diff --git a/chapter-smpc/chapter.tex b/chapter-smpc/chapter.tex index 2c0ef11..2124528 100644 --- a/chapter-smpc/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-smpc/chapter.tex @@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ Multiparty Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic construct that allows several networked parties to jointly perform a computation in such a way that the inputs to the computation remain private to the parties providing them, and no single party must be trusted for the computation to produce the correct result. Conceptually, MPC is similar to a secret -sharing scheme that shares computation instead of data between untrusted parties. The computation primitive MPC offers -is a cryptographic answer to the issue of bootstrapping trust in a computing system. +sharing scheme that shares not just data, but computation between untrusted parties. The computation primitive MPC +offers is a cryptographic answer to the question of how to bootstrap trust in a computing system. %The most challenging scenarios in computing arise when multiple %parties such as manufacturers and operators, servers and clients, or sellers and buyers need to interact through @@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ this problem, maintaining trust in a system once trusted, we have an ample suppl authentication, and formally proven protocols. In contrast, establishing trust in a computing system is largely intractable and despite a large corpus of academic research on approaches such as hardware trojan detection and physicaly unclonable functions, only two approaches find practical adoption: In one, we build the system ourselves from -the ground up, making sure to leave no part vulnerable to third-party compromise. In the other, we arbitrarily buy a -computer from a randomly chosen physical store, assuming that while an attacker can target any particular system, they -cannot target all systems simultaneously and we give them too little time to target the system we buy. +the ground up, making sure to leave no part vulnerable to third-party compromise. In the other, we go to a store and +physically buy a randomly-chosen computer using cash, assuming that while an attacker can target any particular system, +they cannot target all systems simultaneously and we give them too little time to target the system we buy. A limitation of both approaches is that in either case, while the party creating or acquiring the system can trust it, they cannot prove its trustworthiness to other parties. MPC solves this issue by allowing every party to contribute