diff --git a/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex b/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex
index c7820c8..5939e04 100644
--- a/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex
+++ b/chapter-introduction/chapter.tex
@@ -28,17 +28,6 @@
 % physical security is still lacking due to misaligned ecosystem incentices. As Anderson put it,
 % todo cite: betrusted
 % 
-% FIXME: quote from anderson: Security economics remains a big soft spot, with security chips being in many
-% ways a market for lemons. A banker buying HSMs probably won’t be aware of
-% the huge gap between FIPS [US national HSM security standard] level 3 and level 4, and understand that level 3 can
-% sometimes be defeated with a Swiss army knife. The buying incentive there is
-% compliance, and where real security clashes with operations it’s not surprising
-% to see weaker standards designed to make compliance easier. API security is
-% too hard, and the difference between HSMs’ internal and external APIs makes
-% it too confusing. The near-abdication of FIPS in favour of ISO 19790 and vari-
-% ous protection profiles touted under the Common Criteria will confuse things
-% further, as will the UK’s move away from the Criteria. Confusion marketing
-% and liability games appear set to continue.
 %
 % Meanwhile in academia, 
 % In this thesis, we aim to significantly advance the field of hardware security module construction. We publish all
@@ -56,43 +45,65 @@
 %
 
 \emph{No Gods, No Masters} is an anarchist slogan originating in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century that expresses a
-rejection of authorities~\cite{broussaisOriginesDeviseAnarchiste2022,guerinNoGodsNo2005,blomNoGodsNo2025}. While
-politically, this blanket rejection today represents a fringe viewpoint with little mainstream acceptance, there exists
-a parallel between this and modern cryptographic best practice. In modern cryptography, it is generally seen as best
-practice to have the least amount of keys possible involved in any computation and cryptographers have time and time
-again strongly rejected attempts by states and other authorities to insert backdoor access mechanisms into cryptographic
-systems~\cite{
+rejection of authorities~\cite{broussaisOriginesDeviseAnarchiste2022,guerinNoGodsNo2005,blomNoGodsNo2025}. In modern
+cryptography, it is generally seen as best practice to have the least amount of parties possible involved in any
+computation.
+Most cryptographic problems are easily solved by involving a trusted third party (TTP).
+% FIXME cite TTP examples
+Yet, cryptographers have time and time again rejected attempts to involve third parties in cryptographic
+protocols~\cite{
     abelsonRisksKeyRecovery1997,
     abelsonKeysDoormats2015,
     andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020,
     rogawayMoralCharacterCryptographic2015,
 }.
 
-While at a glance it might sound like a fringe position held by people from the Cypherpunk and Hacker movements~\cite{
+The field has produced a versatile set of complex tools for tasks as diverse as secure communication,
+% FIXME cite: signal, noise, something metadata resistant 
+private information retrieval,
+% FIXME PIR = ORAM?
+%FIXME cite ORAM papers, and oblivious transfer papers
+and even general computation that decentralize authority and avoid any sort of centralized control.
+% FIXME cite MPC papers
+While politically, this blanket rejection of authority represents a fringe viewpoint, in cryptography it has a long
+tradition originating with the Cypherpunk and Hacker movements~\cite{
     andersonCypherpunkEthicsRadical2022,
     hughesCypherpunksManifesto,
     jarvisCryptoWarsFight2020,
     marlinspikeWeShouldAll2013},
-it enjoys support far beyond those circles and throughout mainstream academic cryptography. From cryptographic protocol
-standards like TLS, to cryptographic applications like the Signal messenger, backdoor access is not only excluded from
-the system design, its possibility is considered a vulnerability.
-% Measures such as forward secrecy and post-compromise security are taken to mitigate its impact. In computing, this
-% design aspect makes cryptographic protocols a unique holdout. In other parts of the stack, explicit or implicit
-% backdoor access is commonplace, and attempts at preventing it are rare. For instance, network providers are generally
-% required to comply with so-called \emph{Lawful Interception} orders on particular customers or traffic types, and
-% datacenter operators commonly provide hardware access to state authorities. The design decisions in cryptographic
-% protocols generally hold, and the gold standard for backdoor access to modern systems is either exploiting a
-% \emph{zero-day} flaw that is not yet publicly known, or acquiring physical access to the target system.
+and extending throughout mainstream academic cryptography.
 
-In this thesis, we aim to extend the level of protection afforded by cryptographic protocol design down the technology
-stack. While cryptographic protocols and modern software from the operating system up make it possible to secure the
-software side of the stack to a high level, the hardware side remains poorly protected. There are a variety of hardware
-security solutions used in practice, but the majority of them either do not target protection against local, physical
-attacks -- such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) -- or are not widely available due to market segmentation or cost --
-such as conventional Hardware Security Modules (HSMs).
+While the aforementioned cryptographic tools enable a large gamut of use cases in theory, in practice cryptographic
+systems are still routinely compromised.
+% FIXME cite cellphone attacks
+The fundamental flaw of any practical cryptographic system is that secure algorithms have to run on hardware, and even
+today, average computing hardware provides little physical security.
+% FIXME cite TPM attacks
+% FIXME cite Intel TXE etc. attacks
+\emph{Hardware Security Modules} are a class of devices specifically designed to execute cryptographic algorithms while
+providing strict physical security guarantees, but these systems are expensive,
+% FIXME citation
+and their physical security is often questionable.
+% FIXME cite anderson, and immler et al in the early paper with the two HSMs taken apart
+% FIXME reference chapter hsm survey?
+As \textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} writes on HSMs and their security standards:
+% FIXME page numbers
 
-While anarchists, Cypherpunks and Hackers often reject backdoor access out of political conviction alone,
-Cryptographers' aversion to backdoor access derives from a combination of two fundamental computing principles:
+\begin{quote}
+    \begin{flushright}
+        Security economics remains a big soft spot, with security chips being in many ways a market for lemons. A banker
+        buying HSMs probably won’t be aware of the huge gap between FIPS [US national HSM security standard] level 3 and
+        level 4, and understand that level 3 can sometimes be defeated with a Swiss army knife. The buying incentive
+        there is compliance, and where real security clashes with operations it’s not surprising to see weaker standards
+        designed to make compliance easier.
+        \textit{\textcite{andersonSecurityEngineeringGuide2020} p. }
+    \end{flushright}
+\end{quote}
+
+In this thesis, we aim to fill this gap in available, secure hardware and extend the level of protection afforded by
+cryptographic protocol design down the technology stack to the hardware level.
+
+% Go into drawbacks of existing HSMs, they violate kerckhoffs' principle
 Kerckhoffs' principle, and the principle of least authority. Kerckhoffs' principle\footnote{
     \textcite{petitcolasKerckhoffsPrinciplesCryptographie} contains a high-quality OCR'ed copy of the original source,
     as well as a translation of the cited part from French. The original source is