[width=12cm]{prototype_pic2.jpg} - \caption{The prototype as we used it to test power transfer and bidirectional communication between stator and - rotor. This picture shows the proof-of-concept prototype's configuration that we used for accelerometer - characterization (Section~\ref{sec_accel_meas}) without the vertical security mesh struts that connect the circular - top and bottom outer meshes.} + \caption[Inertial HSM prototype]{The prototype as we used it to test power transfer and bidirectional communication + between stator and rotor. This picture shows the proof-of-concept prototype's configuration that we used for + accelerometer characterization (Section~\ref{sec_accel_meas}) without the vertical security mesh struts that connect + the circular top and bottom outer meshes.} \label{prototype_picture} \end{figure} -In Section~\ref{sec_related_work}, we will give an overview of the state of the art in HSM physical security. On this -basis, in Section~\ref{sec_ihsm_construction} we will elaborate the principles of our Inertial HSM approach. We will +In Section~\ref{sec_ihsm_construction} we will elaborate the principles of our Inertial HSM approach. We will analyze its weaknesses in Section~\ref{sec_attacks}. Based on these results we have built a proof-of-concept hardware prototype. In Section~\ref{sec_proto} we will elaborate on the design of this prototype. In Section~\ref{sec_accel_meas} we present our characterization of an automotive MEMS accelerometer IC as a rotation sensor in this proof-of-concept @@ -75,36 +85,18 @@ prototype. We conclude this chapter with a general evaluation of our design in S % summaries of research papers on HSMs. I have not found any actual prior art on anything involving mechanical motion % beyond ultrasound. -In this section, we will briefly explore the history of HSMs and the state of academic research on active tamper -detection. +As we elaborated in Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}, HSMs are an old technology that traces back decades in its electronic +realization. Today's common approach of monitoring meandering electrical traces on a fragile foil that is wrapped around +the HSM essentially transforms the security problem into the challenge to +manufacture very fine electrical traces on a flexible foil~\cite{isaacs2013, immler2019, +andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. There has been some research on monitoring the HSM's interior using e.g.\ +electromagnetic radiation~\cite{tobisch2020, kreft2012} or ultrasound~\cite{vrijaldenhoven2004} but none of this +research has found widespread adoption yet. -HSMs are an old technology that traces back decades in its electronic realization, initially being conceived by the US -NSA during the second world war~\cite{boak1973}. Today's common approach of monitoring meandering electrical traces on a -fragile foil that is wrapped around the HSM essentially transforms the security problem into the challenge to -manufacture very fine electrical traces on a flexible foil~\cite{isaacs2013, immler2019, anderson2020}. There has been -some research on monitoring the HSM's interior using e.g.\ electromagnetic radiation~\cite{tobisch2020, kreft2012} or -ultrasound~\cite{vrijaldenhoven2004} but none of this research has found widespread adoption yet. - -HSMs can be compared to physical seals~\cite{anderson2020}. Both are tamper-evident devices. The difference is that an -HSM continuously monitors itself whereas a physical seal only serves to record tampering and requires someone to examine -it. This examination can be done by eye in the field, but it can also be carried out in a laboratory using complex -equipment. An HSM in principle has to have this examination equipment built-in. - -Physical seals are used in a wide variety of applications. The most interesting ones from a research point of view that -are recorded in public literature are those used for the monitoring of nuclear material under the International Atomic -Energy Authority (IAEA). Most of these seals use the same approach that is used in Physically Unclonable Functions -(PUFs), though their development predates that of PUFs by several decades. The seal is created in a way that -intentionally causes large, random device-to-device variations. These variations are precisely recorded at deployment. -At the end of the seal's lifetime, the seal is returned to a lab and closely examined to check for any deviations from -the seal's prior recorded state. The type of variation used in these seals includes random scratches in metal parts and -random blobs of solder (IAEA metal cap seal), randomly cut optical fibers (COBRA seal), the uncontrollably random -distribution of glitter particles in a polymer matrix (COBRA seal prototypes) as well as the precise three-dimensional -surface structure of metal parts at microscopic scales (LMCV)~\cite{iaea2011}. - -The IAEA's equipment portfolio does include electronic seals such as the EOSS. These devices are intended for remote -reading, similar to an HSM. They are constructed from two components: A cable that is surveilled for tampering, and a -monitoring device. The monitoring device itself is in effect an HSM and uses a security mesh foil like it is used in -commercial HSMs. +HSMs can be compared to physical seals~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. Both are tamper-evident devices. The +difference is that an HSM continuously monitors itself whereas a physical seal only serves to record tampering and +requires someone to examine it. This examination can be done by eye in the field, but it can also be carried out in a +laboratory using complex equipment. An HSM in principle has to have this examination equipment built-in. The self-destruct built into an HSM serves as a strong tamper deterrent. For illustration, compare an HSM to a computer inside a locked safe when opposing a well-funded attacker with plenty of time. In~\cite{boak1973}, Boak asserts that @@ -113,14 +105,16 @@ several minutes. While the state of electronics has advanced rapidly since Boak' has not increased correspondingly. Thus, we can conclude that even today, against a ``smart, well-equipped opponent with plenty of time'' as noted by Boak, this self-destruction functionality is essential. -In~\cite{anderson2020}, Anderson gives a comprehensive overview of physical security. An example HSM that he cites is -the IBM 4758, the details of which are laid out in-depth in~\cite{smith1998}. This HSM is an example of an -industry-standard construction. Although its turn of the century design is now a bit dated, the construction techniques -of the physical security mechanisms have not evolved much in the last two decades. Besides some auxiliary temperature -and radiation sensors to guard against attacks on the built-in SRAM memory, the module's main security barrier uses the -common construction of a flexible mesh foil wrapped around the module's core. In~\cite{smith1998}, the authors state -that the module monitors this mesh for short circuits, open circuits, and conductivity. Other commercial offerings use -similar approaches to tamper detection~\cite{obermaier2018,drimer2008,anderson2020,isaacs2013}. +In~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}, Anderson gives a comprehensive overview of physical security. An example +HSM that he cites is the IBM 4758, the details of which are laid out in-depth +in~\cite{smithBuildingHighperformanceProgrammable1999}. This HSM is an example of an industry-standard construction. +Although its turn of the century design is now a bit dated, the construction techniques of the physical security +mechanisms have not evolved much in the last two decades. Besides some auxiliary temperature and radiation sensors to +guard against attacks on the built-in SRAM memory, the module's main security barrier uses the common construction of a +flexible mesh foil wrapped around the module's core. In~\cite{smithBuildingHighperformanceProgrammable1999}, the authors +state that the module monitors this mesh for short circuits, open circuits, and conductivity. Other commercial offerings +use similar approaches to tamper +detection~\cite{obermaier2018,drimer2008,andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020,isaacs2013}. Shifting our focus from industry use to the academic state of the art, in~\cite{immler2019}, Immler et al. describe an HSM based on precise capacitance measurements of a security mesh, creating a PUF from the mesh. In contrast to @@ -247,9 +241,9 @@ security barrier. In industry, mesh membranes are commonly used for tamper dete systems for a variety of use cases ranging from low-security payment processing to high-security certificate management. From this, we can conclude that a properly implemented mesh \emph{can} provide a practical level of security. In contrast to this industry focus, academic research has largely focused on ways to fabricate enclosures that embed -characteristics of a Physically Unclonable Function as a means of tamper detection~\cite{tobisch2020,immler2019}. By -using stochastic properties of the enclosure material to form a PUF, such academic designs leverage signal processing -techniques to improve the system's security level by a significant margin. +characteristics of a PUF as a means of tamper detection~\cite{tobisch2020,immler2019}. By using stochastic properties of +the enclosure material to form a PUF, such academic designs leverage signal processing techniques to improve the +system's security level by a significant margin. In our research, we focus on security meshes as our IHSM's tamper sensors. The cost of advanced manufacturing techniques and special materials used in fine commercial meshes poses an obstacle to small-scale manufacturing and @@ -321,20 +315,24 @@ shaft penetrates the mesh to simplify mechanical construction. \begin{figure} \center \includegraphics{concept_vis_one_axis.pdf} - \caption{Concept of a simple spinning Inertial HSM. 1 - Shaft. 2 - Security mesh. 3 - Payload. 4 - - Accelerometer. 5 - Shaft penetrating security mesh.} + \caption[Inertial HSM concept visualization]{Concept of a simple spinning Inertial HSM. 1 - Shaft. 2 - Security + mesh. 3 - Payload. 4 - Accelerometer. 5 - Shaft penetrating security mesh.} \label{fig_schema_one_axis} \end{figure} The spinning mesh must be designed to cover the entire surface of the payload, but it suffices if it sweeps over every part of the payload once per rotation. This means we can design longitudinal gaps into the mesh that allow outside air to flow through to the payload. In traditional boundary-sensing HSMs, cooling of the payload processor is a serious -issue since any air duct or heat pipe would have to penetrate the HSM's security boundary. This problem can only be -solved with complex and costly siphon-style constructions, so in commercial systems, heat conduction is used -exclusively~\cite{isaacs2013}. This limits the maximum power dissipation of the payload and thus its processing power. -Using longitudinal gaps in the mesh, our setup allows direct air cooling of regular heatsinks. This unlocks much more -powerful processing capabilities that greatly increase the maximum possible power dissipation of the payload. In an -evolution of our design, the spinning mesh could even be designed to \emph{be} a cooling fan. +issue since any air duct or heat pipe would have to penetrate the HSM's security boundary~\cite{ + petriePartIITechnical, + curetHardwareSecurityModule2025, + zhangTamperrespondentAssembliesPorous2023, + dragoneVentedTamperrespondentAssemblies2020}. +This problem can only be solved with complex and costly siphon-style constructions, so in commercial systems, heat +conduction is used exclusively~\cite{isaacs2013}. This limits the maximum power dissipation of the payload and thus its +processing power. Using longitudinal gaps in the mesh, our setup allows direct air cooling of regular heatsinks. This +unlocks much more powerful processing capabilities that greatly increase the maximum possible power dissipation of the +payload. In an evolution of our design, the spinning mesh could even be designed to \emph{be} a cooling fan. Conventional HSMs are limited by the construction of their security meshes which rely on plastics as their main structural material. The security mesh has to fit the highest components inside the HSM. Since creating a security mesh @@ -532,10 +530,10 @@ One type of these attacks are contactless attacks such as electromagnetic (EM) s EM side-channel attacks can be mitigated by shielding and by designing the IHSM's payload such that critical components such as CPUs are physically distant to the security mesh, preventing EM probes from being brought close. Conducted EMI side-channels that could be used for power analysis can be mitigated by placing filters on the inside of -the security mesh at the point where the power and network connections penetrate the mesh~\cite{anderson2020}. +the security mesh at the point where the power and network connections penetrate the mesh~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. Finally, the API between the HSM's payload and the outside world provides attack surface. Attacks through the network interface must be prevented as in any other networked system by only exposing the minimum necessary amount of API -surface to the outside world, and by carefully vetting this remaining attack surface~\cite{anderson2020}. +surface to the outside world, and by carefully vetting this remaining attack surface~\cite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}. IHSMs do not provide an inherent benefit against such contactless attacks. However, there are two mitigating factors in play that still give IHSMs an advantage over conventional HSMs in this scenario. Because IHSM meshes can be made using @@ -567,16 +565,17 @@ acceleration is $a=\omega^2 r$. In our example, this results in a minimum angula \frac{1}{2\pi}\sqrt{\frac{a}{r}} = \frac{1}{2\pi}\sqrt{\frac{\SI{1000}{\meter\per\second^2}}{\SI{100}{\milli\meter}}} \approx \SI{16}{\hertz} \approx \SI{1000}{rpm}$. From this, we can conclude that even at moderate speeds of $\SI{1000}{rpm}$ and above, a manual attack is no longer possible and any attack would have to be carried out using some -kind of mechanical tool. +kind of mechanical tool. Literature supports this conclusion, with loss of orientation reported as early as at +\SI{70}{rpm} in an observer located on the axis of rotation~\cite{fowlerInvestigationFlowProcesses1966}. \begin{figure} \center \includegraphics[width=6cm]{attack-robot.pdf} - \caption{Schematic overview of a robotic rotating-stage attack. An optical sensor (1) observes the IHSM's rotation - and adjusts the setpoint of a servo motor (2) that rotates the attack stage (3). On the rotating attack stage, a - remote-controlled manipulator (4) is mounted that deactivates the security mesh (7) and creates an opening (5). - Through this opening, a human operator can then insert tools such as probes to read out sensitive information from - the actual payload (6).} + \caption[Inertial HSM attack robot scenario]{Schematic overview of a robotic rotating-stage attack. An optical + sensor (1) observes the IHSM's rotation and adjusts the setpoint of a servo motor (2) that rotates the attack stage + (3). On the rotating attack stage, a remote-controlled manipulator (4) is mounted that deactivates the security mesh + (7) and creates an opening (5). Through this opening, a human operator can then insert tools such as probes to read + out sensitive information from the actual payload (6).} \label{fig_attack_robot} \end{figure} @@ -609,9 +608,9 @@ penetrates the mesh at the axis. The mesh's tangential velocity decreases close allow an attacker to insert tools such as probes into the device through the opening it creates. Conventional HSMs also have to take precautions to protect their power and data connections. In conventional HSMs, power and data are routed into the enclosure along a meandering path through the PCB or through flat flex cables sandwiched in between security -mesh foil layers~\cite{smith1998}. As a result of these precautions, in conventional HSMs, this interface rarely is a -mechanical weak spot. In inertial HSMs, careful engineering is necessary to achieve the same effect. -Figure~\ref{shaft_cm} shows variations of the shaft interface with increasing complexity. +mesh foil layers~\cite{smithBuildingHighperformanceProgrammable1999}. As a result of these precautions, in conventional +HSMs, this interface rarely is a mechanical weak spot. In inertial HSMs, careful engineering is necessary to achieve the +same effect. Figure~\ref{shaft_cm} shows variations of the shaft interface with increasing complexity. \begin{figure} \begin{subfigure}[t]{0.3\textwidth} @@ -636,7 +635,8 @@ Figure~\ref{shaft_cm} shows variations of the shaft interface with increasing co \caption{A second moving tamper detection mesh also enables more complex topographies.} \label{shaft_cm_a} \end{subfigure} - \caption{Mechanical countermeasures to attacks through or close to the shaft of a fixed-axis rotating IHSM.} + \caption[IHSM shaft mechanical attack countermeasures]{Mechanical countermeasures to attacks through or close to the + shaft of a fixed-axis rotating IHSM.} \label{shaft_cm} \end{figure} @@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ files. \center \caption{Assembled mechanical prototype rotor (left) and stator (right) PCB components.} \end{subfigure} - \caption{Our proof-of-concept prototype IHSM's PCB security mesh design} + \caption[IHSM PCB rotor and stator prototypes]{Our proof-of-concept prototype IHSM's PCB security mesh design} \label{fig_proto_mesh} \end{figure} @@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ files. \caption{Detail of a PCB produced with a generated mesh.} \label{mesh_gen_sample} \end{subfigure} - \caption{Our automatic security mesh generation process} + \caption[Automatic security mesh generation process visualization]{Our automatic security mesh generation process} \label{mesh_gen_fig} \end{figure} @@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ are shielded from one another by the motor's body in the center of the PCB. stray capacitances.} \label{photolink_schematic} \end{subfigure} - \caption{IR data link implementation} + \caption[IHSM IR data link implementation]{IR data link implementation} \end{figure} \subsection{Evaluation} @@ -951,17 +951,17 @@ the fly, without stopping the rotor. \begin{figure} \center \includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{fig-acc-theory-meas-run50.pdf} - \caption{Centrifugal acceleration versus angular frequency in theory and in our experiments. Experimental - measurements are shown after correction for offset and scale error. Above \SI{300}{rpm}, the relative error is - below $\SI{0.5}{\percent}$. Below $\SI{300}{rpm}$, the residual offset error has a large impact ($0.05\,g$ absolute - or $8\%$ relative at $\SI{95}{rpm}$.)} + \caption[Centrifugal acceleration versus angular frequency]{Centrifugal acceleration versus angular frequency in + theory and in our experiments. Experimental measurements are shown after correction for offset and scale error. + Above \SI{300}{rpm}, the relative error is below $\SI{0.5}{\percent}$. Below $\SI{300}{rpm}$, the residual + offset error has a large impact ($0.05\,g$ absolute or $8\%$ relative at $\SI{95}{rpm}$.)} \label{fig-acc-theory} \end{figure} \section{Conclusion} \label{sec_conclusion} -In this chapter, we introduced Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs), a novel concept for the construction of +In this chapter, we introduce Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs), a novel concept for the construction of advanced hardware security modules from simple components. We analyzed the concept for its security properties and highlighted its ability to significantly strengthen otherwise weak tamper detection barriers. We validated our design by creating a proof-of-concept hardware prototype. In this prototype, we have demonstrated practical solutions to the @@ -978,9 +978,14 @@ allow the construction of devices secure against a wide range of practical attac specialized tools. The rotating mesh allows longitudinal gaps, which enables new applications that are impossible with traditional HSMs. Such gaps can be used to integrate a fan for air cooling into the HSM, allowing the use of powerful computing hardware inside the HSM. We hope that this simple construction will stimulate academic research into (more) -secure hardware. We published all design artifacts of our PoC online, please refer to Appendix~\ref{sec_repo} for -details. The next steps towards a practical application of our design will be to design a manufacturable stator/rotor -interface with inductive power and data transfer integrated into the motor's magnetics and a custom motor driver tuned -for the application that is able to precisely measure both angular velocity and winding current for an added degree of -tamper detection through the measurement of external forces acting on the rotor. +secure hardware. + +Building on the foundations of IHSM construction that we laid out in this chapter, in the following two chapters we will +provide detailed solutions for two key design challenges in IHSM construction. In +Chapter~\ref{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon}, we will introduce a low-cost tamper sensing mesh monitoring circuit based on +Time Domain Reflectometry. Using this approach, we can further strengthen the security of meshes created using simple +manufacturing processes in an IHSM. In Chapter~\ref{chapter-nice-coils}, we approach the question of a +rotation-invariant wireless inductive power supply for an IHSM and provide a planar inductor layout that minimizes +voltage ripple with IHSM rotation. In Chapters~\ref{chapter-qkd} and \ref{chapter-smpc}, we will analyze two use cases +benefitting from IHSMs and tailor the IHSM concept to their requirements. diff --git a/chapter-ihsm/figures/resilient sphere.pdf b/chapter-ihsm/figures/resilient sphere.pdf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce39ad2 Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-ihsm/figures/resilient sphere.pdf differ diff --git a/chapter-ihsm/resilient sphere.svg b/chapter-ihsm/resilient sphere.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c92405e --- /dev/null +++ b/chapter-ihsm/resilient sphere.svg @@ -0,0 +1,423 @@ + + + +Otiluke’s Resilient SphereLevel 4 Abjuration (Wizard)Casting Time: ActionRange: 30 feetComponents: V, S, M (a glass sphere)Duration: Concentration, up to 1 minuteA shimmering sphere encloses a Large or smaller creature or object within range. An unwilling crea-ture must succeed on a Dexterity saving throw or be enclosed for the duration.Nothing—not physical objects, energy, or other spell effects—can pass through the barrier, in or out, though a creature in the sphere can breathe there. The sphere is immune to all damage, and a creature or object in-side can’t be damaged by attacks or effects originating from outside, nor can a creature inside the sphere damage anything outside it.The sphere is weightless and just large enough to contain the creature or object inside. An enclosed creature can take an action to push against the sphere’s walls and thus roll the sphere at up to half the creature’s Speed. Similarly, the globe can be picked up and moved by other creatures.A Disintegrate spell targeting the globe destroys it without harming anything inside. diff --git a/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex b/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex index 593fc8d..c937884 100644 --- a/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex @@ -6,144 +6,319 @@ } \chaptertitle{Introduction} +\label{chapter-intro} -All Cops Are Bastards, or ACAB is a slogan popular in far left and anarchist circles since the mid-twentieth century -that expresses a rejection of state authority~\cite{constantinouAppliedResearchPolicing2021}. While politically, this -blanket rejection is a fringe viewpoint with no mainstream acceptance, there exists an interesting parallel between this -and modern cryptographic best practice. In modern cryptography, it is generally seen as best practice to have the least -amount of keys possible involved in any computation, and cryptographers have time and time again strongly rejected -attempts by states and other authorities to insert backdoor access mechanisms into cryptographic systems~\cite{ +\emph{No Gods, No Masters} is an anarchist slogan originating in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century that expresses a +rejection of authorities~\cite{broussaisOriginesDeviseAnarchiste2022,guerinNoGodsNo2005,blomNoGodsNo2025}. Despite its +origin in a different era, it encapsulates an approach that is commonly followed in modern cryptography. In +cryptography, it is considered best practice to have the least amount of parties possible involved in any computation. +Most cryptographic problems are easily solved by involving a trusted third party (TTP). Yet, cryptographers have time +and again vocally rejected attempts to involve third parties in cryptographic protocols~\cite{ abelsonRisksKeyRecovery1997, abelsonKeysDoormats2015, andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020, + rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic2015, }. -The aversion of cryptographers against backdoor access shows up everywhere---from cryptographic protocol standards like -TLS, to cryptographic applications like the Signal messenger, not only is backdoor access excluded from the system -design, its possibility is considered a potential vulnerability and measures such as forward secrecy and post-compromise -security are taken to mitigate its impact when it is achieved through other means. In computing, this design aspect -makes cryptographic protocols a unique holdout. In other parts of the stack, explicit or implicit backdoor access is -commonplace, and attempts at preventing it are rare. For instance, network providers are generally required to comply -with so-called \emph{Lawful Interception} orders on particular customers or traffic types, and datacenter operators -commonly provide hardware access to state authorities. The design decisions in cryptographic protocols generally hold, -and the gold standard for backdoor access to modern systems is either exploiting a \emph{zero-day} flaw that is not yet -publically known, or acquiring physical access to the target system. +Considerable research has been focused on creating a versatile set of tools to perform tasks as diverse as secure +communication~\cite{ + alwenDoubleRatchetSecurity2019, + marlinspikeDoubleRatchetAlgorithm2025, + dowlingFlexibleAuthenticatedConfidential2020, + sasySoKMetadataProtectingCommunication2024}, +oblivious database access~\cite{ + chorPrivateInformationRetrieval, + aguilar-melchorXPIRPrivateInformation2016, + reichertMenhirObliviousDatabase2024}, +and even general computation~\cite{ + goosInformationTheoreticallySecure1999, + aumannSecurityCovertAdversaries2010, + chorPrivateInformationRetrieval} +in a decentralized way that avoids trusted authorities. +While politically, the anarchist blanket rejection of authority represents a fringe viewpoint, in cryptography it has a +long tradition originating with the Cypherpunk and Hacker movements~\cite{ + andersonCypherpunkEthicsRadical2022, + hughesCypherpunksManifesto, + jarvisCryptoWarsFight2020, + marlinspikeWeShouldAll2013}, +and extending throughout mainstream academic cryptography. -\section{Research Questions} +While the aforementioned cryptographic tools enable a large gamut of use cases in theory, in practice cryptographic +systems are still routinely compromised~\cite{ + gellmanNSAInfiltratesLinks2013, + goldmanUnrestrainedChineseCyberattackers2025, + scott-railtonWhoseAuthorityPegasus2024, + quintinSomethingRememberUs2024, + marczakGraphiteCaughtFirst2025, + PredatorFilesTechnical2023, + PakistanMassSurveillance2025}. +A fundamental flaw of any practical cryptographic system is that secure algorithms have to run on hardware, and even +today, average computing hardware provides little physical security~\cite{ + gotzfriedCacheAttacksIntel2017, + Lipp2018meltdown, + Kocher2018spectre, + moghimiTPMFAILTPMMeets2020}. +\emph{Hardware Security Modules} are a class of devices specifically designed to execute cryptographic algorithms while +providing strict physical security guarantees, but these systems are expensive, +and their physical security is often questionable~\cite{ + obermaier2018, + andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020}, +which we will elaborate further in Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}. \textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} writes +on HSM security: -In this thesis, we wish to extend the level of protection afforded by cryptographic protocol design down the technology -stack. While cryptographic protocols and modern software from the operating system up make it possible to secure the -software side of the stack to a high level, the hardware side remains poorly protected. There are a variety of hardware -security solutions in the wild, but the majority of them either do not target protection against local, physical attacks --- such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) -- or are not widely available due to market segmentation or cost -- such as -conventional Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). +\begin{quote} + Security economics remains a big soft spot, with security chips being in many ways a market for lemons. A banker + buying HSMs probably won’t be aware of the huge gap between FIPS\footnote{Anderson here refers to the US national + HSM security standard FIPS + 140~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002, + usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019}} level 3 and level 4, and + understand that level 3 can sometimes be defeated with a Swiss army knife. The buying incentive there is compliance, + and where real security clashes with operations it’s not surprising to see weaker standards designed to make + compliance easier. + \begin{flushright} + \textit{\textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} p. 629} + \end{flushright} +\end{quote} -We approach this task by solving three research questions that progress from theory to practical deployment. +In this thesis, we aim to fill this gap in easily obtainable, secure hardware and extend the level of protection +afforded by cryptographic protocol design down the technology stack to the hardware level. We propose a new HSM design +that unlike existing designs can be manufactured at low cost and without access to specialized tools. + +% Go into drawbacks of existing HSMs + +We publish our design fully open source, including all detials necessary for replication. A fundamental principle in +cryptographic engineering is Kerckhoffs' principle\footnote{ + \textcite{petitcolasKerckhoffsPrinciplesCryptographie} contains a high-quality OCR'ed copy of the original source, + as well as a translation of the cited part from French. The original source is + \textcite{kerckhoffsCryptographieMilitaire1883}. +}, named after Dutch military cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs. Kerckhoffs' principle expresses that the security of a +cryptographic system should only depend on the secrecy of its keys, not on the secrecy of its design. Existing +commercial designs routinely contravene Kerckhoff's principle by applying the widespread industry practice of +\emph{Security by Obscurity}. Even in academic related work, the principle is sometimes violated by omitting +implementation and methodological details in the interest of patents and commercial exploitation. By publishing all +details of our research into HSMs and their components, we provide the foundation for future independent research. + +Beyond applying Kerckhoffs' principle, publishing our design also enables independent replication. Our design is +based entirely on standard components and does not require bespoke manufacturing processes. Both commercial and academic +existing HSM tamper sensing designs require bespoke manufacturing methods or custom integrated circuits +(ICs)~\cite{ + obermaierPUFfilmMethodProducing2023, + immler2019, + garbTamperSensitiveDesignPUFBased, + immlerBTREPIDBatterylessTamperresistant2018}. Custom ICs require a large up-front financial commitment to produce. +Bespoke manufacturing methods may require custom machines, training, and specialty materials, also incurring a high +startup cost. This creates a single point of failure in the manufacturer, and opens up an opportunity for a hardware +supply-chain attack~\cite{harrisonSoKSecurityArchitects2025}. Such supply chain attacks can be mitigated by +independently manufacturing our design. + +%%% +\section{A Note on Hardware Security Module Terminology} + +In this thesis, we use the term \emph{Hardware Security Module (HSM)} to refer to a security device that has the +following three properties. \begin{enumerate} - \item Can we achieve physical security without relying on conventional tamper-sensing meshes? - \item Can we monitor tamper-sensing meshes at a higher detail level than the state of the art of a single, scalar - measurement? - \item Can we integrate our findings into a system that provides a useful security guarantee in practice? +\item A HSM targets the prevention of any conceivable physical attack. In particular, this includes intrusion attempts + such as careful drilling or cutting into the device from any direction. +\item A HSM includes tamper sensors that when triggered result in an active tamper response, usually deleting all + cryptographic secrets and rendering the device inoperable. +\item A HSM's tamper sensing and response subsystem is continuously powered from a backup power supply, usually a + battery. Loss of power triggers the tamper response. \end{enumerate} -To solve our first research question, we propose the Inertial Hardware Security Module (IHSM), a new type of HSM that -extends the high level of protection offered by the modern cryptographic software stack down to the hardware level, -enabling secure computation in insecure places. +This use of the term \emph{HSM} aligns with common usage of the term both in the academic literature and in everyday +conversation. Particularly the requirement of active tamper detection and response is crucial to distinguish a HSM from +simpler devices such as TPMs, smart cards or secure enclaves in SoCs. Note that our use of the term HSM is slightly +different from its use in government standards, from its use in the PCI SSC (Payment Card Industry Security Standards +Council) standards, and from its industry use. -To solve our second question, we propose improvements to the state of the art in HSM tamper sensors such as the use of -low-cost, embeddable Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR) that not only improve the security of IHSMs, but that can even be -applied to conventional HSMs. +In industry, the term HSM is often used for solutions that are only logically segregated and that do not include any +particular defense against hardware attacks. Our conjecture is that this is a consequence of the standardization +landscape, where for applications outside of card payment processing the US FIPS +140-22~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002} standard was central to +the industry. Despite encompassing both devices that include active tamper detection and response, FIPS 140-2 did not +draw a distinction in its terminology between the two classes. -Finally, we solve our last research question by showing in two case studies how an end-to-end design of an IHSM-secured -data processing system could look like. Both case studies concern scenarios that IHSMs unlock that were previously -infeasible using conventional HSMs: Datacenter-scale Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) and long-range Quantum Key -Distribution (QKD) networks. As part of this effort we provide a solution adapting and improving upon the state of the -art in wireless power transfer to supply a rotating inertial HSM with a clean, stable power supply. +\subsection{Use in government standards} + +Under the still widely used US national standard FIPS 140 in in its 2002 version +2~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002}, a HSM would be called a +\emph{Multiple-Chip Cryptographic Module} that conforms to the standard's \emph{Security Level} 4 out of 4. Interesting +to note are that only level 4 requires any active tamper detection and response, so devices compliant only up to levels +3 and below do not align with our HSM definition. Futher of note is that according to the standard, a single-chip +solution does not require any tamper detection and response either to meet the standard's security level 4, which is in +misalignment with our definition. The standard's 2019 updated version FIPS +140-3~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019} defers to the +international standards ISO/IEC 19790 and 24759. + +ISO/IEC 19790~\cite{ISOIEC19790} and ISO/IEC 24759~\cite{ISOIEC24759} call what we call a HSM a \emph{Hardware +Cryptographic Module} corresponding with the standards \emph{Security Level 4}. However, these standards only require +active tamper detection and response when cryptographic secrets are transmitted in plaintext between chips. + +\subsection{Use in card payment processing (PCI SSC) standards} + +The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) is an association of credit card network operators that +defines standards for all layers of card payment processing, from card payment terminals in stores to the handling of +payment data in online shop backend systems. + +PCI SSC terminology aligns with our definition and with common everyday use of the term HSM. In PCI SSC terminology, a +HSM is a crytographic device that has active tamper detecion and response circuitry. However, PCI SSC terminology +differs from our use of the term HSM in one nuance: In PCI SSC terminology, a HSM is specifically a datacenter device +used for backend processing of payment data. The general class of ``hardware devices performing some security function +with or without particular physical security requirements'' that ISO/IEC 19790 and other standards call a \emph{Hardware +Cryptographic Module}, in PCI SSC terminology is termed \emph{Secure Cryptographic Device (SCD)} in more recent standard +versions, which was updated from the previous term \emph{Tamper-Resistant Security Module (TRSM)}. Other than HSMs, PCI +SSC includes smartcards and card payment terminals in this category. Card payment terminals, referred to as +\emph{Pin-Entry Device (PED)} in PCI SSC standards, have to include a surprising amount of active tamper detection and +response functionality including partial coverage of areas like their main cryptographic processor and smart card reader +by battery-backed tamper-sensing meshes. Under our definition, these devices can be classified as a type of HSM. + +\subsection{Tamper-Sensing Meshes} + +In this thesis, we use the terms \emph{Tamper-Sensing Mesh} and \emph{Security Mesh} synonymous. We use both terms to +refer to any electrical circuit whose path is laid out to cover a surface with the intent of detecting attempts at +drilling, cutting or otherwise manipulating this surface. While the term \emph{Security Mesh} is more concise, it is +less clear to people unfamiliar with the matter. It is also polysemous, and depending on context can also refer to woven +or stamped metal meshes used as fences or as screens in front of windows to prevent break-ins. As a result, it is harder +to use in online searches, and when using Large Language Models (LLMs), it frequently leads to amusing hallucinations. + +% FIXME note leo: Das ganze wirkt wie ein guter baustein für eine Einleitung. Für einen Terminologie übersicht ist es +% ansonsten auch eigentlich zu lang. +% Splitte das vielleicht auf, ein paar mehr details in den Abstract um die HSM definition etwas zu präzisieren, den rest +% in die Intro? +%%% + +\section{Inertial Hardware Security Modules} + +In this thesis, we propose Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs) to fill the gap of protecting systems that handle +highly sensitive data but that cannot use conventional HSMs for cost or performance reasons. In a system with a secure +software stack, the role of a HSM is to secure the hardware part of the stack. The basic approach of a HSM is to combine +a secure software stack with tamper sensors connected to a fast self-destruct mechanism. The tamper sensors are tasked +with detecting any physical attack an attacker could mount on the device. Common classes of such sensors include +environmental sensors such as temperature or radiation sensors that detect attempts at causing controllable faults in +the HSM by heating, cooling or irradiating it. Building on the basic protection offered by such sensors, +\emph{tamper-sensing meshes} are often employed. These \emph{meshes} are flexible foils containing circuit traces that +are attached to the HSM's enclosure to detect attempts at penetrating the shell of the device with probes. +Tamper-sensing meshes usually are the primary line of defense against most physical attacks. They are very effective at +mitigating a large variety of physical attacks, but they are difficult to construct securely as they usually require +bespoke manufacturing processes. As a result, they are currently only used in niche applications, and even there not +every realization is equally secure. The self-destruct mechanism can be hardware or software that quickly and securely +destroys all cryptographic secrets, thereby rendering the device worthless to an attacker. + +IHSMs are a new design approach that utilizes mechanical motion to create secure tamper-sensing meshes from simple +components. IHSMs solve the issue of creating an impenetrable tamper-sensing envelope by replacing the bespoke +tamper-sensing mesh foil with a set of simple, rigid meshes made from commodity Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) that are +rotating at high speed. In motion, these simple PCB tamper-sensing meshes are as secure as the much more sophisticated +bespoke foils used in conventional HSMs against an attacker with access to commercially available tools, yet they are +simpler and less expensive to manufacture. To verify that the mesh is rotating correctly, an accelerometer is placed on +the rotating mesh, and its centrifugal force reading is used to validate its path of motion. + +IHSMs enable the protection of much larger payloads compared to conventional mesh designs, and they can support larger +power dissipation. Combined with their low cost, this enables the implementation of high-level hardware security in +applications that previously would not have been possible to secure. + +To the best of our knowledge, IHSMs are the first fully open source, replicable HSM with advanced tamper sensing +features. Across application domains, IHSMs can be applied to gain resistance to physical attacks in scenarios where +conventional HSMs were not used because of cost, computing power or implementation effort. Where conventional HSMs come +as fully integrated devices that only expose limited APIs to their users, IHSMs at their core are just an enclosure that +the user can put whatever hardware they need into, adapting the tamper response to their application's needs. Since the +simpler tamper-sensing mesh construction of IHSMs scales to larger payload volumes, entire servers can be +protected---something that is impossible with conventional HSMs. Since the mesh in an IHSM is constantly moving, unlike +a mesh in a conventional HSM, it does not have to entirely cover the payload. Instead, it can have gaps that allow for +air flow between outside and inside, enabling active cooling of the IHSM's payload. This cooling capability increases +computing power by increasing feasible payload power dissipation by orders of magnitude~\cite{kordyban1998}. + +\section{Research Questions and Contributions} + +Based on the current state of the field of hardware security, we deduce six overarching research questions for this +thesis that progress from theory to practical deployment. + +\begin{enumerate} + \item What is the state of the art in commercial tamper sensing mesh implementations? + \item What are criteria and approaches for the design of secure tamper sensing meshes? + \item Can we achieve physical security without relying on a conventional tamper-sensing meshes that requires a + bespoke manufacturing process? + \item Can we monitor tamper-sensing meshes at a higher detail level than the state of the art of a single, scalar + measurement? + \item Can we improve the ripple voltage performance of Wireless Power Transfer (WPT) through rotating joints to + adapt it to IHSM applications? + \item What applications does our IHSM technology open up through its increase in power dissipation and size + capabilities? +\end{enumerate} + +We answer our first research question in two parts. In Chapter~\ref{chapter-epa}, we analyze the hardware security +design of Germany's new national electronic health record system. Our analysis unveils a combination of problematic +choices resulting from conflicting constraints and lack of awareness. In Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}, we present the +results of a survey across approximately 30 real world tamper sensing mesh implementations, analyzing common design +features. + +The second half of our survey in Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey} answers our second research question. From our analysis of +a large corpus of devices, we deduce a list of design criteria that can be applied to increase the security of any +tamper sensing mesh implementation. To answer our third research question, in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm} we propose the +Inertial Hardware Security Module (IHSM), a new type of HSM that extends the high level of protection offered by the +modern cryptographic software stack down to the hardware level, enabling secure computation in insecure places. IHSMs +can be built from basic, off-the-shelf components and do not require bespoke manufacturing processes. To answer our +fourth research question, in Chapter~\ref{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon} we propose improvements to the state of the art in +HSM tamper sensors based on the use of low-cost, embeddable Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR). Our improvements can be +applied to both IHSMs and to conventional HSMs. IHSMs come with unique power supply constraints since their rotating +mesh must be continuously powered. A straightforward solution utilizes Wireless Power Transfer using planar inductors, +but existing WPT designs exhbit a ripple voltage due to an asymmetry of conventional planar inductors. This leads to our +fifth research question, which we solve in Chapter~\ref{chapter-nice-coils} with the design and experimental evaluation +of a new, generalized class of \emph{twisted} planar inductors that reduces voltage ripple in rotating shaft setups. +A finding of independent interest is that compared to conventional two-layer planar inductors, in our experiments our +proposed inductor design improved self-resonant frequency by up to \qty{50}{\percent} and increased inductance by up to +\qty{6.5}{\percent}. Finally, we answer our last research question by showing in two case studies how an end-to-end +design of an IHSM-secured data processing system could look like. Both case studies concern scenarios that IHSMs unlock +that were previously infeasible using conventional HSMs: In Chapter~\ref{chapter-qkd}, we explore how IHSMs enable +long-range Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) networks using trustable physically secured relay nodes and in +Chapter~\ref{chapter-smpc} we elaborate how datacenter-scale Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC) clusters can be +created using IHSM enclosures with commercial server hardware. + +\section{Contributions} + +Through this thesis, we make contributions advancing the state of hardware securty across several related sub-fields. +Our contributions include: + +\begin{enumerate} + \item We conduct the first large-scale survey of tamper sensing measures in the real world, analyzing approximately + 30 devices. + \item From our real world observations, we systematize tamper sensing mesh construction techniques and we provide a + list of criteria improving mesh security. + \item We experimentally analyze the impact of Computed Tomography (CT) imaging on mesh security. + \item We propose the IHSM, a new concept for HSM design based on a rotating mesh that increases payload size and + power dissipation capacity while simultaneously allowing for simpler meshes constructed from standard + components. + \item We show experimental results on IHSM mesh performance obtained with a prototype IHSM. + \item We introduce an algorithm for the automatic layout of tamper-sensing meshes and its implementation on top of a + popular, open-source Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tool. + \item We introduce a high-fidelity mesh monitoring approach that uses Time-Domain Reflectometry (TDR). + \item We show a low-cost implementation of our TDR monitoring approach. + \item We evaluate the performance of our TDR monitoring implementation and demonstrate its response to a large + set of attacks. We show that it reliably distinguishes identical copies of the same mesh specimen, suggesting + PUF-like behavior. + \item We introduce a generalized design approach for low-loss planar inductors that out-peform prior approaches in + parasitic capacitance, self-resonant frequency and rotational symmetry. + \item We apply our design approach to the problem of Wireless Power Transfer to the rotating mesh of an IHSM. + \item We conduct an exhaustive experimental evaluation of the rotational symmetry of a large set of planar WPT + inductors created using our approach. + \item We analyze physically secure Quantum Key Distribution relays as an IHSM use case and develop a low-loss fiber + optic passthrough that supports an additional, secondary, independently rotating mesh shielding the shaft + passthrough of the IHSM's primary mesh. + \item We explore IHSMs for co-located high performance Multiparty Computation (MPC) setups. We demonstrate a + fan-driven IHSM mesh concept for high-availability scenarios that removes motors as a single point of failure + while providing sufficient airflow for cooling high-power server components. +\end{enumerate} We chose to publish all of our research as open source and unencumbered by patents to enable widespread adoption. IHSMs can be custom built with only basic manufacturing capabilities at small scale and enable the deployment of secure computation in insecure places even to small organizations such as university research departments, NGOs and small businesses. -\section{Cryptographic Principles and Physical Reality} - -Cryptographers' aversion to backdoor access derives from a combination of two fundamental computing principles: -Kerckhoffs' principle, and the principle of least authority. Kerckhoffs' principle, named after Dutch military -cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs, expresses that the security of a cryptographic system should only depend on the -secrecy of its keys, not on the secrecy of its design. In this way, Kerckhoff's principle states the opposite of the -widespread industry practice of \emph{Security by Obscurity}, which aims to achieve security by making it sufficiently -annoying to cryptoanalyze a system that nobody bothers. Complementary to Kerckhoff's principle is the principle of least -authority, which describes that in a secure system each component should only have access to the smallest set of -capabilities necessary to fulfill its purpose. Applying both to a cryptographic system means that the system's design -should be transparent and not include any hidden components or opaque parts that cannot be inspected, and that the -system's keys should be scoped to place the least amount of trust possible in each participating party. - -Let's take a basic videoconferencing system as an example. In our example system's deployment, users log on to a central -conference server, which receives and distributes the users' video streams. Allowing backdoor access to the video -streams to some third party like a datacenter operator or a state would violate Kerckhoffs' principle since it would -have to be hidden from the systems' participants, who would therefore not have a complete view of the systems' deployed -architecture. The principle of least authority would also be violated since in almost all cases, such a backdoor access -system would not see legitimate use. As a result, it would possess capabilities that almost never would be essential to -the proper function of the videoconference system. - -In their design, almost all modern software -- especially open source -- cleanly applies these principles. However, the -practical reality after deployment almost always deviates from them. While backdoors are vanishingly rare in modern -open-source software, practical depoloyments usually are vulnerable to physical attacks. Computer hardware generally is -not designed with a local attacker with advanced physical attack capabilities in mind since no mitigation can fully -prevent them---such attacks usually can only be detected, or at best slowed down. As a result, commonplace attacks -against modern software often involve taking over the hardware at some point in the chain. Even End-to-End-Encrypted -(E2EE) communication systems can be compromised if one of the encrypted channel's endpoints can be physically -compromised. Corresponding \emph{digital forensics} capabilities are commonplace among state actors, and are available -as a turnkey solution on the market. - -\section{Inertial HSMs} - -In this thesis, we propose Inertial HSMs to fill this gap in the protection of systems that are not critical enough to -warrant the expensive existing solutions such as conventional HSMs, while still handling highly sensitive data. In a -system with a secure software stack, the role of a HSM is to secure the hardware part of the stack. The basic approach -of a HSM is to combine a secure software stack with a fast self-destruct mechanism and tamper sensors. The self-destruct -mechanism can be hardware or software that quickly and securely destroys all cryptographic secrets, thereby rendering -the device worthless to an attacker. The tamper sensors are tasked with detecting any physical attack an attacker could -mount on the device. Common classes of such sensors include environmental sensors such as temperature or radiation -sensors that detect attempts at causing controllable faults in the HSM by heating, cooling or irradiating it. Building -on the basic protection offered by such sensors, \emph{tamper-sensing meshes} are often employed. These \emph{meshes} -are flexible foils containing circuit traces that are attached to the HSM's enclosure to detect attempts at penetrating -the shell of the device with probes. Tamper-sensing meshes usually are the primary line of defense against most physical -attacks. They are very effective at mitigating a large variety of physical attacks, but they are difficult to construct -securely as they usually require bespoke manufacturing processes. As a result, they are currently only used in niche -applications, and even there not every realization is equally secure. - -Inertial HSMs are a new design approach that utilizes mechanical motion to create secure tamper-sensing meshes from -simple components. IHSMs solve the issue of creating an impenetrable tamper-sensing envelope by replacing the bespoke -tamper-sensing mesh foil with a set of simple, rigid meshes made from commodity Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) that are -rotating at high speed. In motion, these simple PCB tamper-sensing meshes are as secure as the much more sophisticated -bespoke foils used in conventional HSMs, yet they are simpler and less expensive to manufacture. To verify that the mesh -is rotating correctly, an accelerometer is placed on the rotating mesh, and its centrifugal force reading is used to -validate itk path of motion. - -IHSMs enable the protection of much larger payloads compared to conventional mesh designs, and they can support larger -power dissipation. This and their low cost enables the implementation of high-level hardware security in applications -that previously would not have been possible to secure. - -Inertial HSMs are the first fully open source HSM with advanced tamper sensing features. Across application domains, -Inertial HSMs can be applied to gain resistance to physical attacks in scenarios where conventional HSMs were not used -because of cost, computing power or implementation effort. Where conventional HSMs come as fully integrated devices that -only expose limited APIs to their users, Inertial HSMs at their core are just an enclosure that the user can put -whatever hardware they need into. Since the simpler tamper-sensing mesh construction of IHSMs scales to larger payload -volumes, entire servers can be protected---something that is impossible with conventional HSMs. Since the mesh in an -IHSM is constantly moving, unlike a mesh in a convetional HSM, it does not have to entirely cover the payload. Instead, -it can have gaps that allow for air flow between outside and inside, enabling active cooling of the IHSM's payload. This -cooling capability sharply increases computing power by increasing feasible payload power dissipation by -two orders of magnitude. - -\section{Conclusion} - Looking at the practice of applied hardware security, we observe that despite ample availability of commercial solutions promising easy hardware security, clearly there is still a lack of solutions that provide the adaptability necessary for some real use cases at low enough cost. By publishing the tamper-sensing technology we developed during the making of -this thesis as open source hardware designs, we wish to provide this missing building block to provide high-level -hardware security in real-world applications. Our hardware designs can be adapted to a devices ranging from Single-Board +this thesis as open source hardware designs, we aim to provide this missing building block to provide high-level +hardware security in real-world applications. Our hardware designs can be adapted to devices ranging from Single-Board Computers (SBCs) to servers, they are compatible with non-computing applications like Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and their design approaches can even be integrated into existing HSM designs to provide better security at little additional cost. diff --git a/chapter-nice-coils/chapter.tex b/chapter-nice-coils/chapter.tex index a157cdc..a2d61d1 100644 --- a/chapter-nice-coils/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-nice-coils/chapter.tex @@ -1,11 +1,17 @@ -\chapter{Rotation-Invariant Envelope Power Supply} +\chapterquote{Clifford Ashley~\cite{ashleyAshleyBookKnots1993}}{ + A knot is never ``nearly right''; it is either exactly right or it is hopelessly wrong, one or the other; there is + nothing in between. This is not the impossibly high standard of the idealist, it is a mere fact for the realist to + face.} +\chaptertitle{Rotation-Invariant Envelope Power Supply} +\label{chapter-nice-coils} % Twisted Inductor paper A central engineering challenge in inertial HSMs is transferring power and data between the payload and the rotating -mesh cage. Industrially, power and data transfer through rotating joints is usually done using slip ring assemblies. A -slip ring consists of one or more contacts that wipe on a rotating circular surface. Industrially, metal spring contacts -plated with hard gold or other common surface coatings are used for transferring small currents and data signals, and -carbon brushes are used for higher currents. Slip rings are widely used in motors and other rotating machinery. +mesh cage (cf.\ Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}). Industrially, power and data transfer through rotating joints is usually +done using slip ring assemblies. A slip ring consists of one or more contacts that wipe on a rotating circular surface. +Industrially, metal spring contacts plated with hard gold or other common surface coatings are used for transferring +small currents and data signals, and carbon brushes are used for higher currents. Slip rings are widely used in motors +and other rotating machinery. For use in IHSMs, slip rings have several limitations. First, they are complex precision-machined components and thus are rather expensive. Beyond cost, they also have performance limitations. Generally, slip rings are most well-suited to @@ -16,8 +22,9 @@ any misalignment or contamination by dust can increase wear and cause intermitta An IHSM's data link can easily be realized using optical communication. Although power transfer using light is also possible---and we have in fact demonstrated it in our first prototype IHSM---it comes at the disadvantage of a heavy rotating assembly since large solar cells are needed, and it has poor end-to-end efficiency. For the large-scale meshes -needed in a high-performance IHSM tailored to SMPC applications, we engineered a better solution: A rotation-invariant -inductive Wireless Power Transfer link. +needed in a high-performance IHSM such as one tailored to SMPC applications as we will propose later in +Chapter~\ref{chapter-smpc}, we engineered a better solution: A rotation-invariant inductive Wireless Power Transfer +link. While Wireless Power Transfer (WPT) is widely used and can be implemented in many different ways~\cite{ awuahNovelCoilDesign2023, @@ -58,13 +65,14 @@ circuits. \subcaptionbox{\raggedright Our proposed inductor layout}{ \includegraphics[width=0.28\textwidth]{svg_vis_paper.png}} \end{center} - \caption{Illustration of our proposed inductor layout compared to contemporary conventional planar inductors and - honeycomb as well as basket-woven coils from the early days of wireless radio.} + \caption[Planar inductor layout comparison]{Illustration of our proposed inductor layout compared to contemporary + conventional planar inductors and honeycomb as well as basket-woven coils from the early days of wireless + radio.} \label{fig_illust_honeycomb_basket} \end{figure} \todo{Not final graphics. Get proper scans for camera-ready version} -In the WPT link powering the rotating mesh of an IHSM presentsan unusual set of constraints, which does not seem to be +In the WPT link powering the rotating mesh of an IHSM presents an unusual set of constraints, which does not seem to be addressed adequately in the existing literature on inductive WPT yet. To reduce the need for custom-wound inductors, we settled on using a planar inductor implemented in a Printed Circuit Board (PCB). Such planar PCB inductors are limited by the structure size limits of the PCB process, resulting in rotational asymmetry due to the trace width. Planar @@ -113,15 +121,16 @@ rotation ripple at low turn counts. \subsection{Twisted inductors} -To solve these issues, we propose a layout for circular PCB inductors that uses a number of series-connected interleaved -spirals to achieve a topological equivalent to a torus knot from mathematical knot theory. Our layout twists the -inductor's windings around one another by connecting the interleaved spiral segments with a ring of vias each on the -inside and outside of the inductor's windings. Our approach provides better performance beyond our particular use case, -and improves over conventional contemporary planar inductors applying similar principles to those which inspired the -polygonal basket-woven air coils used in early radio sets. We show that we can layout a twisted inductor for any number -of layer inversions that is co-prime to the inductor's turn count. Our approach opens up a design space for inductor -layouts that interpolate between planar spiral inductors on one end, and planar toroidal inductors on the other end. Our -approach thus generalizes a super-set to a number of previous approaches to the design of planar inductors. +To solve these issues, in this chapter we propose a layout for circular PCB inductors that uses a number of +series-connected interleaved spirals to achieve a topological equivalent to a torus knot from mathematical knot theory. +Our layout twists the inductor's windings around one another by connecting the interleaved spiral segments with a ring +of vias each on the inside and outside of the inductor's windings. Our approach provides better performance beyond our +particular use case, and improves over conventional contemporary planar inductors applying similar principles to those +which inspired the polygonal basket-woven air coils used in early radio sets. We show that we can layout a twisted +inductor for any number of layer inversions that is co-prime to the inductor's turn count. Our approach opens up a +design space for inductor layouts that interpolate between planar spiral inductors on one end, and planar toroidal +inductors on the other end. Our approach thus generalizes a super-set to a number of previous approaches to the design +of planar inductors. We observe that in high-frequency applications, a moderate number of layer inversions increases the spacing between the beginning and end of the inductor's conductor, where the majority of the inductor's AC current flows. This decreases the @@ -147,6 +156,10 @@ Our contributions on this matter include: \section{Related Work} +In this section we will give an overview on related work from two primary angles. First, we will approach our question +from the application side, examining literature on Wireless Power Transfer. To conclude, we will then consider our +inductor design question from the fundamentals of inductor design. + \subsection{Inductive WPT in Practice} Inductive WPT has been proposed in a large number of @@ -372,9 +385,9 @@ scheme~\cite{lopeFirstSelfresonantFrequency2021,sproHighVoltageInsulationDesign2 \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{nk_combined.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{Inductor layouts for several sets of turn count $n$ and inversion count $k$. The top row shows the actual - trace layout in cartesian coordinates, the bottom row visualizes the winding schema. - } + \caption[Basic twisted planar inductor layouts]{Inductor layouts for several sets of turn count $n$ and inversion + count $k$. The top row shows the actual trace layout in cartesian coordinates, the bottom row visualizes the + winding schema.} \label{fig_nk_combined} \end{figure} @@ -382,8 +395,9 @@ scheme~\cite{lopeFirstSelfresonantFrequency2021,sproHighVoltageInsulationDesign2 \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{nk_complex_illust.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{Layout examples for a number of combinations of turn count $n$ and inversion count $k$. Note that in this - illustration we chose values for $n$ and $k$ such that all pairs are coprime.} + \caption[Complex twisted planar inductor layout variants]{Layout examples for a number of combinations of turn count + $n$ and inversion count $k$. Note that in this illustration we chose values for $n$ and $k$ such that all pairs + are coprime.} \label{fig_nk_complex_illust} \end{figure} @@ -664,10 +678,11 @@ additional cost and without compromising other performance parameters. $25$& $37$& $18.15$& $6.0$& $2.0197$& $15.9$& $17.100$& $0.2$& $2.000$& $15.1$& $\textbf{17.066}$& $10.31$& $1.698$\\ \end{tabular} - \caption{Inductor sample design parameters and measured characteristics. All inductors have outer diameter - \qty{35}{\milli\meter} and inner diameter \qty{15}{\milli\meter}. The missing values in the simulation results - columns result from the solver failing to converge. Bolded values highlight the best performing coil of each - turn count. Shaded rows indicate conventional two-layer planar inductors ($k=1$).} + \caption[Inductor sample design parameters and measured characteristics.]{Inductor sample design parameters and + measured characteristics. All inductors have outer diameter \qty{35}{\milli\meter} and inner diameter + \qty{15}{\milli\meter}. The missing values in the simulation results columns result from the solver failing to + converge. Bolded values highlight the best performing coil of each turn count. Shaded rows indicate conventional + two-layer planar inductors ($k=1$).} \label{tab_coupons} \end{sidewaystable} @@ -734,9 +749,9 @@ indicating a contribution from flux linkage. $75$&$90$&$53$ &$320$& $461$& $76.2$& $8.75$& $0.72$\\ $75$&$90$&$53$ &$480$& $\mathbf{470}$& $92.9$& $8.00$& $0.84$\\ \end{tabular} - \caption{Parameters and measurement results of a set of larger sample inductors. Bold values indicate best - performance at a given size. Shaded rows indicate conventional planar toroidal ($n=1$) or two-layer planar - spiral inductors ($k=1$).} + \caption[Parameters and measurement results of larger sample inductors.]{Parameters and measurement results of a set + of larger sample inductors. Bold values indicate best performance at a given size. Shaded rows indicate + conventional planar toroidal ($n=1$) or two-layer planar spiral inductors ($k=1$).} \label{tab_wide_coils} \end{table} @@ -754,9 +769,9 @@ angles to one another. \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=.65\textwidth]{test_schematic.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{The test schematic used in all measurements. For direct coupling factor measurements, the load resistor was - disconnected. We measure voltage at the output of the function generator to account for drop in its internal output - resistance.} + \caption[Planar inductor test schematic]{The test schematic used in all measurements. For direct coupling factor + measurements, the load resistor was disconnected. We measure voltage at the output of the function generator to + account for drop in its internal output resistance.} \label{fig_test_schematic} \end{figure} @@ -769,10 +784,10 @@ using Keysight 34465A multimeters in AC Root Mean Square (RMS) mode. \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{symmetry_3turn_n_twist.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{RMS output voltage of the test circuit from Figure\ \ref{fig_test_schematic} for three pairs of matching - inductors with one inductor rotating w.r.t.\ the other. The inductors have $n=3$ turns each and $k=\frac{1}{2}$, - $k=1$, and $k=3$, respectively. For each $k$, voltage curves are plotted for a number of different radial offsets - between the two inductor's centers.} + \caption[Planar inductor voltage ripple versus rotation angle]{RMS output voltage of the test circuit from Figure\ + \ref{fig_test_schematic} for three pairs of matching inductors with one inductor rotating w.r.t.\ the other. The + inductors have $n=3$ turns each and $k=\frac{1}{2}$, $k=1$, and $k=3$, respectively. For each $k$, voltage + curves are plotted for a number of different radial offsets between the two inductor's centers.} \label{fig_symmetry_3turn_n_twist} \end{figure} @@ -804,12 +819,12 @@ pitch, as their turns deviate the furthest from a set of ideal, concentric circl \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=.65\textwidth]{k_ripple_plot.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{RMS Voltage ripple in a model rotating WPT setup with $R_L=\qty{10}{\ohm}$ as a percentage of total RMS - output voltage, plotted against inductor inversion count $k$. Measurements were taken with a number of different - coils with turn count $n$ between a single turn and $25$ turns. Measurements were taken at two different radial coil - offsets of $r=\qty{1}{\milli\meter}$ and $\qty{4}{\milli\meter}$. Coil distance was $d=\qty{1}{\milli\meter}$ in all - cases. The shaded area indicates conventional coil layouts, with the remainder of the plot showing twisted - inductors.} + \caption[Planar inductor voltage ripple versus design parameter]{RMS Voltage ripple in a model rotating WPT setup + with $R_L=\qty{10}{\ohm}$ as a percentage of total RMS output voltage, plotted against inductor inversion count + $k$. Measurements were taken with a number of different coils with turn count $n$ between a single turn and $25$ + turns. Measurements were taken at two different radial coil offsets of $r=\qty{1}{\milli\meter}$ and + $\qty{4}{\milli\meter}$. Coil distance was $d=\qty{1}{\milli\meter}$ in all cases. The shaded area indicates + conventional coil layouts, with the remainder of the plot showing twisted inductors.} \label{fig_k_ripple_plot} \end{figure} @@ -832,12 +847,13 @@ pitch, as their turns deviate the furthest from a set of ideal, concentric circl \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=.65\textwidth]{rms_ripple_double_rotation_n3_r4.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{RMS ripple magnitude as a percentage of mean RMS output voltage, plotted against the rotation of each of - the two inductors. The two coils were kept at a constant \qty{4}{\milli\meter} radial offset, and the output coil - was loaded with a \qty{10}{\ohm} load. All RMS ripple plots in this chapter share the same color scale to allow for - visual comparison. This figure shows four variants of 3-turn coils, plots for $n=5$ can be found in Figure\ - \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n5} and plots for $n=\{10,25\}$ in Figures \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n10} and - \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n25}.} + \caption[Planar inductor voltage ripple versus both angles for $n=3, k=\{0,1,4\}$]{RMS ripple magnitude as a + percentage of mean RMS output voltage, plotted against the rotation of each of the two inductors. The two coils + were kept at a constant \qty{4}{\milli\meter} radial offset, and the output coil was loaded with a + \qty{10}{\ohm} load. All RMS ripple plots in this chapter share the same color scale to allow for visual + comparison. This figure shows four variants of 3-turn coils, plots for $n=5$ can be found in Figure\ + \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n5} and plots for $n=\{10,25\}$ in Figures \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n10} and + \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n25}.} \label{fig_rms_ripple_n3} \end{figure} @@ -845,7 +861,8 @@ pitch, as their turns deviate the furthest from a set of ideal, concentric circl \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=.65\textwidth]{rms_ripple_double_rotation_n10_r4.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{RMS ripple magnitude as shown in Figure\ \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n3} for four different 10-turn coils.} + \caption[Planar inductor voltage ripple versus both angles for $n=10, k=\{0,1,3,7\}$]{RMS ripple magnitude as shown + in Figure\ \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n3} for four different 10-turn coils.} \label{fig_rms_ripple_n10} \end{figure} @@ -853,7 +870,8 @@ pitch, as their turns deviate the furthest from a set of ideal, concentric circl \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=.65\textwidth]{rms_ripple_double_rotation_n25_r4.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{RMS ripple magnitude as shown in Figure\ \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n3} for four different 25-turn coils.} + \caption[Planar inductor voltage ripple versus both angles for $n=25, k=\{0,1,3,13\}$]{RMS ripple magnitude as shown + in Figure\ \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n3} for four different 25-turn coils.} \label{fig_rms_ripple_n25} \end{figure} @@ -861,7 +879,8 @@ pitch, as their turns deviate the furthest from a set of ideal, concentric circl \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=.65\textwidth]{rms_ripple_double_rotation_n5_r4.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{RMS ripple magnitude as shown in Figure\ \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n3} for four different 5-turn coils.} + \caption[Planar inductor voltage ripple versus both angles for $n=5, k=\{0,1,3,7\}$]{RMS ripple magnitude as shown + in Figure\ \ref{fig_rms_ripple_n3} for four different 5-turn coils.} \label{fig_rms_ripple_n5} \end{figure} @@ -895,8 +914,16 @@ increased inductance compared to conventional two-layer planar spiral inductors. We base our evaluation on laboratory measurements on a set of 39 sample inductors in total, including an automated, four-dimensional mapping of the coupling between a pair of identical inductors. We provide both an analytical -description of twisted inductor construction as well as a set of Open-Source tools for their design. +description of twisted inductor construction as well as a set of Open-Source tools for their design in the supplementary +material to this thesis. +Applied to an IHSM design, a wireless power transfer system using twised inductors to power the rotating mesh improves +efficiency by reducing losses due to stray capacitance and reduces secondary-side ripple. The reduced secondary-side +ripple allows the use of smaller filtering components, reducing board mass and mitigating heavy components as a possible +fault location. Additionally, the reduced ripple allows the use of secondary-side voltage regulators with less voltage +headroom, further reducing power transfer losses. By directly embedding twisted inductors into the IHSM's secondary side +mesh monitoring PCB, construction is simplified. The resulting assembly is lighter and smaller, which reduces motor load +and enables the implementation of compact IHSM meshes. %\begin{figure} % \begin{center} diff --git a/chapter-qkd/chapter.tex b/chapter-qkd/chapter.tex index 6923e28..1bb3542 100644 --- a/chapter-qkd/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-qkd/chapter.tex @@ -1,4 +1,9 @@ +\chapterquote{Russell Impagliazzo~\cite{impagliazzoPersonalViewAveragecase1995}}{ + One should always assume that people willing to break a system are also willing to use significantly more resources + doing so than legitimate users are willing to spend routinely. +} \chaptertitle{Case Study: Physical Security in Quantum Key Distribution} +\label{chapter-qkd} Quantum Computing promises efficient solutions to a number of widely used cryptographic computational problems. As a countermeasure, new \emph{post-quantum} cryptosystems have been developed that are not susceptible to known quantum or @@ -35,7 +40,7 @@ requirements of a QKD system. \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{fiber_passthrough_mech_model__8290_small_annotations.pdf} \end{center} - \caption{Photo of our mechanical prototype. + \caption[QKD fiber passthrough prototype mechanical prototype]{Photo of our mechanical prototype. 1 - Bracket connecting payload and shaft with hidden spiral conduit for optical fibers. 2 - Upper tamper sensing mesh PCB. 3 - Outer IHSM tamper sensing mesh cage. @@ -52,7 +57,7 @@ requirements of a QKD system. \end{figure} In this chapter, we present several designs and a mechanical prototype adapting the Inertial Hardware Security Module -(IHSM) concept first proposed by \textcite{gotteCantTouchThis2022} to a QKD relay node. IHSMs replace the tamper sensing +(IHSM) concept that we developed in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm} to a QKD relay node. IHSMs replace the tamper sensing security mesh foil that is wrapped around the payload in conventional HSMs by a tamper-sensing cage made from conventional circuit board material by spinning this cage at a high speed. On its own, circuit board material provides lower tamper security than the tamper sensing foils made using bespoke manufacturing processes that are used in @@ -237,14 +242,15 @@ common fibers is usually in the range of \subsection{Multi-fiber passthrough design} -To approach the security of the data and power connections passing through the IHSM's unprotected shaft, -\textcite{gotteCantTouchThis2022} list some shielding methods that use an independently rotating secondary tamper -sensing mesh on the inside of the primary mesh, located right next to the primary mesh's axis opening. This secondary -mesh makes accessing the payload using probes inserted through the shaft much more difficult. -\textcite{gotteCantTouchThis2022} only present conceptual drawings of these schemes, and focus on electrical signals. In -this chapter, building on these concepts, we present mechanical designs of three variations of a fiber passthrough for -IHSMs that are adapted to the limited bending radius of optical fiber: A simple disc cover, offset labyrinth meshes, and -interlocking gear meshes. We present a mechanical prototype of our offset labyrinth mesh design. +To approach the security of the data and power connections passing through the IHSM's unprotected shaft, in our +introduction of the IHSM concept in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm} we listed some shielding methods that use an +independently rotating secondary tamper sensing mesh on the inside of the primary mesh, located right next to the +primary mesh's axis opening. This secondary mesh makes accessing the payload using probes inserted through the shaft +much more difficult. In our introduction in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}, we only presented conceptual drawings of these +schemes, and focused on electrical signals. In this chapter, building on these concepts, we present mechanical designs +of three variations of a fiber passthrough for IHSMs that are adapted to the limited bending radius of optical fiber: A +simple disc cover, offset labyrinth meshes, and interlocking gear meshes. We present a mechanical prototype of our +offset labyrinth mesh design. \subsection{Simple disc cover} @@ -429,13 +435,13 @@ resulted in a difference below the measurement floor of approximately \qty{0.25} \hspace*{5mm} \includegraphics[width=0.45\textwidth]{fiber_passthrough_mech_model__8292_small.jpg} \end{center} - \caption{An disassembled view of our optical passthrough mechanical prototype. The fiber is passed through from the - shaft going through the IHSM's primary tamper sensing mesh cage to the outside into the interior of the IHSM through - the green bracket. A secondary tamper sensing mesh is located on the inside of the shaft interface and driven - separately. In this prototype, the secondary mesh is driven by a cooling fan. Both independently rotating meshes - have tabs that extend into the bracket such that they do not interfere, but reduce the space available to an - attacker. The HSM's primary mesh cage is partially shown in white. - } + \caption[QKD fiber passthrough mechanical model components]{A disassembled view of our optical passthrough + mechanical prototype. The fiber is passed through from the shaft going through the IHSM's primary tamper sensing + mesh cage to the outside into the interior of the IHSM through the green bracket. A secondary tamper sensing + mesh is located on the inside of the shaft interface and driven separately. In this prototype, the secondary + mesh is driven by a cooling fan. Both independently rotating meshes have tabs that extend into the bracket such + that they do not interfere, but reduce the space available to an attacker. The HSM's primary mesh cage is + partially shown in white.} \label{fig_pic_proto_detail} \end{figure} @@ -456,11 +462,11 @@ the amount of inter-mesh space necessary for power and data feedthroughs as well meshes, on the other hand, this pitch increases by the offset distance. Even for a small offset this quickly adds up to an unwieldy total mesh size. -In this section, we conceptually introduce a solution to this problem that allows for larger offsets using a design -where the two meshes interlock like gears. This does mean that the two meshes' rotation must be synchronized, but it -increases the design space of offset labyrinth meshes. For instance, in a gear setup, the wide sides of the inter-mesh -zones can be aligned to lie on the same side, so fiber passthrough can be realized more easily even without the need to -spiral the fiber around the axes of rotation. +We conceptually introduce a solution to this problem that allows for larger offsets using a design where the two meshes +interlock like gears. This does mean that the two meshes' rotation must be synchronized, but it increases the design +space of offset labyrinth meshes. For instance, in a gear setup, the wide sides of the inter-mesh zones can be aligned +to lie on the same side, so fiber passthrough can be realized more easily even without the need to spiral the fiber +around the axes of rotation. \subsection{Mesh synchronization} @@ -469,78 +475,33 @@ In this setup, the mesh tabs act like gear teeth. Depending on the ratio between meshes do not have to rotate at the same rate of rotation and harmonic ratios are possible. Additionally, unlike actual gears which need to constantly maintain an area of contact, both co-rotating and counter-rotating setups are possible. -\section{Physical attacks and countermeasures} -\label{sec_attacks} -In this section we will consider possible ways to attack an IHSM-secured QKD relay, as well as potential -countermeasures. - -\subsection{Attacks on the IHSM mesh} - -There are two ways an attacker could attack the mesh itself if an adequate speed of rotation such as \qty{1000}{\rpm} is -used~\cite{gotteCantTouchThis2022}: Either, an attacker would have to slow down the mesh so they can perform a manual -attack, or they would have to use a robot. The first class of attack would require the attacker to falsify the readings -of the centrifugal accelerometer. MEMS accelerometers are complex devices, and the simplest way to falsify its readings -would be to attach a circuit to the accelrometer's data bus that overrides the measurement result data. Creating such a -circuit is easy, the challenge the attacker would have to overcome would be to access this bus and attach this circuit -to the mesh in motion without stopping or disturbing it. At high speeds, this would necessarily require a custom attack -robot. - -\subsection{Contactless attacks on the payload} - -Contactless attacks such as electromagnetic (EM) side-channel attacks or optical fault injection attacks on the payload -could conceivably be conducted from the outside of the mesh. The efficacy of EM side-channel as well as fault injection -attacks decays quickly with increased distance between probe and target, and they can be counteracted by simply placing -the QKD relay's components such that they are spaced apart from the mesh. Optical attacks, on the other hand can be -carried out even at a distance using appropriate focusing optics. The easiest way to prevent such attacks would be to -place the payload into an opaque enclosure inside the mesh. - -An additional variant of optical attacks would be using a laser to cut or drill into the payload. Such attacks can be -impeded through several defense-in-depth measures. First, the payload QKD relay should be designed such that destroying -any part of it such as connecting wires or fibers causes it to fail secure. Irrespective of attacks, this is a -reasonable design objective anyway given that components could fail, and a component failure should never put the device -in an insecure state. Further, similar to other optical attacks, a shield can be used to prevent laser cutting or -drilling attacks as well with the only difference being the kind of shield. To prevent laser cutting or drilling, a -thick metal shield can be used. The large thermal mass, high thermal conductivity and reflective surface of such a -shield makes it difficult to cut. There are lasers such as pulsed Nd:YAG lasers that can cut even thick steel, but these -this cutting produces a large amount of metal plasma and debris, which would likely destroy the payload in the process. - -To make sure any active laser attack is quickly detected, as a final line of defense, both mesh and payload should -include wideband optical sensors in their array of environmental tamper sensors. For instace, high-power pulsed lasers -do not deposit much heat into their target because the surface of the target is vaporized by the laser pulse too -quickly, and thus might not trigger a simple temperature alarm inside the payload. In contrast, optical sensors even -outside of the laser's wavelength range would have no trouble detecting the light emitted from the metal plasma created -by the laser's pulses on impact with the payload. - -\subsection{Fast, mechanical attacks on the payload} - -A final class of attacks are mechanical attacks where an attacker mechanically compromises the IHSM QKD relay so quickly -that the tamper alarm mechanism has no time to act. An instance of such an attack would be using a gun to fire a bullet -at the payload, aiming to selectively destroy parts of it that are involved in tamper alarm response before they can -act. This class of attack can be counteracted in similar ways as the previously mentioned optical attacks. Destruction -of parts of the payload should never let it fall into an insecure state, meaning that such an attack alone should never -be enough to compromise the QKD relay. There is little one can do to prevent destruction of the payload by projectile or -by explosive, but a thick metal shield around the payload would make it more difficult to selectively target part of it -using a projectile. - \section{Outlook} \label{sec_outlook} \subsection{Achievable security guarantees} -Like conventional HSMs, Inertial HSMs are only ever an engeineering answer to a security question. In contrast with -cryptographic solutions that can achieve provable, information-theoretic security in some cases, an IHSM's security +Like conventional HSMs, Inertial HSMs are only ever an engineering answer to a security question. In contrast with +cryptographic solutions that in some cases can achieve provable, information-theoretic security, an IHSM's security rests upon an assumption on the engineering capabilities of an attacker. In contrast to conventional HSMs, which achieve this engineering assumption through the manufacture of hard-to-manipulate tamper sensing meshes, Inertial HSMs achieve it by rotating their tamper sensing mesh. In a conventional HSM, increasing the security of the tamper sensing mesh requires fine-tuning a bespoke manufacturing process. In contrast, increasing the security of an IHSMs simply requires making the rotor faster. +While QKD systems provide theroetically impervious security guarantees based on fundamental laws of physics, they too +are engineered systems embedded into a macroscopic world. As such, while the physics at their core might be sound +similar to how the cryptography at the heart of a HSM might be provable, like HSMs they also cannot side-step requiring +engineering solutions to security questions at the system level. As such, IHSMs complement QKD implementations, and +provide the system-level security barrier necessary for the protection of a QKD node's quantum components. + \subsection{Trust bootstrapping} -A key question in any trusted hardware deployment is how to bootstrap trust in a new device when faced with the -possibility of supply-chain attacks. Conventional HSMs are only manufactured by a single manufacturer, and the common -solution is to just trust that manufacturer. The HSM's manufacturer can factory-provision an identity key to the HSM -that can be used to ascertain the HSM's integrity during shipping to the customer. +When considering the security of a system, we often assume a steady state, where the system is already secure at the +start and then needs to resist some attack. A key question in any practical trusted hardware deployment is how to +bootstrap this initial trust in a new device when faced with the possibility of supply-chain attacks. Conventional HSMs +are only manufactured by a single manufacturer, and the common solution is to just trust that manufacturer. The HSM's +manufacturer can factory-provision an identity key to the HSM that can be used to ascertain the HSM's integrity during +shipping to the customer. One of the key components of IHSM technology is that it does not require specialized components, or potting of the payload. While an IHSM could be manufactured and sold as a complete unit like a conventional HSM, their more modular diff --git a/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex index 05384aa..24c7082 100644 --- a/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/chapter.tex @@ -1,7 +1,13 @@ +%\chapterquote{Attributed to Tom Milligan~\cite{peaseTroubleshootingAnalogCircuits1993}}{When you are taking data, if you see something funny, Record Amount of Funny.} +\chapterquote{Stewart Brand~\cite{internetarchiveWholeEarthCatalog1969}}{We are as gods and might as well get good at +it.} \chaptertitle{High Fidelity Security Mesh Monitoring using Low-Cost, Embedded Time Domain Reflectometry} +\label{chapter_sampling_mesh_mon} \section{Introduction} +\sourceattrib{This part is adapted from a paper written by Jan Sebastian Götte and Prof.\ Dr.\ Björn Scheuermann that +will be presented by Jan Sebastian Götte at CHES 2026~\cite{gotteHighFidelitySecurity2026}.} Security meshes continue to be the state of the art for tamper sensing in applications where sophisticated physical attacks such as attempts at drilling or sawing through the device's enclosure to place probes must be prevented. Common applications for such meshes include Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) used to store and process cryptographic keys @@ -13,14 +19,18 @@ two or more conductive traces that are laid out in a meandering pattern to cover electrically monitors these traces to detect attempts at penetrating this surface. As is often the case with security technologies, in practice a tension exists between the level of security offered by a -particular security mesh implementation and its implementation cost. Commercial designs often only coarsely monitor the -conductivity of the mesh traces and are incapable of detecting attacks that manipulate small parts of the mesh. The most +particular security mesh implementation and its implementation cost. In Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}, we have examined a +broad range of real-world security meshes. We found that the majority of implementations use simple construction +approaches and coarse structure sizes, which results in limited security when only monitoring macroscopic parameters of +the mesh such as electrical continuity or resistance. The coarse monitoring approaches based on trace continuity that +are used in many commercial designs are incapable of detecting attacks that manipulate small parts of the mesh. The most secure meshes are made in custom manufacturing processes. Materials such as polymer substrates are specifically chosen such that the mesh is difficult to manipulate without breaking it. A drawback of this approach is that the specialized -manufacturing processes are difficult to replicate and that the resulting cost of the mesh is high. In some -lower-security applications such as card payment terminals, simpler approaches are still commonly used for their ease of -implementation. Often, standard copper/polyimide Flexible Printed Circuits (FPCs) or even standard Printed Circuit -Boards (PCBs) are used because of the wide availability of manufacturing services. +manufacturing processes are difficult to replicate and that the resulting cost of the mesh is high~\cite{isaacs2013}. In +some lower-security applications such as card payment terminals, simpler approaches are still commonly used for their +ease of implementation. Often, standard copper/polyimide Flexible Printed Circuits (FPCs) or even standard Printed +Circuit Boards (PCBs) are used because of the wide availability of +manufacturing services. Inertial HSMs are one approach that enables the use of less expensive, commodity materials in high-security applications. Several other academic approaches exist that target low-cost~\cite{ @@ -38,7 +48,7 @@ applications. Several other academic approaches exist that target low-cost~\cite High-performance mesh monitoring approaches try to characterize the mesh's physical properties with high accuracy, but often come at the cost of specialized, expensive circuitry. Low-cost approaches utilize advanced analog techniques in their circuitry to extract precise measurements using few components. They trade off measurement precision for lower -component cost. Besides simple monitoring, detecting tamper attempts by replacing the mesh with a macro-scale Physically +component cost. Besides simple monitoring, detecting tamper attempts by replacing the mesh with a macro-scale Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) has also been researched~\cite{ immlerBTREPIDBatterylessTamperresistant2018, staatAntiTamperRadioSystemLevel2022, @@ -48,9 +58,10 @@ specialty components. \begin{figure} \centering \includegraphics[width=0.6\textwidth]{pic_board_setup_2_small.jpg} - \caption{Measurement setup. Shown are the test specimen board on the left, and the frontend board with one of the - four pulse amplifiers in the center. The frontend board is powered through a USB-C connection, and data is sent to a - computer through a Single-Wire Debug (SWD) interface. The grid in the background has \qty{10}{\milli\meter} pitch.} + \caption[Sampling mesh monitor prototype and test coupon]{Measurement setup. Shown are the test specimen board on + the left, and the frontend board with one of the four pulse amplifiers in the center. The frontend board is + powered through a USB-C connection, and data is sent to a computer through a Single-Wire Debug (SWD) interface. + The grid in the background has \qty{10}{\milli\meter} pitch.} \label{fig_pic_board} \end{figure} @@ -101,6 +112,7 @@ The contributions of our work are as follows: \end{itemize} \section{Related Work} +\label{sec_sampling_mesh_mon_related_work} Tamper sensing meshes are used in numerous applications from Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to card payment terminals~\cite{andersonCryptographicProcessorsASurvey2006,tehranipoorHardwareSecurityPrimitives2023}. Despite their @@ -139,8 +151,8 @@ blind spots. obermaierMeasurementSystemCapacitive2018, garbTamperSensitiveDesignPUFBased} propose one of the most advanced security mesh designs in the current academic state of the art. They use a specialized -security mesh as a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF), combining tamper sensing with cryptographic key storage. In -their design, the mesh consists of a cross-hatch pattern made from several dozen individually addressable capacitive +security mesh as a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF), combining tamper sensing with cryptographic key storage. In their +design, the mesh consists of a cross-hatch pattern made from several dozen individually addressable capacitive electrodes. They manufacture their meshes in a specialized process that results in unpredictable, random variations in capacitance between electrodes. They propose an analog frontend that measures the precise mutual capacitance of each pair of electrodes~\cite{obermaierMeasurementSystemCapacitive2018} using an approach similar to @@ -392,7 +404,8 @@ attack tools, or specialized tools for large-scale industrial manufacturing such \centering \hspace*{-7mm} \includegraphics[height=80mm]{block_diagram.pdf} - \caption{Block diagram of our prototype sampling TDR security mesh monitoring circuit.} + \caption[Sampling mesh monitor circuit block diagram]{Block diagram of our prototype sampling TDR security mesh + monitoring circuit.} \label{fig_block_diagram} \end{figure} @@ -473,10 +486,10 @@ such as the CML-output comparators made by Analog Devices due to cost. \includegraphics[width=0.9\textwidth]{pic_pi3hdx_small.jpg} \caption{PI3HDX12211} \end{subfigure} - \caption{Implementation of the pulse amplifier variants of the design. Amplifiers were mounted dead bug style on - copper tape and connected with \qty{120}{\micro\meter} wire. Supply rails were connected with copper tape where - possible to reduce impedance. MLCC power supply decoupling capacitors were placed on the copper tape to reduce loop - area.} + \caption[Sampling mesh monitor pulse amplifier implementations]{Implementation of the pulse amplifier variants of + the design. Amplifiers were mounted dead bug style on copper tape and connected with \qty{120}{\micro\meter} + wire. Supply rails were connected with copper tape where possible to reduce impedance. MLCC power supply + decoupling capacitors were placed on the copper tape to reduce loop area.} \label{fig_pic_amps} \end{figure} @@ -532,8 +545,8 @@ of Xilinx 7 Series FPGAs provides the same $\frac{1}{32}$ clock cycle resolution N/A&25&0.01&Various resistors\\\hline \multicolumn{2}{r}{}&\textbf{9.67}&\textbf{Total} \end{tabular} - \caption{Cost breakdown of our prototype design. Prices are listed at order quantity 1000 to make prices more - comparable between distributors.} + \caption[Prototype design cost breakdown]{Cost breakdown of our prototype design. Prices are listed at order + quantity 1000 to make prices more comparable between distributors.} \label{tab_bom} \end{table} @@ -641,10 +654,10 @@ turn-on knee of the sampling diodes. \end{subfigure} \end{center} \vspace*{-5mm} - \caption{Spectrum measurements and reconstructed time domain edge shape of the stimulus pulse - measured at the mesh interface for each of the four driver ICs, captured using a spectrum analyzer. Vertical - scale shows arbitrary units. Spectrum plots include a $\frac{1}{f}$ reference curve indicating an ideal - infinite-bandwidth square wave.} + \caption[Sampling mesh monitor stimulus pulse spectrum measurements]{Spectrum measurements and reconstructed time + domain edge shape of the stimulus pulse measured at the mesh interface for each of the four driver ICs, captured + using a spectrum analyzer. Vertical scale shows arbitrary units. Spectrum plots include a $\frac{1}{f}$ + reference curve indicating an ideal infinite-bandwidth square wave.} \label{fig_spec_risetime} \end{figure} @@ -671,8 +684,9 @@ slower than the raw pulse rise time value alone would suggest. \begin{center} \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig_edge_risetime.pdf}\vspace*{-7mm} \end{center} - \caption{One edge of the stimulus pulse with no mesh connected measured by the board itself, using different - amplifier ICs. For each IC, ten traces are shown. The vertical scale is in Volts at the sampling amplifier output.} + \caption[Sampling mesh monitor pulse self-characterization]{One edge of the stimulus pulse with no mesh connected + measured by the board itself, using different amplifier ICs. For each IC, ten traces are shown. The vertical + scale is in Volts at the sampling amplifier output.} \label{fig_edge_risetime} \end{figure} @@ -710,10 +724,11 @@ slower than the raw pulse rise time value alone would suggest. \qty{2.25}{\volt\per\nano\second} \end{tabular} \end{center} - \caption{Single-ended stimulus edge rise times for different amplifier ICs. The single-ended rise times of both - positive and negative half of the differential pair have been averaged. External measurements are from Figure\ - \ref{fig_spec_risetime}, measuring the stimulus pulse at the mesh interface. $V_{pp}$ measurements are taken at the - mesh interface. Effective slew rates are calculated from the external measurements and pulse $V{pp}$.} + \caption[Single-ended stimulus edge rise times for different amplifier ICs]{Single-ended stimulus edge rise times + for different amplifier ICs. The single-ended rise times of both positive and negative half of the differential + pair have been averaged. External measurements are from Figure\ \ref{fig_spec_risetime}, measuring the stimulus + pulse at the mesh interface. $V_{pp}$ measurements are taken at the mesh interface. Effective slew rates are + calculated from the external measurements and pulse $V{pp}$.} \label{tab_edge_risetime} \end{table} @@ -741,7 +756,47 @@ its switching happens in the short period between its input differential voltage combined forward voltage of the Schottky diodes. Thus, while the \partno{74LVC} might produce slow edges overall, its large output swing results in a high slew rate in the critical region around the zero crossing. -We observed the best result overall with the \partno{PI3HDX12211} redriver, resulting in a rise time of +\begin{figure} + \begin{center} + \begin{subfigure}{0.45\textwidth} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{edge_sampling_pulse_scope.pdf} + \vspace*{-5mm} + \caption{Sampling pulse} + \label{fig_osc_risetime_samp} + \end{subfigure} + \unskip\begin{subfigure}{0.45\textwidth} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{edge_stimulus_pulse_scope_normalized.pdf} + \vspace*{-5mm} + \caption{Stimulus pulse} + \label{fig_osc_risetime_stim} + \end{subfigure} + \end{center} + \vspace*{-5mm} + \caption[Pulse risetime oscilloscope measurements]{Oscilloscope measurements of the sampling pulse probed + differentially (left) and of the stimulus pulse probed single-ended and normalized (right). The 74LVC pulse is + plotted on the right Y axis in the left plot due to its large amplitude. In the right plot, it is not shown + since our measurement setup did not allow for a measurement of this amplitude.} + \label{fig_osc_risetime} +\end{figure} + +Figure~\ref{fig_osc_risetime} shows the sampling and stimulus pulse edges measured using a Siglent SDS7404A +\qty{4}{\giga\hertz} oscilloscope. The stimulus pulse was directly measured single-ended, and the sampaling pulse was +measured differentially through a Siglent SAP2500D \qty{2.5}{\giga\hertz} active differential probe. These measurements +support the conclusion from Figure~\ref{fig_spec_risetime} that in raw edge risetime, \partno{MAX3748} and +\partno{TDP0604} perform fastest, with \partno{PI3HDX12211} being slightly slower. They also exhibit the large +differences in amplitude that we expect cause the differences in actual measurement performance as shwon in +Figure~\ref{fig_edge_risetime}. Note that due to the differences in measurement methodology, a direct comparison of the +rise times is not possible between these plots. The spectrum measurements do not convey amplitude information and +discard low-frequency content, but due to the very large bandwidth of the spectrum analyzer used, they will represent +the true risetime the closest. In both the self-characterization and the oscilloscope measurements, the displayed +risetime is contaminated by the measurement system. In case of the self-characterization, the stimmulus rise time is +folded into the measurement result, leading in the displayed risetime being slower by a factor of $\sqrt{2}$. Similarly, +in the oscilloscope measurements, the combined risetime of the oscilloscope frontend and active probe contaminate the +results. + +We observed the best overall performance with the \partno{PI3HDX12211} redriver, resulting in a rise time of \qty{264}{\pico\second}. In this test specimen, we fed the pulse through the amplifier twice since we had two unused channels, and we used \qty{200}{\pico\second} clip lines on the amplifier's output for pulse shaping. We only used clip lines here and for \partno{TDP0604} since the other amplifiers' output did not contain sufficient harmonic content. @@ -793,27 +848,27 @@ lines here and for \partno{TDP0604} since the other amplifiers' output did not c \qty{2.86}{\meter}& \qty{3.86}{\meter}\\ - \textbf{Approximate Delay}& + \textbf{Approx. Delay}& \qty{7.1}{\nano\second}& \qty{13}{\nano\second}& \qty{19}{\nano\second}& \qty{26}{\nano\second}\\ \end{tabular} \end{center} - \caption{Specifications of mesh test specimens used in the experiments in this chapter. Approximate signal delays - were calculated using wave velocity + \caption[Mesh test specimen specifications]{Specifications of mesh test specimens used in the experiments in this + chapter. Approximate signal delays were calculated using wave velocity $v=\frac{c}{\sqrt{\epsilon_r}}\approx\frac{c}{2}$~\cite{wheelerTransmissionLinePropertiesParallel1965} assuming $\epsilon_r\approx 4$~\cite{mumbyDielectricPropertiesFR41989} for the test specimens' \partno{FR-4} substrate.} \label{tab_mesh_spec} \end{table} -To measure the practical performance of our prototype, we created a set of tamper sensing mesh test specimens. Each -specimen contains four separate meshes with the same area. Table~\ref{tab_mesh_spec} shows the design specifications. -Each specimen contains four separate meshes on the outer layers of a four-layer, \qty{1.0}{\milli\meter} thickness PCB, -two equal-size meshes on each side. The inner layers were used as ground. Figure\ \ref{fig_mesh_length} shows the -results of a baseline measurement of each mesh using each design variant. The step response resulting from an edge -entering the mesh and its reflection arriving back at the start after traversing the mesh back and forth is clearly -visible. +To measure the practical performance of our prototype, we created a set of tamper sensing mesh test specimens using the +algorithm described in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}. Each specimen contains four separate meshes with the same area. +Table~\ref{tab_mesh_spec} shows the design specifications. Each specimen contains four separate meshes on the outer +layers of a four-layer, \qty{1.0}{\milli\meter} thickness PCB, two equal-size meshes on each side. The inner layers were +used as ground. Figure\ \ref{fig_mesh_length} shows the results of a baseline measurement of each mesh using each design +variant. The step response resulting from an edge entering the mesh and its reflection arriving back at the start after +traversing the mesh back and forth is clearly visible. We validated the results from Figure\ \ref{fig_mesh_length} by calculating speed of light in our mesh specimen's substrate based on them. The resulting measurements are shown in Table\ \ref{tab_speed_of_light}. All amplifier @@ -837,9 +892,10 @@ switching. \includegraphics[width=.8\textwidth]{fig_mesh_length.pdf} \vspace*{-10mm} \end{center} - \caption{TDR responses captured by the microcontroller's internal ADCs with each of four candidate pulse amplifier - ICs and four test meshes. The shown time range covers the primary reflection of the stimulus pulse's falling - edge. For clarity, only one channel of the differential response is shown.} + \caption[Sampling mesh monitor time-domain responses versus mesh length and amplifier]{TDR responses captured by the + microcontroller's internal ADCs with each of four candidate pulse amplifier ICs and four test meshes. The shown + time range covers the primary reflection of the stimulus pulse's falling edge. For clarity, only one channel of + the differential response is shown.} \label{fig_mesh_length} \end{figure} @@ -852,7 +908,7 @@ switching. 2& 3& 4& - Calculated speed of light $c$ + Calculated $c$ \\\hline \partno{PI3HDX12211}& @@ -884,8 +940,8 @@ switching. $\qty{1.59d8}{\meter\per\second}$\\ \end{tabular} \end{center} - \caption{Speed of light and time offset calculated from delays read from the graphs in Figure\ - \ref{fig_mesh_length}. $c$ is the speed of light determined by linear fit.} + \caption[Speed of light calculations]{Speed of light $c$ and time offset calculated from delays read from the graphs + in Figure\ \ref{fig_mesh_length}. $c$ is the speed of light determined by linear fit.} \label{tab_speed_of_light} \end{table} @@ -985,8 +1041,9 @@ indicates good performance of our design, and increases the detection efficiency \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig_covar_short_across_traces_p0.4.pdf} \caption{Both traces shorted, p=\qty{0.4}{\milli\meter}. FNR 0.0\% at 0.1\% FPR, CER=0\%.} \end{subfigure} - \caption{Similarity matrix of 10 intact and 10 modified meshes with two pitch sizes under two - different attack scenarios: An interrupted trace, and both mesh traces shorted.} + \caption[Similarity matrices of modified meshes under different attack scenarios]{Similarity matrix of 10 intact and + 10 modified meshes with two pitch sizes under two different attack scenarios: An interrupted trace, and both + mesh traces shorted.} \label{fig_covar_basic_attacks} \end{figure} @@ -999,8 +1056,8 @@ location of the reflected pulse edge, resulting in 0\% Crossover Error Rate. \begin{figure} \centering \includegraphics[width=0.33\textwidth,trim=0 5mm 0 5mm]{fig_covar_short_within_0.3.pdf} - \caption{Similarity matrix of several mesh specimens that have one trace shorted to an - adjacent location on the same trace. Classification FNR 23\% at 0.1\% FPR, CER=22\%.} + \caption[Similarity matrix of shorted meshes]{Similarity matrix of several mesh specimens that have one trace + shorted to an adjacent location on the same trace. Classification FNR 23\% at 0.1\% FPR, CER=22\%.} \label{fig_short_within} \end{figure} @@ -1109,9 +1166,10 @@ distribution shifts. \vspace*{2mm} \label{fig_drill_mod_shape_pic} \end{subfigure} - \caption{The mesh response under a manipulation attack patching across a drill location for a - \qty{300}{\micro\meter} drill, as captured by the microcontroller's ADCs. The mesh pitch is - \qty{300}{\micro\meter}. B-spline smoothing was applied for readability.} + \caption[Time-domain mesh response differences during manipulation attack]{The mesh response under a manipulation + attack patching across a drill location for a \qty{300}{\micro\meter} drill, as captured by the + microcontroller's ADCs. The mesh pitch is \qty{300}{\micro\meter}. B-spline smoothing was applied for + readability.} \label{fig_drill_mod_shape} \end{figure} @@ -1141,8 +1199,8 @@ only benchmark a momentary snapshot after the patch was completed. \caption{\emph{maximum} classifier variant. FNR 51.1\% at 0.1\% FPR, CER=15\%.} \label{fig_patch_large_scale_minmax} \end{subfigure} - \caption{Classification performance in a larger-scale experiment using 10 measurements each of - 7 samples with traces patched through micro-soldering.} + \caption[Classification performance in a large-scale experiment]{Classification performance in a larger-scale + experiment using 10 measurements each of 7 samples with traces patched through micro-soldering.} \label{fig_patch_large_scale} \end{figure} @@ -1195,8 +1253,8 @@ domain based on a temperature measurement. \begin{figure} \centering \includegraphics[width=1.0\textwidth]{fig_tempco_edited.pdf} - \caption{The effect of heating on a time-domain trace. One of 12 channels shown. Gray: Raw data. Black: Relative - difference between hot and cool cases.} + \caption[The effect of heating on a time-domain trace]{The effect of heating on a time-domain trace. One of 12 + channels shown. Gray: Raw data. Black: Relative difference between hot and cool cases.} \label{fig_tempco_time} \end{figure} @@ -1214,9 +1272,9 @@ classification performance remaining approximately constant at 69.0\% FNR at 0.1 % NOTE: not actually "tridelta" data, I'm just too lazy to rename these and fix up the notebook. \includegraphics[width=0.6\textwidth]{fig_covar_patch_repeat_tridelta_all_the_data_p0.3.pdf} \hspace*{2mm} - \caption{Classifier similarity scores of measurements in different environments, 10 - measurements each. For scale, measurements from Figure~\ref{fig_patch_large_scale} are included on the - bottom/right. FNR 69.0\% at 0.1\% FPR, CER=22\%.}~ + \caption[Classifier similarity scores of measurements in different environments]{Classifier similarity scores of + measurements in different environments, 10 measurements each. For scale, measurements from + Figure~\ref{fig_patch_large_scale} are included on the bottom/right. FNR 69.0\% at 0.1\% FPR, CER=22\%.} \label{fig_env_covar} \end{figure} diff --git a/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/edge_sampling_pulse_scope.pdf b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/edge_sampling_pulse_scope.pdf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..baa45bd Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/edge_sampling_pulse_scope.pdf differ diff --git a/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/edge_stimulus_pulse_scope_normalized.pdf b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/edge_stimulus_pulse_scope_normalized.pdf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d43eec Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/edge_stimulus_pulse_scope_normalized.pdf differ diff --git a/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/sampling-mesh-monitor b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/sampling-mesh-monitor index b4dc582..cd33cff 160000 --- a/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/sampling-mesh-monitor +++ b/chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor/figures/sampling-mesh-monitor @@ -1 +1 @@ -Subproject commit b4dc58286d039b1d0f70ea86f9e1f2cc538d8fbb +Subproject commit cd33cff0e8b3284f26a4b87c9c9d40ae226dceed diff --git a/chapter-smpc/chapter.tex b/chapter-smpc/chapter.tex index 2124528..a5153be 100644 --- a/chapter-smpc/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-smpc/chapter.tex @@ -1,18 +1,43 @@ +\chapterquote{Moxie Marlinspike~\cite{marlinspikeWeShouldAll2013}, see also + \textcite{rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic2015}}{ + We can only desire based on what we know. It is our present experience of what we are and are not able to do that + largely determines our sense for what is possible. This is why same sex relationships, in violation of sodomy laws, + were a necessary precondition for the legalization of same sex marriage. This is also why those maintaining + positions of power will always encourage the freedom to talk about ideas, but never to act.} \chaptertitle{Case Study: Multiparty Computation in Scalable Hardware Security Modules} +\label{chapter-smpc} -\section{Fast MPC and Slow HSMs} +Inertial Hardware Security Modules do not only support much larger payloads compared to conventional HSMs, they also +support much higher power dissipation since they allow for direct air cooling of their payload. The tamper-sensing +membrane of a conventional HSM must be continuous to provide security, so any heat dissipated by the payload must pass +through it. Since the polymers used in tamper sensing membranes are poor conductors of heat, and since security benefits +from a thicker tamper sensing assembly (cf.\ Chapter~\ref{chapter-survey}), power dissipation in conventional HSMs is +limited~\cite{ + petriePartIITechnical, + curetHardwareSecurityModule2025, + zhangTamperrespondentAssembliesPorous2023, + dragoneVentedTamperrespondentAssemblies2020}. -Multiparty Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic construct that allows several networked parties to jointly perform a -computation in such a way that the inputs to the computation remain private to the parties providing them, and no single -party must be trusted for the computation to produce the correct result. Conceptually, MPC is similar to a secret -sharing scheme that shares not just data, but computation between untrusted parties. The computation primitive MPC -offers is a cryptographic answer to the question of how to bootstrap trust in a computing system. +Because IHSMs rotate at high speed, IHSM meshes do not need to be contiguous to provide adequate security. While a +non-contiguous rotating mesh might theoretically allow a stationary attack tool to quickly penetrate, then retract +through one of the mesh's gaps while the mesh is rotating, the time available for such an attack would be too short for +a practical attack (cf.\ Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}). For a mesh with three vertical connecting segments (cf.\ +Figure~\ref{fig_proto_mesh} in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}) rotating at \qty{1000}{\rpm}, this time would be in the order +of \qty{20}{\milli\second}. Conventional HSM monitoring circuits would likely require a similar amount of time to react +to an attack~\cite{obermaier2018}. -%The most challenging scenarios in computing arise when multiple -%parties such as manufacturers and operators, servers and clients, or sellers and buyers need to interact through -%computation. In many practical situations, it is impossible to create a single computer that can be trusted by every -%participant. MPC is a generic solution to a multitude of such scenarios reducing the problem of creating a single, -%shared computer everyone can trust simultaneously to everyone creating their own computer that they only can trust. +Similar to how the increase in payload \emph{size} of IHSMs compared to conventional HSMs unlocks new applications such +as the Quantum Key Distribution relay use case we presented in Chapter~\ref{chapter-qkd}, the increase in sustainable +power dissipation enabled by air cooling also unlocks a number of new applications. Especially applications that require +large amounts of computing power benefit from IHSM technology, as their needs fundamentally cannot be met by +conventional HSMs. + +One such application that does not translate to conventional HSMs due to its need for large amounts of computing power +is Multiparty Computation (MPC). MPC is a cryptographic construct that allows several networked parties to jointly +perform a computation in such a way that the inputs to the computation remain private to the parties providing them, and +no single party must be trusted for the computation to produce the correct result. Conceptually, MPC is similar to a +secret sharing scheme that shares not just data, but computation between untrusted parties. The computation primitive +MPC offers is a cryptographic tool for bootstrapping trust in a distributed computing system. We can deconstruct the problem of trust in computing into two largely disjunct parts: Establishing trust in a computing system during its creation is one, and maintaining this trust throughout its life is the other. For the second part of @@ -26,35 +51,43 @@ they cannot target all systems simultaneously and we give them too little time t A limitation of both approaches is that in either case, while the party creating or acquiring the system can trust it, they cannot prove its trustworthiness to other parties. MPC solves this issue by allowing every party to contribute -their trusted system to the protocol, cryptographically bootstrapping common trust in the computation and its +their own trusted system to the protocol, cryptographically bootstrapping common trust in the computation and its output\footnote{ In fact, MPC does more than just bootstrapping from each participant trusting their own system to a trusted shared computation. In an MPC protocol providing semi-honest or better security, MPC even \emph{relaxes} each party's trust - requirement from trusting their own system to trusting that any $n$-of-$k$ out of all systems contributing to the + requirement from trusting their own system to trusting any $n$-of-$k$ out of all systems contributing to the protocol. }. -MPC is a uniquely powerful cryptographic primitive, yet it has still not found widespread practical adoption. This is -because MPC is extremely resource-intensive to run. MPC protocols exist on a continuum trading off between extreme -memory and bandwidth requirements on one end and intense computational requirements on the other end. At a first glance, -MPC and Hardware Security Modules look like they would complement each other well, but HSMs cannot keep up with the -intense computational requirements posed by MPC. +\section{Fast MPC and Slow HSMs} -Commercially available HSMs are quoted to perform between X and Y\todo{Look up number range} individual cryptographic -operations per second. Meanwhile, an MPC protocol doing something as simple as a single AES encryption, corresponding to -X\todo{look up numbers} logic gates or Y\todo{look up numbers} x86-64 instructions, requires -\emph{millions}\todo{Validate and add citation} of cryptographic operations when performed in MPC. As a result, applying -conventional HSMs to MPC at any practical scale is infeasible by multiple orders of magnitude. +MPC is a uniquely powerful cryptographic primitive, yet it has still not found widespread practical adoption. To a large +extent, this is because MPC is extremely resource-intensive to run. MPC protocols exist on a continuum trading off +between extreme memory and bandwidth requirements on one end and intense computational requirements on the other end. At +a first glance, MPC and Hardware Security Modules look like they would complement each other well, but HSMs cannot keep +up with the computational requirements posed by MPC. + +Using P-256 curve ECC key generation as a benchmark, commercially available HSMs are quoted to perform between 3,500 and +22,000 cryptographic operations per second~\cite{ + kumarIBMZ16Performance2025, + ThalesLunaNetwork2024, + Utrust_GP_HSM_Se_Series_Datasheet_ENpdf, +}. Meanwhile, an MPC protocol doing something as simple as a single AES encryption, corresponding to 7,000 logic +gates~\cite{wangGlobalScaleSecureMultiparty2017}, requires tens of thousands of cryptographic operations when performed +in MPC. As a result, applying conventional HSMs to MPC at any practical scale is infeasible by multiple orders of +magnitude. Literature on MPC commonly uses server hardware as a platform for benchmarks, which has power dissipation and +processing speeds well beyond that of conventional HSMs. HSMs are slow compared to contemporary computers because they are limited in their power dissipation, and power dissipation is largely proportional to processing speed. In the limited fields where HSMs have found commercial -application, this limitation was never considered important and market forces pushing towards faster HSMs remain -light\todo{Can we find a citation here?}. Fundamentally, conventional HSMs must envelope the entire payload in a tamper -sensing mesh to detect drilling attacks, but a tamper sensing mesh that is impermeable to a drill is also impermeable to -air. As a result, any heat conducted from the HSMs processor to the outside world must pass through the mesh. At the -same time, the mesh cannot be thinned either because thinning it would enable micro-drilling attacks. The result of -these constraints is a high thermal resistance between the HSM's processor and an external heat sink, which limits -maximum power dissipation to a fraction of what is achieved in modern CPUs or even GPUs. +application, this limitation was never considered important and market forces pushing towards faster HSMs appear to +remain light with the issue receiving little attention in either academic or manufacturer publications on the topic. +Fundamentally, conventional HSMs must envelope the entire payload in a tamper sensing mesh to detect drilling attacks, +but a tamper sensing mesh that is impermeable to a drill is also impermeable to air. As a result, any heat conducted +from the HSMs processor to the outside world must pass through the mesh. At the same time, the mesh cannot be thinned +either because thinning it would enable micro-drilling attacks. The result of these constraints is a high thermal +resistance between the HSM's processor and an external heat sink, which limits maximum power dissipation to a fraction +of that of modern CPUs or even GPUs. A secondary limitation of conventional HSMs is that the highly specialized tamper sensing foils used in their construction often cannot be scaled to arbitray sizes without incurring unsustainable process yields due to the @@ -66,10 +99,9 @@ components such as memory, power supplies and any internal heat spreading compon Inertial HSMs solve this issue since they allow their payload to be air cooled without compromising security, and they expand the feasible security boundary size from the several hundred milliliters offered by conventional HSMs to several liters and more, enabling the integration of standard, off-the-shelf server components such as mainboards, CPUs, CPU -coolers, and power supplies. In this chapter, we will first provide a short overview of the theory of MPC before -elaborating a design of an IHSM tailored to MPC tasks including performance calculations and unique design aspects. We -will conclude with an outlook of applications unlocked by our design as well as promising areas for future improvements -of our design. +coolers, and power supplies. In this chapter, we will first provide a short overview illustrating a basic MPC protocol +for context before elaborating a design of an IHSM tailored to MPC tasks. We will conclude with an outlook of +applications unlocked by our design as well as promising areas for future improvements of our design. \section{The Fundamentals of Multiparty Computation} @@ -96,7 +128,8 @@ real-world settings where parties do not have stable identities such as peer-to- mostly interesting as a research tool since protocols assuming a semi-honest adversary can often be upgraded to covert or malicious security at some performance tradeoff. In a practical setting, a semi-honest secure MPC protocol would not provide additional security over just having one party run the computation except in some situations where inadvertent -side-channel leakage is a concern. +side-channel leakage is a concern. Using HSMs to secure protocol participants' cryptographic computations complements +both the covert and malicious security models. \subsection{Oblivious Transfer} @@ -115,19 +148,17 @@ Transfer Extensions (OTe)\cite{ishaiExtendingObliviousTransfers2003}. Using OTe, base Oblivious Transfer instances can be extended into an arbitrarily large number of Oblivious Transfer instances using only invocations of a pseudo-random function (PRF) such as a cryptographic hash function. -\subsection{Boolean MPC with Yao's Garbled Circuits} -% Yao's Garbled Circuits -Yao's Garbled Circuits (GC) protocol is one of the oldest Multiparty Computation protocols, dating back to the 1980ies. -In Yao's GC, two parties jointly compute a function that is represented as a circuit of binary logic gates by evaluating -the circuit gate by gate. In Yao's GC, one party, generator, creates a random \emph{garbled} representation of the -circuit and sends it to the other party, the evaluator, who computes its output. The core idea in Yao's GC is that every -wire $w_i$ in the circuit is assigned two random cryptographic secret keys $w_i^b$, called wire labels, one $w_i^0$ for -the logical value $0$ and one $w_i^1$ for the value $1$. The mapping from logic values to these keys is assigned -randomly by the generator, and unknown to the evaluator~\cite{ - yaoHowGenerateExchange1986, - beaverComplexitySecureProtocols1990, - evansPragmaticIntroductionSecure -}. +\subsection{A basic MPC protocol: Boolean MPC with Yao's Garbled Circuits} + +As a basic example of the approach taken by MPC protocols, we will give a brief overview of Yao's Garbled Circuits (GC) +protocol. Yao's GC is one of the oldest Multiparty Computation protocols, dating back to the 1980ies. In Yao's GC, two +parties jointly compute a function that is represented as a circuit of binary logic gates by evaluating the circuit gate +by gate. In Yao's GC, one party, generator, creates a random \emph{garbled} representation of the circuit and sends it +to the other party, the evaluator, who computes its output. The core idea in Yao's GC is that every wire $w_i$ in the +circuit is assigned two random cryptographic secret keys $w_i^b$, called wire labels, one $w_i^0$ for the logical value +$0$ and one $w_i^1$ for the value $1$. The mapping from logic values to these keys is assigned randomly by the +generator, and unknown to the +evaluator~\cite{yaoHowGenerateExchange1986,beaverComplexitySecureProtocols1990,evansPragmaticIntroductionSecure}. Gates are represented in Yao's GC as truth tables with one row for every combination of input wire values. Each row of these truth tables contains the output wire label (i.e. secret key) corresponding to the gate's logical output value for @@ -162,84 +193,56 @@ evaluations of a pseudorandom function such as a cryptographic hash or a cipher. Garbled Circuit is many times slower than performing it in the clear. Intuitively, each single-bit gate in the garbled circuit results in several cryptographic operations with input and output sizes of dozens or hundreds of bits. Practically useful functions such as AES encryption have circuit implementations measuring thousands or tens of -thousands of gates, meaning these costs quickly escalate for practical problem sizes. -\cite{ - boyarNewCombinationalLogic2010, - songhoriTinyGarbleHighlyCompressed2015 -} - -% FIXME This entire connecting section - -%\subsection{Practical Application} -%\subsubsection{Preprocessing and Online Phases} -%\subsubsection{Constant-Round MPC} - -% \subsection{Performance} - -% zahurTwoHalvesMake2015,wangGlobalScaleSecureMultiparty2017,kellerMPSPDZVersatileFramework2020,dalskovFantasticFourHonestMajority - -% \subsection{Practical Deployments} - -% \subsection{Solutions} - -% \subsection{Hardware Security Applied to MPC} - -% Hardware security primitives can be applied in several roles in an MPC protocol. +thousands of gates, meaning these costs quickly escalate for practical problem +sizes~\cite{boyarNewCombinationalLogic2010, songhoriTinyGarbleHighlyCompressed2015}. \section{A High-Performance IHSM for MPC Applications} Multiparty Computation is at the verge of being practical in some applications, but is still too computationally expensive for others. While some attempts at GPU-accelerating MPC primitives exist, in practice it is commonly -implemented using CPU processing. From the performance numbers given above\todo{Give performance numbers above} we can -see that a single, modern server-class CPU is sufficient for an useful amount of computation in MPC. +implemented using CPU processing. The technology comes with an unavoidable increase in computational complexity since +each single plaintext computation or gate results in several cryptographic operations. A naive implementation might attempt to implement MPC using an HSM by simply offloading all cryptographic operations to -the HSM. In practice, this is not a workable solution due to the slow processing speed of conventional HSMs. -Conventional HSMs commonly use smartphone-class SoCs, which lag behind server CPUs in processing speed by several orders -of magnitude. -\todo{Cite some HSM/MPC papers here.} - -In the near term, absent radical developments in either MPC theory or in the speed and power efficiency of processing -hardware, the only feasible solution for HSM-protected MPC at any practical scale is to find a way to protect an entire -server-class computer. As elaborated above, IHSMs are a natural fit for this requirement since they allow for large, -air-cooled payloads. - -%\subsection{Hardware Requirements} +the HSM. In practice, this is not a workable solution due to the slow processing speed of conventional HSMs. In the near +term, absent radical developments in either MPC theory or in the speed and power efficiency of processing hardware, the +only feasible solution for HSM-protected MPC at any practical scale is to find a way to protect an entire server-class +computer. IHSMs are a natural fit for this requirement since they allow for large, air-cooled payloads. As a baseline performance target, we consider a commodity server mainboard in CEB or ATX form factor, populated with a high-end server CPU and a large amount of RAM. As MPC systems do not usually require a great amount of storage, we can -largely ignore storage for our size and power calculations.\todo{Refer to performance numbers from research above here} - -As a result, we end up with a total maximum power dissipation of approximately \todo{Calculate, make table} XXX as shown -in Table~\ref{tab_power_budget}. Dissipating this amount of power using air cooling is within the capabilities of -commodity server cooling components\todo{Refer to datasheets}. +largely ignore storage for our size and power calculations. As a result, we end up with a total maximum power +dissipation of approximately \qty{420}{\watt} as shown in Table~\ref{tab_power_budget}. Dissipating this amount of power +using air cooling is within the capabilities of commodity server cooling +components~\cite{coroamaPossibleFutureTrends2025}. \begin{table} \centering \begin{tabular}{r|l|r|r} - Count & Component & Maximum Power Dissipation Each & Total\\\hline - 1 & CPU: & &\\ - 16 & DDR-4 Memory modules: & &\\ - 1 & Mainboard: & &\\ - 1 & Power Supply: & &\\ + Count & Component & Power Dissipation (approx.) & Total\\\hline + 1 & CPU & \qty{350}{\watt}~\cite{tropgen16YearsSPEC2024}&\qty{350}{\watt}\\ + 16 & Memory~\cite{kennedyDDR4DIMMsSystem2017} &\qty{2}{\watt}&\qty{32}{\watt}\\ + 1 & Losses & \qty{40}{\watt}&\qty{40}{\watt}\\ \end{tabular} - \caption{Power budget of a modern mid-range server. Power supply power dissipation calculated at target load.} + \caption[Power budget of a modern mid-range server.]{Power budget of a modern mid-range server. Losses were + estimated at 10\%, consistent with mainboard losses plus losses from a 80plus platinum efficiency certified + power supply (~94\% at load).} \label{tab_power_budget} \end{table} A common type of side-channel attack on cryptographic systems are power analysis attacks. In such attacks, the supply current of the target processing system is measured at high speed while the target is performing cryptographic computations. By aggregating the results of a large number of the resulting power traces, it is often possible to infer -the value of secret data such as cryptographic keys. To mitigate this type of attack, not only do we have to place the -CPU, mainboard, and memory inside of the HSM's tamper-sensing barrier, but also the power supply. A secondary benefit of -placing the power supply inside the tamper-sensing barrier is that it simplifies the power wiring between the outside of -the IHSM cage and the payload. Supplying the \qty{12}{\volt} power rails that commodity mainboard commonly use requires -tens of Ampere. To carrie such high current, the wiring has to be sized accordingly. In an IHSM, even thick wires can -easily be passed through the mesh cage, but such wiring requires a large opening at the shaft on one end of the cage, -which creates a literal security gap. Placing the power supply inside of the cage reduces the size of the wires needed -since the power supply steps down a lower current \qty{240}{\volt} input to the system's high-current \qty{12}{\volt} -rails. According to DIN VDE 0298-4\todo{Citation?}, a pair of \qty{1.5}{\milli\meter^2} conductors is sufficient for -more than \qty{3}{\kilo\watt} of load under worst-case conditions. +the value of secret data such as cryptographic keys. To mitigate this type of attack, we propose placing the system's +power supply inside the IHSM envelope. A secondary benefit of placing the power supply inside the tamper-sensing barrier +is that it simplifies the power wiring between the outside of the IHSM cage and the payload. Supplying the +\qty{12}{\volt} power rails that commodity mainboard commonly use requires tens of Ampere. To carry such high current, +the wiring has to be sized accordingly. In an IHSM, even thick wires can easily be passed through the mesh cage, but +such wiring requires a large opening at the shaft on one end of the cage, which creates a literal security gap. Placing +the power supply inside of the cage reduces the size of the wires needed since the power supply steps down a lower +current \qty{240}{\volt} input to the system's high-current \qty{12}{\volt} rails. Using DIN VDE 0298-4\todo{Citation?} +as a reference, a pair of \qty{1.5}{\milli\meter^2} conductors is sufficient for more than \qty{3}{\kilo\watt} of load +under worst-case conditions. \subsection{Software Considerations} @@ -261,29 +264,61 @@ software without effectively running a system emulation and incurring a massive Intel and AMD contain hardware features that provide transparent DRAM encryption. These hardware features would be necessary when securing an entire sever in an MPC setup with IHSMS technology. -% \subsection{Fast Zeroization of Non-Customizable Memories} -% Thermite experiements and paper - \subsection{A Joint Cooling and IHSM Envelope Powertrain} -We have determined that our requirements are an IHSM envelope large enough to fit a small server mainboard, and that -provides air cooling to the payload. In this section, we will sketch out a solution that solves the engineering issue of -moving such an IHSM envelope while simultaneously providing cooling to the payload. +In this section, we will present a sketch of a design for an IHSM envelope large enough to fit a small server mainboard, +and that provides air cooling to the payload. Our sketch solves the engineering issue of moving such an IHSM envelope +while simultaneously providing cooling to the payload. + +\begin{figure} + \centering + \begin{subfigure}{0.45\textwidth} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{setup_0001.jpg} + \caption{} + \label{fig_setup_left} + \end{subfigure} + \hspace*{5mm} + \begin{subfigure}{0.45\textwidth} + \centering + \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{setup_0002.jpg} + \caption{} + \label{fig_setup_right} + \end{subfigure} + \caption{Conceptual demonstrator of the fan-driven IHSM primary mesh approach.} + \label{fig_setup} +\end{figure} -% FIXME picture! Our proposed design is based on the idea of using the cooling fans' airflow to power the rotation of the IHSM envelope. -Using the basic cylindrical design, the IHSM envelope consists of two discs above and below the payload that are -connected through vertical struts containing part of the tamper-sensing mesh on the outside of the payload. We propose -widening these vertical connecting struts, and angling them such that the entire envelope becomes a centrifugal -impeller. By letting air flow into the envelope from the side, and back out through its top and bottom, the envelope -assumes the same configuration used in centrifugal cooling fans. A secondary advantage of this concept is that we do not -need a motor on the envelope's shaft, saving vertical space and one difficult to source part. Furthermore, the cooling -fans can be located on the outside of the envelope in an easily accessible location, and can be set up in a redundant -way such that a failed cooling fan can be replaced while the system continues operation. The only disadvantage of this -solution over a direct motor drive is noise. To achieve the speed necessary for sufficient security at the large -envelope diameter of an MPC accelerator application, high-airflow fans must be used, which are very noisy when at full -speed. We consider this a valid tradeoff since such a system would be deployed in a datacenter where high noise levels -are acceptable. +Figure~\ref{fig_setup} shows a conceptual demonstration of this approach. Using a basic cylindrical design, the IHSM +envelope consists of two discs above and below the payload that are connected through vertical struts on the outside of +the payload. We propose widening these vertical connecting struts, and angling them such that the entire envelope +becomes a centrifugal impeller. By letting air flow into the envelope from the side, and back out through its top and +bottom, the envelope assumes the same configuration used in centrifugal cooling fans. Tamper sensing meshes are placed +inside the vertical struts as well as along the horizontal discs at the top and at the bottom. + +Laying out an IHSM this way has several advantages. First, we save some vertical space by removing the motor from the +shaft of the mesh. Second, on top of driving the mesh, the airflow also serves to cool the payload. Finally, this +approach eliminates the motor driving the mesh as a single point of failure. In a basic IHSM design as we introduced it +in Chapter~\ref{chapter-ihsm}, this motor is a critical component as its failure would lead to the mesh accelerometer +triggering the deceleration tamper alarm. Using a brushless motor type the number of wear components in this motor can +be reduced to the motor's shaft bearings. A complication in the practical manufacturing of IHSMs at a small scale is +that small-scale production does not allow for a custom-made motor. Limiting the selection to off-the-shelf brushless +motors leads to an unpredictability of bearing life due to the cost of precision bearings. Complicating things, bearing +specifications are not usually included in motor datasheets. + +Compared to the market for off-the-shelf small brushless motors, cooling fans are easier to shop for. A large selection +of products with various form factors and specifications is available, and manufacturers usually give detailed +information on both performance and lifetime. Industrial and server cooling fans are commonly rated for uninterrupted +24/7 operation. The cooling fans can be located on the outside of the envelope in an easily accessible location. Like in +many servers, they can be set up in a redundant way such that a failed cooling fan can be replaced while the system +continues to operate. + +The main drawback of a fan-driven IHSM is the amount of airflow necessary. To maximize payload volume, the fan blades +must be kept as narrow as possible. Narrow fan blades work best at high air speed, but high air speed requires the fan +to have high airflow. Besides limiting fan selection and increasing power consumption, high airflow fans also are noisy. +Despite these limitations, we consider fan-driven IHSMs a valid tradeoff since such a system would most likely be +deployed in a datacenter where high noise levels are acceptable. \section{Outlook} diff --git a/chapter-smpc/figures/setup_0001.jpg b/chapter-smpc/figures/setup_0001.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5c0a1a Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-smpc/figures/setup_0001.jpg differ diff --git a/chapter-smpc/figures/setup_0002.jpg b/chapter-smpc/figures/setup_0002.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d0c91d Binary files /dev/null and b/chapter-smpc/figures/setup_0002.jpg differ diff --git a/common-defs.tex b/common-defs.tex index 3ef391c..3eb2ce3 100644 --- a/common-defs.tex +++ b/common-defs.tex @@ -7,11 +7,13 @@ \usepackage[ backend=biber, style=numeric, + backref=true, natbib=true, url=false, doi=true, eprint=false, refsegment=chapter, + date=iso, ]{biblatex} \addbibresource{main.bib} \DeclareSourcemap{ @@ -52,12 +54,20 @@ \ifdefined\thesispreviewmode % (draft \texttt{\input{version.tex}\unskip}) % \fi % -\leftmark} -\fancyhead[OL]{\footnotesize\rightmark} + \leftmark} +\fancyhead[OL]{\footnotesize% + \ifdefined\thesisoneside % + \leftmark% + \ifdefined\thesispreviewmode % + \\(draft \texttt{\input{version.tex}\unskip}) % + \fi % + \else% + \rightmark% + \fi} \fancyhead[EL,OR]{\thepage} - \fancyfoot[LCR]{} +\setlength{\headheight}{13.6pt} \fancypagestyle{plain}{% \fancyhf{}% \renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0pt}% @@ -128,11 +138,11 @@ \newcommand{\figureattrib}[1]{% \input{\figurepath/#1.latex_meta} % \scriptsize - \ifdefined\thesispreviewmode\resourcestate\ \resourcescale\\\fi% - Resource: % - \texttt{\resourcerepo/\resourcepath} % - rev \texttt{\resourcerev} % - (\underline{\href{\resourceurl}{link}})% + \ifdefined\thesispreviewmode\resourcestate\ \resourcescale\\\fi% + Resource: % + \texttt{\resourcerepo/\resourcepath} % + rev \texttt{\resourcerev} % + (\underline{\href{\resourceurl}{link}})% } \newcommand{\draftgraphics}{\ifdefined\thesispreviewmode\textcolor{red}{\bfseries Not final graphics. }\fi} @@ -149,21 +159,67 @@ \DeclareRefcontext{patref}{labelprefix=P} \DeclareRefcontext{defref}{} \DeclareFieldFormat{labelprefix}{\textsuperscript{\sffamily#1}} +\defbibfilter{webstuff}{ + ( type=online or type=software or type=video ) + and not keyword={preprint} +} \newcommand{\chapterbibliography}{ \FloatBarrier \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{References} \newrefcontext{webref} - \printbibliography[type={online},title={Web sources},heading=subbibliography,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment] + \printbibliography[filter={webstuff},title={Web sources},heading=subbibliography,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment] \newrefcontext{patref} \printbibliography[type={patent},title={Patent References},heading=subbibliography,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment] \newrefcontext{defref} \printbibliography[nottype={online},nottype={patent},heading=subbibliography,resetnumbers=false,segment=\therefsegment] } +% Fix for random mixed date formats, generated with claude.ai +% Redefine the date printing macro +\renewbibmacro*{date}{% + \iffieldundef{year} + {} + {\printtext{% + \thefield{year}% + \iffieldundef{month} + {} + {-\mkdatezeros{\thefield{month}}% + \iffieldundef{day} + {} + {-\mkdatezeros{\thefield{day}}}}% + }}% +} + +% Redefine urldate printing +\renewbibmacro*{urldate}{% + \iffieldundef{urlyear} + {} + {\printtext[urldate]{% + \thefield{urlyear}% + \iffieldundef{urlmonth} + {} + {-\mkdatezeros{\thefield{urlmonth}}% + \iffieldundef{urlday} + {} + {-\mkdatezeros{\thefield{urlday}}}}% + }}% +} +% end fix + \newrefcontext{defref} \hyphenation{a-me-na-ble} \hyphenation{da-ta-cen-ter} +\hyphenation{Si-cher-heits-mo-du-l} +\hyphenation{Si-cher-heits-mo-du-le} +\babelhyphenation[ngerman]{Si-cher-heits-mo-dul} \setstretch{1.3} + +\DeclareUnicodeCharacter{2B24}{$\bullet$} +\newcommand{\sampleno}[1]{\textsf{#1}} +% Settings for tocloft as applied to minitoc +%\setlength{\cftbeforesecskip}{-1pt} +%\setlength{\cftbeforesubsecskip}{-1pt} + diff --git a/common-packages.tex b/common-packages.tex index 172940e..39f3ba7 100644 --- a/common-packages.tex +++ b/common-packages.tex @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -\usepackage[ngerman, english]{babel} +\usepackage[ngerman,english]{babel} \usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} \usepackage[T1]{fontenc} \usepackage{amssymb} @@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ \usepackage{commath} \usepackage{graphicx,color} \usepackage{ccicons} +\usepackage{rotating} +\usepackage{pdflscape} +\usepackage{afterpage} \usepackage{subcaption} \usepackage{float} \usepackage{footmisc} @@ -33,10 +36,17 @@ \usepackage{pdfpages} \usepackage{etoolbox} \usepackage{catchfile} -\usepackage{colortbl} \usepackage{rotating} \usepackage{placeins} -\usepackage{minted} % pygmentized source code +\usepackage{overpic} +\usepackage{adjustbox} +% FOr table formatting +\usepackage{ragged2e} +\usepackage{array} +\usepackage{longtable} +\usepackage{colortbl} +% pygmentized source code +\usepackage{minted} %\usepackage[pdftex]{graphicx,color} %\usepackage{showframe} % Useful for page layout debugging \usepackage{csquotes} diff --git a/defence/pearson-corr-1.png b/defence/pearson-corr-1.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a15897 Binary files /dev/null and b/defence/pearson-corr-1.png differ diff --git a/defence/pearson-corr-sample-1.png b/defence/pearson-corr-sample-1.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2a6015d Binary files /dev/null and b/defence/pearson-corr-sample-1.png differ diff --git a/defence/pearson-corr-sample.tex b/defence/pearson-corr-sample.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34de09d --- /dev/null +++ b/defence/pearson-corr-sample.tex @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +\documentclass[convert={density=500}, border=2pt, varwidth=3in]{standalone} + +\usepackage{amsmath} +\usepackage{amssymb} + +\begin{document} + +\begin{align*} +r_{X, Y} &= \frac{ +\sum_{i=1}^n(x_i - \overline{x})(y_i - \overline{y}) +}{ +\sqrt{ +\sum_{i=1}^n(x_i-\overline{x})^2 +} +\sqrt{ +\sum_{i=1}^n(y_i-\overline{y})^2 +} +} +\end{align*} + +\end{document} diff --git a/defence/pearson-corr.tex b/defence/pearson-corr.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ad3fc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/defence/pearson-corr.tex @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +\documentclass[convert={density=500}, border=2pt, varwidth=2in]{standalone} + +\usepackage{amsmath} +\usepackage{amssymb} + +\begin{document} + +\begin{align*} +\rho_{X,Y} &= \frac{\mathrm{cov}\left(X, Y\right)}{\sigma_X \sigma_Y} +\end{align*} + +\end{document} diff --git a/defence/phd defence pulse shaping.png b/defence/phd defence pulse shaping.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd7aae8 Binary files /dev/null and b/defence/phd defence pulse shaping.png differ diff --git a/defence/phd defence pulse shaping.svg b/defence/phd defence pulse shaping.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..07b6d9d --- /dev/null +++ b/defence/phd defence pulse shaping.svg @@ -0,0 +1,957 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + BAT17-04W + RF Schottky + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Pulse Amplifier + STM32G474 + + + 74LVC2G157 + PI3HDX12211 + Single-Ended +to Differential Conversion + + + Adjustable Voltage Regulator + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Microcontroller + + + Input + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Clip Line + + + Output + Sampling Gate + + diff --git a/defence/phd defence slide drafts.svg b/defence/phd defence slide drafts.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d3e2d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/defence/phd defence slide drafts.svg @@ -0,0 +1,1508 @@ + + + +Bootstrapping Physical +Security with Inertial +Hardware Security ModulesBootstrapping Physical +Security with Inertial +Hardware Security ModulesInertial Hardware +Security ModulesJan Sebastian Götteresearch@jaseg.deDarmstadt +2026-06-16Bootstrapping Physical +Security with Inertial +Hardware Security ModulesJan Sebastian Götteresearch@jaseg.deDarmstadt +2026-06-16Bootstrapping Physical +Security with Inertial +Hardware Security ModulesJan Sebastian Götteresearch@jaseg.deDarmstadt +2026-06-16Bootstrapping Physical +Security with Inertial +Hardware Security ModulesJan Sebastian Götteresearch@jaseg.deDarmstadt +2026-06-16Bootstrapping Physical +Security with Inertial +Hardware Security ModulesJan Sebastian Götteresearch@jaseg.deDarmstadt +2026-06-16Bootstrapping Physical +Security with Inertial +Hardware Security ModulesJan Sebastian Götteresearch@jaseg.deDarmstadt +2026-06-16Bootstrapping Physical +Security with Inertial +Hardware Security ModulesBootstrapping Physical +Security with Inertial +Hardware Security ModulesJan Sebastian Götteresearch@jaseg.deDarmstadt +2026-06-16Inertial Hardware +Security ModulesInertial Hardware +Security Modules diff --git a/defence/phd defence tdr principle.png b/defence/phd defence tdr principle.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0a0041 Binary files /dev/null and b/defence/phd defence tdr principle.png differ diff --git a/defence/phd defence tdr principle.svg b/defence/phd defence tdr principle.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..40f0e25 --- /dev/null +++ b/defence/phd defence tdr principle.svg @@ -0,0 +1,376 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Z + term + + + + + + + + + + Mesh + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Coupler + + Pulse Generator + Sampler + + + + + + + + + + + + diff --git a/defence/slides draft 1.pdf b/defence/slides draft 1.pdf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c610bf0 Binary files /dev/null and b/defence/slides draft 1.pdf differ diff --git a/defence/slides.odp b/defence/slides.odp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a15f09d Binary files /dev/null and b/defence/slides.odp differ diff --git a/defence/slides.pdf b/defence/slides.pdf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..77a2771 Binary files /dev/null and b/defence/slides.pdf differ diff --git a/defence/tdr routing.png b/defence/tdr routing.png new file mode 100644 index 0000000..355f490 Binary files /dev/null and b/defence/tdr routing.png differ diff --git a/defence/tdr routing.svg b/defence/tdr routing.svg new file mode 100644 index 0000000..983cf55 --- /dev/null +++ b/defence/tdr routing.svg @@ -0,0 +1,1010 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Resistive Splitter + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Signal Routing + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Mesh Interface + SKYA21003 + TMUXHS4212 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Stimulus Input + Output to Sampler + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Termination + + diff --git a/hsm-terminology-notes.tex b/hsm-terminology-notes.tex deleted file mode 100644 index 073d503..0000000 --- a/hsm-terminology-notes.tex +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -\chapter*{A Note on Hardware Security Module Terminology} -\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{A Note on Hardware Security Module Terminology} - -In this thesis, we use the term \emph{Hardware Security Module (HSM)} to refer to a security device that has the -following three properties. - -\begin{enumerate} -\item A HSM targets the prevention of any conceivable physical attack. In particular, this includes intrusion attempts - such as careful drilling or cutting into the device from any direction. -\item A HSM includes tamper sensors that when triggered result in an active tamper response, usually deleting all - cryptographic secrets and rendering the device inoperable. -\item A HSM's tamper sensing and response subsystem is continuously powered from a backup power supply, usually a - battery. Loss of power triggers the tamper response. -\end{enumerate} - -This use of the term \emph{HSM} aligns with common usage of the term both in the academic literature and in everyday -conversation. Particularly the requirement of active tamper detection and response is crucial to distinguish a HSM from -simpler devices such as TPMs, smart cards or secure enclaves in SoCs. Note that our use of the term HSM is slightly -different from its use in government standards, from its use in the PCI (card payment industry asscociation) standards, -and from its industry use. - -In industry, the term HSM is often used for solutions that are only logically segregated and that do not include any -particular defense against hardware attacks. Our conjecture is that this is a consequence of the standardization -landscape, where for applications outside of card payment processing the US FIPS -140-22~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002} standard was central to -the industry. Despite encompassing both devices that include active tamper detection and response, FIPS 140-2 did not -draw a distinction in its terminology between the two classes. - -\section{Use in government standards} - -Under US national standard FIPS 140 in in its 2002 version -2~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002}, a HSM would be called a -\emph{Multiple-Chip Cryptographic Module} that conforms to the standard's \emph{Security Level 4}. Interesting to note -are that only security level 4 requires any active tamper detection and response, so its security levels 3 and below do -not align with our HSM definition. Futher of note is that according to the standard, a single-chip solution does not -require any tamper detection and response either to meet the standard's security level 4, which is in misalignment with -our definition. The standard's 2019 updated version FIPS -140-3~\cite{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019} defers to the -international standards ISO/IEC 19790 and 24759. - -ISO/IEC 19790~\cite{ISOIEC19790} and ISO/IEC 24759~\cite{ISOIEC24759} call what we call a HSM a \emph{Hardware -Cryptographic Module} corresponding with the standards \emph{Security Level 4}. However, these standards only require -active tamper detection and response when cryptographic secrets are transmitted in plaintext between chips. - -\section{Use in card payment processing (PCI SSC) standards} - -The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) is an association of credit card network operators that -defines standards for all layes of card payment processing from card payment terminals in stores through the handling of -payment data in online shop backend systems. - -PCI SSC terminology aligns with our use and with common everyday use of the term HSM. In PCI SSC terminology, a HSM is a -crytographic device that has active tamper detecion and response circuitry. However, PCI SSC terminology only differs -from our use of the term HSM in one nuance: In PCI SSC terminology, a HSM is specifically a datacenter device used for -backend processing of payment data. The general class of ``hardware devices performing some security function with or -without particular physical security requirements'' that ISO/IEC 19790 and other standards call a \emph{Hardware -Cryptographic Module}, in PCI SSC terminology is termed \emph{Secure Cryptographic Device (SCD)} in more recent standard -versions, which was updated from the previous term \emph{Tamper-Resistant Security Module (TRSM)}. Other than HSMs, PCI -SSC includes smartcards and card payment terminals in this category. Card payment terminals, referred to as -\emph{Pin-Entry Device (PED)} in PCI SSC standards, have to include a surprising amount of active tamper detection and -response functionality including partial coverage of areas like they system's main cryptographic processor and smart -card reader by battery-backed tamper-sensing meshes. - -\section*{Tamper-Sensing Meshes} -\addcontentsline{toc}{subsection}{Tamper-Sensing Meshes} - -In this thesis, we use the terms \emph{Tamper-Sensing Mesh} and \emph{Security Mesh} synonymous. We use both terms to -refer to any electrical circuit whose path is laid out to cover a surface with the intent of detecting attempts at -drilling, cutting or otherwise manipulating this surface. While the term \emph{Security Mesh} is more concise, it is -less clear to people unfamiliar with the matter. It is also polysemous, and depending on context can also refer to woven -or stamped metal meshes used as fences or as screens in front of windows to prevent break-ins. As a result, it is harder -to use in online searches, and when using Large Language Models (LLMs), it frequently leads to amusing hallucinations. - - diff --git a/main.bib b/main.bib index 6771d20..01dcd7c 100644 --- a/main.bib +++ b/main.bib @@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ doi = {10.1145/2814825}, url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2814825}, urldate = {2025-05-26}, - abstract = {Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications.}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Abelson et al_Keys under doormats.pdf} + abstract = {Mandating insecurity by requiring government access to all data and communications.} } @article{abelsonRisksKeyRecovery1997, @@ -37,13 +36,13 @@ issn = {1085-2301} } -@report{adc2019, +@online{adc2019, title = {Choose the Right Accelerometer for Predictive Maintenance}, author = {Campagnie, Bertrand}, date = {2019}, - institution = {Analog Devices}, url = {https://www.analog.com/media/en/technical-documentation/tech-articles/Choose-the-Right-Accelerometer-for-Predictive-Maintenance.pdf}, - urldate = {2021-04-01} + urldate = {2021-04-01}, + organization = {Analog Devices} } @online{adhikariDonLookUbiquitous2022, @@ -59,8 +58,7 @@ abstract = {We show that as a side effect of building code requirements, almost all commercial buildings today are vulnerable to a novel data exfiltration attack, even if they are air-gapped and secured against traditional attacks. The new attack uses vibrations from an inconspicuous transmitter to send data across the building’s physical infrastructure to a receiver. Our analysis and experiments with several large realworld buildings show a single-frequency bit rate of 300K bps, which is sufficient to transmit ordinary files, real-time MP3-quality audio, or periodic highquality still photos. The attacker can use multiple channels to transmit, for example, real-time MP4quality video. We discuss the difficulty of detecting the attack and the viability of various potential countermeasures.}, langid = {english}, pubstate = {prepublished}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7C2Z5Y9P/Adhikari et al. - 2022 - Don't Look Up Ubiquitous Data Exfiltration Pathwa.pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security} } @article{agnesiAllfiberSelfcompensatingPolarization2019, @@ -79,8 +77,24 @@ urldate = {2024-09-04}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows distant parties to exchange cryptographic keys with unconditional security by encoding information on the degrees of freedom of photons. Polarization encoding has been extensively used for QKD along free-space, optical fiber, and satellite links. However, the polarization encoders used in such implementations are unstable, expensive, and complex and can even exhibit side channels that undermine the security of the protocol. Here we propose a self-compensating polarization encoder based on a lithium niobate phase modulator inside a Sagnac interferometer and implement it using only commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. Our polarization encoder combines a simple design and high stability reaching an intrinsic quantum bit error rate as low as 0.2\%. Since realization is possible from the 800 to the 1550\&\#x00A0;nm band using COTS devices, our polarization modulator is a promising solution for free-space, fiber, and satellite-based QKD.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Lithium niobate,Optical delay lines,Optical fibers,Polarization mode dispersion,Quantum key distribution,Single-photon avalanche diodes}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2019_Agnesi et al_All-fiber self-compensating polarization encoder for quantum key distribution.pdf} + keywords = {Lithium niobate,Optical delay lines,Optical fibers,Polarization mode dispersion,Quantum key distribution,Single-photon avalanche diodes} +} + +@article{aguilar-melchorXPIRPrivateInformation2016, + title = {{{XPIR}} : {{Private Information Retrieval}} for {{Everyone}}}, + shorttitle = {{{XPIR}}}, + author = {Aguilar-Melchor, Carlos and Barrier, Joris and Fousse, Laurent and Killijian, Marc-Olivier}, + date = {2016-04-01}, + journaltitle = {Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}, + volume = {2016}, + number = {2}, + pages = {155--174}, + issn = {2299-0984}, + doi = {10.1515/popets-2016-0010}, + url = {https://petsymposium.org/popets/2016/popets-2016-0010.php}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme is a protocol in which a user retrieves a record from a database while hiding which from the database administrators. PIR can be achieved using mutuallydistrustful replicated databases, trusted hardware, or cryptography. In this paper we focus on the later setting which is known as single-database computationallyPrivate Information Retrieval (cPIR). Classic cPIR protocols require that the database server executes an algorithm over all the database content at very low speeds which impairs their usage. In [1], given certain assumptions, realistic at the time, Sion and Carbunar showed that cPIR schemes were not practical and most likely would never be. To this day, this conclusion is widely accepted by researchers and practitioners. Using the paradigm shift introduced by lattice-based cryptography, we show that the conclusion of Sion and Carbunar is not valid anymore: cPIR is of practical value. This is achieved without compromising security, using standard crytosystems, and conservative parameter choices.}, + langid = {english} } @article{albartus2020, @@ -99,8 +113,7 @@ title = {How to {{Abuse}} and {{Fix Authenticated Encryption Without Key Commitment}}}, author = {Albertini, Ange and Duong, Thai and Gueron, Shay and Kölbl, Stefan and Luykx, Atul and Schmieg, Sophie}, abstract = {Authenticated encryption (AE) is used in a wide variety of applications, potentially in settings for which it was not originally designed. Recent research tries to understand what happens when AE is not used as prescribed by its designers. A question given relatively little attention is whether an AE scheme guarantees “key commitment”: ciphertext should only decrypt to a valid plaintext under the key used to generate the ciphertext. Generally, AE schemes do not guarantee key commitment as it is not part of AE’s design goal. Nevertheless, one would not expect this seemingly obscure property to have much impact on the security of actual products. In reality, however, products do rely on key commitment. We discuss three recent applications where missing key commitment is exploitable in practice. We provide proof-of-concept attacks via a tool that constructs AES-GCM ciphertext which can be decrypted to two plaintexts valid under a wide variety of file formats, such as PDF, Windows executables, and DICOM. Finally we discuss two solutions to add key commitment to AE schemes which have not been analyzed in the literature: a generic approach that adds an explicit key commitment scheme to the AE scheme, and a simple fix which works for AE schemes like AES-GCM and ChaCha20Poly1305, but requires separate analysis for each scheme.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/586UJPWU/Albertini et al. - How to Abuse and Fix Authenticated Encryption With.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{alendalChipChopSmashing2021, @@ -116,8 +129,18 @@ url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2666281721000998}, urldate = {2024-12-13}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {sampling-mesh}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Alendal et al_2021_Chip chop — smashing the mobile phone secure chip for fun and digital forensics.pdf} + keywords = {sampling-mesh} +} + +@online{algorithmicsabotageresearchgroupTechFascism2025, + title = {Against {{Tech Fascism}}}, + author = {{Algorithmic Sabotage Research Group}}, + date = {2025-07-27T00:00:00+00:00}, + url = {https://algorithmic-sabotage.gitlab.io/asrg/against-tech-fascism/}, + urldate = {2025-12-04}, + abstract = {This draft debate piece examines technofascism and its domineering configurations of power, while advancing resistance through the proposed strategic intervention of “algorithmic sabotage”.}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {ASRG} } @online{alievExperimentalDemonstrationScalable2023, @@ -132,16 +155,42 @@ abstract = {Secure communication over long distances is one of the major problems of modern informatics. Classical transmissions are recognized to be vulnerable to quantum computer attacks. Remarkably, the same quantum mechanics that engenders quantum computers offers guaranteed protection against such attacks via quantum key distribution (QKD). Yet, long-distance transmission is problematic since the essential signal decay in optical channels occurs at a distance of about a hundred kilometers. We propose to resolve this problem by a QKD protocol, further referred to as the Terra Quantum QKD protocol (TQ-QKD protocol). In our protocol, we use semiclassical pulses containing enough photons for random bit encoding and exploiting erbium amplifiers to retranslate photon pulses and, at the same time, ensuring that at the chosen pulse intensity only a few photons could go outside the channel even at distances of about a hundred meters. As a result, an eavesdropper will not be able to efficiently utilize the lost part of the signal. The central component of the TQ-QKD protocol is the end-to-end loss control of the fiber-optic communication line since optical losses can in principle be used by the eavesdropper to obtain the transmitted information. However, our control precision is such that if the degree of the leak is below the detectable level, then the leaking states are quantum since they contain only a few photons. Therefore, available to the eavesdropper parts of the bit encoding states representing ‘0’ and ‘1’ are nearly indistinguishable. Our work presents the experimental demonstration of the TQ-QKD protocol allowing quantum key distribution over 1079 kilometers. Further refining the quality of the scheme’s components will expand the attainable transmission distances. This paves the way for creating a secure global QKD network in the upcoming years.}, langid = {english}, pubstate = {prepublished}, - keywords = {Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YV22HBCT/Aliev et al. - 2023 - Experimental demonstration of scalable quantum key.pdf} + keywords = {Quantum Physics} } @article{alomairInformationTheoreticallySecure, title = {Information {{Theoretically Secure Encryption}} with {{Almost Free Authentication}}}, author = {Alomair, Basel}, abstract = {In cryptology, secure channels enable the exchange of messages in a confidential and authenticated manner. The literature of cryptology is rich with proposals and analysis that address the secure communication over public (insecure) channels. In this work, we propose an information theoretically secure direction for the construction of secure channels. First, we propose a method of achieving unconditionally secure authentication with half the amount of key material required by traditional unconditionally secure message authentication codes (MACs). Key reduction is achieved by utilizing the special structure of the authenticated encryption system. That is, authentication exploits the secrecy of the message to reduce the key material required for authentication. After the description of our method, since key material is the most important concern in unconditionally secure authentication, given the message is encrypted with a perfectly secret one-time pad cipher, we extend our method to achieve unconditionally secure authentication with almost free key material. That is, we propose a method for unconditionally authenticating arbitrarily long messages with much shorter keys. Finally, we will show how the special structure of the authenticated encryption systems can be exploited to achieve provably secure authentication that is very efficient for the authentication of short messages.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/ITYF3KAN/Alomair - Information Theoretically Secure Encryption with A.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@incollection{alwenDoubleRatchetSecurity2019, + title = {The {{Double Ratchet}}: {{Security Notions}}, {{Proofs}}, and {{Modularization}} for the {{Signal Protocol}}}, + shorttitle = {The {{Double Ratchet}}}, + booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2019}, + author = {Alwen, Joël and Coretti, Sandro and Dodis, Yevgeniy}, + editor = {Ishai, Yuval and Rijmen, Vincent}, + date = {2019}, + volume = {11476}, + pages = {129--158}, + publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-17653-2_5}, + url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-17653-2_5}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {Signal is a famous secure messaging protocol used by billions of people, by virtue of many secure text messaging applications including Signal itself, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Skype, and Google Allo. At its core it uses the concept of “double ratcheting,” where every message is encrypted and authenticated using a fresh symmetric key; it has many attractive properties, such as forward security, post-compromise security, and “immediate (no-delay) decryption,” which had never been achieved in combination by prior messaging protocols.}, + isbn = {978-3-030-17652-5 978-3-030-17653-2}, + langid = {english} +} + +@online{amazonAWSCloudHSM, + title = {{{AWS CloudHSM}}}, + author = {{Amazon}}, + url = {https://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + abstract = {AWS CloudHSM provides total access management control and protection for your encryption keys with secure and compliant hardware security modules (HSMs).}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {Amazon Web Services, Inc.} } @inproceedings{amhenriorDesignImplementationAutomatic2017, @@ -156,8 +205,7 @@ urldate = {2024-12-13}, abstract = {In this paper, the design and implementation of automatic tamper detection and reporting capability of Energy meter was carried out. The system has the capability to detect bypass internally on the meter and externally on the service cables from the electric pole. It also incorporates wireless disconnection and connection of load capabilities. This becomes imperative as a result of high rate of energy theft that arises from meter tampering. The system comprises of a developed Single Phase Prepayment Energy Meter and the supply authority Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) capable device platform. The meter is made of the energy meter IC, two microcontrollers which are suitably programmed in C++, one for Energy measurement and the other for monitoring of meter activities especially terminal tamper and communications. It also has the tamper switch, the circuit breaker and the GSM modem (SIM900) which is interfaced to the monitoring microcontroller. The modem is used for communication particularly in Short Message Service (SMS) form with the supply authority. The server and the Application Platform communicates with the meter using developed commands available to only the supply authority. The use of Wireless Current Transducers (WCT) for the detection of energy theft through external bypass of the Prepaid Meter was also proposed to be incorporated in the system. The results obtained show satisfactory tamper detection and reporting as well as wireless connection with 100\% success rate recorded as implemented.}, eventtitle = {2017 {{IEEE}} 3rd {{International Conference}} on {{Electro-Technology}} for {{National Development}} ({{NIGERCON}})}, - keywords = {Automatic Tamper Reporting,Companies,Developed Commands,GSM,Meters,Microcontroller,Microcontrollers,Monitoring,Pins,SMS,Wireless Connection}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Amhenrior et al_2017_Design and implementation of an automatic tamper detection and reporting.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8E7R2D7Z/8281947.html} + keywords = {Automatic Tamper Reporting,Companies,Developed Commands,GSM,Meters,Microcontroller,Microcontrollers,Monitoring,Pins,SMS,Wireless Connection} } @incollection{amiriEfficientUnconditionallySecure2018, @@ -169,14 +217,12 @@ volume = {10892}, pages = {143--162}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_8}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_8}, urldate = {2024-06-19}, abstract = {Digital signatures are one of the most important cryptographic primitives. In this work we construct an information-theoretically secure signature scheme which, unlike prior schemes, enjoys a number of advantageous properties such as short signature length and high generation efficiency, to name two. In particular, we extend symmetric-key message authentication codes (MACs) based on universal hashing to make them transferable, a property absent from traditional MAC schemes. Our main results are summarised as follows.}, isbn = {978-3-319-93386-3 978-3-319-93387-0}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2EYFTVCY/Amiri et al. - 2018 - Efficient Unconditionally Secure Signatures Using .pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{amitonovaQuantumKeyEstablishment2020, @@ -195,8 +241,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-04}, abstract = {Quantum communication aims to provide absolutely secure transmission of secret information. State-of-the-art methods encode symbols into single photons or coherent light with much less than one photon on average. For long-distance communication, typically a single-mode fiber is used and significant effort has been devoted already to increase the data carrying capacity of a single optical line. Here we propose and demonstrate a fundamentally new concept for remote key establishment. Our method allows high-dimensional alphabets using spatial degrees of freedom by transmitting information through a light-scrambling multimode fiber and exploiting the no-cloning theorem. Eavesdropper attacks can be detected without using randomly switched mutually unbiased bases. We prove the security against a common class of intercept-resend and beam-splitting attacks with single-photon Fock states and with weak coherent light. Since it is optical fiber based, our method allows to naturally extend secure communication to larger distances. We experimentally demonstrate this new type of key exchange method by encoding information into a few-photon light pulse decomposed over guided modes of an easily available multimode fiber.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Multicore fibers,Multimode fibers,Quantum communications,Quantum key distribution,Single mode fibers,Space division multiplexing}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Amitonova et al_Quantum key establishment via a multimode fiber.pdf} + keywords = {Multicore fibers,Multimode fibers,Quantum communications,Quantum key distribution,Single mode fibers,Space division multiplexing} } @www{anandtech2015, @@ -237,8 +282,20 @@ urldate = {2025-04-04}, abstract = {Tamper-resistant cryptographic processors are becoming the standard way to enforce data-usage policies. Their origins lie with military cipher machines and PIN processing in banking payment networks, expanding in the 1990s into embedded applications: token vending machines for prepayment electricity and mobile phone credit. Major applications such as GSM mobile phone identification and pay TV set-top boxes have pushed low-cost cryptoprocessors toward ubiquity. In the last five years, dedicated crypto chips have been embedded in devices such as game console accessories and printer ink cartridges, to control product and accessory after markets. The "Trusted Computing" initiative will soon embed cryptoprocessors in PCs so they can identify each other remotely. This paper surveys the range of applications of tamper-resistant hardware and the array of attack and defense mechanisms which have evolved in the tamper-resistance arms race.}, eventtitle = {Proceedings of the {{IEEE}}}, - keywords = {Banking,Cryptography,Cryptoprocessor,Embedded computing,fault analysis,GSM,Hardware,HSM,Ink,Mobile handsets,Personal communication networks,power analysis,Printers,security API,semi-invasive attack,survey,TV}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2006_Anderson et al_Cryptographic Processors-A Survey.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/GL9SELT6/1580505.html} + keywords = {Banking,Cryptography,Cryptoprocessor,Embedded computing,fault analysis,GSM,Hardware,HSM,Ink,Mobile handsets,Personal communication networks,power analysis,Printers,security API,semi-invasive attack,survey,TV} +} + +@book{andersonCypherpunkEthicsRadical2022, + title = {Cypherpunk {{Ethics}}: {{Radical Ethics}} for the {{Digital Age}}}, + shorttitle = {Cypherpunk {{Ethics}}}, + author = {Anderson, Patrick D.}, + date = {2022-04-24}, + publisher = {Routledge}, + location = {London}, + doi = {10.4324/9781003220534}, + abstract = {Cypherpunk Ethics explores the moral worldview of the cypherpunks, a movement that advocates the use of strong digital cryptography—or crypto, for short—to defend individual privacy and promote institutional transparency in the digital age. Focusing on the writings of Timothy May and Julian Assange, two of the most prolific and influential cypherpunks, the book examines two competing paradigms of cypherpunk philosophy—crypto anarchy and crypto justice—and examines the implications of cypherpunk ethics for a range of contemporary moral issues, including surveillance, privacy, whistleblowing, cryptocurrencies, journalism, democracy, censorship, intellectual property, and power. Rooted in theory but with very real applications, this volume will appeal not only to students and scholars of digital media, communication, journalism, philosophy, political science, critical data studies, sociology, and the history of technology but also to technologists and activists around the world.}, + isbn = {978-1-00-322053-4}, + pagetotal = {142} } @book{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020, @@ -246,7 +303,7 @@ shorttitle = {Security {{Engineering}}}, author = {Anderson, Ross}, date = {2020-12-22}, - edition = {1}, + edition = {3}, publisher = {Wiley}, doi = {10.1002/9781119644682}, url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119644682}, @@ -267,8 +324,7 @@ @online{AntimatterAlgorithmThat, title = {Antimatter: An Algorithm That Prunes {{CRDT}}/{{OT}} History}, url = {https://braid.org/antimatter}, - urldate = {2024-08-28}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QPW57DMP/antimatter.html} + urldate = {2024-08-28} } @inproceedings{arakiHighThroughputSemiHonestSecure2016, @@ -298,8 +354,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Device tracking is a serious threat to the privacy of users, as it enables spying on their habits and activities. A recent practice embeds ultrasonic beacons in audio and tracks them using the microphone of mobile devices. This side channel allows an adversary to identify a user's current location, spy on her TV viewing habits or link together her different mobile devices. In this paper, we explore the capabilities, the current prevalence and technical limitations of this new tracking technique based on three commercial tracking solutions. To this end, we develop detection approaches for ultrasonic beacons and Android applications capable of processing these. Our findings confirm our privacy concerns: We spot ultrasonic beacons in various web media content and detect signals in 4 of 35 stores in two European cities that are used for location tracking. While we do not find ultrasonic beacons in TV streams from 7 countries, we spot 234 Android applications that are constantly listening for ultrasonic beacons in the background without the user's knowledge.}, eventtitle = {2017 {{IEEE European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})}, - keywords = {Acoustics,Frequency shift keying,Media,Mobile applications,Mobile handsets,privacy,Privacy,side channels,TV,ultrasound}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Arp et al_Privacy Threats through Ultrasonic Side Channels on Mobile Devices2.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FBMINKMB/7961950.html} + keywords = {Acoustics,Frequency shift keying,Media,Mobile applications,Mobile handsets,privacy,Privacy,side channels,TV,ultrasound} } @article{asharovMoreEfficientOblivious2017, @@ -315,16 +370,27 @@ doi = {10.1007/s00145-016-9236-6}, url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00145-016-9236-6}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, + langid = {english} +} + +@book{ashleyAshleyBookKnots1993, + title = {The {{Ashley}} Book of Knots: With Amendments}, + shorttitle = {The {{Ashley}} Book of Knots}, + author = {Ashley, Clifford W. and Budworth, Geoffrey}, + date = {1993}, + edition = {Reprint}, + publisher = {Doubleday}, + location = {New York}, + isbn = {978-0-385-04025-9}, langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Asharov et al_More Efficient Oblivious Transfer Extensions.pdf} + pagetotal = {620} } @article{athalyeVerifyingHardwareSecurity, title = {Verifying {{Hardware Security Modules}} with {{Information-Preserving Refinement}}}, author = {Athalye, Anish and Kaashoek, M Frans and Zeldovich, Nickolai}, abstract = {Knox is a new framework that enables developers to build hardware security modules (HSMs) with high assurance through formal verification. The goal is to rule out all hardware bugs, software bugs, and timing side channels. Knox’s approach is to relate an implementation’s wirelevel behavior to a functional specification stated in terms of method calls and return values with a new definition called information-preserving refinement (IPR). This definition captures the notion that the HSM implements its functional specification, and that it leaks no additional information through its wire-level behavior. The Knox framework provides support for writing specifications, importing HSM implementations written in Verilog and C code, and proving IPR using a combination of lightweight annotations and interactive proofs. To evaluate the IPR definition and the Knox framework, we verified three simple HSMs, including an RFC 6238compliant TOTP token. The TOTP token is written in 2950 lines of Verilog and 360 lines of C and assembly. Its behavior is captured in a succinct specification: aside from the definition of the TOTP algorithm, the spec is only 10 lines of code. In all three case studies, verification covers entire hardware and software stacks and rules out hardware/software bugs and timing side channels.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/E3KVIU4P/Athalye et al. - Verifying Hardware Security Modules with Informati.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{attemaEfficientCompilerCovert2022, @@ -336,14 +402,12 @@ volume = {13269}, pages = {663--683}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_33}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_33}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {We present a novel compiler for transforming arbitrary, passively secure MPC protocols into efficient protocols with covert security and public verifiability in the honest majority setting. Our compiler works for protocols with any number of parties {$>$} 2 and treats the passively secure protocol in a black-box manner.}, isbn = {978-3-031-09233-6 978-3-031-09234-3}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/5RWQFXAC/Attema et al. - 2022 - Efficient Compiler to Covert Security with Public .pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{aumannSecurityCovertAdversaries2010, @@ -361,8 +425,7 @@ url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00145-009-9040-7}, urldate = {2025-08-13}, abstract = {In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of mutually distrustful parties wish to securely compute some joint function of their private inputs. The computation should be carried out in a secure way, meaning that no coalition of corrupted parties should be able to learn more than specified or somehow cause the result to be “incorrect.” Typically, corrupted parties are either assumed to be semi-honest (meaning that they follow the protocol specification) or malicious (meaning that they may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol). However, in many settings, the assumption regarding semi-honest behavior does not suffice and security in the presence of malicious adversaries is excessive and expensive to achieve.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/95AERGSY/Aumann and Lindell - 2010 - Security Against Covert Adversaries Efficient Pro.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{awuahNovelCoilDesign2023, @@ -381,8 +444,7 @@ urldate = {2024-06-21}, abstract = {The power transfer efficiency (PTE) is a crucial aspect for effective wireless power transfer (WPT) applications. The quality factor (Q) of the WPT coil plays a critical role in ensuring higher PTE. In this paper, a novel method of improving the Q of a WPT coil is proposed. Resistance reduction techniques are presented which involves variation of the trace pitch, width, and thickness. This approach targets the high AC losses centered in the inner turns, which subsequently results in an increased Q. Numerical analysis with respect to the inductance and resistance models are presented, analyzed, and compared to that of the EM simulation results. To verify the efficacy of the proposed coil structure, a prototype is fabricated where good agreement is achieved between the measured and simulated results. The proposed coil attained a quality factor increment of about 19.24\% at 85~kHz in comparison to the conventional one. The proposed technique can be used to optimize planar spiral coils to attain higher Q.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Electrical and electronic engineering,Power stations}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Awuah et al_Novel coil design and analysis for high-power wireless power transfer with.pdf} + keywords = {Electrical and electronic engineering,Power stations} } @article{azumaAllphotonicQuantumRepeaters2015, @@ -399,8 +461,7 @@ url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms7787}, urldate = {2024-05-15}, abstract = {Abstract Quantum communication holds promise for unconditionally secure transmission of secret messages and faithful transfer of unknown quantum states. Photons appear to be the medium of choice for quantum communication. Owing to photon losses, robust quantum communication over long lossy channels requires quantum repeaters. It is widely believed that a necessary and highly demanding requirement for quantum repeaters is the existence of matter quantum memories. Here we show that such a requirement is, in fact, unnecessary by introducing the concept of all-photonic quantum repeaters based on flying qubits. In particular, we present a protocol based on photonic cluster-state machine guns and a loss-tolerant measurement equipped with local high-speed active feedforwards. We show that, with such all-photonic quantum repeaters, the communication efficiency scales polynomially with the channel distance. Our result paves a new route towards quantum repeaters with efficient single-photon sources rather than matter quantum memories.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Azuma et al_2015_All-photonic quantum repeaters.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{bahmaniSecureMultipartyComputation2017, @@ -412,14 +473,12 @@ volume = {10322}, pages = {477--497}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_27}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_27}, urldate = {2025-08-13}, abstract = {Isolated Execution Environments (IEE) offered by novel commodity hardware such as Intel’s SGX deployed in Skylake processors permit executing software in a protected environment that shields it from a malicious operating system; it also permits a remote user to obtain strong interactive attestation guarantees on both the code running in an IEE and its input/output behaviour. In this paper we show how IEEs provide a new path to constructing general secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols. Our protocol is intuitive and elegant: it uses code within an IEE to play the role of a trusted third party (TTP), and the attestation guarantees of SGX to bootstrap secure communications between participants and the TTP. In our protocol the load of communications and computations on participants only depends on the size of each party’s inputs and outputs and is thus small and independent from the intricacy of the functionality to be computed. The remaining computational load– essentially that of computing the functionality – is moved to an untrusted party running an IEE-enabled machine, an appealing feature for Cloud-based scenarios. However, as often the case even with the simplest cryptographic protocols, we found that there is a large gap between this intuitively appealing solution and a protocol with rigorous security guarantees. We bridge this gap through a comprehensive set of results that include: i. a detailed construction of a protocol for secure computation for arbitrary functionalities; ii. formal security definitions for the security of the overall protocol and that of its components; and iii. a modular security analysis of our protocol that relies on a novel notion of labeled attested computation. We implemented and extensively evaluated our solution on SGX-enabled hardware, providing detailed measurements of our protocol as well as comparisons with software-only MPC solutions. Furthermore, we show the cost induced by using constant-time, i.e., timing side channel resilient, code in our implementation.}, isbn = {978-3-319-70971-0 978-3-319-70972-7}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/N9G2Z329/Bahmani et al. - 2017 - Secure Multiparty Computation from SGX.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{baiBatCommEnablingInaudible2020, @@ -439,6 +498,13 @@ isbn = {978-1-4503-7590-0} } +@online{banquecentraleduluxembourgInkstainedBanknotes, + title = {Ink-Stained Banknotes}, + author = {{Banque centrale du Luxembourg}}, + url = {https://www.bcl.lu/en/Banknotes-and-Coins/remboursement/billets-macules1/index.html}, + urldate = {2025-11-21} +} + @book{barakIntensiveIntroductionCryptography, title = {An Intensive Introduction to Cryptography: {{Computational}} Security}, shorttitle = {An Intensive Introduction to Cryptography}, @@ -463,8 +529,7 @@ abstract = {We present a simple new technique to secure quantum key distribution relay networks using secret sharing. Previous techniques have relied on creating distinct physical paths in order to create the shares. We show, however, how this can be achieved on a single physical path by creating distinct logical channels. The technique utilizes a random ‘drop-out’ scheme to ensure that an attacker must compromise all of the relays on the channel in order to access the key.}, eventtitle = {2011 {{IEEE GCC Conference}} and {{Exhibition}} ({{GCC}})}, isbn = {978-1-61284-118-2}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4PL34JUV/Barnett and Phoenix - 2011 - Securing a quantum key distribution relay network .pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{barootiPublicKeyEncryptionQuantum2023, @@ -475,12 +540,10 @@ date = {2023}, pages = {198--227}, publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-48624-1_8}, abstract = {In the framework of Impagliazzo’s five worlds, a distinction is often made between two worlds, one where public-key encryption exists (Cryptomania), and one in which only one-way functions exist (MiniCrypt). However, the boundaries between these worlds can change when quantum information is taken into account. Recent work has shown that quantum variants of oblivious transfer and multi-party computation, both primitives that are classically in Cryptomania, can be constructed from one-way functions, placing them in the realm of quantum MiniCrypt (the so-called MiniQCrypt). This naturally raises the following question: Is it possible to construct a quantum variant of public-key encryption, which is at the heart of Cryptomania, from one-way functions or potentially weaker assumptions?}, isbn = {978-3-031-48624-1}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Barooti et al_2023_Public-Key Encryption with Quantum Keys.pdf} + langid = {english} } @online{barrettUSSuspectsHackers2015, @@ -492,8 +555,7 @@ abstract = {The Federal Bureau of Investigation is probing an apparently far-reaching penetration of data held by the Office of Personnel Management, in which the records of approximately four million individuals were compromised.}, langid = {american}, organization = {Wall Street Journal}, - keywords = {Asia,Asia Pacific,BRICS Countries,C&E Executive News Filter,China,Content Types,courts,crime,Crime/Courts,cybercrime,Cybercrime/Hacking,Developing Economies,Eastern Asia,Emerging Market Countries,Factiva Filters,general news,Greater China,hacking,North America,OASN,OCHN,political,Political/General News,SYND,United States,US News}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/86GYMVME/u-s-suspects-hackers-in-china-behind-government-data-breach-sources-say-1433451888.html} + keywords = {Asia,Asia Pacific,BRICS Countries,C&E Executive News Filter,China,Content Types,courts,crime,Crime/Courts,cybercrime,Cybercrime/Hacking,Developing Economies,Eastern Asia,Emerging Market Countries,Factiva Filters,general news,Greater China,hacking,North America,OASN,OCHN,political,Political/General News,SYND,United States,US News} } @online{bartusekCryptographyCertifiedDeletion2023, @@ -508,8 +570,7 @@ abstract = {We propose a unifying framework that yields an array of cryptographic primitives with certified deletion. These primitives enable a party in possession of a quantum ciphertext to generate a classical certificate that the encrypted plaintext has been information-theoretically deleted, and cannot be recovered even given unbounded computational resources.}, langid = {english}, pubstate = {prepublished}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PT8K829W/Bartusek and Khurana - 2023 - Cryptography with Certified Deletion.pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,Quantum Physics} } @article{batraEffectFerriteAddition2015, @@ -525,8 +586,7 @@ url = {https://pubs.aip.org/jap/article/117/17/17D517/387226/Effect-of-ferrite-addition-above-the-base-ferrite}, urldate = {2024-10-30}, abstract = {Power transfer capability of wireless power transfer systems is highly dependent on the magnetic design of the primary and secondary inductors and is measured quantitatively by the coupling factor. The inductors are designed by placing the coil over a ferrite base to increase the coupling factor and reduce magnetic emissions to the surroundings. Effect of adding extra ferrite above the base ferrite at different physical locations on the self-inductance, mutual inductance, and coupling factor is under investigation in this paper. The addition can increase or decrease the mutual inductance depending on the placement of ferrite. Also, the addition of ferrite increases the self-inductance of the coils, and there is a probability for an overall decrease in the coupling factor. Correct placement of ferrite, on the other hand, can increase the coupling factor relatively higher than the base ferrite as it is closer to the other inductor. Ferrite being a heavy compound of iron increases the inductor weight significantly and needs to be added judiciously. Four zones have been identified in the paper, which shows different sensitivity to addition of ferrite in terms of the two inductances and coupling factor. Simulation and measurement results are presented for different air gaps between the coils and at different gap distances between the ferrite base and added ferrite. This paper is beneficial in improving the coupling factor while adding minimum weight to wireless power transfer system.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YYVWKXCV/Batra et al. - 2015 - Effect of ferrite addition above the base ferrite .pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{baumMoz$$mathbbZ_2^k$$arellaEfficient2022, @@ -539,14 +599,12 @@ volume = {13510}, pages = {329--358}, publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-15985-5_12}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-15985-5_12}, urldate = {2023-02-28}, abstract = {Zero-knowledge proof systems are usually designed to support computations for circuits over F2 or Fp for large p, but not for computations over Z2k , which all modern CPUs operate on. Although Z2k -arithmetic can be emulated using prime moduli, this comes with an unavoidable overhead. Recently, Baum et al. (CCS 2021) suggested a candidate construction for a designated-verifier zero-knowledge proof system that natively runs over Z2k . Unfortunately, their construction requires preprocessed random vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE) to be instantiated over Z2k . Currently, it is not known how to efficiently generate such random VOLE in large quantities.}, isbn = {978-3-031-15984-8 978-3-031-15985-5}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/BDZCDH85/Baum et al. - 2022 - Moz$$mathbb Z _ 2^k $$arella Efficient Vector-O.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{beards1996, @@ -571,8 +629,7 @@ abstract = {In a network of n players, each player i having private input zi, we show how the players can collaboratively evaluate a function f(zl, ..., zn) in a way that does not compromise the privacy of the players' inputs, and yet requires only a constant number of rounds of interaction.}, eventtitle = {The Twenty-Second Annual {{ACM}} Symposium}, isbn = {978-0-89791-361-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YAIBCBYY/Beaver et al. - 1990 - The round complexity of secure protocols.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{beckFuzzyMessageDetection2021, @@ -589,8 +646,7 @@ abstract = {Many privacy-preserving protocols employ a primitive that allows a sender to “flag” a message to a recipient’s public key, such that only the recipient (who possesses the corresponding secret key) can detect that the message is intended for their use. Examples of such protocols include anonymous messaging, privacy-preserving payments, and anonymous tracing. A limitation of the existing techniques is that recipients cannot easily outsource the detection of messages to a remote server, without revealing to the server the exact set of matching messages. In this work we propose a new class of cryptographic primitives called fuzzy message detection schemes. These schemes allow a recipient to derive a specialized message detection key that can identify correct messages, while also incorrectly identifying non-matching messages with a specific and chosen false positive rate p. This allows recipients to outsource detection work to an untrustworthy server, without revealing precisely which messages belong to the receiver. We show how to construct these schemes under a variety of assumptions; describe several applications of the new technique; and show that our schemes are efficient enough to use in real applications.}, eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '21: 2021 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-8454-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/H86Q8YZK/Beck et al. - 2021 - Fuzzy Message Detection.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{bellareEfficientGarblingFixedKey2013, @@ -603,20 +659,18 @@ doi = {10.1109/SP.2013.39}, abstract = {We advocate schemes based on fixed-key AES as the best route to highly efficient circuit-garbling. We provide such schemes making only one AES call per garbled-gate evaluation. On the theoretical side, we justify the security of these methods in the random-permutation model, where parties have access to a public random permutation. On the practical side, we provide the Just Garble system, which implements our schemes. Just Garble evaluates moderate-sized garbled-circuits at an amortized cost of 23.2 cycles per gate (7.25 nsec), far faster than any prior reported results.}, eventtitle = {2013 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}}, - keywords = {Cryptography,Games,Garbled circuits,garbling schemes,Logic gates,multiparty computation,Protocols,random-permutation model,Semantics,timing study,Wires,Yao's protocol}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Bellare et al_2013_Efficient Garbling from a Fixed-Key Blockcipher.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/KRT9TT4P/stamp.html} + keywords = {Cryptography,Games,Garbled circuits,garbling schemes,Logic gates,multiparty computation,Protocols,random-permutation model,Semantics,timing study,Wires,Yao's protocol} } @online{bellovinPermissiveActionLinks, title = {Permissive {{Action Links}}}, author = {Bellovin, Steven M.}, url = {https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/nsam-160/pal.html#CZ89}, - urldate = {2024-09-05}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VVPMC5NB/pal.html} + urldate = {2024-09-05} } @article{bencivenniTimeDomainReflectometer2013, - title = {A {{Time Domain Reflectometer}} with 100 ~ Ps Precision Implemented in a Cost-Effective {{FPGA}} for the Test of the {{KLOE-2 Inner Tracker}} Readout Anodes}, + title = {A {{Time Domain Reflectometer}} with 100ps Precision Implemented in a Cost-Effective {{FPGA}} for the Test of the {{KLOE-2 Inner Tracker}} Readout Anodes}, author = {Bencivenni, G. and Czerwinski, E. and De Lucia, E. and De Robertis, G. and Domenici, D. and Erriquez, O. and Fanizzi, G. and Felici, G. and Liuzzi, R. and Loddo, F. and Mongelli, M. and Morello, G. and Ranieri, A. and Valentino, V.}, date = {2013-01-11}, journaltitle = {Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment}, @@ -628,8 +682,7 @@ url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168900212011552}, urldate = {2025-03-11}, abstract = {A Time Domain Reflectometer implemented in a single cost-effective Field Programmable Gate Array device is shown to achieve a precision around 100ps. The Time to Digital Converter section of the device is based on a tapped delay line followed by an encoder and shows both Differential and Integral Non-Linearity below one least significant bit. The same Field Programmable Gate Array houses an 8051 8-bits microprocessor, for the control of the pulse signals generation, the acquisition and the first treatment of raw data. Principles of operation, architecture, performance and preliminary trials on the prototype are presented in this paper. As an example of possible application, the proposed circuit has been usefully used to perform the quality control of the micro-strip anodic planes of the Gas Electron Multiplier Inner Tracker of the KLOE-2 experiment.}, - keywords = {Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA),Micro-strip,Statistical Code Method,Tapped delay line,Time Domain Reflectometer (TDR)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WITGACG9/S0168900212011552.html} + keywords = {Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA),Micro-strip,Statistical Code Method,Tapped delay line,Time Domain Reflectometer (TDR)} } @inproceedings{benderDangersStochasticParrots2021, @@ -647,8 +700,7 @@ abstract = {The past 3 years of work in NLP have been characterized by the development and deployment of ever larger language models, especially for English. BERT, its variants, GPT-2/3, and others, most recently Switch-C, have pushed the boundaries of the possible both through architectural innovations and through sheer size. Using these pretrained models and the methodology of fine-tuning them for specific tasks, researchers have extended the state of the art on a wide array of tasks as measured by leaderboards on specific benchmarks for English. In this paper, we take a step back and ask: How big is too big? What are the possible risks associated with this technology and what paths are available for mitigating those risks? We provide recommendations including weighing the environmental and financial costs first, investing resources into curating and carefully documenting datasets rather than ingesting everything on the web, carrying out pre-development exercises evaluating how the planned approach fits into research and development goals and supports stakeholder values, and encouraging research directions beyond ever larger language models.}, eventtitle = {{{FAccT}} '21: 2021 {{ACM Conference}} on {{Fairness}}, {{Accountability}}, and {{Transparency}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-8309-7}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/ZWE8ES43/Bender et al. - 2021 - On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots Can Language.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{bennettGeneralizedPrivacyAmplification1995, @@ -665,8 +717,7 @@ url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/476316/}, urldate = {2024-05-29}, abstract = {This paper provides a general treatment of privacy amplification by public discussion, a concept introduced by Bennett, Brassard, and Robert for a special scenario. Privacy amplification is a process that allows two parties to distill a secret key from a common random variable about which an eavesdropper has partial information. The two parties generally know nothing about the eavesdropper’s information except that it satisfies a certain constraint. The results have applications to unconditionally secure secret-key agreement protocols and quantum cryptography, and they yield results on wiretap and broadcast channels for a considerably strengthened definition of secrecy capacity.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RP8LVYDL/Bennett et al. - 1995 - Generalized privacy amplification.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{berriosHighFidelityQuantum2012, @@ -700,8 +751,7 @@ abstract = {While modern block ciphers, such as AES, have a block size of at least 128 bits, there are many 64-bit block ciphers, such as 3DES and Blowfish, that are still widely supported in Internet security protocols such as TLS, SSH, and IPsec. When used in CBC mode, these ciphers are known to be susceptible to collision attacks when they are used to encrypt around 232 blocks of data (the so-called birthday bound). This threat has traditionally been dismissed as impractical since it requires some prior knowledge of the plaintext and even then, it only leaks a few secret bits per gigabyte. Indeed, practical collision attacks have never been demonstrated against any mainstream security protocol, leading to the continued use of 64-bit ciphers on the Internet.}, eventtitle = {{{CCS}}'16: 2016 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-4139-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SAF7LRDH/Bhargavan and Leurent - 2016 - On the Practical (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Cip.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{bibakQuantumKeyDistribution2021, @@ -718,8 +768,18 @@ url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11128-021-03164-3}, urldate = {2024-07-29}, abstract = {Peev et al. (Int J Quantum Inf 03:225–231, 2005) introduced a key-efficient two-step hash function for authentication in quantum key distribution (QKD). They suggested using a publicly known hash function as part of this scheme. Improving on this, Pacher et al. (Quantum Inf Process 15:327–362, 2016) suggested a method to restore information-theoretic security (ITS) by using almost universal hash functions instead of publicly known hash functions. While their scheme is a key-efficient almost-strongly universal (ASU) family, like any other ASU family, it only provides a one-time MAC. Here, we propose the use of a MAC paradigm called PRF(Hash, Nonce) for authentication in QKD. This MAC has several advantages which make it suited for QKD. In particular, unlike the above constructions, it is a many-time MAC and is also more key-efficient. In fact, PRF(Hash, Nonce) is even more key-efficient than the Wegman–Carter paradigm, the most widely used MAC scheme for authentication in QKD. Furthermore, it provides everlasting security, which means that if authentication remains unbroken during the execution of QKD, then the resulting keys retain ITS, which guarantees that the adversary cannot gain any new information on the keys even with unlimited computational power.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RDABDXY6/Bibak and Ritchie - 2021 - Quantum key distribution with PRF(Hash, Nonce) ach.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@book{blanquiNiDieuNi2009, + title = {Ni dieu ni maître}, + author = {Blanqui, Auguste and Dommanget, Maurice}, + date = {2009}, + series = {Opium du peuple}, + publisher = {Éd. Aden [diff. Belles lettres]}, + location = {Bruxelles [Le Kremlin-Bicêtre]}, + isbn = {978-2-930402-77-2}, + langid = {fre} } @inproceedings{blantonPrivateObliviousSet2012, @@ -765,6 +825,20 @@ isbn = {978-1-4503-5084-6} } +@incollection{blomNoGodsNo2025, + title = {No {{Gods No Masters}}: {{Anarchist}} Mots de Mémoire from {{Titles}} to {{T-Shirts}}}, + booktitle = {Memory and the {{Language}} of {{Contention}}}, + author = {Blom, Tashina}, + editor = {Van Den Elzen, Sophie and Rigney, Ann}, + date = {2025-03-10}, + pages = {231--247}, + publisher = {BRILL}, + doi = {10.1163/9789004692978}, + url = {https://brill.com/view/title/69864}, + urldate = {2025-11-24}, + isbn = {978-90-04-69297-8} +} + @misc{boak1973, title = {A History of {{U}}.{{S}}. Communications Security, Volumes {{I}} and {{II}}}, author = {Boak, David G.}, @@ -775,6 +849,30 @@ organization = {US National Security Agency (NSA)} } +@book{boakHistoryUSCommunications1973, + title = {A {{History}} of {{U}}.{{S}}. {{Communications Security}} ({{The David G}}. {{Boak Lectures}}), {{Volume I}}}, + author = {Boak, David G.}, + date = {1973}, + publisher = {(US) National Security Agency}, + url = {http://archive.org/details/history_comsec-nsa}, + urldate = {2025-02-18}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {NSA}, + annotation = {2015 re-declassified version contains more material} +} + +@book{boakHistoryUSCommunications1981, + title = {A {{History}} of {{U}}.{{S}}. {{Communications Security}} ({{The David G}}. {{Boak Lectures}}), {{Volume II}}}, + author = {Boak, David G.}, + date = {1981}, + publisher = {(US) National Security Agency}, + url = {http://archive.org/details/history_comsec_ii-nsa}, + urldate = {2025-02-18}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {NSA}, + annotation = {2015 re-declassified version contains more material} +} + @book{bogatinSignalPowerIntegrity2018, title = {Signal and Power Integrity, Simplified}, author = {Bogatin, Eric}, @@ -800,8 +898,7 @@ abstract = {A new technique for combinational logic optimization is described. The technique is a two-step process. In the first step, the non-linearity of a circuit – as measured by the number of non-linear gates it contains – is reduced. The second step reduces the number of gates in the linear components of the already reduced circuit. The technique can be applied to arbitrary combinational logic problems, and often yields improvements even after optimization by standard methods has been performed. In this paper we show the results of our technique when applied to the S-box of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES [6]). This is an experimental proof of concept, as opposed to a full-fledged circuit optimization effort. Nevertheless the result is, as far as we know, the circuit with the smallest gate count yet constructed for this function. We have also used the technique to improve the performance (in software) of several candidates to the Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition. Finally, we have experimentally verified that the second step of our technique yields significant improvements over conventional methods when applied to randomly chosen linear transformations.}, isbn = {978-3-642-13193-6}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {AES,Circuit complexity,linear component minimization,multiplicative complexity,S-box}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2010_Boyar_Peralta_A New Combinational Logic Minimization Technique with Applications to Cryptology.pdf} + keywords = {AES,Circuit complexity,linear component minimization,multiplicative complexity,S-box} } @incollection{boyleEfficientPseudorandomCorrelation2019, @@ -813,15 +910,13 @@ date = {2019}, volume = {11694}, pages = {489--518}, - publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, + publisher = {Springer}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8_16}, url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8_16}, urldate = {2024-02-26}, abstract = {Secure multiparty computation (MPC) often relies on sources of correlated randomness for better efficiency and simplicity. This is particularly useful for MPC with no honest majority, where input-independent correlated randomness enables a lightweight “non-cryptographic” online phase once the inputs are known. However, since the amount of correlated randomness typically scales with the circuit size of the function being computed, securely generating correlated randomness forms an efficiency bottleneck, involving a large amount of communication and storage.}, isbn = {978-3-030-26953-1 978-3-030-26954-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/229Y6I5Z/Boyle et al. - 2019 - Efficient Pseudorandom Correlation Generators Sil.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{boyleFunctionalSignaturesPseudorandom2014, @@ -839,8 +934,7 @@ urldate = {2023-03-02}, abstract = {In this paper, we introduce two new cryptographic primitives: functional digital signatures and functional pseudorandom functions. In a functional signature scheme, in addition to a master signing key that can be used to sign any message, there are signing keys for a function f , which allow one to sign any message in the range of f . As a special case, this implies the ability to generate keys for predicates P , which allow one to sign any message m, for which P (m) = 1.}, isbn = {978-3-642-54630-3 978-3-642-54631-0}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YVIXUWDZ/Boyle et al. - 2014 - Functional Signatures and Pseudorandom Functions.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{boyleObliviousTransferConstant2023, @@ -851,12 +945,10 @@ date = {2023}, pages = {271--302}, publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30545-0_10}, abstract = {The computational overhead of a cryptographic task is the asymptotic ratio between the computational cost of securely realizing the task and that of realizing the task with no security at all.}, isbn = {978-3-031-30545-0}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Boyle et al_Oblivious Transfer with Constant Computational Overhead.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{boyleSecureMultipartyComputation2022, @@ -868,7 +960,6 @@ volume = {13275}, pages = {427--457}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-06944-4_15}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-06944-4_15}, urldate = {2024-06-06}, @@ -884,15 +975,13 @@ date = {2021}, volume = {12826}, pages = {457--485}, - publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, + publisher = {Springer}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_16}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_16}, urldate = {2023-02-28}, abstract = {We consider the efficiency of protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) with a dishonest majority. A popular approach for the design of such protocols is to employ preprocessing. Before the inputs are known, the parties generate correlated secret randomness, which is consumed by a fast and possibly “information-theoretic” online protocol.}, isbn = {978-3-030-84244-4 978-3-030-84245-1}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XWQXDJCM/Boyle et al. - 2021 - Sublinear GMW-Style Compiler for MPC with Preproce.pdf} + langid = {english} } @online{BraidSynchronizationHTTP, @@ -927,8 +1016,7 @@ doi = {10.1145/3490390}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3490390}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, - abstract = {We present MOTION, an efficient and generic open-source framework for mixed-protocol secure multi-party computation\ (MPC). MOTION is built in a user-friendly, modular, and extensible way, intended to be used as a tool in MPC research and to increase adoption of MPC protocols in practice. Our framework incorporates several important engineering decisions such as full communication serialization, which enables MPC over arbitrary messaging interfaces and removes the need of owning network sockets. MOTION also incorporates several performance optimizations that improve the communication complexity and latency, e.g., \textbackslash ( 2\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) \ better online round complexity of precomputed correlated\ Oblivious Transfer\ (OT).We instantiate our framework with protocols for N\ parties and security against up to \textbackslash ( N-1 \textbackslash ) passive corruptions: the MPC protocols of Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson\ (GMW) in its arithmetic and Boolean version and OT-based BMR\ (Ben-Efraim et\ al., CCS’16), as well as novel and highly efficient conversions between them, including a non-interactive conversion from BMR to arithmetic GMW.MOTION is highly efficient, which we demonstrate in our experiments. Compared to secure evaluation of AES-128 with \textbackslash ( N=3 \textbackslash ) parties in a high-latency network with OT-based BMR, we achieve a 16 \textbackslash ( \textbackslash times \textbackslash ) better throughput of 16\ AES evaluations per second using BMR. With this, we show that BMR is much more competitive than previously assumed. For \textbackslash ( N=3 \textbackslash ) parties and full-threshold protocols in a LAN, MOTION is \textbackslash ( 10\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) – \textbackslash ( 18\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) faster than the previous best passively secure implementation from the MP-SPDZ framework, and \textbackslash ( 190\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) – \textbackslash ( 586\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) faster than the actively secure SCALE-MAMBA framework. Finally, we show that our framework is highly efficient for privacy-preserving neural network inference.}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Braun et al_MOTION – A Framework for Mixed-Protocol Multi-Party Computation.pdf} + abstract = {We present MOTION, an efficient and generic open-source framework for mixed-protocol secure multi-party computation\ (MPC). MOTION is built in a user-friendly, modular, and extensible way, intended to be used as a tool in MPC research and to increase adoption of MPC protocols in practice. Our framework incorporates several important engineering decisions such as full communication serialization, which enables MPC over arbitrary messaging interfaces and removes the need of owning network sockets. MOTION also incorporates several performance optimizations that improve the communication complexity and latency, e.g., \textbackslash ( 2\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) \ better online round complexity of precomputed correlated\ Oblivious Transfer\ (OT).We instantiate our framework with protocols for N\ parties and security against up to \textbackslash ( N-1 \textbackslash ) passive corruptions: the MPC protocols of Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson\ (GMW) in its arithmetic and Boolean version and OT-based BMR\ (Ben-Efraim et\ al., CCS’16), as well as novel and highly efficient conversions between them, including a non-interactive conversion from BMR to arithmetic GMW.MOTION is highly efficient, which we demonstrate in our experiments. Compared to secure evaluation of AES-128 with \textbackslash ( N=3 \textbackslash ) parties in a high-latency network with OT-based BMR, we achieve a 16 \textbackslash ( \textbackslash times \textbackslash ) better throughput of 16\ AES evaluations per second using BMR. With this, we show that BMR is much more competitive than previously assumed. For \textbackslash ( N=3 \textbackslash ) parties and full-threshold protocols in a LAN, MOTION is \textbackslash ( 10\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) – \textbackslash ( 18\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) faster than the previous best passively secure implementation from the MP-SPDZ framework, and \textbackslash ( 190\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) – \textbackslash ( 586\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) faster than the actively secure SCALE-MAMBA framework. Finally, we show that our framework is highly efficient for privacy-preserving neural network inference.} } @patent{brodskyCircuitLayoutsTamperrespondent2018, @@ -941,8 +1029,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10136519B2/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {conductive lines,respondent,respondent sensor,sensor,tamper}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Brodsky et al_Circuit layouts of tamper-respondent sensors.pdf} + keywords = {conductive lines,respondent,respondent sensor,sensor,tamper} } @article{brodskyPolarizationModeDispersion2006, @@ -959,8 +1046,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-04}, abstract = {Polarization mode dispersion (PMD), a potentially limiting impairment in high-speed long-distance fiber-optic communication systems, refers to the distortion of propagating optical pulses due to random birefringences in an optical system. Because these perturbations (which can be introduced through manufacturing imperfections, cabling stresses, installation procedures, and environmental sensitivities of fiber and other in-line components) are unknowable and continually changing, PMD is unique among optical impairments. This makes PMD both a fascinating research subject and potentially one of the most challenging technical obstacles for future optoelectronic transmission. Mitigation and compensation techniques, proper emulation, and accurate prediction of PMD-induced outage probabilities critically depend on the understanding and modeling of the statistics of PMD in installed links. Using extensive data on buried fibers used in long-haul high-speed links, the authors discuss the proposition that most of the temporal PMD changes that are observed in installed routes arise primarily from a relatively small number of "hot spots" along the route that are exposed to the ambient environment, whereas the buried shielded sections remain largely stable for month-long time periods. It follows that the temporal variations of the differential group delay for any given channel constitute a distinct statistical distribution with its own channel-specific mean value. The impact of these observations on outage statistics is analyzed, and the implications for future optoelectronic fiber-based transmission are discussed}, eventtitle = {Journal of {{Lightwave Technology}}}, - keywords = {Communication systems,High speed optical techniques,Optical distortion,Optical fiber cables,optical fiber communication,Optical fiber communication,optical fiber dispersion,optical fiber polarization,Optical fiber polarization,Optical propagation,Optical pulses,Optical sensors,Polarization mode dispersion,Statistical distributions}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2006_Brodsky et al_Polarization Mode Dispersion of Installed Fibers.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CAAVGKF5/4063384.html} + keywords = {Communication systems,High speed optical techniques,Optical distortion,Optical fiber cables,optical fiber communication,Optical fiber communication,optical fiber dispersion,optical fiber polarization,Optical fiber polarization,Optical propagation,Optical pulses,Optical sensors,Polarization mode dispersion,Statistical distributions} } @patent{brodskyTamperRespondentAssemblyFlexible2019, @@ -971,8 +1057,21 @@ date = {2019-06-18}, number = {10,327,329 B2}, abstract = {Tamper-respondent assemblies and methods of fabrication are provided which include an enclosure, an in -situ -formed tamper-detect sensor, and one ormore flexible tamper-detect sensors. The enclosure encloses, at least in part, one ormore electronic components to be protected , and the in -situ formed tamper-detect sensor is formed in place over an inner surface of the enclosure. The flexible tamper-detect sensor(s ) is disposed over the in -situ -formed tamper-detect sensor, such that the in -situ -formed tamper-detect sensor is between the inner surface of the enclosure and the flexible tamper-detect sensor(s). Together the in -situ -formed tamper detect sensor and flexible tamper-detect sensor(s) facilitate defining, at least in part, a secure volume about the one or more electronic components.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/926C5HNT/Long - Michael J. Fisher, Poughkeepsie, NY.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@article{broussaisOriginesDeviseAnarchiste2022, + title = {Les Origines de La Devise Anarchiste « {{Ni Dieu}} Ni Maître » : Une Généalogie Discutable}, + shorttitle = {Les Origines de La Devise Anarchiste « {{Ni Dieu}} Ni Maître »}, + author = {Broussais, Romain}, + date = {2022-02-01}, + journaltitle = {Histoire Politique}, + shortjournal = {histoirepolitique}, + number = {46}, + issn = {1954-3670}, + doi = {10.4000/histoirepolitique.2452}, + url = {http://journals.openedition.org/histoirepolitique/2452}, + urldate = {2025-11-24} } @patent{busbyTamperDetectionEnclosuretoboard2020, @@ -984,8 +1083,7 @@ number = {10595401B1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10595401B1/en}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, - keywords = {circuit board,enclosure,respondent,respondent sensor,tamper}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Busby et al_Tamper detection at enclosure-to-board interface.pdf} + keywords = {circuit board,enclosure,respondent,respondent sensor,tamper} } @online{BypassingGlitterNail, @@ -1002,8 +1100,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {PCBs are exceptionally cheap now, and that means everyone gets to experiment with the careful application of copper traces on a fiberglass substrate. For his Hackaday Prize entry, [Carl] is putting…}, langid = {american}, - organization = {Hackaday}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/BLTW3PX3/pcbs-as-linear-motors.html} + organization = {Hackaday} } @article{caldwell1989reducing, @@ -1027,8 +1124,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {On-chip assets, such as cryptographic keys, intermediate cipher computations, obfuscation keys, and hardware security primitive outputs, are usually stored in volatile memories, e.g., registers and SRAMs. Such volatile memories could be read out using active physical attacks, such laser-assisted side-channels. One way to protect assets stored in volatile memories can be the employment of sensors that detect active physical attacks and trigger complete zeroization of sensitive data. However, hundreds or thousands of clock cycles are often needed to accomplish this. Further, the sensing and self-destruction mechanisms are decoupled from the sensitive circuitry and can be disabled separately by an adversary. Moreover, defensive actions (e.g., zeroization) may be disabled by bringing the CPU/SoC into an inoperable condition, while registers may still hold their data, making them susceptible. This paper proposes a self-destructive latch to protect sensitive data from active side-channel attacks, which require supply voltage manipulations. Our proposed latch senses supply voltage interference required during such attacks, and reacts instantaneously by entering a forbidden data state, erasing its stored data. The design uses a NULL convention logic (NCL)-based polymorphic NOR/NAND gate, which changes its functionality with supply voltage. Our results show that the latch is stable across temperature and process variation reacting to attacks with 91\% confidence. Even for the 9\% where data is not destroyed, in 3.33 \% of cases data flips its state which makes reliable extraction difficult for an attacker. The polymorphic latch is straightforward to implement due to its NCL implementation and the voltage for the self-destructive behavior is easily altered by resizing only two transistors. Further, this self-destructive behavior extends to registers which are built out of latches.}, eventtitle = {2023 {{IEEE}}/{{ACM International Conference}} on {{Computer Aided Design}} ({{ICCAD}})}, - keywords = {active side-channel attacks,hardware security,Latches,Logic gates,polymorphic latch,polymorphism,Registers,self-destructive countermeasure,Sensors,Side-channel attacks,Temperature sensors,Voltage,voltage modulation}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Cannon et al_Protection Against Physical Attacks Through Self-Destructive Polymorphic Latch.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WMVHYG3C/10323716.html} + keywords = {active side-channel attacks,hardware security,Latches,Logic gates,polymorphic latch,polymorphism,Registers,self-destructive countermeasure,Sensors,Side-channel attacks,Temperature sensors,Voltage,voltage modulation} } @article{caoEvolutionQuantumKey2022, @@ -1044,8 +1140,7 @@ issn = {1553-877X, 2373-745X}, doi = {10.1109/COMST.2022.3144219}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9684555/}, - urldate = {2024-05-15}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Cao et al_2022_The Evolution of Quantum Key Distribution Networks.pdf} + urldate = {2024-05-15} } @article{caoHybridTrustedUntrusted2021, @@ -1062,16 +1157,14 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9373434/}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) has demonstrated a great potential to provide future-proofed security, especially for 5G and beyond communications. As the critical infrastructure for 5G and beyond communications, optical networks can offer a cost-effective solution to QKD deployment utilizing the existing fiber resources. In particular, measurement-device-independent QKD shows its ability to extend the secure distance with the aid of an untrusted relay. Compared to the trusted relay, the untrusted relay has obviously better security, since it does not rely on any assumption on measurement and even allows to be accessed by an eavesdropper. However, it cannot extend QKD to an arbitrary distance like the trusted relay, such that it is expected to be combined with the trusted relay for large-scale QKD deployment. In this work, we study the hybrid trusted/untrusted relay based QKD deployment over optical backbone networks and focus on cost optimization during the deployment phase. A new network architecture of hybrid trusted/untrusted relay based QKD over optical backbone networks is described, where the node structures of the trusted relay and untrusted relay are elaborated. The corresponding network, cost, and security models are formulated. To optimize the deployment cost, an integer linear programming model and a heuristic algorithm are designed. Numerical simulations verify that the cost-optimized design can significantly outperform the benchmark algorithm in terms of deployment cost and security level. Up to 25\% cost saving can be achieved by deploying QKD with the hybrid trusted/untrusted relay scheme while keeping much higher security level relative to the conventional point-to-point QKD protocols that are only with the trusted relays.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7DI3CGYK/Cao et al. - 2021 - Hybrid TrustedUntrusted Relay-Based Quantum Key D.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{carpovManticoreEfficientFramework, title = {Manticore: {{Efficient Framework}} for {{Scalable Secure Multiparty Computation Protocols}}}, author = {Carpov, S and Deforth, K and Gama, N and Georgieva, M and Jetchev, D and Katz, J and Mohammadi, M and Sae-Tang, A and Vuille, M}, abstract = {We propose a novel MPC framework, Manticore, in the multiparty setting, with full threshold and semi-honest security model, supporting a combination of real number arithmetic (arithmetic shares), Boolean arithmetic (Boolean shares) and garbled circuits (Yao shares). In contrast to prior work [34,32], Manticore never overflows, an important feature for machine learning applications. It achieves this without compromising efficiency or security. Compared to other overflow-free recent techniques such as MP-SPDZ [17] that convert arithmetic to Boolean shares, we introduce a novel highly efficient modular lifting/truncation method that stays in the arithmetic domain. We revisit some of the basic MPC operations such as real-valued polynomial evaluation, division, logarithms, exponentials and comparisons by employing our modular lift in combination with existing efficient conversions between arithmetic, Boolean and Yao shares. Furthermore, we provide a highly efficient and scalable implementation supporting logistic regression models with realworld training data sizes and high numerical precision through PCA and blockwise variants (for memory and runtime optimizations). On a dataset of 50 million rows and 50 columns distributed among two players, it completes in one day with at least 10 decimal digits of precision. Our logistic regression solution placed first at Track 3 of the annual iDASH’2020 Competition. Finally, we mention a novel oblivious sorting algorithm built using Manticore.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/UYZBI38N/Carpov et al. - Manticore Efficient Framework for Scalable Secure M.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{carraraAcousticCovertChannels2015, @@ -1082,13 +1175,11 @@ date = {2015}, pages = {3--16}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-17040-4_1}, abstract = {In this work, we study the ability for malware to leak sensitive information from an air-gapped high-security system to systems on a low-security network, using ultrasonic and audible audio covert channels in two different environments: an open-concept office and a closed-door office. Our results show that malware installed on unmodified commodity hardware can leak data from an air-gapped system using the ultrasonic frequency range from 20~kHz to 20.5~kHz at a rate of 140~bps and at a rate of 6.7~kbps using the audible spectrum from 500~Hz to 18~kHz. Additionally, we show that data can be communicated using ultrasonic communication at distances up~to 11~m with bit rates over 230~bps and a bit error rate of 2~\%. Given our results, our attacks are able to leak captured keystrokes in real-time using ultrasonic signals and, using audible signals when nobody is present in the environment - the overnight attack, both keystrokes and recorded audio.}, isbn = {978-3-319-17040-4}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Audio communication,Jumping air-gaps,Malware communication,Out-of-band covert channels,Ultrasonic}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Carrara_Adams_On Acoustic Covert Channels Between Air-Gapped Systems.pdf} + keywords = {Audio communication,Jumping air-gaps,Malware communication,Out-of-band covert channels,Ultrasonic} } @article{carraraOutofBandCovertChannels2016, @@ -1103,8 +1194,7 @@ doi = {10.1145/2938370}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/2938370}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, - abstract = {A novel class of covert channel, out-of-band covert channels, is presented by extending Simmons’ prisoners’ problem. This new class of covert channel is established by surveying the existing covert channel, device-pairing, and side-channel research. Terminology as well as a taxonomy for out-of-band covert channels is also given. Additionally, a more comprehensive adversarial model based on a knowledgeable passive adversary and a capable active adversary is proposed in place of the current adversarial model, which relies on an oblivious passive adversary. Last, general protection mechanisms are presented, and an argument for a general measure of “covertness” to effectively compare covert channels is given.}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2016_Carrara_Adams_Out-of-Band Covert Channels—A Survey.pdf} + abstract = {A novel class of covert channel, out-of-band covert channels, is presented by extending Simmons’ prisoners’ problem. This new class of covert channel is established by surveying the existing covert channel, device-pairing, and side-channel research. Terminology as well as a taxonomy for out-of-band covert channels is also given. Additionally, a more comprehensive adversarial model based on a knowledgeable passive adversary and a capable active adversary is proposed in place of the current adversarial model, which relies on an oblivious passive adversary. Last, general protection mechanisms are presented, and an argument for a general measure of “covertness” to effectively compare covert channels is given.} } @book{carterManagingNuclearOperations1987, @@ -1127,14 +1217,12 @@ volume = {14008}, pages = {423--447}, publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_15}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_15}, urldate = {2024-06-27}, abstract = {We present an efficient key recovery attack on the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman protocol (SIDH). The attack is based on Kani’s “reducibility criterion” for isogenies from products of elliptic curves and strongly relies on the torsion point images that Alice and Bob exchange during the protocol. If we assume knowledge of the endomorphism ring of the starting curve then the classical running time is polynomial in the input size (heuristically), apart from the factorization of a small number of integers that only depend on the system parameters. The attack is particularly fast and easy to implement if one of the parties uses 2-isogenies and the starting curve comes equipped with a non-scalar endomorphism of very small degree; this is the case for SIKE, the instantiation of SIDH that recently advanced to the fourth round of NIST’s standardization effort for post-quantum cryptography. Our Magma implementation breaks SIKEp434, which aims at security level 1, in about ten minutes on a single core.}, isbn = {978-3-031-30588-7 978-3-031-30589-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LZU2NVHW/Castryck and Decru - 2023 - An Efficient Key Recovery Attack on SIDH.pdf} + langid = {english} } @patent{cesanaSecurityClothDesign2006, @@ -1146,8 +1234,7 @@ number = {6982642B1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US6982642B1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {assembly,bonding pad,cloth,extension,wrap}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2006_Cesana et al_Security cloth design and assembly.pdf} + keywords = {assembly,bonding pad,cloth,extension,wrap} } @patent{cesanaTamperResistantCard2001, @@ -1160,8 +1247,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20010056542A1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {circuit traces,intrusion,resistant enclosure,tamper resistant,traces}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2001_Cesana_Zavatti_Tamper resistant card enclosure with improved intrusion detection circuit.pdf} + keywords = {circuit traces,intrusion,resistant enclosure,tamper resistant,traces} } @article{chafiDesignMethodPCB2021, @@ -1178,8 +1264,7 @@ urldate = {2024-11-14}, abstract = {The new power Gallium Nitride transistors allow to increase the operating frequency of converters to megahertz range, thanks to their low switching time that is of a few nanoseconds or less. This permits to reduce the values and the volume of the passive components, and enhance the power density of power converters. However, inductors needed for energy storage still take a large volume in converters compared with the others components, because of their weak energy density. Furthermore, high-frequency operation require low-losses magnetic materials. In this article, a design method of PCB inductors is proposed. A flexible ferrite sheet is used to enhance the inductance value and ease the realization of custom-shape devices. The design method of the inductor is based on the optimization of the inductor volume taking into account thermal issues of the magnetic sheets. Also a simulation method is proposed to calculate the equivalent stray capacitance of the inductors. The proposed method provides a losses volume tradeoff that helps designers to optimize the inductor for their application.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Copper,Flexible magnetic sheets,Gallium nitride,GaN converters,Inductance,Inductors,Magnetic resonance imaging,optimization of volume,PCB inductor,Saturation magnetization,thermal issues,Toroidal magnetic fields}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Chafi et al_2021_Design Method of PCB Inductors for High-Frequency GaN Converters.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WNNSSCEQ/9110799.html} + keywords = {Copper,Flexible magnetic sheets,Gallium nitride,GaN converters,Inductance,Inductors,Magnetic resonance imaging,optimization of volume,PCB inductor,Saturation magnetization,thermal issues,Toroidal magnetic fields} } @book{chanceWaveforms1949, @@ -1201,14 +1286,12 @@ volume = {13555}, pages = {275--294}, publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-17146-8_14}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-17146-8_14}, urldate = {2024-08-26}, abstract = {We provide a strong definition for committing authenticatedencryption (cAE), as well as a framework that encompasses earlier and weaker definitions. The framework attends not only to what is committed but also the extent to which the adversary knows or controls keys. We slot into our framework strengthened cAE-attacks on GCM and OCB. Our main result is a simple and efficient construction, CTX, that makes a nonce-based AE (nAE) scheme committing. The transformed scheme achieves the strongest security notion in our framework. Just the same, the added computational cost (on top of the nAE scheme’s cost) is a single hash over a short string, a cost independent of the plaintext’s length. And there is no increase in ciphertext length compared to the base nAE scheme. That such a thing is possible, let alone easy, upends the (incorrect) intuition that you can’t commit to a plaintext or ciphertext without hashing one or the other. And it motivates a simple and practical tweak to AE-schemes to make them committing.}, isbn = {978-3-031-17145-1 978-3-031-17146-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EPWFII67/Chan and Rogaway - 2022 - On Committing Authenticated-Encryption.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{chatterjeeARDWAugmentedReality2022, @@ -1225,8 +1308,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, eventtitle = {{{UIST}} '22: {{The}} 35th {{Annual ACM Symposium}} on {{User Interface Software}} and {{Technology}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-9320-1}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9FNYVEX5/Chatterjee et al. - 2022 - ARDW An Augmented Reality Workbench for Printed C.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{chesnoyUnderseaFiberCommunication2015, @@ -1253,8 +1335,7 @@ urldate = {2024-10-31}, abstract = {Protection of the Critical Security Parameters is a permanent concern for the designers, but also for the users of cryptographic equipment. The usage of a conductive mesh is a sensitive and efficient solution in order to protect the firmware, keys or any other sensitive data that could be contained in a cryptographic module. In order to improve the security provided by this principle, based on the flexibility of common technology that can be used to produce PCBs, an algorithm to produce particular designs of conductive mesh on PCBs starting from random bit strings is present in this article. Random design of conductive mesh is useful in order to increase the unpredictability of its electrical characteristics so, in addition to the sensitivity of this conductive mesh which will detect and react even to any attempt of measuring it by probes, an attacker will not have any information which can be exploited. The proposed innovative algorithm provides filling of the full area of envelope which cover the cryptographic module, even if its perimeter is irregular, according to necessary dimensions and profile, keeping traces on a dense grid, without any uncovered areas. The main advantage of the proposed solution consists of the possibility to implement a fully automated production flux, without human participation, and with an increased level of security due to unpredictable electrical characteristics of conductive mesh generated from a true random bit string.}, eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE}} 26th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})}, - keywords = {algorithm,Cryptography,Electric variables,Electronics packaging,Generators,mesh,Probes,Production,random,sampling-mesh,security,Sensitivity,tamperproof}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Chiţu et al_2020_Algorithm to Design Conductive Mesh for Tamperproof Envelope.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XPN3D8DA/9292275.html} + keywords = {algorithm,Cryptography,Electric variables,Electronics packaging,Generators,mesh,Probes,Production,random,sampling-mesh,security,Sensitivity,tamperproof} } @patent{chockPointSaleTerminal2009, @@ -1266,8 +1347,7 @@ number = {7551098B1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US7551098B1/en}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, - keywords = {tamper,tamper detect,terminal,time,voltage}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2009_Chock_Hess_Point of sale terminal having pulsed current tamper control sensing.pdf} + keywords = {tamper,tamper detect,terminal,time,voltage} } @article{choiHalbachMagneticCircuit2010, @@ -1284,8 +1364,7 @@ url = {http://koreascience.or.kr/journal/view.jsp?kj=E1MGAB&py=2010&vnc=v15n3&sp=143}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Rotary-type voice coil motors are widely used as actuators in hard disk drives. The recent trend toward higher density and smaller form factors in data storage devices requires performance improvement of the voice coil motor. In this study, we introduce a Halbach magnet array to the voice coil motor in order to increase the force generation. The Halbach magnetic circuit outperforms the conventional magnetic circuit due to the confined magnetic flux. To investigate the performance of the Halbach magnetic circuit, we analyze air gap flux density with the various shapes and thickness of the magnets using 3-dimensional finite element analysis. Consequently the optimum shape of the Halbach magnetic circuit is proposed. Simulations and experimental results proved effectiveness of the proposed magnet array in the voice coil motor for a commercial hard disk drive.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VI2VBKAG/Choi et al. - 2010 - Halbach Magnetic Circuit for Voice Coil Motor in H.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{choiQuantumKeyDistribution2010, @@ -1304,8 +1383,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-04}, abstract = {We present the first demonstration of quantum key distribution (QKD) on a multi-user wavelength division multiplexed passive optical network (WDM-PON) with simultaneous, bidirectional 10Gb/s classical channel transmission. The C-Band QKD system operates at a clock rate of 10GHz and employs differential phase shift keying (DPSK). A dual feeder fiber and band filtering scheme is used to suppress classical to quantum channel cross-talk generated by spontaneous Raman scattering, which would otherwise prevent secure key distribution. Quantum keys were distributed to 4 users with negligible Raman cross-talk penalties. The mean QBER value for 4 users was 3.5\% with a mean raw key distribution rate of 1.3Mb/s, which decreased to 696kb/s after temporal windowing to reduce inter-symbol interference due to single photon detector timing jitter.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Passive optical networks,Quantum cryptography,Quantum key distribution,Raman scattering,Stimulated Raman scattering,Wavelength division multiplexing}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2010_Choi et al_Quantum key distribution on a 10Gb-s WDM-PON.pdf} + keywords = {Passive optical networks,Quantum cryptography,Quantum key distribution,Raman scattering,Stimulated Raman scattering,Wavelength division multiplexing} } @article{choiSecureMultipartyComputation2019, @@ -1322,8 +1400,21 @@ url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1155/2019/1368905}, urldate = {2025-08-13}, abstract = {When two or more parties need to compute a common result while safeguarding their sensitive inputs, they use secure multiparty computation (SMC) techniques such as garbled circuits. The traditional enabler of SMC is cryptography, but the significant number of cryptographic operations required results in these techniques being impractical for most real-time, online computations. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation of code and data in use, making them promising candidates for making SMC more tractable. This paper revisits the history of improvements to SMC over the years and considers the possibility of coupling trusted hardware with SMC. This paper also addresses three open challenges: (1) defeating malicious adversaries, (2) mobile-friendly TEE-supported SMC, and (3) a more general coupling of trusted hardware and privacy-preserving computation.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Choi_Butler_2019_Secure Multiparty Computation and Trusted Hardware.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RWQRWK7A/1368905.html} + langid = {english} +} + +@article{chorPrivateInformationRetrieval, + title = {Private Information Retrieval}, + author = {Chor, Benny and Goldreich, Oded and Kushilevitz, Eyal}, + date = {1998-11-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of the ACM}, + shortjournal = {JACM}, + volume = {45}, + number = {6}, + pages = {965--981}, + doi = {10.1145/293347.293350}, + abstract = {Publicly accessible databases are an indispensable resource for retrieving up-to-date information. But they also pose a significant risk to the privacy of the user, since a curious database operator can follow the user’s queries and infer what the user is after. Indeed, in cases where the users’ intentions are to be kept secret, users are often cautious about accessing the database. It can be shown that when accessing a single database, to completely guarantee the privacy of the user, the whole database should be down-loaded; namely n bits should be communicated (where n is the number of bits in the database).}, + langid = {english} } @incollection{choudhuriComplexitySecureComputation2020, @@ -1335,14 +1426,12 @@ volume = {12238}, pages = {600--620}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_30}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_30}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {We investigate the exact round complexity of secure multiparty computation (MPC) against covert adversaries who may attempt to cheat, but do not wish to be caught doing so. Covert adversaries lie in between semi-honest adversaries who follow protocol specification and malicious adversaries who may deviate arbitrarily.}, isbn = {978-3-030-57989-0 978-3-030-57990-6}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/NB783SQ2/Choudhuri et al. - 2020 - The Round Complexity of Secure Computation Against.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{choudhuriFluidMPCSecure2021, @@ -1355,14 +1444,12 @@ volume = {12826}, pages = {94--123}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_4}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_4}, urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {Existing approaches to secure multiparty computation (MPC) require all participants to commit to the entire duration of the protocol. As interest in MPC continues to grow, it is inevitable that there will be a desire to use it to evaluate increasingly complex functionalities, resulting in computations spanning several hours or days.}, isbn = {978-3-030-84244-4 978-3-030-84245-1}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RKFV7HX5/Choudhuri et al. - 2021 - Fluid MPC Secure Multiparty Computation with Dyna.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inreference{ChubbDetectorLock2025, @@ -1373,8 +1460,7 @@ urldate = {2025-04-17}, abstract = {A Chubb detector lock is a lever tumbler lock with an integral security feature, a re-locking device, which frustrates unauthorised access attempts and indicates to the lock's owner that it has been interfered with. When someone tries to pick the lock or to open it using the wrong key, the lock is designed to jam in a locked state until (depending on the lock) either a special regulator key or the original key is inserted and turned in a different direction. This alerts the owner to the fact that the lock has been tampered with. Any person who attempts to pick a detector lock must avoid triggering the automatic jamming mechanism. If the automatic jamming mechanism is accidentally triggered (which happens when any one of the levers is lifted too high) the lock-picker has the additional problem of resetting the detector mechanism before the next attempt to open the lock. This introduces additional complexity into the task, increasing the degree of lock-picking skill required to a level which few people have. The first detector lock was produced in 1818 by Jeremiah Chubb of Portsmouth, England, as the result of a government competition to create an unpickable lock. It remained unpicked until the Great Exhibition of 1851.}, langid = {english}, - annotation = {Page Version ID: 1267621709}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/689DCTN6/Chubb_detector_lock.html} + annotation = {Page Version ID: 1267621709} } @inproceedings{cifuentesPoorMansHardware2016, @@ -1404,8 +1490,7 @@ number = {6895509B1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US6895509B1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {node,power source,resistor,transistor,wire loop}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2005_Clark_Tamper detection system for securing data.pdf} + keywords = {node,power source,resistor,transistor,wire loop} } @online{ClavisXGQKD2024, @@ -1415,8 +1500,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-04}, abstract = {Introducing the Clavis XG: IDQ’s long distance and backbone Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) solution, the ultimate in Quantum-Safe Security.}, langid = {british}, - organization = {ID Quantique}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/K2KS43DP/clavis-xg-qkd-system.html} + organization = {ID Quantique} } @article{clementiComparisonTaggingTechnologies2018, @@ -1435,8 +1519,7 @@ abstract = {Several countries are planning to store nuclear spent fuel in long term geological repositories, preserved by copper canisters with an iron insert. This new approach involves many challenging problems and one is to satisfy safeguards requirements: the Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of the fuel must be kept from the encapsulation plant up to the final repository. To date, no measurement system has been suggested for a unique identification and authentication. Following the list of the most important safeguards, safety and security requirements for copper canisters identification and authentication, a review of conventional tagging technologies and measurement systems for nuclear items is reported in this paper. The aim of this study is to verify to what extent each technology could be potentially used for keeping the CoK of copper canisters. Several tagging methods are briefly described and compared, discussing advantages and disadvantages.}, issue = {4}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {copper canisters,identification tags,nuclear spent fuel}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Clementi et al_Comparison of Tagging Technologies for Safeguards of Copper Canisters for.pdf} + keywords = {copper canisters,identification tags,nuclear spent fuel} } @patent{cobianuLargeAreaDistributed2008, @@ -1448,8 +1531,7 @@ number = {20080001741A1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20080001741A1/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&oq=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&sort=old}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {dielectric film,distributed,distributed electrical,electrical circuit,printed}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2008_Cobianu et al_Large area distributed sensor.pdf} + keywords = {dielectric film,distributed,distributed electrical,electrical circuit,printed} } @inproceedings{cominelliEvenBlackCats2020, @@ -1465,8 +1547,7 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9152700/}, urldate = {2023-01-19}, eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, - isbn = {978-1-72813-497-0}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Cominelli et al_2020_Even Black Cats Cannot Stay Hidden in the Dark.pdf} + isbn = {978-1-72813-497-0} } @book{constantinouAppliedResearchPolicing2021, @@ -1476,7 +1557,6 @@ date = {2021}, series = {{{SpringerBriefs}} in {{Criminology}}}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-76377-0}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-76377-0}, urldate = {2025-08-15}, @@ -1493,8 +1573,7 @@ number = {10579833B1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10579833B1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {conductive lines,group,lid,security processor,signal}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Cook_Jr_Tamper detection circuit assemblies and related manufacturing processes.pdf} + keywords = {conductive lines,group,lid,security processor,signal} } @online{CorningSMF28Ultra2024, @@ -1504,6 +1583,15 @@ urldate = {2024-09-05} } +@misc{coroamaPossibleFutureTrends2025, + title = {Past and {{Possible Future Trends}}}, + author = {Coroamă, Vlad C and Dumbrav, Oana and Hinterholzer, Simon and Progni, Kejsi and Hintemann, Ralph}, + date = {2025-04}, + url = {https://www.borderstep.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/EDNA-EE-of-servers-FINAL.pdf}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {International Energy Agency} +} + @incollection{couteauSilverSilentVOLE2021, title = {Silver: {{Silent VOLE}} and {{Oblivious Transfer}} from {{Hardness}} of {{Decoding Structured LDPC Codes}}}, shorttitle = {Silver}, @@ -1514,14 +1602,24 @@ volume = {12827}, pages = {502--534}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_17}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_17}, urldate = {2023-02-28}, abstract = {We put forth new protocols for oblivious transfer extension and vector OLE, called Silver, for SILent Vole and oblivious transfER. Silver offers extremely high performances: generating 10 million random OTs on one core of a standard laptop requires only 300ms of computation and 122KB of communication. This represents 37\% less computation and ∼ 1300× less communication than the standard IKNP protocol, as well as ∼ 4× less computation and ∼ 14× less communication than the recent protocol of Yang et al. (CCS 2020). Silver is silent: after a one-time cheap interaction, two parties can store small seeds, from which they can later locally generate a large number of OTs while remaining offline. Neither IKNP nor Yang et al. enjoys this feature; compared to the best known silent OT extension protocol of Boyle et al. (CCS 2019), upon which we build up, Silver has 19× less computation, and the same communication. Due to its attractive efficiency features, Silver yields major efficiency improvements in numerous MPC protocols.}, isbn = {978-3-030-84251-2 978-3-030-84252-9}, + langid = {english} +} + +@book{crawfordDungeonsDragonsPlayers2024, + title = {Dungeons \& Dragons - Player's Handbook}, + author = {Crawford, Jeremy}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {Wizards of the Coast LLC}, + location = {Renton}, + abstract = {"This revised and expanded Player's Handbook® is the essential reference for every fifth edition Dungeons \& Dragons player. It contains rules for character creation and advancement, exploration, combat, equipment, spells, and much more. Create fantastic D\&D® heroes from the wide selection of character origins, classes, and subclasses provided. Explore ancient ruins and deadly dungeons. Battle monsters while searching for legendary treasures. Gain experience and power as you trek across uncharted lands with your companions."-- Back cover}, + isbn = {978-0-7869-6951-7}, langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Couteau et al_2021_Silver.pdf} + pagetotal = {384} } @article{cuellarStaticFatigueLifetime1987, @@ -1537,8 +1635,19 @@ doi = {10.1080/01468038708223680}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/01468038708223680}, urldate = {2024-08-28}, - abstract = {An experimental program aimed at defining the effects of applied stress, temperature, humidity, and buffer coating on the static fatigue behavior of optical fibers in bending configurations is in progress. Data are presented below which demonstrate that the static fatigue behavior of fiber is strongly dependent on the polymeric buffer coating. Furthermore, the effect of humidity is readily evident by the comparison of times to failure at 30\% RH and in water immersion. The ultimate objective of this research is to determine an allowable bend radius for fiber optic cable which is based on measurements of both static fatigue and strength in bending and which will assure reliable performance of the fiber over the design lifetime.}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Cuellar et al_1987_Static fatigue lifetime of optical fibers in bending.pdf} + abstract = {An experimental program aimed at defining the effects of applied stress, temperature, humidity, and buffer coating on the static fatigue behavior of optical fibers in bending configurations is in progress. Data are presented below which demonstrate that the static fatigue behavior of fiber is strongly dependent on the polymeric buffer coating. Furthermore, the effect of humidity is readily evident by the comparison of times to failure at 30\% RH and in water immersion. The ultimate objective of this research is to determine an allowable bend radius for fiber optic cable which is based on measurements of both static fatigue and strength in bending and which will assure reliable performance of the fiber over the design lifetime.} +} + +@patent{curetHardwareSecurityModule2025, + type = {patentus}, + title = {Hardware Security Module Adapter System, Method and Device}, + author = {Curet, Jon Cameron Grant and Wong, Daniel}, + holder = {{Marvell Asia Pte Ltd}}, + date = {2025-05-20}, + number = {12309267B1}, + url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US12309267B1/en?q=(hardware+security+module+heatsink)&oq=hardware+security+module+heatsink}, + urldate = {2025-12-03}, + keywords = {circuit board,contact pads,encryption,mesh,printed circuit} } @article{curranModelingCharacterizationPCB2015, @@ -1555,8 +1664,7 @@ url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2052841815000147/type/journal_article}, urldate = {2023-10-31}, abstract = {Wireless charging is emerging as a viable technology in many industries, including consumer, medical, and sensor electronics. An investigation of design principles is conducted for a wireless charging platform that is designed to charge devices of different sizes and technologies, using only through vias. It is shown that at a 5 mm separation distance, a coupling coefficient can be achieved which varies from 0.12 to 0.37 when staggered hexagonal transmitter coils (approximately 5 cm across) are used with an unstaggered square receiver coil, which declines to 0.06–0.11 at 2 cm separation. Without design measures, the coupling coefficient will approach zero at certain positions. The quality factors of the coils can be improved by stacking the coils in parallel, enabling the use of only through-vias, while the inductance can be controlled horizontally by increasing the number of turns in the inductor.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/G9UFDMFK/Curran et al. - 2015 - Modeling and characterization of PCB coils for ind.pdf} + langid = {english} } @patent{dalphinEnceinteProtegeeAvec1987, @@ -1569,16 +1677,14 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/EP0231549A1/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&oq=(G08B13%2f126)+wheatstone&sort=old}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, abstract = {Une enceinte protégée L comporte au moins un élément de paroi E muni d'un interrupteur électrique C1, C2 lui-même protégé par une sonde mince et souple S, B qui d'une part transmet la commande mécanique externe P et d'autre part permet la détection d'une intrusion à ce point faible de l'en­ceinte protégée. Application : Enceinte de sécurité avec clavier de saisie du code d'accès notamment pour système de paiement électronique.}, - keywords = {flexible,layer,probe,protected enclosure,thickness}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1987_Dalphin_Enceinte protégée avec interrupteur électrique et son application.pdf} + keywords = {flexible,layer,probe,protected enclosure,thickness} } @article{dalskovFantasticFourHonestMajority, title = {Fantastic {{Four}}: {{Honest-Majority Four-Party Secure Computation With Malicious Security}}}, author = {Dalskov, Anders and Escudero, Daniel and Keller, Marcel}, abstract = {This work introduces a novel four-party honest-majority MPC protocol with active security that achieves comparable efficiency to equivalent protocols in the same setting, while having a much simpler design and not relying on functiondependent preprocessing. Our initial protocol satisfies security with abort, but we present some extensions to achieve guaranteed output delivery. Unlike previous works, we do not achieve this by delegating the computation to one single party that is identified to be honest, which is likely to hinder the adoption of these technologies as it centralizes sensitive data. Instead, our novel approach guarantees termination of the protocol while ensuring that no single party (honest or corrupt) learns anything beyond the output.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z68N5LGE/Dalskov et al. - Fantastic Four Honest-Majority Four-Party Secure .pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{damgardUnconditionallySecureUniversally2013, @@ -1598,8 +1704,7 @@ urldate = {2024-05-29}, abstract = {We present a constant-round unconditional black-box compiler that transforms any ideal (i.e., statistically-hiding and statistically-binding) straight-line extractable commitment scheme, into an extractable and equivocal commitment scheme, therefore yielding to UC-security [9]. We exemplify the usefulness of our compiler by providing two (constant-round) instantiations of ideal straight-line extractable commitment based on (malicious) PUFs [37] and stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens [27], therefore achieving the rst unconditionally UC-secure commitment with malicious PUFs and stateless tokens, respectively. Our constructions are secure for adversaries creating arbitrarily malicious stateful PUFs/tokens.}, isbn = {978-3-642-42044-3 978-3-642-42045-0}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PXJ2VHWV/Damgård and Scafuro - 2013 - Unconditionally Secure and Universally Composable .pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{daneshDifferentiallyDrivenSymmetric2002, @@ -1616,8 +1721,7 @@ urldate = {2024-10-31}, abstract = {A differentially excited symmetric inductor that enhances inductor quality (Q) factor on silicon RFICs is presented. Compared with an equivalent single-ended configuration, experimental data demonstrate that the differential inductor offers a 50\% greater Q factor and a broader range of operating frequencies. Predictions from full-wave simulations and a physics-based SPICE-compatible model are validated by experimental measurements on an inductor fabricated in a triple-level metal silicon technology. Application of the symmetric inductor to a cross-coupled oscillator improves output voltage swing and phase noise by 75\% and 1.8 dB, respectively (for a given power consumption), while chip area is reduced by 35\% compared to conventional inductor equivalents.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Microwave Theory}} and {{Techniques}}}, - keywords = {Frequency,Inductors,Microstrip,Phase noise,Predictive models,Q factor,Radiofrequency integrated circuits,Semiconductor device measurement,Silicon,Voltage-controlled oscillators}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Danesh_Long_2002_Differentially driven symmetric microstrip inductors.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/M8393BNA/981285.html} + keywords = {Frequency,Inductors,Microstrip,Phase noise,Predictive models,Q factor,Radiofrequency integrated circuits,Semiconductor device measurement,Silicon,Voltage-controlled oscillators} } @patent{danglerMethodManufacturingVenting2015, @@ -1628,8 +1732,7 @@ date = {2015-02-24}, number = {8,961,280 B2}, abstract = {Atamper resistant enclosure for an electronic circuit includes an inner copper case, a tamper sensing mesh wrapped around the inner case, an outer copper case enclosing the inner case and the tamper sensing mesh, and a venting device forming a vent channel from inside the inner case to outside the outer case, the vent channel passing between overlapping layers of the tamper sensing mesh and having at least one right angle bend along its length. The venting device consists of two strips of a thin polyamide coverlay material laminated together along their length, and a length of wool yarn sand wiched between the two thin strips and extending from one end of the strips to the other end of the strips to form the vent channel. The length of yarn follows a Zig-Zag path between the first and second strips, the Zig-Zag path including at least one right angle bend.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/T97G59AY/Dangler et al. - (54) METHOD OF MANUFACTURING AVENTING.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{darcoSecureComputationComputers2016, @@ -1645,8 +1748,7 @@ url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304397516303905}, urldate = {2024-03-07}, abstract = {The design of secure protocols which can be used without the aid of a computer and without cryptographic knowledge is an interesting and challenging research task. Indeed, protocols enjoying these features could be useful in a variety of settings where computers cannot be used or where people feel uncomfortable to interact with or trust a computer. In this paper we make a step in such a direction: we propose a novel method for performing secure two-party computations that, apart from the setup phase, requires neither a computing machinery nor cryptographic knowledge. By merging together in a suitable way two beautiful ideas of the 80's and the 90's, Yao's garbled circuit construction and Naor and Shamir's visual cryptography, respectively, we enable Alice and Bob to securely evaluate a function f(⋅,⋅) of their inputs, x and y, through a pure physical process. Indeed, once Alice has prepared a set of properly constructed transparencies (for this activity a computer is useful), Bob computes the function value f(x,y) by applying a sequence of simple steps which require the use of a pair of scissors, superposing transparencies, and the human visual system. Our construction builds on Kolesnikov's gate evaluation secret sharing schemes.}, - keywords = {Secure computation,Visual cryptography,Yao's construction}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9FIX6KMN/S0304397516303905.html} + keywords = {Secure computation,Visual cryptography,Yao's construction} } @incollection{dejeanRFDNARadioFrequencyCertificates2007, @@ -1666,16 +1768,14 @@ urldate = {2023-12-19}, abstract = {A certificate of authenticity (COA) is an inexpensive physical object that has a random and unique multidimensional structure S which is hard to near-exactly replicate. An inexpensive device should be able to scan object’s physical “fingerprint,” i.e., obtain a set of features in the form of a multidimensional signal x that pseudo-uniquely represents S. For a given “fingerprint” x and without access to S, it should be computationally difficult to construct an object of fixed dimensions with a “fingerprint” y which is at a bounded proximity from x according to a standardized distance metric. We introduce objects that behave as COAs in the electromagnetic field. The objective is to complement RFIDs so that they are physically, not only digitally, unique and hard to replicate. By enabling this feature, we introduce a tag whose information about the product can be read within a relative far-field, and also whose authenticity can be reliably verified within its near-field. In order to counterfeit a tag, the adversary faces two difficulties – a computational and a manufacturing one. The computational difficulty stems from the hardness of solving linear inverse problems in the electromagnetic field. In order to create an actual tag, the adversary must also manufacture a multidimensional object with a specific three-dimensional topology, dielectric properties, and conductivity.}, isbn = {978-3-540-74734-5 978-3-540-74735-2}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z5AD924B/DeJean and Kirovski - 2007 - RF-DNA Radio-Frequency Certificates of Authentici.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{deshotelsInaudibleSoundCovert, title = {Inaudible {{Sound}} as a {{Covert Channel}} in {{Mobile Devices}}}, author = {Deshotels, Luke}, abstract = {Mobile devices can be protected by a variety of information flow control systems. These systems can prevent Trojans from leaking secrets over network connections. As mobile devices become more secure, attackers will begin to use unconventional methods for exfiltrating data.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/S8S9P8L5/Deshotels - Inaudible Sound as a Covert Channel in Mobile Devi.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{desouzaAuditBackupProcedures2008, @@ -1693,8 +1793,7 @@ eventtitle = {{{IDtrust}} 2008: 7th {{Symposium}} on {{Identity}} and {{Trust}} on the {{Internet}}}, isbn = {978-1-60558-066-1}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {sampling-mesh}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8ACFQAKY/de Souza et al. - 2008 - Audit and backup procedures for hardware security .pdf} + keywords = {sampling-mesh} } @www{dexter2015, @@ -1719,8 +1818,7 @@ url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/npjqi201625}, urldate = {2024-09-02}, abstract = {Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditional security in data communication and is currently being deployed in commercial applications. Nonetheless, before QKD can be widely adopted, it faces a number of important challenges such as secret key rate, distance, size, cost and practical security. Here, we survey those key challenges and the approaches that are currently being taken to address them.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MQBTKDF8/Diamanti et al. - 2016 - Practical challenges in quantum key distribution.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{disserBreakingSizeBarrier2023, @@ -1737,8 +1835,7 @@ abstract = {A Universal Circuit~(UC) is a Boolean circuit of size~\$\$\textbackslash varTheta (n \textbackslash log n)\$\$Θ(nlogn)that can simulate any Boolean function up to a certain size~n. Valiant (STOC’76) provided the first two UC constructions of asymptotic sizes \$\$\textbackslash sim 5 n\textbackslash log n\$\$∼5nlognand \$\$\textbackslash sim 4.75 n\textbackslash log n\$\$∼4.75nlogn, and today’s most efficient construction of Liu et al.~(CRYPTO’21) has size~\$\$\textbackslash sim 3n\textbackslash log n\$\$∼3nlogn. Evaluating a public UC with a secure Multi-Party Computation~(MPC) protocol allows efficient Private Function Evaluation~(PFE), where a private function is evaluated on private data.}, isbn = {978-981-9987-21-4}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {multi-party computation,private function evaluation,universal circuit}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Disser et al_Breaking the Size Barrier.pdf} + keywords = {multi-party computation,private function evaluation,universal circuit} } @incollection{dittmerAuthenticatedGarblingSimple2022, @@ -1750,14 +1847,12 @@ volume = {13510}, pages = {57--87}, publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-15985-5_3}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-15985-5_3}, urldate = {2023-02-28}, abstract = {We revisit the problem of constant-round malicious secure two-party computation by considering the use of simple correlations, namely sources of correlated randomness that can be securely generated with sublinear communication complexity and good concrete efficiency.}, isbn = {978-3-031-15984-8 978-3-031-15985-5}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VE42VHUT/Dittmer et al. - 2022 - Authenticated Garbling from Simple Correlations.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{dixon2007, @@ -1777,6 +1872,37 @@ organization = {Moog, Inc.} } +@incollection{dowlingFlexibleAuthenticatedConfidential2020, + title = {Flexible {{Authenticated}} and {{Confidential Channel Establishment}} ({{fACCE}}): {{Analyzing}} the {{Noise Protocol Framework}}}, + shorttitle = {Flexible {{Authenticated}} and {{Confidential Channel Establishment}} ({{fACCE}})}, + booktitle = {Public-{{Key Cryptography}} – {{PKC}} 2020}, + author = {Dowling, Benjamin and Rösler, Paul and Schwenk, Jörg}, + editor = {Kiayias, Aggelos and Kohlweiss, Markulf and Wallden, Petros and Zikas, Vassilis}, + date = {2020}, + volume = {12110}, + pages = {341--373}, + publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-45374-9_12}, + url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-45374-9_12}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {The Noise protocol framework is a suite of channel establishment protocols, of which each individual protocol ensures various security properties of the transmitted messages, but keeps specification, implementation, and configuration relatively simple. Implementations of the Noise protocols are themselves, due to the employed primitives, very performant. Thus, despite its relative youth, Noise is already used by large-scale deployed applications such as WhatsApp and Slack. Though the Noise specification describes and claims the security properties of the protocol patterns very precisely, there has been no computational proof yet. We close this gap.}, + isbn = {978-3-030-45373-2 978-3-030-45374-9}, + langid = {english} +} + +@patent{dragoneVentedTamperrespondentAssemblies2020, + type = {patentus}, + title = {Vented Tamper-Respondent Assemblies}, + author = {Dragone, Silvio and Oggioni, Stefano S. and Santiago-Fernandez, William}, + holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}}, + date = {2020-05-26}, + number = {10667389B2}, + url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10667389B2/en?q=(hardware+security+module+heatsink)&assignee=International+Business+Machines+Corporation}, + urldate = {2025-12-03}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {circuit board,multilayer circuit,secure volume,tamper,vent} +} + @inproceedings{drimer2008, title = {Thinking inside the Box: System-Level Failures of Tamper Proofing}, booktitle = {2008 {{IEEE}} Symposium on Security and Privacy (Sp 2008)}, @@ -1790,7 +1916,7 @@ @patent{droegeSicherheitsmodulMitEinteiliger1997, type = {patentde}, title = {Sicherheitsmodul Mit Einteiliger {{Sicherheitsfolie}}}, - author = {Droege, Hartmut Dipl Ing and Fischer, Ludwig Dipl Ing and Scheibel, Markus Dipl Ing and Sonnentag, Dieter Dipl Ing}, + author = {Droege, Hartmut and Fischer, Ludwig and Scheibel, Markus and Sonnentag, Dieter}, holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}}, date = {1997-07-17}, number = {19600769A1}, @@ -1813,16 +1939,14 @@ urldate = {2024-05-21}, abstract = {The cryptographic task of secure multi-party (classical) computation has received a lot of attention in the last decades. Even in the extreme case where a computation is performed between \$k\$ mutually distrustful players, and security is required even for the single honest player if all other players are colluding adversaries, secure protocols are known. For quantum computation, on the other hand, protocols allowing arbitrary dishonest majority have only been proven for \$k=2\$. In this work, we generalize the approach taken by Dupuis, Nielsen and Salvail (CRYPTO 2012) in the two-party setting to devise a secure, efficient protocol for multi-party quantum computation for any number of players \$k\$, and prove security against up to \$k-1\$ colluding adversaries. The quantum round complexity of the protocol for computing a quantum circuit of \$\textbackslash\{\textbackslash mathsf\{CNOT, T\}\textbackslash\}\$ depth \$d\$ is \$O(k \textbackslash cdot (d + \textbackslash log n))\$, where \$n\$ is the security parameter. To achieve efficiency, we develop a novel public verification protocol for the Clifford authentication code, and a testing protocol for magic-state inputs, both using classical multi-party computation.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/JYDREMCV/Dulek et al. - 2020 - Secure Multi-party Quantum Computation with a Dish.pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,Quantum Physics} } @article{dumitruImpostorUSOffPath, title = {The {{Impostor Among US}}({{B}}): {{Off-Path Injection Attacks}} on {{USB Communications}}}, author = {Dumitru, Robert and Genkin, Daniel and Wabnitz, Andrew and Yarom, Yuval}, abstract = {USB is the most prevalent peripheral interface in modern computer systems and its inherent insecurities make it an appealing attack vector. A well-known limitation of USB is that traffic is not encrypted. This allows on-path adversaries to trivially perform man-in-the-middle attacks. Off-path attacks that compromise the confidentiality of communications have also been shown to be possible. However, so far no off-path attacks that breach USB communications integrity have been demonstrated.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/KAKTBELB/Dumitru et al. - The Impostor Among US(B) Off-Path Injection Attac.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{duncanFLATSFillingLogic2019, @@ -1837,8 +1961,7 @@ urldate = {2024-12-13}, abstract = {Security-critical field programmable gate array (FPGA) designs traditionally rely on bitstream encryption and hashing to prevent bitstream modifications and provide design authentication. Recent attacks to extract bitstream encryption keys, and research in automated bitstream manipulation tools, have created a class of vulnerabilities involving post-synthesis low-level FPGA editing. Current authentication and tamper (e.g., malicious modification) detection approaches dependent upon hash-based comparison mechanisms and register transfer level safeguards are vulnerable to these post-synthesis exploits. In this paper, we propose FLATS, which provides filling logic and testing spatially to combat such vulnerability. FLATS fills unused lookup tables (LUTs) within the FPGA design and inserts infrared-emitting spatial watermarks into the partially used LUTs at the post-synthesis stage for physical authentication and tamper detection using backside infrared imaging. FLATS takes an existing synthesized design and re-purposes a portion of its LUT initialization to function as a watermark allowing for the detection of changes to the post-synthesis placement and initialization. Experimental results validate the FLATS architecture on a 28nm Xilinx FPGA with less than 12\% look-up table utilization overhead and negligible compromises in power and speed.}, eventtitle = {2019 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Hardware Oriented Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{HOST}})}, - keywords = {3PIPs,Authentication,Encryption,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,infrared,Table lookup,watermark,Watermarking}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Duncan et al_2019_FLATS.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3C4TK3U3/8741025.html} + keywords = {3PIPs,Authentication,Encryption,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,infrared,Table lookup,watermark,Watermarking} } @article{dupontMiniaturizedUltraLowPowerTamper2022, @@ -1855,8 +1978,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {This article presents a tamper detection sensor complementing cryptographic techniques in order to protect data from unauthorized access and/or from data falsification. Both the mechanical and electronic parts of the systems are described. The proposed architecture targets portable devices and can be realized using commercially available components, widely available materials and known manufacturing and assembly techniques. The tamper detection circuit is based on a capacitive sensing principle and uses ultra-low-power electronic components, leading to an overall consumed current below 10 \textbackslash mu \textbackslash textA . Autonomy is a crucial reported drawback of miniaturized battery backed-up anti-tampering hardware systems: the presented architecture and implementation ensures a lifetime of at least 3 years when powered by one CR2032 coin cell battery. The paper also assesses the sensitivity of the tamper detection: measurements show that the system is able to detect a variation of at least one percent of the capacitance of the tamper layer, resulting from an attempt to breach the outer shell surrounding the circuit for accessing the sensitive data.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Sensors Journal}}}, - keywords = {Batteries,Capacitive sensor,Computer architecture,data security,Encryption,FIPS 140-2,Hardware,sampling-mesh,Security,Sensors,tamper detection,Temperature sensors,ultra-low-power electronics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Dupont et al_A Miniaturized and Ultra-Low-Power Tamper Detection Sensor for Portable.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RHDYLUS7/9682743.html} + keywords = {Batteries,Capacitive sensor,Computer architecture,data security,Encryption,FIPS 140-2,Hardware,sampling-mesh,Security,Sensors,tamper detection,Temperature sensors,ultra-low-power electronics} } @article{durQuantumInternet2017, @@ -1871,8 +1993,7 @@ issn = {0143-0807, 1361-6404}, doi = {10.1088/1361-6404/aa6df7}, url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1361-6404/aa6df7}, - urldate = {2024-05-15}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Dür et al_2017_Towards a quantum internet.pdf} + urldate = {2024-05-15} } @thesis{e2013, @@ -1893,8 +2014,7 @@ urldate = {2025-09-03}, abstract = {Applications such as Point Of Sale (POS) devices and keypads for secure door locks are required to be tamper resistant. If these devices are tampered}, langid = {american}, - organization = {EDN}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/47BLRUGY/achieve-tamper-proof-capacitive-sensing.html} + organization = {EDN} } @patent{elbertSecureCircuitAssembly2006, @@ -1907,8 +2027,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20060259788A1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {boundary area,circuit,circuit board,printed circuit,secure}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2006_Elbert_Diep_Secure circuit assembly.pdf} + keywords = {boundary area,circuit,circuit board,printed circuit,secure} } @patent{ElektrischeSicherheitseinrichtungSchutze1932, @@ -1922,6 +2041,20 @@ keywords = {contacts,covering,door,rugs,safe} } +@book{elzenMemoryLanguageContention2025, + title = {Memory and the Language of Contention}, + editor = {family=Elzen, given=Sophie, prefix=van den, useprefix=false and Rigney, Ann}, + date = {2025}, + series = {Mobilizing Memories}, + number = {volume 1}, + publisher = {Brill}, + location = {Leiden Boston}, + abstract = {This edited volume shows how memories of activism live in the medium of language and, conversely, how working with the historical resonance of words is a central feature of political contention}, + isbn = {978-90-04-69297-8}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {1} +} + @incollection{eppenAnforderungenEinzelteileRundfunkempfanger1927, title = {Anforderungen an Die {{Einzelteile}} Der {{Rundfunkempfänger}}; {{Gesichtspunkte}} Für Den {{Bau}} Der {{Geräte}}}, booktitle = {Die Wissenschaftlichen {{Grundlagen}} Des {{Rundfunkempfangs}}}, @@ -1939,8 +2072,21 @@ date = {2005-03-10}, pages = {22--26}, doi = {10.1109/SICON.2005.257863}, + abstract = {Capacitive sensors can be constructed for tamper resistant enclosures to prevent unauthorized intrusions. The use printed circuit can provide serpentine geometric patterns of conductors. Any penetration of this envelope interferes with the conductive serpentine, producing a detectable warning of intrusion. Capacitive sensors discussed in this paper are suitable for implementing in the area of physical security cryptographic modules. These sensors conform to Levels 3 and 4 of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2} +} + +@inproceedings{erenFringeEffectCapacitiveProximity2005a, + title = {Fringe-{{Effect Capacitive Proximity Sensors}} for {{Tamper Proof Enclosures}}}, + booktitle = {2005 {{Sensors}} for {{Industry Conference}}}, + author = {Eren, Halit and Sandor, Lucas D}, + date = {2005-02}, + pages = {22--26}, + doi = {10.1109/SICON.2005.257863}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/4027448}, + urldate = {2025-12-24}, abstract = {Capacitive sensors can be constructed for tamper resistant enclosures to prevent unauthorized intrusions. The use printed circuit can provide serpentine geometric patterns of conductors. Any penetration of this envelope interferes with the conductive serpentine, producing a detectable warning of intrusion. Capacitive sensors discussed in this paper are suitable for implementing in the area of physical security cryptographic modules. These sensors conform to Levels 3 and 4 of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Eren_Sandor_2005_Fringe-Effect Capacitive Proximity Sensors for Tamper Proof Enclosures.pdf} + eventtitle = {2005 {{Sensors}} for {{Industry Conference}}}, + keywords = {Capacitance,Capacitive sensors,Computer industry,Cryptography,Electrodes,Hardware,Information security,Magnetic sensors,Printed circuits,Protection} } @inproceedings{essexObliviousPrintingSecret2012, @@ -1957,16 +2103,24 @@ abstract = {We propose oblivious printing, a novel approach to document printing in which a set of printers can cooperate to print a secret message—in human or machine readable form—without learning the message. We present multi-party protocols for obliviously printing a secret in three settings: obliviously printing the contents of a ciphertext, obliviously printing a randomized message, and generating and obliviously printing a DSA/Elgamal keypair. We propose an approach to improving the legibility of messages in the presence of numerous participants. Finally we propose some potential applications of oblivious printing in the context of electronic voting and digital cash.}, isbn = {978-3-642-32946-3}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Electronic Vote,Encrypt Image,Secret Message,Translation Table,Visual Cryptography}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Essex_Hengartner_2012_Oblivious Printing of Secret Messages in a Multi-party Setting.pdf} + keywords = {Electronic Vote,Encrypt Image,Secret Message,Translation Table,Visual Cryptography} +} + +@online{europeancentralbankDamagedInkstainedBanknotes2023, + title = {Damaged and Ink-Stained Banknotes}, + author = {{European Central Bank}}, + date = {2023-07-10}, + url = {https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/banknotes/damaged/html/index.en.html}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + abstract = {The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank of the European Union countries which have adopted the euro. Our main task is to maintain price stability in the euro area and so preserve the purchasing power of the single currency.}, + langid = {english} } @article{evansPragmaticIntroductionSecure, title = {A {{Pragmatic Introduction}} to {{Secure Multi-Party Computation}}}, author = {Evans, David and Kolesnikov, Vladimir and Rosulek, Mike}, abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) has evolved from a theoretical curiosity in the 1980s to a tool for building real systems today. Over the past decade, MPC has been one of the most active research areas in both theoretical and applied cryptography. This book introduces several important MPC protocols, and surveys methods for improving the efficiency of privacy-preserving applications built using MPC. Besides giving a broad overview of the field and the insights of the main constructions, we overview the most currently active areas of MPC research and aim to give readers insights into what problems are practically solvable using MPC today and how different threat models and assumptions impact the practicality of different approaches.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4EH2UCP5/Evans et al. - A Pragmatic Introduction to Secure Multi-Party Com.pdf} + langid = {english} } @www{faa2018, @@ -1992,8 +2146,7 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10440478/}, urldate = {2024-06-21}, abstract = {This article proposes a simultaneous wireless power and coil inductance-insensitive data transfer system for rotary structures. Power and data are transferred simultaneously via a pair of coupled coils, adopting frequency division multiplexing technology. The data carrier is injected into and extracted from the power transfer channel by inductors connected serially with the coupled coils and by multiplexing the compensation networks of the power transfer channel. The transfer gain of the data transfer channel is insensitive to the inductances of the coupled coils within a certain interval. LCLC compensation topology is proposed to realize constant voltage output and to filter the high-order harmonics out of the power transfer channel, reducing the total harmonic distortion and creating a favorable condition for simultaneous data transfer. The circuit model is built to analyze the power and data transfer performance, and the complex-frequency-domain model of the system is established to analyze the responses of power interference. Finally, the feasibility of the technology proposed is verified by a 300 W prototype with a data rate of 40 kbps.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LJIBXD6I/Fan et al. - 2024 - A Simultaneous Wireless Power and Coil Inductance .pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{fengConcretelyEfficientSecure2022, @@ -2010,8 +2163,7 @@ url = {https://sands.edpsciences.org/10.1051/sands/2021001}, urldate = {2025-08-15}, abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of parties to jointly compute a function on their private inputs, and reveals nothing but the output of the function. In the last decade, MPC has rapidly moved from a purely theoretical study to an object of practical interest, with a growing interest in practical applications such as privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML). In this paper, we comprehensively survey existing work on concretely efficient MPC protocols with both semi-honest and malicious security, in both dishonestmajority and honest-majority settings. We focus on considering the notion of security with abort, meaning that corrupted parties could prevent honest parties from receiving output after they receive output. We present high-level ideas of the basic and key approaches for designing different styles of MPC protocols and the crucial building blocks of MPC. For MPC applications, we compare the known PPML protocols built on MPC, and describe the efficiency of private inference and training for the state-of-the-art PPML protocols. Furthermore, we summarize several challenges and open problems to break though the efficiency of MPC protocols as well as some interesting future work that is worth being addressed. This survey aims to provide the recent development and key approaches of MPC to researchers, who are interested in knowing, improving, and applying concretely efficient MPC protocols.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/JR694KUR/Feng and Yang - 2022 - Concretely efficient secure multi-party computatio.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{fernandez-hernandezNavigationMessageAuthentication2016, @@ -2027,8 +2179,7 @@ url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/navi.125}, urldate = {2024-05-29}, abstract = {GNSS vulnerabilities have become evident in the last decade. Authentication of the GNSS signals and data can be an important building block contributing to mitigating these vulnerabilities. This paper presents a Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) scheme based on the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol and a novel concept based on a single one-way chain for all senders and cross-authentication. The paper presents an NMA implementation in the Galileo Open Service (OS) navigation message that should provide similar navigation performance to data-authenticated users and standard non-authenticated users in terms of time to first fix, accuracy, and availability even in difficult reception conditions. The proposal also maintains a high level of signal unpredictability to help receivers protect against replay attacks. The scheme and implementation proposed yield significant improvements compared to the state of the art, offering the opportunity for Galileo to become the reference GNSS in civil navigation authentication. Copyright © 2016 Institute of Navigation}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Fernández-Hernández et al_2016_A Navigation Message Authentication Proposal for the Galileo Open Service.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/IVWSDIZC/navi.html} + langid = {english} } @online{FewNotesAWS2024, @@ -2039,8 +2190,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-26}, abstract = {By Paweł Płatek In the race to secure cloud applications, AWS Nitro Enclaves have emerged as a powerful tool for isolating sensitive workloads. But with great power comes great responsibility—and p…}, langid = {american}, - organization = {Trail of Bits Blog}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6Q3M7WZH/notes-on-aws-nitro-enclaves-attack-surface.html} + organization = {Trail of Bits Blog} } @book{filbigLehrbuchHochfrequenztechnik1942, @@ -2059,8 +2209,7 @@ institution = {Technische Universität Darmstadt}, url = {https://www.gematik.de/media/erezept/SGD_Analyse_2021.pdf}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, - langid = {german}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/E6VVYUK5/SGD_Analyse_2021.pdf} + langid = {german} } @book{flemingPrinciplesElectricWave1910, @@ -2072,13 +2221,27 @@ keywords = {twisted-inductor} } +@report{fowlerInvestigationFlowProcesses1966, + title = {An Investigation of the Flow Processes in a Centrifugal Compressor Impeller}, + author = {Fowler, H. S.}, + date = {1966}, + journaltitle = {Mechanical Engineering Report (National Research Council Canada. Division of Mechanical Engineering. Engine Laboratory)}, + volume = {ME-220}, + institution = {National Research Council Canada}, + issn = {0077-555X}, + doi = {10.4224/40003753}, + url = {https://nrc-publications.canada.ca/eng/view/object/?id=fd41e817-48ff-4d37-a5af-aede36a9a9cb}, + urldate = {2025-12-02}, + abstract = {The flow in the impeller of a centrifugal flow compressor is complex, and is not yet fully understood. A theoretical model of this flow is proposed, from first principles, and an experimental method of investigating the validity of this model is described. An observer is placed in the centre of a large model of the impeller, and by rotating with it is enabled to examine the flow in the impeller passages in great detail . Experimental results obtained by this method are analysed, and some tentative conclusions on the accuracy of parts of the model are put forward.}, + langid = {english} +} + @online{fraunhofersitAbschlussberichtSicherheitsanalyseGesamtsystems2024, title = {Abschlussbericht {{Sicherheitsanalyse}} Des {{Gesamtsystems ePA}} Für Alle}, author = {{Fraunhofer SIT}}, date = {2024-08-09}, url = {https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/fileadmin/dokumente/studien_und_technical_reports/Abschlussbericht_Sicherheitsanalyse_ePA_fuer_alle_Fraunhofer_SIT.pdf}, - urldate = {2025-05-16}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/AD5MS92X/Abschlussbericht_Sicherheitsanalyse_ePA_fuer_alle_Fraunhofer_SIT.pdf} + urldate = {2025-05-16} } @article{frazelle2019, @@ -2099,8 +2262,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-05}, abstract = {Kaufen Sie LWL-Pigtail, 1M 12 Fasern SC Singlemode Fasernarbcodiertes LWL-Pigtail, SC/APC Stecker beim Lichtwellenleiter(LWL) Pigtail Hersteller mit besten Preis}, langid = {ngerman}, - organization = {FS.com}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CS2J3R4Q/42416.html} + organization = {FS.com} } @article{fujimotoDemonstrationHTDetectionMethod2018, @@ -2118,6 +2280,12 @@ urldate = {2025-09-30} } +@online{FunLCDsVisual, + title = {Fun with {{LCDs}} and {{Visual Cryptography}}}, + url = {https://justi.cz/security/2020/07/30/lcd-crypto.html}, + urldate = {2025-11-18} +} + @article{ganjiHighPerformancePlanar2017, title = {High Performance Planar Micro-Transformer Using Novel Crossover Connection}, author = {Ganji, Bahram Azizollah and Molanzadeh, Mohammad}, @@ -2132,8 +2300,7 @@ url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00542-017-3494-6}, urldate = {2024-09-23}, abstract = {In this paper a novel planar micro-transformer with high performance is presented. Non-uniform current density distribution, especially in inner turn, increases the effective metal resistance due to skin and proximity effect. In order to overcome this problem, a novel crossover connection between turns has been used to make equal current paths in the turns and uniform the current distribution. By reducing the current crowding effects, the effective resistance is minimized, thereby the transformer performance characteristics can be increased. Simulation has been taken using ADS Momentum and HFSS software. The results show that the quality factor, self-inductance, mutual inductance and coupling factor are about 42.6, 4.9, 3.3 nH, 0.747 respectively, at 3.5~GHz frequency. The footprint of proposed structure is 860~μm~×~860~μm. Compare with conventional micro-transformer, 17\% in quality factor, 5\% in coupling coefficient and more than 20\% in self and mutual inductance improvement has been achieved.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Ganji_Molanzadeh_High performance planar micro-transformer using novel crossover connection.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{gaoOptimalDesignPCB2024, @@ -2150,14 +2317,12 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {The coreless axial flux permanent magnet synchronous motor with printed circuit board stator (PCB motor for short) has attracted research interests for many advantages, such as flexible and precise winding design, low toque ripple, noiseless operation and simple manufacturing process. The motor performance, however, highly depends on its wiring design, which should be carefully optimized. In this article, an arc-shaped distributed winding is adopted due to its higher efficiency. The PCB motor has a 3D magnetic field distribution, which makes its optimal design very difficult since the 3D finite element analysis is usually required. In this article, an analytical model of PCB motor including 3D magnetic field, arc-shaped winding flux linkage and eddy current loss is firstly deduced. On this basis, a multi-objective optimal design is then carried out to design a PCB motor for a vacuum cleaner. Compared with the concentrated winding, the arc winding can achieve a 3\% efficiency improvement. Finally, a 130 W prototype and testbench were built and the presented analytical model is verified by experiments. The results show that there is little difference between calculation and experiment. The presented method effectively simplifies the design process of this kind of motor and shortens the design time.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Energy Conversion}}}, - keywords = {3-D magnetic field calculation,Analytical models,arc-shaped winding,Axial flux motor,Magnetic cores,Magnetostatics,optimization,PCB motor,Permanent magnet motors,Solid modeling,Three-dimensional displays,Windings}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2024_Gao et al_Optimal Design of PCB Coreless Axial Flux Permanent Magnet Synchronous Motor.pdf} + keywords = {3-D magnetic field calculation,Analytical models,arc-shaped winding,Axial flux motor,Magnetic cores,Magnetostatics,optimization,PCB motor,Permanent magnet motors,Solid modeling,Three-dimensional displays,Windings} } @inproceedings{garbFORTRESSFORtifiedTamperResistant2021, title = {{{FORTRESS}}: {{FORtified Tamper-Resistant Envelope}} with {{Embedded Security Sensor}}}, shorttitle = {{{FORTRESS}}}, - booktitle = {2021 18th {{International Conference}} on {{Privacy}}, {{Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{PST}})}, author = {Garb, Kathrin and Obermaier, Johannes and Ferres, Elischa and Künig, Martin}, date = {2021-12}, pages = {1--12}, @@ -2165,16 +2330,15 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9647783/?arnumber=9647783}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, abstract = {Protecting security modules from attacks on the hardware level presents a very challenging endeavor since the attacker can manipulate the device directly through physical access. To address this issue, different physical security enclosures have been developed with the goal to cover entire hardware modules and, hence, protect them from external manipulation.Novel concepts are battery-less and based on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), aiming at overcoming the most severe drawbacks of past devices; the need for active monitoring and, thus, limited battery life-time. Although some progress has already been made for certain aspects of PUF-based enclosures, the combination and integration of all required components and the creation of a corresponding architecture for Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) is still an open issue. In this paper, we present FORTRESS, a PUF-based HSM that integrates the tamper-sensitive capacitive PUF-based envelope and its embedded security sensor IC into a secure architecture. Our concept proposes a secure life cycle concept including shipment aspects, a full key generation scheme with re-enrollment capabilities, and ourthe next generation Embedded Key Management System. With FORTRESS, we take the next step towards the productive operation of PUF-based HSMs.}, - eventtitle = {2021 18th {{International Conference}} on {{Privacy}}, {{Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{PST}})}, - keywords = {capacitive enclosure,Hardware,hardware security module,Integrated circuits,physical unclonable function,Physical unclonable function,Privacy,secure life cycle,Security,Solids,Supply chains,tamper-sensitive}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2021_Garb et al_FORTRESS.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7ASRDHVC/9647783.html} + eventtitle = {18th {{International Conference}} on {{Privacy}}, {{Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{PST}})}, + keywords = {capacitive enclosure,Hardware,hardware security module,Integrated circuits,physical unclonable function,Physical unclonable function,Privacy,secure life cycle,Security,Solids,Supply chains,tamper-sensitive} } @thesis{garbTamperSensitiveDesignPUFBased, + type = {phdthesis}, title = {Tamper-Sensitive Design of PUF-Based Security Enclosures}, author = {Garb, Kathrin A}, - langid = {ngerman}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/B7UFYLEG/Garb - Tamper-Sensitive Design of PUF-Based Security Encl.pdf} + langid = {ngerman} } @article{garbWiretapChannelCapacitive2022, @@ -2193,8 +2357,31 @@ urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {In order to protect devices from physical manipulations, protective security enclosures were developed. However, these battery-backed solutions come with a reduced lifetime, and have to be actively and continuously monitored.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/68BWJ8CR/Garb et al. - 2022 - The Wiretap Channel for Capacitive PUF-Based Secur.pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security} +} + +@online{gctwnlWhenChatGPTSummarises2024, + title = {When {{ChatGPT}} Summarises, It Actually Does Nothing of the Kind.}, + author = {{GCTWNL}}, + date = {2024-05-27T21:58:15+00:00}, + url = {https://ea.rna.nl/2024/05/27/when-chatgpt-summarises-it-actually-does-nothing-of-the-kind/}, + urldate = {2025-11-02}, + abstract = {One of the use cases I thought was reasonable to expect from ChatGPT and Friends (LLMs) was summarising. It turns out I was wrong. What ChatGPT isn’t summarising at all, it only looks like it…}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {R\&A IT Strategy \& Architecture} +} + +@article{gellmanNSAInfiltratesLinks2013, + entrysubtype = {newspaper}, + title = {{{NSA}} Infiltrates Links to {{Yahoo}}, {{Google}} Data Centers Worldwide, {{Snowden}} Documents Say}, + author = {Gellman, Barton and Soltani, Ashkan}, + date = {2013-10-30}, + journaltitle = {The Washington Post}, + issn = {0190-8286}, + url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {Agency positioned itself to collect from among millions of accounts, many of them belonging to Americans}, + langid = {american} } @online{gematikSpezifikationAktensystemEPA2025, @@ -2203,8 +2390,7 @@ date = {2025-05-09}, url = {https://gemspec.gematik.de/docs/gemSpec/gemSpec_Aktensystem_ePAfueralle/latest/}, urldate = {2025-05-16}, - langid = {ngerman}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7UYIC2N4/latest.html} + langid = {ngerman} } @online{gematikSpezifikationSchluesselgenerierungsdienstEPA2023, @@ -2213,8 +2399,7 @@ date = {2023-03-31}, url = {https://gemspec.gematik.de/downloads/gemSpec/gemSpec_SGD_ePA/gemSpec_SGD_ePA_V1.6.0.pdf}, urldate = {2025-05-26}, - langid = {ngerman}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/79DUVAQG/Spezifikation Schlüsselgenerierungsdienst ePA.pdf} + langid = {ngerman} } @online{gematikUbergreifendeSpezifikationVerwendung2024, @@ -2222,8 +2407,7 @@ author = {{gematik}}, date = {2024-02-23}, url = {https://gemspec.gematik.de/downloads/gemSpec/gemSpec_Krypt/gemSpec_Krypt_V2.28.1.html}, - urldate = {2025-05-16}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4G4DKG53/gemSpec_Krypt_V2.28.1.html} + urldate = {2025-05-16} } @online{gematikUebergreifendeSpezifikationVerwendung2025, @@ -2231,8 +2415,16 @@ author = {{gematik}}, date = {2025-03-28}, url = {https://gemspec.gematik.de/downloads/gemSpec/gemSpec_Krypt/gemSpec_Krypt_V2.40.0.pdf}, - langid = {ngerman}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PTWL3X45/Übergreifende Spezifikation Verwendung kryptograph.pdf} + langid = {ngerman} +} + +@online{gematikWhitepaperDatenschutzUnd2025, + title = {Whitepaper Datenschutz und Informationssicherheit in der Telematikinfrastruktur}, + author = {{gematik}}, + date = {2025-07}, + url = {https://www.gematik.de/media/gematik/Medien/Newsroom/Publikationen/Informationsmaterialien/gematik_Whitepaper_Datenschutz_web_20250707.pdf}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + langid = {german} } @software{GerbonaraToolsHandle, @@ -2241,8 +2433,7 @@ url = {https://gitlab.com/gerbolyze/gerbonara}, urldate = {2024-12-03}, version = {1.4.0}, - keywords = {Artistic Software,excellon,gerber,Multimedia - Graphics,pcb,Printing,Scientific/Engineering,Scientific/Engineering - Electronic Design Automation (EDA),Scientific/Engineering - Image Processing,Utilities}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9XQ63WGV/gerbonara.html} + keywords = {Artistic Software,excellon,gerber,Multimedia - Graphics,pcb,Printing,Scientific/Engineering,Scientific/Engineering - Electronic Design Automation (EDA),Scientific/Engineering - Image Processing,Utilities} } @inproceedings{german2007, @@ -2271,8 +2462,7 @@ url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/nme.2579}, urldate = {2024-12-03}, abstract = {Abstract Gmsh is an open‐source 3‐D finite element grid generator with a build‐in CAD engine and post‐processor. Its design goal is to provide a fast, light and user‐friendly meshing tool with parametric input and advanced visualization capabilities. This paper presents the overall philosophy, the main design choices and some of the original algorithms implemented in Gmsh. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley \& Sons, Ltd.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2009_Geuzaine_Remacle_Gmsh.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{gevorgianLineCapacitanceImpedance2001, @@ -2288,15 +2478,13 @@ urldate = {2024-04-16}, abstract = {Closed form formulas for the basic parameters of Coplanar-Strip line on a finite thickness substrate are reviewed. New, improved formulas are derived using conformal mapping technique.}, eventtitle = {31st {{European Microwave Conference}}, 2001}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/922VM3UC/Gevorgian and Berg - 2001 - Line Capacitance and Impedance of Coplanar-Strip W.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{ghaleehDurabilitySolderJoints, title = {The Durability of Solder Joints under Thermo- Mechanical Loading; Application to {{Sn-37Pb}} and {{Sn-3}}.{{8Ag-0}}.{{7Cu}} Lead-Free Replacement Alloy}, author = {Ghaleeh, Mohammad}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/UXRA7DMN/Ghaleeh - The durability of solder joints under thermo- mech.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{ghasemzadehAudioSteganalysisBased2016, @@ -2315,6 +2503,27 @@ keywords = {Audio steganalysis,Audio steganography,Human auditory system,Mel frequency cepstrum coefficients,Universal steganalysis} } +@article{gibneyCanResearchersStop2025, + title = {Can Researchers Stop {{AI}} Making up Citations?}, + author = {Gibney, Elizabeth}, + date = {2025-09-08}, + journaltitle = {Nature}, + volume = {645}, + number = {8081}, + pages = {569--570}, + publisher = {Nature Publishing Group}, + issn = {1476-4687}, + doi = {10.1038/d41586-025-02853-8}, + url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-02853-8}, + urldate = {2025-12-04}, + abstract = {OpenAI’s GPT-5 hallucinates less than previous models do, but cutting hallucination completely might prove impossible.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Computer science}, + annotation = {Bandiera\_abtest: a\\ +Cg\_type: News\\ +Subject\_term: Computer science} +} + @incollection{giraultGeneralizedBirthdayAttack1988, title = {A {{Generalized Birthday Attack}}}, booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} — {{EUROCRYPT}} ’88}, @@ -2330,15 +2539,13 @@ urldate = {2024-07-31}, abstract = {We generalize the birthday attack presented by Coppersmith at Crypto'8S which defrauded a Davies-Price message authentication scheme. We first study the birthday paradox and a variant f o r which some convergence results and related bounds are provided. Secondly, we generalize the Davies-Price scheme and show how the Coppersmith attack can be extended to this case. AS a consequence, the case p=4 with DES (important when RSA with a 512-bit modulus is used €or signature) appears not to be secure enough.}, isbn = {978-3-540-50251-7}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/IUACRFKT/Girault et al. - 1988 - A Generalized Birthday Attack.pdf} + langid = {english} } @online{GithubRepositoryERPFD, title = {Github Repository: {{eRP-FD}}/Vau-Hsm}, url = {https://github.com/eRP-FD/vau-hsm/tree/master}, - urldate = {2025-05-16}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/33V8YQTK/master.html} + urldate = {2025-05-16} } @inproceedings{goldbergPlanarFabricationMesoscale2014, @@ -2355,8 +2562,21 @@ abstract = {Mesoscale robots are devices with characteristic dimensions in the centimeter to millimeter scale, with feature sizes ranging from millimeters to micrometers. Due to the physics involved in scaling down conventional motors, such robots frequently require novel approaches to actuation. Actuation can have a very significant effect on robot performance, particularly at small scales where locomotion becomes energetically expensive; however, existing options for small-scale actuation are quite limited. We present a mesoscale voice coil actuator (VCA) with favorable scaling characteristics and a design that minimizes costly frictional effects at small scales while allowing fast, linear, high-displacement motion. The VCA is fabricated using planar manufacturing techniques, making it well-suited for integration into a number of mesoscale robotic platforms and for mass production. The designed VCA has a mass of 310mg, maximum force of 11.8mN, bandwidth of 51Hz, and a stroke of 4mm.}, eventtitle = {2014 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})}, isbn = {978-1-4799-3685-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/W9TDCK43/Goldberg et al. - 2014 - Planar fabrication of a mesoscale voice coil actua.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@article{goldmanUnrestrainedChineseCyberattackers2025, + entrysubtype = {newspaper}, + title = {‘{{Unrestrained}}’ {{Chinese Cyberattackers May Have Stolen Data From Almost Every American}}}, + author = {Goldman, Adam}, + date = {2025-09-04}, + journaltitle = {The New York Times}, + issn = {0362-4331}, + url = {https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/04/world/asia/china-hack-salt-typhoon.html}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {Information collected during the yearslong Salt Typhoon attack could allow Beijing’s intelligence services to track targets from the United States and dozens of other countries.}, + langid = {american}, + keywords = {China,Cyberattacks and Hackers,Cyberwarfare and Defense,Defense and Military Forces,Espionage and Intelligence Services,International Relations,Surveillance of Citizens by Government,United States Politics and Government} } @book{golumbiaCulturalLogicComputation2009, @@ -2384,8 +2604,7 @@ url = {https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0070206}, urldate = {2024-05-29}, abstract = {We introduce a protocol with a reconfigurable filter system to create non-overlapping single loops in the smart power grid for the realization of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise secure key distribution system. The protocol is valid for onedimensional radial networks (chain-like power line) which are typical of the electricity distribution network between the utility and the customer. The speed of the protocol (the number of steps needed) versus grid size is analyzed. When properly generalized, such a system has the potential to achieve unconditionally secure key distribution over the smart power grid of arbitrary geometrical dimensions.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z5G4ZLGR/Gonzalez et al. - 2013 - Information Theoretically Secure, Enhanced Johnson.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{gonzalezLayerLayerPatterned2022, @@ -2402,8 +2621,18 @@ url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3517251}, urldate = {2024-08-02}, abstract = {Programmable surfaces, which can be instructed to alter their shape or texture, may one day serve as a platform for tangible interfaces and adaptive environments. But so far, these structures have been constrained in scale by a challenging fabrication process, as the numerous constituent actuators must be built and assembled individually. We look towards emerging trends in mechanical engineering and consider an alternate framework — layer-driven design, which enables the production of dynamic, discretely-actuated surfaces at multiple scales. By centering the construction around patterning and stacking, forgoing individual assembly in favor of bulk processes such as photo-etching and laser cutting, we avoid the need for multiple manufacturing steps that are repeated for each of the many actuators that compose the surface. As an instance of this layer-driven model, we build an array of electrostatic valves, and use this composite material (which we refer to as Stoma-Board) to drive four types of pneumatic transducers. We also show how this technique may be readily industrialized, through integration with the highly mature and automated manufacturing processes of modern electronics. CCS Concepts: • Hardware → PCB design and layout; • Human-centered computing → Haptic devices; Interface design prototyping; • Computer systems organization → Robotics.}, + langid = {english} +} + +@online{googleCloudHSMCloud2025, + title = {Cloud {{HSM}} | {{Cloud Key Management Service}}}, + author = {{Google}}, + date = {2025-11-13}, + url = {https://docs.cloud.google.com/kms/docs/hsm}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + abstract = {Allows you to host encryption keys and perform cryptographic operations in a Hardware Security Module (HSM) cluster.}, langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MMG6X3Q8/Gonzalez and Hudson - 2022 - Layer by Layer, Patterned Valves Enable Programmab.pdf} + organization = {Google Cloud Documentation} } @incollection{goosInformationTheoreticallySecure1999, @@ -2414,15 +2643,13 @@ date = {1999}, volume = {1666}, pages = {65--79}, - publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, - location = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, + publisher = {Springer}, doi = {10.1007/3-540-48405-1_5}, url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/3-540-48405-1_5}, urldate = {2024-05-29}, abstract = {We provide a simple secret-key two-party secure communication scheme, which is provably information-theoretically secure in the limited-storage-space model. The limited-storage-space model postulates an eavesdropper who can execute arbitrarily complex computations, and is only limited in the total amount of storage space (not computation space) available to him. The bound on the storage space can be arbitrarily large (e.g. terabytes), as long as it is fixed. Given this bound, the protocol guarantees that the probability of the eavesdropper of gaining any information on the message is exponentially small. The proof of our main results utilizes a novel combination of linear algebra and Kolmogorov complexity considerations.}, isbn = {978-3-540-66347-8 978-3-540-48405-9}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/J7DQKVVH/Goos et al. - 1999 - Information Theoretically Secure Communication in .pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{gotteCantTouchThis2022, @@ -2438,8 +2665,53 @@ urldate = {2024-11-08}, abstract = {In this paper, we introduce a novel countermeasure against physical attacks: Inertial Hardware Security Modules (IHSMs). Conventional systems have in common that their security requires the crafting of fine sensor structures that respond to minute manipulations of the monitored security boundary or volume. Our approach is novel in that we reduce the sensitivity requirement of security meshes and other sensors and increase the complexity of any manipulations by rotating the security mesh or sensor at high speed—thereby presenting a moving target to an attacker. Attempts to stop the rotation are easily monitored with commercial MEMS accelerometers and gyroscopes. Our approach leads to an HSM that can easily be built from off-the-shelf parts by any university electronics lab, yet offers a level of security that is comparable to commercial HSMs. We have built a proof-of-concept hardware prototype that demonstrates solutions to the concept’s main engineering challenges. As part of this proof-of-concept, we have found that a system using a coarse security mesh made from commercial printed circuit boards and an automotive high-g-force accelerometer already provides a useful level of security.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {electronic commerce,hardware security,implementation,smart cards}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Götte_Scheuermann_Can’t Touch This.pdf} + keywords = {electronic commerce,hardware security,implementation,smart cards} +} + +@inproceedings{gotteGermanyRollingOut2026, + title = {Germany Is {{Rolling Out Nation-Scale Key Escrow}} and {{Nobody}} Is {{Talking About}} It}, + booktitle = {Computer {{Security}}. {{ESORICS}} 2025 {{International Workshops}}}, + author = {Götte, Jan Sebastian}, + editor = {Laborde, Romain and Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin and Yazdinejad, Abbas and Epiphaniou, Gregory and Abie, Habtamu and Ranise, Silvio and Choraś, Michał and Woźniak, Michał and Hara, Yuko and Mühlberg, Jan Tobias and Greco, Claudia and Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond}, + date = {2026}, + pages = {370--377}, + publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, + location = {Cham}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-032-16165-9_22}, + abstract = {Germany is currently rolling out an opt-out, nation-scale database of the medical records of the majority of~its population, with low-income people being disproportionally represented among its users. While there has~been considerable criticism of the system coming from civil society, independent academic analysis of the system by~the cryptography and information security community has been largely absent. In this paper, we aim to raise awareness~of the system’s existence and, based on the system’s public specifications, highlight several concerning cryptographic engineering decisions. Our core observations is that the system’s most sensitive long-term user keys are derived~by a rudimentary, home-grown centralized key escrow mechanism. This mechanism relies on a per-use salt and only 256~bit of entropy, shared globally across millions of users. Furthermore, the system’s specification mandates only level~3 compliance with the obsolete FIPS 140-2 security standard, which requires “hard, opaque potting”, but lacks active tamper sensing. As a result, the system remains vulnerable to attacks by nation states and other well-funded adversaries.}, + isbn = {978-3-032-16165-9}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Cryptography,Governance,Hardware Security Module (HSM),Healthcare,Physical Security,Tamper Resistance} +} + +@inproceedings{gotteHighFidelitySecurity2026, + title = {High {{Fidelity Security Mesh Monitoring}} Using {{Low-Cost}}, {{Embedded Time Domain Reflectometry}}}, + booktitle = {Transactions on {{Cryptographic Hardware}} and {{Embedded Systems}}}, + author = {Götte, Jan Sebastian and Scheuermann, Björn}, + date = {2026-01}, + volume = {2026/1}, + pages = {533--558}, + publisher = {IACR}, + doi = {10.46586/tches.v2026.i1.533-558}, + url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1962}, + urldate = {2025-11-04}, + abstract = {Security Meshes are patterns of sensing traces covering an area that are used in Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) and other systems to detect attempts to physically intrude into the device's protective shell. State-of-the-art solutions manufacture meshes in bespoke processes from carefully chosen materials, which is expensive and makes replication challenging. Additionally, state-of-the-art monitoring circuits sacrifice either monitoring precision or cost efficiency. In this paper, we present an embeddable security mesh monitoring circuit constructed from low-cost, standard components that utilizes Time Domain Reflectometry (TDR) to create a unique fingerprint of a mesh. Our approach is both low-cost and precise, and enables the use of inexpensive standard Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) as security mesh material. We demonstrate a working prototype of our TDR circuit costing less than 10 € in components that achieves both time resolution and rise time better than 200 ps—a 25 × improvement over previous work. We demonstrate a simple classifier that detects several types of advanced attacks such as probing using an oscilloscope probe or micro-soldering attacks with no false negatives.}, + eventtitle = {Conference on {{Cryptographic Hardware}} and {{Embedded Systems}} 2026} +} + +@inproceedings{gotzfriedCacheAttacksIntel2017, + title = {Cache {{Attacks}} on {{Intel SGX}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th {{European Workshop}} on {{Systems Security}}}, + author = {Götzfried, Johannes and Eckert, Moritz and Schinzel, Sebastian and Müller, Tilo}, + date = {2017-04-23}, + series = {{{EuroSec}}'17}, + pages = {1--6}, + publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, + doi = {10.1145/3065913.3065915}, + url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3065913.3065915}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {For the first time, we practically demonstrate that Intel SGX enclaves are vulnerable against cache-timing attacks. As a case study, we present an access-driven cache-timing attack on AES when running inside an Intel SGX enclave. Using Neve and Seifert's elimination method, as well as a cache probing mechanism relying on Intel PMC, we are able to extract the AES secret key in less than 10 seconds by investigating 480 encrypted blocks on average. The AES implementation we attack is based on a Gladman AES implementation taken from an older version of OpenSSL, which is known to be vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. In contrast to previous works on cache-timing attacks, our attack is executed with root privileges running on the same host as the vulnerable enclave. Intel SGX, however, was designed to precisely protect applications against such root-level attacks. As a consequence, we show that SGX cannot withstand its designated attacker model when it comes to side-channel vulnerabilities. To the contrary, the attack surface for side-channels increases dramatically in the scenario of SGX due to the power of root-level attackers, for example, by exploiting the accuracy of PMC, which is restricted to kernel code.}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-4935-2} } @online{greenbergSignalMoreEncrypted2024, @@ -2460,28 +2732,24 @@ date = {2021}, pages = {531--561}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_18}, abstract = {MiniQCrypt is a world where quantum-secure one-way functions exist, and quantum communication is possible. We construct an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in MiniQCrypt that achieves simulation-security in the plain model against malicious quantum polynomial-time adversaries, building on the foundational work of Crépeau and Killian (FOCS 1988) and Bennett, Brassard, Crépeau and Skubiszewska (CRYPTO 1991). Combining the OT protocol with prior works, we obtain secure two-party and multi-party computation protocols also in MiniQCrypt. This is in contrast to the classical world, where it is widely believed that one-way functions alone do not give us OT.}, isbn = {978-3-030-77886-6}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Grilo et al_2021_Oblivious Transfer Is in MiniQCrypt.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{grisafiPISTISTrustedComputing, title = {{{PISTIS}}: {{Trusted Computing Architecture}} for {{Low-end Embedded Systems}}}, author = {Grisafi, Michele and Ammar, Mahmoud and Crispo, Bruno and Roveri, Marco}, abstract = {Recently, several hardware-assisted security architectures have been proposed to mitigate the ever-growing cyberattacks on Internet-connected devices. However, such proposals are not compatible with a large portion of the already deployed resource-constrained embedded devices due to hardware limitations. To fill this gap, we propose PISTIS, a puresoftware trusted computing architecture for bare-metal lowend embedded devices. PISTIS enables several security services, such as memory isolation, remote attestation and secure code update, while fully supporting critical features such as Direct Memory Access (DMA) and interrupts. PISTIS targets a wide range of embedded devices including those that lack any hardware protection mechanisms, while only requiring a few kilobytes of Flash memory to store its root of trust (RoT) software. The entire architecture of PISTIS is built from the ground up by leveraging memory protectionenabling techniques such as assembly-level code verification and selective software virtualisation. Most importantly, PISTIS achieves strong security guarantees supported by a formally verified design. We implement and evaluate PISTIS on MSP430 architecture, showing a reasonable overhead in terms of runtime, memory footprint, and power consumption.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PSGQDYRQ/Grisafi et al. - PISTIS Trusted Computing Architecture for Low-end.pdf} + langid = {english} } @standard{GrobkonzeptEPAFuer2023, title = {Grobkonzept ePA für alle}, date = {2023-12-13}, langid = {ngerman}, - version = {1.0.0}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XRXV6BY6/Grobkonzept ePA für alle.pdf} + version = {1.0.0} } @online{groupUsingLaserDirect2012, @@ -2508,8 +2776,7 @@ url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41566-023-01168-2}, urldate = {2024-09-02}, abstract = {Abstract Quantum key distribution has emerged as the most viable scheme to guarantee information security in the presence of large-scale quantum computers and, thanks to the continuous progress made in the past 20 years, it is now commercially available. However, the secret key rates remain limited to just over 10\,Mbps due to several bottlenecks on the receiver side. Here we present a custom multipixel superconducting nanowire single-photon detector that is designed to guarantee high count rates and precise timing discrimination. Leveraging the performance of the detector and coupling it to fast acquisition and real-time key distillation electronics, we remove two major roadblocks and achieve a considerable increase of the secret key rates with respect to the state of the art. In combination with a simple 2.5-GHz clocked time-bin quantum key distribution system, we can generate secret keys at a rate of 64\,Mbps over a distance of 10.0\,km and at a rate of 3.0\,Mbps over a distance of 102.4\,km with real-time key distillation.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PFQ9ZFFV/Grünenfelder et al. - 2023 - Fast single-photon detectors and real-time key dis.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{grunenfelderLimitsMultiplexingQuantum2021, @@ -2526,8 +2793,7 @@ doi = {10.1063/5.0060232}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0060232}, urldate = {2024-09-05}, - abstract = {Network integration of quantum key distribution is crucial for its future widespread deployment due to the high cost of using optical fibers dedicated for the quantum channel only. We studied the performance of a system running a simplified BB84 protocol at 2.5\,GHz repetition rate, operating in the original wavelength band, the short O-band, when multiplexed with communication channels in the conventional wavelength band, and the short C-band. Our system could successfully generate secret keys over a single-mode fiber with a length of 95.5\,km and with co-propagating classical signals at a launch power of 8.9\,dBm. Furthermore, we discuss the performance of an ideal system under the same conditions, showing the limits of what is possible with a discrete variable system in the O-band. We also considered a short and lossy link with 51\,km optical fiber resembling a real link in a metropolitan area network. In this scenario, we could exchange a secret key with a launch power up to 16.7\,dBm in the classical channels.}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Grünenfelder et al_2021_The limits of multiplexing quantum and classical channels.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/R7X3RFMF/40314.html} + abstract = {Network integration of quantum key distribution is crucial for its future widespread deployment due to the high cost of using optical fibers dedicated for the quantum channel only. We studied the performance of a system running a simplified BB84 protocol at 2.5\,GHz repetition rate, operating in the original wavelength band, the short O-band, when multiplexed with communication channels in the conventional wavelength band, and the short C-band. Our system could successfully generate secret keys over a single-mode fiber with a length of 95.5\,km and with co-propagating classical signals at a launch power of 8.9\,dBm. Furthermore, we discuss the performance of an ideal system under the same conditions, showing the limits of what is possible with a discrete variable system in the O-band. We also considered a short and lossy link with 51\,km optical fiber resembling a real link in a metropolitan area network. In this scenario, we could exchange a secret key with a launch power up to 16.7\,dBm in the classical channels.} } @report{gs21, @@ -2553,8 +2819,21 @@ url = {https://opg.optica.org/abstract.cfm?URI=boe-6-9-3320}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {A novel method (Sophia) is presented to track oxygen saturation changes in a controlled environment using an RGB camera placed approximately 1.5 m away from the subject. The method is evaluated on five healthy volunteers (Fitzpatrick skin phenotypes II, III, and IV) whose oxygen saturations were varied between 80\% and 100\% in a purpose-built chamber over 40 minutes each. The method carefully selects regions of interest (ROI) in the camera image by calculating signal-to-noise ratios for each ROI. This allows it to track changes in oxygen saturation accurately with respect to a conventional pulse oximeter (median coefficient of determination, 0.85).}, + langid = {english} +} + +@book{guerinNoGodsNo2005, + title = {No {{Gods No Masters}}: {{An Anthology}} of {{Anarchism}}}, + shorttitle = {No Gods, No Masters}, + author = {Guérin, Daniel}, + translator = {Sharkey, Paul}, + date = {2005}, + edition = {Complete unabridged ed}, + publisher = {AK Press}, + abstract = {Vol.1: Max Stirner (1806-1856) -- Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) -- Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) -- Vol.2: Mikhail Bakunin (cont.) -- Direct action and libertarian construction foreshadowed -- James Guillaume (1844-1916) -- Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921) -- Vol. 3: Errico Malatesta (1853-1932) -- Émile Henry (1872-1894) -- The French anarchists in the trade unions -- Fernand Pelloutier (1867-1901) -- Émile Pouget (1860-1931) -- The Spanish collectives -- Voline (1882-1945) -- Vol.4: Nestor Makhno (1889-1935) -- Kronstadt (1921) -- Anarchists behind bars -- Anarchism in the Spanish Civil War -- Durruti (1896-1936) and libertarian warfare -- Anarcho-syndicalism in government}, + isbn = {978-1-904859-25-3}, langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/77AW34AU/Guazzi et al. - 2015 - Non-contact measurement of oxygen saturation with .pdf} + pagetotal = {699} } @inproceedings{guoEfficientSecureMultiparty2020, @@ -2569,16 +2848,14 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Many implementations of secure computation use fixed-key AES (modeled as a random permutation); this results in substantial performance benefits due to existing hardware support for AES and the ability to avoid recomputing the AES key schedule. Surveying these implementations, however, we find that most utilize AES in a heuristic fashion; in the best case this leaves a gap in the security proof, but in many cases we show it allows for explicit attacks.Motivated by this unsatisfactory state of affairs, we initiate a comprehensive study of how to use fixed-key block ciphers for secure computation-in particular for OT extension and circuit garbling-efficiently and securely. Specifically: · Weconsider several notions of pseudorandomness for hash functions (e.g., correlation robustness), and show provably secure schemes for OT extension, garbling, and other applications based on hash functions satisfying these notions. · We provide provably secure constructions, in the (non-programmable) random-permutation model, of hash functions satisfying the different notions of pseudorandomness we consider. Taken together, our results provide end-to-end security proofs for implementations of secure-computation protocols based on fixed-key block ciphers (modeled as random permutations). Perhaps surprisingly, at the same time our work also results in noticeable performance improvements over the state-of-the-art.}, eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, - keywords = {Ciphers,Computational modeling,Correlation,Protocols,Receivers,Robustness}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Guo et al_Efficient and Secure Multiparty Computation from Fixed-Key Block Ciphers.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3MJ99Z7W/9152760.html} + keywords = {Ciphers,Computational modeling,Correlation,Protocols,Receivers,Robustness} } @article{guriFansmitterAcousticData, title = {Fansmitter: {{Acoustic Data Exfiltration}} from ({{Speakerless}}) {{Air-Gapped Computers}}}, author = {Guri, Mordechai and Solewicz, Yosef and Daidakulov, Andrey and Elovici, Yuval}, abstract = {Because computers may contain or interact with sensitive information, they are often airgapped and in this way kept isolated and disconnected from the Internet. In recent years the ability of malware to communicate over an air-gap by transmitting sonic and ultrasonic signals from a computer speaker to a nearby receiver has been shown. In order to eliminate such acoustic channels, current best practice recommends the elimination of speakers (internal or external) in secure computers, thereby creating a so-called 'audio-gap'.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LUWQNB8Q/Guri et al. - Fansmitter Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speak.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{guriFansmitterAcousticData2020, @@ -2595,8 +2872,7 @@ url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404820300080}, urldate = {2025-05-27}, abstract = {Computers that contain sensitive information are often maintained in air-gapped isolation. In this defensive measure, a computer is disconnected from the Internet - logically and physically - preventing accidental or intentional leakage of sensitive information outward. In recent years it has been shown that malware can leak data over an air-gap by transmitting sonic and ultrasonic signals from a computer speaker. In order to eliminate such acoustic covert channels, current best practice recommends the elimination of speakers in secured computers, thereby creating a so-called ‘audio-gapped’ system. In this paper, we present ‘Fansmitter,’ a malware that can acoustically exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers, even when audio hardware and speakers are not present. Our method utilizes the noise emitted from the CPU, GPU, and chassis fans. We show that a software can regulate the internal fans’ rotation speed in order to control their acoustic signal, known as blade pass frequency (BPF). Binary data can be modulated and transmitted over these audio signals to a remote microphone (e.g., a nearby smartphone). We present design considerations, including acoustic waveform analysis, data modulation and demodulation, and data transmission and reception. We evaluate the acoustic covert channel with various fans at different distances and present the results. We also discuss issues such as stealth, interference, and countermeasures. Using our method we successfully transmitted data from audio-less, air-gapped computers, to a mobile phone in the same room. We demonstrated an effective transmission at distances of 1–8~m, with a maximum bit rate of 60 bit/min per fan.}, - keywords = {Air gaps,Computer viruses,Network security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/G4337H6G/S0167404820300080.html} + keywords = {Air gaps,Computer viruses,Network security} } @inproceedings{guriMOSQUITOCovertUltrasonic2018, @@ -2611,8 +2887,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {In this paper we show how two or more air-gapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the capability of a malware to exploit a specific audio chip feature in order to reverse the connected speakers from output devices into input devices - unobtrusively rendering them microphones. We discuss the attack model and provide technical background and implementation details. We show that although the reversed speakers/headphones/earphones were not originally designed to perform as microphones, they still respond well to the near-ultrasonic range (18kHz to 24kHz). We evaluate the communication channel with different equipment, and at various distances and transmission speeds, and also discuss some practical considerations. Our results show that the speaker-to-speaker communication can be used to covertly transmit data between two air-gapped computers positioned a maximum of nine meters away from one another.}, eventtitle = {2018 {{IEEE Conference}} on {{Dependable}} and {{Secure Computing}} ({{DSC}})}, - keywords = {Acoustics,Computers,Headphones,Lifting equipment,Magnetoacoustic effects,Malware,Microphones}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Guri et al_MOSQUITO.pdf} + keywords = {Acoustics,Computers,Headphones,Lifting equipment,Magnetoacoustic effects,Malware,Microphones} } @article{guriSpeakertospeakerCovertUltrasonic2020, @@ -2649,8 +2924,8 @@ @www{haines2006, title = {{{US}} Outfit Patents 'invisible' {{UAV}}: {{Stealth}} through Persistence of Vision}, author = {Haines, Lester}, - editor = {Register, The}, date = {2006-09-25}, + journaltitle = {The Register}, url = {https://www.theregister.com/2006/09/25/phantom_sentinel/}, urldate = {2020-09-17} } @@ -2665,8 +2940,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US3594770A/en?q=(H01L23%2f576)&oq=(H01L23%2f576)&sort=old&page=2}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, abstract = {A guarding apparatus responsive to violation of the security of an area or space, comprising a printed or similar gridlike circuit configuration of conductors, preferably of resistance characteristic, connected to form one or several continuous trigger circuits. The configuration may be in the nature of printed circuit panels arranged to enclose, preferably completely, the desired area of security, as by constituting part of the walls, floor, junction or connector boxes and the like. The circuitry is connected, as by a cable, to an energized electrical detector which may comprise an instrument movement and a bridge, whereby any shorting or breaking of one or more of the printed or similar conductors will result in a response by the instrument movement.}, - keywords = {bridge,circuit,conductors,grid,printed}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1971_Ham_Horwinski_Printed-circuit type security apparatus for protecting areas.pdf} + keywords = {bridge,circuit,conductors,grid,printed} } @inproceedings{hanScalingHardwareSecurity2019, @@ -2700,8 +2974,7 @@ url = {http://www.jocm.us/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=124&id=600}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Covert channels can be used to circumvent system and network policies by establishing communications that have not been considered in the design of the computing system. We construct a covert channel between different computing systems that utilizes audio modulation/demodulation to exchange data between the computing systems over the air medium. The underlying network stack is based on a communication system that was originally designed for robust underwater communication. We adapt the communication system to implement covert and stealthy communications by utilizing the near ultrasonic frequency range. We further demonstrate how the scenario of covert acoustical communication over the air medium can be extended to multi-hop communications and even to wireless mesh networks. A covert acoustical mesh network can be conceived as a botnet or malnet that is accessible via near-field audio communications. Different applications of covert acoustical mesh networks are presented, including the use for remote keylogging over multiple hops. It is shown that the concept of a covert acoustical mesh network renders many conventional security concepts useless, as acoustical communications are usually not considered. Finally, countermeasures against covert acoustical mesh networks are discussed, including the use of lowpass filtering in computing systems and a host-based intrusion detection system for analyzing audio input and output in order to detect any irregularities.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/W896B45Z/Hanspach and Goetz - 2013 - On Covert Acoustical Mesh Networks in Air.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{haobijamQualityFactorEnhancement2007, @@ -2715,16 +2988,27 @@ urldate = {2024-10-30}, abstract = {In order to exploit the available multilevel interconnects and to reduce the parasitic capacitances, the metal can be traced spirally up and/or down in a pyramidal manner. This paper presents two methods to improve the quality factor (Q) of pyramidically wound inductors. The first method utilizes bulk micromachining to improve the Q. Quality factor improvement of 14.7\% and 19.5\% and self resonating frequency improvement of 26.5\% and 30.6\% respectively were observed in 10 nH and 20 nH over conventional micromachined planar inductors. The second method to improve Q is by differential excitation and is illustrated for 8 nH and 23 nH symmetric pyramidal inductors. The performance of the pyramidically wound inductors are characterized using a full wave Electromagnetic simulator for a six metal layer 0.18 mum process.}, eventtitle = {2007 {{International Workshop}} on {{Physics}} of {{Semiconductor Devices}}}, - keywords = {CMOS inductor,differential excitation,Etching,Inductors,Integrated inductor,micromachining,Micromachining,Parasitic capacitance,Q factor,Radiofrequency integrated circuits,Resonant frequency,Silicon,Spirals,Wounds}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2007_Haobijam_Paily_Quality factor enhancement of CMOS inductor with pyramidal winding of metal.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/92HTG5MX/4472624.html} + keywords = {CMOS inductor,differential excitation,Etching,Inductors,Integrated inductor,micromachining,Micromachining,Parasitic capacitance,Q factor,Radiofrequency integrated circuits,Resonant frequency,Silicon,Spirals,Wounds} } @article{harrisonSoKSecurityArchitects, title = {{{SoK}}: {{A Security Architect}}’s {{View}} of {{Printed Circuit Board Attacks}}}, author = {Harrison, Jacob and Jessurun, Nathan and Tehranipoor, Mark}, abstract = {Many recent papers have proposed novel electrical measurements or physical inspection technologies for defending printed circuit boards (PCBs) and PCB assemblies (PCBAs) against tampering. As motivation, these papers frequently cite Bloomberg News’ “The Big Hack”, video game modchips, and “interdiction attacks” on IT equipment. We find this trend concerning for two reasons. First, implementation errors and security architecture are rarely discussed in recent PCBA security research, even though they were the root causes of these commonly-cited attacks and most other attacks that have occurred or been proposed by researchers. This suggests that the attacks may be poorly understood. Second, if we assume that novel countermeasures and validation methodologies are tailored to these oft-cited attacks, then significant recent work has focused on attacks that can already be mitigated instead of on open problems. We write this SoK to address these concerns. We explain which tampering threats can be mitigated by a PCBA security architecture. Then, we enumerate assumptions that security architecture depends on. We compare and contrast assurances achieved by security architecture vs. by recently-proposed electrical or inspection-based tamper detection. Finally, we review over fifty PCBA attacks to show how most can be prevented by proper architecture and careful implementation.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2SAPGWBH/Harrison et al. - SoK A Security Architect’s View of Printed Circui.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@inproceedings{harrisonSoKSecurityArchitects2025, + title = {{{SoK}}: {{A Security Architect}}'s {{View}} of {{Printed Circuit Board Attacks}}}, + shorttitle = {{{SoK}}}, + author = {Harrison, Jacob and Jessurun, Nathan and Tehranipoor, Mark}, + date = {2025}, + pages = {1907--1924}, + url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/harrison}, + urldate = {2025-11-27}, + eventtitle = {34th {{USENIX Security Symposium}} ({{USENIX Security}} 25)}, + isbn = {978-1-939133-52-6}, + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{hastingsSoKGeneralPurpose2019, @@ -2742,11 +3026,10 @@ abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a group of mutually distrustful parties to compute a joint function on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the result of the computation. This type of computation is extremely powerful and has wide-ranging applications in academia, industry, and government. Protocols for secure computation have existed for decades, but only recently have general-purpose compilers for executing MPC on arbitrary functions been developed. These projects rapidly improved the state of the art, and began to make MPC accessible to non-expert users. However, the field is changing so rapidly that it is difficult even for experts to keep track of the varied capabilities of modern frameworks. In this work, we survey general-purpose compilers for secure multi-party computation. These tools provide high-level abstractions to describe arbitrary functions and execute secure computation protocols. We consider eleven systems: EMP-toolkit, Obliv-C, ObliVM, TinyGarble, SCALE-MAMBA (formerly SPDZ), Wysteria, Sharemind, PICCO, ABY, Frigate and CBMC-GC. We evaluate these systems on a range of criteria, including language expressibility, capabilities of the cryptographic back-end, and accessibility to developers. We advocate for improved documentation of MPC frameworks, standardization within the community, and make recommendations for future directions in compiler development. Installing and running these systems can be challenging, and for each system, we also provide a complete virtual environment (Docker container) with all the necessary dependencies to run the compiler and our example programs.}, eventtitle = {2019 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, isbn = {978-1-5386-6660-9}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YL9DRUQ5/Hastings et al. - 2019 - SoK General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Pa.pdf} + langid = {english} } -@misc{HeatedFlashDrive, +@online{HeatedFlashDrive, title = {I {{Heated}} a {{Flash Drive}} to {{160C}} and It {{Still Works}}! ({{Ovrdrive Update}})}, url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LD9e73BYAnI} } @@ -2755,8 +3038,7 @@ title = {{{GRAM}} with {{O}}(Log2 n) {{Overhead}}}, author = {Heath, David and Kolesnikov, Vladimir and Ostrovsky, Rafail}, abstract = {Garbled RAM (GRAM) is a powerful technique introduced by Lu and Ostrovsky that equips Garbled Circuit (GC) with a sublinear cost RAM without adding rounds of interaction. While multiple GRAM constructions are known, none are suitable for practice, due to costs that have high constants and poor scaling.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Heath et al_GRAM with O(log2 n) Overhead.pdf} + langid = {english} } @www{heise2020t2jailbreak, @@ -2771,7 +3053,7 @@ title = {Cloud-{{Dienstleister OVH}}: {{Feuer}} Zerstört {{Rechenzentrum}}, Ein Weiteres Beschädigt}, author = {Holland, Martin}, date = {2021-03-10}, - publisher = {Heise Online / Heise Online}, + journaltitle = {heise online}, url = {https://www.heise.de/news/OVH-Feuer-zerstoert-Rechenzentrum-in-Strassburg-ein-weiteres-beschaedigt-5076320.html} } @@ -2785,8 +3067,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US7475474B2/en?q=(tamper+monitoring+circuit)&oq=tamper+monitoring+circuit&page=2}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {circuit board,pcb,printed circuit,tamper,traces}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2009_Heitmann et al_Method of making tamper detection circuit for an electronic device.pdf} + keywords = {circuit board,pcb,printed circuit,tamper,traces} } @patent{heitmannTamperBarrierElectronic2005, @@ -2799,8 +3080,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20050161253A1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {circuit board,electrical contact,layer,printed circuit,traces}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2005_Heitmann et al_Tamper barrier for electronic device.pdf} + keywords = {circuit board,electrical contact,layer,printed circuit,traces} } @article{helfinstineOpticalFibreStrength1982, @@ -2825,8 +3105,7 @@ author = {{Henkel Electronic Materials}}, date = {2019-02-14}, url = {https://print-your-electronics-with-loctite.com/mediafiles/Bilder/Brochure_Henkel_Inks_and_Coatings.pdf}, - urldate = {2025-09-03}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RUKG95IR/Brochure_Henkel_Inks_and_Coatings.pdf} + urldate = {2025-09-03} } @patent{hennigApparatusMethodComprising2020, @@ -2835,27 +3114,24 @@ author = {Hennig, Maxim and Schimmel, Oliver and Zieris, Philipp and Filipovic, Bartol}, holder = {{Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Angewandten Forschung eV}}, date = {2020-03-17}, - number = {10592665B2}, + number = {14867889}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10592665B2/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {carrier,circuit structures,component,implemented,result}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Hennig et al_Apparatus and method comprising a carrier with circuit structures.pdf} + keywords = {carrier,circuit structures,component,implemented,result} } @article{henzingerOneServerPrice, title = {One {{Server}} for the {{Price}} of {{Two}}: {{Simple}} and {{Fast Single-Server Private Information Retrieval}}}, author = {Henzinger, Alexandra and Hong, Matthew M and Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry and Meiklejohn, Sarah and Vaikuntanathan, Vinod}, abstract = {We present SimplePIR, the fastest single-server private information retrieval scheme known to date. SimplePIR’s security holds under the learning-with-errors assumption. To answer a client’s query, the SimplePIR server performs fewer than one 32-bit multiplication and one 32-bit addition per database byte. SimplePIR achieves 10 GB/s/core server throughput, which approaches the memory bandwidth of the machine and the performance of the fastest two-server privateinformation-retrieval schemes (which require non-colluding servers). SimplePIR has relatively large communication costs: to make queries to a 1 GB database, the client must download a 121 MB “hint” about the database contents; thereafter, the client may make an unbounded number of queries, each requiring 242 KB of communication. We present a second single-server scheme, DoublePIR, that shrinks the hint to 16 MB at the cost of slightly higher per-query communication (345 KB) and slightly lower throughput (7.4 GB/s/core). Finally, we apply our new private-information-retrieval schemes, together with a novel data structure for approximate set membership, to the task of private auditing in Certificate Transparency. We achieve a strictly stronger notion of privacy than Google Chrome’s current approach with 13× more communication: 16 MB of download per week, along with 1.5 KB per TLS connection.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CNLJAWPW/Henzinger et al. - One Server for the Price of Two Simple and Fast S.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{hestermanAnalysisModelingMagnetic, title = {Analysis and {{Modeling}} of {{Magnetic Coupling}}}, author = {Hesterman, Bryce}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/5XHEVUEN/Hesterman - Analysis and Modeling of Magnetic Coupling.pdf} + langid = {english} } @thesis{hiemstraDesignMovingMagnet2014, @@ -2863,8 +3139,7 @@ author = {Hiemstra, David}, date = {2014-07-01}, doi = {10.13140/RG.2.2.13711.69288}, - abstract = {Moving magnet actuators (MMA) are direct-drive, single-phase electromagnetic linear actuators that provide frictionless and backlash-free motion over a range of several millimeters. This work investigates the use of MMAs to simultaneously achieve large range, high speed, and high motion quality in flexure-based nanopositioning systems. This work impacts technologies such as scanning probe microscopy and lithography, industrial semiconductor wafer quality control processes, and other applications which rely on nanopositioning systems to provide controlled motion with nanoscale precision, resolution and accuracy. Various actuator types are compared to meet system-level requirements and the MMA is chosen as a promising potential candidate. Component and system level design challenges and associated tradeoffs in designing the MMA to meet nanopositioning performance are discussed and derived in this thesis. In particular, it is shown that even as the overall size of an MMA is varied, the actuation force remains directly proportional to the square root of the actuator’s moving magnet mass and the square root of power consumed. This proportionality constant, identified as the dynamic actuator constant, serves as a novel and important figure of merit for MMAs. It describes fundamental performance limits for MMAs and enables the determination of an optimized MMA geometry in a simplified manner. When an MMA is employed in a flexure-based nanopositioning system, this constant directly impacts the system-level positioning performance in terms of range, resolution, speed, and temperature control. This highlights the significance of incorporating a thermal management system for heat dissipation, minimizing noise and harmonic distortion in the current driver, choosing a low ground vibration setting, and improving the force-stroke uniformity of the actuator. Based on this understanding, a single-axis nanopositioning system that simultaneously achieves 10mm range, 4nm resolution, open-loop natural frequency of 25Hz, and temperature rise of less than 0.5°C, is designed, fabricated, and tested. The significance of the dynamic actuator constant is experimentally validated. A novel thermal management system is tested to successfully mitigate heat dissipation. Preliminary controller design and closed-loop operation highlight the potential of MMAs in large range, high speed nanopositioning. These results point to the importance of achieving greater values of the dynamic actuator constant while maintaining low force– stroke non-uniformity. This motivates the development of actuators with a higher dynamic actuator constant. A novel MMA architecture and other MMA and VCA innovations are presented to achieve a significantly higher dynamic actuator constant and improve motion system performance.}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2014_Hiemstra_Design of Moving Magnet Actuators for Large-range Flexure-based Nanopositioning.pdf} + abstract = {Moving magnet actuators (MMA) are direct-drive, single-phase electromagnetic linear actuators that provide frictionless and backlash-free motion over a range of several millimeters. This work investigates the use of MMAs to simultaneously achieve large range, high speed, and high motion quality in flexure-based nanopositioning systems. This work impacts technologies such as scanning probe microscopy and lithography, industrial semiconductor wafer quality control processes, and other applications which rely on nanopositioning systems to provide controlled motion with nanoscale precision, resolution and accuracy. Various actuator types are compared to meet system-level requirements and the MMA is chosen as a promising potential candidate. Component and system level design challenges and associated tradeoffs in designing the MMA to meet nanopositioning performance are discussed and derived in this thesis. In particular, it is shown that even as the overall size of an MMA is varied, the actuation force remains directly proportional to the square root of the actuator’s moving magnet mass and the square root of power consumed. This proportionality constant, identified as the dynamic actuator constant, serves as a novel and important figure of merit for MMAs. It describes fundamental performance limits for MMAs and enables the determination of an optimized MMA geometry in a simplified manner. When an MMA is employed in a flexure-based nanopositioning system, this constant directly impacts the system-level positioning performance in terms of range, resolution, speed, and temperature control. This highlights the significance of incorporating a thermal management system for heat dissipation, minimizing noise and harmonic distortion in the current driver, choosing a low ground vibration setting, and improving the force-stroke uniformity of the actuator. Based on this understanding, a single-axis nanopositioning system that simultaneously achieves 10mm range, 4nm resolution, open-loop natural frequency of 25Hz, and temperature rise of less than 0.5°C, is designed, fabricated, and tested. The significance of the dynamic actuator constant is experimentally validated. A novel thermal management system is tested to successfully mitigate heat dissipation. Preliminary controller design and closed-loop operation highlight the potential of MMAs in large range, high speed nanopositioning. These results point to the importance of achieving greater values of the dynamic actuator constant while maintaining low force– stroke non-uniformity. This motivates the development of actuators with a higher dynamic actuator constant. A novel MMA architecture and other MMA and VCA innovations are presented to achieve a significantly higher dynamic actuator constant and improve motion system performance.} } @inproceedings{hinagaThermalEffectsPCB2010, @@ -2873,8 +3148,7 @@ date = {2010}, abstract = {Values for printed circuit board (PCB) laminate dielectric constant (Dk) and dissipation factor (Df) used in circuit design and signal integrity (SI) modeling are typically those presented on laminate maker datasheets. In most cases, these values are derived from measurements on samples which have not been exposed to thermal stresses representative of the printed circuit board (PCB) assembly process. This paper discusses the changes in Dk and Df values for a variety of laminate materials following simulated assembly thermal exposure of test vehicles to six SMT cycles at 260°C (Pb-free) or 225°C (SnPb eutectic). An additional concern arises around an effect of operating temperatures upon the effective Dk and Df of PCB materials. Due to thermal radiation from active IC devices, power supplies, etc., the operating temperature of PCBs within a network equipment chassis is typically higher than the 23-25°C value at which Dk and Df are measured and reported. This paper also describes the changes in Dk and Df observed when the test samples were measured at temperatures of 50°C and 75°C.}, eventtitle = {{{IPC Apex Expo}}}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EATYK8AG/Hinaga - Thermal Effects on PCB Laminate Material Dielectri.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{hongDesignCompensationControl2020, @@ -2889,8 +3163,19 @@ urldate = {2024-09-05}, abstract = {Snake-like robots for endoscopic surgery make it possible to reach deep-seated lesions. With the use of small flexible tendon-driven instruments, it is possible to perform bimanual micro-surgical tasks that are challenging for standard endoscopic surgeries. Existing devices, however, lack articulated wrists and rolling motion of the end-effector. This paper presents a new instrument design with a distal-roll gripper for snake-like robots. The developed 5 DoFs miniaturized instruments with a diameter of 3 mm enable the deployment into narrow endoluminal channels. Issues related to actuation coupling, tendon slack, and backlash are addressed. Experimental results show that the distal-roll gripper can rotate 106°, and the actuated joints can achieve good repeatability and accuracy with the proposed compensation control scheme.}, eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})}, - keywords = {Gears,Grippers,Instruments,Joints,Robots,Surgery,Tendons}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Hong et al_2020_Design and Compensation Control of a Flexible Instrument for Endoscopic Surgery.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8CGJKAZ8/9196955.html} + keywords = {Gears,Grippers,Instruments,Joints,Robots,Surgery,Tendons} +} + +@book{horowitzArtElectronics2024, + title = {The Art of Electronics}, + author = {Horowitz, Paul and Hill, Winfield}, + date = {2024}, + edition = {Third edition, 21st printing with corrections}, + publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, + location = {Cambridge, New York}, + isbn = {978-0-521-80926-9}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {1230} } @article{houtman1GHzSamplingOscilloscope2000, @@ -2909,8 +3194,7 @@ date = {1962}, publisher = {Hewlett-Packard Company}, url = {http://hparchive.com/Manuals/HP-187B-Manual.pdf}, - urldate = {2025-03-11}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XU2M8JAG/HP-187B-Manual.pdf} + urldate = {2025-03-11} } @article{hsuAnalyticalDesignAlgorithm2008, @@ -2927,8 +3211,7 @@ urldate = {2024-11-08}, abstract = {A layout design algorithm for a variable-width inductor is proposed to minimize metal resistance. For a given chip area, the proposed algorithm can rapidly design metal widths of each coil in a planar inductor due to the analytical form. Two on-chip inductors with identical chip areas and inductance are fabricated to verify the proposed method in foundry 90-nm CMOS technology. Measurement results demonstrate that the improvement of metal resistance in the proposed device is approximately 19\%. The results of this paper provide an effective algorithm to design a high-Q inductor for RFIC applications.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Electron Devices}}}, - keywords = {Analytical algorithm,CMOS integrated circuits,CMOS technology,Inductors,Layout,minimum resistance,on-chip inductor,Radiofrequency integrated circuits,Resistance,variable width}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2008_Hsu et al_Analytical Design Algorithm of Planar Inductor Layout in CMOS Technology.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CKPP397K/4668566.html} + keywords = {Analytical algorithm,CMOS integrated circuits,CMOS technology,Inductors,Layout,minimum resistance,on-chip inductor,Radiofrequency integrated circuits,Resistance,variable width} } @online{HttpsArxivOrg, @@ -2952,14 +3235,21 @@ @book{huangHardwareHackerAdventures2019, title = {The {{Hardware Hacker}}: {{Adventures}} in {{Making}} and {{Breaking Hardware}}}, shorttitle = {The {{Hardware Hacker}}}, - author = {Huang, Andrew "bunnie"}, + author = {Huang, Andrew ``bunnie''}, date = {2019}, publisher = {No Starch Press}, location = {San Francisco}, abstract = {Intro -- Praise for The Hardware Hacker -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Acknowledgments -- brief contents -- contents in detail -- preface -- part 1: adventures in manufacturing -- Chapter 1. made in china -- The Ultimate Electronic Component Flea Market -- The Next Technological Revolution -- Touring Factories with Chumby -- Scale in Shenzhen -- Feeding the Factory -- Dedication to Quality -- Building Technology Without Using It -- Skilled Workers -- The Need for Craftspeople -- Automation for Electronics Assembly -- Precision, Injection Molding, and Patience -- The Challenge of Quality -- Closing Thoughts -- Chapter 2. inside three very different factories -- Where Arduinos Are Born -- Starting with a Sheet of Copper -- Applying the PCB Pattern to the Copper -- Etching the PCBs -- Applying Soldermask and Silkscreen -- Testing and Finishing the Boards -- Where USB Memory Sticks Are Born -- The Beginning of a USB Stick -- Hand-Placing Chips on a PCB -- Bonding the Chips to the PCB -- A Close Look at the USB Stick Boards -- A Tale of Two Zippers -- A Fully Automated Process -- A Semiautomated Process -- The Irony of Scarcity and Demand -- Chapter 3. the factory floor -- How to Make a Bill of Materials -- A Simple BOM for a Bicycle Safety Light -- Approved Manufacturers -- Tolerance, Composition, and Voltage Specification -- Electronic Component Form Factor -- Extended Part Numbers -- The Bicycle Safety Light BOM Revisited -- Planning for and Coping with Change -- Process Optimization: Design for Manufacturing -- Why DFM? -- Tolerances to Consider -- Following DFM Helps Your Bottom Line -- The Product Behind Your Product -- Testing vs. Validation -- Finding Balance in Industrial Design -- The chumby One's Trim and Finish -- The Arduino Uno's Silkscreen Art -- My Design Process -- Picking (and Maintaining) a Partner}, isbn = {978-1-59327-758-1 978-1-59327-813-7}, - langid = {english}, - pagetotal = {1} + langid = {english} +} + +@online{hughesCypherpunksManifesto, + title = {A {{Cypherpunk}}'s {{Manifesto}}}, + author = {Hughes, Eric}, + url = {https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html}, + urldate = {2025-11-18}, + annotation = {Archived: \textbackslash url\{https://web.archive.org/web/20251002111923/https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html\}} } @report{hundRadiofrequencyResistanceInductance1925, @@ -2974,8 +3264,7 @@ doi = {10.6028/nbst.8267}, url = {https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/nbstechnologic/nbstechnologicpaperT298.pdf}, urldate = {2024-09-10}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YUEJUYMM/Hund and De Groot - 1925 - Radio-frequency resistance and inductance of coils.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{hussainTinyGarble2SmartEfficient2020, @@ -2993,8 +3282,7 @@ abstract = {We present TinyGarble2 – a C++ framework for privacy-preserving computation through the Yao’s Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol in both the honest-but-curious and the malicious security models. TinyGarble2 provides a rich library with arithmetic and logic building blocks for developing GC-based secure applications. The framework offers abstractions among three layers: the C++ program, the GC back-end and the Boolean logic representation of the function being computed. TinyGarble2 thus allowing the most optimized versions of all pertinent components. These abstractions, coupled with secure share transfer among the functions make TinyGarble2 the fastest and most memory-efficient GC framework. In addition, the framework provides a library for Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). Our evaluations show that TinyGarble2 is the fastest among the current end-to-end GC frameworks while also being scalable in terms of memory footprint. Moreover, it performs 18× faster on the CNN LeNet-5 compared to the existing scalable frameworks.}, eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '20: 2020 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-8088-1}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FBJ4V9LW/Hussain et al. - 2020 - TinyGarble2 Smart, Efficient, and Scalable Yao's .pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{huttnerLongrangeQKDTrusted2022, @@ -3010,8 +3298,7 @@ doi = {10.1038/s41534-022-00613-4}, url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41534-022-00613-4}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Huttner et al_2022_Long-range QKD without trusted nodes is not possible with current technology.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{iaea2011, @@ -3025,41 +3312,49 @@ isbn = {978-92-0-118910-3} } -@www{iana21, +@online{iana21, title = {Root Zone {{KSK}} Operator Key Management Procedure}, author = {{Root Zone KSK Operator Policy Management Authority}}, date = {2021-09-22}, url = {https://www.iana.org/dnssec/procedures/ksk-operator/KSK_Key_Management_Procedure_v3.4.pdf}, - urldate = {2021-10-07}, - version = {Version 3.4} + urldate = {2021-10-07} +} + +@online{ibmCloudHSM2016, + title = {Cloud {{HSM}}}, + author = {{IBM}}, + date = {2016-05-01}, + url = {https://cloud.ibm.com/catalog/infrastructure/cloud.ibm.com/catalog/infrastructure/hardware-security-module}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + abstract = {A hardware security module (HSM) is a dedicated crypto processor designed for the protection of the crypto key life cycle. HSMs act as trust anchors that protect the cryptographic infrastructure of some of the most security-conscious organizations in the world by securely managing, processing, and storing cryptographic keys inside a hardened, tamper-resistant device. Cloud HSM is a FIPS 140-2 Level 3 validated, single-tenant device available around the world where you need it most.}, + langid = {american} } @online{IEEEXploreFullText, title = {{{IEEE Xplore Full-Text PDF}}:}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=514853}, - urldate = {2024-05-22}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/U6BHG3AD/stamp.html} + urldate = {2024-05-22} } @online{IEEEXploreFullTexta, title = {{{IEEE Xplore Full-Text PDF}}:}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=6520632}, - urldate = {2024-09-10}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PQYCW7K7/stamp.html} + urldate = {2024-09-10} } @online{IEEEXploreFullTextb, title = {{{IEEE Xplore Full-Text PDF}}:}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8558378}, - urldate = {2024-09-10}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/HJJK32NF/stamp.html} + urldate = {2024-09-10} } @www{ika2002, title = {A Test Procedure for Airbags}, + author = {{International Motor Vehicle Inspection Commitee}}, date = {2002}, series = {{{CITA Research}} Study Programme on {{Electronically}} Controlled Systems on Vehicles}, - publisher = {International Motor Vehicle Inspection Commitee / Rheinisch-Westfälischen Technischen Hochschule (RWTH) Aachen, Institut für Kraftfahrwesen Aachen (IKA)} + url = {https://citainsp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ECS-RSP-Study-2-TP-airbags.pdf}, + urldate = {2026-01-17} } @article{immler2019, @@ -3078,17 +3373,16 @@ @inproceedings{immlerBTREPIDBatterylessTamperresistant2018, title = {B-{{TREPID}}: {{Batteryless}} Tamper-Resistant Envelope with a {{PUF}} and Integrity Detection}, shorttitle = {B-{{TREPID}}}, - booktitle = {2018 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Hardware Oriented Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{HOST}})}, author = {Immler, Vincent and Obermaier, Johannes and König, Martin and Hiller, Matthias and Sig, Georg}, date = {2018-04}, pages = {49--56}, + publisher = {IEEE}, doi = {10.1109/HST.2018.8383890}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8383890/?arnumber=8383890}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, abstract = {Protecting embedded devices against physical attacks is a challenging task since the attacker has control of the device in a hostile environment. To address this issue, current countermeasures typically use a battery-backed tamper-respondent envelope that encloses the entire device to create a trusted compartment. However, the battery affects the system's robustness and weight, and also leads to difficulties with the security mechanism while shipping the device. In contrast, we present a batteryless tamper-resistant envelope, which contains a fine mesh of electrodes, and its complementary security concept. An evaluation unit checks the integrity of the sensor mesh by detecting short and open circuits. Additionally, it measures the capacitances of the mesh. Once its preliminary integrity is confirmed, a cryptographic key is derived from the capacitive measurements that represent a PUF, to decrypt and authenticate the firmware of the enclosed host system. We demonstrate the feasibility of our concept, provide details on the layout and electrical properties of the batteryless envelope, and explain the underlying security architecture. Practical results from a set of manufactured envelopes facilitate future research.}, - eventtitle = {2018 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Hardware Oriented Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{HOST}})}, - keywords = {Batteries,Capacitance,Capacitance measurement,Cryptography,FIPS 140-2,Higher-Order Alphabet PUF (HOA PUF),Monitoring,Physical Unclonable Function (PUF),Runtime,Secure Bootstrap,Security Standards,Tamper-resistance}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Immler et al_B-TREPID.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3FBCSM8G/8383890.html} + eventtitle = {International {{Symposium}} on {{Hardware Oriented Security}} and {{Trust}} ({{HOST}})}, + keywords = {Batteries,Capacitance,Capacitance measurement,Cryptography,FIPS 140-2,Higher-Order Alphabet PUF (HOA PUF),Monitoring,Physical Unclonable Function (PUF),Runtime,Secure Bootstrap,Security Standards,Tamper-resistance} } @article{immlerSecurePhysicalEnclosures2018, @@ -3102,15 +3396,13 @@ doi = {10.46586/tches.v2019.i1.51-96}, url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7334}, urldate = {2025-04-09}, - abstract = {Ensuring physical security of multiple-chip embedded systems on a PCB is challenging, since the attacker can control the device in a hostile environment. To detect physical intruders as part of a layered approach to security, it is common to create a physical security boundary that is difficult to penetrate or remove, e.g., enclosures created from tamper-respondent envelopes or covers. Their physical integrity is usually checked by active sensing, i.e., a battery-backed circuit continuously monitors the enclosure. However, adoption is often hampered by the disadvantages of a battery and due to specialized equipment which is required to create the enclosure. In contrast, we present a batteryless tamper-resistant cover made from standard flexPCB technology, i.e., a commercially widespread, scalable, and proven technology. The cover comprises a fine mesh of electrodes and an evaluation unit underneath the cover checks their integrity by detecting short and open circuits. Additionally, it measures the capacitances between the electrodes of the mesh. Once its preliminary integrity is confirmed, a cryptographic key is derived from the capacitive measurements representing a PUF, to decrypt and authenticate sensitive data of the enclosed system. We demonstrate the feasibility of our concept, provide details on the layout, electrical properties of the cover, and explain the underlying security architecture. Practical results including statistics over a set of 115 flexPCB covers, physical attacks, and environmental testing support our design rationale. Hence, our work opens up a new direction of counteracting physical tampering without the need of batteries, while aiming at a physical security level comparable to FIPS 140-2 level 3.}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Immler et al_Secure Physical Enclosures from Covers with Tamper-Resistance.pdf} + abstract = {Ensuring physical security of multiple-chip embedded systems on a PCB is challenging, since the attacker can control the device in a hostile environment. To detect physical intruders as part of a layered approach to security, it is common to create a physical security boundary that is difficult to penetrate or remove, e.g., enclosures created from tamper-respondent envelopes or covers. Their physical integrity is usually checked by active sensing, i.e., a battery-backed circuit continuously monitors the enclosure. However, adoption is often hampered by the disadvantages of a battery and due to specialized equipment which is required to create the enclosure. In contrast, we present a batteryless tamper-resistant cover made from standard flexPCB technology, i.e., a commercially widespread, scalable, and proven technology. The cover comprises a fine mesh of electrodes and an evaluation unit underneath the cover checks their integrity by detecting short and open circuits. Additionally, it measures the capacitances between the electrodes of the mesh. Once its preliminary integrity is confirmed, a cryptographic key is derived from the capacitive measurements representing a PUF, to decrypt and authenticate sensitive data of the enclosed system. We demonstrate the feasibility of our concept, provide details on the layout, electrical properties of the cover, and explain the underlying security architecture. Practical results including statistics over a set of 115 flexPCB covers, physical attacks, and environmental testing support our design rationale. Hence, our work opens up a new direction of counteracting physical tampering without the need of batteries, while aiming at a physical security level comparable to FIPS 140-2 level 3.} } @online{ImpactPolarizationMode, title = {Impact of Polarization Mode Dispersion on Entangled Photon Distribution}, url = {https://arxiv.org/html/2408.01754v1}, - urldate = {2024-09-04}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XVM7CYB5/2408.html} + urldate = {2024-09-04} } @inproceedings{impagliazzoPersonalViewAveragecase1995, @@ -3125,14 +3417,12 @@ url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/514853/}, urldate = {2024-05-22}, eventtitle = {Structure in {{Complexity Theory}}. {{Tenth Annual IEEE Conference}}}, - isbn = {978-0-8186-7052-7}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Impagliazzo_1995_A personal view of average-case complexity.pdf} + isbn = {978-0-8186-7052-7} } @report{ImplementationSecurityQuantum, title = {Implementation {{Security}} of {{Quantum Cryptography}} - {{Introduction}}, Challenges, Solutions}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/K9YRK595/Implementation Security of Quantum Cryptography - .pdf} + langid = {english} } @patent{ImprovementElectromagneticEnvelopes1870, @@ -3142,8 +3432,7 @@ number = {110362A}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US110362A/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)&oq=(G08B13%2f126)&sort=old}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {electro,envelope,lining,safes,vaults}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1870_Improvement in electro-magnetic envelopes for safes, vaults.pdf} + keywords = {electro,envelope,lining,safes,vaults} } @patent{ImprovementProtectingSafes1870, @@ -3153,8 +3442,21 @@ number = {106324A}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US106324A/en?q=(G08B13%2f126)&oq=(G08B13%2f126)&sort=old}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {burglars,conductor,improvement,safe,vaults}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1870_Improvement in protecting safes and vaults from burglars.pdf} + keywords = {burglars,conductor,improvement,safe,vaults} +} + +@book{internetarchiveWholeEarthCatalog1969, + title = {Whole {{Earth Catalog}} {{Spring}} 1969}, + namea = {{Internet Archive}}, + nameatype = {collaborator}, + date = {1969-21}, + publisher = {Point Foundation}, + url = {http://archive.org/details/sim_whole-earth-catalog_whole-earth-catalog_spring-1969}, + urldate = {2025-10-29}, + abstract = {Whole Earth Catalog Spring 1969.. Digitized from IA1632332-05. Previous issue: sim\_whole-earth-catalog\_whole-earth-catalog\_1969-03\_supplement. Next issue: sim\_whole-earth-catalog\_whole-earth-catalog\_1969-07\_supplement.}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {132}, + keywords = {General Interest} } @inproceedings{irikura2012, @@ -3165,12 +3467,14 @@ pages = {24--28} } -@report{isaacs2013, +@inproceedings{isaacs2013, title = {Tamper Proof, Tamper Evident Encryption Technology}, + booktitle = {Pan Pacific Microelectronics Symposium}, author = {Isaacs, Phil and Morris Jr, Thomas and Fisher, Michael J and Cuthbert, Keith}, - date = {2013}, - journaltitle = {Pan pacific microelectronics symposium}, - institution = {Surface Mount Technology Association / Surface Mount Technology Association}, + date = {2013-01-22}, + publisher = {Surface Mount Technology Association}, + doi = {10.37665/ppDGZDE20978}, + eventtitle = {{{SMTA Pan Pacific Symposium}}}, x-fetchedfrom = {Google Scholar} } @@ -3191,8 +3495,7 @@ urldate = {2025-08-15}, abstract = {We consider the problem of extending oblivious transfers: Given a small number of oblivious transfers “for free,” can one implement a large number of oblivious transfers? Beaver has shown how to extend oblivious transfers given a one-way function. However, this protocol is inefficient in practice, in part due to its non-black-box use of the underlying one-way function.}, isbn = {978-3-540-40674-7 978-3-540-45146-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6DAXJHL2/Ishai et al. - 2003 - Extending Oblivious Transfers Efficiently.pdf} + langid = {english} } @online{ISOIEC19790, @@ -3202,8 +3505,7 @@ urldate = {2025-05-15}, abstract = {Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Security requirements for cryptographic modules}, langid = {english}, - organization = {ISO}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CVBBSX3N/82423.html} + organization = {ISO} } @online{ISOIEC24759, @@ -3213,16 +3515,14 @@ urldate = {2025-04-08}, abstract = {Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Test requirements for cryptographic modules}, langid = {english}, - organization = {ISO}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WYIQJ3LN/82424.html} + organization = {ISO} } @article{ivarssonReviewHardwareSecurity, title = {A {{Review}} of {{Hardware Security Modules Fall}} 2010}, author = {Ivarsson, Johan and Nilsson, Andreas}, abstract = {This report describes a technical review of four leading network based Hardware Security Modules performed during the fall of 2010. When deriving the review point set the focus was primarily on security features and functionality used for DNSSEC applications. However the more interesting findings were in different areas such as usability and management procedures.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/V8F2QBRE/Ivarsson and Nilsson - A Review of Hardware Security Modules Fall 2010.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{jarvinenEmbeddedSFEOffloading2010, @@ -3243,8 +3543,19 @@ urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {We consider Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) in the clientserver setting where the server issues a secure token to the client. The token is not trusted by the client and is not a trusted third party.}, isbn = {978-3-642-14576-6 978-3-642-14577-3}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/44V6FMVZ/Järvinen et al. - 2010 - Embedded SFE Offloading Server and Network Using .pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@book{jarvisCryptoWarsFight2020, + title = {Crypto {{Wars}}: {{The Fight}} for {{Privacy}} in the {{Digital Age}}: {{A Political History}} of {{Digital Encryption}}}, + author = {Jarvis, Craig}, + date = {2020-12-14}, + edition = {1}, + publisher = {CRC Press}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003123675}, + urldate = {2025-11-18}, + abstract = {The crypto wars have raged for half a century. In the 1970s, digital privacy activists prophesied the emergence of an Orwellian State, made possible by computer-mediated mass surveillance. The antidote: digital encryption. The U.S. government warned encryption would not only prevent surveillance of law-abiding citizens, but of criminals, terrorists, and foreign spies, ushering in a rival dystopian future. Both parties fought to defend the citizenry from what they believed the most perilous threats. The government tried to control encryption to preserve its surveillance capabilities; privacy activists armed citizens with cryptographic tools and challenged encryption regulations in the courts. No clear victor has emerged from the crypto wars. Governments have failed to forge a framework to govern the, at times conflicting, civil liberties of privacy and security in the digital age—an age when such liberties have an outsized influence on the citizen–State power balance. Solving this problem is more urgent than ever. Digital privacy will be one of the most important factors in how we architect twenty-first century societies—its management is paramount to our stewardship of democracy for future generations. We must elevate the quality of debate on cryptography, on how we govern security and privacy in our technology-infused world. Failure to end the crypto wars will result in societies sleepwalking into a future where the citizen–State power balance is determined by a twentieth-century status quo unfit for this century, endangering both our privacy and security. This book provides a history of the crypto wars, with the hope its chronicling sets a foundation for peace.}, + isbn = {978-1-00-312367-5} } @inproceedings{jiangGhostTypeLimitsUsing2024, @@ -3261,8 +3572,7 @@ abstract = {Keyboards are the primary peripheral input devices for various critical computer application scenarios. This paper performs a security analysis of the keyboard sensing mechanisms and uncovers a new class of vulnerabilities that can be exploited to induce phantom keys—fake keystrokes injected into keyboards’ analog circuits in a contactless way using electromagnetic interference (EMI). Besides regular keystrokes, such phantom keys also include keystrokes that human operators cannot achieve, such as rapidly injecting over 10,000 keys per minute and injecting hidden keys that do not exist on the physical keyboard. The underlying principles of phantom key injections consist in inducing false voltages on keyboard sensing GPIO pins through EMI coupled onto matrix circuits. We investigate the voltage and timing requirements of injection signals both theoretically and empirically to establish the theory of phantom key injection. To validate the threat of keyboard sensing vulnerabilities, we design GhostType that can cause denial-of-service of the keyboard and inject random keystrokes as well as certain targeted keystrokes of the adversary’s choice. We have validated GhostType on 48 of 50 off-the-shelf keyboards/keypads from 20 brands, including both membrane/mechanical structures and USB/Bluetooth protocols. Some example consequences of GhostType include completely blocking keyboard operations, crashing and turning off downstream computers, and deleting computer files. Finally, we glean lessons from our investigations and propose countermeasures, including shielding keyboards with metal materials and enhancing the keystroke sensing mechanism.}, eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/X2FB95IT/Jiang et al. - 2024 - GhostType The Limits of Using Contactless Electro.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{johanssonTamperProtectionCryptographic2020, @@ -3294,8 +3604,7 @@ number = {5568124A}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US5568124A/en?oq=US5568124A}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {conduit means,conduits,frangible,protected,substrate}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1996_Joyce_Kramer_Method to detect penetration of a surface and apparatus implementing same.pdf} + keywords = {conduit means,conduits,frangible,protected,substrate} } @online{JUNOSubmarineNetworks, @@ -3329,13 +3638,22 @@ date = {2020}, pages = {399--422}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-34316-3_18}, url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-34316-3_18}, urldate = {2024-06-25}, isbn = {978-3-030-34315-6 978-3-030-34316-3}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Kalai_2020_The Argument Against Quantum Computers.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@online{kalaiWhyLanguageModels2025, + title = {Why Language Models Hallucinate}, + author = {Kalai, Adam and Vempala, Santosh and Nachum, Ofir and Zhang, Eddie and Robinson, David and Jain, Saachi and Mitchell, Eric and Beutel, Alex and Heidecke, Johannes}, + date = {2025-12-03}, + url = {https://openai.com/index/why-language-models-hallucinate/}, + urldate = {2025-12-04}, + abstract = {OpenAI’s new research explains why language models hallucinate. The findings show how improved evaluations can enhance AI reliability, honesty, and safety.}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {OpenAI} } @incollection{kamaraScalingPrivateSet2014, @@ -3353,8 +3671,7 @@ urldate = {2023-01-17}, abstract = {We examine the feasibility of private set intersection (PSI) over massive datasets. PSI, which allows two parties to find the intersection of their sets without revealing them to each other, has numerous applications including to privacy-preserving data mining, location-based services and genomic computations. Unfortunately, the most efficient constructions only scale to sets containing a few thousand elements—even in the semi-honest model and over a LAN.}, isbn = {978-3-662-45471-8 978-3-662-45472-5}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2014_Kamara et al_Scaling Private Set Intersection to Billion-Element Sets.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{karlDevelopingNoninteractiveMPC2022, @@ -3372,8 +3689,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a promising technology for supporting privacy-preserving computation between multiple untrusted parties. Recent work has made progress reducing the number of online messages that must be sent by each participant to one, in an effort to improve communication overhead. These non-interactive protocols (NI-MPC) are efficient but do not offer standard security guarantees. A vital next step in the research is developing NI-MPC protocols that offer traditional security guarantees in the standard model. This is challenging, because protocols that are non-interactive are vulnerable to the residual function attack, and a malicious party can evaluate a function multiple times using different inputs to deduce the inputs provided by honest users. After proving NI-MPC protocols without extra trust assumptions cannot achieve fully malicious security, fairness, or robustness in the standard model, we solve this problem using trusted hardware. We then present two novel NI-MPC protocols that achieve standard privacy and correctness, and also provide guarantees of fairness and robustness (for the latter additional communication is necessary if an attack occurs). We also introduce the first implementation of an NI-MPC protocol with a one-round online phase that is secure in the standard model. In addition, we rigorously analyze the computational and communication complexity of existing protocols that require either two rounds of communication or one round of online communication. We demonstrate that our protocol outperforms or is comparable to their complexity. Furthermore, we provide rigorous proofs of correctness, security, fairness, and robustness in the covert and malicious adversary models.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Communication round complexity,Non-interactive MPC,Trusted execution environment,Trusted hardware}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Karl et al_Developing non-interactive MPC with trusted hardware for enhanced security.pdf} + keywords = {Communication round complexity,Non-interactive MPC,Trusted execution environment,Trusted hardware} } @incollection{kellerFasterSecureMultiparty2017, @@ -3385,14 +3701,12 @@ volume = {10355}, pages = {229--249}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-61204-1_12}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-61204-1_12}, urldate = {2024-02-26}, abstract = {We present an actively secure protocol for secure multi-party computation based on lookup tables, by extending the recent, two-party ‘TinyTable’ protocol of Damg˚ard et al. (ePrint 2016). Like TinyTable, an attractive feature of our protocol is a very fast and simple online evaluation phase. We also give a new method for efficiently implementing the preprocessing material required for the online phase using arithmetic circuits over characteristic two fields. This improves over the suggested method from TinyTable by at least a factor of 50.}, isbn = {978-3-319-61203-4 978-3-319-61204-1}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/M6LSM6ML/Keller et al. - 2017 - Faster Secure Multi-party Computation of AES and D.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{kellerMPSPDZVersatileFramework2020, @@ -3410,8 +3724,7 @@ abstract = {Multi-Protocol SPDZ (MP-SPDZ) is a fork of SPDZ-2 (Keller et al., CCS ’13), an implementation of the multi-party computation (MPC) protocol called SPDZ (Damgård et al., Crypto ’12). MP-SPDZ extends SPDZ-2 to 30 MPC protocol variants, all of which can be used with the same high-level programming interface based on Python. This considerably simplifies comparing the cost of different protocols and security models.}, eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '20: 2020 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-7089-9}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PC2WPDCY/Keller - 2020 - MP-SPDZ A Versatile Framework for Multi-Party Com.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{kelly1993, @@ -3424,13 +3737,32 @@ isbn = {0-07-230092-2} } +@online{kennedyDDR4DIMMsSystem2017, + title = {{{DDR4 DIMMs}} and {{System Power Consumption}} - {{We Tested}}}, + author = {Kennedy, Patrick}, + date = {2017-01-30T13:52:03+00:00}, + url = {https://www.servethehome.com/ddr4-dimms-system-power-consumption-tested/}, + urldate = {2025-10-27}, + abstract = {We tested a low power 1U system with 16x and 4x DDR4 DIMMs to see the power consumption impact of using fewer RDIMMs in a server}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {ServeTheHome} +} + +@article{kerckhoffsCryptographieMilitaire1883, + title = {La Cryptographie Militaire}, + author = {Kerckhoffs, Auguste}, + date = {1883-01}, + series = {Journal Des Sciences Militaires}, + volume = {9}, + pages = {5--38} +} + @online{KiCadEDA, title = {{{KiCad EDA}}}, url = {https://www.kicad.org/}, urldate = {2024-12-03}, abstract = {A Cross Platform and Open Source Electronics Design Automation Suite}, - langid = {american}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/IYJUIHPL/www.kicad.org.html} + langid = {american} } @article{kim2018, @@ -3458,8 +3790,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-05}, abstract = {The trend of achieving minimal invasiveness in surgeries and recent technological advances in robotics have resulted in the emergence of flexible surgical robots. Such flexible robots can reach a surgical site via narrow and tortuous pathways, extending the reach of robotic surgery and potentially reducing the incision size. This review covers the key technical issues associated with flexible surgical robotics and introduces emerging flexible surgical robot systems organized according to their target applications in the endoluminal surgical field. Furthermore, the challenges and recent advancements in manipulator design, modeling, and control as well as the shape and force sensing of flexible robots are presented as key technical issues. Furthermore, the technical features and clinical values of emerging flexible surgical robot systems are introduced with their medical applications.}, eventtitle = {Proceedings of the {{IEEE}}}, - keywords = {Continuum robot,endoluminal surgery,flexible robot technology,Flexible structures,flexible surgical robot,Hysteresis,hysteresis compensation,interventional endoscopy,intraluminal surgery,Manipulators,Medical robotics,shape measurement,Shape measurement,Surgery,telemanipulation,Telemedicine}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Kim et al_2022_Advancement of Flexible Robot Technologies for Endoluminal Surgeries.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/N5TXZY3R/9779312.html} + keywords = {Continuum robot,endoluminal surgery,flexible robot technology,Flexible structures,flexible surgical robot,Hysteresis,hysteresis compensation,interventional endoscopy,intraluminal surgery,Manipulators,Medical robotics,shape measurement,Shape measurement,Surgery,telemanipulation,Telemedicine} } @article{kiselevAnalysisChromaticDispersion2020, @@ -3478,8 +3809,7 @@ urldate = {2024-06-28}, abstract = {In this paper we investigate the chromatic dispersion impact on the quantum key distribution system based on multi-mode weak coherent phase-coded states. We provide an asymptotic secure key rate estimation, taking into account error detection probability due to chromatic dispersion. We demonstrate numerically and experimentally that the effect of chromatic dispersion in an optical fiber without any compensation hinders the secret key distribution at a distance more than 53 km. Finally, we propose a modification to the considered quantum communication system in order to mitigate the influence of chromatic dispersion on its performance.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Fiber Bragg gratings,Fiber losses,Phase matching,Quantum communications,Quantum key distribution,Raman scattering}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Kiselev et al_2020_Analysis of the chromatic dispersion effect on the subcarrier wave QKD system.pdf} + keywords = {Fiber Bragg gratings,Fiber losses,Phase matching,Quantum communications,Quantum key distribution,Raman scattering} } @online{kissaneDarkForest2024, @@ -3490,8 +3820,7 @@ urldate = {2024-11-23}, abstract = {The complex of ideas I’m going to call the Dark Internet Forest emerges from mostly insidery tech thinking, but from multiple directions.}, langid = {english}, - organization = {wreckage/salvage}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/HCXPR3XB/against-the-dark-forest.html} + organization = {wreckage/salvage} } @patent{kleijneSecurityDeviceSecure1986, @@ -3503,8 +3832,7 @@ number = {4593384A}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US4593384A/en?oq=US4593384A}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {housing,memory,responsive,sensitive data,signal}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1986_Kleijne_Security device for the secure storage of sensitive data.pdf} + keywords = {housing,memory,responsive,sensitive data,signal} } @book{kleinSpulenUndSchwingungskreise1941, @@ -3521,8 +3849,7 @@ title = {{{CRYPTEN}}: {{Secure Multi-Party Computation Meets Machine Learning}}}, author = {Knott, Brian and Venkataraman, Shobha and Hannun, Awni and Sengupta, Shubho and Ibrahim, Mark}, abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows parties to perform computations on data while keeping that data private. This capability has great potential for machine-learning applications: it facilitates training of machine-learning models on private data sets owned by different parties, evaluation of one party’s private model using another party’s private data, etc. Although a range of studies implement machine-learning models via secure MPC, such implementations are not yet mainstream. Adoption of secure MPC is hampered by the absence of flexible software frameworks that “speak the language” of machine-learning researchers and engineers. To foster adoption of secure MPC in machine learning, we present CRYPTEN: a software framework that exposes popular secure MPC primitives via abstractions that are common in modern machine-learning frameworks, such as tensor computations, automatic differentiation, and modular neural networks. This paper describes the design of CRYPTEN and measure its performance on state-ofthe-art models for text classification, speech recognition, and image classification. Our benchmarks show that CRYPTEN’s GPU support and high-performance communication between (an arbitrary number of) parties allows it to perform efficient private evaluation of modern machine-learning models under a semi-honest threat model. For example, two parties using CRYPTEN can securely predict phonemes in speech recordings using Wav2Letter [17] faster than real-time. We hope that CRYPTEN will spur adoption of secure MPC in the machine-learning community.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/AT522L4Z/Knott et al. - CRYPTEN Secure Multi-Party Computation Meets Mach.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{koblahHardwareMovingTarget2022, @@ -3540,8 +3867,18 @@ abstract = {The concept of moving target defense (MTD) has entrenched itself as a viable strategy to reverse the typical asymmetries in cyber warfare. MTDs are technologies that seek to make target systems dynamically change in order to limit the time and information available to complete an attack, increase the likelihood of detection, and/or deter attackers from proceeding. The benefits of MTD have been shown for network-, operating system-, and applicationlevel security. Hardware roots-of-trust, however, are static “sitting ducks", especially against physical attacks, and can therefore benefit from the dynamics brought about by MTDs. Although many MTD concepts seem transferable to hardware applications, there has hardly been any work to establish a functioning research pipeline for countermeasures to physical attacks. The aim of this paper is to introduce viable MTD concepts, describe the issues that they can address, and chart a path towards their realization for the community.}, eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '22: 2022 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-9878-7}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4NYR9495/Koblah et al. - 2022 - Hardware Moving Target Defenses against Physical A.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@article{Kocher2018spectre, + title = {Spectre Attacks: {{Exploiting}} Speculative Execution}, + author = {Kocher, Paul and Horn, Jann and Fogh, Anders and Genkin, {and} Daniel and Gruss, Daniel and Haas, Werner and Hamburg, Mike and Lipp, Moritz and Mangard, Stefan and Prescher, Thomas and Schwarz, Michael and Yarom, Yuval}, + date = {2020}, + journaltitle = {Communications of the ACM}, + volume = {63}, + number = {7}, + pages = {93--101}, + doi = {10.1145/3399742} } @online{kochMoreMoreExperts2025, @@ -3552,8 +3889,19 @@ urldate = {2025-05-26}, abstract = {The electronic patient file is due to be launched in a few days, but more and more experts are advising against it or do not consider it advisable.}, langid = {english}, - organization = {heise online}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XQRRKELL/More-and-more-experts-warn-against-electronic-patient-records-10235907.html} + organization = {heise online} +} + +@online{kochNochVieleUnklarheiten2025, + title = {Noch viele Unklarheiten bei der elektronischen Patientenakte}, + author = {Koch, Marie-Claire}, + date = {2025-05-08}, + issn = {1037-7344}, + url = {https://www.heise.de/hintergrund/Elektronische-Patientenakte-Welche-Unklarheiten-es-noch-gibt-10377344.html}, + urldate = {2025-11-28}, + abstract = {Rund um die elektronische Patientenakte gibt es noch viele offene (Sicherheits-)Fragen. Dabei ist sie gerade erst bundesweit gestartet, zumindest theoretisch.}, + langid = {ngerman}, + organization = {heise online} } @inproceedings{kodwaniSecurityKeyDerivation2021, @@ -3570,8 +3918,7 @@ abstract = {Most common user authentication methods use some form of password or a combination of passwords. However, encryption schemes are generally not directly compatible with user passwords and thus, Password-Based Key Derivation Functions (PBKDFs) are used to convert user passwords into cryptographic keys. In this paper, we analyze the theoretical security of PBKDF2 and present two vulnerabilities, γ-collision and δ-collision. Using AES-128 as our exemplar, we show that due to γ-collision, text encrypted with one user password can be decrypted with γ − 1 different passwords. We also provide a proof that finding a collision in the derived key for AES-128 requires δ lesser calls to PBKDF2 than the known Birthday attack. Due to this, it is possible to break password-based AES-128 in O(264) calls, which is equivalent to brute-forcing DES.}, eventtitle = {2021 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Cyber Security}} and {{Resilience}} ({{CSR}})}, isbn = {978-1-66540-285-9}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LZAAUT5E/Kodwani et al. - 2021 - On Security of Key Derivation Functions in Passwor.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{koehler-sidkiSecuritySelfDifferencingAvalanche2020, @@ -3582,8 +3929,7 @@ url = {https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/304583}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to communicate with information theoretic security by encoding information on single photons. This security is based on the laws of physics and as such can never be broken in theory. However, in practice, components do not always behave according to their theoretical models and these deviations can be exploited by an eavesdropper. In recent years, exposing loopholes in QKD systems, known as quantum hacking, has attracted significant attention. The components most susceptible to being hacked are the single-photon detectors, often avalanche photodiodes (APDs), as they are directly exposed to the optical channel. Whilst measurement-device-independent QKD removes detector vulnerability from the system, secure key rates with this technique can be much lower than point-to-point links. As such, mitigating attacks on QKD systems is a pressing challenge in QKD. In this thesis, the focus is on a special class of detectors, self-differencing APDs (SD-APDs), which have facilitated state-of-the art demonstrations of QKD. The susceptibility of SD-APDs to blinding attacks, the most explored and successful attack to date, was investigated and it was shown that by following best practice for their operation, such an attack would be unsuccessful. We have also proposed and developed a countermeasure such that the onus for appropriate operation could be removed from the user. We have also explored an arguably more dangerous attack, in the form of the after-gate attack. We have shown that delayed detection events, ordinarily considered detrimental in QKD, can provide inherent protection against this attack. Finally, backflashes in GHz-gated APDs were investigated for the first time and it was shown that threat they pose to QKD security is negligible. These results highlight the inherent protection to a number of attacks that self-differencing APDs possess. We stress that the findings presented in this thesis are also applicable to other types of fast-gated InGaAs APDs that don't possess self-differencing circuitry.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Koehler-Sidki_The Security of Self-Differencing Avalanche Photodiodes for Quantum Key.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{koehler-sidkiSettingBestPractice2017, @@ -3601,24 +3947,36 @@ abstract = {In recent years, the security of avalanche photodiodes as single photon detectors for quantum key distribution has been subjected to much scrutiny. The most prominent example of this surrounds the vulnerability of such devices to blinding under strong illumination. We focus on self-differencing avalanche photodiodes, single photon detectors that have demonstrated count rates exceeding 1 GCounts/s resulting in secure key rates over 1 MBit/s. These detectors use a passive electronic circuit to cancel any periodic signals thereby enhancing detection sensitivity. However this intrinsic feature can be exploited by adversaries to gain control of the devices using illumination of a moderate intensity. Through careful experimental examinations, we define here a set of criteria for these detectors to avoid such attacks.}, eventtitle = {Quantum {{Technologies}} and {{Quantum Information Science}}}, isbn = {978-1-5106-1348-5 978-1-5106-1349-2}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/P8B7NSNB/Koehler-Sidki et al. - 2017 - Setting best practice criteria for self-differenci.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{koemmerlingDesignPrinciplesTamperResistant, title = {Design {{Principles}} for {{Tamper-Resistant Smartcard Processors}}}, author = {Koemmerling, Oliver and Kuhn, Markus G}, abstract = {We describe techniques for extracting protected software and data from smartcard processors. This includes manual microprobing, laser cutting, focused ion-beam manipulation, glitch attacks, and power analysis. Many of these methods have already been used to compromise widely-fielded conditionalaccess systems, and current smartcards offer little protection against them. We give examples of lowcost protection concepts that make such attacks considerably more difficult.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2AIT93LW/Koemmerling and Kuhn - Design Principles for Tamper-Resistant Smartcard P.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{kohlsVerLocVerifiableLocalization, title = {{{VerLoc}}: {{Verifiable Localization}} in {{Decentralized Systems}}}, author = {Kohls, Katharina and Diaz, Claudia}, abstract = {We tackle the challenge of reliably determining the geolocation of nodes in decentralized networks, considering adversarial settings and without depending on any trusted landmarks. In particular, we consider active adversaries that control a subset of nodes, announce false locations and strategically manipulate measurements. To address this problem we propose, implement and evaluate VerLoc, a system that allows verifying the claimed geo-locations of network nodes in a fully decentralized manner. VerLoc securely schedules roundtrip time (RTT) measurements between randomly chosen pairs of nodes. Trilateration is then applied to the set of measurements to verify claimed geo-locations. We evaluate VerLoc both with simulations and in the wild using a prototype implementation integrated in the Nym network (currently run by thousands of nodes). We find that VerLoc can localize nodes in the wild with a median error of 60 km, and that in attack simulations it is capable of detecting and filtering out adversarial timing manipulations for network setups with up to 20 \% malicious nodes.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Kohls_Diaz_VerLoc.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@inproceedings{kohnoAnalysisElectronicVoting2004, + title = {Analysis of an Electronic Voting System}, + booktitle = {{{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}, 2004. {{Proceedings}}. 2004}, + author = {Kohno, T. and Stubblefield, A. and Rubin, A.D. and Wallach, D.S.}, + date = {2004-05}, + pages = {27--40}, + issn = {1081-6011}, + doi = {10.1109/SECPRI.2004.1301313}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1301313/}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {With significant U.S. federal funds now available to replace outdated punch-card and mechanical voting systems, municipalities and states throughout the U.S. are adopting paperless electronic voting systems from a number of different vendors. We present a security analysis of the source code to one such machine used in a significant share of the market. Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts. We identify several problems including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network threats, and poor software development processes. We show that voters, without any insider privileges, can cast unlimited votes without being detected by any mechanisms within the voting terminal software. Furthermore, we show that even the most serious of our outsider attacks could have been discovered and executed without access to the source code. In the face of such attacks, the usual worries about insider threats are not the only concerns; outsiders can do the damage. That said, we demonstrate that the insider threat is also quite considerable, showing that not only can an insider, such as a poll worker, modify the votes, but that insiders can also violate voter privacy and match votes with the voters who cast them. We conclude that this voting system is unsuitable for use in a general election. Any paperless electronic voting system might suffer similar flaws, despite any certification it could have otherwise received. We suggest that the best solutions are voting systems having a voter-verifiable audit trail, where a computerized voting system might print a paper ballot that can be read and verified by the voter.}, + eventtitle = {{{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}, 2004. 2004}, + keywords = {Computer science,Cryptography,Electronic voting,Electronic voting systems,Face detection,Information security,Nominations and elections,Privacy,Programming,Robustness} } @inproceedings{kolesnikovGateEvaluationSecret2005, @@ -3635,8 +3993,7 @@ abstract = {We propose Gate Evaluation Secret Sharing (GESS) – a new kind of secret sharing, designed for use in secure function evaluation (SFE) with minimal interaction. The resulting simple and powerful GESS approach to SFE is a generalization of Yao’s garbled circuit technique.}, isbn = {978-3-540-32267-2}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Binary Input,Boolean Formula,Oblivious Transfer,Secret Sharing Scheme,Secure Multiparty Computation}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Kolesnikov_2005_Gate Evaluation Secret Sharing and Secure One-Round Two-Party Computation.pdf} + keywords = {Binary Input,Boolean Formula,Oblivious Transfer,Secret Sharing Scheme,Secure Multiparty Computation} } @book{kordyban1998, @@ -3660,8 +4017,7 @@ urldate = {2024-05-15}, eventtitle = {{{NANOCOM}} '19: {{The Sixth Annual ACM International Conference}} on {{Nanoscale Computing}} and {{Communication}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-6897-1}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Kozlowski_Wehner_2019_Towards Large-Scale Quantum Networks.pdf} + langid = {english} } @online{krachenfelsAutomaticExtractionSecrets2021, @@ -3676,8 +4032,7 @@ abstract = {The security of modern electronic devices relies on secret keys stored on secure hardware modules as the root-of-trust (RoT). Extracting those keys would break the security of the entire system. As shown before, sophisticated side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, using chip failure analysis (FA) techniques, can extract data from on-chip memory cells. However, since the chip’s layout is unknown to the adversary in practice, secret key localization and reverse engineering are onerous tasks. Consequently, hardware vendors commonly believe that the ever-growing physical complexity of the integrated circuit (IC) designs can be a natural barrier against potential adversaries. In this work, we present a novel approach that can extract the secret key without any knowledge of the IC’s layout, and independent from the employed memory technology as key storage. We automate the – traditionally very laborintensive – reverse engineering and data extraction process. To that end, we demonstrate that black-box measurements captured using laser-assisted SCA techniques from a training device with known key can be used to profile the device for a later key prediction on other victim devices with unknown keys. To showcase the potential of our approach, we target keys on three different hardware platforms, which are utilized as RoT in different products.}, langid = {english}, pubstate = {prepublished}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6MHCY79U/Krachenfels et al. - 2021 - Automatic Extraction of Secrets from the Transisto.pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security} } @inproceedings{krachenfelsRealWorldSnapshotsVs2021, @@ -3695,8 +4050,7 @@ urldate = {2024-01-08}, abstract = {Due to its sound theoretical basis and practical efficiency, masking has become the most prominent countermeasure to protect cryptographic implementations against physical sidechannel attacks (SCAs). The core idea of masking is to randomly split every sensitive intermediate variable during computation into at least t+1 shares, where t denotes the maximum number of shares that are allowed to be observed by an adversary without learning any sensitive information. In other words, it is assumed that the adversary is bounded either by the possessed number of probes (e.g., microprobe needles) or by the order of statistical analyses while conducting higher-order SCA attacks (e.g., differential power analysis). Such bounded models are employed to prove the SCA security of the corresponding implementations. Consequently, it is believed that given a sufficiently large number of shares, the vast majority of known SCA attacks are mitigated. In this work, we present a novel laser-assisted SCA technique, called Laser Logic State Imaging (LLSI), which offers an unlimited number of contactless probes, and therefore, violates the probing security model assumption. This technique enables us to take snapshots of hardware implementations, i.e., extract the logical state of all registers at any arbitrary clock cycle with a single measurement. To validate this, we mount our attack on masked AES hardware implementations and practically demonstrate the extraction of the full-length key in two different scenarios. First, we assume that the location of the registers (key and/or state) is known, and hence, their content can be directly read by a single snapshot. Second, we consider an implementation with unknown register locations, where we make use of multiple snapshots and a SAT solver to reveal the secrets.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VAZQHSTV/Krachenfels et al. - 2021 - Real-World Snapshots vs. Theory Questioning the t.pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security} } @inproceedings{krachenfelsRealWorldSnapshotsVs2021a, @@ -3714,8 +4068,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Due to its sound theoretical basis and practical efficiency, masking has become the most prominent countermeasure to protect cryptographic implementations against physical sidechannel attacks (SCAs). The core idea of masking is to randomly split every sensitive intermediate variable during computation into at least t+1 shares, where t denotes the maximum number of shares that are allowed to be observed by an adversary without learning any sensitive information. In other words, it is assumed that the adversary is bounded either by the possessed number of probes (e.g., microprobe needles) or by the order of statistical analyses while conducting higher-order SCA attacks (e.g., differential power analysis). Such bounded models are employed to prove the SCA security of the corresponding implementations. Consequently, it is believed that given a sufficiently large number of shares, the vast majority of known SCA attacks are mitigated. In this work, we present a novel laser-assisted SCA technique, called Laser Logic State Imaging (LLSI), which offers an unlimited number of contactless probes, and therefore, violates the probing security model assumption. This technique enables us to take snapshots of hardware implementations, i.e., extract the logical state of all registers at any arbitrary clock cycle with a single measurement. To validate this, we mount our attack on masked AES hardware implementations and practically demonstrate the extraction of the full-length key in two different scenarios. First, we assume that the location of the registers (key and/or state) is known, and hence, their content can be directly read by a single snapshot. Second, we consider an implementation with unknown register locations, where we make use of multiple snapshots and a SAT solver to reveal the secrets.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z3FB94WA/Krachenfels et al. - 2021 - Real-World Snapshots vs. Theory Questioning the t.pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security} } @article{krachenfelsTrojanAwakenerDetecting2023, @@ -3733,8 +4086,7 @@ url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13389-023-00323-3}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Abstract The threat of (HTs) and their detection is a widely studied field. While the effort for inserting a Trojan into an (ASIC) can be considered relatively high, especially when trusting the chip manufacturer, programmable hardware is vulnerable to Trojan insertion even after the product has been shipped or during usage. At the same time, detecting dormant HTs with small or zero-overhead triggers and payloads on these platforms is still a challenging task, as the Trojan might not get activated during the chip verification using logical testing or physical measurements. In this work, we present a novel Trojan detection approach based on a technique known from (IC) failure analysis, capable of detecting virtually all classes of dormant Trojans. Using (LLSI), we show how supply voltage modulations can awaken inactive Trojans, making them detectable using laser voltage imaging techniques. Therefore, our technique does not require triggering the Trojan. To support our claims, we present three case studies on 28~nm and 20~nm SRAM- and flash-based (FPGAs). We demonstrate how to detect with high confidence small changes in sequential and combinatorial logic as well as in the routing configuration of FPGAs in a non-invasive manner. Finally, we discuss the practical applicability of our approach on dormant analog Trojans in ASICs.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Krachenfels et al_Trojan awakener.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{kreft2012, @@ -3745,6 +4097,28 @@ doi = {10.1109/ahs.2012.6268655} } +@book{kropotkinWordsRebel2022, + title = {Words of a {{Rebel}}}, + author = {Kropotkin, Peter}, + namea = {McKay, Iain and Reclus, Elisée}, + nameatype = {collaborator}, + date = {2022}, + publisher = {PM Press}, + location = {Oakland}, + abstract = {Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Introduction -- Further Reading -- A Bibliographical Sketch -- A Note on the Text -- Preface -- Preface to the 1904 Italian Edition -- Preface to the 1919 Russian Edition -- Words of a Rebel -- I: The Situation -- II: The Breakdown of the State -- III: The Necessity of Revolution -- IV: The Next Revolution -- V: Political Rights -- VI: To the Young -- VII: War -- VIII: Revolutionary Minorities -- IX: Order -- X: The Commune -- XI: The Paris Commune -- XII: The Agrarian Question -- XIII: Representative Government -- XIV: Law and Authority -- XV: Revolutionary Government -- XVI: All Socialists! -- XVII: The Spirit of Revolt -- XVIII: Theory and Practice -- XIX: Expropriation -- Afterword to the 1919 Russian Edition -- Supplementary Material -- International Workers' Association: General Assembly of the Jura Federation -- The Anarchist Idea from the Point of View of Its Practical Realisation -- International Workers' Association: Jura Federation -- Enemies of the People -- The League and the Trade Unions -- The Workers' Movement in Spain -- Workers' Organisation -- Congress of the Jura Federation of the International Workers' Association -- Declaration of the Accused Anarchists before the Lyon Criminal Court -- The Lyon Trial -- A Letter to Georges Herzig -- Glossary -- Notes -- Index -- About the Authors}, + isbn = {978-1-62963-898-0}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {1} +} + +@online{krusesicherheitssystemeDatenblattKRUSEFWSchlusseldepot2018, + title = {Datenblatt {{KRUSE FW-Schlüsseldepot}} Basic}, + author = {{Kruse Sicherheitssysteme}}, + date = {2018-12}, + url = {https://kruse-shop.de/media/pdf/e3/c0/6c/MA-KRUSE-FW-Schluesseldepot-FSD-D-E_Rev1-3-20-12-18.pdf}, + urldate = {2025-10-30} +} + @inproceedings{kryjakFPGAImplementationCamera2012, title = {{{FPGA}} Implementation of Camera Tamper Detection in Real-Time}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2012 {{Conference}} on {{Design}} and {{Architectures}} for {{Signal}} and {{Image Processing}}}, @@ -3755,15 +4129,24 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Video surveillance systems are becoming very common nowadays. Cameras installed in many places are exposed to sabotage or tampering. This can be done by covering the camera lens, changing the focus of the camera lens or changing the camera position to prevent proper registration of the surveilled area. This paper describes a hardware implementation of a system that can detect these kind of events. The algorithm is based on background modelling, histograms comparison, edges comparison and analysis of the image's average brightness. In was described in a hardware description language in a pipeline manner and implemented in an FPGA device. Real-time processing of a video stream with a resolution of 640×480@60 frames per second was achieved. Tests performed on several sequences demonstrated the usefulness of the presented solution.}, eventtitle = {Proceedings of the 2012 {{Conference}} on {{Design}} and {{Architectures}} for {{Signal}} and {{Image Processing}}}, - keywords = {Analytical models,background generation,camera sabotage detection,camera tampering detection,Cameras,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,Histograms,Image edge detection,Mathematical model,real-time video processing}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2012_Kryjak et al_FPGA implementation of camera tamper detection in real-time.pdf} + keywords = {Analytical models,background generation,camera sabotage detection,camera tampering detection,Cameras,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,Histograms,Image edge detection,Mathematical model,real-time video processing} +} + +@misc{kumarIBMZ16Performance2025, + title = {{{IBM}} Z16 {{Performance}} of {{Cryptographic Operations}}: {{Cryptographic Hardware}}: {{CPACF}}, {{CEX8S}} with {{Quantum-Safe CRYSTALS}} Algorithms}, + author = {Kumar, Dinesh}, + date = {2025-03}, + url = {https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/cryptocards?topic=4770-performance}, + urldate = {2025-10-27}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {IBM} } @article{kvk2019, title = {Internet of Things Based Monitoring of Large Rotor Vibration with a Microelectromechanical Systems Accelerometer}, author = {Koene, Ivar and Viitala, Raine and Kuosmanen, Petri}, date = {2019}, - journaltitle = {IEEE access : practical innovations, open solutions}, + journaltitle = {IEEE Access}, shortjournal = {IEEE Access}, doi = {10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2927793} } @@ -3782,8 +4165,7 @@ url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s43673-021-00017-0}, urldate = {2024-09-02}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution is a matured quantum science and technology. Over the last 20 years, there has been substantial research and development in this area. Recently, silicon technology has offered tremendous promise in the field for improved miniaturization of quantum key distribution through integrated photonic chips. We expect further progress in this area both in terms of protocols, photon sources, and photon detectors. This review captures some of the recent advances in this area.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/L6XGR229/Kwek et al. - 2021 - Chip-based quantum key distribution.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{lamonacaBloodOxygenSaturation2015, @@ -3797,8 +4179,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {This study investigates the usability of the smartphone camera for the evaluation of arterial blood oxygenation (SpO2\%). The advantage of this solution derives from the pervasiveness of the smartphone that makes available the evaluation of the SpO2\% everywhere. Differently from the pulse oximeter, which uses well-defined wavelength light, the smartphone uses Light Emitting Diodes as a light source to evaluate the SpO2\%. The change of the light intensity in the Red and Green colour channels in the video frames of the patient fingertip are properly processed. Two PPG signals are obtained at the wavelengths 600nm and 940nm, respectively. These two PPGs are used to evaluate the SpO2\% without calibration coefficients and independently of the smartphone hardware and skin characteristics. Experimental tests are performed to compare the proposed procedure with respect to a commercial pulse oximeter and gas chromatograph. The experimental tests assess the effectiveness of the proposal.}, eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Medical Measurements}} and {{Applications}} ({{MeMeA}}) {{Proceedings}}}, - keywords = {Absorption,Bio-signal Processing,Biomedical measurement,Blood,Cameras,Light emitting diodes,Monitoring,Oxygen saturation measurement,Photoplethysmogram signal,Pulse measurements,Signal feature extraction}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Lamonaca et al_Blood oxygen saturation measurement by smartphone camera.pdf} + keywords = {Absorption,Bio-signal Processing,Biomedical measurement,Blood,Cameras,Light emitting diodes,Monitoring,Oxygen saturation measurement,Photoplethysmogram signal,Pulse measurements,Signal feature extraction} } @article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018, @@ -3819,8 +4200,7 @@ urldate = {2024-05-27}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/I7UL2SKX/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf} + keywords = {Quantum Physics} } @article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018a, @@ -3841,8 +4221,7 @@ urldate = {2024-05-02}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/A2BQHUUW/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf} + keywords = {Quantum Physics} } @article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018b, @@ -3863,8 +4242,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Y7HDB8L4/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf} + keywords = {Quantum Physics} } @incollection{launchburyApplicationScaleSecureMultiparty2014, @@ -3884,22 +4262,20 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Secure multiparty computation (MPC) permits a collection of parties to compute a collaborative result without any of the parties or compute servers gaining any knowledge about the inputs provided by other parties, except what can be determined from the output of the computation. In the form of MPC known as linear (or additive) sharing, computation proceeds on data that appears entirely random. Operations such as addition or logical-XOR can be performed purely locally, but operations such as multiplication or logical-AND require a network communication between the parties. Consequently, the computational overhead of MPC is large, and the cost is still measured in orders of magnitude slowdown with respect to computing in the clear. However, e ciency improvements over the last few years have shifted the potential applicability of MPC from just micro benchmarks to user-level applications.}, isbn = {978-3-642-54832-1 978-3-642-54833-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SPNJ8KBL/Launchbury et al. - 2014 - Application-Scale Secure Multiparty Computation.pdf} + langid = {english} } -@inproceedings{ledger2019, +@online{ledger2019, title = {Everybody Be Cool, This Is a Robbery!}, - booktitle = {Symposium Sur La Sécurité Des Technologies de l'information et Des Communications 2019}, author = {Bédrune, Jean-Baptiste and Campana, Gabriel}, date = {2019}, - url = {https://www.sstic.org/media/SSTIC2019/SSTIC-actes/hsm/SSTIC2019-Article-hsm-campana_bedrune_neNSDyL.pdf}, - urldate = {2021-09-24} + url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UX88bdHT54M}, + urldate = {2021-09-24}, + organization = {Black Hat USA} } @inproceedings{lee16psresolutionRandomEquivalent2003, title = {A 16ps-Resolution {{Random Equivalent Sampling}} Circuit for {{TDR}} Utilizing a {{Vernier}} Time Delay Generation}, - booktitle = {2003 {{IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium}}. {{Conference Record}} ({{IEEE Cat}}. {{No}}.{{03CH37515}})}, author = {Lee, Donghwan and Sung, Jinho and Park, Jaehong}, date = {2003-10}, volume = {2}, @@ -3909,9 +4285,8 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1351912}, urldate = {2025-03-11}, abstract = {A Random Equivalent Sampling (RES) circuit that has 16ps sampling resolution has been developed for a high-resolution Time-Domain Reflectometer (TDR). The high-resolution TDR uses an expensive programmable delay chip or a complex Time-to-Digital Converter (TDC) circuit to capture the waveform with very fine time interval. The Vernier time delay generation technique using two crystal oscillators of slightly different frequency is proposed, which is simpler and more cost-effective and provides subpicosecond time resolution. One of the two clocks is used for the reference time to generate incident periodic pulses, and another clock is used for the sampling, The implemented RES circuit consists of the Vernier clock generator, the pulse generator and the control logic for pulse generation, interface and high-speed memory control. Using the ADC of relatively low sampling rate, the periodic pulse waveform is reconstructed with tens of GSPS high equivalent sampling rate by the repetitive sampling utilizing the incremental Vernier time delay. The performance of RES circuit is measured through the operation of TDR. The resolution of the RES circuit is 16.8ps equal to 59.5GSPS sampling rate, which means that the signal waveform in the 66.7\%VOP RG58C/U cable can be sampled by 1.6mm interval.}, - eventtitle = {2003 {{IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium}}. {{Conference Record}} ({{IEEE Cat}}. {{No}}.{{03CH37515}})}, - keywords = {Clocks,Delay effects,Frequency,Logic circuits,Oscillators,Propagation delay,Pulse circuits,Pulse generation,Sampling methods,Time domain analysis}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2003_Lee et al_A 16ps-resolution Random Equivalent Sampling circuit for TDR utilizing a.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/68D63ZM5/1351912.html} + eventtitle = {2003 {{IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium}}}, + keywords = {Clocks,Delay effects,Frequency,Logic circuits,Oscillators,Propagation delay,Pulse circuits,Pulse generation,Sampling methods,Time domain analysis} } @patent{leekTamperDetection2021, @@ -3922,8 +4297,7 @@ date = {2021-02-16}, number = {10,925,154 B2}, abstract = {In described examples, an enclosure for circuitry includes a platform , a charge source, a first capacitive plate, a second capacitive plate, and a capacitive sensor. The circuitry is fixedly coupled to the platform . The first capacitive plate is also fixedly coupled to the platform , and either alone, or together with the platform , surrounds a volume containing the circuitry and the charge source, the charge source electrically coupled to and configured to charge the first capacitive plate. The second capacitive plate is fixedly coupled to the platform without touching the first capacitive plate, and either alone, or together with the platform , sur rounds the first capacitive plate. The second capacitive plate is configured so that there is an electric potential difference between the first capacitive plate and the second capacitive plate. The capacitive sensor is electrically connected to the first capacitive plate and configured to determine when a capacitance between the first and second capacitive plates is changed .}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QSDA9K48/Hall - (72) Inventors Alan Henry Leek, Frisco, TX (US);.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{leePrintedSpiralWinding2011a, @@ -3940,8 +4314,7 @@ urldate = {2024-10-30}, abstract = {Winding parasitic capacitance is a major factor limiting the bandwidth of an inductor. In this paper, 1) the traditional, 2) the alternating, and 3) the partial alternating winding methods are evaluated for the multilayer printed spiral winding inductors for megahertz operations. The self-capacitances of various winding structures are estimated by the summation of parasitic capacitance among the turns of a winding. The electric field energy distributions in the inductors are derived from the voltage profiles to illustrate the relative magnitudes of winding parasitic capacitances. The results show that parasitic capacitance reduction can be achieved by reducing stored electric field energy. The partial alternating winding method is found to have the widest frequency bandwidth with reduced number of through-hole vias for multilayer printed spiral winding design. The theoretical analysis has been confirmed with practical measurements. The results provide useful information for the optimal design of coreless or core-based high-frequency planar magnetics.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Bandwidth,Electric fields,Inductors,Parasitic capacitance,Planar magnetic device,printed circuit board inductors,spiral winding,Spirals,Windings}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2011_Lee et al_Printed Spiral Winding Inductor With Wide Frequency Bandwidth2.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CXZSAL3U/5580123.html} + keywords = {Bandwidth,Electric fields,Inductors,Parasitic capacitance,Planar magnetic device,printed circuit board inductors,spiral winding,Spirals,Windings} } @article{leeSimpleWirelessPower2017, @@ -3959,8 +4332,7 @@ urldate = {2024-10-30}, abstract = {We report a simple wireless power charging (WPC) antenna system (50 mm \textbackslash times40 mm \textbackslash times0.1 mm) for use in simulating power transfer efficiency ( \textbackslash eta ) with and without ferrite and a metallic object (battery case), thereby identifying suitable magnetic parameters and ferrite sheet thickness. The simulation results suggest that magnetic loss tangent (tan \textbackslash delta \textsubscript{\textbackslash mu } ) and permeability ( \textbackslash mu ' ) need to be less than 0.05 and higher than 125 at 13.56 MHz, respectively, to achieve at least 75\% of the transfer efficiency ( \textbackslash eta \_\textbackslash mathrm max ) of the WPC antenna without ferrite and the metallic object. Accordingly, we have fabricated NixZn0.85–xCu0.15Fe2O4 (x = 0.32 – 0.38) spinel ferrites using a one-step sintering process and obtained relatively high \textbackslash mu ' of 169 and low tan \textbackslash delta \textsubscript{\textbackslash mu } of 0.1 with a nickel (Ni) concentration of 0.38. This magnetic loss is still too high to achieve 75\% of the \textbackslash eta \_\textbackslash mathrm max value. In order to further reduce the magnetic loss, a two-step sintering process was used. The two-step sintered Ni0.38Zn0.47Cu0.15Fe2O4 shows \textbackslash mu ' of 132 and a tan \textbackslash delta \textsubscript{\textbackslash mu } of 0.03 at 13.56 MHz, respectively. Therefore, this ferrite meets criteria identified by the transfer efficiency simulation and is a good candidate for 13.56-MHz wireless power transfer charging antenna system. In addition, our designed WPC system is capable of evaluating other magnetic materials that are suitable for WPC antenna applications.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Magnetics}}}, - keywords = {Antennas,Ferrites,Magnetic losses,Magnetic noise,Ni–Zn–Cu ferrite,Nickel,Permeability,Powders,power transfer efficiency,wireless power charging (WPC) system}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Lee et al_A Simple Wireless Power Charging Antenna System.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/S7MHYEYX/7867861.html} + keywords = {Antennas,Ferrites,Magnetic losses,Magnetic noise,Ni–Zn–Cu ferrite,Nickel,Permeability,Powders,power transfer efficiency,wireless power charging (WPC) system} } @article{lellaSecurityQuantumKey2023, @@ -3979,8 +4351,7 @@ abstract = {The main purpose of a quantum key distribution network is to provide secret keys to any users or applications requiring a high level of security, ideally such as to offer the best protection against any computational attack, even of a quantum nature. The keys shared through a point-to-point link between a source and a detector using a quantum key distribution protocol can be proven information-theoretically secure based on the quantum information theory. However, evaluating the security of a quantum key distribution network, especially if it is based on relay nodes, goes far beyond the quantum security of its single quantum links, involving aspects of conventional security for devices and their communication channels. In this contribution, we perform a rigorous threat analysis based on the most recent recommendations and practical network deployment security issues. We show that, at least in the current state of our understanding of quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution networks can only offer computational security and that their security in practical implementations in the shorter term requires resorting to post-quantum cryptography.}, issue = {4}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {post-quantum cryptography,quantum key distribution,security controls,threat analysis,unconditional secrecy}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Lella_Schmid_2023_On the Security of Quantum Key Distribution Networks.pdf} + keywords = {post-quantum cryptography,quantum key distribution,security controls,threat analysis,unconditional secrecy} } @article{leviGarbledCircuitsSCA2023, @@ -3996,24 +4367,21 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Garbling schemes, invented in the 80’s by Yao (FOCS’86), have been a versatile and fundamental tool in modern cryptography. A prominent application of garbled circuits is constant round secure two-party computation, which led to a long line of study of this object, where one of the most influential optimizations is Free-XOR (Kolesnikov and Schneider ICALP’08), introducing a global offset Δ for all garbled wire values where XOR gates are computed locally without garbling them. To date, garbling schemes were not studied per their side-channel attacks (SCA) security characteristics, even though SCA pose a significant security threat to cryptographic devices. In this research we, demonstrate that adversaries utilizing advanced SCA tools such as horizontal attacks, mixed with advanced hypothesis building and standard (vertical) SCA tools, can jeopardize garbling implementations.Our main observation is that garbling schemes utilizing a global secret Δ open a door to quite trivial side-channel attacks. We model our side-channel attacks on the garbler’s device and discuss the asymmetric setting where various computations are not performed on the evaluator side. This enables dangerous leakage extraction on the garbler and renders our attack impossible on the evaluator’s side.Theoretically, we first demonstrate on a simulated environment, that such attacks are quite devastating. Concretely, our attack is capable of extracting Δ when the circuit embeds only 8 input non-linear gates with fifth/first-order attack Success-Rates of 0.65/0.7. With as little as 3 such gates, our attack reduces the first-order Guessing Entropy of Δ from 128 to ∼ 48-bits. We further demonstrate our attack via an implementation and power measurements data over an STM 32-bit processor software implementing circuit garbling, and discuss their limitations and mitigation tactics on logical, protocol and implementation layers.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Free-XOR,Garbled Circuits,Horizontal Attacks,Secure Computation,Side-channel analysis,Single Trace}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Levi_Hazay_Garbled Circuits from an SCA Perspective.pdf} + keywords = {Free-XOR,Garbled Circuits,Horizontal Attacks,Secure Computation,Side-channel analysis,Single Trace} } @article{liLearningNormalityEnough, title = {Learning {{Normality}} Is {{Enough}}: {{A Software-based Mitigation}} against {{Inaudible Voice Attacks}}}, author = {Li, Xinfeng and Ji, Xiaoyu and Yan, Chen and Li, Chaohao and Li, Yichen and Zhang, Zhenning and Xu, Wenyuan}, abstract = {Inaudible voice attacks silently inject malicious voice commands into voice assistants to manipulate voice-controlled devices such as smart speakers. To alleviate such threats for both existing and future devices, this paper proposes NormDetect, a software-based mitigation that can be instantly applied to a wide range of devices without requiring any hardware modification. To overcome the challenge that the attack patterns vary between devices, we design a universal detection model that does not rely on audio features or samples derived from specific devices. Unlike existing studies’ supervised learning approach, we adopt unsupervised learning inspired by anomaly detection. Though the patterns of inaudible voice attacks are diverse, we find that benign audios share similar patterns in the time-frequency domain. Therefore, we can detect the attacks (the anomaly) by learning the patterns of benign audios (the normality). NormDetect maps spectrum features to a low-dimensional space, performs similarity queries, and replaces them with the standard feature embeddings for spectrum reconstruction. This results in a more significant reconstruction error for attacks than normality. Evaluation based on the 383,320 test samples we collected from 24 smart devices shows an average AUC of 99.48\% and EER of 2.23\%, suggesting the effectiveness of NormDetect in detecting inaudible voice attacks.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3GAC8HBK/Li et al. - Learning Normality is Enough A Software-based Mit.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{lindellSecureMultipartyComputation, title = {Secure {{Multiparty Computation}} ({{MPC}})}, author = {Lindell, Yehuda}, abstract = {Protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) enable a set of parties to interact and compute a joint function of their private inputs while revealing nothing but the output. The potential applications for MPC are huge: privacy-preserving auctions, private DNA comparisons, private machine learning, threshold cryptography, and more. Due to this, MPC has been an intensive topic of research in academia ever since it was introduced in the 1980s by Yao for the two-party case (FOCS 1986), and by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson for the multiparty case (STOC 1987). Recently, MPC has become efficient enough to be used in practice, and has made the transition from an object of theoretical study to a technology being used in industry. In this article, we will review what MPC is, what problems it solves, and how it is being currently used.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/63GP4CNS/Lindell - Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC).pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{linINSPIRETorageRivate2022, @@ -4031,8 +4399,18 @@ abstract = {Private Information Retrieval (PIR) plays a vital role in secure, database-centric applications. However, existing PIR protocols explore a massive working space containing hundreds of GiBs of query and database data. As a consequence, PIR performance is severely bounded by storage communication, making it far from practical for real-world deployment.}, eventtitle = {{{ISCA}} '22: {{The}} 49th {{Annual International Symposium}} on {{Computer Architecture}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-8610-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2TP8V3PI/Lin et al. - 2022 - INSPIRE in - s torage p rivate i nformation re tr.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@article{Lipp2018meltdown, + title = {Meltdown: {{Reading}} Kernel Memory from User Space}, + author = {Lipp, Moritz and Schwarz, Michael and Gruss, Daniel and Prescher, Thomas and Haas, Werner and Fogh, Anders and Horn, Jann and Mangard, Stefan and Kocher, Paul and Genkin, Daniel and Yarom, Yuval and Hamburg, Mike}, + date = {2018}, + journaltitle = {Communications of the ACM}, + volume = {63}, + number = {6}, + pages = {46--56}, + doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3357033} } @online{litinskiHowCompute256bit2023, @@ -4047,8 +4425,7 @@ abstract = {We use Shor's algorithm for the computation of elliptic curve private keys as a case study for resource estimates in the silicon-photonics-inspired active-volume architecture. Here, a fault-tolerant surface-code quantum computer consists of modules with a logarithmic number of non-local inter-module connections, modifying the algorithmic cost function compared to 2D-local architectures. We find that the non-local connections reduce the cost per key by a factor of 300-700 depending on the operating regime. At 10\% threshold, assuming a 10-\$\textbackslash mu\$s code cycle and non-local connections, one key can be generated every 10 minutes using 6000 modules with 1152 physical qubits each. By contrast, a device with strict 2D-local connectivity requires more qubits and produces one key every 38 hours. We also find simple architecture-independent algorithmic modifications that reduce the Toffoli count per key by up to a factor of 5. These modifications involve reusing the stored state for multiple keys and spreading the cost of the modular division operation over multiple parallel instances of the algorithm.}, langid = {english}, pubstate = {prepublished}, - keywords = {Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MUV3B963/Litinski - 2023 - How to compute a 256-bit elliptic curve private ke.pdf} + keywords = {Quantum Physics} } @misc{liuImprovedQuantumCircuits2023, @@ -4056,8 +4433,7 @@ author = {Liu, Qun and Preneel, Bart and Zhao, Zheng and Wang, Meiqin}, date = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1417}, - annotation = {Published: Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1417}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Liu et al_2023_Improved Quantum Circuits for AES.pdf} + annotation = {Published: Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1417} } @article{liWirelessPowerTransfer2015, @@ -4074,8 +4450,7 @@ urldate = {2024-11-08}, abstract = {Wireless power transfer (WPT) using magnetic resonance is the technology which could set human free from the annoying wires. In fact, the WPT adopts the same basic theory which has already been developed for at least 30 years with the term inductive power transfer. WPT technology is developing rapidly in recent years. At kilowatts power level, the transfer distance increases from several millimeters to several hundred millimeters with a grid to load efficiency above 90\%. The advances make the WPT very attractive to the electric vehicle (EV) charging applications in both stationary and dynamic charging scenarios. This paper reviewed the technologies in the WPT area applicable to EV wireless charging. By introducing WPT in EVs, the obstacles of charging time, range, and cost can be easily mitigated. Battery technology is no longer relevant in the mass market penetration of EVs. It is hoped that researchers could be encouraged by the state-of-the-art achievements, and push forward the further development of WPT as well as the expansion of EV.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Journal}} of {{Emerging}} and {{Selected Topics}} in {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Batteries,Coils,Couplers,Couplings,Dynamic charging,electric vehicle (EV),Ferrites,inductive power transfer (IPT),Power electronics,safety guidelines,stationary charging,Wireless communication,wireless power transfer (WPT)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Li_Mi_Wireless Power Transfer for Electric Vehicle Applications.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QYEZNYUG/6804648.html} + keywords = {Batteries,Coils,Couplers,Couplings,Dynamic charging,electric vehicle (EV),Ferrites,inductive power transfer (IPT),Power electronics,safety guidelines,stationary charging,Wireless communication,wireless power transfer (WPT)} } @inproceedings{liWirelessPowerTransfer2021, @@ -4089,8 +4464,7 @@ urldate = {2024-12-10}, abstract = {This paper presents a wireless power transfer system (WPT) for long-term sensor rotating around an axis on a plane. The system is suitable for powering long-term sensor and does not need to replace the battery periodically. By designing a new type of magnetic coupler, the coupling coefficient between the receiving coil and the transmitting coil can be maintained in a certain range. On the transmitting side, six planar spiral coils are evenly distributed in a circular array, so that the magnetic field on the path of the sensor is always strong. On the receiving side, two planar spiral coils are partially overlapped. The magnetic field generated by the magnetic coupler is analyzed theoretically and simulated by finite element method. The experimental results verify that the WPT system can continuously supply power for 5W load during rotation.}, eventtitle = {2021 {{IEEE Industrial Electronics}} and {{Applications Conference}} ({{IEACon}})}, - keywords = {Couplers,Finite element analysis,long-term sensor,magnetic coupler,Maintenance engineering,Power supplies,Rectifiers,rotation,Spirals,Wireless power transfer,wireless power transfer (WPT)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Li et al_2021_Wireless Power Transfer System for Long-term Sensor on Rotating Plane.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/DQ9TIGTB/9654747.html} + keywords = {Couplers,Finite element analysis,long-term sensor,magnetic coupler,Maintenance engineering,Power supplies,Rectifiers,rotation,Spirals,Wireless power transfer,wireless power transfer (WPT)} } @article{loMeasurementDeviceIndependentQuantumKey2012, @@ -4106,8 +4480,7 @@ doi = {10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.130503}, url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.130503}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Y7DKAXM6/Lo et al. - 2012 - Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distrib.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{longEMEyeCharacterizing2024, @@ -4124,8 +4497,7 @@ abstract = {IoT devices and other embedded systems are increasingly equipped with cameras that can sense critical information in private spaces. The data security of these cameras, however, has hardly been scrutinized from the hardware design perspective. Our paper presents the first attempt to analyze the attack surface of physical-channel eavesdropping on embedded cameras. We characterize EM Eye—a vulnerability in the digital image data transmission interface that allows adversaries to reconstruct high-quality image streams from the cameras’ unintentional electromagnetic emissions, even from over 2 meters away in many cases. Our evaluations of 4 popular IoT camera development platforms and 12 commercial off-the-shelf devices with cameras show that EM Eye poses threats to a wide range of devices, from smartphones to dash cams and home security cameras. By exploiting this vulnerability, adversaries may be able to visually spy on private activities in an enclosed room from the other side of a wall. We provide root cause analysis and modeling that enable system defenders to identify and simulate mitigation against this vulnerability, such as improving embedded cameras’ data transmission protocols with minimum costs. We further discuss EM Eye’s relationship with known computer display eavesdropping attacks to reveal the gaps that need to be addressed to protect the data confidentiality of sensing systems.}, eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WBSKAYAN/Long et al. - 2024 - EM Eye Characterizing Electromagnetic Side-channe.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{lopeFirstSelfResonant2021, @@ -4142,8 +4514,7 @@ url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1049/pel2.12030}, urldate = {2024-09-10}, abstract = {Inductive devices are extensively employed in power electronic systems due to their magnetic energy storage and power transfer capabilities. The current trend is towards increasing the frequency of operation in order to reduce the size of the magnetic components, but the main drawback is that the parasitic capacitance effect can become significant, and degrade the performance of the system. This work analyses the influence of this stray capacitance, and considers how to improve the performance of the device. In general, the impact of the stray capacitance on a magnetic component can be reduced by two methods: reducing the parasitic capacitance between turns of the winding or, alternatively, modifying the arrangement of the connection between turns. To evaluate the last option, an approximated expression of the first self-resonant frequency of the magnetic device is proposed. This gives a rapid assessment of the performance of different devices maintaining the overall equivalent inductance. The proposed expression accounts for the influence of the connection between turns in the bandwidth of the component. Finally, some numerical results are verified with planar coils manufactured on two-layer printed circuit boards.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CN4BW264/Lope et al. - 2021 - First self‐resonant frequency of power inductors b.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{lopeFrequencyDependentResistancePlanar2014, @@ -4160,8 +4531,7 @@ urldate = {2024-10-04}, abstract = {Printed circuit board (PCB) windings are convenient for many applications given their ease of manufacture, high repeatability, and low profile. In many cases, the use of multistranded litz wires is appropriate due to the rated power, frequency range, and efficiency constraints. This paper proposes a manufacturing technique and a semianalytical loss model for PCB windings using planar litz structure to obtain a similar ac loss reduction to that of conventional windings of round wires with litz structure. Different coil prototypes have been tested in several configurations to validate the proposal.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Magnetics}}}, - keywords = {Coils,Conductors,Electromagnetic analysis,frequency-dependent resistance,Magnetic devices,Media,passive components,printed circuit board (PCB) inductor,Resistance,Windings,Wires}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Lope et al_2014_Frequency-Dependent Resistance of Planar Coils in Printed Circuit Board With.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/JJQHT5A5/6851880.html} + keywords = {Coils,Conductors,Electromagnetic analysis,frequency-dependent resistance,Magnetic devices,Media,passive components,printed circuit board (PCB) inductor,Resistance,Windings,Wires} } @article{lopez-villegasImprovementQualityFactor2000, @@ -4178,8 +4548,7 @@ urldate = {2024-11-08}, abstract = {A systematic method to improve the quality (Q) factor of RF integrated inductors is presented in this paper. The proposed method is based on the layout optimization to minimize the series resistance of the inductor coil, taking into account both ohmic losses, due to conduction currents, and magnetically induced losses, due to eddy currents. The technique is particularly useful when applied to inductors in which the fabrication process includes integration substrate removal. However, it is also applicable to inductors on low-loss substrates. The method optimizes the width of the metal strip for each turn of the inductor coil, leading to a variable strip-width layout. The optimization procedure has been successfully applied to the design of square spiral inductors in a silicon-based multichip-module technology, complemented with silicon micromachining postprocessing. The obtained experimental results corroborate the validity of the proposed method. A Q factor of about 17 have been obtained for a 35-nH inductor at 1.5 GHz, with Q values higher than 40 predicted for a 20-nH inductor working at 3.5 GHz. The latter is up to a 60\% better than the best results for a single strip-width inductor working at the same frequency.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Microwave Theory}} and {{Techniques}}}, - keywords = {Coils,Design optimization,Eddy currents,Fabrication,Inductors,Magnetic losses,Optimization methods,Q factor,Radio frequency,Strips}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2000_Lopez-Villegas et al_Improvement of the quality factor of RF integrated inductors by layout.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/GQKEU7DE/817474.html} + keywords = {Coils,Design optimization,Eddy currents,Fabrication,Inductors,Magnetic losses,Optimization methods,Q factor,Radio frequency,Strips} } @article{loSecureQuantumKey2014, @@ -4195,8 +4564,15 @@ doi = {10.1038/nphoton.2014.149}, url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/nphoton.2014.149}, urldate = {2024-05-15}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Lo et al_2014_Secure quantum key distribution.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@online{lpkflaser&electronicsagLPKFLDSLaser2014, + title = {{{LPKF LDS}}: {{Laser Direct Structuring}} for {{3D Molded Interconnect Devices}}}, + author = {{LPKF Laser \& Electronics AG}}, + date = {2014}, + url = {https://www.lpkf.com/fileadmin/mediafiles/user_upload/products/pdf/EQ/3D-MID-LDS/brochure_lpkf_laser_direct_structuring_en.pdf}, + urldate = {2025-11-07} } @article{lucamariniOvercomingRateDistance2018, @@ -4212,8 +4588,7 @@ doi = {10.1038/s41586-018-0066-6}, url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0066-6}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/NUNHFGTD/Lucamarini et al. - 2018 - Overcoming the rate–distance limit of quantum key .pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{luCorrelatedRandomnessTeleportation2021, @@ -4224,34 +4599,22 @@ date = {2021}, volume = {12973}, pages = {699--720}, - publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, - doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_34}, - url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_34}, - urldate = {2024-07-15}, - abstract = {With the advancement of the trusted execution environment (TEE) technologies, hardware-supported secure computing becomes increasingly popular due to its e ciency. During the protocol execution, typically, the players need to contact a third-party server for remote a estation, ensuring the validity of the involved trusted hardware component, such as Intel SGX, as well as the integrity of the computation result. When the hardware manufacturer is not fully trusted, sensitive information may be leaked to the third-party server through backdoors, steganography, and kleptography, etc. In this work, we introduce a new security notion called semi-trusted hardware model, where the adversary is allowed to passively or maliciously corrupt the hardware. erefore, she can learn the input of the hardware component and might also tamper its output. We then show how to utilize such semi-trusted hardwares for correlated randomness teleportation. When the semi-trusted hardware is instantiated by Intel SGX, to generate 10k random OT’s, our protocol is 24X and 450X faster than the EMP-IKNP-ROT in the LAN and WAN se ing, respectively. When SGX is used to teleport garbled circuits, the resulting two-party computation protocol is 5.3-5.7X and 43-47X faster than the EMP-SH2PC in the LAN and WAN se ing, respectively, for the AES-128, SHA-256, and SHA-512 evaluation. We also show how to achieve malicious security with li le overhead.}, - isbn = {978-3-030-88427-7 978-3-030-88428-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4PI9MSMM/Lu et al. - 2021 - Correlated Randomness Teleportation via Semi-trust.pdf} -} - -@incollection{luCorrelatedRandomnessTeleportation2021a, - title = {Correlated {{Randomness Teleportation}} via {{Semi-trusted Hardware}}—{{Enabling Silent Multi-party Computation}}}, - booktitle = {Computer {{Security}} – {{ESORICS}} 2021}, - author = {Lu, Yibiao and Zhang, Bingsheng and Zhou, Hong-Sheng and Liu, Weiran and Zhang, Lei and Ren, Kui}, - editor = {Bertino, Elisa and Shulman, Haya and Waidner, Michael}, - date = {2021}, - volume = {12973}, - pages = {699--720}, - publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, + publisher = {Springer}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_34}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_34}, urldate = {2025-08-13}, abstract = {With the advancement of the trusted execution environment (TEE) technologies, hardware-supported secure computing becomes increasingly popular due to its efficiency. During the protocol execution, typically, the players need to contact a third-party server for remote attestation, ensuring the validity of the involved trusted hardware component, such as Intel SGX, as well as the integrity of the computation result. When the hardware manufacturer is not fully trusted, sensitive information may be leaked to the third-party server through backdoors, steganography, and kleptography, etc. In this work, we introduce a new security notion called semi-trusted hardware model, where the adversary is allowed to passively or maliciously corrupt the hardware. Therefore, she can learn the input of the hardware component and might also tamper its output. We then show how to utilize such semi-trusted hardwares for correlated randomness teleportation. When the semi-trusted hardware is instantiated by Intel SGX, to generate 10k random OT’s, our protocol is 24X and 450X faster than the EMP-IKNP-ROT in the LAN and WAN setting, respectively. When SGX is used to teleport Garbled circuits, the resulting two-party computation protocol is 5.3-5.7X and 43-47X faster than the EMP-SH2PC in the LAN and WAN setting, respectively, for the AES-128, SHA-256, and SHA-512 evaluation. We also show how to achieve malicious security with little overhead.}, isbn = {978-3-030-88427-7 978-3-030-88428-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PZAMVZ3L/Lu et al. - 2021 - Correlated Randomness Teleportation via Semi-trust.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@online{LunaNetworkHSM, + title = {Thales {{Luna Network HSM}} 7 {{Functionality Module Software Development Kit Guide}}}, + author = {{Thales Group}}, + date = {2025-11-26}, + url = {https://thalesdocs.com/gphsm/luna/7/docs/network/Content/PDF_Network/FM%20SDK%20Programming%20Guide.pdf}, + urldate = {2025-12-01}, + langid = {english} } @patent{macphersonImprovementsSecurityEnclosures1993, @@ -4265,8 +4628,7 @@ urldate = {2025-09-10}, abstract = {A security enclosure comprises a flexible sheet (60) of insulating material extending over the whole of the area of the enclosure and carrying lines (62, 64) of electrically - responsive material on each side. The lines on one side of the sheet (60) extend obliquely relative to the lines on the other side of the sheet and are connected thereto at edge portions of the sheet to form a plurality of conductors so divid - ing the sheet into a number of relatively small areas so that attempted opening of the enclosure changes an electrical characteristic of the conductors. Con - nectors (70) are provided at an edge portion of the sheet (60) for individually connecting the conductors to a detector (88) for detecting the changes in the electrical characteristic of the lines (62, 64). The connectors (70) include a switch arrangement which is selectively configured to connect further connec - tors (72) associated with the detector (88) with se - lected conductors. One edge portion of the sheet includes a plurality of line switches (66a - d) which are selectively configured to connect each one of the lines (62a - d) on one side of the sheet with a selected one of a plurality of lines (64a - d) on the other side of the sheet.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {conductors,edges,enclosure,lines,sheet}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1993_Macpherson_Improvements in security enclosures.pdf} + keywords = {conductors,edges,enclosure,lines,sheet} } @patent{macphersonTamperRespondentEnclosure1999, @@ -4278,8 +4640,7 @@ number = {5858500A}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US5858500A/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {delamination,enclosure,layer,respondent,sheet}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1999_MacPherson_Tamper respondent enclosure.pdf} + keywords = {delamination,enclosure,layer,respondent,sheet} } @article{mahmodSRAMHasNo2025, @@ -4309,8 +4670,7 @@ urldate = {2025-09-03}, abstract = {ORWL's secure PC is hardened against physical attacks, using technology you might find in a bank's ATM.}, langid = {english}, - organization = {PCWorld}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9CKQB34P/orwl-pc-the-most-secure-home-computer-ever.html} + organization = {PCWorld} } @article{maierContributionSystemDesign2019, @@ -4327,8 +4687,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {In this contribution, a design procedure that is applicable to many kinds of wireless or contactless energy transfer systems is proposed. The design procedure is limited to near field wireless energy transfer systems in resonant operation. For this purpose, the input impedance and voltage transfer function of different natural frequencies are calculated analytically, and moreover, the behavior of the system is described. Following three issues lead to a readily applicable design procedure. First, the knowledge of the transfer functions. Secondly, the knowledge of basic magnetic properties and lastly, the known influence of harmonics according to rectifier and inverter. This design procedure is demonstrated with two hardware setups.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industry Applications}}}, - keywords = {Capacitors,Equivalent circuits,Impedance,Inductive charging,inductive power transmission,Magnetic circuits,Magnetic separation,power conversion harmonics,Reactive power,resonant inverters transfer functions,Transfer functions}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Maier et al_2019_Contribution to the System Design of Contactless Energy Transfer Systems.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Q4MPPLFH/8440726.html} + keywords = {Capacitors,Equivalent circuits,Impedance,Inductive charging,inductive power transmission,Magnetic circuits,Magnetic separation,power conversion harmonics,Reactive power,resonant inverters transfer functions,Transfer functions} } @article{makarFormateAssayBody1975, @@ -4355,12 +4714,22 @@ organization = {Make Your Electronics Tamper-Evident} } +@online{marczakGraphiteCaughtFirst2025, + title = {Graphite {{Caught}}: {{First Forensic Confirmation}} of {{Paragon}}’s {{iOS Mercenary Spyware Finds Journalists Targeted}}}, + shorttitle = {Graphite {{Caught}}}, + author = {Marczak, Bill and Scott-Railton, John}, + date = {2025-06-12T07:55:29-04:00}, + url = {https://citizenlab.ca/2025/06/first-forensic-confirmation-of-paragons-ios-mercenary-spyware-finds-journalists-targeted/}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {On April 29, 2025, a select group of iOS users were notified by Apple that they were targeted with advanced spyware. Among the group were two journalists who consented to the technical analysis of their cases. In this report, we discuss key findings from our forensic analyses of their devices.}, + keywords = {Italy,Mercenary Spyware,Paragon Solutions} +} + @article{marhoeferApplicabilityQuantumCryptography, title = {Applicability of {{Quantum Cryptography}} for {{Securing Mobile Communication Networks}}}, author = {Marhoefer, Michael and Wimberger, Ilse and Poppe, Andreas}, abstract = {After 20 years of basic research, quantum cryptography has meanwhile led to first commercial products. Its progress has triggered high publicity and additional R\&D funding. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the status of quantum cryptography regarding its practical applicability for securing (mobile) communication networks. With that aim in mind, the paper presents a survey of the state-of-the-art, an analysis of its practical constraints and still open R\&D challenges, and some candidate applications for securing mobile communication networks. First industrial applications of quantum cryptography have become reality; more applications may soon reach practical maturity due to recent technological progress.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FCPRRWEK/Marhoefer et al. - Applicability of Quantum Cryptography for Securing.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{markantonakisSecureSmartEmbedded2014, @@ -4378,8 +4747,29 @@ title = {Active Electromagnetic Attacks on Secure Hardware}, author = {Markettos, A Theodore}, abstract = {The field of side-channel attacks on cryptographic hardware has been extensively studied. In many cases it is easier to derive the secret key from these attacks than to break the cryptography itself. One such sidechannel attack is the electromagnetic side-channel attack, giving rise to electromagnetic analysis (EMA).}, + langid = {english} +} + +@misc{marlinspikeDoubleRatchetAlgorithm2025, + title = {The {{Double Ratchet Algorithm}}}, + author = {Marlinspike, Moxie and Schmidt, Rolfe}, + editor = {Perrin, Trevor}, + date = {2025-11-04}, + url = {https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/doubleratchet.pdf}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + langid = {english} +} + +@online{marlinspikeWeShouldAll2013, + title = {We {{Should All Have Something To Hide}}}, + author = {Marlinspike, Moxie}, + date = {2013-06-12}, + url = {https://moxie.org/2013/06/12/we-should-all-have-something-to-hide.html}, + urldate = {2025-11-18}, + abstract = {Suddenly, it feels like 2000 again. Back then, surveillance programs like Carnivore, Echelon, and Total Information Awarenesshelped spark a surge in electronic privacy awareness. Now a decade later, the recent discovery of programs likePRISM, Boundless Informant, and FISA ordersare catalyzing r...}, langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/W3QDPN4U/Markettos - Active electromagnetic attacks on secure hardware.pdf} + organization = {Blog of Moxie Marlinspike}, + annotation = {Archived: https://archive.is/upNKT} } @incollection{martinaOpenHSMOpenKey2007, @@ -4412,8 +4802,7 @@ urldate = {2024-11-08}, abstract = {A Fully symmetric multi-turn twisted inductor is presented for the suppression of on-chip interference in the transmit chain of a LTE transceiver chip implemented in TSMC 65nm CMOS process. The inductor is ultra-compact, symmetrical and presents up to ×3 inductance density as compared to a standard spiral inductor. Magnetic coupling reduction of more than 12dB was measured and EM simulation results validate the design procedure. A simple and accurate closed form expression for the inductance estimation is introduced for the first time in the context of planar twisted-inductors to simplify the design process.}, eventtitle = {2016 {{IEEE International Conference}} on the {{Science}} of {{Electrical Engineering}} ({{ICSEE}})}, - keywords = {closed-form inductance expression,Couplings,crosstalk,Figure-8 inductor,Frequency conversion,Inductance,Inductors,Injection-Lock Divider,Q-factor,Resonant frequency,Standards,Twisted-Inductor}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2016_Martin et al_A multi-turn twisted inductor for on-chip cross-talk reduction.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/HIHNNITA/7806138.html} + keywords = {closed-form inductance expression,Couplings,crosstalk,Figure-8 inductor,Frequency conversion,Inductance,Inductors,Injection-Lock Divider,Q-factor,Resonant frequency,Standards,Twisted-Inductor} } @inproceedings{martinSealClubComputeraidedPaper2023, @@ -4431,8 +4820,7 @@ abstract = {Paper documents, where digital signatures are not directly applicable, are still widely utilized due to usability and legal reasons. We propose a novel approach to authenticating paper documents by taking short videos of them with smartphones. Our solution combines cryptographic and image comparison techniques to detect and highlight semantic-changing attacks on rich documents, containing text and graphics. We provide geometrical arguments for the security of our novel comparison algorithm, and prove that its combination with a cryptographic protocol is secure against strong adversaries capable of compromising different system components. We also measure its accuracy on a set of 128 videos of paper documents and a set of 960 synthetically generated warped documents, half containing subtle forgeries. Our algorithm finds all forgeries accurately with no false positives. The highlighted regions are large enough to be visible to users, but small enough to precisely locate forgeries.}, eventtitle = {{{ACSAC}} '23: {{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference}}}, isbn = {9798400708862}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7D7R9GCM/Martín et al. - 2023 - SealClub Computer-aided Paper Document Authentica.pdf} + langid = {english} } @patent{matsunoProtectionCircuitSemiconductor2008, @@ -4445,8 +4833,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US7345497B2/en?q=(tamper+monitoring+circuit)&oq=tamper+monitoring+circuit}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {protection circuit,semiconductor device,shielded,shielded line,signal}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2008_Matsuno_Protection circuit for semiconductor device and semiconductor device including.pdf} + keywords = {protection circuit,semiconductor device,shielded,shielded line,signal} } @inproceedings{maurerAuthenticationAmplificationSynchronization2013, @@ -4463,8 +4850,7 @@ abstract = {Information-theoretic message authentication is traditionally defined as the task of authenticating a message, transmitted over an insecure channel, using a secret key shared between sender and receiver. Previous results have investigated the trade-offs between key size, message size, and the adversary’s cheating probability.}, eventtitle = {2013 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Information Theory}} ({{ISIT}})}, isbn = {978-1-4799-0446-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/S4I6UBNX/Maurer - 2013 - Authentication amplification by synchronization.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{maurerInformationTheoreticallySecureSecretKey1997, @@ -4484,8 +4870,7 @@ urldate = {2024-05-29}, abstract = {All information-theoretically secure key agreement protocols (e.g. based on quantum cryptography or on noisy channels) described in the literature are secure only against passive adversaries in the sense that they assume the existence of an authenticated public channel. The goal of this paper is to investigate information-theoretic security even against active adversaries with complete control over the communication channel connecting the two parties who want to agree on a secret key. Several impossibility results are proved and some scenarios are characterized in which secret-key agreement secure against active adversaries is possible. In particular, when each of the parties, including the adversary, can observe a sequence of random variables that are correlated between the parties, the rate at which key agreement against active adversaries is possible is characterized completely: it is either 0 or equal to the rate achievable against passive adversaries, and the condition for distinguishing between the two cases is given.}, isbn = {978-3-540-62975-7 978-3-540-69053-5}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Y24TQ9UT/Maurer - 1997 - Information-Theoretically Secure Secret-Key Agreem.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{meeekerFiniteElementMethod2015, @@ -4507,8 +4892,7 @@ issn = {1063-6692, 1558-2566}, doi = {10.1109/TNET.2019.2956079}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8935373/}, - urldate = {2024-05-21}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Mehic et al_2020_A Novel Approach to Quality-of-Service Provisioning in Trusted Relay Quantum.pdf} + urldate = {2024-05-21} } @article{mehicQuantumKeyDistribution2021, @@ -4526,8 +4910,7 @@ url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3402192}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {The convergence of quantum cryptography with applications used in everyday life is a topic drawing attention from the industrial and academic worlds. The development of quantum electronics has led to the practical achievement of quantum devices that are already available on the market and waiting for their first application on a broader scale. A major aspect of quantum cryptography is the methodology of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which is used to generate and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys between two geographically separate users using the principles of quantum physics. In previous years, several successful QKD networks have been created to test the implementation and interoperability of different practical solutions. This article surveys previously applied methods, showing techniques for deploying QKD networks and current challenges of QKD networking. Unlike studies focusing on optical channels and optical equipment, this survey focuses on the network aspect by considering network organization, routing and signaling protocols, simulation techniques, and a software-defined QKD networking approach.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6CQ2P3KX/Mehic et al. - 2021 - Quantum Key Distribution A Networking Perspective.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{meinkeTaschenbuchHochfrequenztechnik1956, @@ -4542,20 +4925,19 @@ title = {{{CONIKS}}: {{Bringing Key Transparency}} to {{End Users}}}, author = {Melara, Marcela S and Blankstein, Aaron and Bonneau, Joseph and Felten, Edward W and Freedman, Michael J}, abstract = {We present CONIKS, an end-user key verification service capable of integration in end-to-end encrypted communication systems. CONIKS builds on transparency log proposals for web server certificates but solves several new challenges specific to key verification for end users. CONIKS obviates the need for global third-party monitors and enables users to efficiently monitor their own key bindings for consistency, downloading less than 20 kB per day to do so even for a provider with billions of users. CONIKS users and providers can collectively audit providers for non-equivocation, and this requires downloading a constant 2.5 kB per provider per day. Additionally, CONIKS preserves the level of privacy offered by today’s major communication services, hiding the list of usernames present and even allowing providers to conceal the total number of users in the system.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/TMI3LX3I/Melara et al. - CONIKS Bringing Key Transparency to End Users.pdf} + langid = {english} } -@online{mennChineseGovernmentHackers2024, +@article{mennChineseGovernmentHackers2024, + entrysubtype = {newspaper}, title = {Chinese Government Hackers Penetrate {{U}}.{{S}}. Internet Providers to Spy}, author = {Menn, Joseph}, date = {2024-08-27}, + journaltitle = {The Washington Post}, url = {https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/08/27/chinese-government-hackers-penetrate-us-internet-providers-spy/}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, abstract = {Beijing’s hacking effort has “dramatically stepped up from where it used to be,” says former top U.S cybersecurity official.}, - langid = {american}, - organization = {The Washington Post}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4FLHNCC6/chinese-government-hackers-penetrate-us-internet-providers-spy.html} + langid = {american} } @www{mgchemicals2017, @@ -4566,11 +4948,18 @@ urldate = {2021-07-08} } -@video{mikeselectricstuffNeopostPostalFranking2023, - entrysubtype = {video}, +@online{microsoftOverviewAzureCloud, + title = {Overview of {{Azure Cloud HSM}}}, + author = {{Microsoft}}, + url = {https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/cloud-hsm/overview}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + abstract = {Learn how Azure Cloud HSM offers cryptographic key storage within the Azure environment as a dedicated HSM service.}, + langid = {american} +} + +@online{mikeselectricstuffNeopostPostalFranking2023, title = {Neopost {{Postal Franking Machines}}}, - editor = {{mikeselectricstuff}}, - editortype = {director}, + author = {{mikeselectricstuff}}, date = {2023-10-03}, url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eO7AoHI2Tpk}, urldate = {2025-02-17}, @@ -4591,8 +4980,7 @@ abstract = {The ever-increasing growth of Internet-of-Things (IoT) has led to wide-scale deployment of high-frequency, highly complex Systems-on-a-Chip (SoCs), which are capable of running a full-fledged operating system (OS). The presence of OS and other software countermeasures make SoCs resilient against the traditional fault attacks that are relevant on FPGAs and microprocessors. In this work, we present the first practical implications of targeting an orthogonal aspect of SoC’s architecture: the system bus. We inject electromagnetic pulses onto the system bus during the execution of instructions involving processor-memory interaction. We show how address bus faults compromise software implementations of masked implementations of ciphers, illustrated using implementations of state-of-theart post-quantum cryptography (PQC) schemes, leaking entire secret keys with a single fault. We also demonstrate that data bus faults can be controlled and exploited to launch Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attacks on table-based implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Furthermore, we demonstrate that the impact of such bus faults can be farreaching and mislead the security guarantees of the popular and widely used ARM TrustZone. We use data-bus faults (along with loopholes in the GlobalPlatform API specification) to mislead the signature verification step to load a malicious Trusted Application (TA) inside the TrustZone. We follow this up with address bus faults to steal symmetric encryption keys of other benign TAs in the system, leading to complete breakdown of security on TrustZone. We note that since the attack relies upon loopholes in the GlobalPlatform API specification, it is portable to any TEE following this specification. To emphasize upon this portability of the attack, we demonstrate successful installation of malicious TAs on two TrustZone implementations (OP-TEE and MyTEE) on two different platforms (Raspberry Pi 3 and Raspberry Pi 4). Finally, we propose countermeasures that can be integrated into the SoC environment to defend against these attack vectors.}, eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/GB9DXZKG/Mishra et al. - 2024 - Faults in Our Bus Novel Bus Fault Attack to Break.pdf} + langid = {english} } @online{ModulationRescueIdentifying, @@ -4601,6 +4989,21 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25} } +@inproceedings{moghimiTPMFAILTPMMeets2020, + title = {{{TPM-FAIL}}: {{TPM}} Meets {{Timing}} and {{Lattice Attacks}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 29th {{USENIX Security Symposium}}}, + author = {Moghimi, Daniel and Sunar, Berk and Eisenbarth, Thomas and Heninger, Nadia}, + date = {2020-08}, + pages = {2057--2073}, + publisher = {USENIX Association}, + url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/moghimi-tpm}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {Trusted Platform Module (TPM) serves as a hardwarebased root of trust that protects cryptographic keys from privileged system and physical adversaries. In this work, we perform a black-box timing analysis of TPM 2.0 devices deployed on commodity computers. Our analysis reveals that some of these devices feature secret-dependent execution times during signature generation based on elliptic curves. In particular, we discovered timing leakage on an Intel firmwarebased TPM as well as a hardware TPM. We show how this information allows an attacker to apply lattice techniques to recover 256-bit private keys for ECDSA and ECSchnorr signatures. On Intel fTPM, our key recovery succeeds after about 1,300 observations and in less than two minutes. Similarly, we extract the private ECDSA key from a hardware TPM manufactured by STMicroelectronics, which is certified at Common Criteria (CC) EAL 4+, after fewer than 40,000 observations. We further highlight the impact of these vulnerabilities by demonstrating a remote attack against a StrongSwan IPsec VPN that uses a TPM to generate the digital signatures for authentication. In this attack, the remote client recovers the server’s private authentication key by timing only 45,000 authentication handshakes via a network connection.}, + eventtitle = {{{USENIX Security Symposium}}}, + isbn = {978-1-939133-17-5}, + langid = {english} +} + @article{mohanSimpleAccurateExpressions1999, title = {Simple Accurate Expressions for Planar Spiral Inductances}, author = {Mohan, S.S. and Del Mar Hershenson, M. and Boyd, S.P. and Lee, T.H.}, @@ -4614,24 +5017,21 @@ doi = {10.1109/4.792620}, url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/792620/}, urldate = {2024-10-10}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/AM4Q8Y76/Mohan et al. - 1999 - Simple accurate expressions for planar spiral indu.pdf} + langid = {english} } @online{molexMolexSilverFlexible, title = {Molex {{Silver Flexible Circuit Solutions}}}, author = {{Molex}}, url = {https://my.avnet.com/wcm/connect/d5fa4b27-de81-4aac-9bcb-cff3844b9eb3/Silver-Flexible-Circuit-Solutions-Brochure-EN-Brochure.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=oMyo8ki}, - urldate = {2025-05-07}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SY87W3RX/Silver-Flexible-Circuit-Solutions-Brochure-EN-Brochure.pdf} + urldate = {2025-05-07} } @article{monfaredHardwareMovingTarget, title = {Hardware {{Moving Target Defenses}} against {{Post-Silicon Side-Channel Leakages}}}, author = {Monfared, Saleh Khalaj and Mitard, Kyle and Forte, Domenic and Tajik, Shahin}, abstract = {Pre-silicon tools for hardening hardware against side-channel and fault injection attacks have become popular recently. However, the security of the system is still threatened by sophisticated physical attacks, which exploit the physical layer characteristics of the computing system beyond the integrated circuits (ICs) and, therefore, bypass the conventional countermeasures. Further, environmental conditions for the hardware can also impact side-channel leakage and fault vulnerability in unexpected ways that are challenging to model in pre-silicon. Thus, attacks cannot be addressed solely by conventional countermeasures at higher layers of the compute stack due to the lack of awareness about the events occurring at the physical layer during runtime. In this paper, we first discuss why the current presilicon security and verification tools might fail to achieve security against physical threats in the post-silicon phase. Afterward, we provide insights from the fields of power/signal integrity (PI/SI), and failure analysis (FA) to understand the fundamental issue with the failed current practices. We argue that hardware-based moving target defenses (MTDs) to randomize the physical fabric’s characteristics of the system can mitigate such unaccounted postsilicon threats. We show the effectiveness of such an approach by presenting the results of two case studies in which we perform powerful attacks, such as impedance analysis and laser voltage probing. Finally, we review the overhead of our proposed approach and show that the imposed overhead by MTD solutions can be addressed by making them active only when a threat is detected.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6XBDSNWT/Monfared et al. - Hardware Moving Target Defenses against Post-Silic.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{monfaredLeakyOhmSecretBits2023, @@ -4648,8 +5048,7 @@ url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623092}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a chip. Such data-dependent influence can be exploited by, for instance, power or electromagnetic analysis. In this work, we introduce a novel non-invasive physical side-channel attack, which exploits the data-dependent changes in the impedance of the chip. Our attack relies on the fact that the temporarily stored contents in registers alter the physical characteristics of the circuit, which results in changes in the die's impedance. To sense such impedance variations, we deploy a well-known RF/microwave method called scattering parameter analysis, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies into the system's power distribution network (PDN) and measure the echo of the signals. We demonstrate that according to the content bits and physical location of a register, the reflected signal is modulated differently at various frequency points enabling the simultaneous and independent probing of individual registers. Such side-channel leakage challenges the t-probing security model assumption used in masking, which is a prominent side-channel countermeasure. To validate our claims, we mount non-profiled and profiled impedance analysis attacks on hardware implementations of unprotected and high-order masked AES. We show that in the case of the profiled attack, only a single trace is required to recover the secret key. Finally, we discuss how a specific class of hiding countermeasures might be effective against impedance leakage.}, - isbn = {9798400700507}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Monfared et al_LeakyOhm.pdf} + isbn = {9798400700507} } @article{mooreApplicationsWirelessPower2019, @@ -4667,8 +5066,7 @@ url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10439-018-02142-8}, urldate = {2024-11-08}, abstract = {Magnetic resonance within the field of wireless power transfer has seen an increase in popularity over the past decades. This rise can be attributed to the technological advances of electronics and the increased efficiency of popular battery technologies. The same principles of electromagnetic theory can be applied to the medical field. Several medical devices intended for use inside the body use batteries and electrical circuits that could be powered wirelessly. Other medical devices limit the mobility or make patients uncomfortable while in use. The fundamental theory of electromagnetics can improve the field by solving some of these problems. This survey paper summarizes the recent uses and discoveries of wireless power in the medical field. A comprehensive search for papers was conducted using engineering search engines and included papers from related conferences. During the initial search, 247 papers were found then nonrelevant papers were eliminated to leave only suitable material. Seventeen relevant journal papers and/or conference papers were found, then separated into defined categories: Implants, Pumps, Ultrasound Imaging, and Gastrointestinal (GI) Endoscopy. The approach and methods for each paper were analyzed and compared yielding a comprehensive review of these state of the art technologies.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/JVKURIVI/Moore et al. - 2019 - Applications of Wireless Power Transfer in Medicin.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{morimotoSimultaneousMeasurementSpecific2006, @@ -4717,8 +5115,7 @@ url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9954}, urldate = {2024-07-10}, abstract = {Physical attacks can compromise the security of cryptographic devices. Depending on the attack’s requirements, adversaries might need to (i) place probes in the proximity of the integrated circuits (ICs) package, (ii) create physical connections between their probes/wires and the system’s PCB, or (iii) physically tamper with the PCB’s components, chip’s package, or substitute the entire PCB to prepare the device for the attack. While tamper-proof enclosures prevent and detect physical access to the system, their high manufacturing cost and incompatibility with legacy systems make them unattractive for many low-cost scenarios. In this paper, inspired by methods known from the field of power integrity analysis, we demonstrate how the impedance characterization of the system’s power distribution network (PDN) using on-chip circuit-based network analyzers can detect various classes of tamper events. We explain how these embedded network analyzers, without any modifications to the system, can be deployed on FPGAs to extract the frequency response of the PDN. The analysis of these frequency responses reveals different classes of tamper events from board to chip level. To validate our claims, we run an embedded network analyzer on FPGAs of a family of commercial development kits and perform extensive measurements for various classes of PCB and IC package tampering required for conducting different side-channel or fault attacks. Using the Wasserstein Distance as a statistical metric, we further show that we can confidently detect tamper events. Our results, interestingly, show that even environment-level tampering activities, such as the proximity of contactless EM probes to the IC package or slightly polished IC package, can be detected using on-chip impedance sensing.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EBAXQHG5/Mosavirik et al. - 2022 - ImpedanceVerif On-Chip Impedance Sensing for Syst.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{mosavirikImpedanceVerifOnChipImpedance2023, @@ -4734,8 +5131,7 @@ urldate = {2025-02-17}, abstract = {Physical attacks can compromise the security of cryptographic devices. Depending on the attack’s requirements, adversaries might need to (i) place probes in the proximity of the integrated circuits (ICs) package, (ii) create physical connections between their probes/wires and the system’s PCB, or (iii) physically tamper with the PCB’s components, chip’s package, or substitute the entire PCB to prepare the device for the attack. While tamper-proof enclosures prevent and detect physical access to the system, their high manufacturing cost and incompatibility with legacy systems make them unattractive for many low-cost scenarios. In this paper, inspired by methods known from the field of power integrity analysis, we demonstrate how the impedance characterization of the system’s power distribution network (PDN) using on-chip circuit-based network analyzers can detect various classes of tamper events. We explain how these embedded network analyzers, without any modifications to the system, can be deployed on FPGAs to extract the frequency response of the PDN. The analysis of these frequency responses reveals different classes of tamper events from board to chip level. To validate our claims, we run an embedded network analyzer on FPGAs of a family of commercial development kits and perform extensive measurements for various classes of PCB and IC package tampering required for conducting different side-channel or fault attacks. Using the Wasserstein Distance as a statistical metric, we further show that we can confidently detect tamper events. Our results, interestingly, show that even environment-level tampering activities, such as the proximity of contactless EM probes to the IC package or slightly polished IC package, can be detected using on-chip impedance sensing.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Anti-Tamper,PCB Verification,Physical Attacks,Physical Layer Security,Power Distribution Network}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Mosavirik et al_2023_ImpedanceVerif.pdf} + keywords = {Anti-Tamper,PCB Verification,Physical Attacks,Physical Layer Security,Power Distribution Network} } @article{mosavirikSiliconEchoesNonInvasive2023, @@ -4754,8 +5150,7 @@ abstract = {The threat of chip-level tampering and its detection has been widely researched. Hardware Trojan insertions are prominent examples of such tamper events. Altering the placement and routing of a design or removing a part of a circuit for side-channel leakage/fault sensitivity amplification are other instances of such attacks. While semi- and fully-invasive physical verification methods can confidently detect such stealthy tamper events, they are costly, time-consuming, and destructive. On the other hand, virtually all proposed non-invasive side-channel methods suffer from noise and, therefore, have low confidence. Moreover, they require activating the tampered part of the circuit (e.g., the Trojan trigger) to compare and detect the modifications. In this work, we introduce a non-invasive post-silicon tamper detection technique applicable to different classes of tamper events at the chip level without requiring the activation of the malicious circuit. Our method relies on the fact that physical modifications (regardless of their physical, activation, or action characteristics) alter the impedance of the chip. Hence, characterizing the impedance can lead to the detection of the tamper events. To sense the changes in the impedance, we deploy known RF tools, namely, scattering parameters, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies to the power distribution network (PDN) of the system and measure the “echo” of the signal. The reflected signals in various frequency bands reveal different tamper events based on their impact size on the die. To validate our claims, we performed measurements on several proof-ofconcept tampered hardware implementations realized on FPGAs manufactured with a 28 nm technology. We further show that deploying the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance can distinguish between tamper events and noise resulting from manufacturing process variation of different chips/boards. Based on the acquired results, we demonstrate that stealthy hardware Trojans, as well as sophisticated modifications of P\&R, can be detected.}, issue = {4}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Backscattered Side-channel,Hardware Trojans,Impedance Characterization,Physical Layer Security,sampling-mesh,Scattering Parameters,Tamper Detection}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Mosavirik et al_Silicon Echoes2.pdf} + keywords = {Backscattered Side-channel,Hardware Trojans,Impedance Characterization,Physical Layer Security,sampling-mesh,Scattering Parameters,Tamper Detection} } @article{mouEnergyEfficientAdaptiveDesign2017, @@ -4772,8 +5167,7 @@ urldate = {2024-11-08}, abstract = {Wireless power transfer (WPT) could revolutionize global transportation and accelerate growth in the electric vehicle (EV) market, offering an attractive alternative to cabled charging. Coil misalignment is inevitable due to driver parking behavior and has a detrimental effect on power transfer efficiency (PTE). This paper proposes a novel coil design and adaptive hardware to improve PTE in magnetic resonant coupling WPT and mitigate coil misalignment, a crucial roadblock in the acceptance of WPT for EVs. The new design was verified using ADS, providing a good match to theoretical analysis. Custom designed receiver and transmitter circuitry was used to simulate vehicle and parking bay conditions and obtain PTE data in a small-scale setup. Experimental results showed that PTE can be improved by 30\% at the array's center, and an impressive 90\% when misaligned by three-fourths of the array's radius. The proposed novel coil array achieves overall higher PTE compared to the benchmark single coil design.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industrial Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Adaptive hardware,coil design,Couplings,electric vehicle (EV),Hardware,Inductive charging,Magnetic resonance,magnetic resonant coupling (MRC),misalignment,power transfer efficiency (PTE),Receivers,Transmitters,Windings,wireless power transfer (WPT)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Mou et al_Energy-Efficient and Adaptive Design for Wireless Power Transfer in Electric.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9EFPC8GL/7885065.html} + keywords = {Adaptive hardware,coil design,Couplings,electric vehicle (EV),Hardware,Inductive charging,Magnetic resonance,magnetic resonant coupling (MRC),misalignment,power transfer efficiency (PTE),Receivers,Transmitters,Windings,wireless power transfer (WPT)} } @inproceedings{mouWirelessPowerTransfer2015, @@ -4789,8 +5183,7 @@ urldate = {2024-11-07}, abstract = {Wireless power transfer (WPT) technologies have been widely used in many areas, e.g., the charging of electric toothbrush, mobile phones, and electric vehicles. This paper introduces fundamental principles of three WPT technologies, i.e., inductive coupling-based WPT, magnetic resonant coupling-based WPT, and electromagnetic radiation-based WPT, together with discussions of their strengths and weaknesses. Main research themes are then presented, i.e., improving the transmission efficiency and distance, and designing multiple transmitters/receivers. The state-of-the-art techniques are reviewed and categorised. Several WPT applications are described. Open research challenges are then presented with a brief discussion of potential roadmap.}, eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 81st {{Vehicular Technology Conference}} ({{VTC Spring}})}, - keywords = {Couplings,Magnetic resonance,Receivers,Transmitters,Wireless communication,Wireless sensor networks}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Mou_Sun_2015_Wireless Power Transfer.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/U6XA93RL/7146165.html} + keywords = {Couplings,Magnetic resonance,Receivers,Transmitters,Wireless communication,Wireless sensor networks} } @inproceedings{muehlmannMutualCouplingModeling2012, @@ -4803,16 +5196,14 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6404553}, urldate = {2023-10-31}, abstract = {Near Field Communication (NFC) antennas are not comparable to standard communication antennas used for traditional transmission services. The geometries are complex, narrow conductor cross-sections and long loops located close to materials sensitive to electromagnetic interaction, when integrated, make the application of analytical coupling formulations inapplicable, even when it comes down to non-linear relations forced by ferrite shielding. Commercial finite element (FEM) solvers are powerful, but they do not serve the needs of NFC applications due to complexity, inadequateness and code obscuration. An intensive open source code investigation has identified one alternative solver which is capable to deal with all NFC RFID related coupling effects one can imagine. Automated scripts, the tool-chain, and geometry macros have been developed for rapid prototyping of such. Amongst other open source tools listed, the ElmerFEM solver is the most promising solver for linear and non-linear quasi-static electro-magnetic (EM) NFC problems. The solver has a powerful interface and delivers results close to reality even when computational complexity is a trade of physical resolution and memory capacity of standard commercial workstations.}, - eventtitle = {2012 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{RFID-Technologies}} and {{Applications}} ({{RFID-TA}})}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2012_Muehlmann et al_Mutual coupling modeling of NFC antennas by using open-source CAD-FEM tools.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YTC9WVJE/6404553.html} + eventtitle = {2012 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{RFID-Technologies}} and {{Applications}} ({{RFID-TA}})} } @article{mullenEffectMisalignmentInductive, title = {Effect of {{Misalignment}} of {{Inductive Wireless Power Transfer Coils}}}, author = {Mullen, Christopher and Lee, Soobum}, abstract = {As inductive wireless power transfer becomes ubiquitous for charging phones and other portable electronics, consumers are less worried about efficiency and more concerned with high charging rates. For a Soldier in the field, less efficiency means they must carry more batteries or fuel, or forgo wireless charging altogether. To determine changes in wireless power transfer efficiency with respect to inductor misalignment, this research develops the equations used to calculate inductance, mutual inductance, and coupling coefficient depending on inductor geometry and distance. The results show that despite inductive coils that are not well coupled, there are strategies to maintain the same power transfer efficiency as perfectly coupled coils.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7VYCMNA7/Mullen and Lee - Effect of Misalignment of Inductive Wireless Power.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016, @@ -4826,8 +5217,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-26}, abstract = {Wiring the World is a cultural and social history that explores how the large Anglo-American cable companies won out over alternative visions. Through telegram prices, visions for world peace, scientific innovation, and the role of the nation-state, Simone M. Müller traces globalization's diverse paths and close ties to business and politics.}, isbn = {978-0-231-54026-1}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YL2WRUTZ/Müller - 2016 - Wiring the World The Social and Cultural Creation.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{mumbyDielectricPropertiesFR41989, @@ -4844,8 +5234,7 @@ url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF02657420}, urldate = {2024-10-30}, abstract = {The relationship between the dielectric properties (dielectric constant, e\textasciitilde am,and loss factor, e\textasciitilde m) and thickness of FR-4 laminates was investigated. Thickness variations for laminates reinforced by the same style and number of plies of glass cloth were predominantly due to differences in the resin content. At each measurement frequency, values of both el"mand e]'m were found to vary in an approximate linear manner with changes in the volume fraction of resin, Vr\textasciitilde n. An empirical equation was derived that gives the dielectric constant of an FR-4 laminate, el'm, as a function of the volume fraction of resin, Vr\textasciitilde n, and the frequency at which the measurement was performed (between 1 kHz and 1 GHz). An alternative expression was also determined that permits the calculation of e\textasciitilde. in the same frequency range from just the dielectric thickness of the laminate, providing the effective thickness of the reinforcement is known. The effective thickness of one style of glass cloth (2116) was experimentally determined to be 1.6 mils/ply. Effective thicknesses of most other common woven glass reinforcements used in FR-4 laminates were calculated and tabulated. The empirical relationships should be a valuable aid to electrical designers and others who need to know the frequency dependence of the dielectric properties of FR-4 laminates having different glass-to-resin ratios.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9MA5VBJY/Mumby and Yuan - 1989 - Dielectric properties of FR-4 laminates as a funct.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{muraliContinuousAuthenticationUsing2023, @@ -4862,8 +5251,7 @@ abstract = {Most terminal devices authenticate users only once at the time of initial login, leaving the terminal unprotected during an active session when the original user leaves it unattended. To address this issue, continuous authentication has been proposed by automatically locking the terminal after a period of inactivity. However, it does not fully eliminate the risk of unauthorized access before the session expires. Recent research has also investigated the feasibility of using physiological and behavioral patterns as biometrics. This study presents a novel two-factor continuous authentication that explores a new form of signal called human-induced electric potential captured by wearables in contact with the user’s body. By analyzing this signal, we can determine the time of user-terminal interactions and compare it with information recorded by the terminal’s OS. If the original user remains on the same terminal, the two-source readings would match. Additionally, the proposed scheme includes an extra layer of protection by extracting terminal’s physical fingerprints from the human-induced electric potential to defend against advanced mimicry attacks. To test the effectiveness of our design, a low-cost wearable prototype is developed. Through extensive experiments, it is found that the proposed scheme has a low error rate of 2.3\%, with minimal computational and energy requirements.}, eventtitle = {{{ACSAC}} '23: {{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference}}}, isbn = {9798400708862}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3XBD9Z7V/Murali et al. - 2023 - Continuous Authentication Using Human-Induced Elec.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{murtazaPortableHardwareSecurity2022, @@ -4879,8 +5267,7 @@ url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212622001776}, urldate = {2024-12-13}, abstract = {It has been noted with concern that the ability of a password to keep an information system secure is diminishing. Increasingly sophisticated attack vectors and low memorability associated with complicated passwords are among the leading reasons limiting security provisioned by passwords. Cryptographic keys suffer from issues including lack of memorability, vulnerable storage mechanisms, key retrieval attacks, lockouts due to key loss and risk of using the same key for multiple services. This study proposes a novel Hardware Security Module (HSM) as a basis for the generation/ re-creation of cryptographic keys. The designed hardware module entirely eliminates the stored cryptographic keys thus eliminating attacks against stored keys. The HSM derives the cryptographic key from sub-components behaving similar to multi-factor authentication, where each factor is an independent authenticator. The proposed scheme enhances security by incorporating physical security into digital security, i.e. as long as either the crypto provider device remains secure or the human component remains secure, the system security remains intact. The scheme proposes a strategy based on defense in depth to secure the HSM, its user, the related service from attacks ranging from simple shoulder surfing to sophisticated Man-in-the-Middle attacks. The proposed HSM is based on commodity hardware components thus having limited cost implications.}, - keywords = {Cryptography,Hardware security module,Key generator,Key-based authentication,Multi factor authentication,Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QP5FG729/S2214212622001776.html} + keywords = {Cryptography,Hardware security module,Key generator,Key-based authentication,Multi factor authentication,Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)} } @article{nabilIST2002507932ECRYPTEuropean, @@ -4891,26 +5278,69 @@ abstract = {Project co-funded by the European Commission within the 6th Framework Programme Dissemination Level PU Public X PP Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission services) RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium} } +@article{naddafMajorAIConference2025, + title = {Major {{AI}} Conference Flooded with Peer Reviews Written Fully by {{AI}}}, + author = {Naddaf, Miryam}, + date = {2025-11-27}, + journaltitle = {Nature}, + publisher = {Nature Publishing Group}, + issn = {1476-4687}, + doi = {10.1038/d41586-025-03506-6}, + url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-03506-6}, + urldate = {2025-12-04}, + abstract = {Controversy has erupted after 21\% of manuscript reviews for an international AI conference were found to be generated by artificial intelligence.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Computer science,Conferences and meetings,Peer review}, + annotation = {Bandiera\_abtest: a\\ +Cg\_type: News\\ +Subject\_term: Conferences and meetings, Computer science, Peer review} +} + @article{nassiLamphonePassiveSound, title = {Lamphone: {{Passive Sound Recovery}} from a {{Desk Lamp}}’s {{Light Bulb Vibrations}}}, author = {Nassi, Ben and Pirutin, Yaron and Swissa, Raz and Shamir, Adi and Elovici, Yuval and Zadov, Boris}, abstract = {In this paper, we introduce "Lamphone," an optical sidechannel attack used to recover sound from desk lamp light bulbs; such lamps are commonly used in home offices, which became a primary work setting during the COVID-19 pandemic. We show how fluctuations in the air pressure on the surface of a light bulb, which occur in response to sound and cause the bulb to vibrate very slightly (a millidegree vibration), can be exploited by eavesdroppers to recover speech passively, externally, and using equipment that provides no indication regarding its application. We analyze a light bulb’s response to sound via an electro-optical sensor and learn how to isolate the audio signal from the optical signal. We compare Lamphone to related methods presented in other studies and show that Lamphone can recover sound at high quality and lower volume levels that those methods. Finally, we show that eavesdroppers can apply Lamphone in order to recover speech at the sound level of a virtual meeting with fair intelligibility when the victim is sitting/working at a desk that contains a desk lamp with a light bulb from a distance of 35 meters.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Nassi et al_Lamphone.pdf} + langid = {english} } -@report{nationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologyusSecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019, - title = {Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules}, - author = {{National Institute of Standards and Technology (US)}}, - date = {2019}, - number = {error: 140-3}, - institution = {{National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)}}, - location = {Washington, D.C.}, - doi = {10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3}, - url = {https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf}, - urldate = {2025-04-08}, - abstract = {The selective application of technological and related procedural safeguards is an important responsibility of every federal organization in providing adequate security in its computer and telecommunication systems. This standard is applicable to all federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to provide adequate information security for all agency operations and assets as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. The standard provides four increasing, qualitative levels of security intended to cover a wide range of potential applications and environments. The security requirements cover areas related to the secure design, implementation and operation of a cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; software/firmware security; operating environment; physical security; non-invasive security; sensitive security parameter management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; and mitigation of other attacks.}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2019_National Institute of Standards and Technology (US)_Security requirements for cryptographic modules.pdf} +@article{natureeditorsToolsSuchChatGPT2023, + title = {Tools Such as {{ChatGPT}} Threaten Transparent Science; Here Are Our Ground Rules for Their Use}, + author = {{nature editors}}, + date = {2023-01-24}, + journaltitle = {Nature}, + volume = {613}, + number = {7945}, + pages = {612--612}, + publisher = {Nature Publishing Group}, + doi = {10.1038/d41586-023-00191-1}, + url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-00191-1}, + urldate = {2025-12-04}, + abstract = {As researchers dive into the brave new world of advanced AI chatbots, publishers need to acknowledge their legitimate uses and lay down clear guidelines to avoid abuse.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Ethics,Machine learning,Publishing,Scientific community}, + annotation = {Bandiera\_abtest: a\\ +Cg\_type: Editorial\\ +Subject\_term: Ethics, Machine learning, Publishing, Scientific community} +} + +@article{natureeditorsWhyNatureWill2023, + title = {Why {{Nature}} Will Not Allow the Use of Generative {{AI}} in Images and Video}, + author = {{nature editors}}, + date = {2023-06-07}, + journaltitle = {Nature}, + volume = {618}, + number = {7964}, + pages = {214--214}, + publisher = {Nature Publishing Group}, + doi = {10.1038/d41586-023-01546-4}, + url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-01546-4}, + urldate = {2025-12-04}, + abstract = {Saying ‘no’ to this kind of visual content is a question of research integrity, consent, privacy and intellectual-property protection.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Authorship,Education,Machine learning,Publishing}, + annotation = {Bandiera\_abtest: a\\ +Cg\_type: Editorial\\ +Subject\_term: Publishing, Machine learning, Authorship, Education} } @article{navasMTDWhereArt2021, @@ -4926,8 +5356,7 @@ issn = {2327-4662, 2372-2541}, doi = {10.1109/JIOT.2020.3040358}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9270287/}, - urldate = {2024-04-04}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Navas et al_2021_MTD, Where Art Thou.pdf} + urldate = {2024-04-04} } @inproceedings{nazReviewVariousAttack2020, @@ -4941,8 +5370,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {In the past air-gapped systems that are isolated from networks have been considered to be very secure. Yet there have been reports of such systems being breached. These breaches have shown to use unconventional means for communication also known as covert channels such as Acoustic, Electromagnetic, Magnetic, Electric, Optical, and Thermal to transfer data. In this paper, a review of various attack methods that can compromise an air-gapped system is presented along with a summary of how efficient and dangerous a particular method could be. The capabilities of each covert channel are listed to better understand the threat it poses and also some countermeasures to safeguard against such attack methods are mentioned. These attack methods have already been proven to work and awareness of such covert channels for data exfiltration is crucial in various industries.}, eventtitle = {2020 {{International Conference}} on {{Innovation}} and {{Intelligence}} for {{Informatics}}, {{Computing}} and {{Technologies}} ({{3ICT}})}, - keywords = {Acoustics,air-gapped,attack methods,Cameras,covert channels,data leak,Electromagnetic radiation,exfiltrate,Fans,Magnetoacoustic effects,Malware,security breach,Universal Serial Bus}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Naz_Zeki_A Review of Various Attack Methods on Air-Gapped Systems.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CWS4WZPK/9311995.html} + keywords = {Acoustics,air-gapped,attack methods,Cameras,covert channels,data leak,Electromagnetic radiation,exfiltrate,Fans,Magnetoacoustic effects,Malware,security breach,Universal Serial Bus} } @online{NECBuildNew, @@ -4951,8 +5379,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-03}, abstract = {NEC Corporation (NEC; TSE: 6701) today announced that it has been contracted by Seren Juno Network Co., Ltd., a company established by NTT Ltd Japan Corporation, PC Landing Corp.}, langid = {english}, - organization = {NEC}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FV5RHTLR/global_20220721_01.html} + organization = {NEC} } @inproceedings{negreaSequentialSamplingTime2009, @@ -4965,8 +5392,7 @@ urldate = {2025-03-11}, abstract = {Time domain reflectometry (TDR) is a well-known technique used to detect and characterize impedance discontinuities in transmission lines. Usually the application of this technique employs the usage of a step generator to drive one end of the transmission line and a high speed oscilloscope to visualize the signal reflected at various impedance discontinuities points. This paper presents the design and implementation of an USB-based time domain reflectometer which integrates the functions of both equipments and is intended to be a low cost solution for time domain reflectometry. The acquisition technique used is sequential sampling based on integrated delay lines, giving a time step of 250 [ps] at a total acquisition time of about 2.6 [us]. Sequential sampling is successfully used for high speed sampling oscilloscopes and can be implemented using commercially available components. Unlike similar implementations of the method, our proposal uses internal delay calibration to eliminate the ghost effect which limits the minimum measurable cable length. Also, by comparison with random sampling TDRs, our approach allows an improved control over the acquisition parameters.}, eventtitle = {2009 15th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} of {{Electronics Packages}} ({{SIITME}})}, - keywords = {Cost function,Drives,Impedance,Oscilloscopes,Reflectometry,Sampling methods,Signal generators,Transmission line discontinuities,Transmission lines,Visualization}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2009_Negrea_Rangu_Sequential sampling time domain reflectometer.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/NDQTGESM/5407341.html} + keywords = {Cost function,Drives,Impedance,Oscilloscopes,Reflectometry,Sampling methods,Signal generators,Transmission line discontinuities,Transmission lines,Visualization} } @online{nelsonLittleHelpMy2022, @@ -4982,8 +5408,7 @@ abstract = {Traffic analysis for instant messaging (IM) applications continues to pose an important privacy challenge. In particular, transport-level data can leak unintentional information about IM – such as who communicates with whom. Existing tools for metadata privacy have adoption obstacles, including the risks of being scrutinized for having a particular app installed, and performance overheads incompatible with mobile devices. We posit that resilience to traffic analysis must be directly supported by major IM services themselves, and must be done in a low-cost manner without breaking existing features. As a first step in this direction, we propose a hybrid messaging model that combines regular and deniable messages. We present a novel protocol for deniable instant messaging, which we call DenIM. DenIM is built on the principle that deniable messages can be made indistinguishable from regular messages with a little help from a user’s friends. Deniable messages’ network traffic can then be explained by a plausible cover story. DenIM achieves overhead proportional to the messages sent, as opposed to scaling with time or number of users. To show the effectiveness of DenIM, we implement a trace simulator, and show that DenIM’s deniability guarantees hold against strong adversaries such as internet service providers.}, langid = {english}, pubstate = {prepublished}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MNTNWQW4/Nelson and Askarov - 2022 - With a Little Help from My Friends Transport Deni.pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security} } @mvbook{nesperHandbuchDrahtlosenTelegraphie1921, @@ -5010,8 +5435,7 @@ url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2058-9565/abe5ee}, urldate = {2024-09-04}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables unconditionally secure communication guaranteed by the laws of physics. The last decades have seen tremendous efforts in making this technology feasible under real-life conditions, with implementations bridging ever longer distances and creating ever higher secure key rates. Readily deployed glass fiber connections are a natural choice for distributing the single photons necessary for QKD both in intra- and intercity links. Any fiber-based implementation however experiences chromatic dispersion which deteriorates temporal detection precision. This ultimately limits maximum distance and achievable key rate of such QKD systems. In this work, we address this limitation to both maximum distance and key rate and present an effective and easy-to-implement method to overcome chromatic dispersion effects. By exploiting entangled photons’ frequency correlations, we make use of nonlocal dispersion compensation to improve the photons’ temporal correlations. Our experiment is the first implementation utilizing the inherently quantum-mechanical effect of nonlocal dispersion compensation for QKD in this way. We experimentally show an increase in key rate from 6.1 to 228.3 bits/s over 6.46 km of telecom fiber. Our approach is extendable to arbitrary fiber lengths and dispersion values, resulting in substantially increased key rates and even enabling QKD in the first place where strong dispersion would otherwise frustrate key extraction at all.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CZZS49B2/Neumann et al. - 2021 - Experimentally optimizing QKD rates via nonlocal d.pdf} + langid = {english} } @online{NewCompanyBuilds, @@ -5026,7 +5450,7 @@ title = {Apple's {{T2}} Security Chip Has an Unfixable Flaw}, author = {Newman, Lily Hay}, date = {2020-10-06}, - publisher = {Wired Magazine}, + journaltitle = {WIRED}, url = {https://www.wired.com/story/apple-t2-chip-unfixable-flaw-jailbreak-mac/} } @@ -5044,8 +5468,7 @@ url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/9/8/1324}, urldate = {2024-10-30}, abstract = {At high frequency, AC resistance of a printed circuit board (PCB) winding becomes important and accounts for a large proportion of planar transformer losses. The winding is then influenced by both skin and proximity phenomenon, which makes the current distribution uneven resulting in an increased resistance. The study of improving AC resistance of a PCB winding has been tackled by many researchers. However, the lack of an overview and comparison among improvements has made it difficult to apply those methods to a specific winding. To overcome the above limitations, this paper investigates the pros and cons of three popular AC resistance optimizing methods: optimizing track width of a solid PCB winding, using multi-strands and using Litz style PCB winding. To verify the theoretical analysis, a total of 12 PCBs are simulated by finite element (FEM) and tested in the laboratory. Five criteria are analyzed, including skin resistance, proximity resistance, AC to DC ratio, total AC resistance and complexity are taken into consideration. The results of this study show that optimizing track width method has a significant improvement on AC resistance while the use of Litz PCB is effective for applications that need stable AC resistance in a wide frequency range. The use of parallel strands winding should be carefully considered as there is not significant benefit in both reducing the AC resistance and AC to DC ratio.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Nguyen_Fortin Blanchette_A Review and Comparison of Solid, Multi-Strands and Litz Style PCB Winding.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{nielsenNewApproachPractical2012, @@ -5063,8 +5486,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {We propose a new approach to practical two-party computation secure against an active adversary. All prior practical protocols were based on Yao’s garbled circuits. We use an OT-based approach and get efficiency via OT extension in the random oracle model. To get a practical protocol we introduce a number of novel techniques for relating the outputs and inputs of OTs in a larger construction.}, isbn = {978-3-642-32008-8 978-3-642-32009-5}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QEUPEH3C/Nielsen et al. - 2012 - A New Approach to Practical Active-Secure Two-Part.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{nikolopoulosOpticalSchemeCryptographic2019, @@ -5085,8 +5507,7 @@ urldate = {2024-06-25}, abstract = {We investigate the possibility of using multiple-scattering optical media, as resources of randomness in cryptographic tasks pertaining to commitments and auctions. The proposed commitment protocol exploits standard wavefront-shaping and heterodyne-detection techniques, and can be implemented with current technology. Its security is discussed in the framework of a tamper-resistant trusted setup.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,Physics - Applied Physics,Physics - Optics,Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8PAEDSEQ/Nikolopoulos - 2019 - Optical scheme for cryptographic commitments with .pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,Physics - Applied Physics,Physics - Optics,Quantum Physics} } @article{nikolopoulosRemoteQuantumSafeAuthentication2021, @@ -5105,8 +5526,7 @@ abstract = {Physical unclonable functions have been shown to be a useful resource of randomness for implementing various cryptographic tasks including entity authentication. All the related entity authentication protocols that have been discussed in the literature so far, either they are vulnerable to an emulation attack, or they are limited to short distances. Hence, quantum-safe remote entity authentication over large distances remains an open question. In the first part of this work, we discuss the requirements that an entity authentication protocol has to offer, to be useful for remote entity authentication in practice. Subsequently, we propose a protocol, which can operate over large distances, and offers security against both classical and quantum adversaries. The proposed protocol relies on standard techniques, it is fully compatible with the infrastructure of existing and future photonic networks, and it can operate in parallel with other quantum protocols, including QKD protocols.}, issue = {7}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {entity authentication,physical unclonable functions,quantum cryptography}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Nikolopoulos_2021_Remote Quantum-Safe Authentication of Entities with Physical Unclonable.pdf} + keywords = {entity authentication,physical unclonable functions,quantum cryptography} } @online{nilgesCryptographicStrengthTamperProof2015, @@ -5117,8 +5537,7 @@ url = {https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000051809}, urldate = {2023-02-28}, abstract = {Tamper-proof hardware has found its way into our everyday life in various forms, be it SIM cards, credit cards or passports. Usually, a cryptographic key is embedded in these hardware tokens that allows the execution of simple cryptographic operations, such as encryption or digital signing. The inherent security guarantees of tamper-proof hardware, however, allow more complex and diverse applications.}, - langid = {ngerman}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Nilges_2015_The Cryptographic Strength of Tamper-Proof Hardware.pdf} + langid = {ngerman} } @misc{nisargaSystemLevelTamperProtection2016, @@ -5126,8 +5545,7 @@ author = {Nisarga, Bhargavi and Peeters, Eric}, date = {2016}, abstract = {Security in embedded systems is a topic that is gaining prominence as embedded systems and products are being deployed everywhere to be used in our everyday routines. Security concerns for embedded system developers and its users scales from adversaries having remote to physical access of the system. Increasing security for remote access includes incorporating secure data communication and secure software and firmware updates to the system; for example, leveraging industry-accepted cryptographic algorithms and secure communication protocols. This application report focuses on security concerns with adversaries having physical access to the system or product, understanding the need for system-level tamper protection, and how the security impact can be mitigated using system-level tamper detection and response functions.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RXLIM8IA/2016 - System-Level Tamper Protection Using MSP MCUs.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{niuLaserLogicState2014, @@ -5151,8 +5569,7 @@ urldate = {2024-10-04}, abstract = {Coils built on printed circuit boards (PCBs) have been widely used for transformers and inductors because they have the advantages of downsizing and consistency for mounting components on the PCBs. However, copper loss caused by the skin and proximity effect takes a large proportion of the total loss of the inductors at high-frequency regions. Thus, reducing copper loss is one of the significant issues for the inductors to reduce the power loss on the coils. This paper proposes a method to suppress copper loss (AC-resistance) due to the skin and proximity effect by splitting patterns of a coil and swapping them at the corner of the coil. The proposed structure for the coil is characterized as having no via, which results in an increase in cost and copper loss. The simulation results demonstrate that a 12-corner coil shape with a splitting pattern into three sections suppresses the resistance by 16.7\% compared to a spiral coil and improves the quality factor by 10.9\%. Practical experiments have revealed that the optimized 12-corner coil improves resistance by 24.6\% and the quality factor by 18.7\%.}, eventtitle = {2024 {{IEEE Applied Power Electronics Conference}} and {{Exposition}} ({{APEC}})}, - keywords = {Coils,Printed circuit board (PCB),Printed circuits,Proximity effect,Q-factor,Resistance,Shape,Simulation,Skin effect,Spiral coil,Spirals}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Nomoto et al_2024_Splitting Conductors of Coils on PCB for AC-resistance Reduction.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/K8XAZLUH/10509283.html} + keywords = {Coils,Printed circuit board (PCB),Printed circuits,Proximity effect,Q-factor,Resistance,Shape,Simulation,Skin effect,Spiral coil,Spirals} } @patent{nortonTamperDetectingCases2019, @@ -5165,8 +5582,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10489614B2/en}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {mating lid,opposing side,side walls,socket,storage unit}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2019_Norton_Tamper detecting cases.pdf} + keywords = {mating lid,opposing side,side walls,socket,storage unit} } @book{nottebrockSpulen1950, @@ -5179,32 +5595,6 @@ keywords = {twisted-inductors} } -@book{nsaHistoryUSCommunications1973, - title = {A {{History}} of {{U}}.{{S}}. {{Communications Security}} ({{The David G}}. {{Boak Lectures}}), {{Volume I}}}, - author = {{NSA}}, - namea = {{Michael Best}}, - nameatype = {collaborator}, - date = {1973}, - url = {http://archive.org/details/history_comsec-nsa}, - urldate = {2025-02-18}, - langid = {english}, - keywords = {NSA}, - annotation = {2015 re-declassified version contains more material} -} - -@book{nsaHistoryUSCommunications1981, - title = {A {{History}} of {{U}}.{{S}}. {{Communications Security}} ({{The David G}}. {{Boak Lecture}}), {{Volume II}}}, - author = {{NSA}}, - namea = {{Michael Best}}, - nameatype = {collaborator}, - date = {1981}, - url = {http://archive.org/details/history_comsec_ii-nsa}, - urldate = {2025-02-18}, - langid = {english}, - keywords = {NSA}, - annotation = {2015 re-declassified version contains more material} -} - @article{obermaier2018, title = {The Past, Present, and Future of Physical Security Enclosures: {{From}} Battery-Backed Monitoring to {{PUF-based}} Inherent Security and Beyond}, author = {Obermaier, Johannes and Immler, Vincent}, @@ -5220,14 +5610,13 @@ title = {Physical Unclonable Functions: {{The}} Future Technology for Physical Security Enclosures?}, author = {Obermaier, Johannes}, date = {2019-08-24}, - publisher = {Chaos Computer Club e.V.}, - doi = {10.5446/43265} + doi = {10.5446/43265}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.5446/43265} } @article{obermaierBreakingRestoringEmbedded, title = {Breaking and {{Restoring Embedded System Security}} - {{From Practical Attacks}} to {{Novel PUF-Based Physical Security Enclosures}}}, - author = {Obermaier, Johannes}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/GNLH2H8J/Obermaier - Breaking and Restoring Embedded System Security - .pdf} + author = {Obermaier, Johannes} } @inproceedings{obermaierMeasurementSystemCapacitive2018, @@ -5243,30 +5632,51 @@ abstract = {Battery-backed security enclosures that are permanently monitored for penetration and tampering are common solutions for providing physical integrity to multi-chip embedded systems. This paper presents a well-tailored measurement system for a batteryless PUFbased capacitive enclosure. The key is derived from the PUF and encrypts the underlying system. We present a system concept for combined enclosure integrity verification and PUF evaluation. The system performs differential capacitive measurements inside the enclosure by applying stimulus signals with a 180◦ phase shift that isolate the local variation in the femtofarad range. The analog circuitry and corresponding digital signal processing chain perform precise PUF digitization, using a microcontroller-based digital lockin amplifier. The system’s measurement range is approximately ±73 fF, the conversion time per PUF node is less than 0.6 ms, and the raw data shows a measurement noise of 0.3 fF. This is the base for a high-entropy key generation while enabling a short system startup time. The system is scalable to the enclosure size and has been experimentally verified to extract information from 128 PUF nodes, using a system prototype. The results show that our concept forms a cornerstone of a novel batteryless PUF-based security enclosure.}, eventtitle = {{{DAC}} '18: {{The}} 55th {{Annual Design Automation Conference}} 2018}, isbn = {978-1-4503-5700-5}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6RGSZ8PG/Obermaier et al. - 2018 - A measurement system for capacitive PUF-based secu.pdf} + langid = {english} } @patent{obermaierPUFfilmMethodProducing2023, type = {patentus}, title = {{{PUF-film}} and Method for Producing the Same}, - author = {Obermaier, Johannes and Immler, Vincent and HESSELBARTH, Robert}, + author = {Obermaier, Johannes and Immler, Vincent and Hesselbarth, Robert}, holder = {{Fraunhofer Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Angewandten Forschung eV}}, date = {2023-02-21}, number = {11586780B2}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US11586780B2/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {circuit,conductive traces,film,layer,puf}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Obermaier et al_PUF-film and method for producing the same.pdf} + keywords = {circuit,conductive traces,film,layer,puf} +} + +@online{oberthurcashprotectionIntroductionCashProtection2019, + title = {Introduction to {{Cash Protection}}: {{Intelligent Banknote Neutralization Systems}}}, + author = {{Oberthur Cash Protection}}, + date = {2019}, + url = {https://www.oberthurcp.com/hubfs/Oberthur_December2020/Pdf/IBNS_Introduction_to_ink_staining_Oberthur_Cash_Protection_2019.pdf}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + annotation = {Archived: https://web.archive.org/web/20250822134238/https://www.oberthurcp.com/hubfs/Oberthur\_December2020/Pdf/IBNS\_Introduction\_to\_ink\_staining\_Oberthur\_Cash\_Protection\_2019.pdf} } @article{oflynnPhaseModulationSide, title = {Phase {{Modulation Side Channels}}: {{Jittery JTAG}} for {{On-Chip Voltage Measurements}}}, author = {O’Flynn, Colin}, abstract = {Measuring fluctuations of the clock phase was identified as a source of leakage in early electromagnetic side-channel investigations. Despite this, only recently was measuring the clock phase (or jitter) of digital signals (not electromagnetic signals) from a target used as a source of exploitable leakage. As the phase of a clock output will be related to signal propagation delay through the target, and this propagation delay is related to voltage, this means that most digital devices perform an unintended phase modulation (PM) of their internal voltage onto clock outputs.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/582N9AQB/O’Flynn - Phase Modulation Side Channels Jittery JTAG for O.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@online{ogaraHardwareEnabledMechanismsVerifying2025, + title = {Hardware-{{Enabled Mechanisms}} for {{Verifying Responsible AI Development}}}, + author = {O'Gara, Aidan and Kulp, Gabriel and Hodgkins, Will and Petrie, James and Immler, Vincent and Aysu, Aydin and Basu, Kanad and Bhasin, Shivam and Picek, Stjepan and Srivastava, Ankur}, + date = {2025-04-02}, + eprint = {2505.03742}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {cs}, + doi = {10.48550/arXiv.2505.03742}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.03742}, + urldate = {2025-12-24}, + abstract = {Advancements in AI capabilities, driven in large part by scaling up computing resources used for AI training, have created opportunities to address major global challenges but also pose risks of misuse. Hardware-enabled mechanisms (HEMs) can support responsible AI development by enabling verifiable reporting of key properties of AI training activities such as quantity of compute used, training cluster configuration or location, as well as policy enforcement. Such tools can promote transparency and improve security, while addressing privacy and intellectual property concerns. Based on insights from an interdisciplinary workshop, we identify open questions regarding potential implementation approaches, emphasizing the need for further research to ensure robust, scalable solutions.}, + pubstate = {prepublished}, + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security} } @inproceedings{ohHeySiriAre2018, @@ -5297,6 +5707,10 @@ isbn = {978-1-931971-10-2} } +@misc{OpticalBasedSmartStructures, + title = {Optical-{{Based Smart Structures}} for {{Tamper-Indicating Applications}}} +} + @article{orlandiOptimizationShieldedPCB2011, title = {Optimization of {{Shielded PCB Air-Core Toroids}} for {{High-Efficiency DC}}–{{DC Converters}}}, author = {Orlandi, Stefano and Allongue, Bruno Andre and Blanchot, Georges and Buso, Simone and Faccio, Federico and Fuentes, Cristian Alejandro and Kayal, Maher and Michelis, Stefano and Spiazzi, Giorgio}, @@ -5309,8 +5723,7 @@ issn = {0885-8993, 1941-0107}, doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2010.2090902}, url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5621918/}, - urldate = {2024-10-25}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Orlandi et al_2011_Optimization of Shielded PCB Air-Core Toroids for High-Efficiency DC–DC.pdf} + urldate = {2024-10-25} } @online{orosaDataplantEnhancingSystem2019, @@ -5325,8 +5738,18 @@ urldate = {2024-07-02}, abstract = {DRAM manufacturers have been prioritizing memory capacity, yield, and bandwidth for years, while trying to keep the design complexity as simple as possible. DRAM chips do not carry out any computation or other important functions, such as security. Processors implement most of the existing security mechanisms that protect the system against security threats, because 1) executing security mechanisms usually require non-trivial computational capabilities (e.g., encryption), and 2) commodity DRAM chips are not designed to perform computations or tasks other than data storage. In this work, we advocate for DRAM as a key component for providing security mechanisms to the system. To this end, we propose Dataplant, a new class of low-cost, high-performance, and reliable security primitives that can be integrated in commodity DRAM chips with minimal changes. The main idea of Dataplant is to slightly modify the internal DRAM timing signals to expose the inherent process variation found in all DRAM chips for generating unpredictable but reproducible values (e.g., keys) within DRAM. We use Dataplant to build two new security mechanisms. First, a new Dataplant-based physical unclonable function (PUF) with non-destructive read-out, low evaluation latency, robust responses, resiliency to temperature changes, and data-independent responses. Second, a new cold boot attack prevention mechanism that automatically destroys all data within DRAM on every power cycle with zero run-time energy and latency overheads. Using a combination of detailed simulations and experiments with 136 real commodity DRAM chips, we show that our Dataplant-based PUF has 1.8x higher throughput than the best state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs. We also demonstrate that our Dataplant-based cold boot attack protection mechanism is 19.5x faster and consumes 2.54x less energy when compared to existing mechanisms.}, pubstate = {prepublished}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2019_Orosa et al_Dataplant.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z5JJPEM9/1902.html} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security} +} + +@online{PakistanMassSurveillance2025, + title = {Pakistan: {{Mass}} Surveillance and Censorship Machine Is Fueled by {{Chinese}}, {{European}}, {{Emirati}} and {{North American}} Companies}, + shorttitle = {Pakistan}, + date = {2025-09-09T04:00:00+00:00}, + url = {https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2025/09/pakistan-mass-surveillance-and-censorship-machine-is-fueled-by-chinese-european-emirati-and-north-american-companies/}, + urldate = {2025-11-27}, + abstract = {Amnesty International have published a new report, Shadows of Control: Censorship and mass surveillance in Pakistan.}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {Amnesty International Security Lab} } @inproceedings{paleyActiveProtectionPCB2016, @@ -5341,8 +5764,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-10}, abstract = {A printed circuit board (PCB) acts as the backbone of any electronic system hardware by providing mechanical support and electrical connections to its active and passive components. Traditionally, the PCB of a system has been considered trusted and robust during field operation. However, there are numerous recent reports on physical tampering of PCB in the field for malicious alteration of its functionality (e.g. adding/replacing a component through soldering, snooping a trace, and bypassing a connection). Through such alteration, an adversary can leak secret information from PCB or bypass security protection implemented in a system. This paper presents a novel approach to detect tampering in a PCB after it is deployed and to actively prevent system operation when tampering is detected. To our knowledge, this is the first report on active protection against PCB tampering in field. The proposed autonomous monitoring and prevention can enable active defense against physical tampering of electronic hardware, thus maintaining the integrity of a system against various security issues arising from such tampering.}, eventtitle = {2016 17th {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})}, - keywords = {Active Protection,Copper,Electrical resistance measurement,Games,Monitoring,Physical Tampering,Printed Circuit Board,Resistance,Security,Wires}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2016_Paley et al_Active protection against PCB physical tampering.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/5UH5JJZ6/7479227.html} + keywords = {Active Protection,Copper,Electrical resistance measurement,Games,Monitoring,Physical Tampering,Printed Circuit Board,Resistance,Security,Wires} } @article{parsonsTamperRadiationResistant1977, @@ -5358,8 +5780,7 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4328751/}, urldate = {2025-04-11}, abstract = {A tamper-resistant liquid level/accountability instrumentation system for safeguards use has been developed and tested. The tests demonstrate the accuracy of liquid level measurement using TDR (Time Domain Reflectometry) techniques and the accuracy of differential pressure and temperature measurements utilizing a custom designed liquid level sensor probe. The calibrated liquid level, differential pressure, and temperature data provide sufficient information to accurately determine volume, density, and specific gravity. Test solutions used include ordinary tap water, diluted nitric acid in varying concentrations, and diluted uranium trioxide also in varying concentrations. System operations and preliminary test results conducted at the General Electric Midwest Fuel Recovery Plant and the National Bureau of Standards, respectively, suggest that the system will provide the safeguards inspector with an additional tool for real-time independent verification of normal operations and special nuclear materials accountancy data for chemical reprocessing plants. This paper discusses the system design concepts, including a brief description of the tamper and radiation resistant features, the preliminary test results, and the significance of the work.}, - keywords = {Gravity,Instruments,Level control,Level measurement,Materials testing,Probes,Reflectometry,System testing,Temperature measurement,Temperature sensors}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1977_Parsons_Wells_Tamper and Radiation Resistant Instrumentation for Safeguarding Special Nuclear.pdf} + keywords = {Gravity,Instruments,Level control,Level measurement,Materials testing,Probes,Reflectometry,System testing,Temperature measurement,Temperature sensors} } @inproceedings{parvinOpticalProbingResistant2022, @@ -5375,8 +5796,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Laser-assisted side-channel analysis techniques, such as optical probing (OP), have been shown to pose a severe threat to secure hardware. While several countermeasures have been proposed in the literature, they can either be bypassed by an attacker or require a modification in the transistor's fabrication process, which is costly and complex. In this work, firstly, we propose a formulation for the caliber of reflected light from OP. Secondly, we propose circuit design techniques and logic styles to alleviate OP attacks based on our formulation. Finally, we compare several logic families and circuit design techniques in terms of performance and OP security merits. In this regard, we perform simulations to compare the optical beam interaction between the different logic gates. By utilizing our proposed circuit design techniques and dual-rail logic (DRL), the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the reflected light from OP is reduced significantly.}, eventtitle = {2022 27th {{Asia}} and {{South Pacific Design Automation Conference}} ({{ASP-DAC}})}, - keywords = {Circuit synthesis,Logic gates,Optical design techniques,Optical device fabrication,Optical reflection,Resistance,Security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Parvin et al_Toward Optical Probing Resistant Circuits.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XUWVTUA4/9712518.html} + keywords = {Circuit synthesis,Logic gates,Optical design techniques,Optical device fabrication,Optical reflection,Resistance,Security} } @inproceedings{patelArithmeticBooleanSecret2020, @@ -5391,22 +5811,19 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is an important technique used to enable computation over confidential data from several sources. The public cloud provides a unique opportunity to enable MPC in a low latency environment. Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) hardware adoption allows for both MPC acceleration and utilization of low latency, high bandwidth communication networks that substantially improve the performance of MPC applications. In this work, we show how designing arithmetic and Boolean Multi-Party Computation gates for FPGAs in a cloud provide improvements to current MPC offerings and ease their use in applications such as machine learning. We focus on the usage of Secret Sharing MPC first designed by Araki et al [1] to design our FPGA MPC while also providing a comparison with those utilizing Garbled Circuits for MPC. We show that Secret Sharing MPC provides a better usage of cloud resources, specifically FPGA acceleration, than Garbled Circuits and is able to use at least a 10 × less computer resources as compared to the original design using CPUs.}, eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference}} ({{HPEC}})}, - keywords = {Acceleration,Cloud computing,Cloud Service,Cryptography,Data Center,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,Logic gates,Machine learning,Machine Learning,Matrix Multiplication,Multiparty Computation,Secret Sharing,Secure Computation}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Patel et al_Arithmetic and Boolean Secret Sharing MPC on FPGAs in the Data Center.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/JJSPUT5P/9286159.html} + keywords = {Acceleration,Cloud computing,Cloud Service,Cryptography,Data Center,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,Logic gates,Machine learning,Machine Learning,Matrix Multiplication,Multiparty Computation,Secret Sharing,Secure Computation} } @article{patraABY2ImprovedMixedProtocol, title = {{{ABY2}}.0: {{Improved Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-Party Computation}}}, author = {Patra, Arpita and Schneider, Thomas and Suresh, Ajith and Yalame, Hossein}, abstract = {Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) allows a set of mutually distrusting parties to jointly evaluate a function on their private inputs while maintaining input privacy. In this work, we improve semi-honest secure two-party computation (2PC) over rings, with a focus on the efficiency of the online phase.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RLBAU32H/Patra et al. - ABY2.0 Improved Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-Party C.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{PavingWayFull, title = {Paving the {{Way}} to {{Full Security}} in {{eHealth}} – {{Ensuring}} Complete Security for Digital Data, Connected Environments and Devices in {{eHealth}}}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CCJFZZ34/Paving the Way to Full Security in eHealth – Ensur.pdf} + langid = {english} } @standard{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2021, @@ -5416,11 +5833,10 @@ url = {https://docs-prv.pcisecuritystandards.org/PTS/Standard/PCI_HSM_Security_Requirements_v4.pdf}, urldate = {2025-04-08}, abstract = {HSMs (Hardware Security Modules) play a critical role in helping to ensure the confidentiality and/or data integrity of financial transactions. Therefore, to help engender trust in the legitimacy of the financial transactions being supported, it is imperative that HSMs are appropriately secure during their entire lifecycle. This includes manufacturing, shipment, use, and decommissioning. The purpose of this document is to provide guidance and direction for appropriately designing HSMs to meet the security needs of the financial payments industry, and for protecting those HSMs up to the point of initial deployment. Other security requirements apply at the point of deployment for the management of HSMs involved with financial payments industry. This document provides vendors with a list of all the security requirements against which their products will be evaluated in order to obtain Payment Card Industry (PCI) PIN Transaction Security (PTS) Hardware Security Module (HSM) device approval. HSMs may support a variety of payment-processing and cardholder-authentication applications and processes. The processes relevant to the full set of requirements outlined in this document are: ▪ PIN processing ▪ 3-D Secure ▪ Card verification ▪ Card production and personalization ▪ EFTPOS ▪ ATM interchange ▪ Cash-card reloading ▪ Data integrity ▪ Chip-card transaction processing ▪ Key generation ▪ Key injection There are many other applications and processes that may utilize general-purpose HSMs, and which may necessitate the adoption of all or a subset of the requirements listed in this document. However, this document does not aim to develop a standard for general-purpose HSMs for use outside of applications such as those listed above that are in support of a variety of payment-processing and cardholder- authentication applications and processes for the financial payments industry.}, - version = {4.0}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CZF34DDM/PCI_HSM_Security_Requirements_v4.pdf} + version = {4.0} } -@misc{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2021a, +@standard{pcisecuritystandardscouncilPaymentCardIndustry2021, title = {Payment {{Card Industry PIN Transaction Security Hardware Security Module Modular Derived Test Requirements}}}, author = {{PCI Security Standards Council}}, date = {2021-12}, @@ -5438,6 +5854,18 @@ version = {2.2} } +@book{peaseTroubleshootingAnalogCircuits1993, + title = {Troubleshooting {{Analog Circuits}}}, + author = {Pease, Robert A.}, + date = {1993}, + publisher = {Newnes}, + location = {Boston}, + abstract = {Based on the author's popular series in EDN Magazine, the book contains a wealth of information on debugging and troubleshooting analog circuits. In this book, you'll find advice on using simple equipment to troubleshoot (would you believe an ordinary AM radio?); step-by-step procedures for analog troubleshooting methods; and generous helpings of the author's unique insights, humor, and philosophy on analog circuits.}, + isbn = {978-0-7506-9499-5}, + langid = {english}, + pagetotal = {234} +} + @patent{perreaultSystemMethodInstalling2005, type = {patentus}, title = {System and Method for Installing a Tamper Barrier Wrap in a {{PCB}} Assembly, Including a {{PCB}} Assembly Having Improved Heat Sinking}, @@ -5448,16 +5876,14 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US20050160702A1/en?q=(tamper)&assignee=Gore+%26+Ass}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {circuit board,installation tool,printed circuit,tamper,wrap}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2005_Perreault et al_System and method for installing a tamper barrier wrap in a PCB assembly,.pdf} + keywords = {circuit board,installation tool,printed circuit,tamper,wrap} } @article{perrigTESLABroadcastAuthentication, title = {The {{TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol}}}, author = {Perrig, Adrian and Canetti, Ran and Tygar, J D and Song, Dawn}, abstract = {One of the main challenges of securing broadcast communication is source authentication, or enabling receivers of broadcast data to verify that the received data really originates from the claimed source and was not modified en route. This problem is complicated by mutually untrusted receivers and unreliable communication environments where the sender does not retransmit lost packets.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QDJV4ERT/Perrig et al. - The TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol.pdf} + langid = {english} } @www{perrin2018, @@ -5469,6 +5895,24 @@ version = {Revision 34} } +@online{petitcolasKerckhoffsPrinciplesCryptographie, + type = {Blog}, + title = {Kerckhoffs' Principles from « {{La}} Cryptographie Militaire »}, + author = {Petitcolas, Fabien}, + url = {http://www.petitcolas.net/steganography/}, + urldate = {2025-11-18}, + organization = {The information hiding homepage}, + annotation = {Archived: https://archive.is/cTxF6\\ +Website contains OCR'ed original source and a translation} +} + +@online{petriePartIITechnical, + title = {Flexible {{Hardware-Enabled Guarantees Part II}}: {{Technical Options}}}, + author = {Petrie, James and Aarne, Onni}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {(UK) Advanced Research and Innovation Agency} +} + @patent{phamAntitamperMesh2011, type = {patentus}, title = {Anti-Tamper Mesh}, @@ -5478,8 +5922,7 @@ number = {7947911B1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US7947911B1/en}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {conductive,conductive pattern,electronic device,mesh,pattern}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2011_Pham et al_Anti-tamper mesh.pdf} + keywords = {conductive,conductive pattern,electronic device,mesh,pattern} } @incollection{pinkasPSIPaXoSFast2020, @@ -5492,22 +5935,19 @@ volume = {12106}, pages = {739--767}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25}, urldate = {2023-01-17}, abstract = {We present a 2-party private set intersection (PSI) protocol which provides security against malicious participants, yet is almost as fast as the fastest known semi-honest PSI protocol of Kolesnikov et al. (CCS 2016).}, isbn = {978-3-030-45723-5 978-3-030-45724-2}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Pinkas et al_PSI from PaXoS.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{piotrowskaLoopixAnonymitySystem, title = {The {{Loopix Anonymity System}}}, author = {Piotrowska, Ania M and Hayes, Jamie and Elahi, Tariq and Meiser, Sebastian and Danezis, George}, abstract = {We present Loopix, a low-latency anonymous communication system that provides bi-directional ‘third-party’ sender and receiver anonymity and unobservability. Loopix leverages cover traffic and Poisson mixing—brief independent message delays—to provide anonymity and to achieve traffic analysis resistance against, including but not limited to, a global network adversary. Mixes and clients self-monitor and protect against active attacks via self-injected loops of traffic. The traffic loops also serve as cover traffic to provide stronger anonymity and a measure of sender and receiver unobservability. Loopix is instantiated as a network of Poisson mix nodes in a stratified topology with a low number of links, which serve to further concentrate cover traffic. Service providers mediate access in and out of the network to facilitate accounting and off-line message reception.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z6RH2ET2/Piotrowska et al. - The Loopix Anonymity System.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{pirandolaFundamentalLimitsRepeaterless2017, @@ -5524,8 +5964,7 @@ url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms15043}, urldate = {2024-05-15}, abstract = {Abstract Quantum communications promises reliable transmission of quantum information, efficient distribution of entanglement and generation of completely secure keys. For all these tasks, we need to determine the optimal point-to-point rates that are achievable by two remote parties at the ends of a quantum channel, without restrictions on their local operations and classical communication, which can be unlimited and two-way. These two-way assisted capacities represent the ultimate rates that are reachable without quantum repeaters. Here, by constructing an upper bound based on the relative entropy of entanglement and devising a dimension-independent technique dubbed ‘teleportation stretching’, we establish these capacities for many fundamental channels, namely bosonic lossy channels, quantum-limited amplifiers, dephasing and erasure channels in arbitrary dimension. In particular, we exactly determine the fundamental rate-loss tradeoff affecting any protocol of quantum key distribution. Our findings set the limits of point-to-point quantum communications and provide precise and general benchmarks for quantum repeaters.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Pirandola et al_2017_Fundamental limits of repeaterless quantum communications.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{pirandolaTheoryChannelSimulation2018, @@ -5542,8 +5981,7 @@ url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2058-9565/aac394}, urldate = {2024-05-03}, abstract = {We review recent results on the simulation of quantum channels, the reduction of adaptive protocols (teleportation stretching), and the derivation of converse bounds for quantum and private communication, as established in PLOB (Pirandola et al 2017 Nat. Commun. 8 15043). We startby introducing a general weak converse bound for private communication based on the relative entropy of entanglement. We discuss how combining this bound with channel simulation and teleportation stretching, PLOB established the two-way quantum and private capacities of several fundamental channels, including the bosonic lossy channel. We then provide a rigorous proof of the strong converse property of these bounds by adopting a correct use of the Braunstein–Kimble teleportation protocol for the simulation of bosonic Gaussian channels. This analysis provides a full justification of claims presented in the follow-up paper WTB (Wilde et al 2017 IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 63 1792–817) whose upper bounds for Gaussian channels would be otherwise infinitely large. Besides clarifying contributions in the area of channel simulation and protocol reduction, we also present some generalizations of the tools to other entanglement measures and novel results on the maximum excess noise which is tolerable in quantum key distribution.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/256F975G/Pirandola et al. - 2018 - Theory of channel simulation and bounds for privat.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{pirnayLearningClassicalReadout2022, @@ -5561,8 +5999,7 @@ urldate = {2024-06-25}, abstract = {Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a way to identify and authenticate electronic devices. Recently, several ideas have been presented to that aim to achieve the same for quantum devices. Some of these constructions apply single-qubit gates in order to provide a secure fingerprint of the quantum device. In this work, we formalize the class of classical readout quantum PUFs (CR-QPUFs) using the statistical query (SQ) model and explicitly show insufficient security for CR-QPUFs based on single-qubit rotation gates, when the adversary has SQ access to the CR-QPUF. We demonstrate how a malicious party can learn the CR-QPUF characteristics and forge the signature of a quantum device through a modelling attack using a simple regression of low-degree polynomials. The proposed modelling attack was successfully implemented in a real-world scenario on real IBM Q quantum machines. We thoroughly discuss the prospects and problems of CR-QPUFs where quantum device imperfections are used as a secure fingerprint.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Computer security,Machine learning,Modelling attack,Quantum physical unclonable function}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Pirnay et al_2022_Learning classical readout quantum PUFs based on single-qubit gates.pdf} + keywords = {Computer security,Machine learning,Modelling attack,Quantum physical unclonable function} } @inproceedings{plummerHistoryNuclearWeapon1998, @@ -5572,8 +6009,7 @@ publisher = {Sandia National Laboratories}, url = {https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/671923}, urldate = {2025-04-16}, - eventtitle = {34th {{AIAA}}/{{ASME}}/{{SAE}}/{{ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference}}}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/T6MZFXIB/671923.pdf} + eventtitle = {34th {{AIAA}}/{{ASME}}/{{SAE}}/{{ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference}}} } @thesis{polasekReflektometrCasoveOblasti2020, @@ -5599,14 +6035,23 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6797875/}, urldate = {2024-05-29}, abstract = {In their seminal work on authentication, Wegman and Carter propose that to authenticate multiple messages, it is sufficient to reuse the same hash function as long as each tag is encrypted with a one-time pad. They argue that because the one-time pad is perfectly hiding, the hash function used remains completely unknown to the adversary. Since their proof is not composable, we revisit it using a composable security framework. It turns out that the above argument is insufficient: if the adversary learns whether a corrupted message was accepted or rejected, information about the hash function is leaked, and after a bounded finite amount of rounds it is completely known. We show however that this leak is very small: Wegman and Carter’s protocol is still ε-secure, if ε-almost strongly universal2 hash functions are used. This implies that the secret key corresponding to the choice of hash function can be reused in the next round of authentication without any additional error than this ε. We also show that if the players have a mild form of synchronization, namely that the receiver knows when a message should be received, the key can be recycled for any arbitrary task, not only new rounds of authentication.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/N2G8VMNP/Portmann - 2014 - Key Recycling in Authentication.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{PositionPaperQuantum, title = {Position {{Paper}} on {{Quantum Key Distribution}}}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/ZVE2HZTZ/Position Paper on Quantum Key Distribution.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@online{PredatorFilesTechnical2023, + title = {Predator {{Files}}: {{Technical}} Deep-Dive into {{Intellexa Alliance}}'s Surveillance Products}, + shorttitle = {Predator {{Files}}}, + date = {2023-10-06T06:00:52+00:00}, + url = {https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2023/10/technical-deep-dive-into-intellexa-alliance-surveillance-products/}, + urldate = {2025-11-27}, + abstract = {An expose the Intellexa Alliance's surveillance capabilities including advanced spyware, mass surveillance platforms, and tactical systems for targeting and intercepting nearby devices.}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {Amnesty International Security Lab} } @online{ProductPageFiber, @@ -5615,8 +6060,20 @@ urldate = {2024-09-05}, abstract = {The LC fiber pigtail has a primary coating (900µ) in the colour of the respective category (see table). The colour of the primary coating is equal to the colour of the secondary coating. A numeric connector coding 1 .. 12 simplifies the allocation of the…}, langid = {british}, - organization = {EFB-Elektronik GmbH}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WTJ3HBFT/o0485.html} + organization = {EFB-Elektronik GmbH} +} + +@article{purserAIDestroyingUniversity2025, + entrysubtype = {magazine}, + title = {{{AI}} Is {{Destroying}} the {{University}} and {{Learning Itself}}}, + author = {Purser, Ronald}, + date = {2025-12-01}, + journaltitle = {Current Affairs}, + issn = {2471-2647}, + url = {https://www.currentaffairs.org/news/ai-is-destroying-the-university-and-learning-itself}, + urldate = {2025-12-04}, + abstract = {Students use AI to write papers, professors use AI to grade them, degrees become meaningless, and tech companies make fortunes. Welcome to the death of higher education.}, + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{putzAcousticIntegrityCodes2020, @@ -5633,8 +6090,7 @@ url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3395351.3399420}, urldate = {2025-05-28}, abstract = {Secure Device Pairing (SDP) relies on an out-of-band channel to authenticate devices. This requires a common hardware interface, which limits the use of existing SDP systems. We propose to use short-range acoustic communication for the initial pairing. Audio hardware is commonly available on existing off-the-shelf devices and can be accessed from user space without requiring firmware or hardware modifications.We improve upon previous approaches by designing Acoustic Integrity Codes (AICs): a modulation scheme that provides message authentication on the acoustic physical layer. We analyze their security and demonstrate that we can defend against signal cancellation attacks by designing signals with low autocorrelation. Our system can detect overshadowing attacks using a ternary decision function with a threshold. In our evaluation of this SDP scheme's security and robustness, we achieve a bit error ratio below 0.1\% for a net bit rate of 100 bps with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 14 dB. Using our open-source proof-of-concept implementation on Android smartphones, we demonstrate pairing between different smartphone models.}, - isbn = {978-1-4503-8006-5}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Putz et al_2020_Acoustic integrity codes.pdf} + isbn = {978-1-4503-8006-5} } @book{querfurthCoilWindingDescription1954, @@ -5643,8 +6099,19 @@ date = {1954}, publisher = {G. Stevens Mfg. Company}, url = {https://vintagewindings.com/gen%20pop/8299543VW8335/TransDesign%201/Coil%20Winding.pdf}, - urldate = {2024-10-30}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MJR5J958/Coil Winding.pdf} + urldate = {2024-10-30} +} + +@online{quintinSomethingRememberUs2024, + title = {Something to {{Remember Us By}}: {{Device Confiscated}} by {{Russian Authorities Returned}} with {{Monokle-Type Spyware Installed}}}, + shorttitle = {Something to {{Remember Us By}}}, + author = {Quintin, Cooper and Brown, Rebekah and Scott-Railton, John}, + date = {2024-12-05T05:57:38-05:00}, + url = {https://citizenlab.ca/2024/12/device-confiscated-by-russian-authorities-returned-with-monokle-type-spyware-installed/}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {In a joint investigation with The First Department, The Citizen Lab uncovered spyware covertly implanted on the phone of a Russian programmer following his release from Russian custody. The Monokle-like spyware allows an operator to track the device’s location, record phone calls, keystrokes, and read messages from encrypted messaging apps.}, + organization = {Citizen Lab, University of Toronto}, + keywords = {Russia,spyware} } @inproceedings{quisquaterElectroMagneticAnalysisEMA2001, @@ -5661,8 +6128,7 @@ abstract = {A processor can leak information by different ways [1], electromagnetic radiations could be one of them. This idea, was first introduced by Kocher, with timing and power measurements. Here we developed the continuation of his ideas by measuring the field radiated by the processor. Therefore we show that the electromagnetic attack obtains at least the same result as power consumption and consequently must be carefuly taken into account. Finally we enumerate countermeasures to be implemented.}, isbn = {978-3-540-45418-2}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {DEMA,DPA,electromagnetic and power analysis,SEMA,smartcard,SPA,tamper resistance}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Quisquater_Samyde_2001_ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA).pdf} + keywords = {DEMA,DPA,electromagnetic and power analysis,SEMA,smartcard,SPA,tamper resistance} } @online{QuoteOriginMost2014, @@ -5671,14 +6137,14 @@ date = {2014-11-27}, url = {https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/11/27/always-done/}, urldate = {2025-10-22}, - langid = {american}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Y8PN52YR/always-done.html} + langid = {american} } @patent{rahman1988, type = {patentus}, title = {Optical Fiber Cable with Tampering Detecting Means}, author = {Rahman, Mujib}, + holder = {{Pirelli Cable Corp}}, date = {1988-03-10}, number = {Patent US4859024A} } @@ -5688,8 +6154,7 @@ author = {Rahman, Habibur}, abstract = {In the face of escalating security threats in modern computing systems, there is an urgent need for comprehensive defense mechanisms that can effectively mitigate invasive, noninvasive and interactive security vulnerabilities in hardware and software domains. Individually, hardware and software weaknesses and probable remedies have been practiced but protecting a combined system has not yet been discussed in detail. This survey paper provides a comprehensive overview of the emerging field of Hardware-Software co-Protection against Invasive and Non-Invasive Security Threats. We systematically review state-of-the-art research and developments in hardware and software security techniques, focusing on their integration to create synergistic defense mechanisms. The survey covers a wide range of security threats, including physical attacks, side-channel attacks, and malware exploits, and explores the diverse strategies employed to counter them. Our survey meticulously examines the landscape of security vulnerabilities, encompassing both physical and software-based attack vectors, and explores the intricate interplay between hardware and software defenses in mitigating these threats.Furthermore, we discuss the challenges and opportunities associated with Hardware-Software co-Protection and identify future research directions to advance the field. Through this survey, we aim to provide researchers, practitioners, and policymakers with valuable insights into the latest advancements and best practices for defending against complex security threats in modern computing environments.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {sampling-mesh}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EKJ87EQG/Rahman - A Comprehensive Survey on Hardware-Software co-Pro.pdf} + keywords = {sampling-mesh} } @patent{razaghiCircuitBoardHold2019, @@ -5701,8 +6166,7 @@ number = {10251260B1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10251260B1/en?q=(H01L23%2f576)&oq=(H01L23%2f576)&sort=old}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, - keywords = {board,conductive,detection circuit,tamper,tamper detection}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2019_Razaghi_Circuit board to hold connector pieces for tamper detection circuit.pdf} + keywords = {board,conductive,detection circuit,tamper,tamper detection} } @patent{razaghiTamperDetectionSystem2020, @@ -5714,16 +6178,14 @@ number = {10595400B1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10595400B1/en}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, - keywords = {detection circuit,housing,sensor element,tamper,tamper detection}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Razaghi_Hill_Tamper detection system.pdf} + keywords = {detection circuit,housing,sensor element,tamper,tamper detection} } @online{RecommendationsUniversityState2025, title = {Recommendations of the {{University}} and {{State Library Darmstadt}} for {{Labelling}} and {{Documenting AI-generated Content}}}, date = {2025-09-22}, url = {https://www.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/ki-doku}, - urldate = {2025-10-24}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/BHBDVJAI/ki_empfehlung_kurz.en.pdf} + urldate = {2025-10-24} } @online{RefusingTechFascism, @@ -5732,11 +6194,27 @@ urldate = {2025-05-16}, abstract = {An essay on Refusing Tech Fascism by Jürgen Geuter aka @tante}, langid = {english}, - organization = {Error 417 Expectation Failed}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/I6AG4WCP/essay-refusing-tech-fascism-by-tante.html} + organization = {Error 417 Expectation Failed} } -@misc{renesaselectronicscorporationApplicationNoteAN2242019, +@inproceedings{reichertMenhirObliviousDatabase2024, + title = {Menhir: {{An Oblivious Database}} with {{Protection}} against {{Access}} and {{Volume Pattern Leakage}}}, + shorttitle = {Menhir}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 19th {{ACM Asia Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, + author = {Reichert, Leonie and Chandran, Gowri R and Schoppmann, Phillipp and Schneider, Thomas and Scheuermann, Björn}, + date = {2024-07-01}, + series = {{{ASIA CCS}} '24}, + pages = {1675--1690}, + publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, + location = {New York, NY, USA}, + doi = {10.1145/3634737.3657005}, + url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3634737.3657005}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {Analyzing user data while protecting the privacy of individuals remains a big challenge. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are a possible solution as they protect processes and Virtual Machines (VMs) against malicious hosts. However, TEEs can leak access patterns to code and to the data being processed. Furthermore, when data is stored in a TEE database, the data volume required to answer a query is another unwanted side channel that contains sensitive information. Both types of information leaks, access patterns and volume patterns, allow for database reconstruction attacks.In this paper, we present Menhir, an oblivious TEE database that hides access patterns with ORAM guarantees and volume patterns through differential privacy. The database allows range and point queries with SQL-like WHERE-clauses. It builds on the state-of-the-art oblivious AVL tree construction Oblix (S\&P'18), which by itself does not protect against volume leakage. We show how volume leakage can be exploited in range queries and improve the construction to mitigate this type of attack. We prove the correctness and obliviousness of Menhir. Our evaluation shows that our approach is feasible and scales well with the number of rows and columns in the database.}, + isbn = {979-8-4007-0482-6} +} + +@online{renesaselectronicscorporationApplicationNoteAN2242019, title = {Application {{Note AN-224}}: {{ALVC}}/{{LVC Logic Characteristics}} and {{Applications}}}, author = {{Renesas Electronics Corporation}}, date = {2019}, @@ -5744,12 +6222,6 @@ urldate = {2025-04-09} } -@article{RenesasRA6T1Group, - title = {Renesas {{RA6T1 Group User}}'s {{Manual}}: {{Hardware}}}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/IZHL79MX/Renesas RA6T1 Group User's Manual Hardware.pdf} -} - @article{renHybridQuantumKey2022, title = {Hybrid Quantum Key Distribution Network}, author = {Ren, Siyu and Wang, Yu and Su, Xiaolong}, @@ -5764,8 +6236,7 @@ url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11432-022-3509-6}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) is now moving toward a scalable and secure QKD network, which establishes secret keys among network users. The continuous-variable (CV) and discrete-variable (DV) QKD systems are currently being developed in parallel and are all used in QKD networks. We propose here a hybrid QKD network, in which the CV QKD system is used to build metropolitan QKD networks, and the DV QKD system is used to connect metropolitan QKD networks. The hybrid QKD network takes advantage of high secret key rates for CV QKD systems and long distance for DV QKD systems. We also present a feasible hybrid measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD network, which combines both CV and DV MDI QKD systems. The presented hybrid QKD networks meet the low cost and compact requirement of a realistic QKD network and provide a feasible solution for future real QKD networks by combining the advantages of both CV and DV QKD systems.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/TA6CK85C/Ren et al. - 2022 - Hybrid quantum key distribution network.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{restelliQuantumKeyDistribution2009, @@ -5780,8 +6251,7 @@ urldate = {2024-05-22}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) channels are typically realized by transmitting and detecting single photons, and therefore suffer from dramatic reductions in throughput due to both channel loss and noise. These shortcomings can be mitigated by applying telecommunications clock-recovery techniques to maximize the bandwidth of the single-photon channel and minimize the system’s exposure to noise. We demonstrate a QKD system operating continuously at a quantum-channel transmission rate of 1.25 GHz, with dedicated data-handling hardware and error-correction/privacy amplification. We discuss the design and performance of our system and highlight issues which limit our maximum transmission and key production rates.}, eventtitle = {{{SPIE OPTO}}: {{Integrated Optoelectronic Devices}}}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XDSSUQKY/Restelli et al. - 2009 - Quantum key distribution at GHz transmission rates.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{rezmeritaSelfMutualInductance2017, @@ -5798,8 +6268,7 @@ abstract = {This paper presents how to implement the finite element method (FEM) to determine the magnetically coupled coils parameters. The method is applied for computing the parameters of the two resonators used in wireless power transfer (WPT). To compute the parameters corresponding to the resistance, self inductance, capacity and mutual inductance (R, L, C and M), we used CEDRAT Flux 2D software. The results of the 2D analyses are used to calculate the circuit’s parameters in order to compute the wireless power transferred to a load. Using FEM we realized two models: the first one in order to determine the values corresponding to L1, R1, L2, R2 and M and the second model to test its functioning in steady state. The two models differs by an electric circuit used to realize the coupling and the numerical models are modeled using the magnetic quasistationary state. The wireless power transfer efficiency depends on the coil’s shape which can play an important role in the operation of such devices.}, eventtitle = {2017 {{International Conference}} on {{Modern Power Systems}} ({{MPS}})}, isbn = {978-1-5090-6565-3}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QQZ7V3G4/Rezmerita et al. - 2017 - A self and mutual inductance calculation resonator.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{roettelerQuantumResourceEstimates2017, @@ -5811,22 +6280,32 @@ volume = {10625}, pages = {241--270}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_9}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-70697-9_9}, urldate = {2024-09-02}, abstract = {We give precise quantum resource estimates for Shor’s algorithm to compute discrete logarithms on elliptic curves over prime fields. The estimates are derived from a simulation of a Toffoli gate network for controlled elliptic curve point addition, implemented within the framework of the quantum computing software tool suite LIQU i| . We determine circuit implementations for reversible modular arithmetic, including modular addition, multiplication and inversion, as well as reversible elliptic curve point addition. We conclude that elliptic curve discrete logarithms on an elliptic curve defined over an n-bit prime field can be computed on a quantum computer with at most 9n + 2 log2(n) + 10 qubits using a quantum circuit of at most 448n3 log2(n) + 4090n3 Toffoli gates. We are able to classically simulate the Toffoli networks corresponding to the controlled elliptic curve point addition as the core piece of Shor’s algorithm for the NIST standard curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521. Our approach allows gate-level comparisons to recent resource estimates for Shor’s factoring algorithm. The results also support estimates given earlier by Proos and Zalka and indicate that, for current parameters at comparable classical security levels, the number of qubits required to tackle elliptic curves is less than for attacking RSA, suggesting that indeed ECC is an easier target than RSA.}, isbn = {978-3-319-70696-2 978-3-319-70697-9}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/B8JEIE23/Roetteler et al. - 2017 - Quantum Resource Estimates for Computing Elliptic .pdf} + langid = {english} } -@article{rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic, +@inproceedings{rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic2015, title = {The {{Moral Character}} of {{Cryptographic Work}}}, + booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}}}, author = {Rogaway, Phillip}, + date = {2015}, + series = {{{LNCS}}}, + volume = {9452 \& 9453}, + pages = {XVIII}, + publisher = {Springer}, + location = {Auckland, New Zealand}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3}, + url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1162.pdf}, + urldate = {2025-11-18}, abstract = {Cryptography rearranges power: it configures who can do what, from what. This makes cryptography an inherently political tool, and it confers on the field an intrinsically moral dimension. The Snowden revelations motivate a reassessment of the political and moral positioning of cryptography. They lead one to ask if our inability to effectively address mass surveillance constitutes a failure of our field. I believe that it does. I call for a community-wide effort to develop more effective means to resist mass surveillance. I plead for a reinvention of our disciplinary culture to attend not only to puzzles and math, but, also, to the societal implications of our work.}, + eventtitle = {{{ASIACRYPT}} 2015}, + isbn = {978-3-662-48800-3}, langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MPMSITSP/Rogaway - The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work.pdf} + annotation = {Paper on an Invited Talk, full version on eprint, one-page abstract in proceedings} } @article{rosaCalculationSelfinductanceSinglelayer1906, @@ -5842,8 +6321,7 @@ doi = {10.6028/bulletin.034}, url = {https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/bulletin/02/nbsbulletinv2n2p161_A2b.pdf}, urldate = {2024-10-10}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1906_Rosa_Calculation of the self-inductance of single-layer coils.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{roySelftimedSensorsDetecting2022, @@ -5858,8 +6336,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Sophisticated optical side-channel attacks such as Laser Logic State Imaging (LLSI) can destroy an entire system’s security by extracting static signals. LLSI is based on chip failure analysis (FA) techniques and is conducted from the backside of an IC. It provides unlimited number of probes to observe static signals in the hands of an attacker. Several countermeasures have been proposed to prevent optical probing techniques like LLSI, but they have limitations such as complex fabrication steps, large area, etc. which makes them difficult to verify and implement. In this paper, we propose self-timed, CMOS-compatible sensors for easy-to-implement countermeasures to thwart LLSI attack. To conduct LLSI attack, the attacker needs to freeze the clock at a point of interest and modulate the voltage supply line at a known frequency. With these two attack surfaces in mind, we design and simulate clock freeze and voltage modulation detection sensors that can detect LLSI attacks with very high confidence.1}, eventtitle = {2022 23rd {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})}, - keywords = {Integrated optics,Optical device fabrication,Optical imaging,Optical sensors,Security,Side-channel attacks,Voltage}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Roy et al_Self-timed Sensors for Detecting Static Optical Side Channel Attacks.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/L8N5JEJF/9806217.html} + keywords = {Integrated optics,Optical device fabrication,Optical imaging,Optical sensors,Security,Side-channel attacks,Voltage} } @article{ruchtiWhenDecoderHas2022, @@ -5875,8 +6352,7 @@ urldate = {2023-02-24}, abstract = {Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been increasingly used as an alternative to non-volatile memory for the storage of cryptographic secrets. Research on side channel and fault attacks with the goal of extracting these secrets has begun to gain interest but no fault injection attack targeting the necessary error correction within a PUF device has been shown so far. This work demonstrates one such attack on a hardware fuzzy commitment scheme implementation and thus shows a new potential attack threat existing in current PUF key storage systems. After presenting evidence for the overall viability of the profiled attack by performing it on an FPGA implementation, countermeasures are analysed: we discuss the efficacy of hashing helper data with the PUF-derived key to prevent the attack as well as codeword masking, a countermeasure effective against a side channel attack. The analysis shows the limits of these approaches. First, we demonstrate the criticality of timing in codeword masking by confirming the attack’s effectiveness on ostensibly protected hardware. Second, our work shows a successful attack without helper data manipulation and thus the potential for sidestepping helper data hashing countermeasures.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {clock glitch,fault attack,fuzzy commitment scheme,masking,physical unclonable function,safe error attack}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Ruchti et al_2022_When the Decoder Has to Look Twice.pdf} + keywords = {clock glitch,fault attack,fuzzy commitment scheme,masking,physical unclonable function,safe error attack} } @inproceedings{ruhrmairVirtualProofsReality2015, @@ -5893,8 +6369,7 @@ abstract = {We discuss the question of how physical statements can be proven over digital communication channels between two parties (a “prover” and a “verifier”) residing in two separate local systems. Examples include: (i) “a certain object in the prover’s system has temperature X◦C”, (ii) “two certain objects in the prover’s system are positioned at distance X”, or (iii) “a certain object in the prover’s system has been irreversibly altered or destroyed”. As illustrated by these examples, our treatment goes beyond classical security sensors in considering more general physical statements. Another distinctive aspect is the underlying security model: We neither assume secret keys in the prover’s system, nor do we suppose classical sensor hardware in his system which is tamperresistant and trusted by the verifier. Without an established name, we call this new type of security protocol a ”virtual proof of reality” or simply a “virtual proof” (VP).}, eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, isbn = {978-1-4673-6949-7}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9EWXN9MY/Ruhrmair et al. - 2015 - Virtual Proofs of Reality and their Physical Imple.pdf} + langid = {english} } @software{ruokolainenElmerCSCElmerfemElmer2023, @@ -5906,7 +6381,6 @@ url = {https://zenodo.org/record/7892181}, urldate = {2024-12-03}, abstract = {Elmer Release Notes for version 9.0 Previous release: {$<$}strong{$>$}8.4{$<$}/strong{$><$}br{$>$} Period covered: {$<$}strong{$>$}Dec 18 2018 - Nov 10 2020{$<$}/strong{$><$}br{$>$} Number of commits: {$<$}strong{$>$}\textasciitilde 1340{$<$}/strong{$>$} (excluding merges) These release notes provide information on the most essential changes. You can get a complete listing of commit messages, for example, with:{$<$}br{$>$} git log --since="2018-12-18" \> log.txt Apart from the core Elmer team at CSC (Juhani K., Mika M., Juha R., Peter R., Thomas Z.) git log shows contributions from Daniel B., Denis C., Eef v. D., Eelis T., Fabien G-C, Foad S. F., Fredrik R., Olivier G., Joe T., Luz P., Mondher C., Rupert G., Sami I., Sami R., Samuel C., and Saeki T. to this release. Additionally there are many ongoing developments in several branches that have not been merged to this release and are not therefore covered here. Also sometimes the code has been passed on by the original author by other means than the git, and in such cases the names may have been accidentally omitted. The contributions of all developers are gratefully acknowledged! New Solver Modules IncompressibleNSVec Incompressible Navier-Stokes solver utilizing vectorized and threaded assembly Includes built-in support for block preconditioning (Schur complement approximation included) Includes non-Newtonian material laws Intended for Elmer/Ice community but also other may find it useful. BeamSolver3D Solver for the Timoshenko equations of elastic beams embedded in 3-D space (see Elmer Models Manual for documentation) GmshReader Reads the mesh and results from simple Gmsh file format (that can be written by ElmerSolver as well) Solver includes interpolation of the fields to the current mesh May be used for hierarchical simulations where results are inherited from previous simulations ModelMixedPoisson A general-purpose mixed FEM solver for the Poisson equation (see Elmer Models Manual for documentation) Employs a div-conforming (face) finite element approximation SpringAssembly A generic utility to add node-wise springs and masses to structural models (see Elmer Models Manual for documentation) MarchingODESolver A solver that can compute ordinary differential equations on a moving mesh. It is assumed that the mesh is structured and there is a known draw speed. This makes it possible to relate timestep and mesh parameter directly with each other. Enhanced Solver Modules ElasticSolve Adding a new UMAT material model is simplified: compilation with an elmerf90 command is sufficient The state variables of UMAT material model can be written to a result file and visualized UMAT implementation updated to support axial symmetry EMWaveSolver The solver updated to support the basis functions of second order and simulation in 2D The solver is now documented in Elmer Models Manual MagnetoDynamics Fixes and generalization to the source projection (the determination of Jfix). A surface impedance condition for the time-harmonic AV model Thin region formulation for 1D wires in transient analysis Magnetic anisotropy (a complex-valued reluctivity tensor) enabled for the time-harmonic AV model MagnetoDynamics2D A velocity field can be given to add a Lorentz term to the equations Coreloss a posteriori formulas (Bertotti + extended Bertotti) MagnetoDynamicsCalcFields Enabled postprocessing in the case of a complex-valued reluctivity tensor Enabled the computation of magnetic co-energy ResultOutputSolver Vtu format: Enable saving of pieces, i.e. bodies and boundaries Improved saving of elemental, DG and IP fields Gmsh format: Improved use of masking features in output ShellSolver Eigenanalysis with the shell solver enabled Spring, resultant force and couple BCs added Combined analysis of 2-D shells and 1-D beams enabled Fully coupled analysis of 2-D shells and 3-D solids enabled (still subject to some geometric constraints on the mesh) Partial support for using an alternate formulation with drilling degrees of freedom StructuredMeshMapper Enable arbitrary number of layers, before limited to three. HeatSolver A new tentative vectorized version: HeatSolverVec Enable symmetric 3D cases for view factor computation to obtain significant timesavings Make Gebhart factors linear system symmetric, if possible "ViewFactor Symmetry" StressSolver Added a Maxwell visco-elastic model to linear elasticity solver Possible also to be run as incompressible (introducing pressure variable) Optional pre-stress advection term for layered Earth-deformation model WaveSolver The solver can be used to model harmonic and eigenmode cases as well. ParticleAdvector Allow particles to be sent from Gaussian integration points as well. This is beneficial for robustness since they are not located at surface. Local integration time based on local Courant number. ElmerSolver library functionality Treatment of block systems The block matrix approach for solving complicated problems has been enhanced. Currently the block approach can be used in several ways during some stage of the solution. Split up monolithic equations into subproblems that are easier to solve (e.g. IncompressibleNS) Combine linear multiphysical (coupled) problems into a block matrix (e.g. FSI problems) For problems belonging to class 1) we may perform recreation of a monolithic matrix. This will allow better use of standard linear algebra to utilize direct solvers, or change the system to be harmonic or eigenvalue problem. For the documentation of utilizing block-matrix construct in connection with the fully coupled simulation of multiphysical problems see the new chapter "Block-matrix construct to build tightly coupled solvers" in ElmerSolver Manual. More economical integration rules A collection of economical Gauss quadrature rules for prismatic elements are introduced to replace tensor product rules for quadrilateral p-elements when 1 \< p \<= 8. The tensor product rule with n = (p+1)**2 points is now replaced by more economical ones. Dirichlet BCs for div-conforming vector finite elements (face elements) A sif command of the form Q \{f\} j = Real ... can be used to specify vector-valued data whose normal component is then used to integrate the values of DOFs for vector-valued interpolation of the data. Here Q is an Elmer variable which is approximated with face finite elements. Conforming BCs by elimination System can identify conforming boundaries such that dofs related to nodes or edges on opposing sides may be assembled into one degree of freedom. This decreases the size of the linear system and is numerically favourable. Antiperiodicity may be included. For vector-valued problems all components must be treated alike. Conforming BCs for edge dofs may consider the direction of edge. See test cases with "Apply Conforming BCs" and "Conforming BC" defined. Improved internal partitioning with Zoltan Enable internal partitioning with Zoltan to honor connected boundaries. Enable primary solver to call other solvers For documentation see the section "Solver execution by a master solver" in ElmerSolver Manual. Enables calling before and after solving the primary problem. Also possible to call before and after each nonlinear iteration. Anderson Acceleration for nonlinear systems Implemented a version of Anderson Acceleration where previous solutions and residuals are used to accelerate the nonlinear convergence. May increase nonlinear convergence to quadratic, quadratic convergence (Newton's method) is not improved. Swapping meshes on-the-fly Implemented library functionality to swap meshes during the simulation. Currently no history data is interpolated. ListGetElemental routines More flexible routines for obtaining material parameters for the Gaussian integration points. Detects automatically what kind of fields the dependency depends on (nodal, DG, elemental, IP points) Vectorized versions to be used with vectorized finite element assembly View factors Allow computation of view factors in 3D cases with symmetry. Speed-up computation for cases where emissivity not equal to one. Enable view factors to be used in conjunction with DG (in HeatSolveVec) Run Control Enable external loop control over the simulation. May be used in optimization and parametric scanning etc. Applicable also to transient systems as the variable "time" is not used for the control level. Inline parameters Enable inline keywords -rpar and -ipar They are followed by the number of argument + values of the arguments. Generic source control We may tune a r.h.s. load vector such that the solution (or reaction force) at given node is the desired one. Mimics the old Smart Control operation of HeatSolve but on a library level. ElmerGrid Fixes for UNV, mptxt and Gmsh file format import. Tentative reader for FVCOM format Add possibility to define seed for Metis partitioning (-metisseed). Maintain entity names in extrusion ElmerGrid and its plugin under ElmerGUI were harmonized such that they use the same codebase. ElmerGUI Huge number of improvements by Saeki! Highlights include: Object browser to view the case at a glance and to easily access the most windows. Removed sif auto-generation functionality to avoid unintended overwriting of sif file. "Generate, save and run" button to quickly run the case modifed via GUI. "Save and run" button on sif window to quickly run the case modifed via sif window. Postprocessor button selectable from ElmerVTK, ElmerPost or ParaView. "New project..." menu as an alternative way to start a new project. Seperated "Save project as..." menu from "Save project" menu to save the project in a different directory. Improved and more robust project loading "Preference" menu on sif window and on solver log window for syntax highlighting and font selection. "Recent projects" in File menu for quick loading of recently used projects. Improved ElmerVTK postprocessor (reading simple .vtu file, bottom toolbar including time-step control and displace button, etc) Configuration \& Compilation New Windows installer utilizing msys2 either with or without ElmerGUI + with or without MPI installers Elmer/Ice New features in Elmer/Ice are documented in elmerfem/elmerice/ReleaseNotes/release\_elmerice\_9.0.md Other FreeCADBatchFEMTools improvements and added tests New Contributors @frroberts made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/176 @mmcker made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/118 @Foadsf made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/207 @dremerb made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/210 @Kezii made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/234 @kinnala made their first contribution in https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/pull/243 {$<$}strong{$>$}Full Changelog{$<$}/strong{$>$}: https://github.com/ElmerCSC/elmerfem/compare/release-8.4...release-9.0}, - organization = {Zenodo}, version = {release-9.0} } @@ -5948,8 +6422,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {The security and privacy of the Android system is an important research area due to the widespread use of Android devices. Most of the existing researches on this area focus on the mobile and wireless networks. Security breach through the speaker remains relatively less explored. In this work, we focus on potential security breaches in the Android system using ultrasonic channel in the speaker. We have proposed a dynamic vocabulary selection strategy to facilitate faster data transmission in ultrasonic side-channel attacks. We also propose a novel piecewise linear amplitude reduction technique that helps the system to achieve a higher bit-rate and higher amplitude for a long time. Our proposed system improves the bit-rate of the modulated audio by 27.5\% and maximum attack distance by 20\%. The improvement for the data transfer rate is 155\% for numeric data, 70\% for alpha-numeric data and 27.5\% for any ASCII character. We also propose a detection mechanism for similar attacks using Android log analysis.}, eventtitle = {2022 {{IEEE Wireless Communications}} and {{Networking Conference}} ({{WCNC}})}, - keywords = {Android,Bandwidth,Conferences,Inaudible sound,malware,Privacy breach,Side-channel attacks,Transmitters,Ultrasonic security,Vocabulary,Wireless networks}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Sadeq_Hossain_Privacy Breach in Android Smartphone Through Inaudible Sound.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8EHLVEMJ/9771721.html} + keywords = {Android,Bandwidth,Conferences,Inaudible sound,malware,Privacy breach,Side-channel attacks,Transmitters,Ultrasonic security,Vocabulary,Wireless networks} } @inproceedings{saeifDayAfterTomorrowPerformanceRadio2023, @@ -5966,8 +6439,7 @@ urldate = {2023-12-21}, eventtitle = {{{ACSAC}} '23: {{Annual Computer Security Applications Conference}}}, isbn = {9798400708862}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LYZND7TS/Saeif et al. - 2023 - The Day-After-Tomorrow On the Performance of Radi.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{safaCounterfeitChipDetection2023, @@ -5982,8 +6454,7 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10139623/}, urldate = {2025-09-30}, eventtitle = {2023 26th {{International Symposium}} on {{Design}} and {{Diagnostics}} of {{Electronic Circuits}} and {{Systems}} ({{DDECS}})}, - isbn = {979-8-3503-3277-3}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/T9KWPNZX/Safa et al. - 2023 - Counterfeit Chip Detection using Scattering Parameter Analysis.pdf} + isbn = {979-8-3503-3277-3} } @article{sagarStudiesTemperatureDependent2024, @@ -6012,8 +6483,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9209139B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric}, urldate = {2025-08-13}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {conductive,screen,security,security screen,terminals}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/DXN96WSL/Salle et al. - 2015 - Multilayer security wrap.pdf} + keywords = {conductive,screen,security,security screen,terminals} } @patent{salleSecurityWrap2015, @@ -6026,8 +6496,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9224280B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric}, urldate = {2025-08-13}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {conductive,pattern,security,security wrap,substrate}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FQSYNFXG/Salle et al. - 2015 - Security wrap.pdf} + keywords = {conductive,pattern,security,security wrap,substrate} } @patent{salleSecurityWrapBreakable2017, @@ -6040,8 +6509,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9576450B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric}, urldate = {2025-08-13}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {layer,screen,security,substrate,wrap}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Salle et al_2017_Security wrap with breakable conductors.pdf} + keywords = {layer,screen,security,substrate,wrap} } @patent{salleSecurityWrapTearable2017, @@ -6054,8 +6522,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9721199B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric}, urldate = {2025-08-13}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {conductor,point,screen,security,substrate}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Salle_EDMONDS_2017_Security wrap with tearable substrate.pdf} + keywords = {conductor,point,screen,security,substrate} } @patent{salleStackableSecurityWraps2017, @@ -6068,8 +6535,7 @@ url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9730314B2/en?q=(payment+OR+security)&assignee=johnson+electric}, urldate = {2025-08-13}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {conductive,screen,security,terminals,wrap}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Salle_2017_Stackable security wraps.pdf} + keywords = {conductive,screen,security,terminals,wrap} } @article{samiAdvancingTrustworthinessSysteminPackage2024, @@ -6086,8 +6552,7 @@ urldate = {2024-12-13}, abstract = {The semiconductor industry has adopted heterogeneous integration (HI), incorporating modular intellectual property (IP) blocks (chiplets) into a unified system-in-package (SiP) to overcome the slowdown in Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling and to respond to the increasing demand for advanced integrated circuits (ICs). Despite the manifold benefits of HI, such as enhanced performance, reduced area overhead, and improved yield, this transformation has also led to security vulnerabilities in the SiP supply chain and in-field operations, ranging from chiplet piracy and SiP reverse engineering (RE) to information leakage. Although conventional countermeasures provide the desired robustness for monolithic ICs, they are insufficient for addressing these challenges in the context of HI. To address these concerns, this paper presents a novel root-of-trust architecture, augmenting the process of integration using a centralized chiplet hardware security module (CHSM), aiming to provide comprehensive and robust protection throughout the SiP supply chain and in-field operations. Also, the proposed architecture equipped with the CHSM effectively addresses potential security breaches while providing robust protection against zero-day attacks through its reconfigurable capabilities. Throughout five detailed case studies, this paper performs a comprehensive security analysis to illustrate the resilience of CHSM against contemporary attack scenarios in the HI domain.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Access}}}, - keywords = {chiplet,Hardware security,hardware security module,Heterogeneous integration,Information leakage,Intellectual property,Multichip modules,Packaging,packaging technology,Reverse engineering,Security management,Semiconductor device manufacture,SiP security,Supply chain management,supply chain security,system-in-package,System-in-package,Trust management,vulnerability mitigation}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Sami et al_2024_Advancing Trustworthiness in System-in-Package.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CHJP67V4/10466542.html} + keywords = {chiplet,Hardware security,hardware security module,Heterogeneous integration,Information leakage,Intellectual property,Multichip modules,Packaging,packaging technology,Reverse engineering,Security management,Semiconductor device manufacture,SiP security,Supply chain management,supply chain security,system-in-package,System-in-package,Trust management,vulnerability mitigation} } @article{sasakiQuantumNetworksWhere2017, @@ -6103,8 +6568,25 @@ issn = {2058-9565}, doi = {10.1088/2058-9565/aa6994}, url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/2058-9565/aa6994}, - urldate = {2024-05-15}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Sasaki_2017_Quantum networks.pdf} + urldate = {2024-05-15} +} + +@article{sasySoKMetadataProtectingCommunication2024, + title = {{{SoK}}: {{Metadata-Protecting Communication Systems}}}, + shorttitle = {{{SoK}}}, + author = {Sasy, Sajin and Goldberg, Ian}, + date = {2024-01}, + journaltitle = {Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}, + shortjournal = {PoPETs}, + volume = {2024}, + number = {1}, + pages = {509--524}, + issn = {2299-0984}, + doi = {10.56553/popets-2024-0030}, + url = {https://petsymposium.org/popets/2024/popets-2024-0030.php}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {Protecting metadata of communications has been an area of active research since the dining cryptographers problem was introduced by David Chaum in 1988. The Snowden revelations from 2013 resparked research in this direction. Consequently over the last decade we have witnessed a flurry of novel systems designed to protect metadata of users' communications online. However, such systems leverage different assumptions and design choices to achieve their goal; resulting in a scattered view of the desirable properties, potential vulnerabilities, and limitations of existing metadata-protecting communication systems (MPCS). In this work we survey 31 systems targeting metadata-protected communications, and present a unified view of the current state of affairs. We provide two different taxonomies for existing MPCS, first into four different categories by the precise type of metadata protections they offer, and next into six families based on the core techniques that underlie them. By contrasting these systems we identify potential vulnerabilities, as well as subtle privacy implications of design choices of existing MPCS. Furthermore, we identify promising avenues for future research for MPCS, and desirable properties that merit more attention.}, + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{satoToucheEnhancingTouch2012, @@ -6121,8 +6603,7 @@ abstract = {Touché proposes a novel Swept Frequency Capacitive Sensing technique that can not only detect a touch event, but also recognize complex configurations of the human hands and body. Such contextual information significantly enhances touch interaction in a broad range of applications, from conventional touchscreens to unique contexts and materials. For example, in our explorations we add touch and gesture sensitivity to the human body and liquids. We demonstrate the rich capabilities of Touché with five example setups from different application domains and conduct experimental studies that show gesture classification accuracies of 99\% are achievable with our technology.}, eventtitle = {{{CHI}} '12: {{CHI Conference}} on {{Human Factors}} in {{Computing Systems}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-1015-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/544SAJVE/Sato et al. - 2012 - Touché enhancing touch interaction on humans, scr.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{schermerImprovedBendLoss2007, @@ -6139,8 +6620,7 @@ urldate = {2024-08-30}, abstract = {This paper presents an improved curvature loss formula for optical waveguides, which is shown to accurately predict the bend loss of both single-mode and multimode fibers. The formula expands upon a previous formula derived by Marcuse, greatly improving its accuracy for the case of multimode fiber. Also presented are the results of bent fiber simulations using the beam propagation method (BPM), and experimental measurements of bend loss. Agreement among simulation, formula and measurement support the validity of both theoretical methods. BPM simulations showed that the lowest order modes of the bent fiber were reduced to their linearly polarized constituents prior to the onset of significant bend loss. This implies that certain LP mode orientations should propagate with much lower loss than previously expected, and should impact the mode stripping ability of bent large mode area fibers, as employed in fiber lasers and amplifiers.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Journal}} of {{Quantum Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Dielectric waveguides,Fiber lasers,laser amplifiers,Laser modes,Loss measurement,optical fiber amplifiers,Optical fiber amplifiers,optical fiber lasers,Optical fiber losses,Optical fiber polarization,Optical fibers,Optical propagation,optical waveguide theory,Optical waveguides,Propagation losses,waveguide bends}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2007_Schermer_Cole_Improved Bend Loss Formula Verified for Optical Fiber by Simulation and.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2L6674ME/4300920.html} + keywords = {Dielectric waveguides,Fiber lasers,laser amplifiers,Laser modes,Loss measurement,optical fiber amplifiers,Optical fiber amplifiers,optical fiber lasers,Optical fiber losses,Optical fiber polarization,Optical fibers,Optical propagation,optical waveguide theory,Optical waveguides,Propagation losses,waveguide bends} } @online{schmiegGoogleThreatModel2024, @@ -6152,8 +6632,7 @@ urldate = {2024-06-27}, abstract = {Read on to understand how Google currently evaluates the threat landscape related to post-quantum cryptography, and what implications this has for migrating from classical cryptographic algorithms to PQC.}, langid = {american}, - organization = {Google's Threat model for Post-Quantum Cryptography}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CPBIT3L7/google-s-threat-model-for-post-quantum-cryptography.html} + organization = {Google's Threat model for Post-Quantum Cryptography} } @inproceedings{schmitzRollingTipFlexibleInstrument2019, @@ -6168,8 +6647,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-05}, abstract = {Snake-like robots are commonly used in Minimally Invasive Surgery as they are able to reach areas deep inside the human body. These robots have instruments that are deployed out of the robot's head and controlled via tendons, which connect the instrument to motors at the proximal end. In most currently available systems the instruments are lacking a rolling motion of the end-effector.In this paper, we present a new instrument prototype for a snake-like robot that can perform a stable in-place rolling motion. The prototype has a diameter of 4mm, uses 13 tendons and has 6 degrees of freedom. The robot can bend and roll to high angles, and strongly improves the dexterity compared to an instrument without rolling capabilities. In the evaluation we show that the rolling-tip gripper can rotate about 165° and is capable of applying forces up to 6.5N.}, eventtitle = {2019 {{International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})}, - keywords = {End effectors,Fasteners,Grippers,Instruments,Surgery,Tendons}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Schmitz et al_2019_A Rolling-Tip Flexible Instrument for Minimally Invasive Surgery.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LIBS2JT6/8793480.html} + keywords = {End effectors,Fasteners,Grippers,Instruments,Surgery,Tendons} } @article{schoosJitSCAJitterbasedSideChannel2023, @@ -6188,16 +6666,35 @@ abstract = {In safety and security conscious environments, isolated communication channels are often deemed necessary. Galvanically isolated communication channels are typically expected not to allow physical side-channel attacks through that channel. However, in this paper, we show that they can inadvertently leak side channel information in the form of minuscule jitter on the communication signal. We observe worst-case signal jitter within 54 ± 45 ps using an FPGA-based receiver employing a time-to-digital converter (TDC), which is a higher time resolution than a typical oscilloscope can measure, while in many other systems such measurements are also possible. A transmitter device runs a cryptographic accelerator, while we connect an FPGA on the receiver side and measure the signal jitter using a TDC. We can indeed show sufficient side-channel leakage in the jitter of the signal by performing a key recovery of an AES accelerator running on the transmitter. Furthermore, we compare this leakage to a power side channel also measured with a TDC and prove that the timing jitter alone contains sufficient side-channel information. While for an on-chip power analysis attack about 27k traces are needed for key recovery, our cross-device jitter-based attack only needs as few as 47k traces, depending on the setup. Galvanic isolation does not change that significantly. That is an increase by only 1.7x, showing that fine-grained jitter timing information can be a very potent attack vector even under galvanic isolation. In summary, we introduce a new side-channel attack vector that can leak information in many presumably secure systems. Communication channels can inadvertently leak information through tiny timing variations, known as signal jitter. This could affect millions of devices and needs to be considered.}, issue = {3}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {galvanically isolated,jitter,power,side-channel,timing}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Schoos et al_2023_JitSCA.pdf} + keywords = {galvanically isolated,jitter,power,side-channel,timing} +} + +@online{scott-railtonWhoseAuthorityPegasus2024, + title = {By {{Whose Authority}}? {{Pegasus}} Targeting of {{Russian}} \& {{Belarusian-speaking}} Opposition Activists and Independent Media in {{Europe}}}, + shorttitle = {By {{Whose Authority}}?}, + author = {Scott-Railton, John and Marczak, Bill and Razzak, Bahr Abdul and Ermoshina, Ksenia and Anstis, Siena and Deibert, Ron}, + date = {2024-05-30T07:59:44-04:00}, + url = {https://citizenlab.ca/2024/05/pegasus-russian-belarusian-speaking-opposition-media-europe/}, + urldate = {2025-11-26}, + abstract = {In a joint investigation with Access Now, we found that seven Russian and Belarusian-speaking independent journalists and opposition activists based in Europe were targeted and/or infected with NSO Group’s Pegasus mercenary spyware.}, + organization = {Citizen Lab, University of Toronto}, + keywords = {Apple,Pegasus,spyware} } @article{sculleyMachineLearningHighInterest, title = {Machine {{Learning}}: {{The High-Interest Credit Card}} of {{Technical Debt}}}, author = {Sculley, D and Holt, Gary and Golovin, Daniel and Davydov, Eugene and Phillips, Todd and Ebner, Dietmar and Chaudhary, Vinay and Young, Michael}, abstract = {Machine learning offers a fantastically powerful toolkit for building complex systems quickly. This paper argues that it is dangerous to think of these quick wins as coming for free. Using the framework of technical debt, we note that it is remarkably easy to incur massive ongoing maintenance costs at the system level when applying machine learning. The goal of this paper is highlight several machine learning specific risk factors and design patterns to be avoided or refactored where possible. These include boundary erosion, entanglement, hidden feedback loops, undeclared consumers, data dependencies, changes in the external world, and a variety of system-level anti-patterns.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Sculley et al_Machine Learning.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@online{SD04203RB25D5, + title = {{{SD-04203RB25-D5}}}, + author = {{Securitas Technology GmbH}}, + date = {2019}, + url = {https://setec-security.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SD-04203RB25-D5.pdf}, + urldate = {2025-10-30}, + organization = {Setec Sicherheitstechnik} } @online{SecureFlexPaymentTerminal, @@ -6219,8 +6716,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {Laser Fault Injection (LFI) is considered to be the most powerful semiinvasive fault injection method for implementation attacks on security devices. In this work we discuss for the first time the application of the nonlinear Two-Photon Absorption (TPA) effect for the purpose of LFI. Though TPA is an established technique in other areas, e.g. fluorescence microscopy, so far it did not receive any attention in the field of physical attack methods on integrated circuits. We show that TPA has several superior properties over the regular linear LFI method. The TPA effect allows to work on non-thinned devices without increasing the induced energy and hence the stress on the device. In contrast to regular LFI, the nonlinearity of the TPA effect leads to increased precision due to the steeper descent in intensity and also a vertically restricted photoelectric effect. By practical experiments, we demonstrate the general applicability of the method for a specific device and that unlike a regular LFI setup, TPA-LFI is capable to inject faults without triggering a latch-up effect. In addition we discuss the possible implications of TPA-LFI on various sensor-based countermeasures.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Countermeasures,Fault Attacks,Laser Fault Injection,Single-Photon Absorption,Two-Photon Absorption}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Selmke et al_2022_On the application of Two-Photon Absorption for Laser Fault Injection attacks.pdf} + keywords = {Countermeasures,Fault Attacks,Laser Fault Injection,Single-Photon Absorption,Two-Photon Absorption} } @article{senOrigamiInductorFoldable2024, @@ -6238,8 +6734,7 @@ urldate = {2024-10-30}, abstract = {Traditional air-coupled inductors are usually limited to two phases. This article presents the concept of multiphase 3-D polyhedron air-coupled inductors – termed “origami inductors” – formed by folding planar windings on modular surfaces into symmetric 3-D structures, which enables symmetric air-coupling of more than two phases. The air-coupled origami inductors, unlike traditional multiphase coupled inductors, do not need a magnetic core and can operate at high frequencies. Compared to discrete air-core inductors, the origami inductors can be easily transported and assembled and can offer reduced size, smaller current ripple, and faster transient due to dc and ac flux cancellation. Models are developed to quantify the performance benefits of the origami inductor. A tetrahedron-shaped four-phase origami inductor was designed and through FEM simulations, its reduced volume was verified. The origami inductor was also tested as a part of a 5 V input, 12 V output, 80 W four-phase interleaved dc–dc boost converter, switching between frequencies ranging from 1 to 5 MHz, to verify its operational effectiveness.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Air-coupled inductor,Analytical models,Atmospheric modeling,dc–dc converter,inductance dual model,Inductors,Integrated circuit modeling,interleaving,magnetic circuit model,multiphase,origami,permeance-capacitor model,polyhedron,Semiconductor device modeling,Solid modeling,Windings}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2024_Sen et al_Origami Inductor.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/35VMZ29J/10462531.html} + keywords = {Air-coupled inductor,Analytical models,Atmospheric modeling,dc–dc converter,inductance dual model,Inductors,Integrated circuit modeling,interleaving,magnetic circuit model,multiphase,origami,permeance-capacitor model,polyhedron,Semiconductor device modeling,Solid modeling,Windings} } @article{seolTrustedIaaSEnvironment2016, @@ -6256,8 +6751,7 @@ urldate = {2024-12-13}, abstract = {With the proliferation of cloud computing, security concerns about confidentiality violations of user data by the privileged domain and system administrators have been growing. This paper proposes secure cloud architecture with a hardware security module, which isolates cloud user data from potentially malicious privileged domains or cloud administrators. Within a securely isolated execution environment, the hardware security module provides essential security functionality with only restricted interfaces exposed to vulnerable management systems or cloud administrators. Such restriction prevents cloud administrators from affecting the security of guest VMs. The proposed architecture not only defends against wide attack vectors but also achieves a small TCB. This paper discusses our hardware and software implementation of the proposed cloud architecture, analyzes its security, and presents its performance results.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Services Computing}}}, - keywords = {Cloud computing,Computer architecture,Cryptography,Hardware,hardware security module,Hardware Security Module,Protocols,security,TCB}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Seol et al_2016_A Trusted IaaS Environment with Hardware Security Module.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/ZFNE2NAZ/7010017.html} + keywords = {Cloud computing,Computer architecture,Cryptography,Hardware,hardware security module,Hardware Security Module,Protocols,security,TCB} } @article{sh2016, @@ -6295,8 +6789,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {Traditional anonymous networks (e.g., Tor) are vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks that monitor the whole network traffic to determine which users are communicating. To preserve user anonymity against traffic analysis attacks, the emerging mix networks mess up the order of packets through a set of centralized and explicit shuffling nodes. However, this centralized design of mix networks is insecure against targeted DoS attacks that can completely block these shuffling nodes. In this article, we present DAENet, an efficient mix network that resists both targeted DoS attacks and traffic analysis attacks with a new abstraction called Stealthy Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Network. The stealthy P2P network effectively hides the shuffling nodes used in a routing path into the whole network, such that adversaries cannot distinguish specific shuffling nodes and conduct targeted DoS attacks to block these nodes. In addition, to handle traffic analysis attacks, we leverage the confidentiality and integrity protection of Intel SGX to ensure trustworthy packet shuffles at each distributed host and use multiple routing paths to prevent adversaries from tracking and revealing user identities. We show that our system is scalable with moderate latency (2.2s) when running in a cluster of 10,000 participants and is robust in the case of machine failures, making it an attractive new design for decentralized anonymous communication. DAENet ’s code is released on https://github.com/hku-systems/DAENet.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Dependable}} and {{Secure Computing}}}, - keywords = {Cryptography,Denial-of-service attack,DoS attack,mix network,P2P network,Peer-to-peer computing,Relays,Resists,Routing,Scalable anonymous communication,Servers,SGX,traffic analysis attack}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Shen et al_2022_DAENet.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CJVFJ33M/9328493.html} + keywords = {Cryptography,Denial-of-service attack,DoS attack,mix network,P2P network,Peer-to-peer computing,Relays,Resists,Routing,Scalable anonymous communication,Servers,SGX,traffic analysis attack} } @article{shenThermalModelingDesign2020, @@ -6313,8 +6806,7 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8706634/}, urldate = {2024-01-30}, abstract = {Miniature power semiconductor devices mounted on printed circuit boards (PCBs) are normally cooled by means of PCB vias, copper pads, and/or heatsinks. Various reference PCB thermal designs have been provided by semiconductor manufacturers and researchers. However, the recommendations are not optimal, and there are some discrepancies among them, which may confuse electrical engineers. This paper aims to develop analytical thermal resistance models for PCB vias and pads, and further to obtain the optimal design for thermal resistance minimization. First, the PCB via array is thermally modeled in terms of multiple design parameters. A systematic parametric analysis leads to an optimal trajectory for the via diameter at different PCB specifications. Then, an axisymmetric thermal resistance model is developed for PCB thermal pads where the heat conduction, convection, and radiation all exist; due to the interdependence between the conductive/radiative heat transfer coefficients and the board temperatures, an algorithm is proposed to fast obtain the board-ambient thermal resistance and to predict the semiconductor junction temperature. Finally, the proposed thermal models and design optimization algorithms are verified by computational fluid dynamics simulations and experimental measurements.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9JF534CK/Shen et al. - 2020 - Thermal Modeling and Design Optimization of PCB Vi.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{shorAlgorithmsQuantumComputation1994, @@ -6329,8 +6821,7 @@ urldate = {2024-09-02}, abstract = {A computer is generally considered to be a universal computational device; i.e., it is believed able to simulate any physical computational device with a cost in computation time of at most a polynomial factor: It is not clear whether this is still true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. Several researchers, starting with David Deutsch, have developed models for quantum mechanical computers and have investigated their computational properties. This paper gives Las Vegas algorithms for finding discrete logarithms and factoring integers on a quantum computer that take a number of steps which is polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. These two problems are generally considered hard on a classical computer and have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. We thus give the first examples of quantum cryptanalysis.{$<>$}}, eventtitle = {Proceedings 35th {{Annual Symposium}} on {{Foundations}} of {{Computer Science}}}, - keywords = {Circuit simulation,Computational modeling,Computer simulation,Costs,Cryptography,Mechanical factors,Physics computing,Polynomials,Quantum computing,Quantum mechanics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XIZ8N8T8/365700.html} + keywords = {Circuit simulation,Computational modeling,Computer simulation,Costs,Cryptography,Mechanical factors,Physics computing,Polynomials,Quantum computing,Quantum mechanics} } @article{shorPolynomialTimeAlgorithmsPrime1997, @@ -6347,8 +6838,7 @@ doi = {10.1137/S0097539795293172}, url = {https://epubs.siam.org/doi/10.1137/S0097539795293172}, urldate = {2024-09-02}, - abstract = {A digital computer is generally believed to be an efficient universal computing device; that is, it is believed able to simulate any physical computing device with an increase in computation time by at most a polynomial factor. This may not be true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. This paper considers factoring integers and finding discrete logarithms, two problems which are generally thought to be hard on a classical computer and which have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. Efficient randomized algorithms are given for these two problems on a hypothetical quantum computer. These algorithms take a number of steps polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. MSC codes 81P10 11Y05 68Q10 03D10 Keywords algorithmic number theory prime factorization discrete logarithms Church's thesis quantum computers foundations of quantum mechanics spin systems Fourier transforms}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1997_Shor_Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a.pdf} + abstract = {A digital computer is generally believed to be an efficient universal computing device; that is, it is believed able to simulate any physical computing device with an increase in computation time by at most a polynomial factor. This may not be true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. This paper considers factoring integers and finding discrete logarithms, two problems which are generally thought to be hard on a classical computer and which have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. Efficient randomized algorithms are given for these two problems on a hypothetical quantum computer. These algorithms take a number of steps polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. MSC codes 81P10 11Y05 68Q10 03D10 Keywords algorithmic number theory prime factorization discrete logarithms Church's thesis quantum computers foundations of quantum mechanics spin systems Fourier transforms} } @online{siffermanUnlockingPerformanceProximity2023, @@ -6363,15 +6853,14 @@ abstract = {We provide methods which recover planar scene geometry by utilizing the transient histograms captured by a class of close-range time-of-flight (ToF) distance sensor. A transient histogram is a one dimensional temporal waveform which encodes the arrival time of photons incident on the ToF sensor. Typically, a sensor processes the transient histogram using a proprietary algorithm to produce distance estimates, which are commonly used in several robotics applications. Our methods utilize the transient histogram directly to enable recovery of planar geometry more accurately than is possible using only proprietary distance estimates, and consistent recovery of the albedo of the planar surface, which is not possible with proprietary distance estimates alone. This is accomplished via a differentiable rendering pipeline, which simulates the transient imaging process, allowing direct optimization of scene geometry to match observations. To validate our methods, we capture 3,800 measurements of eight planar surfaces from a wide range of viewpoints, and show that our method outperforms the proprietary-distance-estimate baseline by an order of magnitude in most scenarios. We demonstrate a simple robotics application which uses our method to sense the distance to and slope of a planar surface from a sensor mounted on the end effector of a robot arm.}, langid = {english}, pubstate = {prepublished}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,Computer Science - Robotics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/S2TLFNT7/Sifferman et al. - 2023 - Unlocking the Performance of Proximity Sensors by .pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,Computer Science - Robotics} } @www{signal2019, title = {Technology {{Preview}} for Secure Value Recovery}, author = {Lund, Joshua}, date = {2019-12-19}, - publisher = {signal.org / signal.org}, + journaltitle = {Signal}, url = {https://signal.org/blog/secure-value-recovery/}, urldate = {2021-07-12} } @@ -6389,8 +6878,7 @@ url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4446/}, urldate = {2025-06-26}, abstract = {The author presents a solution to the problem of how to make it possible for two mutually distrusting (and presumed deceitful) parties, the host and the monitor, to both trust a data acquisition system that informs the monitor and perhaps third parties, whether the host has or has not violated the terms of a treaty. He starts by assuming that such a data acquisition system exists, and that the opportunities for deception lie only in the manipulation, i.e. forgery, modification, retransmission, etc. The author shows that it is possible to satisfy simultaneously the interests of all parties. The technical device on which this resolution depends is the concatenation of two or more private authentication channels to create a system in which each participant need only trust that part of the whole that he or she contributed. In the resulting scheme, no part of the data need to be kept secret from any participant at any time; no party nor collusion of fewer than all of the parties can utter an undetectable forgery; no unilateral action on the part of any party can lessen the confidence of others as to the authenticity of the data, and third parties, i.e. arbiters, can be logically persuaded of the authenticity of data.{$<>$}}, - keywords = {Arm,Computer security,Computer Society,Control systems,Data acquisition,Forgery,Laboratories,Monitoring,Nuclear weapons,System testing}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Simmons_1988_How to insure that data acquired to verify treaty compliance are trustworthy.pdf} + keywords = {Arm,Computer security,Computer Society,Control systems,Data acquisition,Forgery,Laboratories,Monitoring,Nuclear weapons,System testing} } @article{skorobogatovHardwareSecurityImplications2018, @@ -6408,8 +6896,7 @@ urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Secure semiconductor devices usually destroy key material on tamper detection. However, data remanence effect in SRAM and Flash/EEPROM makes secure erasure process more challenging. On the other hand, data integrity of the embedded memory is essential to mitigate fault attacks and Trojan malware. Data retention issues could influence the reliability of embedded systems. Some examples of such issues in industrial and automotive applications are presented. When it comes to the security of semiconductor devices, both data remanence and data retention issues could lead to possible data recovery by an attacker. This paper introduces a new power glitching technique that reduces the data remanence time in embedded SRAM from seconds to microseconds at almost no cost. This would definitely help in designing systems with better secret key guarding. Data remanence in non-volatile memory could be influenced in the same way. The effect of data remanence and data retention on hardware security is discussed and possible countermeasures are suggested. This should raise awareness among the designers of secure embedded systems.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Data remanence,Data retention,EEPROM,Flash,Glitching,Hardware security,PRNG,PUF,SRAM}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Skorobogatov_Hardware Security Implications of Reliability, Remanence, and Recovery in.pdf} + keywords = {Data remanence,Data retention,EEPROM,Flash,Glitching,Hardware security,PRNG,PUF,SRAM} } @online{slanySicherheitsanalyseZurSicherheit2020, @@ -6418,8 +6905,7 @@ date = {2020-03}, url = {https://www.gematik.de/media/gematik/Medien/Newsroom/Presse/Dokumente/Sicherheitsanalyse_TU_Graz_zur_ePA_mit_Vorwort_der_gematik.pdf}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, - langid = {german}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SVMJG2SZ/Sicherheitsanalyse_TU_Graz_zur_ePA_mit_Vorwort_der_gematik.pdf} + langid = {german} } @online{SmaugDracheUnd, @@ -6430,20 +6916,24 @@ abstract = {Stell Dir vor, wir befinden uns in Tolkiens Welt von Der Hobbit: Smaug, der mächtige Drache, liegt auf einem Berg aus Gold, überzeugt davon, dass er unbesiegbar ist. Doch in seiner scheinbar uneinnehmbaren Festung gibt es eine winzige Schwachstelle – eine kleine Stelle in seinem Panzer.}, langid = {ngerman}, annotation = {Archive 1: https://archive.is/PVJO8\\ -Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pulse/smaug-der-drache-und-die-epa-ein-zentraler-zentrales-risiko-block-vh3ue}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FIPZSEGC/smaug-der-drache-und-die-epa-ein-zentraler-zentrales-risiko-block-vh3ue.html} +Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pulse/smaug-der-drache-und-die-epa-ein-zentraler-zentrales-risiko-block-vh3ue} } -@article{smith1998, +@article{smithBuildingHighperformanceProgrammable1999, title = {Building a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor}, - author = {Smith, Sean and Weingart, Steve}, - date = {1999}, + author = {Smith, Sean W and Weingart, Steve}, + date = {1999-04}, journaltitle = {Computer Networks}, + shortjournal = {Computer Networks}, volume = {31}, number = {8}, - publisher = {IBM T.J. Watson Research Center}, - url = {ftp://www6.software.ibm.com/software/cryptocards/rc21102.pdf}, - urldate = {2020-09-16} + pages = {831--860}, + issn = {13891286}, + doi = {10.1016/S1389-1286(98)00019-X}, + url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S138912869800019X}, + urldate = {2025-11-04}, + abstract = {Secure coprocessors enable secure distributed applications by providing safe havens where an application program can execute Žand accumulate state., free of observation and interference by an adversary with direct physical access to the device. However, for these coprocessors to be effective, participants in such applications must be able to verify that they are interacting with an authentic program on an authentic, untampered device. Furthermore, secure coprocessors that support general-purpose computation and will be manufactured and distributed as commercial products must provide these core sanctuary and authentication properties while also meeting many additional challenges, including: Ø the applications, operating system, and underlying security management may all come from different, mutually suspicious authorities; Ø configuration and maintenance must occur in a hostile environment, while minimizing disruption of operations; Ø the device must be able to recover from the vulnerabilities that inevitably emerge in complex software; Ø physical security dictates that the device itself can never be opened and examined; and Ø ever-evolving cryptographic requirements dictate that hardware accelerators be supported by reloadable on-card software. This paper summarizes the hardware, software, and cryptographic architecture we developed to address these problems. Furthermore, with our colleagues, we have implemented this solution, into a commercially available product. q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.}, + langid = {english} } @article{smithDesignOptimizationVoice2015, @@ -6460,8 +6950,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {This paper proposes a new application for the rotary voice coil motor (VCM). In developing a low-cost ultrasound scanner for the developing world, an oscillating transducer is required to sweep over the skin. The ultrasound scanner must operate from a USB power supply in remote locations. The application requires a 3.3-N force on the coils of the motor to overcome the inertia of the skin. A proof-of-concept prototype motor with electronics has been designed, simulated, and tested. The VCM optimization is discussed in detail with the unique separation of the magnets being critical to reduce the axial bearing forces for this application.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industrial Electronics}}}, - keywords = {3-D finite-element analysis (FEA),3D Finite-Element Analysis,Force,Magnetic flux leakage,Magnetic levitation,Magnetic separation,Optimization,Permanent Magnet (PM) Motor,Permanent-magnet (PM) motor,rotary actuator,Rotary Actuator,Saturation magnetization,Ultrasonic imaging,voice coil motor (VCM),Voice Coil Motor (VCM)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Smith et al_Design and Optimization of a Voice Coil Motor With a Rotary Actuator for an.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PKJDFUKZ/7132747.html} + keywords = {3-D finite-element analysis (FEA),3D Finite-Element Analysis,Force,Magnetic flux leakage,Magnetic levitation,Magnetic separation,Optimization,Permanent Magnet (PM) Motor,Permanent-magnet (PM) motor,rotary actuator,Rotary Actuator,Saturation magnetization,Ultrasonic imaging,voice coil motor (VCM),Voice Coil Motor (VCM)} } @patent{smithMethodApparatusActive1999, @@ -6473,8 +6962,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu number = {6002501A}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US6002501A/en}, urldate = {2025-04-11}, - keywords = {breach,loop,operative,reflectometer,signals}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1999_Smith et al_Method and apparatus for active tamper indicating device using optical.pdf} + keywords = {breach,loop,operative,reflectometer,signals} } @report{smithRobustInexactGeometric, @@ -6501,8 +6989,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2025-08-15}, abstract = {We introduce Tiny Garble, a novel automated methodology based on powerful logic synthesis techniques for generating and optimizing compressed Boolean circuits used in secure computation, such as Yao's Garbled Circuit (GC) protocol. Tiny Garble achieves an unprecedented level of compactness and scalability by using a sequential circuit description for GC. We introduce new libraries and transformations, such that our sequential circuits can be optimized and securely evaluated by interfacing with available garbling frameworks. The circuit compactness makes the memory footprint of the garbling operation fit in the processor cache, resulting in fewer cache misses and thereby less CPU cycles. Our proof-of-concept implementation of benchmark functions using Tiny Garble demonstrates a high degree of compactness and scalability. We improve the results of existing automated tools for GC generation by orders of magnitude, for example, Tiny Garble can compress the memory footprint required for 1024-bit multiplication by a factor of 4,172, while decreasing the number of non-XOR gates by 67\%. Moreover, with Tiny Garble we are able to implement functions that have never been reported before, such as SHA-3. Finally, our sequential description enables us to design and realize a garbled processor, using the MIPS I instruction set, for private function evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scalable emulation of a general purpose processor.}, eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}}, - keywords = {Garbled Circuit,Hardware design languages,Hardware Synthesis,Libraries,Logic Design,Logic gates,Optimization,Protocols,Secure Function Evaluation,Sequential circuits,Wires}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Songhori et al_TinyGarble.pdf} + keywords = {Garbled Circuit,Hardware design languages,Hardware Synthesis,Libraries,Logic Design,Logic gates,Optimization,Protocols,Secure Function Evaluation,Sequential circuits,Wires} } @inproceedings{songPOSTERInaudibleVoice2017, @@ -6520,8 +7007,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {Voice assistants like Siri enable us to control IoT devices conveniently with voice commands, however, they also provide new attack opportunities for adversaries. Previous papers attack voice assistants with obfuscated voice commands by leveraging the gap between speech recognition system and human voice perception. The limitation is that these obfuscated commands are audible and thus conspicuous to device owners. In this poster, we propose a novel mechanism to directly attack the microphone used for sensing voice data with inaudible voice commands. We show that the adversary can exploit the microphone’s non-linearity and play welldesigned inaudible ultrasounds to cause the microphone to record normal voice commands, and thus control the victim device inconspicuously. We demonstrate via end-to-end real-world experiments that our inaudible voice commands can attack an Android phone and an Amazon Echo device with high success rates at a range of 2-3 meters.}, eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '17: 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-4946-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/DVUMANPK/Song and Mittal - 2017 - POSTER Inaudible Voice Commands.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{songRotationLightweightWirelessPower2019, @@ -6538,8 +7024,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-12-10}, abstract = {In this paper, a novel magnetic coupler of wireless power transfer system for the solar wing driving of the spacecraft is designed. Compared with the traditional slip-ring power supply, the proposed magnetic coupler is characterized by non-contact, high efficiency, wear free, safety, and reliability. Particularly, it can be applied to the rotating condition. To realize light weight and small volume of the receiver, the magnetic coupler has been optimized from both compensation topology and coil configuration. First, a series-none topology is employed to eliminate the bulky secondary-side compensation capacitor. Second, a new nested solenoid coil with strip core is proposed to ensure miniaturization, stable power transfer, and high efficiency. Finally, the experimental setup is built to verify the performance of the designed magnetic coupler. Experimental results are well matched to simulations, demonstrating that the weight of the prototype is 1.3 kg and the transfer power is 3 kW at an ac-dc efficiency of 92.7\%.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Couplers,Couplings,Magnetic cores,Magnetic flux,Power generation,Resistance,Rotary magnetic coupler,series-none (S-0) topology,solar wing driving,solenoid coil,strip core,Topology,wireless power transfer (WPT)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Song et al_2019_A Rotation-Lightweight Wireless Power Transfer System for Solar Wing Driving.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7DHIZ9WS/8576647.html} + keywords = {Couplers,Couplings,Magnetic cores,Magnetic flux,Power generation,Resistance,Rotary magnetic coupler,series-none (S-0) topology,solar wing driving,solenoid coil,strip core,Topology,wireless power transfer (WPT)} } @inproceedings{sozioPatchableHardwareSecurity2021, @@ -6553,16 +7038,14 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-07-10}, abstract = {Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are re-programmable hardware devices widely used in consumer and defense applications. Their specific functionality is determined by programming the FPGA with a configuration file, or bitstream, which often occurs at bootup. FPGAs rely on a hardware Root-of-Trust (RoT) to verify the authenticity of these (re)programming attempts. Any vulnerability in an FPGA’s RoT enables adversarial (re)programming, tampering, and information extraction from the FPGA. Unlike software, when hardware RoT vulnerabilities are exposed the FPGA cannot be patched, but remains forever vulnerable to exploit.This work assumes a hardware RoT on an FPGA will be compromised at some point by an adversary. We propose incorporating a second, patchable, layer of security to prevent adversarial attacks on FPGAs, even those with potentially compromised hardware RoT schemes. To accomplish this, we present Patchable Hardware Security Module (PHaSM), a patchable hybrid security framework that enables a secondary RoT. PHaSM implements a small bootloader in the FPGA’s reconfigurable fabric and incorporates user-defined authentication and decryption schemes. The bootloader loads an application configuration, PHaSM then decrypts and authenticates it using the user-defined schemes, and programs the application design into the remaining FPGA fabric using partial reconfiguration. Should the user-defined security scheme become vulnerable, a new security scheme can be incorporated without modifying the original application design.}, eventtitle = {2021 {{IEEE Physical Assurance}} and {{Inspection}} of {{Electronics}} ({{PAINE}})}, - keywords = {Authentication,Bitstream,Fabrics,FPGA,Hardware,Information retrieval,Inspection,Programming,Reconfiguration,Security,Software}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2021_Sozio et al_Patchable Hardware Security Module (PHaSM) for Extending FPGA Root-of-Trust.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/D5BLNRV7/9707698.html} + keywords = {Authentication,Bitstream,Fabrics,FPGA,Hardware,Information retrieval,Inspection,Programming,Reconfiguration,Security,Software} } @standard{SpezifikationFachmodulEPA2023, title = {Spezifikation Fachmodul ePA}, date = {2023-04-03}, langid = {ngerman}, - version = {1.53.0}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/J79W78KS/Spezifikation Fachmodul ePA.pdf} + version = {1.53.0} } @article{sproHighVoltageInsulationDesign2021, @@ -6579,8 +7062,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-10-30}, abstract = {This article investigates the insulation design for printed, planar, coreless, and high-frequency transformers with high isolation-voltage. By using finite element analysis on 2-D axial-symmetry, the transformer circuit parameters and electric field distribution are modeled and estimated. Several transformers are designed for an operating frequency of 6.78 MHz. The high frequency, coreless design allows for using thicker insulation material while ensuring a high transformer efficiency. The inclusion of the coupling capacitance in the design optimization results in several design solutions with the same figure of merit, but with different footprint and isolation voltages. Moreover, high electric fields are identified around the sharp edges of the printed circuit board (PCB) windings. Finally, the electrical and isolation performance is verified experimentally. The measured electrical properties are close to the simulated values, validating the chosen model. Breakdown tests demonstrate the feasibility of isolation voltage levels up to several tens of kilovolts. The majority of breakdowns occurs at the outer edge of the PCB winding that was identified as a high-field area. Additionally, a concept for grading the electric field of PCB windings is also proposed. Based on the results, the design aspects are discussed in detail for planar, high-frequency isolation transformers with medium-voltage isolation level.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Capacitance,Couplings,Design methodology,dielectric breakdown,insulation,Insulation,Power supplies,Power transformer insulation,resonant power conversion,Transformer cores,transformers,Windings}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2021_Spro et al_High-Voltage Insulation Design of Coreless, Planar PCB Transformers for.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/I2H9EHKJ/9314282.html} + keywords = {Capacitance,Couplings,Design methodology,dielectric breakdown,insulation,Insulation,Power supplies,Power transformer insulation,resonant power conversion,Transformer cores,transformers,Windings} } @inproceedings{staatAntiTamperRadioSystemLevel2022, @@ -6596,11 +7078,10 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2025-04-09}, abstract = {A whole range of attacks becomes possible when adversaries gain physical access to computing systems that process or contain sensitive data. Examples include side-channel analysis, bus probing, device cloning, or implanting hardware Trojans. Defending against these kinds of attacks is considered a challenging endeavor, requiring anti-tamper solutions to monitor the physical environment of the system. Current solutions range from simple switches, which detect if a case is opened, to meshes of conducting material that provide more fine-grained detection of integrity violations. However, these solutions suffer from an intricate trade-off between physical security on the one side and reliability, cost, and difficulty to manufacture on the other.In this work, we demonstrate that radio wave propagation in an enclosed system of complex geometry is sensitive against adversarial physical manipulation. We present an anti-tamper radio (ATR) solution as a method for tamper detection, which combines high detection sensitivity and reliability with ease-of-use. ATR constantly monitors the wireless signal propagation behavior within the boundaries of a metal case. Tamper attempts such as insertion of foreign objects, will alter the observed radio signal response, subsequently raising an alarm.The ATR principle is applicable in many computing systems that require physical security such as servers, ATMs, and smart meters. As a case study, we use 19” servers and thoroughly investigate capabilities and limits of the ATR. Using a custom-built automated probing station, we simulate probing attacks by inserting needles with high precision into protected environments. Our experimental results show that our ATR implementation can detect 16mm insertions of needles of diameter as low as 0.1mm under ideal conditions. In the more realistic environment of a running 19” server, we demonstrate reliable detection of 40mm insertions of needles of diameter 1mm for a period of 10 days.}, eventtitle = {2022 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, - keywords = {Geometry,Needles,Robot sensing systems,Sensitivity,Servers,Wireless communication,Wireless sensor networks}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Staat et al_Anti-Tamper Radio.pdf} + keywords = {Geometry,Needles,Robot sensing systems,Sensitivity,Servers,Wireless communication,Wireless sensor networks} } -@misc{stmicroelectronicsSTM32G474xBDatasheet2021, +@online{stmicroelectronicsSTM32G474xBDatasheet2021, title = {{{STM32G474xB}}/{{C}}/{{E Datasheet}}}, author = {{ST Microelectronics}}, date = {2021-11}, @@ -6632,8 +7113,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1367-2630/13/12/123001}, urldate = {2024-09-05}, abstract = {In this paper, we report on the performance of the SwissQuantum quantum key distribution (QKD) network. The network was installed in the Geneva metropolitan area and ran for more than one-and-a-half years, from the end of March 2009 to the beginning of January 2011. The main goal of this experiment was to test the reliability of the quantum layer over a long period of time in a production environment. A key management layer has been developed to manage the key between the three nodes of the network. This QKD-secure network was utilized by end-users through an application layer.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4KALSJCN/Stucki et al. - 2011 - Long-term performance of the SwissQuantum quantum .pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{suhDesignDiscreteBending2017, @@ -6651,8 +7131,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-09-05}, abstract = {Miniature steerable robots are required for various medical applications. Although a typical continuum joint mechanism has a great advantage of miniaturization, it is difficult to have a small bending radius of curvature. With a discrete joint, it is easy to secure definite bending with strength; however, a coarsely structured joint cannot provide a stable distal rolling motion to the end-effector. This paper proposes a method to construct a 2-DOF discrete bending joint using multiple pulleyless rolling joints with an example of a 4-segmental joint. The effects of the stacking sequence on its performance are analyzed. Then, three evaluation criteria are established, and the best stacking sequences are determined. The proposed design method is valid for various numbers of unit joints, and it can be easily applied to the structural design of soft robots resembling snakes or elephant trunks.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Continuum joint,discrete joint,isotropic bending,PREF joint,stacking sequence,surgical robot}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Suh_Kim_2017_Design of a discrete bending joint using multiple unit PREF joints for.pdf} + keywords = {Continuum joint,discrete joint,isotropic bending,PREF joint,stacking sequence,surgical robot} } @article{sutardjaIsolatorLessNearFieldRFID2018, @@ -6680,8 +7159,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US708093A/en?oq=US708093}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {circuit,grooves,protected,wires,wiring}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1902_Sutton et al_Electrically-protected structure.pdf} + keywords = {circuit,grooves,protected,wires,wiring} } @article{takeokaFundamentalRatelossTradeoff2014, @@ -6697,8 +7175,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu doi = {10.1038/ncomms6235}, url = {https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms6235}, urldate = {2024-09-05}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XURXLX9C/Takeoka et al. - 2014 - Fundamental rate-loss tradeoff for optical quantum.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{TamperResistance2020a, @@ -6713,8 +7190,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {The security engineer needs to understand what tamper resistance is, and what it can and can't do. In this chapter, the author takes the reader through the past thirty years of evolution of attack and defence. The banking community realised that commercial operating systems were likely to remain insufficient to protect PINs, particularly from bank insiders, and decided to use separate hardware to manage them. This led to the development of standalone cryptographic modules or hardware security modules (HSMs). The chapter provides a few comments about the evaluation of HSMs. Each of the product categories discussed in this chapter, from HSMs down through FPGAs to smartcards, has a wide range of offerings with wide variability in the quality of protection. The security engineer will therefore have to pay attention to the many failure modes of systems involving tamper-resistant processors that are more or less independent of the price or technical tamper-resistance of the device.}, isbn = {978-1-119-64468-2}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {banking community,FPGAs,hardware security modules,security engineer,smartcards,tamper resistance}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Tamper Resistance.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EMWJABZF/9781119644682.html} + keywords = {banking community,FPGAs,hardware security modules,security engineer,smartcards,tamper resistance} } @article{tangMeasurementDeviceIndependentQuantumKey2016, @@ -6730,8 +7206,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu doi = {10.1103/PhysRevX.6.011024}, url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevX.6.011024}, urldate = {2024-05-02}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/L3WQWFRM/Tang et al. - 2016 - Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distrib.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{tanImprovedParasiticCapacitance2012, @@ -6744,8 +7219,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-09-23}, abstract = {Power semiconductor components with high switching speed are widely used in static converters. However, they produce conducted electromagnetic interferences in high frequencies. Filters are one solution for reducing the conducted emissions. However, the parasitic elements of the passive components in the EMI filter deteriorate its performances. In this paper, we propose to study a differential mode (DM) inductor in planar technology. The goal is to reduce the parasitic capacitance of the planar DM inductor via an improved parasitic capacitance cancellation technique. The technique is based on the results of an analytical method using Electric Field Decomposition and energy based approach. The cancellation is then realized through the structural parasitic capacitances under an optimal geometry configuration. The efficiency of the proposed cancellation technique is validated by measurements.}, eventtitle = {2012 7th {{International Conference}} on {{Integrated Power Electronics Systems}} ({{CIPS}})}, - keywords = {Conductors,Delta modulation,Ferrites,Inductors,Parasitic capacitance,Windings}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2012_Tan et al_An Improved Parasitic Capacitance Cancellation Method for Planar Differential.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/A9A5D7YJ/6170646.html} + keywords = {Conductors,Delta modulation,Ferrites,Inductors,Parasitic capacitance,Windings} } @article{taoDesignPCBRogowski2016, @@ -6772,8 +7246,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu doi = {10.2172/1167318}, url = {http://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1167318/}, urldate = {2025-04-11}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9ALCIPXB/Tedeschi et al. - 2014 - Time-Domain Reflectometry for Tamper Indication in.pdf} + langid = {english} } @book{tehranipoorHardwareSecurityPrimitives2023, @@ -6781,7 +7254,6 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu author = {Tehranipoor, Mark and Pundir, Nitin and Vashistha, Nidish and Farahmandi, Farimah}, date = {2023}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, - location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-19185-5}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-19185-5}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, @@ -6799,8 +7271,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4419-8080-9}, urldate = {2024-12-13}, isbn = {978-1-4419-8079-3}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QX3DYZC3/Tehranipoor and Wang - 2012 - Introduction to Hardware Security and Trust.pdf} + langid = {english} } @misc{tektronixinc.TektronixS6Sampling1982, @@ -6808,15 +7279,14 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu author = {{Tektronix Inc.}}, date = {1982-09}, url = {https://w140.com/tekwiki/images/2/22/070-1128-01_1987.pdf}, - urldate = {2025-04-08}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SXP7TBFQ/070-1128-01_1987.pdf} + urldate = {2025-04-08} } @www{terdiman2013, title = {Aboard {{America}}'s {{Doomsday}} Command and Control Plane}, author = {Terdiman, Daniel}, - year = {2013-07-23, 2013-07}, - publisher = {CNET / cnet.com}, + date = {2013-07-23}, + journaltitle = {CNET}, url = {https://www.cnet.com/news/aboard-americas-doomsday-command-and-control-plane} } @@ -6838,6 +7308,23 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2021-07-08} } +@misc{ThalesLunaNetwork2024, + title = {Thales {{Luna Network HSM Product Brief}}}, + date = {2024-10}, + url = {https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/sites/default/files/content/product_briefs/luna-sa-network-attached-hsm-pb.pdf}, + urldate = {2025-10-27}, + organization = {Thales} +} + +@online{thalesLunaNetworkHardware, + title = {Luna {{Network Hardware Security Modules}}}, + author = {{Thales}}, + url = {https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/encryption/hardware-security-modules/network-hsms}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + abstract = {Luna Network HSMs is a high-assurance, tamper-resistant, network-attached appliance that's an easy to integrate HSM solution.}, + langid = {english} +} + @article{tobisch2020, title = {Electromagnetic Enclosure {{PUF}} for Tamper Proofing Commodity Hardware and Other Applications}, author = {Tobisch, Johannes and Zenger, Christian and Paar, Christof}, @@ -6856,8 +7343,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu @article{tobischPhysicalSystemsIntegritya, title = {Physical Systems for Integrity Protection and Authentication}, author = {Tobisch, Johannes}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/TLI54XGI/Tobisch - Physical systems for integrity protection and auth.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{tolkSafeguardsSensorsSystems2007, @@ -6887,8 +7373,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6484979}, urldate = {2025-04-08}, abstract = {Time-domain reflectometry (TDR) is a well-known measurement principle for evaluating frequency-dependent electric and dielectric properties of various materials and substances. Although TDR is a proven method, the high price for TDR measurement equipment and complex laboratory setups is often a limiting factor for cost-sensitive applications or large-scale field experiments, where a large number of TDR meters is required. This paper reports on the development of a new miniaturized low-cost TDR meter capable of sampling a repetitive rectangular waveform, which is used as an excitation signal. The developed sampling circuit is based on a digital delta modulator (DM) and allows for capturing the waveform of a repetitive measurement signal. A 1-MHz signal can be captured with a virtual sampling resolution of 1 ps within a measurement interval of 1 s. The generated pulses have a rise time of 2 ns and can be captured with an amplitude resolution of approximately 10 bit and an accuracy of approximately 8 bit. The developed digital DM architecture is implemented inside a small field programmable gate array and integrated into a miniaturized low-power TDR meter prototype for battery-powered outdoor applications. The captured measurement data are stored on integrated micro-SD card memory and can be read out either via a Universal Serial Bus, an RS-485 bus system, or a wireless interface. The TDR meter is controlled by an integrated microcontroller and a real-time clock and therefore can operate completely independent from any additional control setup. The TDR meter targets applications within the field of geoscience and agricultural monitoring, where large-scale measurement systems are required.}, - keywords = {Delta-modulation,Impedance,Power cables,Signal resolution,time-domain reflectometry (TDR),Time-frequency analysis,Transmission line measurements,undersampling}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/ZCJLJ7JB/6484979.html} + keywords = {Delta-modulation,Impedance,Power cables,Signal resolution,time-domain reflectometry (TDR),Time-frequency analysis,Transmission line measurements,undersampling} } @inproceedings{trippel2017, @@ -6898,31 +7383,45 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu date = {2017}, pages = {3--18}, publisher = {IEEE}, + doi = {10.1109/EuroSP.2017.42}, x-fetchedfrom = {Google Scholar} } -@online{tschirsichHackerHinOder0100, +@inproceedings{tropgen16YearsSPEC2024, + title = {16 {{Years}} of {{SPEC Power}}: {{An Analysis}} of X86 {{Energy Efficiency Trends}}}, + shorttitle = {16 {{Years}} of {{SPEC Power}}}, + booktitle = {2024 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Cluster Computing Workshops}} ({{CLUSTER Workshops}})}, + author = {Tröpgen, Hannes and Schöne, Robert and Ilsche, Thomas and Hackenberg, Daniel}, + date = {2024-09}, + pages = {76--80}, + doi = {10.1109/CLUSTERWorkshops61563.2024.00020}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/10740865}, + urldate = {2025-10-27}, + abstract = {The SPEC Power benchmark offers valuable insights into the energy efficiency of server systems, allowing comparisons across various hardware and software configurations. Benchmark results are publicly available for hundreds of systems from different vendors, published since 2007. We leverage this data to perform an analysis of trends in x86 server systems, focusing on power consumption, energy efficiency, energy proportionality and idle power consumption. Through this analysis, we aim to provide a clearer understanding of how server energy efficiency has evolved and the factors influencing these changes.}, + eventtitle = {2024 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Cluster Computing Workshops}} ({{CLUSTER Workshops}})}, + keywords = {Benchmark testing,Computer architecture,Computer performance,Conferences,Energy efficiency,Focusing,Hardware,High performance computing,Market research,Performance analysis,Power demand,Processor energy efficiency,Servers,Software} +} + +@online{tschirsichHackerHinOder2019, title = {"{{Hacker}} Hin Oder Her": {{Die}} Elektronische {{Patientenakte}} Kommt!}, shorttitle = {"{{Hacker}} Hin Oder Her"}, - author = {Tschirsich, Martin and Brodowski, cbro-Dr med Christian and Zilch, Dr André}, - year = {01:00:00 +0100}, + author = {Tschirsich, Martin and Brodowski, Dr med Christian and Zilch, Dr André}, + date = {2019-12-27}, url = {https://media.ccc.de/v/36c3-10595-hacker_hin_oder_her_die_elektronische_patientenakte_kommt}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, abstract = {Herzstück der digitalen Gesundheitsversorgung für 73 Millionen Versicherte ist die hochsichere, kritische Telematik-Infrastruktur mit ber...}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XVJB3U43/36c3-10595-hacker_hin_oder_her_die_elektronische_patientenakte_kommt.html} + langid = {english} } -@online{tschirsichKonnteBisherNoch0100, +@online{tschirsichKonnteBisherNoch2024, title = {„{{Konnte}} Bisher Noch Nie Gehackt Werden“: {{Die}} Elektronische {{Patientenakte}} Kommt - Jetzt Für Alle!}, shorttitle = {„{{Konnte}} Bisher Noch Nie Gehackt Werden“}, author = {Tschirsich, Martin and Kastl, Bianca}, - year = {00:00:00 +0100}, + date = {2024-12-27}, url = {https://media.ccc.de/v/38c3-konnte-bisher-noch-nie-gehackt-werden-die-elektronische-patientenakte-kommt-jetzt-fr-alle}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, abstract = {In wenigen Wochen werden die Gesundheitsdaten von rund 73 Millionen in Deutschland Krankenversicherten ohne deren Zutun über Praxis- und ...}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FYNQN7QX/38c3-konnte-bisher-noch-nie-gehackt-werden-die-elektronische-patientenakte-kommt-jetzt-fr-alle.html} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{tschofenig2015, @@ -6951,16 +7450,14 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2025-08-15}, abstract = {In this paper we describe a low-tech and user friendly solution for secure two-way communication between two parties over a network of untrusted devices. We present a solution in which displays play a central role. Our approach guarantees privacy and allows to check the authenticity of information presented on displays. Furthermore, we provide the user with a secure return channel. To this end we propose to provide every user with a small decryption display which is, for example, integrated in a credit card and requires very limited computing power. The authentication and security are based on visual cryptography which was first introduced by Naor and Shamir in 1994. We solve some practical shortcomings of traditional visual cryptography and develop protocols for two-way authentication and privacy in untrusted environments.}, isbn = {978-3-540-20887-7 978-3-540-39881-3}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7ZN8T82V/Tuyls et al. - 2004 - Visual Crypto Displays Enabling Secure Communicati.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{tyagiOrcaBlocklistingSenderAnonymous, title = {Orca: {{Blocklisting}} in {{Sender-Anonymous Messaging}}}, author = {Tyagi, Nirvan and Len, Julia and Miers, Ian and Ristenpart, Thomas}, abstract = {Sender-anonymous end-to-end encrypted messaging allows sending messages to a recipient without revealing the sender’s identity to the messaging platform. Signal recently introduced a sender anonymity feature that includes an abuse mitigation mechanism meant to allow the platform to block malicious senders on behalf of a recipient.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Tyagi et al_Orca.pdf} + langid = {english} } @report{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2002, @@ -6973,8 +7470,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/140-2/upd2/final}, urldate = {2025-04-08}, abstract = {This Federal Information Processing Standard (140-2) specifies the security requirements that will be satisfied by a cryptographic module, providing four increasing, qualitative levels intended to cover a wide range of potential applications and environments. The areas covered, related to the secure design and implementation of a cryptographic module, include specification; ports and interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; finite state model; physical security; operational environment; cryptographic key management; electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC); self-tests; design assurance; and mitigation of other attacks.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2002_Technology_Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.pdf} + langid = {english} } @report{usnationalinstituteofstandardsandtechnologySecurityRequirementsCryptographic2019, @@ -6987,8 +7483,34 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/140-3/final}, urldate = {2025-05-15}, abstract = {The selective application of technological and related procedural safeguards is an important responsibility of every federal organization in providing adequate security in its computer and telecommunication systems.~ ~This standard is applicable to all federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106 and the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Public Law 107-347.~ This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract.~ The standard provides four increasing, qualitative levels of security intended to cover a wide range of potential applications and environments.~ The security requirements cover areas related to the secure design,...}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2019_Technology_Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.pdf} + langid = {english} +} + +@online{utimacoUseCases, + title = {Use {{Cases}}}, + author = {{Utimaco}}, + url = {https://utimaco.com/use-cases}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + langid = {english} +} + +@online{utimacoWhatCloudHSM2025, + title = {What Is {{Cloud HSM}}?}, + shorttitle = {What Is {{Cloud HSM}}?}, + author = {{Utimaco}}, + date = {2025-09-10}, + url = {https://utimaco.com/service/knowledge-base/hardware-security-modules/what-cloud-hsm}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + abstract = {Cloud HSM is a cloud-hosted Hardware Security Module (HSM) that enables the user to host encryption keys and perform cryptographic operations with the benefits of a cloud service deployment while leveraging the benefits of cloud service deployment and eliminating the need to host and maintain on-premises appliances.}, + langid = {english} +} + +@online{Utrust_GP_HSM_Se_Series_Datasheet_ENpdf, + title = {U.Trust {{General Purpose HSM Se-Series Datasheet}}}, + date = {2025-04}, + url = {https://utimaco.com/resources/downloads/data-sheets/utrust-general-purpose-hsm-se-series-datasheet}, + urldate = {2025-10-27}, + organization = {utimaco} } @inproceedings{uzunCryptographicKeyDerivation2021, @@ -7033,13 +7555,11 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {This paper studies the integration of two successful hardware-supported security mechanisms: capabilities and enclaved execution. Capabilities are a powerful and flexible security mechanism for implementing fine-grained memory access control and compartmentalizing untrusted or buggy software components. Capabilities have a long history but have gained significant momentum recently, as evidenced by ARM’s experimental Morello processor that supports the Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI). Enclaved execution is a popular mechanism for dynamically creating Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), called enclaves. Enclaves are isolated execution contexts that protect the integrity and confidentiality of software in the enclave (even against compromised system software) and that support attestation.Integrating capabilities and enclaved execution in a single processor is challenging because they overlap partially in their security objectives, and a clean integration should unify the way in which these overlapping objectives are achieved. In addition, it is not obvious how attestation should interact with capabilities. In this paper, we propose CHERI-TrEE: a novel design for a processor that cleanly integrates support for both capabilities and enclaved execution. CHERI-TrEE targets low-end embedded systems without virtual memory. We show that CHERI-TrEE is greater than the sum of its parts by showing how it naturally supports useful features that have traditionally been hard to support in enclaved execution, like dynamically growing and shrinking enclaves, non-contiguous and nested enclaves, sharing of memory between enclaves etc. We implement our proposal both in hardware on a RISC-V processor, as well as in a small software hypervisor on top of ARM Morello, and evaluate impact on performance and hardware resources.}, eventtitle = {2023 {{IEEE}} 8th {{European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})}, - keywords = {Access control,ARM Morello,capability machines,CHERI,CHERI-RISC-V,Context,Embedded systems,enclaves,Hardware,Reduced instruction set computing,System software,TEE,trusted execution,Virtual machine monitors}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Van Strydonck et al_2023_CHERI-TrEE.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RZGRHCII/10190507.html} + keywords = {Access control,ARM Morello,capability machines,CHERI,CHERI-RISC-V,Context,Embedded systems,enclaves,Hardware,Reduced instruction set computing,System software,TEE,trusted execution,Virtual machine monitors} } @inproceedings{vasileActiveTamperDetection2017, title = {Active Tamper Detection Circuit Based on the Analysis of Pulse Response in Conductive Mesh}, - booktitle = {2017 40th {{International Spring Seminar}} on {{Electronics Technology}} ({{ISSE}})}, author = {Vasile, Daniel-Ciprian and Svasta, Paul and Codreanu, Norocel and Safta, Mariana}, date = {2017-05}, pages = {1--6}, @@ -7048,9 +7568,8 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8000987/?arnumber=8000987}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {Tamper detection circuits provide the first and most important defensive wall in protecting electronic modules containing security data. A widely used procedure is to cover the entire module with a foil containing fine conductive mesh, which detects intrusion attempts. Detection circuits are further classified as passive or active. Passive circuits have the advantage of low power consumption, however they are unable to detect small variations in the conductive mesh parameters. Since modern tools provide an upper leverage over the passive method, the most efficient way to protect security modules is thus to use active circuits. The active tamper detection circuits are typically probing the conductive mesh with short pulses, analyzing its response in terms of delay and shape. The method proposed in this paper generates short pulses at one end of the mesh and analyzes the response at the other end. Apart from measuring pulse delay, the analysis includes a frequency domain characterization of the system, determining whether there has been an intrusion or not, by comparing it to a reference (un-tampered with) spectrum. The novelty of this design is the combined analysis, in time and frequency domains, of the small variations in mesh characteristic parameters.}, - eventtitle = {2017 40th {{International Spring Seminar}} on {{Electronics Technology}} ({{ISSE}})}, - keywords = {Clocks,Delays,Frequency-domain analysis,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,sampling-mesh,Security,Shape}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Vasile et al_Active tamper detection circuit based on the analysis of pulse response in2.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CY2XYJWB/8000987.html} + eventtitle = {40th {{International Spring Seminar}} on {{Electronics Technology}} ({{ISSE}})}, + keywords = {Clocks,Delays,Frequency-domain analysis,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,sampling-mesh,Security,Shape} } @inproceedings{vasileImprovedTamperDetection2016, @@ -7064,8 +7583,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {The paper presents an improved method to detect tamper intrusions based on an active circuit. It is composed of a logical part, a microcontroller, capable of generating pulses that follow the rule of a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), and an analogical part made of a mesh network, used to cover secure modules, and a pulse forming circuit. Pulses resulted from this forming circuit are analyzed by the microcontroller to determine the durations between pulses and the durations of pulses. The novelty of this method is that the pulses are generated synchronously at both ends of the mesh network in order to prevent any attempts of an attacker to break the wire of the mesh network and to simulate the generation of pulses.}, eventtitle = {2016 {{IEEE}} 22nd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})}, - keywords = {active,Copper,Delays,Generators,LFSR,mesh,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,Pins,Resistance,sampling-mesh,security,tamper}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2016_Vasile et al_Improved tamper detection circuit based on linear-feedback shift register.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RRHPBYLR/7777261.html} + keywords = {active,Copper,Delays,Generators,LFSR,mesh,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,Pins,Resistance,sampling-mesh,security,tamper} } @inproceedings{vasileProtectingSecretsAdvanced2019, @@ -7074,29 +7592,28 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu author = {Vasile, Daniel-Ciprian and Svasta, Paul}, date = {2019-10}, pages = {212--215}, + publisher = {IEEE}, issn = {2642-7036}, doi = {10.1109/SIITME47687.2019.8990877}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8990877/?arnumber=8990877}, urldate = {2024-12-13}, abstract = {Cryptographic modules and security circuits are the kernels of every piece of equipment that process security data. No matter where they are deployed, the equipment must be protected against physical attacks, as no one can access the electronic circuits that process the security data: firmware implementations, cryptographic keys and secret data. The most effective way to protect this kind of electronic circuits is to wrap them in a special conductive mesh and probe it with proper signals in order to detect intrusions. This paper provides a complete solution for intrusions detection: a system made of a special conductive mesh and an active tamper detection circuit. The conductive mesh consists of three layers that detect intrusions earlier than the effective penetration of the mesh. The active tamper detection circuit is designed to probe the mesh with signals that cannot be emulated by an adversary.}, - eventtitle = {2019 {{IEEE}} 25th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})}, - keywords = {anti-tamper,cryptography,mesh,security}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Vasile_Svasta_2019_Protecting the Secrets.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/TBDMU8PT/8990877.html} + eventtitle = {25th {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})}, + keywords = {anti-tamper,cryptography,mesh,security} } @inproceedings{vasileTemperatureSensitiveActive2017, title = {Temperature Sensitive Active Tamper Detection Circuit}, - booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE}} 23rd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})}, author = {Vasile, D. C. and Svasta, P. M.}, date = {2017-10}, pages = {175--178}, + publisher = {IEEE}, doi = {10.1109/SIITME.2017.8259885}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8259885/?arnumber=8259885}, urldate = {2024-12-12}, abstract = {Electronic modules designed for processing sensitive data, such as cryptographic modules, firmware solutions protected by intellectual property rights and secure communication devices, use special circuits designed for protecting these solutions from unauthorized physical access. The main components of these circuits are the conductive mesh structure, which acts as a protective cover, and the active tamper detection circuit. Besides the physical attacks, there are side channel attacks, where an attacker takes advantage of the errors produced by the logic circuits functioning in extreme conditions. When logic circuits are subject of temperatures that exceed the operational limits, they may run with faults and create proper conditions for cryptographic attacks. This paper proposes an active tamper detection circuit that analyses the temperature (and its variation gradient) of the conductive mesh. This method improves and complements the protection functions of the active tamper detection circuits.}, - eventtitle = {2017 {{IEEE}} 23rd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})}, - keywords = {active,Cryptography,Electronic circuits,Ports (Computers),Program processors,sampling-mesh,security,tamper,temperature,Temperature distribution,Temperature measurement,Temperature sensors}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Vasile_Svasta_2017_Temperature sensitive active tamper detection circuit.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RDC8GN3K/8259885.html} + eventtitle = {23rd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})}, + keywords = {active,Cryptography,Electronic circuits,Ports (Computers),Program processors,sampling-mesh,security,tamper,temperature,Temperature distribution,Temperature measurement,Temperature sensors} } @article{vidakovicHardwareBasedMethodsElectronic2023, @@ -7113,8 +7630,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/12/21/4507}, urldate = {2025-03-21}, abstract = {This paper reviews hardware-based protection methods for electronic devices, encompassing scientific publications and published patents. This review covers insights from the scientific community and innovative solutions patented in the industry. By combining these two sources, this paper offers a comprehensive and holistic review of electronic device security. Electronic devices are integral to modern life, but their widespread use invites security threats, both digital and physical. This paper reviews hardware-based protection methods against invasive and non-invasive attacks, emphasizing the importance of a dual approach through hardware design. Invasive attacks involve physical tampering, and we explore anti-tampering techniques such as conductive meshes, sensors and physically unclonable functions (PUFs). Non-invasive, side-channel attacks encompass various attack vectors, focusing on electromagnetic analysis. To counter these attacks, we analyze techniques like reducing and masking electromagnetic radiation. This paper bridges the gap between invasive and non-invasive attack mitigation. It underscores the necessity of a multifaceted approach to safeguard electronic devices in an interconnected world, preserving their reliability and functionality.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Vidaković_Vinko_2023_Hardware-Based Methods for Electronic Device Protection against Invasive and.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{voloshynovskiyInformationtheoreticAnalysisElectronic2006, @@ -7129,8 +7645,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-05-29}, abstract = {In this paper we consider the problem of document authentication in electronic and printed forms. We formulate this problem from the information-theoretic perspectives and present the joint source-channel coding theorems showing the performance limits in such protocols. We analyze the security of document authentication methods and present the optimal attacking strategies with corresponding complexity estimates that, contrarily to the existing studies, crucially rely on the information leaked by the authentication protocol. Finally, we present the results of experimental validation of the developed concept that justifies the practical efficiency of the elaborated framework.}, eventtitle = {Electronic {{Imaging}} 2006}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EGDJZN37/Voloshynovskiy et al. - 2006 - Information-theoretic analysis of electronic and p.pdf} + langid = {english} } @thesis{vrijaldenhoven2004, @@ -7155,8 +7670,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9133575/}, urldate = {2024-05-02}, abstract = {This paper studies the design and performance analysis of relay-assisted satellite freespace optics (FSO) quantum key distribution (QKD) systems for secure vehicular networks. High-altitude platforms (HAPs) equipped with optical amplify-and-forward nodes are used as relay stations. Secrecy performances in terms of quantum bit error rate and ergodic secret-key rate are analytically investigated under the effects of transceiver misalignment, receiver’s velocity variation, receiver noises, and atmospheric turbulence conditions. Based on the analyzed results, the design criteria for the legitimate user are determined so that the security of the considered system could be guaranteed.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2HCQ4S6I/Vu et al. - 2020 - Design and Performance of Relay-Assisted Satellite.pdf} + langid = {english} } @patent{wadeMagneticStripeReader2015, @@ -7168,8 +7682,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu number = {9203546B1}, url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9203546B1/en}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, - keywords = {card,card reader,data,pseudo,signal}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Wade_Guise_Magnetic stripe reader tamper protection.pdf} + keywords = {card,card reader,data,pseudo,signal} } @patent{wadeTamperProtectionMesh2016, @@ -7182,8 +7695,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US9298956B2/en}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {control signal,detector,electrical condition,electronic device,housing}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2016_Wade et al_Tamper protection mesh in an electronic device.pdf} + keywords = {control signal,detector,electrical condition,electronic device,housing} } @thesis{wandelAttenuationSilicabasedOptical2006, @@ -7191,8 +7703,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu author = {Wandel, Marie Emilie}, date = {2006}, institution = {Technical University of Denmark}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LXMAVLMC/Wandel - Attenuation in silica-based optical fibers.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{wangBeatingPhotonNumberSplittingAttack2005, @@ -7208,8 +7719,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu doi = {10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.230503}, url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevLett.94.230503}, urldate = {2024-09-02}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4WQLMTSB/Wang - 2005 - Beating the Photon-Number-Splitting Attack in Prac.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{wangBernoulliHoneywords2024, @@ -7225,8 +7735,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {Decoy passwords, or “honeywords,” planted in a credential database can alert a site to its breach if ever submitted in a login attempt. To be effective, some honeywords must appear at least as likely to be user-chosen passwords as the real ones, and honeywords must be very difficult to guess without having breached the database, to prevent false breach alarms. These goals have proved elusive, however, for heuristic honeyword generation algorithms. In this paper we explore an alternative strategy in which the defender treats honeyword selection as a Bernoulli process in which each possible password (except the user-chosen one) is selected as a honeyword independently with a fixed probability. We show how Bernoulli honeywords can be integrated into two existing system designs for leveraging honeywords: one based on a honeychecker that stores the secret index of the user-chosen password in the list of account passwords, and another that does not leverage secret state at all. We show that Bernoulli honeywords enable analytic derivation of false breach-detection probabilities irrespective of what information the attacker gathers about the sites’ users; that their true and false breach-detection probabilities demonstrate compelling efficacy; and that they can even enable performance improvements in modern honeyword system designs.}, eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VP5799QI/Wang and Reiter - 2024 - Bernoulli Honeywords.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{wangCascadingAttackTrustedrelay2021, @@ -7243,8 +7752,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1572-9494/abeedc}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, abstract = {Trusted relays are the main state-of-the-art way to realize quantum key distribution networks. However, it is hard to require that all nodes in the network are fully trusted. In a multipath keytransmission mechanism, the nodes can be weakly trusted because the secret key can be split into many parts and each part is transmitted to the receiver through a different path. However, if the capacity of a node’s quantum key pool is poorly designed, an attacker, Eve may eavesdrop on the communicating parties’ secret message by initiating a redirection attack. In this paper, we show that Eve can trigger a cascading collapse effect by collapsing one of the edges in the network and forcing the communication parties to transmit the message through the nodes controlled by Eve. The influence of the traffic transfer ratio and the control parameters of the edge load on the breakdown probability of the edge are analyzed using a simulation. In order to effectively defend against the cascading attack, it is important for the designer to handle the relationship between the traffic and the capacity of the quantum key pool of each node in the network.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/KBKFVCHU/Wang and Liu - 2021 - Cascading attack on trusted-relay quantum key dist.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{wangCoaxialNestedCouplersBased2020, @@ -7260,8 +7768,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-12-10}, abstract = {In order to improve poor anti-offset capability of rotary transformer in electric excitation motor, a coaxial nested rotary wireless power transfer (CNR-WPT) system has been proposed in this paper. Firstly, considering the spatial geometric relationship of the coils and the power transmission efficiency of the CNR-WPT, the preliminary coil structure has been proposed. Secondly, through theoretical derivation, the specific relationship between the mutual inductance of the coils and the offset have been studied to verify the feasibility of the preliminary design. Thirdly, aiming at the problem that the CNR-WPT is susceptible to steel interference, the magnetic field has been optimized by adding ferrite and introducing a protective casing in this paper. Finally, an experimental platform for CNR-WPT system has been built. The experimental results verify that the power transmission efficiency of the CNR-WPT system can reach 90\% when the radial offset and axial offset are below 5 mm, and the angular offset is below 5°. The energy losses can be reduced by adding ferrite and protecting the casing. The CNR-WPT system thereof can also be applied to other rotary power transmission occasions.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Access}}}, - keywords = {anti-offset capability,Brushless motors,coaxial nested rotary wireless power transfer system,Coils,Electric excitation motor,Induction motors,power transmission efficiency,Reluctance motors,Shafts,Wireless power transfer}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Wang et al_2020_Coaxial Nested Couplers-Based Offset-Tolerance Rotary Wireless Power Transfer.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XK24S953/9022913.html} + keywords = {anti-offset capability,Brushless motors,coaxial nested rotary wireless power transfer system,Coils,Electric excitation motor,Induction motors,power transmission efficiency,Reluctance motors,Shafts,Wireless power transfer} } @inproceedings{wangGhostTalkInteractiveAttack2022, @@ -7278,16 +7785,14 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2023-02-24}, abstract = {Inaudible voice command injection is one of the most threatening attacks towards voice assistants. Existing attacks aim at injecting the attack signals over the air, but they require the access to the authorized user’s voice for activating the voice assistants. Moreover, the effectiveness of the attacks can be greatly deteriorated in a noisy environment. In this paper, we explore a new type of channel, the power line side-channel, to launch the inaudible voice command injection. By injecting the audio signals over the power line through a modified charging cable, the attack becomes more resilient against various environmental factors and liveness detection models. Meanwhile, the smartphone audio output can be eavesdropped through the modified cable, enabling a highly-interactive attack.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,dumb}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Wang et al_GhostTalk.pdf} + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security,dumb} } @article{wangGhostTouchTargetedAttacks, title = {{{GhostTouch}}: {{Targeted Attacks}} on {{Touchscreens}} without {{Physical Touch}}}, author = {Wang, Kai and Ji, Xiaoyu and Mitev, Richard and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza and Yan, Chen and Xu, Wenyuan}, abstract = {Capacitive touchscreens have become the primary humanmachine interface for personal devices such as smartphones and tablets. In this paper, we present GhostTouch, the first active contactless attack against capacitive touchscreens. GhostTouch uses electromagnetic interference (EMI) to inject fake touch points into a touchscreen without the need to physically touch it. By tuning the parameters of the electromagnetic signal and adjusting the antenna, we can inject two types of basic touch events, taps and swipes, into targeted locations of the touchscreen and control them to manipulate the underlying device. We successfully launch the GhostTouch attacks on nine smartphone models. We can inject targeted taps continuously with a standard deviation of as low as 14.6 × 19.2 pixels from the target area, a delay of less than 0.5s and a distance of up to 40mm. We show the real-world impact of the GhostTouch attacks in a few proofof-concept scenarios, including answering an eavesdropping phone call, pressing the button, swiping up to unlock, and entering a password. Finally, we discuss potential hardware and software countermeasures to mitigate the attack.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Wang et al_GhostTouch.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{wangGlobalScaleSecureMultiparty2017, @@ -7304,8 +7809,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {We propose a new, constant-round protocol for multi-party computation of boolean circuits that is secure against an arbitrary number of malicious corruptions. At a high level, we extend and generalize recent work of Wang et al. in the two-party setting. Namely, we design an efficient preprocessing phase that allows the parties to generate authenticated information; we then show how to use this information to distributively construct a single “authenticated” garbled circuit that is evaluated by one party. Our resulting protocol improves upon the state-of-the-art both asymptotically and concretely. We validate these claims via several experiments demonstrating both the efficiency and scalability of our protocol: • Efficiency: For three-party computation over a LAN, our protocol requires only 95 ms to evaluate AES. This is roughly a 700× improvement over the best prior work, and only 2.5× slower than the best known result in the two-party setting. In general, for n-party computation our protocol improves upon prior work (which was never implemented) by a factor of more than 230n, e.g., an improvement of 3 orders of magnitude for 5-party computation. • Scalability: We successfully executed our protocol with a large number of parties located all over the world, computing (for example) AES with 128 parties across 5 continents in under 3 minutes. Our work represents the largest-scale demonstration of secure computation to date.}, eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '17: 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-4946-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/HTT44SBU/Wang et al. - 2017 - Global-Scale Secure Multiparty Computation.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{wangGroupCrossSymmetricalInductor2006, @@ -7338,8 +7842,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu doi = {10.1103/PhysRevA.95.012301}, url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevA.95.012301}, urldate = {2024-09-04}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CMWK7SHH/Wang et al. - 2017 - Long-distance copropagation of quantum key distrib.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{wangNovelRotatingWireless2024, @@ -7358,8 +7861,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {This study investigates the dynamics of wireless power supply technology under rotation and its system redundancy, aiming to design a redundant, rotating wireless power supply system. In order to satisfy specifications of redundancy and fault tolerance, the circuit design of the wireless power transmission system was developed, and a planar three-sector coil coupling mechanism was designed; finally, the stability and power output characteristics of the system were assessed under static and dynamic working conditions, and the results show that the maximum output power of the system can reach 3 kW and the efficiency is more than 91\% under both static and dynamic working conditions. The study improved the rotating wireless charging system’s efficiency, which improves the energy utilization efficiency.}, issue = {13}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {multi-coil coupling mechanism,rotating equipment,wireless power supply}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Wang et al_2024_A Novel Rotating Wireless Power Transfer System for Slipring with Redundancy.pdf} + keywords = {multi-coil coupling mechanism,rotating equipment,wireless power supply} } @article{wangTopologicalOptimizationHybrid2020, @@ -7376,8 +7878,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://opg.optica.org/abstract.cfm?URI=oe-28-18-26348}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, abstract = {With the growing complexity of quantum key distribution (QKD) network structures, aforehand topology design is of great significance to support a large-number of nodes over a large-spatial area. However, the exclusivity of quantum channels, the limitation of key generation capabilities, the variety of QKD protocols and the necessity of untrusted-relay selection, make the optimal topology design a very complicated task. In this research, a hybrid QKD network is studied for the first time from the perspective of topology, by analyzing the topological differences of various QKD protocols. In addition, to make full use of hybrid networking, an analytical model for optimal topology calculation is proposed, to reach the goal of best secure communication service by optimizing the deployment of various QKD devices and the selection of untrusted-relays under a given cost limit. Plentiful simulation results show that hybrid networking and untrusted-relay selection can bring great performance advantages, and then the universality and effectiveness of the proposed analytical model are verified.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/S93U8AF3/Wang et al. - 2020 - Topological optimization of hybrid quantum key dis.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{wangTwinfieldQuantumKey2022, @@ -7396,8 +7897,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2025-05-08}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a promising solution for sharing information-theoretic secure keys between remote peers with physics-based protocols. According to the law of quantum physics, the photons carrying signals cannot be amplified or relayed via classical optical techniques to maintain quantum security. As a result, the transmission loss of the channel limits its achievable distance, and this has been a huge barrier towards building large-scale quantum-secure networks. Here we present an experimental QKD system that could tolerate a channel loss beyond 140\,dB and obtain a secure distance of 833.8\,km, setting a new record for fibre-based QKD. Furthermore, the optimized four-phase twin-field protocol and high-quality set-up make its secure key rate more than two orders of magnitude greater than previous records over similar distances. Our results mark a breakthrough towards building reliable and efficient terrestrial quantum-secure networks over a scale of 1,000\,km.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Quantum information,Single photons and quantum effects}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FCHS9D49/Wang et al. - 2022 - Twin-field quantum key distribution over 830-km fi.pdf} + keywords = {Quantum information,Single photons and quantum effects} } @article{wegmanNewHashFunctions1981, @@ -7432,13 +7932,12 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {In the world of global politics, talk is cheap. States sign negotiated agreements, but a treaty without an enforcement mechanism is considered weak, because states are not expected to adhere to commitments whose materiality is merely that of ink and paper. To verify the terms of state commitments to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in 1970, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear safeguards inspectors place tamper-evident seals in nuclear facilities. While seals appear to work simply as a binary signal, their meanings are multivalent. This article draws on fieldwork at the IAEA, and on broken seals in Iran between 2004 and 2006 that escalated into an international crisis, to examine the relationship between the material properties of the seal and its signifying potentialities. Bringing the perspective of semiotic ontology to the question of materiality, this essay argues that seals constitute a semiotic infrastructure of nuclear governance that materializes international law.}, issue = {4}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {agency}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2019_Weichselbraun_Of Broken Seals and Broken Promises.pdf} + keywords = {agency} } @patent{weidnerHardwareschutzFormHalbschalen2007, type = {patent}, - title = {Hardwareschutz in form von zu halbschalen tiefgezogenen leiterplatten}, + title = {Hardwareschutz in Form von zu Halbschalen tiefgezogenen Leiterplatten}, author = {Weidner, Karl and Wimmer, Anton}, holder = {{Siemens Aktiengesellschaft}}, date = {2007-01-11}, @@ -7447,8 +7946,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/WO2007003227A1/en?oq=WO2007003227A1}, urldate = {2025-09-10}, langid = {ngerman}, - keywords = {circuit,hardware,hardware protection,protected,substrate}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2007_Weidner_Wimmer_Hardwareschutz in form von zu halbschalen tiefgezogenen leiterplatten.pdf} + keywords = {circuit,hardware,hardware protection,protected,substrate} } @patent{wernerFabricatingTamperrespondentSensors2024, @@ -7461,8 +7959,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US11877390B2/en}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {security,sensor,tamper,trace,volume}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2024_Werner et al_Fabricating tamper-respondent sensors with random three-dimensional security.pdf} + keywords = {security,sensor,tamper,trace,volume} } @inproceedings{wernerTransparentMemoryEncryption2017, @@ -7479,8 +7976,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {Security features of modern (SoC) FPGAs permit to protect the confidentiality of hard- and software IP when the devices are powered off as well as to validate the authenticity of IP when being loaded at startup. However, these approaches are insufficient since attackers with physical access can also perform attacks during runtime, demanding for additional security measures. In particular, RAM used by modern (SoC) FPGAs is under threat since RAM stores software IP as well as all kinds of other sensitive information during runtime.}, eventtitle = {2017 27th {{International Conference}} on {{Field Programmable Logic}} and {{Applications}} ({{FPL}})}, isbn = {978-90-90-30428-1}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2D23R8P8/Werner et al. - 2017 - Transparent memory encryption and authentication.pdf} + langid = {english} } @patent{wesselhoffTamperResponsiveSensor2018, @@ -7493,8 +7989,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10078764B2/en}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {circuitry,line,mesh,tamper,track}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Wesselhoff_Tamper responsive sensor.pdf} + keywords = {circuitry,line,mesh,tamper,track} } @patent{wesselhoffTamperResponsiveSensor2020, @@ -7507,8 +8002,17 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US10678957B2/en}, urldate = {2025-04-04}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {detecting circuitry,line,mesh,tamper,track}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Wesselhoff_Tamper responsive sensor.pdf} + keywords = {detecting circuitry,line,mesh,tamper,track} +} + +@online{WhatCloudHSM, + title = {What Is a {{Cloud HSM}}?}, + shorttitle = {What Is a {{Cloud HSM}}?}, + author = {{Entrust Corporation}}, + url = {https://www.entrust.com/resources/learn/what-is-cloud-hsm}, + urldate = {2025-11-21}, + abstract = {Learn what a cloud hardware security module (HSM) is and how a cloud HSM can deliver the same cryptographic functionalities as on-premises HSMs.}, + langid = {english} } @article{wheelerTransmissionLinePropertiesParallel1965, @@ -7525,8 +8029,18 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2025-04-02}, abstract = {A transmission line is made of a symmetrical pair of strip conductors, or a single strip and a ground plane, on opposite faces of a sheet of dielectric material. There is computed, to a close approximation, the relations among the dielectric constant of the sheet, the effective dielectric constant of the sheet and the empty space, the shape ratio, and the wave resistance, for the entire range of possible values. These relations are summarized in a graphical chart covering the range of practical interest. The computation is based on conformal mapping of the dielectric boundary on coordinates such that its effect can be most closely evaluated by simple principles. All relations are approximated in terms of ordinary functions (exponential and hyperbolic). Of particular interest is the effective filling fraction of the dielectric material, which depends mainly on the shape ratio and only slightly on the dielectric constant. Explicit formulas are given for analysis or synthesis.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Microwave Theory}} and {{Techniques}}}, - keywords = {Conducting materials,Conformal mapping,Dielectric constant,Dielectric materials,Filling,Shape,Sheet materials,Strips,Transmission line theory,Transmission lines}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/1965_Wheeler_Transmission-Line Properties of Parallel Strips Separated by a Dielectric Sheet.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/J6YQL49I/1125962.html} + keywords = {Conducting materials,Conformal mapping,Dielectric constant,Dielectric materials,Filling,Shape,Sheet materials,Strips,Transmission line theory,Transmission lines} +} + +@online{wierdaWhenChatGPTSummarises2024, + title = {When {{ChatGPT}} Summarises, It Actually Does Nothing of the Kind.}, + author = {Wierda, Gerben}, + date = {2024-05-27T21:58:15+00:00}, + url = {https://ea.rna.nl/2024/05/27/when-chatgpt-summarises-it-actually-does-nothing-of-the-kind/}, + urldate = {2025-12-04}, + abstract = {One of the use cases I thought was reasonable to expect from ChatGPT and Friends (LLMs) was summarising. It turns out I was wrong. What ChatGPT isn’t summarising at all, it only looks like it…}, + langid = {english}, + organization = {R\&A IT Strategy \& Architecture} } @article{wiesmannEffectChloroquineCultured1975, @@ -7561,8 +8075,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu title = {{{WikiQuote}}: {{Grace Hopper}}}, date = {2025-04-08}, url = {https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Grace_Hopper}, - urldate = {2025-10-22}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/T27MULIE/Grace_Hopper.html} + urldate = {2025-10-22} } @article{worathumrongEffectOsalicylatePentose1975, @@ -7613,8 +8126,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {The proliferation of consumer IoT products in our daily lives has raised the need for secure device authentication and access control. Unfortunately, these resource-constrained devices typically use token-based authentication, which is vulnerable to token compromise attacks that allow attackers to impersonate the devices and perform malicious operations by stealing the access token. Using hardware fingerprints to secure their authentication is a promising way to mitigate these threats. However, once attackers have stolen some hardware fingerprints (e.g., via MitM attacks), they can bypass the hardware authentication by training a machine learning model to mimic fingerprints or by reusing these fingerprints to craft forged requests.}, eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/DNUS4DNE/Xiao et al. - 2024 - From Hardware Fingerprint to Access Token Enhanci.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{xiaRotaryWirelessPower2024, @@ -7630,8 +8142,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-12-10}, abstract = {Traditional power supply methods for rotating mechanisms are found to face problems, including complex structures, limited functionality, and potential safety hazards. To address these problems, a rotary wireless power transfer system with new rail-type coupling structure (RTR-WPT) is proposed in this paper. This system, characterized by safety, reliability, and flexible installation, is designed to provide power to devices mounted on rotating shafts. Firstly, the topological structure of the RTR-WPT system is introduced, and the corresponding circuit model is established. Secondly, MAXWELL is utilized for finite element analysis to design and optimize the rail-type rotary coupler. Finally, an experimental platform for the RTR-WPT system is built and tested. From the experimental results, it is validated that the new rail-type coupler and the design methodology are feasible, and the system can achieve a power transmission of 10.33W with an overall efficiency of 72.1\% under rotating conditions.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Access}}}, - keywords = {Coils,Couplers,Couplings,finite element analysis,Finite element analysis,Power supplies,rail-type coupling structure,Reliability,Rotating mechanism,Topology,wireless power transfer,Wireless power transfer}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Xia et al_2024_A Rotary Wireless Power Transfer System With Rail-Type Coupling Structure.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SVKEQEZL/10508729.html} + keywords = {Coils,Couplers,Couplings,finite element analysis,Finite element analysis,Power supplies,rail-type coupling structure,Reliability,Rotating mechanism,Topology,wireless power transfer,Wireless power transfer} } @article{xuMeasurementdeviceindependentQuantumCryptography2015, @@ -7652,8 +8163,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-05-21}, abstract = {In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security based on the laws of physics. Owing to the imperfections of real-life implementations, however, there is a big gap between the theory and practice of QKD, which has been recently exploited by several quantum hacking activities. To fill this gap, a novel approach, called measurementdevice-independent QKD (mdiQKD), has been proposed. It can remove all side-channels from the measurement unit, arguably the most vulnerable part in QKD systems, thus offering a clear avenue towards secure QKD realisations. Here, we review the latest developments in the framework of mdiQKD, together with its assumptions, strengths and weaknesses.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WYVII6DL/Xu et al. - 2015 - Measurement-device-independent quantum cryptograph.pdf} + keywords = {Quantum Physics} } @article{xuSecureQuantumKey2020, @@ -7669,8 +8179,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu doi = {10.1103/RevModPhys.92.025002}, url = {https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/RevModPhys.92.025002}, urldate = {2024-05-15}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Xu et al_2020_Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{yamashitaRedshiftManipulatingSignal2022, @@ -7686,8 +8195,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {We propose a new laser injection attack Redshift that manipulates signal propagation delay, allowing for precise control of oscillator frequencies and other behaviors in delay-sensitive circuits. The target circuits have a significant sensitivity to light, and a low-power continuous-wave laser, similar to a laser pointer, is sufficient for the attack. This is in contrast to previous fault injection attacks that use highpowered laser pulses to flip digital bits. This significantly reduces the cost of the attack and extends the range of possible attackers. Moreover, the attack potentially evades sensor-based countermeasures configured for conventional pulse lasers. To demonstrate Redshift, we target ring-oscillator and arbiter PUFs that are used in cryptographic applications. By precisely controlling signal propagation delays within these circuits, an attacker can control the output of a PUF to perform a state-recovery attack and reveal a secret key. We finally discuss the physical causality of the attack and potential countermeasures.}, langid = {english}, - keywords = {Delay-Sensitive Circuits,Laser Fault Injection,Oscillator,Physically Unclonable Function}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Yamashita et al_2022_Redshift.pdf} + keywords = {Delay-Sensitive Circuits,Laser Fault Injection,Oscillator,Physically Unclonable Function} } @article{yanFeasibilityInjectingInaudible2019, @@ -7717,8 +8225,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-12-10}, abstract = {In the underwater environment, the ocean current will have a great influence on the anti-misalignment performance of the wireless power transfer (WPT) system for the autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). In this letter, a free-rotation WPT system with a new magnetic coupler for AUVs is proposed to improve the rotational and axial misalignment tolerance. The magnetic coupler has two decoupled transmitters and one segmented arc solenoid receiver with reversely wound adjacent receiver coils. The mutual inductances between the receiver and the two transmitters can compensate each other. Moreover, cooperated with the phase control between the two transmitters, the system can achieve more stable output power under the rotational and axial misalignment. A free-rotation WPT prototype was set up and the experimental results showed that the output power can reach 700 W and the output power fluctuation is below 5\% based on the proposed anti-misalignment method.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Anti-misalignment,autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV),Couplers,Ferrites,Fluctuations,free-rotation,Magnetic resonance,Power generation,Receivers,Transmitters,wireless power transfer (WPT)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Yan et al_2023_Free-Rotation Wireless Power Transfer System Based on Composite.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/KL3X7E4B/10021879.html} + keywords = {Anti-misalignment,autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV),Couplers,Ferrites,Fluctuations,free-rotation,Magnetic resonance,Power generation,Receivers,Transmitters,wireless power transfer (WPT)} } @article{yangFPGABasedLDPCDecoder2021, @@ -7734,8 +8241,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9376906/}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, abstract = {In this paper, we propose a good decoding performance, low-complexity, and high-speed decoder architecture for ultra-long quasi-cyclic LDPC codes by using the layered sum-product decoding scheme. To reduce implementation complexity and hardware resource consumption, the messages in the iteration process are uniformly quantified and the function (x) is approximated with second-order functions. The decoder architecture improves the decoding throughput by using partial parallel and pipeline structures. A modified construction method of parity check matrices was applied to prevent read\&write conflicts and achieve high-speed pipeline structure. The simulation results show that our decoder architecture has good performance at signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) as low as −0.6 dB. We have implemented our decoder architecture on a Virtex-7 XC7VX690T field programmable gate array (FPGA) device. The implementation results show that the FPGA-based LDPC decoder can achieve throughputs of 108.64 Mb/s and 70.32 Mb/s at SNR of 1.0 dB when the code length is 262,144 and 349,952, respectively. The decoder can find useful applications in those scenarios that require very low SNRs and high throughputs, such as the information reconciliation of continuous-variable quantum key distribution.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3GQBXIIG/Yang et al. - 2021 - An FPGA-Based LDPC Decoder With Ultra-Long Codes f.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{yangQuantumKeyDistribution2018, @@ -7753,8 +8259,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8300270/}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, abstract = {Since the QKD network can overcome the distance limitation and expand the point-to-point QKD system to a multi-user key distribution system, some testing QKD networks have been built. However, all of this previous research seldom focused on the routing mechanism of QKD network in detail. Therefore, this paper focuses on the routing issue in trust relaying QKD network, builds a model of the trust relaying QKD network and proposes a secret-key-aware routing method. In our method, a dynamic model for the residual local key is proposed to forecast the residual local key quantity of each QKD link more accurately, and the cost of QKD link and relaying path are defined by multiple affecting factors, e.g. the generation, consumption rate and the local key depletion index. The proposed method is implemented and evaluated in a simulation environment. The simulation results show that our routing method can increase the success rate of key exchange, make all the QKD links participate key exchange with almost equal opportunity to achieve load balance, and trade off the local key generation and consumption of each QKD link. Therefore, our proposed method can contribute to effectively improve the holistic performance of the trust relaying QKD network.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9BBJ86AQ/Yang et al. - 2018 - Quantum key distribution network Optimal secret-k.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{yaoHowGenerateExchange1986, @@ -7769,8 +8274,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2025-08-14}, abstract = {In this paper we introduce a new tool for controlling the knowledge transfer process in cryptographic protocol design. It is applied to solve a general class of problems which include most of the two-party cryptographic problems in the literature. Specifically, we show how two parties A and B can interactively generate a random integer N = p·q such that its secret, i.e., the prime factors (p, q), is hidden from either party individually but is recoverable jointly if desired. This can be utilized to give a protocol for two parties with private values i and j to compute any polynomially computable functions f(i,j) and g(i,j) with minimal knowledge transfer and a strong fairness property. As a special case, A and B can exchange a pair of secrets sA, sB, e.g. the factorization of an integer and a Hamiltonian circuit in a graph, in such a way that sA becomes computable by B when and only when sB becomes computable by A. All these results are proved assuming only that the problem of factoring large intergers is computationally intractable.}, eventtitle = {27th {{Annual Symposium}} on {{Foundations}} of {{Computer Science}} (Sfcs 1986)}, - keywords = {Circuits,Computer science,Cryptographic protocols,Cryptography,History,Knowledge transfer,Polynomials,Privacy,Probability distribution,Turing machines}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/TCEMMDWR/4568207.html} + keywords = {Circuits,Computer science,Cryptographic protocols,Cryptography,History,Knowledge transfer,Polynomials,Privacy,Probability distribution,Turing machines} } @inproceedings{yetisInvestigationNoiseEffects2021, @@ -7784,8 +8288,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-09-02}, abstract = {Today, all the implemented quantum computers are in Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) level. In such quantum computers, when circuit length and size increase, the results become less reliable because of the increasing effect of noise. The noise is an important factor that should be handled in NISQ level quantum computers. In this study, we investigate the noise factor on 5 qubit IBM-Q computers for basic circuits. For this purpose, existing 5 qubit IBM-Q computers with different architectures are examined. Then quantum circuit equivalents corresponding to basic logic gates such as XOR, AND, and OR are presented. Quantum circuits created for XOR, AND, and OR are run 10 times on different quantum computers of 5 qubits named Santiago, Athens, Valencia, Vigo, Ourance, and IBMQX2. Statistical information such as std., mean is obtained from the results. The consistency of the results obtained and their difference from the optimum result are discussed. As a result of the study, there is no contradiction in the results obtained with quantum volume. Studies show that even small growths in XOR, AND, and OR circuits can lead to a big deflection in results.}, eventtitle = {2021 25th {{International Conference}} on {{Information Technology}} ({{IT}})}, - keywords = {Computer architecture,Computers,Integrated circuit reliability,Logic gates,Quantum circuit,Qubit,Standards}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CJXHEBEI/9390130.html} + keywords = {Computer architecture,Computers,Integrated circuit reliability,Logic gates,Quantum circuit,Qubit,Standards} } @article{yoshimitsu1990, @@ -7814,8 +8317,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu doi = {10.1109/JLT.2022.3153992}, url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9721069/}, urldate = {2024-05-21}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Q2LQVJM7/Yu et al. - 2022 - Secret-Key Provisioning With Collaborative Routing.pdf} + langid = {english} } @incollection{zahurTwoHalvesMake2015, @@ -7834,8 +8336,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2025-08-15}, abstract = {The well-known classical constructions of garbled circuits use four ciphertexts per gate, although various methods have been proposed to reduce this cost. The best previously known methods for optimizing AND gates (two ciphertexts; Pinkas et al., ASIACRYPT 2009) and XOR gates (zero ciphertexts; Kolesnikov and Schneider, ICALP 2008) were incompatible, so most implementations used the best known method compatible with free-XOR gates (three ciphertexts; Kolesnikov and Schneider, ICALP 2008). In this work we show how to simultaneously garble AND gates using two ciphertexts and XOR gates using zero ciphertexts, resulting in smaller garbled circuits than any prior scheme. The main idea behind our construction is to break an AND gate into two half-gates —AND gates for which one party knows one input. Each half-gate can be garbled with a single ciphertext, so our construction uses two ciphertexts for each AND gate while being compatible with free-XOR gates. The price for the reduction in size is that the evaluator must perform two cryptographic operations per AND gate, rather than one as in previous schemes. We experimentally demonstrate that our garbling scheme leads to an overall decrease in time (up to 25\%), bandwidth (up to 33\%), and energy use (up to 20\%) over several benchmark applications. We show that our construction is optimal for a large class of garbling schemes encompassing all known practical garbling techniques.}, isbn = {978-3-662-46802-9 978-3-662-46803-6}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/46G42LQL/Zahur et al. - 2015 - Two Halves Make a Whole Reducing Data Transfer in.pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{zeppelzauerSoniControlMobileUltrasonic2018, @@ -7851,8 +8352,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3240508.3241393}, urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {The exchange of data between mobile devices in the near-ultrasonic frequency band is a new promising technology for near field communication (NFC) but also raises a number of privacy concerns. We present the first ultrasonic firewall that reliably detects ultrasonic communication and provides the user with effective means to prevent hidden data exchange. This demonstration showcases a new media-based communication technology ("data over audio") together with its related privacy concerns. It enables users to (i) interactively test out and experience ultrasonic information exchange and (ii) shows how to protect oneself against unwanted tracking.}, - isbn = {978-1-4503-5665-7}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Zeppelzauer et al_SoniControl - A Mobile Ultrasonic Firewall.pdf} + isbn = {978-1-4503-5665-7} } @article{zhangBallJointWirelessPower2018, @@ -7869,8 +8369,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-12-10}, abstract = {A new wireless power transfer (WPT) system based on ball-joint structure is presented in this paper. A ball-joint WPT system consists of a ball structure with a mechanical rod attached to the ball and a ball socket that accommodates the ball structure. This ball-joint structure comprises at least one winding in the ball structure and at least one winding in the ball socket structure. The ball structure can be flexibly rotated over a wide range of angle inside the ball socket, while wireless power can still be transferred from the transmitter winding to the receiver winding through magnetic resonance. The magnetic coupling coefficient between the transmitter and receiver coil over a wide rotating angular range has been analyzed and experimentally checked. Experimental results confirm that an energy efficiency of up to 81\% can be achieved.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Ball-joint structure,Inductance,magnetic resonance,Magnetic resonance,Receivers,Sockets,Transmitters,Windings,Wireless power transfer,wireless power transfer (WPT)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Zhang et al_2018_Ball-Joint Wireless Power Transfer Systems.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/C376LBE8/7918527.html} + keywords = {Ball-joint structure,Inductance,magnetic resonance,Magnetic resonance,Receivers,Sockets,Transmitters,Windings,Wireless power transfer,wireless power transfer (WPT)} } @inproceedings{zhangDolphinAttackInaudibleVoice2017, @@ -7888,8 +8387,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {Speech recognition (SR) systems such as Siri or Google Now have become an increasingly popular human-computer interaction method, and have turned various systems into voice controllable systems (VCS). Prior work on attacking VCS shows that the hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to people can control the systems. Hidden voice commands, though ‘hidden’, are nonetheless audible. In this work, we design a completely inaudible attack, DolphinAttack, that modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers (e.g., f {$>$} 20 kHz) to achieve inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits, the modulated lowfrequency audio commands can be successfully demodulated, recovered, and more importantly interpreted by the speech recognition systems. We validate DolphinAttack on popular speech recognition systems, including Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Huawei HiVoice, Cortana and Alexa. By injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, we show a few proof-of-concept attacks, which include activating Siri to initiate a FaceTime call on iPhone, activating Google Now to switch the phone to the airplane mode, and even manipulating the navigation system in an Audi automobile. We propose hardware and software defense solutions. We validate that it is feasible to detect DolphinAttack by classifying the audios using supported vector machine (SVM), and suggest to re-design voice controllable systems to be resilient to inaudible voice command attacks.}, eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '17: 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-4946-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SXDU6E5J/Zhang et al. - 2017 - DolphinAttack Inaudible Voice Commands.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{zhangDynamicWirelessPower2025, @@ -7906,8 +8404,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-12-11}, abstract = {Segmented transmitter coils are commonly employed in dynamic wireless power transfer, and automatic switching is a preferred function to limit the transmitter current. This letter proposes a method for segment transmitter automatic switching utilizing a dc-controlled variable inductor (DCCVI), where the dc current can change the ac side's self-inductance. When the coils are decoupled, the dc current is small, so the inductance of the DCCVI is relatively large, leading to the suppression of the transmitter current. When the coils meet certain coupling conditions, the dc current becomes large, leading to a significant reduction in the ac inductance of the DCCVI, resulting in higher transmission power, thereby enabling segment transmitter automatic switching. The proposed method is straightforward and does not need additional position feedback. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed system can automatically limit the coil current within the range of [0, 0.15] and achieve higher power transmission with higher efficiency within the coupling range of [0.165, 0.3].}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Automatic switching,Coils,Couplings,dynamic wireless power transfer (DWPT),Inductance,Inductors,Receivers,Switches,Transmitters,variable inductor}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2025_Zhang et al_A Dynamic Wireless Power Transfer System Using DC-Controlled Variable Inductor.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6G27HTPY/10592813.html} + keywords = {Automatic switching,Coils,Couplings,dynamic wireless power transfer (DWPT),Inductance,Inductors,Receivers,Switches,Transmitters,variable inductor} } @article{zhangEnergyEncryptionWireless2015, @@ -7924,8 +8421,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-11-07}, abstract = {This paper presents a novel energy encryption strategy for wireless power transfer (WPT) systems, which can effectively improve the security performance of wirelessly transferred energy. In a WPT system, energy is expected to transfer to specific receptors as well as to switch off other unauthorized energy transmission channels, so the security of energy transmission is an important issue. In the proposed secure WPT system, the energy is encrypted by chaotically regulating the frequency of the power source. Then, the authorized receptor can receive the energy by simultaneously adjusting the circuit to decrypt the encrypted energy based on the security key obtained from the power supply, while the unauthorized receptor cannot receive the energy without knowledge of the security key. Hence, a secure energy transmission channel is established to effectively prevent unauthorized receptors from stealing the energy. In this paper, both simulation and experimental results are provided to verify the validity of the proposed encrypted WPT system.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Capacitors,Chaos,Coils,Contactless charging,Couplings,Encryption,energy encryption,magnetic resonant coupling (MRC),security,Wireless communication,wireless power transmission (WPT)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Zhang et al_2015_Energy Encryption for Wireless Power Transfer.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/AYSH2G8F/6928497.html} + keywords = {Capacitors,Chaos,Coils,Contactless charging,Couplings,Encryption,energy encryption,magnetic resonant coupling (MRC),security,Wireless communication,wireless power transmission (WPT)} } @article{zhangImprovedCompensationMethod2025, @@ -7942,8 +8438,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-12-11}, abstract = {Dual-layer or multilayer coils are often used to increase the power density of inductive power transfer systems. However, compared to single-layer coils, multilayer coils suffer from additional loss caused by interlayer displacement current (IDC), which can reduce system transmission efficiency. Therefore, this letter establishes a general mathematical model for IDC loss in multilayer coils regardless of whether the adjacent layers are symmetric. The traditional centralized compensation capacitor is split into two capacitors (interlayer and auxiliary capacitors), and a novel parameteric design method for the interlayer capacitor is proposed to optimize the IDC losses. The auxiliary capacitor is used to adjust the resonance state of the circuit. The experimental results show that compared to the traditional method, the prototype with the double-layer symmetrical coil achieves efficiency improvements of 0.5\% under light load and 2.27\% under heavy load. The double-layer asymmetrical coil prototype achieves efficiency improvements of 0.58\% under light load and 2.11\% under heavy load compared to the traditional method.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Capacitors,Coils,Dielectrics,Inductance,Inductive power transfer (IPT),interlayer displacement current (IDC) loss,multilayer coil,Nonhomogeneous media,Resistance,Wire}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2025_Zhang et al_An Improved Compensation Method Reducing Displacement Current Loss for.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Y3LF7826/10681322.html} + keywords = {Capacitors,Coils,Dielectrics,Inductance,Inductive power transfer (IPT),interlayer displacement current (IDC) loss,multilayer coil,Nonhomogeneous media,Resistance,Wire} } @article{zhangLargeScaleQuantum2018, @@ -7960,8 +8455,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu doi = {10.1364/OE.26.024260}, url = {https://opg.optica.org/abstract.cfm?URI=oe-26-18-24260}, urldate = {2024-05-15}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Zhang et al_2018_Large scale quantum key distribution.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{zhangPerformanceEnhancementSubSampling2007, @@ -7978,8 +8472,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-07-25}, abstract = {An ultra-wideband (UWB) sampling mixer has been developed based on utilizing the combined advantages of two known circuit topologies: a wideband balun and a balanced-feed mixer. The developed sampler is integrated with a step-recovery diode strobe-step generator to sub-sample UWB signals. The fabricated sub-sampler demonstrated a 3.5-dB radio frequency to intermediate frequency (RF-IF) conversion loss up to 1 GHz (without the IF amplification), and a wide 3 dB bandwidth that exceeded 3.5-GHz. It has a reduced spurious level of better than -38 dBc, a lower sensitivity to the Schottky diode-placement, an excellent input match, and good isolation.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Microwave}} and {{Wireless Components Letters}}}, - keywords = {Circuit topology,Frequency conversion,Impedance matching,Mixers,Radio frequency,Sampler,sampling mixer,Schottky diodes,Signal generators,Signal processing,Signal sampling,step recovery diode (SRD),strobe generator,Ultra wideband technology,ultra-wideband (UWB)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2007_Zhang et al_Performance Enhancement of a Sub-Sampling Circuit for Ultra-Wideband Signal.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/62VKLVBN/4385758.html} + keywords = {Circuit topology,Frequency conversion,Impedance matching,Mixers,Radio frequency,Sampler,sampling mixer,Schottky diodes,Signal generators,Signal processing,Signal sampling,step recovery diode (SRD),strobe generator,Ultra wideband technology,ultra-wideband (UWB)} } @inproceedings{zhangRobustCounterfeitPCB2015, @@ -7994,8 +8487,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-10-04}, abstract = {The long and distributed supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) makes them vulnerable to different forms of counterfeiting attacks. Existing chip-level integrity validation approaches cannot be readily extended to PCB. In this paper, we address this issue with a novel PCB authentication approach that creates robust, unique signatures from a PCB based on process-induced variations in its trace impedances. The approach comes at virtually zero design and hardware overhead and can be applied to legacy PCBs. Experiments with two sets of commercial PCBs as well as a set of custom designed PCBs show that the proposed approach can obtain unique authentication signature with inter-PCB hamming distance of 47.94\% or higher.}, eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 33rd {{VLSI Test Symposium}} ({{VTS}})}, - keywords = {Authentication,Copper,Counterfeiting,Electrical resistance measurement,High definition video,Impedance,Impedance measurement,Piracy,Printed Circuit Board (PCB),Probes,PUF,Trust}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Zhang et al_2015_Robust counterfeit PCB detection exploiting intrinsic trace impedance variations.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/GS9H6QT9/7116294.html} + keywords = {Authentication,Copper,Counterfeiting,Electrical resistance measurement,High definition video,Impedance,Impedance measurement,Piracy,Printed Circuit Board (PCB),Probes,PUF,Trust} } @inproceedings{zhangRobustCounterfeitPCB2015a, @@ -8010,8 +8502,20 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-10-31}, abstract = {The long and distributed supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) makes them vulnerable to different forms of counterfeiting attacks. Existing chip-level integrity validation approaches cannot be readily extended to PCB. In this paper, we address this issue with a novel PCB authentication approach that creates robust, unique signatures from a PCB based on process-induced variations in its trace impedances. The approach comes at virtually zero design and hardware overhead and can be applied to legacy PCBs. Experiments with two sets of commercial PCBs as well as a set of custom designed PCBs show that the proposed approach can obtain unique authentication signature with inter-PCB hamming distance of 47.94\% or higher.}, eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE}} 33rd {{VLSI Test Symposium}} ({{VTS}})}, - keywords = {Authentication,Copper,Counterfeiting,Electrical resistance measurement,High definition video,Impedance,Impedance measurement,Piracy,Printed Circuit Board (PCB),Probes,PUF,Trust}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Zhang et al_2015_Robust counterfeit PCB detection exploiting intrinsic trace impedance variations2.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9M243M47/7116294.html} + keywords = {Authentication,Copper,Counterfeiting,Electrical resistance measurement,High definition video,Impedance,Impedance measurement,Piracy,Printed Circuit Board (PCB),Probes,PUF,Trust} +} + +@patent{zhangTamperrespondentAssembliesPorous2023, + type = {patentus}, + title = {Tamper-Respondent Assemblies with Porous Heat Transfer Element(s)}, + author = {Zhang, Hongqing and HIGBY, Arthur J. and Lewison, David J. and REGO, Philipp K. BUCHLING and Bunt, Jay A. and Busby, James and Campbell, Levi}, + holder = {{International Business Machines Corp}}, + date = {2023-08-01}, + number = {11716808B2}, + url = {https://patents.google.com/patent/US11716808B2/en?q=(hardware+security+module+heatsink)&assignee=International+Business+Machines+Corporation}, + urldate = {2025-12-03}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {circuit board,electronic component,enclosure,tamper,thermally conductive} } @article{zhangWirelessPowerTransfer2019, @@ -8028,8 +8532,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-11-07}, abstract = {Due to limitations of low power density, high cost, heavy weight, etc., the development and application of battery-powered devices are facing with unprecedented technical challenges. As a novel pattern of energization, the wireless power transfer (WPT) offers a band new way to the energy acquisition for electric-driven devices, thus alleviating the over-dependence on the battery. This paper presents an overview of WPT techniques with emphasis on working mechanisms, technical challenges, metamaterials, and classical applications. Focusing on WPT systems, this paper elaborates on current major research topics and discusses about future development trends. This novel energy transmission mechanism shows significant meanings on the pervasive application of renewable energies in our daily life.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industrial Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Batteries,Capacitive coupled power transfer (CCPT),contactless charging,Couplings,dynamic charging,Electromagnetic interference,Impedance,inductive power transfer (IPT),Integrated circuit modeling,Load modeling,overview,Wireless power transfer,wireless power transfer (WPT)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Zhang et al_2019_Wireless Power Transfer—An Overview.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MHMC3VK4/8357386.html} + keywords = {Batteries,Capacitive coupled power transfer (CCPT),contactless charging,Couplings,dynamic charging,Electromagnetic interference,Impedance,inductive power transfer (IPT),Integrated circuit modeling,Load modeling,overview,Wireless power transfer,wireless power transfer (WPT)} } @article{zhangWirelessSensorPower2024, @@ -8046,8 +8549,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu urldate = {2024-12-11}, abstract = {24 × 7 health monitoring of rotating shaft is very important for the safe operation of automotive axles. Wireless sensor power supply technology is one of the promising power supply means for monitoring systems. Since the radius of many rotation shafts is large up to 1 m, segmented coils are adopted to reduce the magnetic interference and power loss compared to single receiver coils, but this will lead to output voltage fluctuation causing the monitoring system failures. This letter proposes a fluctuation suppression method by a dc-side diode array and parameter optimization. Using multiple reverse parallel diode groups to connect the dc side of multiple receivers and the load, the diodes will be conducted when corresponding coils are activated, while those without induced voltage will not be conducted. In this way, the mutual inductance fluctuation as per different rotation angles can be greatly reduced. In addition, a detuned system has been designed, rendering the output gain insensitive to variations in mutual inductance, thereby enhancing the output stability. A prototype was built to verify the theoretical analysis. The experimental results indicate that the output voltage fluctuation is only 5.0\%. The proposed method can achieve significant output stability without complex control and dedicated coil design.}, eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Power Electronics}}}, - keywords = {Coils,Diode array,Diodes,Fluctuations,Inductance,Power supplies,Receivers,Rectifiers,Shafts,stable output,Transmitters,Wireless sensor networks,wireless sensor power supply (WSPS)}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2024_Zhang et al_Wireless Sensor Power Supply for Rotating Shaft Using DC-Side Diode Array With.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/BK6YYH4R/10629183.html} + keywords = {Coils,Diode array,Diodes,Fluctuations,Inductance,Power supplies,Receivers,Rectifiers,Shafts,stable output,Transmitters,Wireless sensor networks,wireless sensor power supply (WSPS)} } @online{zhaoDesignOptimizationLitzWire2023, @@ -8060,7 +8562,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {Litz wire planar spiral coils are widely used in inductive power transfer systems due to low power loss in high-frequency operation and low profile. However, the complicated structure of the litz wire coil imposes difficulties in estimating the frequency-dependent resistance and quality factor accurately. In this work, we present an 2D analytical model for calculating the frequency-dependent resistance and quality factor of multi-coil inductive power transfer systems based on superposition of different loss effects. Its accuracy is validated with multiple coils and litz wires over wide frequency range. Meanwhile, a fast and accurate multi-objective optimization method is developed to improve the product quality factor and coupling factor. From the optimization results, there are five factors affecting the quality factor and coupling factor. A set of design guidelines is proposed to cope with these design factors. The final prototypes show 33\textbackslash\% increase in quality factor and 23\textbackslash\% improvement in coupling factor compared with the state-of-the-art designs. Meanwhile, a 30W, 500kHz inductive power transfer system is designed with 91\textbackslash\% peak efficiency.}, langid = {english}, pubstate = {prepublished}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/ZAQTS252/Zhao et al. - 2023 - Design and Optimization of Litz-Wire Planar Spiral.pdf} + keywords = {preprint} } @article{zhouHiddenVoiceCommands2019, @@ -8112,8 +8614,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {Privacy issue is a main concern restricting data sharing and crossorganization collaborations. While Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning techniques such as Multi-Party Computations (MPC), Homomorphic Encryption, and Federated Learning are proposed to solve this problem, no solution exists with both strong security and high performance to run large-scale, complex machine learning models. This paper presents PPMLAC, a novel chipset architecture to accelerate MPC, which combines MPC’s strong security and hardware’s high performance, eliminates the communication bottleneck from MPC, and achieves several orders of magnitudes speed up over software-based MPC. It is carefully designed to only rely on a minimum set of simple hardware components in the trusted domain, thus is robust against side-channel attacks and malicious adversaries. Our FPGA prototype can run mainstream large-scale ML models like ResNet in near real-time under a practical network environment with non-negligible latency, which is impossible for existing MPC solutions.}, eventtitle = {{{ISCA}} '22: {{The}} 49th {{Annual International Symposium}} on {{Computer Architecture}}}, isbn = {978-1-4503-8610-4}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/N6XAKEXE/Zhou et al. - 2022 - PPMLAC high performance chipset architecture for .pdf} + langid = {english} } @inproceedings{zhouPrintListenerUncoveringVulnerability2024, @@ -8130,8 +8631,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu abstract = {Fingerprint authentication has been extensively employed in contemporary identity verification systems owing to its rapidity and cost-effectiveness. Due to its widespread use, fingerprint leakage may cause sensitive information theft, enormous economic and personnel losses, and even a potential compromise of national security. As a fingerprint that can coincidentally match a specific proportion of the overall fingerprint population, MasterPrint rings the alarm bells for the security of fingerprint authentication. In this paper, we propose a new side-channel attack on the minutiae-based Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), called PrintListener, which leverages users’ fingertip swiping actions on the screen to extract fingerprint pattern features (the first-level features) and synthesizes a stronger targeted PatternMasterPrint with potential second-level features. The attack scenario of PrintListener is extensive and covert. It only needs to record users’ fingertip friction sound and can be launched by leveraging a large number of social media platforms. Extensive experimental results in realworld scenarios show that Printlistener can significantly improve the attack potency of MasterPrint.}, eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VQFNGMWQ/Zhou et al. - 2024 - PrintListener Uncovering the Vulnerability of Fin.pdf} + langid = {english} } @article{zhuPDNPulseSensingPCB2023, @@ -8147,8 +8647,7 @@ Archive 2: https://web.archive.org/web/20250510104017/https://de.linkedin.com/pu url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10153638/}, urldate = {2025-04-09}, abstract = {The ubiquitous presence of printed circuit boards (PCBs) in modern electronic systems and embedded devices makes their integrity a top security concern. To take advantage of the economies of scale, today’s PCB design and manufacturing are often performed by suppliers around the globe, exposing them to many security vulnerabilities along the segmented PCB supply chain. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the PCB designs also leaves ample room for numerous sneaky board-level attacks to be implemented throughout each stage of a PCB’s lifetime, threatening many electronic devices. In this paper, we propose PDNPulse, a power delivery network (PDN) based PCB anomaly detection framework that can identify a wide spectrum of board-level malicious modifications. PDNPulse leverages the fact that the PDN’s characteristics are inevitably affected by modifications to the PCB. By detecting changes to the PDN impedance profile against the golden model and using the Frechet distance-based anomaly detection algorithms, PDNPulse can robustly and successfully discern malicious modifications across the system. Using PDNPulse, we conduct extensive experiments on seven commercial-off-the-shelf PCBs, covering different design scales, different threat models, and seven different anomaly types. The results confirm that PDNPulse creates an effective security asymmetry between attack and defense.}, - keywords = {anomaly detection,Anomaly detection,cyberattack,impedance,Impedance,Impedance measurement,power distribution networks,Printed circuits,Probes,Sensitivity,Trojan horses,Voltage measurement}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Zhu et al_PDNPulse.pdf} + keywords = {anomaly detection,Anomaly detection,cyberattack,impedance,Impedance,Impedance measurement,power distribution networks,Printed circuits,Probes,Sensitivity,Trojan horses,Voltage measurement} } @incollection{zicknerSpulen1927, diff --git a/thesis.tex b/thesis.tex index a97d728..0c8e866 100644 --- a/thesis.tex +++ b/thesis.tex @@ -1,5 +1,10 @@ -\documentclass[11pt,a4paper,notitlepage,twoside]{book} -\usepackage[a4paper, top=3cm, bottom=3.5cm, inner=3.5cm, outer=5cm, marginpar=3.8cm]{geometry} +\ifdefined\thesisoneside % + \documentclass[11pt,a4paper,notitlepage,oneside]{book} + \usepackage[a4paper, top=3cm, bottom=3.5cm, inner=3.5cm, outer=5cm, marginpar=3.5cm]{geometry} +\else % + \documentclass[11pt,a4paper,notitlepage,twoside]{book} + \usepackage[a4paper, top=3cm, bottom=3.5cm, inner=3.5cm, outer=5cm, marginpar=3.5cm]{geometry} +\fi % \input{common-packages} \input{common-defs} @@ -8,7 +13,10 @@ \newcommand{\chaptertitle}[1]{ \chapter{#1} \printchapterquote - \minitoc + %FIXME note leo: remove minitocs? + \begin{spacing}{1.1} + \minitoc + \end{spacing} \newpage } @@ -23,27 +31,30 @@ \author{Jan Sebastian Götte} \begin{document} \input{titlepage.tex} -\ifdefined\thesispreviewmode -{\Large \textbf{Draft build}, git revision \texttt{\input{version}}} -\fi \frontmatter -\tableofcontents -\listoffigures -\listoftables +%\chapter*{Akademischer Werdegang} +%\includepdf[pages=-]{lebenslauf-en-akademischer-werdegang-diss.pdf} +\input{abstract-de.tex} +\input{abstract.tex} \input{ai-llm-use-disclosure.tex} -\input{hsm-terminology-notes.tex} + +\clearpage +\tableofcontents +%\listoffigures +%\listoftables \mainmatter \dochapter{chapter-introduction} % Status: In pretty good shape \dochapter{chapter-epa} % Status: In pretty good shape -\dochapter{chapter-ihsm} % Status: Copy-paste done, build works, integration TODO \dochapter{chapter-hsms} % Status: In pretty good shape +\dochapter{chapter-ihsm} % Status: Copy-paste done, build works, integration TODO \dochapter{chapter-sampling-mesh-monitor} % Status: Copy-paste done, build works, integration TODO \dochapter{chapter-nice-coils} % Status: Copy-paste done, build works, integration TODO -\dochapter{chapter-qkd} % Status: Re-integration of changes from workshop paper TODO +\dochapter{chapter-qkd} % Status: Re-integration of changes from workshop paper done \dochapter{chapter-smpc} % Status: TODO -\dochapter{chapter-conclusion} % Status: TODO + +\input{chapter-conclusion/chapter.tex} % Status: draft done \appendix diff --git a/titlepage.tex b/titlepage.tex index e9fec86..3557dae 100644 --- a/titlepage.tex +++ b/titlepage.tex @@ -7,16 +7,20 @@ \textbf{\Huge Bootstrapping Physical Security with Inertial Hardware Security Modules} \end{spacing} + \ifdefined\thesispreviewmode + {\Large \textbf{Draft build}, git revision \texttt{\input{version}}} + \fi + \vspace*{5cm} \begin{spacing}{1.3} \noindent Dissertation von Jan Sebastian Götte \noindent - zur Erlangung des Grades Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr. Ing.) + zur Erlangung des Grades Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr.-Ing.) \noindent - am Fachbereich Kommunikationsnetze + am Fachbereich Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik \noindent der Technischen Universität Darmstadt @@ -25,7 +29,7 @@ Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Björn Scheuermann \noindent - Zweitgutachter: TBD FIXME + Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Shahin Tajik \end{spacing} @@ -51,10 +55,16 @@ Darmstadt, Technische Universität Darmstadt, 2025 \noindent - URN: TBD FIXME + URN: https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuda-150469 \noindent - Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: TBD FIXME + DOI: https://doi.org/10.26083/tuda-7720 + + \noindent + Document revision: \input{version} + + \noindent + Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: TBD \noindent Veröffentlicht unter CC-BY-SA 4.0 International