diff --git a/chapter-qkd/chapter.pdf b/chapter-qkd/chapter.pdf index a257244..69660bf 100644 Binary files a/chapter-qkd/chapter.pdf and b/chapter-qkd/chapter.pdf differ diff --git a/chapter-qkd/chapter.tex b/chapter-qkd/chapter.tex index e87e757..9bcb042 100644 --- a/chapter-qkd/chapter.tex +++ b/chapter-qkd/chapter.tex @@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ key storage, network communication and computation costs. \todo{research some more policies.} \section{The Physics of Quantum Computing} +\todo{missing} \section{Quantum Key Distribution} @@ -317,7 +318,7 @@ xWDM.} \todo{CV-QKD} \subsection{Relaying} -% FIXME (one?) term of the art seems to be "repeater" +\todo{(one?) term of the art seems to be "repeater"} The No-Cloning Theorem prevents us from using conventional optical amplifiers to extend the range of a single continuous QKD link. What remains as ways to extend the range of a QKD link are \emph{relaying} methods, where one QKD link is @@ -349,7 +350,7 @@ QKD services over complex network topologies. There exists a large corpus of academic research on the theory of such large-scale QKD networks ranging from the technical implementation of management protocols to specialized QKD systems for QKD networks that improve on standard -two-party QKD in areas such as complexity or performance. % FIXME lots of citations here +two-party QKD in areas such as complexity or performance. \todo{lots of citations here} In the past decades, a number of proof-of-concept QKD networks have been put into practice. None of these systems provide any practical utility yet, and their raison d'être lies in the political realm more than it arises out of technical necessity considering that any of today's city-scale demonstrations can easily be simulated more compactly in @@ -388,13 +389,77 @@ The second prediction we can make is that any practical QKD network will have to distances. While in certain specialized applications such as the proposed financial QKD network in Switzerland \todo{citation on swiss deployment} smaller, isolated networks are conceivable, in every telecommunication system from the telegraph through the telephone system and up to the internet it has been shown conclusively that there is a real -demand for a unified, global interconnected network. \todo{citation on historic networks} +demand for a global, interconnected network\footnote{In fact, history repeats, and the enthusiasm that Quantum Key +Distribution networks have kindled parallels the one that the first trans-atlantic telegraph cables brought forth as +described by \textcite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. Both parallel not just in the extensive promises attributed to +their respective technologies, but also in the facade of technological determinism that in both cases hides a number of +social and political motivations.}\cite{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016}. \todo{at least one more citation on historic +networks} In this section, we will outline a solution that provides practical, end-to-end security in large-scale QKD networks by delegating the hardware trust issue of QKD relays to Inertial Hardware Security Modules. The primary design challenges we will address are the systems' overall envelope design, optical passthroughs, and matching the cryptographic assumptions behind the IHSM's heartbeat and alarm subsystem to those of the QKD application. +\subsection{The anatomy of a QKD node} + +With the exception of special cases such as the middle node in a MDI-QKD system, a general QKD relay contains the same +components that the endpoint of a QKD connection uses. Only in a QKD relay, two transceivers are connected back-to-back +to one another. QKD provides physical security for the photons traversing the fiber that forms the systme's channel, and +the security envelope of the system begins where this fiber is terminated in the power splitters, single-photon +deetctors, lasers, and interferometers of the QKD transmitter and receiver. To process the raw measurements of the QKD +system into a usable stream of secret key bits, in addition to these components implementing the physics of the QKD +system, a classical computer is needed. On top of the remote monitoring and management tasks that any piece of +networking equipment is expected to perform nowadays, this computer is tasked with the information reconciliation and +privacy amplification that form the information-theoretic part of the QKD system. Since this computer necesesarily +handles secret key bits in their plain text form, it, too, must be inside the relay node's physical protection envelope. + +\subsection{Physical requirements of QKD transceivers} + +\paragraph{Physical dimensions.} +At this point, a number of commercial systems promising QKD exist. Common QKD protocols do not require any particularly +large or power-hungry components, and so commercial systems have generally adopted the 19 Inch rackmount enclosure +standard that is common to modern telecommunications equipment, with a width of $\approx\qty{50}{\centi\meter}$, a +height between $\approx\qtyrange{4}{30}{\centi\meter}$ and a depth below $\approx\qty{100}{\centi\meter}$.\todo{Re-check +these shortly before submission}. While something of this size would be infeasible to protect with the security mesh of +a traditional hardware security module, placed vertically, even without modifications any of these systems are well +within an envelope that can be protected with a single IHSM cage. + +\paragraph{Power supply.} +QKD systems do not contain any particularly power-hungry components. Unlike quantum computers, most of the signal path +is optical, and as such can be implemented with room-temperature fiber-optic components. Only the single-photon +detectors may require cooling in some systems, but unlike something like an ion trap quantum computer's processor, +energy-intensive deep cryogenic cooling is not necessary. Most manufacturers don't quote the power requirements of their +systems, but we were able to find that IDQuantique specifies their QKD systems to be able to run off a single +\qty{300}{\watt} power supply. In an intertial HSM, power up to several \unit{\kilo\watt} can easily be transferred to +the payload with through-axis cables. + +\paragraph{Cooling.} +While the few hundred watt of power that QKD systems require could easily be transported through the mesh of a a +traditional HSM as well, cooling that amount of thermal load purely by heat conduction through centimeters of epoxy +resin would make implementation infeasible in traditional HSM. In an IHSM, on the other hand, up to several +\unit{\kilo\watt} can easily be dissipated through forced-air cooling since the rotating security mesh can have an +arbitrary amount of longitudinal slots or holes. + +\paragraph{Data and signals.} +A QKD transceiver has a number of ports in addition the port for the fiber optic quantum channel. Depending on the +system, one or more additional optical links may be necessary for clock distribution, allowing both endpoints to tune +their lasers into precise alignment. QKD protocols require a classical link used for information reconciliation, which +along with the key stream output and management links requires one or more classical network ports. + +In a QKD relay node, the key stream never leaves the security envelope. The management and information reconciliation +links can be combined into a single, classical network link, requiring a single fiber when using a standard wavelength +division multiplexing transceiver. The QKD link's clock channel and the quantum channel require a dedicated fiber each, +adding up to a total of five fibers for a uni-directional QKD relay, or nine fibers for a bidirectional one. Since fiber +pigtails have an outer diameter of usually about \qty{1}{\milli\meter}, this amount of fibers can easily be fed through +an IHSM's axis of rotation. The mechanical challenge in such a multi-fiber signal and data feedthrough is to observe the +fiber's minimum bending radius, which for common fibers is usually in the range of +\qtyrange{5}{10}{\milli\meter}\todo{Provide citation on bend radius. Maybe a small table of products by a few vendors?}. +For detailed passthrough designs, we refer the reader to Chapter FIXME of this thesis.\todo{Actually write the chapter, +then cross-link here.} + + + \section{Outlook} \newpage diff --git a/main.bib b/main.bib index b189a4e..85fb5a6 100644 --- a/main.bib +++ b/main.bib @@ -1,3 +1,20 @@ +@online{adhikariDonLookUbiquitous2022, + title = {Don't {{Look Up}}: {{Ubiquitous Data Exfiltration Pathways}} in {{Commercial Spaces}}}, + shorttitle = {Don't {{Look Up}}}, + author = {Adhikari, Anku and Guo, Samuel and Smaragdis, Paris and Winslett, Marianne}, + date = {2022-06-26}, + eprint = {2206.12944}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {cs}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2206.12944}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {We show that as a side effect of building code requirements, almost all commercial buildings today are vulnerable to a novel data exfiltration attack, even if they are air-gapped and secured against traditional attacks. The new attack uses vibrations from an inconspicuous transmitter to send data across the building’s physical infrastructure to a receiver. Our analysis and experiments with several large realworld buildings show a single-frequency bit rate of 300K bps, which is sufficient to transmit ordinary files, real-time MP3-quality audio, or periodic highquality still photos. The attacker can use multiple channels to transmit, for example, real-time MP4quality video. We discuss the difficulty of detecting the attack and the viability of various potential countermeasures.}, + langid = {english}, + pubstate = {prepublished}, + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7C2Z5Y9P/Adhikari et al. - 2022 - Don't Look Up Ubiquitous Data Exfiltration Pathwa.pdf} +} + @article{alomairInformationTheoreticallySecure, title = {Information {{Theoretically Secure Encryption}} with {{Almost Free Authentication}}}, author = {Alomair, Basel}, @@ -25,6 +42,54 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2EYFTVCY/Amiri et al. - 2018 - Efficient Unconditionally Secure Signatures Using .pdf} } +@inproceedings{arakiHighThroughputSemiHonestSecure2016, + title = {High-{{Throughput Semi-Honest Secure Three-Party Computation}} with an {{Honest Majority}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2016 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, + author = {Araki, Toshinori and Furukawa, Jun and Lindell, Yehuda and Nof, Ariel and Ohara, Kazuma}, + date = {2016-10-24}, + series = {{{CCS}} '16}, + pages = {805--817}, + publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, + location = {New York, NY, USA}, + doi = {10.1145/2976749.2978331}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978331}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {In this paper, we describe a new information-theoretic protocol (and a computationally-secure variant) for secure three-party computation with an honest majority. The protocol has very minimal computation and communication; for Boolean circuits, each party sends only a single bit for every AND gate (and nothing is sent for XOR gates). Our protocol is (simulation-based) secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and achieves privacy in the client/server model in the presence of malicious adversaries. On a cluster of three 20-core servers with a 10Gbps connection, the implementation of our protocol carries out over 1.3 million AES computations per second, which involves processing over 7 billion gates per second. In addition, we developed a Kerberos extension that replaces the ticket-granting-ticket encryption on the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in MIT-Kerberos with our protocol, using keys/ passwords that are shared between the servers. This enables the use of Kerberos while protecting passwords. Our implementation is able to support a login storm of over 35,000 logins per second, which suffices even for very large organizations. Our work demonstrates that high-throughput secure computation is possible on standard hardware.}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-4139-4} +} + +@inproceedings{arpPrivacyThreatsUltrasonic2017, + title = {Privacy {{Threats}} through {{Ultrasonic Side Channels}} on {{Mobile Devices}}}, + booktitle = {2017 {{IEEE European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})}, + author = {Arp, Daniel and Quiring, Erwin and Wressnegger, Christian and Rieck, Konrad}, + date = {2017-04}, + pages = {35--47}, + doi = {10.1109/EuroSP.2017.33}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7961950/?arnumber=7961950}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Device tracking is a serious threat to the privacy of users, as it enables spying on their habits and activities. A recent practice embeds ultrasonic beacons in audio and tracks them using the microphone of mobile devices. This side channel allows an adversary to identify a user's current location, spy on her TV viewing habits or link together her different mobile devices. In this paper, we explore the capabilities, the current prevalence and technical limitations of this new tracking technique based on three commercial tracking solutions. To this end, we develop detection approaches for ultrasonic beacons and Android applications capable of processing these. Our findings confirm our privacy concerns: We spot ultrasonic beacons in various web media content and detect signals in 4 of 35 stores in two European cities that are used for location tracking. While we do not find ultrasonic beacons in TV streams from 7 countries, we spot 234 Android applications that are constantly listening for ultrasonic beacons in the background without the user's knowledge.}, + eventtitle = {2017 {{IEEE European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})}, + keywords = {Acoustics,Frequency shift keying,Media,Mobile applications,Mobile handsets,privacy,Privacy,side channels,TV,ultrasound}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Arp et al_Privacy Threats through Ultrasonic Side Channels on Mobile Devices2.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/FBMINKMB/7961950.html} +} + +@article{asharovMoreEfficientOblivious2017, + title = {More {{Efficient Oblivious Transfer Extensions}}}, + author = {Asharov, Gilad and Lindell, Yehuda and Schneider, Thomas and Zohner, Michael}, + date = {2017-07}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Cryptology}, + shortjournal = {J Cryptol}, + volume = {30}, + number = {3}, + pages = {805--858}, + issn = {0933-2790, 1432-1378}, + doi = {10.1007/s00145-016-9236-6}, + url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00145-016-9236-6}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Asharov et al_More Efficient Oblivious Transfer Extensions.pdf} +} + @article{athalyeVerifyingHardwareSecurity, title = {Verifying {{Hardware Security Modules}} with {{Information-Preserving Refinement}}}, author = {Athalye, Anish and Kaashoek, M Frans and Zeldovich, Nickolai}, @@ -33,6 +98,25 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/E3KVIU4P/Athalye et al. - Verifying Hardware Security Modules with Informati.pdf} } +@incollection{attemaEfficientCompilerCovert2022, + title = {Efficient {{Compiler}} to {{Covert Security}} with {{Public Verifiability}} for {{Honest Majority MPC}}}, + booktitle = {Applied {{Cryptography}} and {{Network Security}}}, + author = {Attema, Thomas and Dunning, Vincent and Everts, Maarten and Langenkamp, Peter}, + editor = {Ateniese, Giuseppe and Venturi, Daniele}, + date = {2022}, + volume = {13269}, + pages = {663--683}, + publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, + location = {Cham}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_33}, + url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-09234-3_33}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {We present a novel compiler for transforming arbitrary, passively secure MPC protocols into efficient protocols with covert security and public verifiability in the honest majority setting. Our compiler works for protocols with any number of parties {$>$} 2 and treats the passively secure protocol in a black-box manner.}, + isbn = {978-3-031-09233-6 978-3-031-09234-3}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/5RWQFXAC/Attema et al. - 2022 - Efficient Compiler to Covert Security with Public .pdf} +} + @article{awuahNovelCoilDesign2023, title = {Novel Coil Design and Analysis for High-Power Wireless Power Transfer with Enhanced {{Q-factor}}}, author = {Awuah, Charles Marfo and Danuor, Patrick and Moon, Jung-Ick and Jung, Young-Bae}, @@ -71,6 +155,23 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Azuma et al_2015_All-photonic quantum repeaters.pdf} } +@inproceedings{baiBatCommEnablingInaudible2020, + title = {{{BatComm}}: Enabling Inaudible Acoustic Communication with High-Throughput for Mobile Devices}, + shorttitle = {{{BatComm}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 18th {{Conference}} on {{Embedded Networked Sensor Systems}}}, + author = {Bai, Yang and Liu, Jian and Lu, Li and Yang, Yilin and Chen, Yingying and Yu, Jiadi}, + date = {2020-11-16}, + series = {{{SenSys}} '20}, + pages = {205--217}, + publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, + location = {New York, NY, USA}, + doi = {10.1145/3384419.3430773}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3384419.3430773}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Acoustic communication is an increasingly popular alternative to existing short-range wireless communication technologies for mobile devices, such as NFC and QR codes. Unlike the current standards, there are no requirements for extra hardware, lighting conditions, or Internet connection. However, the audibility and limited throughput of existing studies hinder their deployment on a wide range of applications. In this paper, we aim to redesign acoustic communication mechanism to push the boundary of potential throughput while keeping the inaudibility. Specifically, we propose BatComm, a high-throughput and inaudible acoustic communication system for mobile devices capable of throughput rates 12X higher than contemporary state-of-the-art acoustic communication for mobile devices. We theoretically model the non-linearity of microphone and use orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) to transmit data bits over multiple orthogonal channels with an ultrasound frequency carrier. We also design a series of techniques to mitigate interference caused by sources such as the signal's unbalanced frequency response, ambient noise, and unrelated residual signals created through OFDM, amplitude modulation (AM), and related processes. Extensive evaluations under multiple realistic settings demonstrate that our inaudible acoustic communication system can achieve over 47kbps within a 10cm communication range. We also show the possibility of increasing the communication range to room scale (i.e., around 2m) while maintaining high-throughput and inaudibility. Our findings offer a new direction for future inaudible acoustic communication techniques to pursue in emerging mobile and IoT applications.}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-7590-0} +} + @inproceedings{barnettSecuringQuantumKey2011, title = {Securing a Quantum Key Distribution Relay Network Using Secret Sharing}, booktitle = {2011 {{IEEE GCC Conference}} and {{Exhibition}} ({{GCC}})}, @@ -125,6 +226,24 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/BDZCDH85/Baum et al. - 2022 - Moz$$mathbb Z _ 2^k $$arella Efficient Vector-O.pdf} } +@inproceedings{beckFuzzyMessageDetection2021, + title = {Fuzzy {{Message Detection}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2021 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, + author = {Beck, Gabrielle and Len, Julia and Miers, Ian and Green, Matthew}, + date = {2021-11-12}, + pages = {1507--1528}, + publisher = {ACM}, + location = {Virtual Event Republic of Korea}, + doi = {10.1145/3460120.3484545}, + url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3460120.3484545}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {Many privacy-preserving protocols employ a primitive that allows a sender to “flag” a message to a recipient’s public key, such that only the recipient (who possesses the corresponding secret key) can detect that the message is intended for their use. Examples of such protocols include anonymous messaging, privacy-preserving payments, and anonymous tracing. A limitation of the existing techniques is that recipients cannot easily outsource the detection of messages to a remote server, without revealing to the server the exact set of matching messages. In this work we propose a new class of cryptographic primitives called fuzzy message detection schemes. These schemes allow a recipient to derive a specialized message detection key that can identify correct messages, while also incorrectly identifying non-matching messages with a specific and chosen false positive rate p. This allows recipients to outsource detection work to an untrustworthy server, without revealing precisely which messages belong to the receiver. We show how to construct these schemes under a variety of assumptions; describe several applications of the new technique; and show that our schemes are efficient enough to use in real applications.}, + eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '21: 2021 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-8454-4}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/H86Q8YZK/Beck et al. - 2021 - Fuzzy Message Detection.pdf} +} + @inproceedings{bellareEfficientGarblingFixedKey2013, title = {Efficient {{Garbling}} from a {{Fixed-Key Blockcipher}}}, booktitle = {2013 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}}}, @@ -207,6 +326,22 @@ langid = {english} } +@inproceedings{blockAutonomicPermissionlessAndroid2017, + title = {An Autonomic and Permissionless {{Android}} Covert Channel}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th {{ACM Conference}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} in {{Wireless}} and {{Mobile Networks}}}, + author = {Block, Kenneth and Narain, Sashank and Noubir, Guevara}, + date = {2017-07-18}, + series = {{{WiSec}} '17}, + pages = {184--194}, + publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, + location = {New York, NY, USA}, + doi = {10.1145/3098243.3098250}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3098243.3098250}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Demand for mobile devices continues to experience worldwide growth. Within the U.S., there is a significant shift away from broadband usage towards Smartphones as the primary Internet entry point for consumers. Although technological advancements have helped fuel demand for greater features and functionality to enhance the user experience, they have also drawn attention from malicious actors seeking to access and exfiltrate increasingly available sensitive and content rich personalized information.In traditional Android based exfiltration channels, the application engaged in information acquisition is granted permission to execute off-board communications. This tactic increases the possibility of detection by applications designed to identify this form of behavior. In this paper, we sever the acquisition / exfiltration bundling by assigning independent responsibilities to two apps communicating via a stealthy, permissionless, self-configuring and self-optimizing ultrasonic bridge. We present a framework for analyzing channel feasibility and performance, and apply it to 28 popular mobile devices. We demonstrate basic channel capability on 13 devices, achieving in certain cases, Bit Error Rates lower than 10−4 and Shannon capacity approaching 14 bps. We further demonstrate two performance boosting solutions that build on these results: a multichannel implementation which improves performance by nearly 80\% and; a single channel Amplitude Shift Keying solution that increases capacity three-fold.}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-5084-6} +} + @incollection{boyleEfficientPseudorandomCorrelation2019, title = {Efficient {{Pseudorandom Correlation Generators}}: {{Silent OT Extension}} and {{More}}}, shorttitle = {Efficient {{Pseudorandom Correlation Generators}}}, @@ -246,6 +381,22 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YVIXUWDZ/Boyle et al. - 2014 - Functional Signatures and Pseudorandom Functions.pdf} } +@inproceedings{boyleObliviousTransferConstant2023, + title = {Oblivious {{Transfer}} with~{{Constant Computational Overhead}}}, + booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2023}, + author = {Boyle, Elette and Couteau, Geoffroy and Gilboa, Niv and Ishai, Yuval and Kohl, Lisa and Resch, Nicolas and Scholl, Peter}, + editor = {Hazay, Carmit and Stam, Martijn}, + date = {2023}, + pages = {271--302}, + publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, + location = {Cham}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-30545-0_10}, + abstract = {The computational overhead of a cryptographic task is the asymptotic ratio between the computational cost of securely realizing the task and that of realizing the task with no security at all.}, + isbn = {978-3-031-30545-0}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Boyle et al_Oblivious Transfer with Constant Computational Overhead.pdf} +} + @incollection{boyleSecureMultipartyComputation2022, title = {Secure {{Multiparty Computation}} with {{Sublinear Preprocessing}}}, booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2022}, @@ -296,6 +447,50 @@ langid = {english} } +@article{braunMOTIONFrameworkMixedProtocol2022, + title = {{{MOTION}} – {{A Framework}} for {{Mixed-Protocol Multi-Party Computation}}}, + author = {Braun, Lennart and Demmler, Daniel and Schneider, Thomas and Tkachenko, Oleksandr}, + date = {2022-03-04}, + journaltitle = {ACM Trans. Priv. Secur.}, + volume = {25}, + number = {2}, + pages = {8:1--8:35}, + issn = {2471-2566}, + doi = {10.1145/3490390}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3490390}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {We present MOTION, an efficient and generic open-source framework for mixed-protocol secure multi-party computation\ (MPC). MOTION is built in a user-friendly, modular, and extensible way, intended to be used as a tool in MPC research and to increase adoption of MPC protocols in practice. Our framework incorporates several important engineering decisions such as full communication serialization, which enables MPC over arbitrary messaging interfaces and removes the need of owning network sockets. MOTION also incorporates several performance optimizations that improve the communication complexity and latency, e.g., \textbackslash ( 2\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) \ better online round complexity of precomputed correlated\ Oblivious Transfer\ (OT).We instantiate our framework with protocols for N\ parties and security against up to \textbackslash ( N-1 \textbackslash ) passive corruptions: the MPC protocols of Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson\ (GMW) in its arithmetic and Boolean version and OT-based BMR\ (Ben-Efraim et\ al., CCS’16), as well as novel and highly efficient conversions between them, including a non-interactive conversion from BMR to arithmetic GMW.MOTION is highly efficient, which we demonstrate in our experiments. Compared to secure evaluation of AES-128 with \textbackslash ( N=3 \textbackslash ) parties in a high-latency network with OT-based BMR, we achieve a 16 \textbackslash ( \textbackslash times \textbackslash ) better throughput of 16\ AES evaluations per second using BMR. With this, we show that BMR is much more competitive than previously assumed. For \textbackslash ( N=3 \textbackslash ) parties and full-threshold protocols in a LAN, MOTION is \textbackslash ( 10\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) – \textbackslash ( 18\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) faster than the previous best passively secure implementation from the MP-SPDZ framework, and \textbackslash ( 190\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) – \textbackslash ( 586\textbackslash times \textbackslash ) faster than the actively secure SCALE-MAMBA framework. Finally, we show that our framework is highly efficient for privacy-preserving neural network inference.}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Braun et al_MOTION – A Framework for Mixed-Protocol Multi-Party Computation.pdf} +} + +@online{byPCBsLinearMotors2018, + title = {{{PCBs As Linear Motors}}}, + author = {By}, + date = {2018-06-11T18:30:54+00:00}, + url = {https://hackaday.com/2018/06/11/pcbs-as-linear-motors/}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {PCBs are exceptionally cheap now, and that means everyone gets to experiment with the careful application of copper traces on a fiberglass substrate. For his Hackaday Prize entry, [Carl] is putting…}, + langid = {american}, + organization = {Hackaday}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/BLTW3PX3/pcbs-as-linear-motors.html} +} + +@inproceedings{cannonProtectionPhysicalAttacks2023, + title = {Protection {{Against Physical Attacks Through Self-Destructive Polymorphic Latch}}}, + booktitle = {2023 {{IEEE}}/{{ACM International Conference}} on {{Computer Aided Design}} ({{ICCAD}})}, + author = {Cannon, Andrew and Farheen, Tasnuva and Roy, Sourav and Tajik, Shahin and Forte, Domenic}, + date = {2023-10}, + pages = {1--9}, + issn = {1558-2434}, + doi = {10.1109/ICCAD57390.2023.10323716}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10323716/?arnumber=10323716}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {On-chip assets, such as cryptographic keys, intermediate cipher computations, obfuscation keys, and hardware security primitive outputs, are usually stored in volatile memories, e.g., registers and SRAMs. Such volatile memories could be read out using active physical attacks, such laser-assisted side-channels. One way to protect assets stored in volatile memories can be the employment of sensors that detect active physical attacks and trigger complete zeroization of sensitive data. However, hundreds or thousands of clock cycles are often needed to accomplish this. Further, the sensing and self-destruction mechanisms are decoupled from the sensitive circuitry and can be disabled separately by an adversary. Moreover, defensive actions (e.g., zeroization) may be disabled by bringing the CPU/SoC into an inoperable condition, while registers may still hold their data, making them susceptible. This paper proposes a self-destructive latch to protect sensitive data from active side-channel attacks, which require supply voltage manipulations. Our proposed latch senses supply voltage interference required during such attacks, and reacts instantaneously by entering a forbidden data state, erasing its stored data. The design uses a NULL convention logic (NCL)-based polymorphic NOR/NAND gate, which changes its functionality with supply voltage. Our results show that the latch is stable across temperature and process variation reacting to attacks with 91\% confidence. Even for the 9\% where data is not destroyed, in 3.33 \% of cases data flips its state which makes reliable extraction difficult for an attacker. The polymorphic latch is straightforward to implement due to its NCL implementation and the voltage for the self-destructive behavior is easily altered by resizing only two transistors. Further, this self-destructive behavior extends to registers which are built out of latches.}, + eventtitle = {2023 {{IEEE}}/{{ACM International Conference}} on {{Computer Aided Design}} ({{ICCAD}})}, + keywords = {active side-channel attacks,hardware security,Latches,Logic gates,polymorphic latch,polymorphism,Registers,self-destructive countermeasure,Sensors,Side-channel attacks,Temperature sensors,Voltage,voltage modulation}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Cannon et al_Protection Against Physical Attacks Through Self-Destructive Polymorphic Latch.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WMVHYG3C/10323716.html} +} + @article{caoEvolutionQuantumKey2022, title = {The {{Evolution}} of {{Quantum Key Distribution Networks}}: {{On}} the {{Road}} to the {{Qinternet}}}, shorttitle = {The {{Evolution}} of {{Quantum Key Distribution Networks}}}, @@ -331,6 +526,47 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7DI3CGYK/Cao et al. - 2021 - Hybrid TrustedUntrusted Relay-Based Quantum Key D.pdf} } +@article{carpovManticoreEfficientFramework, + title = {Manticore: {{Efficient Framework}} for {{Scalable Secure Multiparty Computation Protocols}}}, + author = {Carpov, S and Deforth, K and Gama, N and Georgieva, M and Jetchev, D and Katz, J and Mohammadi, M and Sae-Tang, A and Vuille, M}, + abstract = {We propose a novel MPC framework, Manticore, in the multiparty setting, with full threshold and semi-honest security model, supporting a combination of real number arithmetic (arithmetic shares), Boolean arithmetic (Boolean shares) and garbled circuits (Yao shares). In contrast to prior work [34,32], Manticore never overflows, an important feature for machine learning applications. It achieves this without compromising efficiency or security. Compared to other overflow-free recent techniques such as MP-SPDZ [17] that convert arithmetic to Boolean shares, we introduce a novel highly efficient modular lifting/truncation method that stays in the arithmetic domain. We revisit some of the basic MPC operations such as real-valued polynomial evaluation, division, logarithms, exponentials and comparisons by employing our modular lift in combination with existing efficient conversions between arithmetic, Boolean and Yao shares. Furthermore, we provide a highly efficient and scalable implementation supporting logistic regression models with realworld training data sizes and high numerical precision through PCA and blockwise variants (for memory and runtime optimizations). On a dataset of 50 million rows and 50 columns distributed among two players, it completes in one day with at least 10 decimal digits of precision. Our logistic regression solution placed first at Track 3 of the annual iDASH’2020 Competition. Finally, we mention a novel oblivious sorting algorithm built using Manticore.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/UYZBI38N/Carpov et al. - Manticore Efficient Framework for Scalable Secure M.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{carraraAcousticCovertChannels2015, + title = {On {{Acoustic Covert Channels Between Air-Gapped Systems}}}, + booktitle = {Foundations and {{Practice}} of {{Security}}}, + author = {Carrara, Brent and Adams, Carlisle}, + editor = {Cuppens, Frédéric and Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin and Zincir Heywood, Nur and Fong, Philip W. L.}, + date = {2015}, + pages = {3--16}, + publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, + location = {Cham}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-17040-4_1}, + abstract = {In this work, we study the ability for malware to leak sensitive information from an air-gapped high-security system to systems on a low-security network, using ultrasonic and audible audio covert channels in two different environments: an open-concept office and a closed-door office. Our results show that malware installed on unmodified commodity hardware can leak data from an air-gapped system using the ultrasonic frequency range from 20~kHz to 20.5~kHz at a rate of 140~bps and at a rate of 6.7~kbps using the audible spectrum from 500~Hz to 18~kHz. Additionally, we show that data can be communicated using ultrasonic communication at distances up~to 11~m with bit rates over 230~bps and a bit error rate of 2~\%. Given our results, our attacks are able to leak captured keystrokes in real-time using ultrasonic signals and, using audible signals when nobody is present in the environment - the overnight attack, both keystrokes and recorded audio.}, + isbn = {978-3-319-17040-4}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Audio communication,Jumping air-gaps,Malware communication,Out-of-band covert channels,Ultrasonic}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Carrara_Adams_On Acoustic Covert Channels Between Air-Gapped Systems.pdf} +} + +@article{carraraOutofBandCovertChannels2016, + title = {Out-of-{{Band Covert Channels}}—{{A Survey}}}, + author = {Carrara, Brent and Adams, Carlisle}, + date = {2016-06-30}, + journaltitle = {ACM Comput. Surv.}, + volume = {49}, + number = {2}, + pages = {23:1--23:36}, + issn = {0360-0300}, + doi = {10.1145/2938370}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/2938370}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {A novel class of covert channel, out-of-band covert channels, is presented by extending Simmons’ prisoners’ problem. This new class of covert channel is established by surveying the existing covert channel, device-pairing, and side-channel research. Terminology as well as a taxonomy for out-of-band covert channels is also given. Additionally, a more comprehensive adversarial model based on a knowledgeable passive adversary and a capable active adversary is proposed in place of the current adversarial model, which relies on an oblivious passive adversary. Last, general protection mechanisms are presented, and an argument for a general measure of “covertness” to effectively compare covert channels is given.}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2016_Carrara_Adams_Out-of-Band Covert Channels—A Survey.pdf} +} + @incollection{castryckEfficientKeyRecovery2023, title = {An {{Efficient Key Recovery Attack}} on {{SIDH}}}, booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{EUROCRYPT}} 2023}, @@ -350,6 +586,81 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LZU2NVHW/Castryck and Decru - 2023 - An Efficient Key Recovery Attack on SIDH.pdf} } +@inproceedings{chatterjeeARDWAugmentedReality2022, + title = {{{ARDW}}: {{An Augmented Reality Workbench}} for {{Printed Circuit Board Debugging}}}, + shorttitle = {{{ARDW}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 35th {{Annual ACM Symposium}} on {{User Interface Software}} and {{Technology}}}, + author = {Chatterjee, Ishan and Pforte, Tadeusz and Tng, Aspen and Salemi Parizi, Farshid and Chen, Chaoran and Patel, Shwetak}, + date = {2022-10-29}, + pages = {1--16}, + publisher = {ACM}, + location = {Bend OR USA}, + doi = {10.1145/3526113.3545684}, + url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3526113.3545684}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + eventtitle = {{{UIST}} '22: {{The}} 35th {{Annual ACM Symposium}} on {{User Interface Software}} and {{Technology}}}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-9320-1}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9FNYVEX5/Chatterjee et al. - 2022 - ARDW An Augmented Reality Workbench for Printed C.pdf} +} + +@article{choiHalbachMagneticCircuit2010, + title = {Halbach {{Magnetic Circuit}} for {{Voice Coil Motor}} in {{Hard Disk Drives}}}, + author = {Choi, Young-Man and Ahn, Da-Hoon and Gweon, Dae-Gab and Jeong, Jae-Hwa}, + date = {2010-09-30}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Magnetics}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Magnetics}, + volume = {15}, + number = {3}, + pages = {143--147}, + issn = {1226-1750}, + doi = {10.4283/JMAG.2010.15.3.143}, + url = {http://koreascience.or.kr/journal/view.jsp?kj=E1MGAB&py=2010&vnc=v15n3&sp=143}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Rotary-type voice coil motors are widely used as actuators in hard disk drives. The recent trend toward higher density and smaller form factors in data storage devices requires performance improvement of the voice coil motor. In this study, we introduce a Halbach magnet array to the voice coil motor in order to increase the force generation. The Halbach magnetic circuit outperforms the conventional magnetic circuit due to the confined magnetic flux. To investigate the performance of the Halbach magnetic circuit, we analyze air gap flux density with the various shapes and thickness of the magnets using 3-dimensional finite element analysis. Consequently the optimum shape of the Halbach magnetic circuit is proposed. Simulations and experimental results proved effectiveness of the proposed magnet array in the voice coil motor for a commercial hard disk drive.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VI2VBKAG/Choi et al. - 2010 - Halbach Magnetic Circuit for Voice Coil Motor in H.pdf} +} + +@incollection{choudhuriComplexitySecureComputation2020, + title = {The {{Round Complexity}} of {{Secure Computation Against Covert Adversaries}}}, + booktitle = {Security and {{Cryptography}} for {{Networks}}}, + author = {Choudhuri, Arka Rai and Goyal, Vipul and Jain, Abhishek}, + editor = {Galdi, Clemente and Kolesnikov, Vladimir}, + date = {2020}, + volume = {12238}, + pages = {600--620}, + publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, + location = {Cham}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_30}, + url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-57990-6_30}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {We investigate the exact round complexity of secure multiparty computation (MPC) against covert adversaries who may attempt to cheat, but do not wish to be caught doing so. Covert adversaries lie in between semi-honest adversaries who follow protocol specification and malicious adversaries who may deviate arbitrarily.}, + isbn = {978-3-030-57989-0 978-3-030-57990-6}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/NB783SQ2/Choudhuri et al. - 2020 - The Round Complexity of Secure Computation Against.pdf} +} + +@incollection{choudhuriFluidMPCSecure2021, + title = {Fluid {{MPC}}: {{Secure Multiparty Computation}} with {{Dynamic Participants}}}, + shorttitle = {Fluid {{MPC}}}, + booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2021}, + author = {Choudhuri, Arka Rai and Goel, Aarushi and Green, Matthew and Jain, Abhishek and Kaptchuk, Gabriel}, + editor = {Malkin, Tal and Peikert, Chris}, + date = {2021}, + volume = {12826}, + pages = {94--123}, + publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, + location = {Cham}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_4}, + url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-84245-1_4}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {Existing approaches to secure multiparty computation (MPC) require all participants to commit to the entire duration of the protocol. As interest in MPC continues to grow, it is inevitable that there will be a desire to use it to evaluate increasingly complex functionalities, resulting in computations spanning several hours or days.}, + isbn = {978-3-030-84244-4 978-3-030-84245-1}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RKFV7HX5/Choudhuri et al. - 2021 - Fluid MPC Secure Multiparty Computation with Dyna.pdf} +} + @inproceedings{cominelliEvenBlackCats2020, title = {Even {{Black Cats Cannot Stay Hidden}} in the {{Dark}}: {{Full-band De-anonymization}} of {{Bluetooth Classic Devices}}}, shorttitle = {Even {{Black Cats Cannot Stay Hidden}} in the {{Dark}}}, @@ -464,6 +775,32 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z5AD924B/DeJean and Kirovski - 2007 - RF-DNA Radio-Frequency Certificates of Authentici.pdf} } +@article{deshotelsInaudibleSoundCovert, + title = {Inaudible {{Sound}} as a {{Covert Channel}} in {{Mobile Devices}}}, + author = {Deshotels, Luke}, + abstract = {Mobile devices can be protected by a variety of information flow control systems. These systems can prevent Trojans from leaking secrets over network connections. As mobile devices become more secure, attackers will begin to use unconventional methods for exfiltrating data.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/S8S9P8L5/Deshotels - Inaudible Sound as a Covert Channel in Mobile Devi.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{disserBreakingSizeBarrier2023, + title = {Breaking the~{{Size Barrier}}: {{Universal Circuits Meet Lookup Tables}}}, + shorttitle = {Breaking the~{{Size Barrier}}}, + booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{ASIACRYPT}} 2023}, + author = {Disser, Yann and Günther, Daniel and Schneider, Thomas and Stillger, Maximilian and Wigandt, Arthur and Yalame, Hossein}, + editor = {Guo, Jian and Steinfeld, Ron}, + date = {2023}, + pages = {3--37}, + publisher = {Springer Nature}, + location = {Singapore}, + doi = {10.1007/978-981-99-8721-4_1}, + abstract = {A Universal Circuit~(UC) is a Boolean circuit of size~\$\$\textbackslash varTheta (n \textbackslash log n)\$\$Θ(nlogn)that can simulate any Boolean function up to a certain size~n. Valiant (STOC’76) provided the first two UC constructions of asymptotic sizes \$\$\textbackslash sim 5 n\textbackslash log n\$\$∼5nlognand \$\$\textbackslash sim 4.75 n\textbackslash log n\$\$∼4.75nlogn, and today’s most efficient construction of Liu et al.~(CRYPTO’21) has size~\$\$\textbackslash sim 3n\textbackslash log n\$\$∼3nlogn. Evaluating a public UC with a secure Multi-Party Computation~(MPC) protocol allows efficient Private Function Evaluation~(PFE), where a private function is evaluated on private data.}, + isbn = {978-981-9987-21-4}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {multi-party computation,private function evaluation,universal circuit}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Disser et al_Breaking the Size Barrier.pdf} +} + @incollection{dittmerAuthenticatedGarblingSimple2022, title = {Authenticated {{Garbling}} from {{Simple Correlations}}}, booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2022}, @@ -518,6 +855,24 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/KAKTBELB/Dumitru et al. - The Impostor Among US(B) Off-Path Injection Attac.pdf} } +@article{dupontMiniaturizedUltraLowPowerTamper2022, + title = {A {{Miniaturized}} and {{Ultra-Low-Power Tamper Detection Sensor}} for {{Portable Applications}}}, + author = {Dupont, François and Laurent, Philippe and Montfort, Francis and Pierre, Hervé and Jeanne, Léo and Stoukatch, Serguei and Dricot, Samuel and Redouté, Jean-Michel}, + date = {2022-03}, + journaltitle = {IEEE Sensors Journal}, + volume = {22}, + number = {5}, + pages = {4524--4533}, + issn = {1558-1748}, + doi = {10.1109/JSEN.2022.3143656}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9682743/?arnumber=9682743}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {This article presents a tamper detection sensor complementing cryptographic techniques in order to protect data from unauthorized access and/or from data falsification. Both the mechanical and electronic parts of the systems are described. The proposed architecture targets portable devices and can be realized using commercially available components, widely available materials and known manufacturing and assembly techniques. The tamper detection circuit is based on a capacitive sensing principle and uses ultra-low-power electronic components, leading to an overall consumed current below 10 \textbackslash mu \textbackslash textA . Autonomy is a crucial reported drawback of miniaturized battery backed-up anti-tampering hardware systems: the presented architecture and implementation ensures a lifetime of at least 3 years when powered by one CR2032 coin cell battery. The paper also assesses the sensitivity of the tamper detection: measurements show that the system is able to detect a variation of at least one percent of the capacitance of the tamper layer, resulting from an attempt to breach the outer shell surrounding the circuit for accessing the sensitive data.}, + eventtitle = {{{IEEE Sensors Journal}}}, + keywords = {Batteries,Capacitive sensor,Computer architecture,data security,Encryption,FIPS 140-2,Hardware,Security,Sensors,tamper detection,Temperature sensors,ultra-low-power electronics}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Dupont et al_A Miniaturized and Ultra-Low-Power Tamper Detection Sensor for Portable.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RHDYLUS7/9682743.html} +} + @article{durQuantumInternet2017, title = {Towards a Quantum Internet}, author = {Dür, Wolfgang and Lamprecht, Raphael and Heusler, Stefan}, @@ -534,6 +889,16 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Dür et al_2017_Towards a quantum internet.pdf} } +@inproceedings{erenFringeEffectCapacitiveProximity2005, + title = {Fringe-{{Effect Capacitive Proximity Sensors}} for {{Tamper Proof Enclosures}}}, + author = {Eren, Halit and Sandor, L.D.}, + date = {2005-03-10}, + pages = {22--26}, + doi = {10.1109/SICON.2005.257863}, + abstract = {Capacitive sensors can be constructed for tamper resistant enclosures to prevent unauthorized intrusions. The use printed circuit can provide serpentine geometric patterns of conductors. Any penetration of this envelope interferes with the conductive serpentine, producing a detectable warning of intrusion. Capacitive sensors discussed in this paper are suitable for implementing in the area of physical security cryptographic modules. These sensors conform to Levels 3 and 4 of the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Eren_Sandor_2005_Fringe-Effect Capacitive Proximity Sensors for Tamper Proof Enclosures.pdf} +} + @inproceedings{essexObliviousPrintingSecret2012, title = {Oblivious {{Printing}} of {{Secret Messages}} in a {{Multi-party Setting}}}, booktitle = {Financial {{Cryptography}} and {{Data Security}}}, @@ -578,24 +943,6 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LJIBXD6I/Fan et al. - 2024 - A Simultaneous Wireless Power and Coil Inductance .pdf} } -@article{fanSimultaneousWirelessPower2024a, - title = {A {{Simultaneous Wireless Power}} and {{Coil Inductance Insensitive Data Transfer System}} for {{Rotary Structures}}}, - author = {Fan, Yuanshuang and Hu, Hongsheng and Sun, Yue and Hu, Han and Wu, Sihan}, - date = {2024-05}, - journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics}, - shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Power Electron.}, - volume = {39}, - number = {5}, - pages = {6526--6536}, - issn = {0885-8993, 1941-0107}, - doi = {10.1109/TPEL.2024.3367295}, - url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10440478/}, - urldate = {2024-06-21}, - abstract = {This article proposes a simultaneous wireless power and coil inductance-insensitive data transfer system for rotary structures. Power and data are transferred simultaneously via a pair of coupled coils, adopting frequency division multiplexing technology. The data carrier is injected into and extracted from the power transfer channel by inductors connected serially with the coupled coils and by multiplexing the compensation networks of the power transfer channel. The transfer gain of the data transfer channel is insensitive to the inductances of the coupled coils within a certain interval. LCLC compensation topology is proposed to realize constant voltage output and to filter the high-order harmonics out of the power transfer channel, reducing the total harmonic distortion and creating a favorable condition for simultaneous data transfer. The circuit model is built to analyze the power and data transfer performance, and the complex-frequency-domain model of the system is established to analyze the responses of power interference. Finally, the feasibility of the technology proposed is verified by a 300 W prototype with a data rate of 40 kbps.}, - langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3VF4XTSU/Fan et al. - 2024 - A Simultaneous Wireless Power and Coil Inductance .pdf} -} - @article{fernandez-hernandezNavigationMessageAuthentication2016, title = {A {{Navigation Message Authentication Proposal}} for the {{Galileo Open Service}}}, author = {Fernández-Hernández, Ignacio and Rijmen, Vincent and Seco-Granados, Gonzalo and Simon, Javier and Rodríguez, Irma and Calle, J. David}, @@ -613,6 +960,44 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Fernández-Hernández et al_2016_A Navigation Message Authentication Proposal for the Galileo Open Service.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/IVWSDIZC/navi.html} } +@article{gaoOptimalDesignPCB2024, + title = {Optimal {{Design}} of {{PCB Coreless Axial Flux Permanent Magnet Synchronous Motor With Arc Windings}}}, + author = {Gao, Bo and Cheng, Yuan and Wang, Yao and Zhao, Tianxu and Ding, Ling and Cui, Shumei and Liu, Xinhua and Shi, Yu}, + date = {2024-03}, + journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Energy Conversion}, + volume = {39}, + number = {1}, + pages = {567--577}, + issn = {1558-0059}, + doi = {10.1109/TEC.2023.3315413}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10251645}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The coreless axial flux permanent magnet synchronous motor with printed circuit board stator (PCB motor for short) has attracted research interests for many advantages, such as flexible and precise winding design, low toque ripple, noiseless operation and simple manufacturing process. The motor performance, however, highly depends on its wiring design, which should be carefully optimized. In this article, an arc-shaped distributed winding is adopted due to its higher efficiency. The PCB motor has a 3D magnetic field distribution, which makes its optimal design very difficult since the 3D finite element analysis is usually required. In this article, an analytical model of PCB motor including 3D magnetic field, arc-shaped winding flux linkage and eddy current loss is firstly deduced. On this basis, a multi-objective optimal design is then carried out to design a PCB motor for a vacuum cleaner. Compared with the concentrated winding, the arc winding can achieve a 3\% efficiency improvement. Finally, a 130 W prototype and testbench were built and the presented analytical model is verified by experiments. The results show that there is little difference between calculation and experiment. The presented method effectively simplifies the design process of this kind of motor and shortens the design time.}, + eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Energy Conversion}}}, + keywords = {3-D magnetic field calculation,Analytical models,arc-shaped winding,Axial flux motor,Magnetic cores,Magnetostatics,optimization,PCB motor,Permanent magnet motors,Solid modeling,Three-dimensional displays,Windings}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2024_Gao et al_Optimal Design of PCB Coreless Axial Flux Permanent Magnet Synchronous Motor.pdf} +} + +@article{garbWiretapChannelCapacitive2022, + title = {The {{Wiretap Channel}} for {{Capacitive PUF-Based Security Enclosures}}}, + author = {Garb, Kathrin and Xhemrishi, Marvin and Kürzinger, Ludwig and Frisch, Christoph}, + date = {2022-06-08}, + journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, + shortjournal = {TCHES}, + eprint = {2202.01508}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {cs}, + pages = {165--191}, + issn = {2569-2925}, + doi = {10.46586/tches.v2022.i3.165-191}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.01508}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {In order to protect devices from physical manipulations, protective security enclosures were developed. However, these battery-backed solutions come with a reduced lifetime, and have to be actively and continuously monitored.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/68BWJ8CR/Garb et al. - 2022 - The Wiretap Channel for Capacitive PUF-Based Secur.pdf} +} + @inproceedings{gevorgianLineCapacitanceImpedance2001, title = {Line {{Capacitance}} and {{Impedance}} of {{Coplanar-Strip Waveguides}} on {{Substrates}} with {{Multiple Dielectric Layers}}}, booktitle = {31st {{European Microwave Conference}}, 2001}, @@ -630,6 +1015,47 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/922VM3UC/Gevorgian and Berg - 2001 - Line Capacitance and Impedance of Coplanar-Strip W.pdf} } +@article{ghaleehDurabilitySolderJoints, + title = {The Durability of Solder Joints under Thermo- Mechanical Loading; Application to {{Sn-37Pb}} and {{Sn-3}}.{{8Ag-0}}.{{7Cu}} Lead-Free Replacement Alloy}, + author = {Ghaleeh, Mohammad}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/UXRA7DMN/Ghaleeh - The durability of solder joints under thermo- mech.pdf} +} + +@article{ghasemzadehAudioSteganalysisBased2016, + title = {Audio Steganalysis Based on Reversed Psychoacoustic Model of Human Hearing}, + author = {Ghasemzadeh, Hamzeh and Tajik Khass, Mehdi and Khalil Arjmandi, Meisam}, + date = {2016-04-01}, + journaltitle = {Digital Signal Processing}, + shortjournal = {Digital Signal Processing}, + volume = {51}, + pages = {133--141}, + issn = {1051-2004}, + doi = {10.1016/j.dsp.2015.12.015}, + url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1051200416000026}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {During the last decade, audio information hiding has attracted lots of attention due to its ability to provide a covert communication channel. On the other hand, various audio steganalysis schemes have been developed to detect the presence of any secret messages. Basically, audio steganography methods attempt to hide their messages in areas of time or frequency domains where human auditory system (HAS) does not perceive. Considering this fact, we propose a reliable audio steganalysis system based on the reversed Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (R-MFCC) which aims to provide a model with maximum deviation from HAS model. Genetic algorithm is deployed to optimize dimension of the R-MFCC-based features. This will both speed up feature extraction and reduce the complexity of classification. The final decision is made by a trained support vector machine (SVM) to detect suspicious audio files. The proposed method achieves detection rates of 97.8\% and 94.4\% in the targeted (Steghide@1.563\%) and universal scenarios. These results are respectively 17.3\% and 20.8\% higher than previous D2-MFCC based method.}, + keywords = {Audio steganalysis,Audio steganography,Human auditory system,Mel frequency cepstrum coefficients,Universal steganalysis} +} + +@inproceedings{goldbergPlanarFabricationMesoscale2014, + title = {Planar Fabrication of a Mesoscale Voice Coil Actuator}, + booktitle = {2014 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})}, + author = {Goldberg, Benjamin and Karpelson, Michael and Ozcan, Onur and Wood, Robert J.}, + date = {2014-05}, + pages = {6319--6325}, + publisher = {IEEE}, + location = {Hong Kong, China}, + doi = {10.1109/ICRA.2014.6907791}, + url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6907791/}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Mesoscale robots are devices with characteristic dimensions in the centimeter to millimeter scale, with feature sizes ranging from millimeters to micrometers. Due to the physics involved in scaling down conventional motors, such robots frequently require novel approaches to actuation. Actuation can have a very significant effect on robot performance, particularly at small scales where locomotion becomes energetically expensive; however, existing options for small-scale actuation are quite limited. We present a mesoscale voice coil actuator (VCA) with favorable scaling characteristics and a design that minimizes costly frictional effects at small scales while allowing fast, linear, high-displacement motion. The VCA is fabricated using planar manufacturing techniques, making it well-suited for integration into a number of mesoscale robotic platforms and for mass production. The designed VCA has a mass of 310mg, maximum force of 11.8mN, bandwidth of 51Hz, and a stroke of 4mm.}, + eventtitle = {2014 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{Robotics}} and {{Automation}} ({{ICRA}})}, + isbn = {978-1-4799-3685-4}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/W9TDCK43/Goldberg et al. - 2014 - Planar fabrication of a mesoscale voice coil actua.pdf} +} + @book{golumbiaCulturalLogicComputation2009, title = {The Cultural Logic of Computation}, author = {Golumbia, David}, @@ -678,6 +1104,140 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/J7DQKVVH/Goos et al. - 1999 - Information Theoretically Secure Communication in .pdf} } +@article{grisafiPISTISTrustedComputing, + title = {{{PISTIS}}: {{Trusted Computing Architecture}} for {{Low-end Embedded Systems}}}, + author = {Grisafi, Michele and Ammar, Mahmoud and Crispo, Bruno and Roveri, Marco}, + abstract = {Recently, several hardware-assisted security architectures have been proposed to mitigate the ever-growing cyberattacks on Internet-connected devices. However, such proposals are not compatible with a large portion of the already deployed resource-constrained embedded devices due to hardware limitations. To fill this gap, we propose PISTIS, a puresoftware trusted computing architecture for bare-metal lowend embedded devices. PISTIS enables several security services, such as memory isolation, remote attestation and secure code update, while fully supporting critical features such as Direct Memory Access (DMA) and interrupts. PISTIS targets a wide range of embedded devices including those that lack any hardware protection mechanisms, while only requiring a few kilobytes of Flash memory to store its root of trust (RoT) software. The entire architecture of PISTIS is built from the ground up by leveraging memory protectionenabling techniques such as assembly-level code verification and selective software virtualisation. Most importantly, PISTIS achieves strong security guarantees supported by a formally verified design. We implement and evaluate PISTIS on MSP430 architecture, showing a reasonable overhead in terms of runtime, memory footprint, and power consumption.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PSGQDYRQ/Grisafi et al. - PISTIS Trusted Computing Architecture for Low-end.pdf} +} + +@article{guazziNoncontactMeasurementOxygen2015, + title = {Non-Contact Measurement of Oxygen Saturation with an {{RGB}} Camera}, + author = {Guazzi, Alessandro R. and Villarroel, Mauricio and Jorge, João and Daly, Jonathan and Frise, Matthew C. and Robbins, Peter A. and Tarassenko, Lionel}, + date = {2015-09-01}, + journaltitle = {Biomedical Optics Express}, + shortjournal = {Biomed. Opt. Express}, + volume = {6}, + number = {9}, + pages = {3320}, + issn = {2156-7085, 2156-7085}, + doi = {10.1364/BOE.6.003320}, + url = {https://opg.optica.org/abstract.cfm?URI=boe-6-9-3320}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {A novel method (Sophia) is presented to track oxygen saturation changes in a controlled environment using an RGB camera placed approximately 1.5 m away from the subject. The method is evaluated on five healthy volunteers (Fitzpatrick skin phenotypes II, III, and IV) whose oxygen saturations were varied between 80\% and 100\% in a purpose-built chamber over 40 minutes each. The method carefully selects regions of interest (ROI) in the camera image by calculating signal-to-noise ratios for each ROI. This allows it to track changes in oxygen saturation accurately with respect to a conventional pulse oximeter (median coefficient of determination, 0.85).}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/77AW34AU/Guazzi et al. - 2015 - Non-contact measurement of oxygen saturation with .pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{guoEfficientSecureMultiparty2020, + title = {Efficient and {{Secure Multiparty Computation}} from {{Fixed-Key Block Ciphers}}}, + booktitle = {2020 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, + author = {Guo, Chun and Katz, Jonathan and Wang, Xiao and Yu, Yu}, + date = {2020-05}, + pages = {825--841}, + issn = {2375-1207}, + doi = {10.1109/SP40000.2020.00016}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9152760/?arnumber=9152760}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Many implementations of secure computation use fixed-key AES (modeled as a random permutation); this results in substantial performance benefits due to existing hardware support for AES and the ability to avoid recomputing the AES key schedule. Surveying these implementations, however, we find that most utilize AES in a heuristic fashion; in the best case this leaves a gap in the security proof, but in many cases we show it allows for explicit attacks.Motivated by this unsatisfactory state of affairs, we initiate a comprehensive study of how to use fixed-key block ciphers for secure computation-in particular for OT extension and circuit garbling-efficiently and securely. Specifically: · Weconsider several notions of pseudorandomness for hash functions (e.g., correlation robustness), and show provably secure schemes for OT extension, garbling, and other applications based on hash functions satisfying these notions. · We provide provably secure constructions, in the (non-programmable) random-permutation model, of hash functions satisfying the different notions of pseudorandomness we consider. Taken together, our results provide end-to-end security proofs for implementations of secure-computation protocols based on fixed-key block ciphers (modeled as random permutations). Perhaps surprisingly, at the same time our work also results in noticeable performance improvements over the state-of-the-art.}, + eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, + keywords = {Ciphers,Computational modeling,Correlation,Protocols,Receivers,Robustness}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Guo et al_Efficient and Secure Multiparty Computation from Fixed-Key Block Ciphers.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3MJ99Z7W/9152760.html} +} + +@article{guriFansmitterAcousticData, + title = {Fansmitter: {{Acoustic Data Exfiltration}} from ({{Speakerless}}) {{Air-Gapped Computers}}}, + author = {Guri, Mordechai and Solewicz, Yosef and Daidakulov, Andrey and Elovici, Yuval}, + abstract = {Because computers may contain or interact with sensitive information, they are often airgapped and in this way kept isolated and disconnected from the Internet. In recent years the ability of malware to communicate over an air-gap by transmitting sonic and ultrasonic signals from a computer speaker to a nearby receiver has been shown. In order to eliminate such acoustic channels, current best practice recommends the elimination of speakers (internal or external) in secure computers, thereby creating a so-called 'audio-gap'.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/LUWQNB8Q/Guri et al. - Fansmitter Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speak.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{guriMOSQUITOCovertUltrasonic2018, + title = {{{MOSQUITO}}: {{Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions Between Two Air-Gapped Computers Using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication}}}, + shorttitle = {{{MOSQUITO}}}, + booktitle = {2018 {{IEEE Conference}} on {{Dependable}} and {{Secure Computing}} ({{DSC}})}, + author = {Guri, Mordechai and Solewicz, Yosef and Elovici, Yuval}, + date = {2018-12}, + pages = {1--8}, + doi = {10.1109/DESEC.2018.8625124}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8625124}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {In this paper we show how two or more air-gapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the capability of a malware to exploit a specific audio chip feature in order to reverse the connected speakers from output devices into input devices - unobtrusively rendering them microphones. We discuss the attack model and provide technical background and implementation details. We show that although the reversed speakers/headphones/earphones were not originally designed to perform as microphones, they still respond well to the near-ultrasonic range (18kHz to 24kHz). We evaluate the communication channel with different equipment, and at various distances and transmission speeds, and also discuss some practical considerations. Our results show that the speaker-to-speaker communication can be used to covertly transmit data between two air-gapped computers positioned a maximum of nine meters away from one another.}, + eventtitle = {2018 {{IEEE Conference}} on {{Dependable}} and {{Secure Computing}} ({{DSC}})}, + keywords = {Acoustics,Computers,Headphones,Lifting equipment,Magnetoacoustic effects,Malware,Microphones}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Guri et al_MOSQUITO.pdf} +} + +@article{guriSpeakertospeakerCovertUltrasonic2020, + title = {Speaker-to-Speaker Covert Ultrasonic Communication}, + author = {Guri, Mordechai and Solewicz, Yosef and Elovici, Yuval}, + date = {2020-04-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Information Security and Applications}, + shortjournal = {Journal of Information Security and Applications}, + volume = {51}, + pages = {102458}, + issn = {2214-2126}, + doi = {10.1016/j.jisa.2020.102458}, + url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212619304697}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {In this paper we show how two or more air-gapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the capability of a malware to exploit a specific audio chip feature in order to reverse the connected speakers from output devices into input devices - unobtrusively rendering them microphones. We discuss the attack model and provide technical background and implementation details. We show that although the reversed speakers/headphones/earphones were not originally designed to perform as microphones, they still respond well to the near-ultrasonic range (18~kHz to 24~kHz). We evaluate the communication channel with different equipment, and at various distances and transmission speeds, and also discuss some practical considerations. Our results show that the speaker-to-speaker communication can be used to covertly transmit data between two air-gapped computers positioned a maximum of 9~m away from one another. Moreover, we show that two (microphone-less) headphones can exchange data from a distance of 3~m apart. This enables ‘headphones-to-headphones’ covert communication, which is discussed for the first time in this paper.} +} + +@article{hagenContactDiscoveryMobile2022, + title = {Contact {{Discovery}} in {{Mobile Messengers}}: {{Low-cost Attacks}}, {{Quantitative Analyses}}, and {{Efficient Mitigations}}}, + shorttitle = {Contact {{Discovery}} in {{Mobile Messengers}}}, + author = {Hagen, Christoph and Weinert, Christian and Sendner, Christoph and Dmitrienko, Alexandra and Schneider, Thomas}, + date = {2022-11-07}, + journaltitle = {ACM Trans. Priv. Secur.}, + volume = {26}, + number = {1}, + pages = {2:1--2:44}, + issn = {2471-2566}, + doi = {10.1145/3546191}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3546191}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Contact discovery allows users of mobile messengers to conveniently connect with people in their address book. In this work, we demonstrate that severe privacy issues exist in currently deployed contact discovery methods and propose suitable mitigations.Our study of three popular messengers\ (WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram) shows that large-scale crawling attacks are\ (still) possible. Using an accurate database of mobile phone number prefixes and very few resources, we queried\ 10 \% of\ US mobile phone numbers for\ WhatsApp and\ 100 \% for\ Signal. For\ Telegram, we find that its\ API exposes a wide range of sensitive information, even about numbers not registered with the service. We present interesting\ (cross-messenger) usage statistics, which also reveal that very few users change the default privacy settings.Furthermore, we demonstrate that currently deployed hashing-based contact discovery protocols are severely broken by comparing three methods for efficient hash reversal. Most notably, we show that with the password cracking tool\ “JTR,” we can iterate through the entire worldwide mobile phone number space in\ \< 150 s on a consumer-grade\ GPU. We also propose a significantly improved rainbow table construction for non-uniformly distributed input domains that is of independent interest.Regarding mitigations, we most notably propose two novel rate-limiting schemes: our\ incremental contact discovery for services without server-side contact storage strictly improves over\ Signal’s current approach while being compatible with private set intersection, whereas our\ differential scheme allows even stricter rate limits at the overhead for service providers to store a small constant-size state that does not reveal any contact information.} +} + +@article{hanspachCovertAcousticalMesh2013, + title = {On {{Covert Acoustical Mesh Networks}} in {{Air}}}, + author = {Hanspach, Michael and Goetz, Michael}, + date = {2013}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Communications}, + shortjournal = {JCM}, + volume = {8}, + number = {11}, + pages = {758--767}, + issn = {17962021}, + doi = {10.12720/jcm.8.11.758-767}, + url = {http://www.jocm.us/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=124&id=600}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Covert channels can be used to circumvent system and network policies by establishing communications that have not been considered in the design of the computing system. We construct a covert channel between different computing systems that utilizes audio modulation/demodulation to exchange data between the computing systems over the air medium. The underlying network stack is based on a communication system that was originally designed for robust underwater communication. We adapt the communication system to implement covert and stealthy communications by utilizing the near ultrasonic frequency range. We further demonstrate how the scenario of covert acoustical communication over the air medium can be extended to multi-hop communications and even to wireless mesh networks. A covert acoustical mesh network can be conceived as a botnet or malnet that is accessible via near-field audio communications. Different applications of covert acoustical mesh networks are presented, including the use for remote keylogging over multiple hops. It is shown that the concept of a covert acoustical mesh network renders many conventional security concepts useless, as acoustical communications are usually not considered. Finally, countermeasures against covert acoustical mesh networks are discussed, including the use of lowpass filtering in computing systems and a host-based intrusion detection system for analyzing audio input and output in order to detect any irregularities.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/W896B45Z/Hanspach and Goetz - 2013 - On Covert Acoustical Mesh Networks in Air.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{hastingsSoKGeneralPurpose2019, + title = {{{SoK}}: {{General Purpose Compilers}} for {{Secure Multi-Party Computation}}}, + shorttitle = {{{SoK}}}, + booktitle = {2019 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, + author = {Hastings, Marcella and Hemenway, Brett and Noble, Daniel and Zdancewic, Steve}, + date = {2019-05}, + pages = {1220--1237}, + publisher = {IEEE}, + location = {San Francisco, CA, USA}, + doi = {10.1109/SP.2019.00028}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8835312/}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a group of mutually distrustful parties to compute a joint function on their inputs without revealing any information beyond the result of the computation. This type of computation is extremely powerful and has wide-ranging applications in academia, industry, and government. Protocols for secure computation have existed for decades, but only recently have general-purpose compilers for executing MPC on arbitrary functions been developed. These projects rapidly improved the state of the art, and began to make MPC accessible to non-expert users. However, the field is changing so rapidly that it is difficult even for experts to keep track of the varied capabilities of modern frameworks. In this work, we survey general-purpose compilers for secure multi-party computation. These tools provide high-level abstractions to describe arbitrary functions and execute secure computation protocols. We consider eleven systems: EMP-toolkit, Obliv-C, ObliVM, TinyGarble, SCALE-MAMBA (formerly SPDZ), Wysteria, Sharemind, PICCO, ABY, Frigate and CBMC-GC. We evaluate these systems on a range of criteria, including language expressibility, capabilities of the cryptographic back-end, and accessibility to developers. We advocate for improved documentation of MPC frameworks, standardization within the community, and make recommendations for future directions in compiler development. Installing and running these systems can be challenging, and for each system, we also provide a complete virtual environment (Docker container) with all the necessary dependencies to run the compiler and our example programs.}, + eventtitle = {2019 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, + isbn = {978-1-5386-6660-9}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YL9DRUQ5/Hastings et al. - 2019 - SoK General Purpose Compilers for Secure Multi-Pa.pdf} +} + @misc{HeatedFlashDrive, title = {I {{Heated}} a {{Flash Drive}} to {{160C}} and It {{Still Works}}! ({{Ovrdrive Update}})}, url = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LD9e73BYAnI} @@ -699,12 +1259,27 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CNLJAWPW/Henzinger et al. - One Server for the Price of Two Simple and Fast S.pdf} } +@thesis{hiemstraDesignMovingMagnet2014, + title = {Design of {{Moving Magnet Actuators}} for {{Large-range Flexure-based Nanopositioning}}}, + author = {Hiemstra, David}, + date = {2014-07-01}, + doi = {10.13140/RG.2.2.13711.69288}, + abstract = {Moving magnet actuators (MMA) are direct-drive, single-phase electromagnetic linear actuators that provide frictionless and backlash-free motion over a range of several millimeters. This work investigates the use of MMAs to simultaneously achieve large range, high speed, and high motion quality in flexure-based nanopositioning systems. This work impacts technologies such as scanning probe microscopy and lithography, industrial semiconductor wafer quality control processes, and other applications which rely on nanopositioning systems to provide controlled motion with nanoscale precision, resolution and accuracy. Various actuator types are compared to meet system-level requirements and the MMA is chosen as a promising potential candidate. Component and system level design challenges and associated tradeoffs in designing the MMA to meet nanopositioning performance are discussed and derived in this thesis. In particular, it is shown that even as the overall size of an MMA is varied, the actuation force remains directly proportional to the square root of the actuator’s moving magnet mass and the square root of power consumed. This proportionality constant, identified as the dynamic actuator constant, serves as a novel and important figure of merit for MMAs. It describes fundamental performance limits for MMAs and enables the determination of an optimized MMA geometry in a simplified manner. When an MMA is employed in a flexure-based nanopositioning system, this constant directly impacts the system-level positioning performance in terms of range, resolution, speed, and temperature control. This highlights the significance of incorporating a thermal management system for heat dissipation, minimizing noise and harmonic distortion in the current driver, choosing a low ground vibration setting, and improving the force-stroke uniformity of the actuator. Based on this understanding, a single-axis nanopositioning system that simultaneously achieves 10mm range, 4nm resolution, open-loop natural frequency of 25Hz, and temperature rise of less than 0.5°C, is designed, fabricated, and tested. The significance of the dynamic actuator constant is experimentally validated. A novel thermal management system is tested to successfully mitigate heat dissipation. Preliminary controller design and closed-loop operation highlight the potential of MMAs in large range, high speed nanopositioning. These results point to the importance of achieving greater values of the dynamic actuator constant while maintaining low force– stroke non-uniformity. This motivates the development of actuators with a higher dynamic actuator constant. A novel MMA architecture and other MMA and VCA innovations are presented to achieve a significantly higher dynamic actuator constant and improve motion system performance.}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2014_Hiemstra_Design of Moving Magnet Actuators for Large-range Flexure-based Nanopositioning.pdf} +} + @online{HttpsArxivOrg, title = {{{https://arxiv.org/pdf/1909.13770}}}, url = {https://arxiv.org/pdf/1909.13770}, urldate = {2024-05-21} } +@online{HttpsWebArchive, + title = {{{https://web.archive.org/web/20160421023836id\_/http://people.seas.harvard.edu/\textasciitilde bgoldberg/documents/Papers/ICRA14\_Goldberg.pdf}}}, + url = {https://web.archive.org/web/20160421023836id_/http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~bgoldberg/documents/Papers/ICRA14_Goldberg.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-07-25} +} + @online{HttpsWwwEuroix, title = {{{https://www.euro-ix.net/media/filer\_public/1f/74/1f7457be-afd8-471b-b333-2cb7958f9d0b/demystify\_quantum\_key\_distribution\_euro-ix.pdf}}}, url = {https://www.euro-ix.net/media/filer_public/1f/74/1f7457be-afd8-471b-b333-2cb7958f9d0b/demystify_quantum_key_distribution_euro-ix.pdf}, @@ -751,6 +1326,20 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Impagliazzo_1995_A personal view of average-case complexity.pdf} } +@article{ImplementationSecurityQuantum, + title = {Implementation {{Security}} of {{Quantum Cryptography}} - {{Introduction}}, Challenges, Solutions}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/K9YRK595/Implementation Security of Quantum Cryptography - .pdf} +} + +@article{ivarssonReviewHardwareSecurity, + title = {A {{Review}} of {{Hardware Security Modules Fall}} 2010}, + author = {Ivarsson, Johan and Nilsson, Andreas}, + abstract = {This report describes a technical review of four leading network based Hardware Security Modules performed during the fall of 2010. When deriving the review point set the focus was primarily on security features and functionality used for DNSSEC applications. However the more interesting findings were in different areas such as usability and management procedures.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/V8F2QBRE/Ivarsson and Nilsson - A Review of Hardware Security Modules Fall 2010.pdf} +} + @incollection{jarvinenEmbeddedSFEOffloading2010, title = {Embedded {{SFE}}: {{Offloading Server}} and {{Network Using Hardware Tokens}}}, shorttitle = {Embedded {{SFE}}}, @@ -766,11 +1355,40 @@ location = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_17}, url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-14577-3_17}, - urldate = {2023-02-28}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {We consider Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) in the clientserver setting where the server issues a secure token to the client. The token is not trusted by the client and is not a trusted third party.}, isbn = {978-3-642-14576-6 978-3-642-14577-3}, langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CRS7EPIW/Järvinen et al. - 2010 - Embedded SFE Offloading Server and Network Using .pdf} + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/44V6FMVZ/Järvinen et al. - 2010 - Embedded SFE Offloading Server and Network Using .pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{jiangGhostTypeLimitsUsing2024, + title = {{{GhostType}}: {{The Limits}} of {{Using Contactless Electromagnetic Interference}} to {{Inject Phantom Keys}} into {{Analog Circuits}} of {{Keyboards}}}, + shorttitle = {{{GhostType}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + author = {Jiang, Qinhong and Ren, Yanze and Long, Yan and Yan, Chen and Sun, Yumai and Ji, Xiaoyu and Fu, Kevin and Xu, Wenyuan}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {Internet Society}, + location = {San Diego, CA, USA}, + doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.23015}, + url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-15-paper.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Keyboards are the primary peripheral input devices for various critical computer application scenarios. This paper performs a security analysis of the keyboard sensing mechanisms and uncovers a new class of vulnerabilities that can be exploited to induce phantom keys—fake keystrokes injected into keyboards’ analog circuits in a contactless way using electromagnetic interference (EMI). Besides regular keystrokes, such phantom keys also include keystrokes that human operators cannot achieve, such as rapidly injecting over 10,000 keys per minute and injecting hidden keys that do not exist on the physical keyboard. The underlying principles of phantom key injections consist in inducing false voltages on keyboard sensing GPIO pins through EMI coupled onto matrix circuits. We investigate the voltage and timing requirements of injection signals both theoretically and empirically to establish the theory of phantom key injection. To validate the threat of keyboard sensing vulnerabilities, we design GhostType that can cause denial-of-service of the keyboard and inject random keystrokes as well as certain targeted keystrokes of the adversary’s choice. We have validated GhostType on 48 of 50 off-the-shelf keyboards/keypads from 20 brands, including both membrane/mechanical structures and USB/Bluetooth protocols. Some example consequences of GhostType include completely blocking keyboard operations, crashing and turning off downstream computers, and deleting computer files. Finally, we glean lessons from our investigations and propose countermeasures, including shielding keyboards with metal materials and enhancing the keystroke sensing mechanism.}, + eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/X2FB95IT/Jiang et al. - 2024 - GhostType The Limits of Using Contactless Electro.pdf} +} + +@book{johanssonTamperProtectionCryptographic2020, + title = {Tamper {{Protection}} for {{Cryptographic Hardware}} : {{A}} Survey and Analysis of State-of-the-Art Tamper Protection for Communication Devices Handling Cryptographic Keys}, + shorttitle = {Tamper {{Protection}} for {{Cryptographic Hardware}}}, + author = {Johansson, Emil}, + date = {2020}, + url = {https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-166083}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {DiVA portal is a finding tool for research publications and student theses written at the following 50 universities and research institutions.}, + langid = {english} } @incollection{kalaiArgumentQuantumComputers2020, @@ -809,6 +1427,25 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2014_Kamara et al_Scaling Private Set Intersection to Billion-Element Sets.pdf} } +@article{karlDevelopingNoninteractiveMPC2022, + title = {Developing Non-Interactive {{MPC}} with Trusted Hardware for Enhanced Security}, + author = {Karl, Ryan and Burchfield, Hannah and Takeshita, Jonathan and Jung, Taeho}, + date = {2022-08-01}, + journaltitle = {International Journal of Information Security}, + shortjournal = {Int. J. Inf. Secur.}, + volume = {21}, + number = {4}, + pages = {777--797}, + issn = {1615-5270}, + doi = {10.1007/s10207-022-00583-w}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-022-00583-w}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a promising technology for supporting privacy-preserving computation between multiple untrusted parties. Recent work has made progress reducing the number of online messages that must be sent by each participant to one, in an effort to improve communication overhead. These non-interactive protocols (NI-MPC) are efficient but do not offer standard security guarantees. A vital next step in the research is developing NI-MPC protocols that offer traditional security guarantees in the standard model. This is challenging, because protocols that are non-interactive are vulnerable to the residual function attack, and a malicious party can evaluate a function multiple times using different inputs to deduce the inputs provided by honest users. After proving NI-MPC protocols without extra trust assumptions cannot achieve fully malicious security, fairness, or robustness in the standard model, we solve this problem using trusted hardware. We then present two novel NI-MPC protocols that achieve standard privacy and correctness, and also provide guarantees of fairness and robustness (for the latter additional communication is necessary if an attack occurs). We also introduce the first implementation of an NI-MPC protocol with a one-round online phase that is secure in the standard model. In addition, we rigorously analyze the computational and communication complexity of existing protocols that require either two rounds of communication or one round of online communication. We demonstrate that our protocol outperforms or is comparable to their complexity. Furthermore, we provide rigorous proofs of correctness, security, fairness, and robustness in the covert and malicious adversary models.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Communication round complexity,Non-interactive MPC,Trusted execution environment,Trusted hardware}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Karl et al_Developing non-interactive MPC with trusted hardware for enhanced security.pdf} +} + @incollection{kellerFasterSecureMultiparty2017, title = {Faster {{Secure Multi-party Computation}} of {{AES}} and {{DES Using Lookup Tables}}}, booktitle = {Applied {{Cryptography}} and {{Network Security}}}, @@ -848,6 +1485,14 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Kiselev et al_2020_Analysis of the chromatic dispersion effect on the subcarrier wave QKD system.pdf} } +@article{knottCRYPTENSecureMultiParty, + title = {{{CRYPTEN}}: {{Secure Multi-Party Computation Meets Machine Learning}}}, + author = {Knott, Brian and Venkataraman, Shobha and Hannun, Awni and Sengupta, Shubho and Ibrahim, Mark}, + abstract = {Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows parties to perform computations on data while keeping that data private. This capability has great potential for machine-learning applications: it facilitates training of machine-learning models on private data sets owned by different parties, evaluation of one party’s private model using another party’s private data, etc. Although a range of studies implement machine-learning models via secure MPC, such implementations are not yet mainstream. Adoption of secure MPC is hampered by the absence of flexible software frameworks that “speak the language” of machine-learning researchers and engineers. To foster adoption of secure MPC in machine learning, we present CRYPTEN: a software framework that exposes popular secure MPC primitives via abstractions that are common in modern machine-learning frameworks, such as tensor computations, automatic differentiation, and modular neural networks. This paper describes the design of CRYPTEN and measure its performance on state-ofthe-art models for text classification, speech recognition, and image classification. Our benchmarks show that CRYPTEN’s GPU support and high-performance communication between (an arbitrary number of) parties allows it to perform efficient private evaluation of modern machine-learning models under a semi-honest threat model. For example, two parties using CRYPTEN can securely predict phonemes in speech recordings using Wav2Letter [17] faster than real-time. We hope that CRYPTEN will spur adoption of secure MPC in the machine-learning community.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/AT522L4Z/Knott et al. - CRYPTEN Secure Multi-Party Computation Meets Mach.pdf} +} + @inproceedings{koblahHardwareMovingTarget2022, title = {Hardware {{Moving Target Defenses}} against {{Physical Attacks}}: {{Design Challenges}} and {{Opportunities}}}, shorttitle = {Hardware {{Moving Target Defenses}} against {{Physical Attacks}}}, @@ -867,6 +1512,37 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4NYR9495/Koblah et al. - 2022 - Hardware Moving Target Defenses against Physical A.pdf} } +@article{koehler-sidkiSecuritySelfDifferencingAvalanche2020, + title = {The {{Security}} of {{Self-Differencing Avalanche Photodiodes}} for {{Quantum Key Distribution}}}, + author = {Koehler-Sidki, Alexander Mark}, + date = {2020-07-17}, + doi = {10.17863/CAM.51665}, + url = {https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/304583}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to communicate with information theoretic security by encoding information on single photons. This security is based on the laws of physics and as such can never be broken in theory. However, in practice, components do not always behave according to their theoretical models and these deviations can be exploited by an eavesdropper. In recent years, exposing loopholes in QKD systems, known as quantum hacking, has attracted significant attention. The components most susceptible to being hacked are the single-photon detectors, often avalanche photodiodes (APDs), as they are directly exposed to the optical channel. Whilst measurement-device-independent QKD removes detector vulnerability from the system, secure key rates with this technique can be much lower than point-to-point links. As such, mitigating attacks on QKD systems is a pressing challenge in QKD. In this thesis, the focus is on a special class of detectors, self-differencing APDs (SD-APDs), which have facilitated state-of-the art demonstrations of QKD. The susceptibility of SD-APDs to blinding attacks, the most explored and successful attack to date, was investigated and it was shown that by following best practice for their operation, such an attack would be unsuccessful. We have also proposed and developed a countermeasure such that the onus for appropriate operation could be removed from the user. We have also explored an arguably more dangerous attack, in the form of the after-gate attack. We have shown that delayed detection events, ordinarily considered detrimental in QKD, can provide inherent protection against this attack. Finally, backflashes in GHz-gated APDs were investigated for the first time and it was shown that threat they pose to QKD security is negligible. These results highlight the inherent protection to a number of attacks that self-differencing APDs possess. We stress that the findings presented in this thesis are also applicable to other types of fast-gated InGaAs APDs that don't possess self-differencing circuitry.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Koehler-Sidki_The Security of Self-Differencing Avalanche Photodiodes for Quantum Key.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{koehler-sidkiSettingBestPractice2017, + title = {Setting Best Practice Criteria for Self-Differencing Avalanche Photodiodes in Quantum Key Distribution}, + booktitle = {Quantum {{Information Science}} and {{Technology III}}}, + author = {Koehler-Sidki, Alexander and Dynes, James F. and Yuan, Zhiliang L. and Lucamarini, Marco and Roberts, George R. and Savory, Seb J. and Shields, Andrew J. and Sharpe, Andrew W.}, + editor = {Gruneisen, Mark T. and Dusek, Miloslav and Rarity, John G.}, + date = {2017-10-05}, + pages = {19}, + publisher = {SPIE}, + location = {Warsaw, Poland}, + doi = {10.1117/12.2275675}, + url = {https://www.spiedigitallibrary.org/conference-proceedings-of-spie/10442/2275675/Setting-best-practice-criteria-for-self-differencing-avalanche-photodiodes-in/10.1117/12.2275675.full}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {In recent years, the security of avalanche photodiodes as single photon detectors for quantum key distribution has been subjected to much scrutiny. The most prominent example of this surrounds the vulnerability of such devices to blinding under strong illumination. We focus on self-differencing avalanche photodiodes, single photon detectors that have demonstrated count rates exceeding 1 GCounts/s resulting in secure key rates over 1 MBit/s. These detectors use a passive electronic circuit to cancel any periodic signals thereby enhancing detection sensitivity. However this intrinsic feature can be exploited by adversaries to gain control of the devices using illumination of a moderate intensity. Through careful experimental examinations, we define here a set of criteria for these detectors to avoid such attacks.}, + eventtitle = {Quantum {{Technologies}} and {{Quantum Information Science}}}, + isbn = {978-1-5106-1348-5 978-1-5106-1349-2}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/P8B7NSNB/Koehler-Sidki et al. - 2017 - Setting best practice criteria for self-differenci.pdf} +} + @article{kohlsVerLocVerifiableLocalization, title = {{{VerLoc}}: {{Verifiable Localization}} in {{Decentralized Systems}}}, author = {Kohls, Katharina and Diaz, Claudia}, @@ -910,6 +1586,22 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Kozlowski_Wehner_2019_Towards Large-Scale Quantum Networks.pdf} } +@online{krachenfelsAutomaticExtractionSecrets2021, + title = {Automatic {{Extraction}} of {{Secrets}} from the {{Transistor Jungle}} Using {{Laser-Assisted Side-Channel Attacks}}}, + author = {Krachenfels, Thilo and Kiyan, Tuba and Tajik, Shahin and Seifert, Jean-Pierre}, + date = {2021-02-23}, + eprint = {2102.11656}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {cs}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.11656}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The security of modern electronic devices relies on secret keys stored on secure hardware modules as the root-of-trust (RoT). Extracting those keys would break the security of the entire system. As shown before, sophisticated side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, using chip failure analysis (FA) techniques, can extract data from on-chip memory cells. However, since the chip’s layout is unknown to the adversary in practice, secret key localization and reverse engineering are onerous tasks. Consequently, hardware vendors commonly believe that the ever-growing physical complexity of the integrated circuit (IC) designs can be a natural barrier against potential adversaries. In this work, we present a novel approach that can extract the secret key without any knowledge of the IC’s layout, and independent from the employed memory technology as key storage. We automate the – traditionally very laborintensive – reverse engineering and data extraction process. To that end, we demonstrate that black-box measurements captured using laser-assisted SCA techniques from a training device with known key can be used to profile the device for a later key prediction on other victim devices with unknown keys. To showcase the potential of our approach, we target keys on three different hardware platforms, which are utilized as RoT in different products.}, + langid = {english}, + pubstate = {prepublished}, + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6MHCY79U/Krachenfels et al. - 2021 - Automatic Extraction of Secrets from the Transisto.pdf} +} + @inproceedings{krachenfelsRealWorldSnapshotsVs2021, title = {Real-{{World Snapshots}} vs. {{Theory}}: {{Questioning}} the t-{{Probing Security Model}}}, shorttitle = {Real-{{World Snapshots}} vs. {{Theory}}}, @@ -929,7 +1621,96 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VAZQHSTV/Krachenfels et al. - 2021 - Real-World Snapshots vs. Theory Questioning the t.pdf} } +@inproceedings{krachenfelsRealWorldSnapshotsVs2021a, + title = {Real-{{World Snapshots}} vs. {{Theory}}: {{Questioning}} the t-{{Probing Security Model}}}, + shorttitle = {Real-{{World Snapshots}} vs. {{Theory}}}, + booktitle = {2021 {{IEEE Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{SP}})}, + author = {Krachenfels, Thilo and Ganji, Fatemeh and Moradi, Amir and Tajik, Shahin and Seifert, Jean-Pierre}, + date = {2021-05}, + eprint = {2009.04263}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {cs}, + pages = {1955--1971}, + doi = {10.1109/SP40001.2021.00029}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2009.04263}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Due to its sound theoretical basis and practical efficiency, masking has become the most prominent countermeasure to protect cryptographic implementations against physical sidechannel attacks (SCAs). The core idea of masking is to randomly split every sensitive intermediate variable during computation into at least t+1 shares, where t denotes the maximum number of shares that are allowed to be observed by an adversary without learning any sensitive information. In other words, it is assumed that the adversary is bounded either by the possessed number of probes (e.g., microprobe needles) or by the order of statistical analyses while conducting higher-order SCA attacks (e.g., differential power analysis). Such bounded models are employed to prove the SCA security of the corresponding implementations. Consequently, it is believed that given a sufficiently large number of shares, the vast majority of known SCA attacks are mitigated. In this work, we present a novel laser-assisted SCA technique, called Laser Logic State Imaging (LLSI), which offers an unlimited number of contactless probes, and therefore, violates the probing security model assumption. This technique enables us to take snapshots of hardware implementations, i.e., extract the logical state of all registers at any arbitrary clock cycle with a single measurement. To validate this, we mount our attack on masked AES hardware implementations and practically demonstrate the extraction of the full-length key in two different scenarios. First, we assume that the location of the registers (key and/or state) is known, and hence, their content can be directly read by a single snapshot. Second, we consider an implementation with unknown register locations, where we make use of multiple snapshots and a SAT solver to reveal the secrets.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z3FB94WA/Krachenfels et al. - 2021 - Real-World Snapshots vs. Theory Questioning the t.pdf} +} + +@article{krachenfelsTrojanAwakenerDetecting2023, + title = {Trojan Awakener: Detecting Dormant Malicious Hardware Using Laser Logic State Imaging (Extended Version)}, + shorttitle = {Trojan Awakener}, + author = {Krachenfels, Thilo and Seifert, Jean-Pierre and Tajik, Shahin}, + date = {2023-11}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Cryptographic Engineering}, + shortjournal = {J Cryptogr Eng}, + volume = {13}, + number = {4}, + pages = {485--499}, + issn = {2190-8508, 2190-8516}, + doi = {10.1007/s13389-023-00323-3}, + url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13389-023-00323-3}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Abstract The threat of (HTs) and their detection is a widely studied field. While the effort for inserting a Trojan into an (ASIC) can be considered relatively high, especially when trusting the chip manufacturer, programmable hardware is vulnerable to Trojan insertion even after the product has been shipped or during usage. At the same time, detecting dormant HTs with small or zero-overhead triggers and payloads on these platforms is still a challenging task, as the Trojan might not get activated during the chip verification using logical testing or physical measurements. In this work, we present a novel Trojan detection approach based on a technique known from (IC) failure analysis, capable of detecting virtually all classes of dormant Trojans. Using (LLSI), we show how supply voltage modulations can awaken inactive Trojans, making them detectable using laser voltage imaging techniques. Therefore, our technique does not require triggering the Trojan. To support our claims, we present three case studies on 28~nm and 20~nm SRAM- and flash-based (FPGAs). We demonstrate how to detect with high confidence small changes in sequential and combinatorial logic as well as in the routing configuration of FPGAs in a non-invasive manner. Finally, we discuss the practical applicability of our approach on dormant analog Trojans in ASICs.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Krachenfels et al_Trojan awakener.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{kryjakFPGAImplementationCamera2012, + title = {{{FPGA}} Implementation of Camera Tamper Detection in Real-Time}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2012 {{Conference}} on {{Design}} and {{Architectures}} for {{Signal}} and {{Image Processing}}}, + author = {Kryjak, Tomasz and Komorkiewicz, Mateusz and Gorgon, Marek}, + date = {2012-10}, + pages = {1--8}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/6385386}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Video surveillance systems are becoming very common nowadays. Cameras installed in many places are exposed to sabotage or tampering. This can be done by covering the camera lens, changing the focus of the camera lens or changing the camera position to prevent proper registration of the surveilled area. This paper describes a hardware implementation of a system that can detect these kind of events. The algorithm is based on background modelling, histograms comparison, edges comparison and analysis of the image's average brightness. In was described in a hardware description language in a pipeline manner and implemented in an FPGA device. Real-time processing of a video stream with a resolution of 640×480@60 frames per second was achieved. Tests performed on several sequences demonstrated the usefulness of the presented solution.}, + eventtitle = {Proceedings of the 2012 {{Conference}} on {{Design}} and {{Architectures}} for {{Signal}} and {{Image Processing}}}, + keywords = {Analytical models,background generation,camera sabotage detection,camera tampering detection,Cameras,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,Histograms,Image edge detection,Mathematical model,real-time video processing}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2012_Kryjak et al_FPGA implementation of camera tamper detection in real-time.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{lamonacaBloodOxygenSaturation2015, + title = {Blood Oxygen Saturation Measurement by Smartphone Camera}, + booktitle = {2015 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Medical Measurements}} and {{Applications}} ({{MeMeA}}) {{Proceedings}}}, + author = {Lamonaca, Francesco and Carnì, Domenico Luca and Grimaldi, Domenico and Nastro, Alfonso and Riccio, Maria and Spagnolo, Vitaliano}, + date = {2015-05}, + pages = {359--364}, + doi = {10.1109/MeMeA.2015.7145228}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7145228}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {This study investigates the usability of the smartphone camera for the evaluation of arterial blood oxygenation (SpO2\%). The advantage of this solution derives from the pervasiveness of the smartphone that makes available the evaluation of the SpO2\% everywhere. Differently from the pulse oximeter, which uses well-defined wavelength light, the smartphone uses Light Emitting Diodes as a light source to evaluate the SpO2\%. The change of the light intensity in the Red and Green colour channels in the video frames of the patient fingertip are properly processed. Two PPG signals are obtained at the wavelengths 600nm and 940nm, respectively. These two PPGs are used to evaluate the SpO2\% without calibration coefficients and independently of the smartphone hardware and skin characteristics. Experimental tests are performed to compare the proposed procedure with respect to a commercial pulse oximeter and gas chromatograph. The experimental tests assess the effectiveness of the proposal.}, + eventtitle = {2015 {{IEEE International Symposium}} on {{Medical Measurements}} and {{Applications}} ({{MeMeA}}) {{Proceedings}}}, + keywords = {Absorption,Bio-signal Processing,Biomedical measurement,Blood,Cameras,Light emitting diodes,Monitoring,Oxygen saturation measurement,Photoplethysmogram signal,Pulse measurements,Signal feature extraction}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Lamonaca et al_Blood oxygen saturation measurement by smartphone camera.pdf} +} + @article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018, + title = {Continuous-{{Variable Quantum Key Distribution}} with {{Gaussian Modulation}} -- {{The Theory}} of {{Practical Implementations}}}, + author = {Laudenbach, Fabian and Pacher, Christoph and Fung, Chi-Hang Fred and Poppe, Andreas and Peev, Momtchil and Schrenk, Bernhard and Hentschel, Michael and Walther, Philip and Hübel, Hannes}, + date = {2018-08}, + journaltitle = {Advanced Quantum Technologies}, + shortjournal = {Adv Quantum Tech}, + volume = {1}, + number = {1}, + eprint = {1703.09278}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {quant-ph}, + pages = {1800011}, + issn = {2511-9044, 2511-9044}, + doi = {10.1002/qute.201800011}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09278}, + urldate = {2024-05-02}, + abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Quantum Physics}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/A2BQHUUW/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf} +} + +@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018a, title = {Continuous-{{Variable Quantum Key Distribution}} with {{Gaussian Modulation}} -- {{The Theory}} of {{Practical Implementations}}}, author = {Laudenbach, Fabian and Pacher, Christoph and Fung, Chi-Hang Fred and Poppe, Andreas and Peev, Momtchil and Schrenk, Bernhard and Hentschel, Michael and Walther, Philip and Hübel, Hannes}, date = {2018-08}, @@ -951,7 +1732,7 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/I7UL2SKX/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf} } -@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018a, +@article{laudenbachContinuousVariableQuantumKey2018b, title = {Continuous-{{Variable Quantum Key Distribution}} with {{Gaussian Modulation}} -- {{The Theory}} of {{Practical Implementations}}}, author = {Laudenbach, Fabian and Pacher, Christoph and Fung, Chi-Hang Fred and Poppe, Andreas and Peev, Momtchil and Schrenk, Bernhard and Hentschel, Michael and Walther, Philip and Hübel, Hannes}, date = {2018-08}, @@ -966,11 +1747,32 @@ issn = {2511-9044, 2511-9044}, doi = {10.1002/qute.201800011}, url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.09278}, - urldate = {2024-05-02}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {Quantum key distribution using weak coherent states and homodyne detection is a promising candidate for practical quantum-cryptographic implementations due to its compatibility with existing telecom equipment and high detection efficiencies. However, despite the actual simplicity of the protocol, the security analysis of this method is rather involved compared to discrete-variable QKD. In this article we review the theoretical foundations of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with Gaussian modulation and rederive the essential relations from scratch in a pedagogical way. The aim of this paper is to be as comprehensive and self-contained as possible in order to be well intelligible even for readers with little pre-knowledge on the subject. Although the present article is a theoretical discussion of CV-QKD, its focus lies on practical implementations, taking into account various kinds of hardware imperfections and suggesting practical methods to perform the security analysis subsequent to the key exchange. Apart from a review of well known results, this manuscript presents a set of new original noise models which are helpful to get an estimate of how well a given set of hardware will perform in practice.}, langid = {english}, keywords = {Quantum Physics}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/A2BQHUUW/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf} + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Y7HDB8L4/Laudenbach et al. - 2018 - Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution with .pdf} +} + +@incollection{launchburyApplicationScaleSecureMultiparty2014, + title = {Application-{{Scale Secure Multiparty Computation}}}, + booktitle = {Programming {{Languages}} and {{Systems}}}, + author = {Launchbury, John and Archer, Dave and DuBuisson, Thomas and Mertens, Eric}, + editor = {Shao, Zhong}, + editora = {Hutchison, David and Kanade, Takeo and Kittler, Josef and Kleinberg, Jon M. and Mattern, Friedemann and Mitchell, John C. and Naor, Moni and Nierstrasz, Oscar and Pandu Rangan, C. and Steffen, Bernhard and Sudan, Madhu and Terzopoulos, Demetri and Tygar, Doug and Vardi, Moshe Y. and Weikum, Gerhard}, + editoratype = {redactor}, + date = {2014}, + volume = {8410}, + pages = {8--26}, + publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, + location = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-54833-8_2}, + url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-54833-8_2}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Secure multiparty computation (MPC) permits a collection of parties to compute a collaborative result without any of the parties or compute servers gaining any knowledge about the inputs provided by other parties, except what can be determined from the output of the computation. In the form of MPC known as linear (or additive) sharing, computation proceeds on data that appears entirely random. Operations such as addition or logical-XOR can be performed purely locally, but operations such as multiplication or logical-AND require a network communication between the parties. Consequently, the computational overhead of MPC is large, and the cost is still measured in orders of magnitude slowdown with respect to computing in the clear. However, e ciency improvements over the last few years have shifted the potential applicability of MPC from just micro benchmarks to user-level applications.}, + isbn = {978-3-642-54832-1 978-3-642-54833-8}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SPNJ8KBL/Launchbury et al. - 2014 - Application-Scale Secure Multiparty Computation.pdf} } @article{lellaSecurityQuantumKey2023, @@ -993,6 +1795,23 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Lella_Schmid_2023_On the Security of Quantum Key Distribution Networks.pdf} } +@article{leviGarbledCircuitsSCA2023, + title = {Garbled {{Circuits}} from an {{SCA Perspective}}: {{Free XOR}} Can Be {{Quite Expensive}}. . .}, + shorttitle = {Garbled {{Circuits}} from an {{SCA Perspective}}}, + author = {Levi, Itamar and Hazay, Carmit}, + date = {2023-03-06}, + journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, + pages = {54--79}, + issn = {2569-2925}, + doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i2.54-79}, + url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/10277}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Garbling schemes, invented in the 80’s by Yao (FOCS’86), have been a versatile and fundamental tool in modern cryptography. A prominent application of garbled circuits is constant round secure two-party computation, which led to a long line of study of this object, where one of the most influential optimizations is Free-XOR (Kolesnikov and Schneider ICALP’08), introducing a global offset Δ for all garbled wire values where XOR gates are computed locally without garbling them. To date, garbling schemes were not studied per their side-channel attacks (SCA) security characteristics, even though SCA pose a significant security threat to cryptographic devices. In this research we, demonstrate that adversaries utilizing advanced SCA tools such as horizontal attacks, mixed with advanced hypothesis building and standard (vertical) SCA tools, can jeopardize garbling implementations.Our main observation is that garbling schemes utilizing a global secret Δ open a door to quite trivial side-channel attacks. We model our side-channel attacks on the garbler’s device and discuss the asymmetric setting where various computations are not performed on the evaluator side. This enables dangerous leakage extraction on the garbler and renders our attack impossible on the evaluator’s side.Theoretically, we first demonstrate on a simulated environment, that such attacks are quite devastating. Concretely, our attack is capable of extracting Δ when the circuit embeds only 8 input non-linear gates with fifth/first-order attack Success-Rates of 0.65/0.7. With as little as 3 such gates, our attack reduces the first-order Guessing Entropy of Δ from 128 to ∼ 48-bits. We further demonstrate our attack via an implementation and power measurements data over an STM 32-bit processor software implementing circuit garbling, and discuss their limitations and mitigation tactics on logical, protocol and implementation layers.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Free-XOR,Garbled Circuits,Horizontal Attacks,Secure Computation,Side-channel analysis,Single Trace}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Levi_Hazay_Garbled Circuits from an SCA Perspective.pdf} +} + @article{liLearningNormalityEnough, title = {Learning {{Normality}} Is {{Enough}}: {{A Software-based Mitigation}} against {{Inaudible Voice Attacks}}}, author = {Li, Xinfeng and Ji, Xiaoyu and Yan, Chen and Li, Chaohao and Li, Yichen and Zhang, Zhenning and Xu, Wenyuan}, @@ -1001,6 +1820,14 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/3GAC8HBK/Li et al. - Learning Normality is Enough A Software-based Mit.pdf} } +@article{lindellSecureMultipartyComputation, + title = {Secure {{Multiparty Computation}} ({{MPC}})}, + author = {Lindell, Yehuda}, + abstract = {Protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) enable a set of parties to interact and compute a joint function of their private inputs while revealing nothing but the output. The potential applications for MPC are huge: privacy-preserving auctions, private DNA comparisons, private machine learning, threshold cryptography, and more. Due to this, MPC has been an intensive topic of research in academia ever since it was introduced in the 1980s by Yao for the two-party case (FOCS 1986), and by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson for the multiparty case (STOC 1987). Recently, MPC has become efficient enough to be used in practice, and has made the transition from an object of theoretical study to a technology being used in industry. In this article, we will review what MPC is, what problems it solves, and how it is being currently used.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/63GP4CNS/Lindell - Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC).pdf} +} + @inproceedings{linINSPIRETorageRivate2022, title = {{{INSPIRE}}: In - s Torage p Rivate i Nformation Re Trieval via Protocol and Architecture Co-Design}, shorttitle = {{{INSPIRE}}}, @@ -1020,6 +1847,22 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2TP8V3PI/Lin et al. - 2022 - INSPIRE in - s torage p rivate i nformation re tr.pdf} } +@online{litinskiHowCompute256bit2023, + title = {How to Compute a 256-Bit Elliptic Curve Private Key with Only 50 Million {{Toffoli}} Gates}, + author = {Litinski, Daniel}, + date = {2023-06-14}, + eprint = {2306.08585}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {quant-ph}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.08585}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {We use Shor's algorithm for the computation of elliptic curve private keys as a case study for resource estimates in the silicon-photonics-inspired active-volume architecture. Here, a fault-tolerant surface-code quantum computer consists of modules with a logarithmic number of non-local inter-module connections, modifying the algorithmic cost function compared to 2D-local architectures. We find that the non-local connections reduce the cost per key by a factor of 300-700 depending on the operating regime. At 10\% threshold, assuming a 10-\$\textbackslash mu\$s code cycle and non-local connections, one key can be generated every 10 minutes using 6000 modules with 1152 physical qubits each. By contrast, a device with strict 2D-local connectivity requires more qubits and produces one key every 38 hours. We also find simple architecture-independent algorithmic modifications that reduce the Toffoli count per key by up to a factor of 5. These modifications involve reusing the stored state for multiple keys and spreading the cost of the modular division operation over multiple parallel instances of the algorithm.}, + langid = {english}, + pubstate = {prepublished}, + keywords = {Quantum Physics}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MUV3B963/Litinski - 2023 - How to compute a 256-bit elliptic curve private ke.pdf} +} + @misc{liuImprovedQuantumCircuits2023, title = {Improved {{Quantum Circuits}} for {{AES}}: {{Reducing}} the {{Depth}} and the {{Number}} of {{Qubits}}}, author = {Liu, Qun and Preneel, Bart and Zhao, Zheng and Wang, Meiqin}, @@ -1046,6 +1889,24 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Y7DKAXM6/Lo et al. - 2012 - Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distrib.pdf} } +@inproceedings{longEMEyeCharacterizing2024, + title = {{{EM Eye}}: {{Characterizing Electromagnetic Side-channel Eavesdropping}} on {{Embedded Cameras}}}, + shorttitle = {{{EM Eye}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + author = {Long, Yan and Jiang, Qinhong and Yan, Chen and Alam, Tobias and Ji, Xiaoyu and Xu, Wenyuan and Fu, Kevin}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {Internet Society}, + location = {San Diego, CA, USA}, + doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.24552}, + url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-552-paper.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {IoT devices and other embedded systems are increasingly equipped with cameras that can sense critical information in private spaces. The data security of these cameras, however, has hardly been scrutinized from the hardware design perspective. Our paper presents the first attempt to analyze the attack surface of physical-channel eavesdropping on embedded cameras. We characterize EM Eye—a vulnerability in the digital image data transmission interface that allows adversaries to reconstruct high-quality image streams from the cameras’ unintentional electromagnetic emissions, even from over 2 meters away in many cases. Our evaluations of 4 popular IoT camera development platforms and 12 commercial off-the-shelf devices with cameras show that EM Eye poses threats to a wide range of devices, from smartphones to dash cams and home security cameras. By exploiting this vulnerability, adversaries may be able to visually spy on private activities in an enclosed room from the other side of a wall. We provide root cause analysis and modeling that enable system defenders to identify and simulate mitigation against this vulnerability, such as improving embedded cameras’ data transmission protocols with minimum costs. We further discuss EM Eye’s relationship with known computer display eavesdropping attacks to reveal the gaps that need to be addressed to protect the data confidentiality of sensing systems.}, + eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/WBSKAYAN/Long et al. - 2024 - EM Eye Characterizing Electromagnetic Side-channe.pdf} +} + @article{loSecureQuantumKey2014, title = {Secure Quantum Key Distribution}, author = {Lo, Hoi-Kwong and Curty, Marcos and Tamaki, Kiyoshi}, @@ -1092,11 +1953,29 @@ location = {Cham}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_34}, url = {https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-88428-4_34}, - urldate = {2023-02-28}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, abstract = {With the advancement of the trusted execution environment (TEE) technologies, hardware-supported secure computing becomes increasingly popular due to its e ciency. During the protocol execution, typically, the players need to contact a third-party server for remote a estation, ensuring the validity of the involved trusted hardware component, such as Intel SGX, as well as the integrity of the computation result. When the hardware manufacturer is not fully trusted, sensitive information may be leaked to the third-party server through backdoors, steganography, and kleptography, etc. In this work, we introduce a new security notion called semi-trusted hardware model, where the adversary is allowed to passively or maliciously corrupt the hardware. erefore, she can learn the input of the hardware component and might also tamper its output. We then show how to utilize such semi-trusted hardwares for correlated randomness teleportation. When the semi-trusted hardware is instantiated by Intel SGX, to generate 10k random OT’s, our protocol is 24X and 450X faster than the EMP-IKNP-ROT in the LAN and WAN se ing, respectively. When SGX is used to teleport garbled circuits, the resulting two-party computation protocol is 5.3-5.7X and 43-47X faster than the EMP-SH2PC in the LAN and WAN se ing, respectively, for the AES-128, SHA-256, and SHA-512 evaluation. We also show how to achieve malicious security with li le overhead.}, isbn = {978-3-030-88427-7 978-3-030-88428-4}, langid = {english}, - file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8PJMW2P5/Lu et al. - 2021 - Correlated Randomness Teleportation via Semi-trust.pdf} + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/4PI9MSMM/Lu et al. - 2021 - Correlated Randomness Teleportation via Semi-trust.pdf} +} + +@article{maierContributionSystemDesign2019, + title = {Contribution to the {{System Design}} of {{Contactless Energy Transfer Systems}}}, + author = {Maier, David and Heinrich, Jörg and Zimmer, Marco and Maier, Marcel and Parspour, Nejila}, + date = {2019-01}, + journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications}, + volume = {55}, + number = {1}, + pages = {316--326}, + issn = {1939-9367}, + doi = {10.1109/TIA.2018.2866247}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8440726/?arnumber=8440726}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {In this contribution, a design procedure that is applicable to many kinds of wireless or contactless energy transfer systems is proposed. The design procedure is limited to near field wireless energy transfer systems in resonant operation. For this purpose, the input impedance and voltage transfer function of different natural frequencies are calculated analytically, and moreover, the behavior of the system is described. Following three issues lead to a readily applicable design procedure. First, the knowledge of the transfer functions. Secondly, the knowledge of basic magnetic properties and lastly, the known influence of harmonics according to rectifier and inverter. This design procedure is demonstrated with two hardware setups.}, + eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industry Applications}}}, + keywords = {Capacitors,Equivalent circuits,Impedance,Inductive charging,inductive power transmission,Magnetic circuits,Magnetic separation,power conversion harmonics,Reactive power,resonant inverters transfer functions,Transfer functions}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Maier et al_2019_Contribution to the System Design of Contactless Energy Transfer Systems.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Q4MPPLFH/8440726.html} } @article{marhoeferApplicabilityQuantumCryptography, @@ -1181,6 +2060,25 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Mehic et al_2020_A Novel Approach to Quality-of-Service Provisioning in Trusted Relay Quantum.pdf} } +@article{mehicQuantumKeyDistribution2021, + title = {Quantum {{Key Distribution}}: {{A Networking Perspective}}}, + shorttitle = {Quantum {{Key Distribution}}}, + author = {Mehic, Miralem and Niemiec, Marcin and Rass, Stefan and Ma, Jiajun and Peev, Momtchil and Aguado, Alejandro and Martin, Vicente and Schauer, Stefan and Poppe, Andreas and Pacher, Christoph and Voznak, Miroslav}, + date = {2021-09-30}, + journaltitle = {ACM Computing Surveys}, + shortjournal = {ACM Comput. Surv.}, + volume = {53}, + number = {5}, + pages = {1--41}, + issn = {0360-0300, 1557-7341}, + doi = {10.1145/3402192}, + url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3402192}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The convergence of quantum cryptography with applications used in everyday life is a topic drawing attention from the industrial and academic worlds. The development of quantum electronics has led to the practical achievement of quantum devices that are already available on the market and waiting for their first application on a broader scale. A major aspect of quantum cryptography is the methodology of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which is used to generate and distribute symmetric cryptographic keys between two geographically separate users using the principles of quantum physics. In previous years, several successful QKD networks have been created to test the implementation and interoperability of different practical solutions. This article surveys previously applied methods, showing techniques for deploying QKD networks and current challenges of QKD networking. Unlike studies focusing on optical channels and optical equipment, this survey focuses on the network aspect by considering network organization, routing and signaling protocols, simulation techniques, and a software-defined QKD networking approach.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6CQ2P3KX/Mehic et al. - 2021 - Quantum Key Distribution A Networking Perspective.pdf} +} + @article{melaraCONIKSBringingKey, title = {{{CONIKS}}: {{Bringing Key Transparency}} to {{End Users}}}, author = {Melara, Marcela S and Blankstein, Aaron and Bonneau, Joseph and Felten, Edward W and Freedman, Michael J}, @@ -1189,6 +2087,48 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/TMI3LX3I/Melara et al. - CONIKS Bringing Key Transparency to End Users.pdf} } +@inproceedings{mishraFaultsOurBus2024, + title = {Faults in {{Our Bus}}: {{Novel Bus Fault Attack}} to {{Break ARM TrustZone}}}, + shorttitle = {Faults in {{Our Bus}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + author = {Mishra, Nimish and Chakraborty, Anirban and Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {Internet Society}, + location = {San Diego, CA, USA}, + doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.24499}, + url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-499-paper.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The ever-increasing growth of Internet-of-Things (IoT) has led to wide-scale deployment of high-frequency, highly complex Systems-on-a-Chip (SoCs), which are capable of running a full-fledged operating system (OS). The presence of OS and other software countermeasures make SoCs resilient against the traditional fault attacks that are relevant on FPGAs and microprocessors. In this work, we present the first practical implications of targeting an orthogonal aspect of SoC’s architecture: the system bus. We inject electromagnetic pulses onto the system bus during the execution of instructions involving processor-memory interaction. We show how address bus faults compromise software implementations of masked implementations of ciphers, illustrated using implementations of state-of-theart post-quantum cryptography (PQC) schemes, leaking entire secret keys with a single fault. We also demonstrate that data bus faults can be controlled and exploited to launch Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attacks on table-based implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Furthermore, we demonstrate that the impact of such bus faults can be farreaching and mislead the security guarantees of the popular and widely used ARM TrustZone. We use data-bus faults (along with loopholes in the GlobalPlatform API specification) to mislead the signature verification step to load a malicious Trusted Application (TA) inside the TrustZone. We follow this up with address bus faults to steal symmetric encryption keys of other benign TAs in the system, leading to complete breakdown of security on TrustZone. We note that since the attack relies upon loopholes in the GlobalPlatform API specification, it is portable to any TEE following this specification. To emphasize upon this portability of the attack, we demonstrate successful installation of malicious TAs on two TrustZone implementations (OP-TEE and MyTEE) on two different platforms (Raspberry Pi 3 and Raspberry Pi 4). Finally, we propose countermeasures that can be integrated into the SoC environment to defend against these attack vectors.}, + eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/GB9DXZKG/Mishra et al. - 2024 - Faults in Our Bus Novel Bus Fault Attack to Break.pdf} +} + +@online{ModulationRescueIdentifying, + title = {Modulation to the {{Rescue}}: {{Identifying Sub-Circuitry}} in the {{Transistor Morass}} for {{Targeted Analysis}} | {{Proceedings}} of the 2023 {{Workshop}} on {{Attacks}} and {{Solutions}} in {{Hardware Security}}}, + url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3605769.3623999}, + urldate = {2024-07-25} +} + +@inproceedings{monfaredLeakyOhmSecretBits2023, + title = {{{LeakyOhm}}: {{Secret Bits Extraction}} Using {{Impedance Analysis}}}, + shorttitle = {{{LeakyOhm}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2023 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, + author = {Monfared, Saleh Khalaj and Mosavirik, Tahoura and Tajik, Shahin}, + date = {2023-11-21}, + series = {{{CCS}} '23}, + pages = {1675--1689}, + publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, + location = {New York, NY, USA}, + doi = {10.1145/3576915.3623092}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623092}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or voltage drop on a chip. Such data-dependent influence can be exploited by, for instance, power or electromagnetic analysis. In this work, we introduce a novel non-invasive physical side-channel attack, which exploits the data-dependent changes in the impedance of the chip. Our attack relies on the fact that the temporarily stored contents in registers alter the physical characteristics of the circuit, which results in changes in the die's impedance. To sense such impedance variations, we deploy a well-known RF/microwave method called scattering parameter analysis, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies into the system's power distribution network (PDN) and measure the echo of the signals. We demonstrate that according to the content bits and physical location of a register, the reflected signal is modulated differently at various frequency points enabling the simultaneous and independent probing of individual registers. Such side-channel leakage challenges the t-probing security model assumption used in masking, which is a prominent side-channel countermeasure. To validate our claims, we mount non-profiled and profiled impedance analysis attacks on hardware implementations of unprotected and high-order masked AES. We show that in the case of the profiled attack, only a single trace is required to recover the secret key. Finally, we discuss how a specific class of hiding countermeasures might be effective against impedance leakage.}, + isbn = {9798400700507}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Monfared et al_LeakyOhm.pdf} +} + @article{morimotoSimultaneousMeasurementSpecific2006, title = {Simultaneous Measurement of Specific Heat, Thermal Conductivity, and Thermal Diffusivity of Modified Barium Titanate Ceramics}, author = {Morimoto, Kohsuke and Sawai, Shinya and Hisano, Kumao and Yamamoto, Takashi}, @@ -1205,6 +2145,43 @@ langid = {english} } +@article{mosavirikImpedanceVerifOnChipImpedance2022, + title = {{{ImpedanceVerif}}: {{On-Chip Impedance Sensing}} for {{System-Level Tampering Detection}}}, + shorttitle = {{{ImpedanceVerif}}}, + author = {Mosavirik, Tahoura and Schaumont, Patrick and Tajik, Shahin}, + date = {2022-11-29}, + journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, + shortjournal = {TCHES}, + pages = {301--325}, + issn = {2569-2925}, + doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i1.301-325}, + url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9954}, + urldate = {2024-07-10}, + abstract = {Physical attacks can compromise the security of cryptographic devices. Depending on the attack’s requirements, adversaries might need to (i) place probes in the proximity of the integrated circuits (ICs) package, (ii) create physical connections between their probes/wires and the system’s PCB, or (iii) physically tamper with the PCB’s components, chip’s package, or substitute the entire PCB to prepare the device for the attack. While tamper-proof enclosures prevent and detect physical access to the system, their high manufacturing cost and incompatibility with legacy systems make them unattractive for many low-cost scenarios. In this paper, inspired by methods known from the field of power integrity analysis, we demonstrate how the impedance characterization of the system’s power distribution network (PDN) using on-chip circuit-based network analyzers can detect various classes of tamper events. We explain how these embedded network analyzers, without any modifications to the system, can be deployed on FPGAs to extract the frequency response of the PDN. The analysis of these frequency responses reveals different classes of tamper events from board to chip level. To validate our claims, we run an embedded network analyzer on FPGAs of a family of commercial development kits and perform extensive measurements for various classes of PCB and IC package tampering required for conducting different side-channel or fault attacks. Using the Wasserstein Distance as a statistical metric, we further show that we can confidently detect tamper events. Our results, interestingly, show that even environment-level tampering activities, such as the proximity of contactless EM probes to the IC package or slightly polished IC package, can be detected using on-chip impedance sensing.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/EBAXQHG5/Mosavirik et al. - 2022 - ImpedanceVerif On-Chip Impedance Sensing for Syst.pdf} +} + +@article{mosavirikSiliconEchoesNonInvasive2023, + title = {Silicon {{Echoes}}: {{Non-Invasive Trojan}} and {{Tamper Detection}} Using {{Frequency-Selective Impedance Analysis}}}, + shorttitle = {Silicon {{Echoes}}}, + author = {Mosavirik, Tahoura and Monfared, Saleh Khalaj and Safa, Maryam Saadat and Tajik, Shahin}, + date = {2023-08-31}, + journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, + volume = {2023}, + number = {4}, + pages = {238--261}, + issn = {2569-2925}, + doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i4.238-261}, + url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/11165}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The threat of chip-level tampering and its detection has been widely researched. Hardware Trojan insertions are prominent examples of such tamper events. Altering the placement and routing of a design or removing a part of a circuit for side-channel leakage/fault sensitivity amplification are other instances of such attacks. While semi- and fully-invasive physical verification methods can confidently detect such stealthy tamper events, they are costly, time-consuming, and destructive. On the other hand, virtually all proposed non-invasive side-channel methods suffer from noise and, therefore, have low confidence. Moreover, they require activating the tampered part of the circuit (e.g., the Trojan trigger) to compare and detect the modifications. In this work, we introduce a non-invasive post-silicon tamper detection technique applicable to different classes of tamper events at the chip level without requiring the activation of the malicious circuit. Our method relies on the fact that physical modifications (regardless of their physical, activation, or action characteristics) alter the impedance of the chip. Hence, characterizing the impedance can lead to the detection of the tamper events. To sense the changes in the impedance, we deploy known RF tools, namely, scattering parameters, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies to the power distribution network (PDN) of the system and measure the “echo” of the signal. The reflected signals in various frequency bands reveal different tamper events based on their impact size on the die. To validate our claims, we performed measurements on several proof-ofconcept tampered hardware implementations realized on FPGAs manufactured with a 28 nm technology. We further show that deploying the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance can distinguish between tamper events and noise resulting from manufacturing process variation of different chips/boards. Based on the acquired results, we demonstrate that stealthy hardware Trojans, as well as sophisticated modifications of P\&R, can be detected.}, + issue = {4}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Backscattered Side-channel,Hardware Trojans,Impedance Characterization,Physical Layer Security,Scattering Parameters,Tamper Detection}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2023_Mosavirik et al_Silicon Echoes2.pdf} +} + @inproceedings{muehlmannMutualCouplingModeling2012, title = {Mutual Coupling Modeling of {{NFC}} Antennas by Using Open-Source {{CAD}}/{{FEM}} Tools}, booktitle = {2012 {{IEEE International Conference}} on {{RFID-Technologies}} and {{Applications}} ({{RFID-TA}})}, @@ -1227,6 +2204,21 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/7VYCMNA7/Mullen and Lee - Effect of Misalignment of Inductive Wireless Power.pdf} } +@book{mullerWiringWorldSocial2016, + title = {Wiring the {{World}}: {{The Social}} and {{Cultural Creation}} of {{Global Telegraph Networks}}}, + shorttitle = {Wiring the {{World}}}, + author = {Müller, Simone}, + date = {2016-04-12}, + publisher = {Columbia University Press}, + doi = {10.7312/mlle17432}, + url = {https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7312/mlle17432/html}, + urldate = {2024-07-26}, + abstract = {Wiring the World is a cultural and social history that explores how the large Anglo-American cable companies won out over alternative visions. Through telegram prices, visions for world peace, scientific innovation, and the role of the nation-state, Simone M. Müller traces globalization's diverse paths and close ties to business and politics.}, + isbn = {978-0-231-54026-1}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/YL2WRUTZ/Müller - 2016 - Wiring the World The Social and Cultural Creation.pdf} +} + @inproceedings{muraliContinuousAuthenticationUsing2023, title = {Continuous {{Authentication Using Human-Induced Electric Potential}}}, booktitle = {Annual {{Computer Security Applications Conference}}}, @@ -1270,6 +2262,57 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Navas et al_2021_MTD, Where Art Thou.pdf} } +@inproceedings{nazReviewVariousAttack2020, + title = {A {{Review}} of {{Various Attack Methods}} on {{Air-Gapped Systems}}}, + booktitle = {2020 {{International Conference}} on {{Innovation}} and {{Intelligence}} for {{Informatics}}, {{Computing}} and {{Technologies}} ({{3ICT}})}, + author = {Naz, Mohammad Tazeem and Zeki, Ahmed M.}, + date = {2020-12}, + pages = {1--6}, + doi = {10.1109/3ICT51146.2020.9311995}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9311995}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {In the past air-gapped systems that are isolated from networks have been considered to be very secure. Yet there have been reports of such systems being breached. These breaches have shown to use unconventional means for communication also known as covert channels such as Acoustic, Electromagnetic, Magnetic, Electric, Optical, and Thermal to transfer data. In this paper, a review of various attack methods that can compromise an air-gapped system is presented along with a summary of how efficient and dangerous a particular method could be. The capabilities of each covert channel are listed to better understand the threat it poses and also some countermeasures to safeguard against such attack methods are mentioned. These attack methods have already been proven to work and awareness of such covert channels for data exfiltration is crucial in various industries.}, + eventtitle = {2020 {{International Conference}} on {{Innovation}} and {{Intelligence}} for {{Informatics}}, {{Computing}} and {{Technologies}} ({{3ICT}})}, + keywords = {Acoustics,air-gapped,attack methods,Cameras,covert channels,data leak,Electromagnetic radiation,exfiltrate,Fans,Magnetoacoustic effects,Malware,security breach,Universal Serial Bus}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Naz_Zeki_A Review of Various Attack Methods on Air-Gapped Systems.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CWS4WZPK/9311995.html} +} + +@online{nelsonLittleHelpMy2022, + title = {With a {{Little Help}} from {{My Friends}}: {{Transport Deniability}} for {{Instant Messaging}}}, + shorttitle = {With a {{Little Help}} from {{My Friends}}}, + author = {Nelson, Boel and Askarov, Aslan}, + date = {2022-02-04}, + eprint = {2202.02043}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {cs}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.02043}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Traffic analysis for instant messaging (IM) applications continues to pose an important privacy challenge. In particular, transport-level data can leak unintentional information about IM – such as who communicates with whom. Existing tools for metadata privacy have adoption obstacles, including the risks of being scrutinized for having a particular app installed, and performance overheads incompatible with mobile devices. We posit that resilience to traffic analysis must be directly supported by major IM services themselves, and must be done in a low-cost manner without breaking existing features. As a first step in this direction, we propose a hybrid messaging model that combines regular and deniable messages. We present a novel protocol for deniable instant messaging, which we call DenIM. DenIM is built on the principle that deniable messages can be made indistinguishable from regular messages with a little help from a user’s friends. Deniable messages’ network traffic can then be explained by a plausible cover story. DenIM achieves overhead proportional to the messages sent, as opposed to scaling with time or number of users. To show the effectiveness of DenIM, we implement a trace simulator, and show that DenIM’s deniability guarantees hold against strong adversaries such as internet service providers.}, + langid = {english}, + pubstate = {prepublished}, + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/MNTNWQW4/Nelson and Askarov - 2022 - With a Little Help from My Friends Transport Deni.pdf} +} + +@incollection{nielsenNewApproachPractical2012, + title = {A {{New Approach}} to {{Practical Active-Secure Two-Party Computation}}}, + booktitle = {Advances in {{Cryptology}} – {{CRYPTO}} 2012}, + author = {Nielsen, Jesper Buus and Nordholt, Peter Sebastian and Orlandi, Claudio and Burra, Sai Sheshank}, + editor = {Safavi-Naini, Reihaneh and Canetti, Ran}, + date = {2012}, + volume = {7417}, + pages = {681--700}, + publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg}, + location = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, + doi = {10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_40}, + url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_40}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {We propose a new approach to practical two-party computation secure against an active adversary. All prior practical protocols were based on Yao’s garbled circuits. We use an OT-based approach and get efficiency via OT extension in the random oracle model. To get a practical protocol we introduce a number of novel techniques for relating the outputs and inputs of OTs in a larger construction.}, + isbn = {978-3-642-32008-8 978-3-642-32009-5}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QEUPEH3C/Nielsen et al. - 2012 - A New Approach to Practical Active-Secure Two-Part.pdf} +} + @article{nikolopoulosOpticalSchemeCryptographic2019, title = {Optical Scheme for Cryptographic Commitments with Physical Unclonable Keys}, author = {Nikolopoulos, Georgios M.}, @@ -1324,6 +2367,144 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Nilges_2015_The Cryptographic Strength of Tamper-Proof Hardware.pdf} } +@book{niuLaserLogicState2014, + title = {Laser {{Logic State Imaging}} ({{LLSI}})}, + author = {Niu, Baohua and Khoo, Ms and Chapman, Mr and Chen, Mr and Bockelman, Mr}, + date = {2014-11-10}, + volume = {2014}, + doi = {10.31399/asm.cp.istfa2014p0065}, + abstract = {Infrared Emission Microscopy based logic state imaging, since its introduction in early 2000, has been an indispensable tool and technology in the advanced process technology development and design debug applications. Continuous Laser (1064nm and 1319nm lasers) based Signal Imaging and Probing (CW-SIP) Technology, since its introductions about 4 years ago, has been widely used for scan debug and probing work extensively. We report a new technology-LLSI that combines the better resolution (50\% better) and high signal to noise (SnR) of the CW-SIP with the unique capabilities of the IREM based LSI to enable a unique technology that extend LSI to low voltage (} +} + +@article{obermaierBreakingRestoringEmbedded, + title = {Breaking and {{Restoring Embedded System Security}} - {{From Practical Attacks}} to {{Novel PUF-Based Physical Security Enclosures}}}, + author = {Obermaier, Johannes}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/GNLH2H8J/Obermaier - Breaking and Restoring Embedded System Security - .pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{obermaierMeasurementSystemCapacitive2018, + title = {A Measurement System for Capacitive {{PUF-based}} Security Enclosures}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 55th {{Annual Design Automation Conference}}}, + author = {Obermaier, Johannes and Immler, Vincent and Hiller, Matthias and Sigl, Georg}, + date = {2018-06-24}, + pages = {1--6}, + publisher = {ACM}, + location = {San Francisco California}, + doi = {10.1145/3195970.3195976}, + url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3195970.3195976}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {Battery-backed security enclosures that are permanently monitored for penetration and tampering are common solutions for providing physical integrity to multi-chip embedded systems. This paper presents a well-tailored measurement system for a batteryless PUFbased capacitive enclosure. The key is derived from the PUF and encrypts the underlying system. We present a system concept for combined enclosure integrity verification and PUF evaluation. The system performs differential capacitive measurements inside the enclosure by applying stimulus signals with a 180◦ phase shift that isolate the local variation in the femtofarad range. The analog circuitry and corresponding digital signal processing chain perform precise PUF digitization, using a microcontroller-based digital lockin amplifier. The system’s measurement range is approximately ±73 fF, the conversion time per PUF node is less than 0.6 ms, and the raw data shows a measurement noise of 0.3 fF. This is the base for a high-entropy key generation while enabling a short system startup time. The system is scalable to the enclosure size and has been experimentally verified to extract information from 128 PUF nodes, using a system prototype. The results show that our concept forms a cornerstone of a novel batteryless PUF-based security enclosure.}, + eventtitle = {{{DAC}} '18: {{The}} 55th {{Annual Design Automation Conference}} 2018}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-5700-5}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/6RGSZ8PG/Obermaier et al. - 2018 - A measurement system for capacitive PUF-based secu.pdf} +} + +@article{oflynnPhaseModulationSide, + title = {Phase {{Modulation Side Channels}}: {{Jittery JTAG}} for {{On-Chip Voltage Measurements}}}, + author = {O’Flynn, Colin}, + abstract = {Measuring fluctuations of the clock phase was identified as a source of leakage in early electromagnetic side-channel investigations. Despite this, only recently was measuring the clock phase (or jitter) of digital signals (not electromagnetic signals) from a target used as a source of exploitable leakage. As the phase of a clock output will be related to signal propagation delay through the target, and this propagation delay is related to voltage, this means that most digital devices perform an unintended phase modulation (PM) of their internal voltage onto clock outputs.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/582N9AQB/O’Flynn - Phase Modulation Side Channels Jittery JTAG for O.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{ohHeySiriAre2018, + title = {Hey {{Siri}} – {{Are You There}}?: {{Jamming}} of {{Voice Commands Using}} the {{Resonance Effect}} ({{Work-in-Progress}})}, + shorttitle = {Hey {{Siri}} – {{Are You There}}?}, + booktitle = {2018 {{International Conference}} on {{Software Security}} and {{Assurance}} ({{ICSSA}})}, + author = {Oh, Taekkyung and Aiken, William and Kim, Hyoungshick}, + date = {2018-07}, + pages = {73--76}, + publisher = {IEEE}, + location = {Seoul, Korea (South)}, + doi = {10.1109/ICSSA45270.2018.00026}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9092296/}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + eventtitle = {2018 {{International Conference}} on {{Software Security}} and {{Assurance}} ({{ICSSA}})}, + isbn = {978-1-5386-9210-3} +} + +@online{orosaDataplantEnhancingSystem2019, + title = {Dataplant: {{Enhancing System Security}} with {{Low-Cost In-DRAM Value Generation Primitives}}}, + shorttitle = {Dataplant}, + author = {Orosa, Lois and Wang, Yaohua and Puddu, Ivan and Sadrosadati, Mohammad and Razavi, Kaveh and Gómez-Luna, Juan and Hassan, Hasan and Mansouri-Ghiasi, Nika and Tavakkol, Arash and Patel, Minesh and Kim, Jeremie and Seshadri, Vivek and Kang, Uksong and Ghose, Saugata and Azevedo, Rodolfo and Mutlu, Onur}, + date = {2019-11-05}, + eprint = {1902.07344}, + eprinttype = {arXiv}, + eprintclass = {cs}, + url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/1902.07344}, + urldate = {2024-07-02}, + abstract = {DRAM manufacturers have been prioritizing memory capacity, yield, and bandwidth for years, while trying to keep the design complexity as simple as possible. DRAM chips do not carry out any computation or other important functions, such as security. Processors implement most of the existing security mechanisms that protect the system against security threats, because 1) executing security mechanisms usually require non-trivial computational capabilities (e.g., encryption), and 2) commodity DRAM chips are not designed to perform computations or tasks other than data storage. In this work, we advocate for DRAM as a key component for providing security mechanisms to the system. To this end, we propose Dataplant, a new class of low-cost, high-performance, and reliable security primitives that can be integrated in commodity DRAM chips with minimal changes. The main idea of Dataplant is to slightly modify the internal DRAM timing signals to expose the inherent process variation found in all DRAM chips for generating unpredictable but reproducible values (e.g., keys) within DRAM. We use Dataplant to build two new security mechanisms. First, a new Dataplant-based physical unclonable function (PUF) with non-destructive read-out, low evaluation latency, robust responses, resiliency to temperature changes, and data-independent responses. Second, a new cold boot attack prevention mechanism that automatically destroys all data within DRAM on every power cycle with zero run-time energy and latency overheads. Using a combination of detailed simulations and experiments with 136 real commodity DRAM chips, we show that our Dataplant-based PUF has 1.8x higher throughput than the best state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs. We also demonstrate that our Dataplant-based cold boot attack protection mechanism is 19.5x faster and consumes 2.54x less energy when compared to existing mechanisms.}, + pubstate = {prepublished}, + keywords = {Computer Science - Cryptography and Security}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2019_Orosa et al_Dataplant.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z5JJPEM9/1902.html} +} + +@inproceedings{paleyActiveProtectionPCB2016, + title = {Active Protection against {{PCB}} Physical Tampering}, + booktitle = {2016 17th {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})}, + author = {Paley, Steven and Hoque, Tamzidul and Bhunia, Swarup}, + date = {2016-03}, + pages = {356--361}, + issn = {1948-3295}, + doi = {10.1109/ISQED.2016.7479227}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7479227/?arnumber=7479227}, + urldate = {2024-07-10}, + abstract = {A printed circuit board (PCB) acts as the backbone of any electronic system hardware by providing mechanical support and electrical connections to its active and passive components. Traditionally, the PCB of a system has been considered trusted and robust during field operation. However, there are numerous recent reports on physical tampering of PCB in the field for malicious alteration of its functionality (e.g. adding/replacing a component through soldering, snooping a trace, and bypassing a connection). Through such alteration, an adversary can leak secret information from PCB or bypass security protection implemented in a system. This paper presents a novel approach to detect tampering in a PCB after it is deployed and to actively prevent system operation when tampering is detected. To our knowledge, this is the first report on active protection against PCB tampering in field. The proposed autonomous monitoring and prevention can enable active defense against physical tampering of electronic hardware, thus maintaining the integrity of a system against various security issues arising from such tampering.}, + eventtitle = {2016 17th {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})}, + keywords = {Active Protection,Copper,Electrical resistance measurement,Games,Monitoring,Physical Tampering,Printed Circuit Board,Resistance,Security,Wires}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2016_Paley et al_Active protection against PCB physical tampering.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/5UH5JJZ6/7479227.html} +} + +@inproceedings{parvinOpticalProbingResistant2022, + title = {Toward {{Optical Probing Resistant Circuits}}: {{A Comparison}} of {{Logic Styles}} and {{Circuit Design Techniques}}}, + shorttitle = {Toward {{Optical Probing Resistant Circuits}}}, + booktitle = {2022 27th {{Asia}} and {{South Pacific Design Automation Conference}} ({{ASP-DAC}})}, + author = {Parvin, Sajjad and Krachenfels, Thilo and Tajik, Shahin and Seifert, Jean-Pierre and Torres, Frank Sill and Drechsler, Rolf}, + date = {2022-01}, + pages = {429--435}, + issn = {2153-697X}, + doi = {10.1109/ASP-DAC52403.2022.9712518}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9712518/?arnumber=9712518}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Laser-assisted side-channel analysis techniques, such as optical probing (OP), have been shown to pose a severe threat to secure hardware. While several countermeasures have been proposed in the literature, they can either be bypassed by an attacker or require a modification in the transistor's fabrication process, which is costly and complex. In this work, firstly, we propose a formulation for the caliber of reflected light from OP. Secondly, we propose circuit design techniques and logic styles to alleviate OP attacks based on our formulation. Finally, we compare several logic families and circuit design techniques in terms of performance and OP security merits. In this regard, we perform simulations to compare the optical beam interaction between the different logic gates. By utilizing our proposed circuit design techniques and dual-rail logic (DRL), the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the reflected light from OP is reduced significantly.}, + eventtitle = {2022 27th {{Asia}} and {{South Pacific Design Automation Conference}} ({{ASP-DAC}})}, + keywords = {Circuit synthesis,Logic gates,Optical design techniques,Optical device fabrication,Optical reflection,Resistance,Security}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Parvin et al_Toward Optical Probing Resistant Circuits.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/XUWVTUA4/9712518.html} +} + +@inproceedings{patelArithmeticBooleanSecret2020, + title = {Arithmetic and {{Boolean Secret Sharing MPC}} on {{FPGAs}} in the {{Data Center}}}, + booktitle = {2020 {{IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference}} ({{HPEC}})}, + author = {Patel, Rushi and Wolfe, Pierre-François and Munafo, Robert and Varia, Mayank and Herbordt, Martin}, + date = {2020-09}, + pages = {1--8}, + issn = {2643-1971}, + doi = {10.1109/HPEC43674.2020.9286159}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9286159/?arnumber=9286159}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is an important technique used to enable computation over confidential data from several sources. The public cloud provides a unique opportunity to enable MPC in a low latency environment. Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) hardware adoption allows for both MPC acceleration and utilization of low latency, high bandwidth communication networks that substantially improve the performance of MPC applications. In this work, we show how designing arithmetic and Boolean Multi-Party Computation gates for FPGAs in a cloud provide improvements to current MPC offerings and ease their use in applications such as machine learning. We focus on the usage of Secret Sharing MPC first designed by Araki et al [1] to design our FPGA MPC while also providing a comparison with those utilizing Garbled Circuits for MPC. We show that Secret Sharing MPC provides a better usage of cloud resources, specifically FPGA acceleration, than Garbled Circuits and is able to use at least a 10 × less computer resources as compared to the original design using CPUs.}, + eventtitle = {2020 {{IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference}} ({{HPEC}})}, + keywords = {Acceleration,Cloud computing,Cloud Service,Cryptography,Data Center,Field programmable gate arrays,FPGA,Hardware,Logic gates,Machine learning,Machine Learning,Matrix Multiplication,Multiparty Computation,Secret Sharing,Secure Computation}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Patel et al_Arithmetic and Boolean Secret Sharing MPC on FPGAs in the Data Center.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/JJSPUT5P/9286159.html} +} + +@article{patraABY2ImprovedMixedProtocol, + title = {{{ABY2}}.0: {{Improved Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-Party Computation}}}, + author = {Patra, Arpita and Schneider, Thomas and Suresh, Ajith and Yalame, Hossein}, + abstract = {Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) allows a set of mutually distrusting parties to jointly evaluate a function on their private inputs while maintaining input privacy. In this work, we improve semi-honest secure two-party computation (2PC) over rings, with a focus on the efficiency of the online phase.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RLBAU32H/Patra et al. - ABY2.0 Improved Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-Party C.pdf} +} + +@article{perrigTESLABroadcastAuthentication, + title = {The {{TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol}}}, + author = {Perrig, Adrian and Canetti, Ran and Tygar, J D and Song, Dawn}, + abstract = {One of the main challenges of securing broadcast communication is source authentication, or enabling receivers of broadcast data to verify that the received data really originates from the claimed source and was not modified en route. This problem is complicated by mutually untrusted receivers and unreliable communication environments where the sender does not retransmit lost packets.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QDJV4ERT/Perrig et al. - The TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol.pdf} +} + @incollection{pinkasPSIPaXoSFast2020, title = {{{PSI}} from {{PaXoS}}: {{Fast}}, {{Malicious Private Set Intersection}}}, shorttitle = {{{PSI}} from {{PaXoS}}}, @@ -1344,6 +2525,14 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2020_Pinkas et al_PSI from PaXoS.pdf} } +@article{piotrowskaLoopixAnonymitySystem, + title = {The {{Loopix Anonymity System}}}, + author = {Piotrowska, Ania M and Hayes, Jamie and Elahi, Tariq and Meiser, Sebastian and Danezis, George}, + abstract = {We present Loopix, a low-latency anonymous communication system that provides bi-directional ‘third-party’ sender and receiver anonymity and unobservability. Loopix leverages cover traffic and Poisson mixing—brief independent message delays—to provide anonymity and to achieve traffic analysis resistance against, including but not limited to, a global network adversary. Mixes and clients self-monitor and protect against active attacks via self-injected loops of traffic. The traffic loops also serve as cover traffic to provide stronger anonymity and a measure of sender and receiver unobservability. Loopix is instantiated as a network of Poisson mix nodes in a stratified topology with a low number of links, which serve to further concentrate cover traffic. Service providers mediate access in and out of the network to facilitate accounting and off-line message reception.}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Z6RH2ET2/Piotrowska et al. - The Loopix Anonymity System.pdf} +} + @article{pirandolaFundamentalLimitsRepeaterless2017, title = {Fundamental Limits of Repeaterless Quantum Communications}, author = {Pirandola, Stefano and Laurenza, Riccardo and Ottaviani, Carlo and Banchi, Leonardo}, @@ -1417,6 +2606,12 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/N2G8VMNP/Portmann - 2014 - Key Recycling in Authentication.pdf} } +@article{PositionPaperQuantum, + title = {Position {{Paper}} on {{Quantum Key Distribution}}}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/ZVE2HZTZ/Position Paper on Quantum Key Distribution.pdf} +} + @article{RenesasRA6T1Group, title = {Renesas {{RA6T1 Group User}}'s {{Manual}}: {{Hardware}}}, langid = {english}, @@ -1475,6 +2670,22 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/QQZ7V3G4/Rezmerita et al. - 2017 - A self and mutual inductance calculation resonator.pdf} } +@inproceedings{roySelftimedSensorsDetecting2022, + title = {Self-Timed {{Sensors}} for {{Detecting Static Optical Side Channel Attacks}}}, + booktitle = {2022 23rd {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})}, + author = {Roy, Sourav and Farheen, Tasnuva and Tajik, Shahin and Forte, Domenic}, + date = {2022-04}, + pages = {1--6}, + issn = {1948-3295}, + doi = {10.1109/ISQED54688.2022.9806217}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9806217/?arnumber=9806217}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Sophisticated optical side-channel attacks such as Laser Logic State Imaging (LLSI) can destroy an entire system’s security by extracting static signals. LLSI is based on chip failure analysis (FA) techniques and is conducted from the backside of an IC. It provides unlimited number of probes to observe static signals in the hands of an attacker. Several countermeasures have been proposed to prevent optical probing techniques like LLSI, but they have limitations such as complex fabrication steps, large area, etc. which makes them difficult to verify and implement. In this paper, we propose self-timed, CMOS-compatible sensors for easy-to-implement countermeasures to thwart LLSI attack. To conduct LLSI attack, the attacker needs to freeze the clock at a point of interest and modulate the voltage supply line at a known frequency. With these two attack surfaces in mind, we design and simulate clock freeze and voltage modulation detection sensors that can detect LLSI attacks with very high confidence.1}, + eventtitle = {2022 23rd {{International Symposium}} on {{Quality Electronic Design}} ({{ISQED}})}, + keywords = {Integrated optics,Optical device fabrication,Optical imaging,Optical sensors,Security,Side-channel attacks,Voltage}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Roy et al_Self-timed Sensors for Detecting Static Optical Side Channel Attacks.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/L8N5JEJF/9806217.html} +} + @article{ruchtiWhenDecoderHas2022, title = {When the {{Decoder Has}} to {{Look Twice}}: {{Glitching}} a {{PUF Error Correction}}}, shorttitle = {When the {{Decoder Has}} to {{Look Twice}}}, @@ -1510,6 +2721,22 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/9EWXN9MY/Ruhrmair et al. - 2015 - Virtual Proofs of Reality and their Physical Imple.pdf} } +@inproceedings{sadeqPrivacyBreachAndroid2022, + title = {Privacy {{Breach}} in {{Android Smartphone Through Inaudible Sound}}}, + booktitle = {2022 {{IEEE Wireless Communications}} and {{Networking Conference}} ({{WCNC}})}, + author = {Sadeq, Nafis and Hossain, Md. Shohrab}, + date = {2022-04}, + pages = {2441--2446}, + issn = {1558-2612}, + doi = {10.1109/WCNC51071.2022.9771721}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9771721}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The security and privacy of the Android system is an important research area due to the widespread use of Android devices. Most of the existing researches on this area focus on the mobile and wireless networks. Security breach through the speaker remains relatively less explored. In this work, we focus on potential security breaches in the Android system using ultrasonic channel in the speaker. We have proposed a dynamic vocabulary selection strategy to facilitate faster data transmission in ultrasonic side-channel attacks. We also propose a novel piecewise linear amplitude reduction technique that helps the system to achieve a higher bit-rate and higher amplitude for a long time. Our proposed system improves the bit-rate of the modulated audio by 27.5\% and maximum attack distance by 20\%. The improvement for the data transfer rate is 155\% for numeric data, 70\% for alpha-numeric data and 27.5\% for any ASCII character. We also propose a detection mechanism for similar attacks using Android log analysis.}, + eventtitle = {2022 {{IEEE Wireless Communications}} and {{Networking Conference}} ({{WCNC}})}, + keywords = {Android,Bandwidth,Conferences,Inaudible sound,malware,Privacy breach,Side-channel attacks,Transmitters,Ultrasonic security,Vocabulary,Wireless networks}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2022_Sadeq_Hossain_Privacy Breach in Android Smartphone Through Inaudible Sound.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/8EHLVEMJ/9771721.html} +} + @inproceedings{saeifDayAfterTomorrowPerformanceRadio2023, title = {The {{Day-After-Tomorrow}}: {{On}} the {{Performance}} of {{Radio Fingerprinting}} over {{Time}}}, shorttitle = {The {{Day-After-Tomorrow}}}, @@ -1558,6 +2785,26 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CPBIT3L7/google-s-threat-model-for-post-quantum-cryptography.html} } +@article{schoosJitSCAJitterbasedSideChannel2023, + title = {{{JitSCA}}: {{Jitter-based Side-Channel Analysis}} in {{Picoscale Resolution}}}, + shorttitle = {{{JitSCA}}}, + author = {Schoos, Kai and Meschkov, Sergej and Tahoori, Mehdi B. and Gnad, Dennis R. E.}, + date = {2023-06-09}, + journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, + volume = {2023}, + number = {3}, + pages = {294--320}, + issn = {2569-2925}, + doi = {10.46586/tches.v2023.i3.294-320}, + url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/10965}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {In safety and security conscious environments, isolated communication channels are often deemed necessary. Galvanically isolated communication channels are typically expected not to allow physical side-channel attacks through that channel. However, in this paper, we show that they can inadvertently leak side channel information in the form of minuscule jitter on the communication signal. We observe worst-case signal jitter within 54 ± 45 ps using an FPGA-based receiver employing a time-to-digital converter (TDC), which is a higher time resolution than a typical oscilloscope can measure, while in many other systems such measurements are also possible. A transmitter device runs a cryptographic accelerator, while we connect an FPGA on the receiver side and measure the signal jitter using a TDC. We can indeed show sufficient side-channel leakage in the jitter of the signal by performing a key recovery of an AES accelerator running on the transmitter. Furthermore, we compare this leakage to a power side channel also measured with a TDC and prove that the timing jitter alone contains sufficient side-channel information. While for an on-chip power analysis attack about 27k traces are needed for key recovery, our cross-device jitter-based attack only needs as few as 47k traces, depending on the setup. Galvanic isolation does not change that significantly. That is an increase by only 1.7x, showing that fine-grained jitter timing information can be a very potent attack vector even under galvanic isolation. In summary, we introduce a new side-channel attack vector that can leak information in many presumably secure systems. Communication channels can inadvertently leak information through tiny timing variations, known as signal jitter. This could affect millions of devices and needs to be considered.}, + issue = {3}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {galvanically isolated,jitter,power,side-channel,timing}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Schoos et al_2023_JitSCA.pdf} +} + @article{sculleyMachineLearningHighInterest, title = {Machine {{Learning}}: {{The High-Interest Credit Card}} of {{Technical Debt}}}, author = {Sculley, D and Holt, Gary and Golovin, Daniel and Davydov, Eugene and Phillips, Todd and Ebner, Dietmar and Chaudhary, Vinay and Young, Michael}, @@ -1566,6 +2813,42 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Sculley et al_Machine Learning.pdf} } +@article{selmkeApplicationTwoPhotonAbsorption2022, + title = {On the Application of {{Two-Photon Absorption}} for {{Laser Fault Injection}} Attacks: {{Pushing}} the Physical Boundaries for {{Laser-based Fault Injection}}}, + shorttitle = {On the Application of {{Two-Photon Absorption}} for {{Laser Fault Injection}} Attacks}, + author = {Selmke, Bodo and Pollanka, Maximilian and Duensing, Andreas and Strieder, Emanuele and Wen, Hayden and Mittermair, Michael and Kienberger, Reinhard and Sigl, Georg}, + date = {2022-08-31}, + journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, + pages = {862--885}, + issn = {2569-2925}, + doi = {10.46586/tches.v2022.i4.862-885}, + url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9843}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {Laser Fault Injection (LFI) is considered to be the most powerful semiinvasive fault injection method for implementation attacks on security devices. In this work we discuss for the first time the application of the nonlinear Two-Photon Absorption (TPA) effect for the purpose of LFI. Though TPA is an established technique in other areas, e.g. fluorescence microscopy, so far it did not receive any attention in the field of physical attack methods on integrated circuits. We show that TPA has several superior properties over the regular linear LFI method. The TPA effect allows to work on non-thinned devices without increasing the induced energy and hence the stress on the device. In contrast to regular LFI, the nonlinearity of the TPA effect leads to increased precision due to the steeper descent in intensity and also a vertically restricted photoelectric effect. By practical experiments, we demonstrate the general applicability of the method for a specific device and that unlike a regular LFI setup, TPA-LFI is capable to inject faults without triggering a latch-up effect. In addition we discuss the possible implications of TPA-LFI on various sensor-based countermeasures.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Countermeasures,Fault Attacks,Laser Fault Injection,Single-Photon Absorption,Two-Photon Absorption}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Selmke et al_2022_On the application of Two-Photon Absorption for Laser Fault Injection attacks.pdf} +} + +@article{shenDAENetMakingStrong2022, + title = {{{DAENet}}: {{Making Strong Anonymity Scale}} in a {{Fully Decentralized Network}}}, + shorttitle = {{{DAENet}}}, + author = {Shen, Tianxiang and Jiang, Jianyu and Jiang, Yunpeng and Chen, Xusheng and Qi, Ji and Zhao, Shixiong and Zhang, Fengwei and Luo, Xiapu and Cui, Heming}, + date = {2022-07}, + journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing}, + volume = {19}, + number = {4}, + pages = {2286--2303}, + issn = {1941-0018}, + doi = {10.1109/TDSC.2021.3052831}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9328493/?arnumber=9328493}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {Traditional anonymous networks (e.g., Tor) are vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks that monitor the whole network traffic to determine which users are communicating. To preserve user anonymity against traffic analysis attacks, the emerging mix networks mess up the order of packets through a set of centralized and explicit shuffling nodes. However, this centralized design of mix networks is insecure against targeted DoS attacks that can completely block these shuffling nodes. In this article, we present DAENet, an efficient mix network that resists both targeted DoS attacks and traffic analysis attacks with a new abstraction called Stealthy Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Network. The stealthy P2P network effectively hides the shuffling nodes used in a routing path into the whole network, such that adversaries cannot distinguish specific shuffling nodes and conduct targeted DoS attacks to block these nodes. In addition, to handle traffic analysis attacks, we leverage the confidentiality and integrity protection of Intel SGX to ensure trustworthy packet shuffles at each distributed host and use multiple routing paths to prevent adversaries from tracking and revealing user identities. We show that our system is scalable with moderate latency (2.2s) when running in a cluster of 10,000 participants and is robust in the case of machine failures, making it an attractive new design for decentralized anonymous communication. DAENet ’s code is released on https://github.com/hku-systems/DAENet.}, + eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Dependable}} and {{Secure Computing}}}, + keywords = {Cryptography,Denial-of-service attack,DoS attack,mix network,P2P network,Peer-to-peer computing,Relays,Resists,Routing,Scalable anonymous communication,Servers,SGX,traffic analysis attack}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Shen et al_2022_DAENet.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CJVFJ33M/9328493.html} +} + @article{shenThermalModelingDesign2020, title = {Thermal {{Modeling}} and {{Design Optimization}} of {{PCB Vias}} and {{Pads}}}, author = {Shen, Yanfeng and Wang, Huai and Blaabjerg, Frede and Zhao, Hui and Long, Teng}, @@ -1600,6 +2883,43 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/S2TLFNT7/Sifferman et al. - 2023 - Unlocking the Performance of Proximity Sensors by .pdf} } +@article{skorobogatovHardwareSecurityImplications2018, + title = {Hardware {{Security Implications}} of {{Reliability}}, {{Remanence}}, and {{Recovery}} in {{Embedded Memory}}}, + author = {Skorobogatov, Sergei}, + date = {2018-12-01}, + journaltitle = {Journal of Hardware and Systems Security}, + shortjournal = {J Hardw Syst Secur}, + volume = {2}, + number = {4}, + pages = {314--321}, + issn = {2509-3436}, + doi = {10.1007/s41635-018-0050-5}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-018-0050-5}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Secure semiconductor devices usually destroy key material on tamper detection. However, data remanence effect in SRAM and Flash/EEPROM makes secure erasure process more challenging. On the other hand, data integrity of the embedded memory is essential to mitigate fault attacks and Trojan malware. Data retention issues could influence the reliability of embedded systems. Some examples of such issues in industrial and automotive applications are presented. When it comes to the security of semiconductor devices, both data remanence and data retention issues could lead to possible data recovery by an attacker. This paper introduces a new power glitching technique that reduces the data remanence time in embedded SRAM from seconds to microseconds at almost no cost. This would definitely help in designing systems with better secret key guarding. Data remanence in non-volatile memory could be influenced in the same way. The effect of data remanence and data retention on hardware security is discussed and possible countermeasures are suggested. This should raise awareness among the designers of secure embedded systems.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Data remanence,Data retention,EEPROM,Flash,Glitching,Hardware security,PRNG,PUF,SRAM}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Skorobogatov_Hardware Security Implications of Reliability, Remanence, and Recovery in.pdf} +} + +@article{smithDesignOptimizationVoice2015, + title = {Design and {{Optimization}} of a {{Voice Coil Motor With}} a {{Rotary Actuator}} for an {{Ultrasound Scanner}}}, + author = {Smith, Kristopher J. and Graham, David J. and Neasham, Jeffrey A.}, + date = {2015-11}, + journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics}, + volume = {62}, + number = {11}, + pages = {7073--7078}, + issn = {1557-9948}, + doi = {10.1109/TIE.2015.2449780}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7132747/?arnumber=7132747}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {This paper proposes a new application for the rotary voice coil motor (VCM). In developing a low-cost ultrasound scanner for the developing world, an oscillating transducer is required to sweep over the skin. The ultrasound scanner must operate from a USB power supply in remote locations. The application requires a 3.3-N force on the coils of the motor to overcome the inertia of the skin. A proof-of-concept prototype motor with electronics has been designed, simulated, and tested. The VCM optimization is discussed in detail with the unique separation of the magnets being critical to reduce the axial bearing forces for this application.}, + eventtitle = {{{IEEE Transactions}} on {{Industrial Electronics}}}, + keywords = {3-D finite-element analysis (FEA),3D Finite-Element Analysis,Force,Magnetic flux leakage,Magnetic levitation,Magnetic separation,Optimization,Permanent Magnet (PM) Motor,Permanent-magnet (PM) motor,rotary actuator,Rotary Actuator,Saturation magnetization,Ultrasonic imaging,voice coil motor (VCM),Voice Coil Motor (VCM)}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2015_Smith et al_Design and Optimization of a Voice Coil Motor With a Rotary Actuator for an.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/PKJDFUKZ/7132747.html} +} + @report{smithRobustInexactGeometric, title = {Towards Robust Inexact Geometric Computation}, author = {Smith, Julian M.}, @@ -1611,6 +2931,40 @@ abstract = {Geometric algorithms implemented using rounded arithmetic are prone to robustness problems. Geometric algorithms are often a mix of arithmetic and combinatorial computations, arising from the need to create geometric data structures that are themselves a complex mix of numerical and combinatorial data. Decisions that influence the topology of a geometric structure are made on the basis of certain arithmetic calculations, but the inexactness of these calculations may lead to inconsistent decisions, causing the algorithm to produce a topologically invalid result or to fail catastrophically. The research reported here investigates ways to produce robust algorithms with inexact computation. I present two algorithms for operations on piecewise linear (polygonal/polyhedral) shapes. Both algorithms are topologically robust, meaning that they are guaranteed to generate a topologically valid result from a topologically valid input, irrespective of numerical errors in the computations. The first algorithm performs the Boolean operation in 3D, and also in 2D. The main part of this algorithm is a series of interdependent operations. The relationship between these operations ensures a consistency in these operations, which, I prove, guarantees the generation of a shape representation with valid topology. The basic algorithm may generate geometric artifacts such as gaps and slivers, which generally can be removed by a data-smoothing post-process. The second algorithm presented performs simplification in 2D, converting a geometrically invalid (but topologically valid) shape representation into one that is fully valid. This algorithm is based on a variant of the Bentley-Ottmann sweep line algorithm, but with additional rules to handle situations not possible under an exact implementation. Both algorithms are presented in the context of what is required of an algorithm in order for it to be classed as robust in some sense. I explain why the formulaic approach used for the Boolean algorithm cannot readily be used for the simplification process. I also give essential code details for a C++ implementation of the 2D simplification algorithm, and discuss the results of extreme tests designed to show up any problems. Finally, I discuss floating-point arithmetic, present error analysis for the floating-point computation of the intersection point between two segments in 2D, and discuss how such errors affect both the simplification algorithm and the basic Boolean algorithm in 2D.} } +@inproceedings{songPOSTERInaudibleVoice2017, + title = {{{POSTER}}: {{Inaudible Voice Commands}}}, + shorttitle = {{{POSTER}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, + author = {Song, Liwei and Mittal, Prateek}, + date = {2017-10-30}, + pages = {2583--2585}, + publisher = {ACM}, + location = {Dallas Texas USA}, + doi = {10.1145/3133956.3138836}, + url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3133956.3138836}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Voice assistants like Siri enable us to control IoT devices conveniently with voice commands, however, they also provide new attack opportunities for adversaries. Previous papers attack voice assistants with obfuscated voice commands by leveraging the gap between speech recognition system and human voice perception. The limitation is that these obfuscated commands are audible and thus conspicuous to device owners. In this poster, we propose a novel mechanism to directly attack the microphone used for sensing voice data with inaudible voice commands. We show that the adversary can exploit the microphone’s non-linearity and play welldesigned inaudible ultrasounds to cause the microphone to record normal voice commands, and thus control the victim device inconspicuously. We demonstrate via end-to-end real-world experiments that our inaudible voice commands can attack an Android phone and an Amazon Echo device with high success rates at a range of 2-3 meters.}, + eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '17: 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-4946-8}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/DVUMANPK/Song and Mittal - 2017 - POSTER Inaudible Voice Commands.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{sozioPatchableHardwareSecurity2021, + title = {Patchable {{Hardware Security Module}} ({{PHaSM}}) for {{Extending FPGA Root-of-Trust Capabilities}}}, + booktitle = {2021 {{IEEE Physical Assurance}} and {{Inspection}} of {{Electronics}} ({{PAINE}})}, + author = {Sozio, Christopher and Jordan, Zachary and Skipper, Grant and Lukefahr, Andrew and Duncan, Adam}, + date = {2021-11}, + pages = {1--8}, + doi = {10.1109/PAINE54418.2021.9707698}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9707698/?arnumber=9707698}, + urldate = {2024-07-10}, + abstract = {Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are re-programmable hardware devices widely used in consumer and defense applications. Their specific functionality is determined by programming the FPGA with a configuration file, or bitstream, which often occurs at bootup. FPGAs rely on a hardware Root-of-Trust (RoT) to verify the authenticity of these (re)programming attempts. Any vulnerability in an FPGA’s RoT enables adversarial (re)programming, tampering, and information extraction from the FPGA. Unlike software, when hardware RoT vulnerabilities are exposed the FPGA cannot be patched, but remains forever vulnerable to exploit.This work assumes a hardware RoT on an FPGA will be compromised at some point by an adversary. We propose incorporating a second, patchable, layer of security to prevent adversarial attacks on FPGAs, even those with potentially compromised hardware RoT schemes. To accomplish this, we present Patchable Hardware Security Module (PHaSM), a patchable hybrid security framework that enables a secondary RoT. PHaSM implements a small bootloader in the FPGA’s reconfigurable fabric and incorporates user-defined authentication and decryption schemes. The bootloader loads an application configuration, PHaSM then decrypts and authenticates it using the user-defined schemes, and programs the application design into the remaining FPGA fabric using partial reconfiguration. Should the user-defined security scheme become vulnerable, a new security scheme can be incorporated without modifying the original application design.}, + eventtitle = {2021 {{IEEE Physical Assurance}} and {{Inspection}} of {{Electronics}} ({{PAINE}})}, + keywords = {Authentication,Bitstream,Fabrics,FPGA,Hardware,Information retrieval,Inspection,Programming,Reconfiguration,Security,Software}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2021_Sozio et al_Patchable Hardware Security Module (PHaSM) for Extending FPGA Root-of-Trust.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/D5BLNRV7/9707698.html} +} + @article{sutardjaIsolatorLessNearFieldRFID2018, title = {Isolator-{{Less Near-Field RFID Reader}} for {{Sub-Cranial Powering}}/{{Data Link}} of {{Millimeter-Sized Implants}}}, author = {Sutardja, Christopher and Rabaey, Jan M.}, @@ -1673,6 +3027,53 @@ langid = {english} } +@inproceedings{vanstrydonckCHERITrEEFlexibleEnclaves2023, + title = {{{CHERI-TrEE}}: {{Flexible}} Enclaves on Capability Machines}, + shorttitle = {{{CHERI-TrEE}}}, + booktitle = {2023 {{IEEE}} 8th {{European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})}, + author = {Van Strydonck, Thomas and Noorman, Job and Jackson, Jennifer and Alves Dias, Leonardo and Vanderstraeten, Robin and Oswald, David and Piessens, Frank and Devriese, Dominique}, + date = {2023-07}, + pages = {1143--1159}, + doi = {10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00070}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10190507/?arnumber=10190507}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {This paper studies the integration of two successful hardware-supported security mechanisms: capabilities and enclaved execution. Capabilities are a powerful and flexible security mechanism for implementing fine-grained memory access control and compartmentalizing untrusted or buggy software components. Capabilities have a long history but have gained significant momentum recently, as evidenced by ARM’s experimental Morello processor that supports the Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI). Enclaved execution is a popular mechanism for dynamically creating Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), called enclaves. Enclaves are isolated execution contexts that protect the integrity and confidentiality of software in the enclave (even against compromised system software) and that support attestation.Integrating capabilities and enclaved execution in a single processor is challenging because they overlap partially in their security objectives, and a clean integration should unify the way in which these overlapping objectives are achieved. In addition, it is not obvious how attestation should interact with capabilities. In this paper, we propose CHERI-TrEE: a novel design for a processor that cleanly integrates support for both capabilities and enclaved execution. CHERI-TrEE targets low-end embedded systems without virtual memory. We show that CHERI-TrEE is greater than the sum of its parts by showing how it naturally supports useful features that have traditionally been hard to support in enclaved execution, like dynamically growing and shrinking enclaves, non-contiguous and nested enclaves, sharing of memory between enclaves etc. We implement our proposal both in hardware on a RISC-V processor, as well as in a small software hypervisor on top of ARM Morello, and evaluate impact on performance and hardware resources.}, + eventtitle = {2023 {{IEEE}} 8th {{European Symposium}} on {{Security}} and {{Privacy}} ({{EuroS}}\&{{P}})}, + keywords = {Access control,ARM Morello,capability machines,CHERI,CHERI-RISC-V,Context,Embedded systems,enclaves,Hardware,Reduced instruction set computing,System software,TEE,trusted execution,Virtual machine monitors}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Van Strydonck et al_2023_CHERI-TrEE.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RZGRHCII/10190507.html} +} + +@inproceedings{vasileActiveTamperDetection2017, + title = {Active Tamper Detection Circuit Based on the Analysis of Pulse Response in Conductive Mesh}, + booktitle = {2017 40th {{International Spring Seminar}} on {{Electronics Technology}} ({{ISSE}})}, + author = {Vasile, Daniel-Ciprian and Svasta, Paul and Codreanu, Norocel and Safta, Mariana}, + date = {2017-05}, + pages = {1--6}, + issn = {2161-2536}, + doi = {10.1109/ISSE.2017.8000987}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8000987/?arnumber=8000987}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Tamper detection circuits provide the first and most important defensive wall in protecting electronic modules containing security data. A widely used procedure is to cover the entire module with a foil containing fine conductive mesh, which detects intrusion attempts. Detection circuits are further classified as passive or active. Passive circuits have the advantage of low power consumption, however they are unable to detect small variations in the conductive mesh parameters. Since modern tools provide an upper leverage over the passive method, the most efficient way to protect security modules is thus to use active circuits. The active tamper detection circuits are typically probing the conductive mesh with short pulses, analyzing its response in terms of delay and shape. The method proposed in this paper generates short pulses at one end of the mesh and analyzes the response at the other end. Apart from measuring pulse delay, the analysis includes a frequency domain characterization of the system, determining whether there has been an intrusion or not, by comparing it to a reference (un-tampered with) spectrum. The novelty of this design is the combined analysis, in time and frequency domains, of the small variations in mesh characteristic parameters.}, + eventtitle = {2017 40th {{International Spring Seminar}} on {{Electronics Technology}} ({{ISSE}})}, + keywords = {Clocks,Delays,Frequency-domain analysis,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,Security,Shape}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2017_Vasile et al_Active tamper detection circuit based on the analysis of pulse response in2.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/CY2XYJWB/8000987.html} +} + +@inproceedings{vasileImprovedTamperDetection2016, + title = {Improved Tamper Detection Circuit Based on Linear-Feedback Shift Register}, + booktitle = {2016 {{IEEE}} 22nd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})}, + author = {Vasile, D. C. and Marghescu, A. and Svasta, P.}, + date = {2016-10}, + pages = {130--133}, + doi = {10.1109/SIITME.2016.7777261}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7777261/?arnumber=7777261}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The paper presents an improved method to detect tamper intrusions based on an active circuit. It is composed of a logical part, a microcontroller, capable of generating pulses that follow the rule of a linear-feedback shift register (LFSR), and an analogical part made of a mesh network, used to cover secure modules, and a pulse forming circuit. Pulses resulted from this forming circuit are analyzed by the microcontroller to determine the durations between pulses and the durations of pulses. The novelty of this method is that the pulses are generated synchronously at both ends of the mesh network in order to prevent any attempts of an attacker to break the wire of the mesh network and to simulate the generation of pulses.}, + eventtitle = {2016 {{IEEE}} 22nd {{International Symposium}} for {{Design}} and {{Technology}} in {{Electronic Packaging}} ({{SIITME}})}, + keywords = {active,Copper,Delays,Generators,LFSR,mesh,Mesh networks,Microcontrollers,Pins,Resistance,security,tamper}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2016_Vasile et al_Improved tamper detection circuit based on linear-feedback shift register.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/RRHPBYLR/7777261.html} +} + @inproceedings{voloshynovskiyInformationtheoreticAnalysisElectronic2006, title = {Information-Theoretic Analysis of Electronic and Printed Document Authentication}, author = {Voloshynovskiy, Sviatoslav and Koval, Oleksiy and Villan, Renato and Topak, Emre and Vila Forcén, José Emilio and Deguillaume, Frederic and Rytsar, Yuriy and Pun, Thierry}, @@ -1706,6 +3107,23 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2HCQ4S6I/Vu et al. - 2020 - Design and Performance of Relay-Assisted Satellite.pdf} } +@inproceedings{wangBernoulliHoneywords2024, + title = {Bernoulli {{Honeywords}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + author = {Wang, Ke Coby and Reiter, Michael K.}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {Internet Society}, + location = {San Diego, CA, USA}, + doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.23295}, + url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-295-paper.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Decoy passwords, or “honeywords,” planted in a credential database can alert a site to its breach if ever submitted in a login attempt. To be effective, some honeywords must appear at least as likely to be user-chosen passwords as the real ones, and honeywords must be very difficult to guess without having breached the database, to prevent false breach alarms. These goals have proved elusive, however, for heuristic honeyword generation algorithms. In this paper we explore an alternative strategy in which the defender treats honeyword selection as a Bernoulli process in which each possible password (except the user-chosen one) is selected as a honeyword independently with a fixed probability. We show how Bernoulli honeywords can be integrated into two existing system designs for leveraging honeywords: one based on a honeychecker that stores the secret index of the user-chosen password in the list of account passwords, and another that does not leverage secret state at all. We show that Bernoulli honeywords enable analytic derivation of false breach-detection probabilities irrespective of what information the attacker gathers about the sites’ users; that their true and false breach-detection probabilities demonstrate compelling efficacy; and that they can even enable performance improvements in modern honeyword system designs.}, + eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VP5799QI/Wang and Reiter - 2024 - Bernoulli Honeywords.pdf} +} + @article{wangCascadingAttackTrustedrelay2021, title = {Cascading Attack on Trusted-Relay Quantum Key Distribution Networks}, author = {Wang, Jian and Liu, Xing-tong}, @@ -1801,6 +3219,58 @@ langid = {english} } +@inproceedings{wernerTransparentMemoryEncryption2017, + title = {Transparent Memory Encryption and Authentication}, + booktitle = {2017 27th {{International Conference}} on {{Field Programmable Logic}} and {{Applications}} ({{FPL}})}, + author = {Werner, Mario and Unterluggauer, Thomas and Schilling, Robert and Schaffenrath, David and Mangard, Stefan}, + date = {2017-09}, + pages = {1--6}, + publisher = {IEEE}, + location = {Ghent, Belgium}, + doi = {10.23919/FPL.2017.8056797}, + url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8056797/}, + urldate = {2024-07-02}, + abstract = {Security features of modern (SoC) FPGAs permit to protect the confidentiality of hard- and software IP when the devices are powered off as well as to validate the authenticity of IP when being loaded at startup. However, these approaches are insufficient since attackers with physical access can also perform attacks during runtime, demanding for additional security measures. In particular, RAM used by modern (SoC) FPGAs is under threat since RAM stores software IP as well as all kinds of other sensitive information during runtime.}, + eventtitle = {2017 27th {{International Conference}} on {{Field Programmable Logic}} and {{Applications}} ({{FPL}})}, + isbn = {978-90-90-30428-1}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/2D23R8P8/Werner et al. - 2017 - Transparent memory encryption and authentication.pdf} +} + +@article{wuGenericServeraidedSecure2022, + title = {Generic Server-Aided Secure Multi-Party Computation in Cloud Computing}, + author = {Wu, Yulin and Wang, Xuan and Susilo, Willy and Yang, Guomin and Jiang, Zoe L. and Yiu, Siu-Ming and Wang, Hao}, + date = {2022-01-01}, + journaltitle = {Computer Standards \& Interfaces}, + shortjournal = {Computer Standards \& Interfaces}, + volume = {79}, + pages = {103552}, + issn = {0920-5489}, + doi = {10.1016/j.csi.2021.103552}, + url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0920548921000477}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Cloud computing has become one of the most popular distributed computing paradigms in recent years. With its advantages of low cost, on-demand flexibility, and high data processing abilities, more and more enterprises have adopted the cloud computing paradigm to build up their IT infrastructure. By performing collaborative computation tasks (e.g., big data analysis tasks) with multiple datasets of different correlated enterprises in cloud computing, the generated valuable information will provide the enterprises with higher productivity and financial gains. However, due to the privacy concerns from the enterprises, how to efficiently enable them to achieve secure multi-party joint datasets analysis in cloud computing without leaking their own private dataset becomes a critical but challenging problem for the enterprises. In this paper, focusing on securely performing any collaborative computation task in cloud computing, we construct a generic server-aided secure multi-party computation protocol to tackle the problem. Our solution can provide security guarantee in the setting where at most n-1 client parties are malicious while the server is semi-honest and there is no collusion between the server and clients. The security and experimental performance analysis show that this work is currently the most efficient server-aided secure multi-party computation protocol with the same security guarantee compared with all the previous works to the best of our knowledge.}, + keywords = {Cloud computing,Garbled circuit,Secure multi-party computation,Server-aided computation} +} + +@inproceedings{xiaoHardwareFingerprintAccess2024, + title = {From {{Hardware Fingerprint}} to {{Access Token}}: {{Enhancing}} the {{Authentication}} on {{IoT Devices}}}, + shorttitle = {From {{Hardware Fingerprint}} to {{Access Token}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + author = {Xiao, Yue and He, Yi and Zhang, Xiaoli and Wang, Qian and Xie, Renjie and Sun, Kun and Xu, Ke and Li, Qi}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {Internet Society}, + location = {San Diego, CA, USA}, + doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.241231}, + url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-1231-paper.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The proliferation of consumer IoT products in our daily lives has raised the need for secure device authentication and access control. Unfortunately, these resource-constrained devices typically use token-based authentication, which is vulnerable to token compromise attacks that allow attackers to impersonate the devices and perform malicious operations by stealing the access token. Using hardware fingerprints to secure their authentication is a promising way to mitigate these threats. However, once attackers have stolen some hardware fingerprints (e.g., via MitM attacks), they can bypass the hardware authentication by training a machine learning model to mimic fingerprints or by reusing these fingerprints to craft forged requests.}, + eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/DNUS4DNE/Xiao et al. - 2024 - From Hardware Fingerprint to Access Token Enhanci.pdf} +} + @article{xuMeasurementdeviceindependentQuantumCryptography2015, title = {Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Cryptography}, author = {Xu, Feihu and Curty, Marcos and Qi, Bing and Lo, Hoi-Kwong}, @@ -1840,6 +3310,36 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Xu et al_2020_Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices.pdf} } +@article{yamashitaRedshiftManipulatingSignal2022, + title = {Redshift: {{Manipulating Signal Propagation Delay}} via {{Continuous-Wave Lasers}}}, + shorttitle = {Redshift}, + author = {Yamashita, Kohei and Cyr, Benjamin and Fu, Kevin and Burleson, Wayne and Sugawara, Takeshi}, + date = {2022-08-31}, + journaltitle = {IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems}, + pages = {463--489}, + issn = {2569-2925}, + doi = {10.46586/tches.v2022.i4.463-489}, + url = {https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9828}, + urldate = {2024-07-15}, + abstract = {We propose a new laser injection attack Redshift that manipulates signal propagation delay, allowing for precise control of oscillator frequencies and other behaviors in delay-sensitive circuits. The target circuits have a significant sensitivity to light, and a low-power continuous-wave laser, similar to a laser pointer, is sufficient for the attack. This is in contrast to previous fault injection attacks that use highpowered laser pulses to flip digital bits. This significantly reduces the cost of the attack and extends the range of possible attackers. Moreover, the attack potentially evades sensor-based countermeasures configured for conventional pulse lasers. To demonstrate Redshift, we target ring-oscillator and arbiter PUFs that are used in cryptographic applications. By precisely controlling signal propagation delays within these circuits, an attacker can control the output of a PUF to perform a state-recovery attack and reveal a secret key. We finally discuss the physical causality of the attack and potential countermeasures.}, + langid = {english}, + keywords = {Delay-Sensitive Circuits,Laser Fault Injection,Oscillator,Physically Unclonable Function}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Yamashita et al_2022_Redshift.pdf} +} + +@article{yanFeasibilityInjectingInaudible2019, + title = {The {{Feasibility}} of {{Injecting Inaudible Voice Commands}} to {{Voice Assistants}}}, + author = {Yan, Chen and Zhang, Guoming and Ji, Xiaoyu and Zhang, Tianchen and Zhang, Taimin and Xu, Wenyuan}, + date = {2019}, + journaltitle = {IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing}, + shortjournal = {IEEE Trans. Dependable and Secure Comput.}, + pages = {1--1}, + issn = {1545-5971, 1941-0018, 2160-9209}, + doi = {10.1109/TDSC.2019.2906165}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8669818/}, + urldate = {2024-07-25} +} + @article{yangFPGABasedLDPCDecoder2021, title = {An {{FPGA-Based LDPC Decoder With Ultra-Long Codes}} for {{Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution}}}, author = {Yang, Shen-Shen and Liu, Jian-Qiang and Lu, Zhen-Guo and Bai, Zeng-Liang and Wang, Xu-Yang and Li, Yong-Min}, @@ -1893,6 +3393,42 @@ file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/Q2LQVJM7/Yu et al. - 2022 - Secret-Key Provisioning With Collaborative Routing.pdf} } +@inproceedings{zeppelzauerSoniControlMobileUltrasonic2018, + title = {{{SoniControl}} - {{A Mobile Ultrasonic Firewall}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 26th {{ACM}} International Conference on {{Multimedia}}}, + author = {Zeppelzauer, Matthias and Ringot, Alexis and Taurer, Florian}, + date = {2018-10-15}, + series = {{{MM}} '18}, + pages = {1250--1252}, + publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, + location = {New York, NY, USA}, + doi = {10.1145/3240508.3241393}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3240508.3241393}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {The exchange of data between mobile devices in the near-ultrasonic frequency band is a new promising technology for near field communication (NFC) but also raises a number of privacy concerns. We present the first ultrasonic firewall that reliably detects ultrasonic communication and provides the user with effective means to prevent hidden data exchange. This demonstration showcases a new media-based communication technology ("data over audio") together with its related privacy concerns. It enables users to (i) interactively test out and experience ultrasonic information exchange and (ii) shows how to protect oneself against unwanted tracking.}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-5665-7}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2018_Zeppelzauer et al_SoniControl - A Mobile Ultrasonic Firewall.pdf} +} + +@inproceedings{zhangDolphinAttackInaudibleVoice2017, + title = {{{DolphinAttack}}: {{Inaudible Voice Commands}}}, + shorttitle = {{{DolphinAttack}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, + author = {Zhang, Guoming and Yan, Chen and Ji, Xiaoyu and Zhang, Tianchen and Zhang, Taimin and Xu, Wenyuan}, + date = {2017-10-30}, + pages = {103--117}, + publisher = {ACM}, + location = {Dallas Texas USA}, + doi = {10.1145/3133956.3134052}, + url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3133956.3134052}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Speech recognition (SR) systems such as Siri or Google Now have become an increasingly popular human-computer interaction method, and have turned various systems into voice controllable systems (VCS). Prior work on attacking VCS shows that the hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to people can control the systems. Hidden voice commands, though ‘hidden’, are nonetheless audible. In this work, we design a completely inaudible attack, DolphinAttack, that modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers (e.g., f {$>$} 20 kHz) to achieve inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits, the modulated lowfrequency audio commands can be successfully demodulated, recovered, and more importantly interpreted by the speech recognition systems. We validate DolphinAttack on popular speech recognition systems, including Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Huawei HiVoice, Cortana and Alexa. By injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, we show a few proof-of-concept attacks, which include activating Siri to initiate a FaceTime call on iPhone, activating Google Now to switch the phone to the airplane mode, and even manipulating the navigation system in an Audi automobile. We propose hardware and software defense solutions. We validate that it is feasible to detect DolphinAttack by classifying the audios using supported vector machine (SVM), and suggest to re-design voice controllable systems to be resilient to inaudible voice command attacks.}, + eventtitle = {{{CCS}} '17: 2017 {{ACM SIGSAC Conference}} on {{Computer}} and {{Communications Security}}}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-4946-8}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/SXDU6E5J/Zhang et al. - 2017 - DolphinAttack Inaudible Voice Commands.pdf} +} + @article{zhangLargeScaleQuantum2018, title = {Large Scale Quantum Key Distribution: Challenges and Solutions [{{Invited}}]}, shorttitle = {Large Scale Quantum Key Distribution}, @@ -1910,3 +3446,56 @@ langid = {english}, file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/Zhang et al_2018_Large scale quantum key distribution.pdf} } + +@article{zhangPerformanceEnhancementSubSampling2007, + title = {Performance {{Enhancement}} of a {{Sub-Sampling Circuit}} for {{Ultra-Wideband Signal Processing}}}, + author = {Zhang, Cemin and Fathy, Aly E. and Mahfouz, Mohamed}, + date = {2007-12}, + journaltitle = {IEEE Microwave and Wireless Components Letters}, + volume = {17}, + number = {12}, + pages = {873--875}, + issn = {1558-1764}, + doi = {10.1109/LMWC.2007.910500}, + url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4385758/?arnumber=4385758}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {An ultra-wideband (UWB) sampling mixer has been developed based on utilizing the combined advantages of two known circuit topologies: a wideband balun and a balanced-feed mixer. The developed sampler is integrated with a step-recovery diode strobe-step generator to sub-sample UWB signals. The fabricated sub-sampler demonstrated a 3.5-dB radio frequency to intermediate frequency (RF-IF) conversion loss up to 1 GHz (without the IF amplification), and a wide 3 dB bandwidth that exceeded 3.5-GHz. It has a reduced spurious level of better than -38 dBc, a lower sensitivity to the Schottky diode-placement, an excellent input match, and good isolation.}, + eventtitle = {{{IEEE Microwave}} and {{Wireless Components Letters}}}, + keywords = {Circuit topology,Frequency conversion,Impedance matching,Mixers,Radio frequency,Sampler,sampling mixer,Schottky diodes,Signal generators,Signal processing,Signal sampling,step recovery diode (SRD),strobe generator,Ultra wideband technology,ultra-wideband (UWB)}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Sync/Research/Zotero/2007_Zhang et al_Performance Enhancement of a Sub-Sampling Circuit for Ultra-Wideband Signal.pdf;/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/62VKLVBN/4385758.html} +} + +@inproceedings{zhouPPMLACHighPerformance2022, + title = {{{PPMLAC}}: High Performance Chipset Architecture for Secure Multi-Party Computation}, + shorttitle = {{{PPMLAC}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings of the 49th {{Annual International Symposium}} on {{Computer Architecture}}}, + author = {Zhou, Xing and Xu, Zhilei and Wang, Cong and Gao, Mingyu}, + date = {2022-06-11}, + series = {{{ISCA}} '22}, + pages = {87--101}, + publisher = {Association for Computing Machinery}, + location = {New York, NY, USA}, + doi = {10.1145/3470496.3527392}, + url = {https://doi.org/10.1145/3470496.3527392}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Privacy issue is a main concern restricting data sharing and cross-organization collaborations. While Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning techniques such as Multi-Party Computations (MPC), Homomorphic Encryption, and Federated Learning are proposed to solve this problem, no solution exists with both strong security and high performance to run large-scale, complex machine learning models. This paper presents PPMLAC, a novel chipset architecture to accelerate MPC, which combines MPC's strong security and hardware's high performance, eliminates the communication bottleneck from MPC, and achieves several orders of magnitudes speed up over software-based MPC. It is carefully designed to only rely on a minimum set of simple hardware components in the trusted domain, thus is robust against side-channel attacks and malicious adversaries. Our FPGA prototype can run mainstream large-scale ML models like ResNet in near real-time under a practical network environment with non-negligible latency, which is impossible for existing MPC solutions.}, + isbn = {978-1-4503-8610-4} +} + +@inproceedings{zhouPrintListenerUncoveringVulnerability2024, + title = {{{PrintListener}}: {{Uncovering}} the {{Vulnerability}} of {{Fingerprint Authentication}} via the {{Finger Friction Sound}}}, + shorttitle = {{{PrintListener}}}, + booktitle = {Proceedings 2024 {{Network}} and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + author = {Zhou, Man and Su, Shuao and Wang, Qian and Li, Qi and Zhou, Yuting and Ma, Xiaojing and Li, Zhengxiong}, + date = {2024}, + publisher = {Internet Society}, + location = {San Diego, CA, USA}, + doi = {10.14722/ndss.2024.24618}, + url = {https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-618-paper.pdf}, + urldate = {2024-07-25}, + abstract = {Fingerprint authentication has been extensively employed in contemporary identity verification systems owing to its rapidity and cost-effectiveness. Due to its widespread use, fingerprint leakage may cause sensitive information theft, enormous economic and personnel losses, and even a potential compromise of national security. As a fingerprint that can coincidentally match a specific proportion of the overall fingerprint population, MasterPrint rings the alarm bells for the security of fingerprint authentication. In this paper, we propose a new side-channel attack on the minutiae-based Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), called PrintListener, which leverages users’ fingertip swiping actions on the screen to extract fingerprint pattern features (the first-level features) and synthesizes a stronger targeted PatternMasterPrint with potential second-level features. The attack scenario of PrintListener is extensive and covert. It only needs to record users’ fingertip friction sound and can be launched by leveraging a large number of social media platforms. Extensive experimental results in realworld scenarios show that Printlistener can significantly improve the attack potency of MasterPrint.}, + eventtitle = {Network and {{Distributed System Security Symposium}}}, + isbn = {978-1-891562-93-8}, + langid = {english}, + file = {/home/jaseg/Zotero/storage/VQFNGMWQ/Zhou et al. - 2024 - PrintListener Uncovering the Vulnerability of Fin.pdf} +}