From 7ec7b56de1de078a7f465bcc78e331173e7d79d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: jaseg <git@jaseg.de>
Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 13:01:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] WIP

---
 paper.tex | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/paper.tex b/paper.tex
index db36a35..590925a 100644
--- a/paper.tex
+++ b/paper.tex
@@ -59,10 +59,11 @@
     implementations exist yet. Current practice for long-range QKD networks use physically trusted repeater stations
     that convert QKD signals to (insecure) classical signals and back.
 
-    In this paper, we outline an application of the IHSM approach first proposed by \textcite{gotteCantTouchThis2022} to
-    QKD that bootstraps a physically secure repeater node. At the core of our proposal is a work-in-progress optical
-    passthrough connecting multiple optical fibers from the payload through the mesh to the outside world. Our design is
-    low-cost, scales to dozens of optical fibers and allows the joint pass-through of electrical connections.
+    In this paper, we outline an application of the IHSM approach first proposed by \textcite{gotteCantTouchThis2022}
+    bootstrapping a physically secure QKD repeater node. At the core of our proposal is a work-in-progress optical
+    passthrough connecting multiple optical fibers from the payload through the tamper sensing mesh to the outside
+    world. Our design is low-cost, scales to dozens of optical fibers and allows the joint pass-through of electrical
+    connections.
 \end{abstract}
 
 \section{Introduction}
@@ -140,7 +141,9 @@ sheds spread across sparsely populated areas against adversaries with advanced p
 daunting task. Effectively, each quantum relay has to be made into a hardware security module including advanced
 including active tamper sensing.
 
-\section{Inertial Hardware Security Modules}
+\section{Related Work}
+
+\subsection{Inertial Hardware Security Modules}
 
 As of now, QKD nodes are large, rack-mount devices. While miniaturization is ongoing, the processing requirements of
 such systems alone exceed the capabilities of conventional hardware security modules. With a conventional hardware
@@ -181,7 +184,11 @@ Where in conventional HSMs covering larger areas with a patchwork of smaller mes
 creating secure seams between the foils, in IHSMs, multiple PCB meshes can easily be joint into a larger mesh by simply
 overlapping them, since the mesh's rotation makes any attack on such a joint exceedingly difficult.
 
-\section{Related Work}
+\subsection{Customizable tamper sensing HSMs}
+
+\subsection{Optical slip rings}
+
+\subsection{Long-range QKD}
 
 \section{QKD in an IHSM}
 
@@ -198,14 +205,10 @@ observe the fiber's minimum bending radius, which for common fibers is usually i
 
 \section{Multi-fiber passthrough with active secondary mesh}
 
-\textcite{gotteCantTouchThis2022} list some \emph{shielding} methods that use a independently rotating secondary
-mesh on the inside of the primary mesh, located right next to the primary mesh's axis opening. In this section, we will
-go into some more detail on four variations of this solution. In order of increasing complexity, these variations are a
-simple disc cover, coaxial labyrinth meshes, offset labyrinth meshes, and interlocking gear meshes. We will demonstrate
-a functional prototype of the simple disc cover, present a design and mechanical prototypes of the offset labyrinth
-meshes, and provide details on the design of a interlocking gear mesh.
-
-\subsection{Simple disc cover}
+\textcite{gotteCantTouchThis2022} list some \emph{shielding} methods that use a independently rotating secondary tamper
+sensing mesh on the inside of the primary mesh, located right next to the primary mesh's axis opening. In this paper, we
+present three variations of an IHSM optical fiber pass through: A simple disc cover, offset labyrinth meshes, and
+interlocking gear meshes. \subsection{Simple disc cover}
 
 \begin{figure}[h!]
     \centering